The Decline of African-Americans in Major League Baseball: Statistics and Explanations

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Decline of African-Americans in Major League Baseball: Statistics andExplanations

Al Figone

Introduction

More than six decades after Jackie Robinson integrated Major League Baseball (MLB), Commissioner Bud Selig announced the formation of a seventeen member task force in April, 2013 to study the comparative percentage decline of African-Americans. Since the baseball, advertising, and mass media industries are reporting unparelled profits, cynics are puzzled as to why MLB has chosen an issue to study that exists in all American sports except professional and college football and basketball.

Baseball historians have been puzzled and unable to explain the gambling corruption that began when the game was played for moneyfollowing the Civil War. Beginning with the Louisville Scandal of1877, rumors alleging the fixing of the 1905, 1913, and 1918 World Series appeared with regularity.1 MLB’s innocence was lost in 1919 when that World Series was played for gamblers. The hiring in 1920 of conservative federal judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis by owners seeking to regain the public’s trust because of the gambling shenanigans accomplished two important milestones for baseball: 1) it ended the open fixing of games in the major leagues—at least no games were reported fixed in MLB during Landis’ tenure, but the rigging did continue in the minors until the 1970’s; and 2) ensured the exclusion of African-Americans in MLB would continue until after his death in 1944.2

The National League’s (NL’s) Bylaws in 1876 (the first MLB baseball league) did not include Jim Crow stipulations that African-Americans could not play in the game. To include such a clause would have been a violation of the 14th Amendment (i.e. equal protection laws). In fact, before 1900, fifty five black players had played in organized baseball (i.e. loosely defined minors). Asreported, by Regan and Zang, Moses Fleetwood Walker and his brotherWelday were the only two MLB players before Robinson to play MLB.Both played in the American Association in 1884—then recognized as a major league and the forerunner of the American League (AL).3

The reactions of white players toward blacks in organized baseball before 1890 were virulent and included the introduction

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of the feet first or bent-leg slide to injure African-Americans playing second base or shortstop.4 Moses Walker’s experiences in and out of baseball prompted the intellectual to write a book in 1893 titled: Our Home Colony: A treatise on the past, present, and future of the Negro race in America. Walker’s contention was that members of African-American society would never find social, economic, and political justice in America and suggested black people might find these equalities in Africa.5

Until the signing of Jackie Robinson in 1946, baseball’s unwritten law was not to sign blacks. The economic rationale for the implementation of this practice was that the mixing of races in MLB would reduce attendance and negatively influence owner profits. Biologically and politically, the belief espoused by themedical profession and political leaders was that interracial relationships would create a mentally and physically weaker society. Ill-informed scientists unable to explain the black race’s evolutionary development and color differences conveniently referred to African-Americans as evolutionary cripples during the 19th century.6

Statistics and Analyses

MLB has known that the percentage African-Americans began to decline in 1987 (see page 3) from a high of 18.7 in 1981 (see page 4).7 The all-time low was recorded in 2009 at 7.1%. Latino rates were the highest that same year at 28.5% (see page 4). The Asian high of 2.3% was recorded in 2008.8

African-American players have been most highly represented as outfielders where the rate since 1967 had hovered over 40% until 1999 (see page 8).9 Since that year, African-Americans have dropped below 30% in the outfield while Latinos remained consistently at 20% for the past 20 years.

African-Americans have represented over 6% of the overall total of pitchers at various points in time since 1947. Today, over 50%of MLB rosters consist of pitchers because of specialization (i.e. starter, middle reliever, set-up pitcher, closer, etc. (seepage 6). A factor contributing to the decline of African-Americans in all positions was that in 2012, there were 10 times as many Latino as African-American pitchers. In 2012, the percentage of African-American and Asian pitchers was identical at about 2% (see page 6).10

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For catchers, the last African-American was Charles Johnson in 2005 (see page 7). Latinos in 2012 have almost achieved parity atthis position with whites (see page 7). In a typical 25 man roster, African-Americans are competing for 10 or 11 slots as the14 or 15 catcher and pitcher spots are overwhelmingly filled by Whites and Latinos11

Fifty-percent (50%) of the middle infielder positions were filledby Latinos from 2000 to 2006 (see page 7). African-Americans from1970 to 2000, represented 15%-30% of the corner position players.Since 2001, Latinos have represented four times as many players as African-Americans at these two positions (see page 8).12

Table: 1 Baseball Demographics: 1947-2012 13

Year White African-Americans Latino Asian

1947 98.3% 0.9% 0.7% 0.0%

1948 98.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.0%

1949 96.6% 1.5% 1.9% 0.0%

1950 95.3% 1.7% 3.0% 0.0%

1951 94.3% 2.9% 2.8% 0.0%

1952 94.4% 2.9% 2.7% 0.0%

1953 93.3% 3.7% 3.0% 0.0%

1954 90.7% 5.6% 3.7% 0.0%

1955 89.8% 5.2% 5.0% 0.0%

1956 88.2% 6.7% 5.1% 0.0%

1957 88.1% 6.7% 5.2% 0.0%

1958 86.7% 7.4% 5.9% 0.0%

1959 84.8% 8.8% 6.5% 0.0%

1960 82.3% 8.9% 8.9% 0.0%

1961 82.6% 9.7% 7.7% 0.0%

1962 81.9% 10.1% 8.0% 0.0%

1963 80.1% 11.7% 8.2% 0.0%

1964 79.3% 11.7% 8.9% 0.1%

1965 78.3% 12.7% 8.8% 0.1%

1966 76.9% 13.4% 9.7% 0.0%

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1967 75.6% 13.6% 10.7% 0.0%

1968 73.8% 15.4% 10.8% 0.0%

1969 74.4% 14.5% 11.1% 0.0%

1970 73.7% 14.6% 11.7% 0.0%

1971 73.9% 15.5% 10.6% 0.0%

1972 72.9% 16.1% 10.9% 0.0%

1973 71.6% 17.4% 11.0% 0.0%

1974 71.1% 17.4% 11.5% 0.0%

1975 71.3% 18.5% 10.2% 0.0%

1976 70.5% 18.0% 11.5% 0.0%

1977 70.7% 17.9% 11.4% 0.0%

1978 71.3% 17.4% 11.3% 0.0%

1979 71.4% 17.9% 10.7% 0.0%

1980 71.1% 17.4% 11.6% 0.0%

1981 70.1% 18.7% 11.1% 0.0%

1982 70.4% 17.9% 11.7% 0.0%

1983 70.3% 18.0% 11.6% 0.0%

1984 69.6% 18.4% 12.0% 0.0%

1985 70.3% 18.3% 11.3% 0.0%

1986 70.0% 18.3% 11.8% 0.0%

1987 69.9% 17.7% 12.3% 0.0%

1988 68.2% 17.3% 14.5% 0.0%

1989 70.3% 16.5% 13.2% 0.0%

1990 68.6% 16.6% 14.8% 0.0%

1991 66.8% 17.0% 16.1% 0.1%

1992 67.7% 16.7% 15.6% 0.0%

1993 66.3% 16.8% 16.9% 0.0%

1994 65.0% 17.2% 17.8% 0.1%

1995 64.5% 16.1% 19.2% 0.2%

1996 63.2% 16.0% 20.4% 0.4%

1997 60.9% 15.0% 23.5% 0.5%

1998 62.0% 14.3% 22.8% 0.8%

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1999 61.7% 13.6% 23.5% 1.2%

2000 61.2% 12.8% 24.7% 1.3%

2001 60.7% 12.1% 26.0% 1.2%

2002 60.8% 10.8% 26.5% 1.9%

2003 61.0% 10.4% 26.8% 1.8%

2004 60.3% 10.1% 27.7% 1.8%

2005 60.9% 9.1% 27.8% 2.3%

2006 61.3% 9.0% 27.8% 1.9%

2007 63.1% 8.5% 26.1% 2.2%

2008 62.1% 8.2% 27.3% 2.3%

2009 62.2% 7.1% 28.5% 2.1%

2010 63.0% 7.8% 27.2% 1.9%

2011 63.5% 7.9% 26.9% 1.7%

2012 63.9% 7.2% 26.9% 1.9%

Baseball Demographics: Graphs

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Conclusions

The reasons for the decline of African-Americans argue for systematic research by individuals that are unconnected to MLB. Reasoned speculation by anyone involved in MLB will in all probability result in answers, solutions, and actions that reflect MLB’s bottom line--Money. If MLB and college baseball aretruly concerned about reforming their internal structures and expect the American public’s financial support, they must be willing to illustrate their genuine respect for social accountability and conduct their businesses under the cover of anti-trust laws.

Questions To Investigate

In my opinion, any study of the declining rates of Africans-Americans in baseball should address the following questions:

A.Why has baseball assumed the credit for the integration of mostsports when it was neither the first nor the most successful to integrate African Americans?

B. Have commercialized college football and basketball programs contributed to the decline of African-Americans in MLB?

C. Has youth sports’ transformation into a billion dollar industry affected African-American parental influence involving their children’s initial entry into sports?

D. Is the cartel-based baseball business related to the decline of African-Americans in MLB?

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Responses and Sources

A: Integration

Technically, horse racing and boxing were the first sports to integrate in this country. For this question, basketball at the professional level was the first sport to fully integrate in the 1930’s. In 1942, twelve black players integrated the National Basketball League (NBL); the forerunner of the National Basketball Association (NBA) formed in 1946. Other professional teams such as the Toledo White Huts, Sheboygan Art Imigs, and Syracuse Reds were integrated even earlier.

The White Huts, for example defeated Sheboygan Reds and the Chicago Bruins in the 1941 World Professional Basketball Tournament, finishing fourth overall in a field of sixteen. The Reds later joined the NBL. The racially inclusive invitation onlyWorld Professional Basketball Tournament’s inaugural year was 1939. Professional basketball’s twelve best professional teams including two all-black teams—the New York Rens and Harlem Globetrotters were featured in this event. The 1939, 1940, and 1943 tournaments were won by black teams.14

Jackie Robinson, after leading the southern division of the Pacific Coast Conference (PCC) in scoring in 1940 and 1941 at UCLA played in an integrated professional basketball league.15In 1946, he signed with the Los Angeles Red Devils who were seeking to join the NBA playing their games at the Olympic Auditorium in the city of Angels’ downtown. Most sport historians and contemporaries of Robinson (i.e. teammates, opponents, coaches, and spectators) believed he could have succeeded as a professional basketball or football player.

Note his vertical jump and hand in relation to the rim in the photo on page seventeen as he could easily dunk the ball. In a side note and illustrating that racism was not a Southern tradition, Robinson was selected to the Second All Southern Division PCC Team in 1941 even though he was the leading scorer in the division.

Of the many sports played in the 19th century in the United States, except for boxing, one could hardly find a sport that involved the close interaction and contact with players than basketball. This fact reveals much about why baseball was almost the last sport to integrate in America. Some baseball and sport historians have written that professional basketball delayed

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integration as it waited for the fans’ reactions to the Robinson Experiment16 This is revisionist history, inaccurate, and naïve.

The forerunners to the (NBA) ----namely, the NBL and Basketball Association of America (BAA) delayed integration despite the large crowds that attended contests between all black and white teams for one reason: Money.17 Professional basketball had struggled financially, lacked stability, and played many doubleheaders featuring Abe Saperstein’s Harlem Globetrotters in the first game drawing record crowds. The diminutive owner threatened to shut down the doubleheaders if professional teams signed black players. New York Knicks’ owner Ned Irish threatenedto pull out of the NBA if the other owners did not begin standingup to Saperstein and sign African-Americans.18 Unlike baseball, the increased signing of blacks such as USF’s Bill Russell and K.C. Jones (both with Boston Celtics), and Nat Sweetwater Clifton (New York Knicks) in the early and mid-1950’s quickly integrated the NBA and it never looked back. The appearance of African-Americans converted the professional league into a profitable enterprise (i.e. Russell-Chamberlain match-ups). MLB’s troubled history with integration speaks more to crafting an image insteaddeeds.

B: Commercialized College Sport

Commercialized college football players (Bowl Championship Series) level and Division One basketball players represent one percent of all NCAA athletes and receive ninety eight percent of the publicity Yet, they are involved in the same percentage of all National College Athletic Association (NCAA) infractions and criminal law violations.19Football programs are allowed eighty five full scholarships, basketball fifteen, and baseball eleven point seven (11.7). Football programs don’t need eighty five scholarships as the professionals carry a maximum of forty four players on their rosters, Baseball programs need more than their allotment. These figures affect MLB in two ways

1. Seventy percent of the MLB draftees are from the two and four-year colleges. Almost all two and four-year college baseball players have to pay most or all of their costs because very few high school or junior college players receive financial assistance through baseball.20 Most African Americans drafted outof high school or two -year colleges sign professional contracts.

2. Ninety nine percent of televised college sports involve football and basketball. African-Americans and all other

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ethnicities associate these two sports with big-time colleges in America. Assuredly, young athletes audiences’ exposure to collegeathletes from these sports including their portrayal as spectacles (i.e. pre and post-game shows, sideline histrionics, women cheerleaders, and selected spectators shots) sends a false but believable message to targeted audiences (i.e. Football is King).21

C: Youth Sport Industry

If I wanted to illustrate a sport development in the last twenty five years that has absolutely no redeeming value, I would have to travel no further than to the commercialized youth sports industry. This five billion dollar industry includes: traveling thousands of miles by parents, athletes, and coaches to compete against similarly-aged athletes, the renting of talented players to another team located as far three thousand miles from athletes’ homes, injuries from overuse and poor techniques, and aserious lack of instruction.22 And, the competition is unregulated by local, state, or federal governments.

The underlying motive for the industry assumes that youngsters atthe same age in distant locales must be more skilled or competentthan their cohorts in other parts of the country. There is no evidence supporting significant differences in similar skill levels based on geographical regions.23 Competing against teams close to one’s residence has not been proven to be less valuable.24(i.e. Texas and Florida do not raise better baseball players than California).

Paying the bills for the traveling, lodging, participation, coaching, facility construction and maintenance and equipment arethe parents and talent scouts looking for prospects as young as eight that can be groomed and ultimately delivered to a college coach (i.e. football and basketball) for money (i.e. finder’s fee).

Unfortunately, salesmanship has trumped scientific research in determining the best way to train youngsters for later sport competition without compromising their academic development. Manyhigh school coaches can only sit on the sidelines as many athletes chose travel ball over high school competition25. In many cases an in-season athlete will abandon teammates and a team for the opportunity to participate in showcase events for college coaches or professional scouts.26

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Since the socio-economic status of African American families on average is significantly lower than whites, youth and travel sports are virtually closed to them.27 This leads to clustering in the areas that are less affluent that places most under-privileged children in programs that are underfunded, not fully staffed, and are perceived as inferior by the participants leading to disinterest and drop out.

Exposure to a healthy family, academic, and sport environment foryoungsters is critical.28 And, that does not require pursuing elitist-based programs. How many potentially successful African American baseball players are lost because of the money-based youth sport industry in America?

D. Cartel Structure of the Baseball Business

The integration of MLB baseball in 1947 was controversial, not supported by fourteen of the sixteen MLB owners, and mythologizedby sportswriters. An objective understanding of this event was presented by the late San Francisco State historian Jules Tygiel in: Baseball’s Great Experiment: Jackie Robinson And His Legacy published in 1983. Until that date, most of the writings about integration were hyperbolized by sportswriters inflating the roles of Robinson, MLB, and Branch Rickey

To be sure, Robinson, Don Bankhead (Dodgers, Larry Doby, (Cleveland), Hank Thompson and Willard Brown (both on the St. Louis Browns) endured vicious racist behaviors from teammates, spectators, managers, coaches, and baseball management during the1947 season.29 Of the five, only Robinson was a success. The failure of the other four reinforced the caution and conservatismof the other 14 owners. Except for Robinson, integration at the end of the 1947 season had reached a standstill.

Baseball owners for years had cited the lack of African-American players in the minor leagues as the reason for segregation in thelate 1940’s. The argument was flawed and disingenuous. Major league clubs dictated minor league policies as most of them had working agreements with several hundred franchises in the more than fifty leagues.30 In the minors, four blacks were in the Dodger chain and six played for the independent Stamford, CT teamin the Colonial League in 1947. Other than Brooklyn, the Browns were the only other franchise to sign and assign a black prospectto their farm system until the mid-1950’s.

I am a man of substance, flesh, and bone, fiber and liquids---

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and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me31

lamented the black protagonist in Ralph Ellison’s novel, Invisible Man. The book won a National Book Award in 1952 and portrayed the plight of most African-Americans in the 1950’s. The small percentage that had been signed by major league organizations from the Negro leagues and directly out of high school or collegewere assigned to minor league cities throughout the country. Formost, their experiences included: racial taunts such as Sambo, Chocolate drop, and Snowball, refusal of service in restaurants, inferior living accommodations, physical threats, expectations ofsuperior performance because of black stereotypes (i.e. image of blacks as natural athletes), boos because of lesser performance, and similar instances of de facto segregation. Young Johnny Roseboroof the Dodgers playing in Sheboygan, WI wrote a letter to his parents: There isn’t a nigger in Sheboygan. Send your clippers to me. The peckers don’t know how to cut a nigger’s hair. 32Racism was as common in the Midwest, North, and West as it was in the South. Most Americans had never seen an African-American on a baseball field.

During the 1950’s, baseball experienced an epidemic of beanballs and a heightened number of injuries and hospitalizations of blackplayers. Despite these obstacles, African-Americans appeared regularly among the league leaders wherever they played. Robinson’s ordeal in 1947 and nine years thereafter occurred amidst a lot of publicity and fanfare. The trials and tribulations of many blacks who followed him playing in the rest of America where racism had not been exposed and remained unyielding as a daily reality of life for African-Americans, has rarely been acknowledged. African-American scholars, legal practitioners, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) who spoke out against these blatant violations of the 14th Amendment did not move the MLB owners to act.33.

Oakland’s Curt Flood was assigned to Savanna in Georgia and had to live in a junior high school gym. Richie Allen regularly heardvocal threats to his life playing in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957.34 Unaware of the city’s public defiance to integrate their schools because of the 1954 Supreme Court decision (i.e. Brown v.Topeka Board of Education), Allen’s MLB parent team assigned him to a city which had never seen a black play with whites. In

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Sacramento, Oakland’s Artie Wilson reported he could expect his own personal heckler.35

In 1954, twelve of the sixteen teams fielded blacks. The holdoutsincluded the Yankees, Red Sox, Tigers, and Phillies. Some owners such as Fred Saigh of the Cardinals (i.e. 1947-1953), the Tigers’Walter Briggs, and Tom Yawkey of the Red Sox openly defied integration---at least covertly as their public pronouncements did not square with their roster’s lack of minority players.36

In 1957, the Phillies signed African-American John Kennedy two years after Elston Howard joined the Yankees. Yet, until the death of Briggsand with the threat of a fan boycott, only then did the Tigers finallyintegrate in 1958 signing Ossie Virgil, Sr. The Red Sox followed in July, 1959 when El Cerrito (CA) High’s Elijah Pumpsie Green was promotedto the big team.37 Numerically at least, MLB had integrated 12 years after Robinsonwith deliberate speed. Some organizations such as the Giants, Dodgers, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and White Sox instructed their scouts to pursueAfrican-Americans and Latinos. But, for the other eleven teams, the signing of blacks was a gesture of tokenism.38

The majority of Pacific Coast League (PCL) teams from 1946 to 1955 remained unaffiliated with MLB. Hence, players could play in the league for two or three years and then sold to a MLB team. Under a national agreement between MLB and the PCL, the league’s best players could be drafted and sold to MLB for a small fixed price after a season ended.39 Every International League and American Association franchises were MLB farm clubs and could lose their best players if the parent club chose to promote them during a season. Fans in the PCLwere assured of a pennant race as the league’s players were not owned by a MLB club.40 In 1948 through 1950 PCL African-Americans John Richie, Minnie Minoso, Artie Wilson, and Al Smith signed with the San Diego Padres who were affiliated with Bill Veeck’s Cleveland Indians.41

Most importantly, integration in the PCL proceeded without the publicity, turbulence, and fear that characterized Robinson’s 1947 MLBdebut season. By all accounts, integration in the PCL and minor leagues especially in the North was relatively uneventful.

And, why has MLB operated its business unfettered and in many cases in violation of anti-trust and equal protection laws? Understanding this question and answer also tells us much about the decline of African Americans in all levels of baseball.

From its beginnings in the late 19th century until today, MLB has conducted its business as one of the most stable and profitable professional sports league in the world. It has enjoyed immunity from congressional and government oversight since the 1922 tortured interpretation by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Oliver Wendell Holmes of anti-trust law.42 Professional football and to a

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lesser extent basketball, hockey, and tennis had reached the economic status of MLB in the early 1980’s because of television contracts. But, all of these sports operate under the cover of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. MLB does not.43

The Federal League in 1922 had brought a cause of action to court alleging MLB had violated the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act causing their demise as a third major league. Speaking for the unanimous court, Justice Holmes ruled that baseball was intrastate not interstate commerce.44

Then and now, the franchises have been established in different statesto generate interstate rivalries and fan loyalties. Players and spectators cross state lines to conduct and attend public exhibitions.Broadcasts and news coverage promoting fan attendance and television viewing are interstate endeavors. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have ruled that theatrical performances, boxing, professional football, and basketball are subject to the Sherman Act.

In professional baseball, monopolization allows competitors to collidefor mutual benefit. MLB makes arrangements on matters such as: schedules, ticket prices, promotions, expansion, media contracts, and employment practices to the exclusion of governmental oversight.45 Competitive bidding among teams for players is controlled through player drafts (i.e. signing Latinos for exorbitant prices), contracts, and trades.Competition among franchises is restricted by limiting the number of teams in specific areas. Add the public subsidies including: construction of stadiums, the infrastructures surrounding stadiums, law enforcement needed for events, favorable income tax rates, inflated concession prizes, and other amenities, and we can safely assert that MLB owners are treated by the public as reverse Robin Hoods.46

African-Americans who had reached MLB by the 1960 soon were confronted with extant Jim Crow laws in Spring Training. Adopting a stance of accommodation because the franchises were allowed the use thefacilities at almost no cost; they chose to stay in Florida.47 The exceptions were: Cleveland in Tucson, New York Giants in Phoenix, the Boston Red Sox in Scottsdale, and Cubs in Mesa (Yankees had briefly moved to Phoenix in the late 1940’s). By 1963, almost every black player was embittered by the Florida conditions.48

The employment practices that adversely affected African-Americans included: jobs in coaching, managing, scouting, umpiring, and executive positions (i.e. Campanis, April 6, 1987, Nightline), disproportionate release of non-starters, and unequal income for performance and commercial opportunities. 49

In recent years, MLB’s fabricated anti-trust exemption has grown more preposterous. This same scenario is now being played out in the San Francisco Bay Area as the Athletics have sought in recent years to

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build a new stadium and relocate to Santa Clara (about thirty minutes from their present location). The San Francisco Giants claiming territorial rights to the South Bay Area have consistently blocked theA’s movement.

In early April 2013, Federal Judge Ronald M Whyte dismissed the city of San Jose lawsuit against the MLB involving Oakland’s relocation to Santa Clara County. Citing the lack of legal standing by the city because anti-trust laws barring monopolies don’t apply to MLB, the judge also agreed baseball’s anti-trust exemption is an aberration. 50. Whyte also suggested it’s the Supreme Court’s job to change it.51

MLB’s owners and the Commissioner’s Office in a secret deal cheated the Washington Nationals of their television rights through a deal with Baltimore owner Pete Angelos 52The Orioles’ owner for years deprived the nation’s capital of an MLB franchise to protect his business from nearby interstate competition to inflate the value of his franchise53Angelos lost the relocation battle but won the financialwar by obtaining monopolistic control over the Nationals’ television.

MLB owners secretly acquiesced to Angelos’ ultimatum that the new teambe forced to become a minority partner in a regional sports network created in 2004—the Mid-Atlantic Sports Network (MASN) that owns broadcast rights for both the Orioles and Nationals.54 Ninety percent of MASN is owned by Angelos. Baltimore's broadcast rights are substantially inferior to Washington’s. The national capital features more than twice the number of television sets and twice the per capitaincome of Baltimore and is the eighth largest media market. Baltimore is 23rd.

The unregulated business of MLB has allowed owners to operate since the latter part of the 19th century almost to the exclusion of anti-trust law. To maximize profits, owners and sportswriters hid the fixing of games from the public for at least 50 years, unilaterally refined the reserve clause to control salaries, excluded African-Americans from non-playing positions, and have winked an eye at various discriminatory practices. 55 Ignoring the commercial reality of the baseball business, the high court gave MLB a pass in Flood v. Kuhn (i.e. challenging the constitutionality of the reserve clause).56However in 1998, Congress passed the Curt Flood Law eliminating the reserve clause.57

This has been baseball business pure and simple and the reality for many blacks in the game. If an African-American has chosen to employ his first amendment rights and truly speak out about racism in professional sports as have boxer Jack Johnson, Bill Russell, Jackie Robinson, Bob Gibson, Curt Flood, Jim Brown (Cleveland halfback), and Paul Robeson (Princeton football All-American who spoke to owners about integration in 1944), and others, the door to The Room where

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jobs in professional sports are awarded has been closed to them. Evenin the 21st century.

.

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Jackie Robinson, whose pro basketball debut on anintegrated team

pre-dated his breakthrough with the Brooklyn Dodgers.

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1End Notes Eliot Asinof, Eight Men Out: The Black Sox and the 1919 World Series. San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963, Sean Devaney, The Original Curse: Did The Cubs Throw The 1918 World Series To Babe Ruth’s Boston Red Sox And Incite The Black Sox Scandal? New York: McGraw Hill, 2010. 2 Charles E. Ginsberg, The Fix Is In: A History of Baseball Gambling and Game Fixing Scandals. Jefferson, NC: McFarland Co., 1995.3 Barry Regan, Moses Fleetwood Walker: The Forgotten Man Who Actually Integrated Baseball, 16 April 2012. Available at: www.bleacherreport.com/articles/1147947-moses-fleetwood-walker-the-forgotten-man-who-actually-integrated-baseball. Accessed 26 October 2013, David W. Zang, Fleet Walker’s Divided Heart: The Life of Baseball’s First Black Major Leaguer. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, Press, 1995.4 Al Figone & Karren, Judy, Special Report: Is Head First Sliding More Dangerous? Collegiate Baseball, 20 April 2012.5 Moses Fleetwood Walker, Our Home Colony: A treatise on the past, present, and future of the Negro race in America, P.E. Regier, 2nd Edition, 1893, Zang, Fleet Walker’s Divided Heart. 6 Jay Coakley, Sport in Society: Issues & Controversies. Boston: McGraw Hill, 2001, 242-2767 Mark Armour & Levit, Dan. Baseball Demographics, 1947-2012-SABR. Available at:www.Sabr.org/bioproj/topic/baseball-demographics-1947-2012. Accessed: 25 October 2013.8 Ibid.9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 Ibid.14 Ibid.15 Black Fives Foundation, Was Baseball Integration Leader? Or Basketball? In: History, Motivation, Race. 3 June 2008. Available at:www.blackfives.org/baseball-integration-leader-orbasketball/ . Accessed 25 October 2013.16 Black Fives Foundation, Was Baseball Integration Leader? 17 Ibid.18 Ibid.19 Roger Noll, The business of college sports and the high costs of winning. Milken Institute Review, 1 24 April 1999, 24-37. 20 Chris Isodore, Green behind decline of blacks in baseball. 13 April 2007, CNN Money. Available at:www.money.cnn.com/2007/04/13/commentary/sportsbiz/. Accessed 28 October 2013.21 Michael Oriard, King Football: Sport & Spectacle In The Golden Age Of Radio & Newsreels, Movies & Magazines, The Weekly & The Daily Press. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 22 Coakley, Sport and Society, 109-13423 B.R. Cahill, and Pearl, A.J., Intensive Participation in Children’s Sports. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1993.24 Ibid.25 Coakley, Sport in Society, 417-435.26 Mike Wagner, et. al. Children may be vulnerable in $5 billion dollar youth-sports industry, Dispatch Analysis, 29 August 2010.

Available at: www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local2010/08/29/chldren-may-be-vulnerable-in5-billion-youth-sports-industry.html. Accessed 28 October 2013. 27 Ibid.28 Bill Russell and Branch, Taylor, Second Wind: Memoirs of an Opinionated Man. New York: Random House, 1979.29 Jules Tygiel, Baseball’s Great Experiment: Jackie Robinson And His Legacy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, 211-226. Jackie Robinson as told to Alan Duckett, An Autobiography Of Jackie Robinson: I Never Had It Made. New York: Harper Collins, 1995.30 Ibid. 222-22331 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man. London: Random House (Vintage Books), 2nd Edition, 1995, 49. 32 Quoted in Tygiel, Baseball’s Great Experiment, 252-253. 33 Gerald W. Scully, The Business Of Major League Baseball. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.34 Ibid. 246-264.35 Ibid., 254.36 Tygiel, Baseball’s Great Experiment, 37 Tygiel, Baseball’s Great Experiment, 38 Arnold Rampersad, Jackie Robinson: A Biography. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1997, 310-348, Dennis Snelling, The Greatest Minor League, A History of the Pacific Coast League, 1903-1957. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 225-24439 Ibid. 310-34940 Ibid. 310-34941 Ibid, 310-34942 Ibid, 257-284. 43 Ibid, 300-32744 Bruce Fein, Baseball’s Privileged Anti-Trust Exemption, DC BAR, October 2005, Available at: www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washintgon_lawyer/October_2005/stand.cfm. Accessed 27 October 2013, 190.45 Ibid. 190.46 Rodney D. Fort, Sports Economics, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2003, 232-240. 47 Benjamin G. Rader, American Sports: From The Age of Folk Games to The Age Of Televised Sports.Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2004, 62-66.48 Tygiel, Baseball’s Great Experiment, 49 John Woolfolk, Judge questions San Jose lawsuit against MLB over A’s move. San Jose Mercury News, 4 October 2013. Available at:http://www.mercurynews.com. Accessed 29, November 201350 Fein, Baseball’s Privileged Anti-Trust Exemption.51 Ibid.52 Ibid. 53 S. Jose’ claims against MLB denied, Associated Press, 11 October 2011. Available at:Espn.go.com/mlb/story/_id98009824/judge-rejects-san-jose-antitrust-claims-vs-mlb.Accessed 29 November 2013. 54 Ibid.55 San Jose Vows Action On A’s Move Despite Judge’s Split Ruling, CBS-5KPIX, 11 October 2013. Available at:

San Francisco.cbslocal.com/2013/10/11/split-ruling-on-mlb-motion-to-dismiss-san-jose-lawsuit-over-as-move/.56 Ibid, Curt Flood with Carter, Richard, The Way It Is. New York: Pocket Books, 1971, Brad Snyder, A Well-Paid Slave: Curt Flood’s Fight For Free Agency in Professional Sports, New York: Penguin, 2007, Robert Michael Goldman, One Man Out: Curt Flood Versus Baseball (Landmark Law Cases and American Society), Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008, Stuart Weiss, The Curt Flood Story: The Man Behind The Myth (Sport and Culture Series), Columbia: Universityof Missouri Press, 2007, Bill Russell and Taylor Branch, Second Wind, Martin Doberman, Paul Robeson, New York: New Press, 199557 Ibid.

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