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Case 334
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISISUnited States Deliberations and
Negotiations
at the Edge of the Precipice
Gabrielle S. BrusselColumbia University
BACKGROUND
On Monday, October 22, 1962, after six days ofsecret U.S.
government deliberations, President JohnF. Kennedy announced on
television that the SovietUnion had placed offensive nuclear
missiles inCuba. The Soviets had staged a sealift to Cuba,which had
begun in July of that year and continuedover the next few months,
which constituted amajor military deployment involving more than
onehundred shiploads and containing several thousandvehicles and
more than twenty thousand men. U.S.policymakers interpreted these
actions as contradic-tions of explicit Soviet pledges and
statements thatSoviet aid to Cuba was defensive and would
remainso.
The United States employed political pressure onbilateral and
multilateral levels—through both for-mal and informal channels. It
also applied militarypressure while policymakers sought to resolve
thecrisis short of war. The United States succeeded inpresenting a
firm and resolved stance, but it stoppedshort of a bellicose
response. The administration,and particularly the president, was
not interested inbeginning a military confrontation with the
SovietUnion, but the United States was strongly commit-
ted to proving to its allies and adversaries that itcould meet
whatever it perceived as a threat to itsnational security and its
sphere of influence. Fur-thermore, since the Soviets had been
warnedagainst employing such a display of force, theadministration
wanted to prove it would back upstatements of policy with
actions.
Publicly the crisis lasted for six days—fromKennedy’s speech on
October 22 until the officialSoviet statement on October 28 that
the missiles inCuba would be dismantled and removed from theisland.
For U.S. policymakers, however, the crisisbegan on October 16 at
11:45 A.M. during the firstmeeting of the group of advisors that
becameknown as the ExComm.1 The group served the pres-ident almost
twenty-four hours a day as the UnitedStates managed the
situation.
When they were presented with the evidence ofthe missiles, U.S.
government officials were sur-prised and angered by the Soviet
deception.Kennedy personally assembled a politically diversegroup
of advisors comprising representatives of thepublic and private
sectors that he believed wouldcontribute to a successful
resolution. They were menhe depended on regardless of rank or
political affilia-tion, men he believed served their country and
hisadministration above all. They were recruitedregardless of
seniority, the criteria for their selectionbeing President
Kennedy’s assessment of their intel-ligence, judgment, and loyalty.
During the crisis thisadvisory group consisted of:
Copyright 1992, 1988 by Institute for the Study of
Diplomacy.ISBN: 1-56927-334-0Publications, Institute for the Study
of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C.20057–1025
http://data.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/
1
http://data.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/
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2222 Gabrielle S. Brussel Case 334
Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon
Secretary of State Dean Rusk (who was absent dur-ing a large
part of the deliberations)
Under Secretary of State George Ball
Soviet expert and Ambassador at Large Llewellyn “Tommy”
Thompson2
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric
General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
Assistant Secretary for International Security AffairPaul
Nitze
The Central Intelligence Agency membersincluded Deputy Director
Marshall Carter for thefirst day and Director John McCone, who
returned toWashington on October 16, thereafter. The
specialassistants/advisors to the president included:
McGeorge Bundy, advisor on national security affairs
Presidential Counsel Theodore “Ted” Sorenson
Kenneth O’Donnell
Other intermittent participants included:
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Edwin M.
Martin
Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, U.S. representative tthe United
Nations
USIA Deputy Director Donald Wilson
State Department Director of Intelligence and Research Roger
Hilsman
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who left the
deliberations after a naval quarantine was chosen as the U.S.
policy response but served as Kennedy’s personal emissary to France
and West Germany
Former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett
Wall Street lawyer and former High Commissioner of Germany John
McCloy
The ExComm was primarily divided into twocamps—the hawks and the
doves3—with the hawksadvocating a military confrontation and the
doves
stressing negotiation. The hawks included TaylorAcheson, the
Joint Chiefs (without U.S. Marine CorpsCommandant David Shoup),
McCloy, Nitze, and, ini-tially, Dillon and McCloy. The doves were
RobertKennedy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Ball, Thompson,Sorenson,
Stevenson and Lovett. The others wereindecisive, shifting their
opinions as the days woreon.
The president mandated, and his advisorsagreed, that the crisis
remain secret until the UnitedStates formulated a plan.
Consequently, to avoidleaks, the circle of people in government who
knewabout the crisis remained extremely tight. The groupmet almost
continuously for the two weeks of thecrisis. It broke up into
smaller groups for purposes ofanalysis and debates while experts
presented infor-mation, but the composition of the general
groupremained consistent.
The Soviets placed missiles on an island that theUnited States
had viewed as its backyard since thelate nineteenth century.
U.S.-Cuban relationsthough certainly strained by 1962, had been
closelytied for almost a hundred years. As far back as1808, U.S.
foreign policy and government officialshad viewed Cuban interests
“as their own.”Repeated offers to buy Cuba culminated in theOstend
Manifesto of 1854, which stated that theUnited States had the
“right” to acquire Cuba. LaterU.S. government officials asserted
that Cuba was“indispensable to the United States.”
On January 1, 1959, Cuban rebels took control ofthe government.
The United States officially recog-nized the new regime on January
7. Not long after,U.S.-Cuban relations began to deteriorate.
Tensionsincreased steadily, and the two nations went head-to-head
in public forums. Cuban Prime MinisterFidel Castro refused to back
the United-States in itsCold War with the Soviet Union. In April
1959, Presi-dent Dwight D. Eisenhower publicly refused to meetwith
Castro during his trip to the United States,instead leaving
Washington to play golf. By Decem-ber Castro had declared himself
and his revolutionCommunist and had received substantial
Sovietbacking. Soon the United States reduced trade withCuba and
refused to purchase sugar from Cubaabove world sugar prices. Cuba
increased its anti-American rhetoric. The Soviets began to
purchasesugar at premium prices, sent aid packages, andpromised to
“support the Cuban people with . . .rocket fire if aggressive
forces in the Pentagondare[d] to launch an intervention against
Cuba.”
Trade between the United States and Cuba dimin-ished quickly. In
1958 exports from the UnitedStates totaled 69.8 percent of Cuban
imports; by
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Case 334 The Cuban Missile Crisis 3333
1961 this figure was down to 3.7 percent. In con-trast, Soviet
imports from Cuba rose during thesame period from 0 to 48.2
percent. Trade withSoviet bloc countries accounted for 73.4 percent
ofCuba’s trade in 1961, while just three years earlier ithad been a
mere 2.5 percent. Tensions culminatedin expropriation of all U.S.
property in Cuba (1960–61) and the 1962 U.S. trade embargo. Further
exac-erbating the relationship was the 1961 Bay of Pigsepisode.
Supported by the CIA and personallyapproved by President Kennedy,
anti-Castro Cubanexiles attempted to invade Cuba. The
invasionfailed, and the U.S. government withdrew its air sup-port
of the exiles after they reached the island.Although Kennedy made a
public apology and theadministration pursued diplomatic
negotiations tosecure the release of captured exiles from
Cubanjails, the crisis contributed greatly to strained rela-tions.
Moreover, the Kennedy administrationemployed policies that had the
potential to causethe ouster or death of Fidel Castro. The
UnitedStates also encouraged the political and diplomaticisolation
of Cuba with the declaration by the Organi-zation of American
States (OAS) in January 1962that Cuba’s government was incompatible
with theinter-American system. These incidents and poli-cies
created an atmosphere of mistrust and misap-prehension, with the
Soviets and the Cubansexpecting an invasion and the United States
fearingincreased Soviet-Cuban ties and military build-ups
Cuba’s importance to the United States is a resultof its
geography and politics. it is ninety miles fromthe tip of Florida,
closer than Puerto Rico to thecoast of United States. It lies on
the Windward Pas-sage, the Straits of Florida, the Yucatan Channel,
andthe shipping lanes from the east coast of the UnitedStates. It
has direct access to the strategic sea lanesof South and Central
America, the Caribbean andthe Western allies of the United States.
Since itsearly role as a colony of Spain, Cuba’s proximity tothe
Caribbean sea lanes that carry trade to LatinAmerica has given it
strategic importance.
Cuba was the only communist country that had aU.S. naval base on
its territory. It was also the onlycountry that maintained both
Soviet and U.S. mili-tary installations and by which Soviet naval
vesselsfreely passed. Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, cover-ing
forty-five square miles, 1 percent of Cuban terri-tory, trains more
than 40,000 U.S. militarypersonnel every year. Built after the
Treaty of Paristhat ended the Spanish-American War, Guantánamowas
leased in perpetuity to the United States. TheCastro government has
long maintained that theagreement for the base is illegitimate
because the
governments were not “on equal footing” andbecause Cuba was
coerced into the contract by aforeign government. Many U.S.
government offi-cials and analysts feared that the Soviet
Unionwould request a U.S. withdrawal from Guantánamoin exchange for
the withdrawal of Soviet missilesfrom Cuba. This proposition was
never brought tothe negotiating table, and President Kennedy
main-tained during the ExComm deliberations that itwould be
rejected “out of hand.”
The Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba wentbeyond actual
military and strategic importance; itwas a modern, post-nuclear
affront to U.S. perceivedinterests dating back to the early
nineteenth cen-tury. On December 2, 1823, President James Mon-roe
delivered an address to Congress in which heasserted that the
United States viewed the WesternHemisphere as its sphere of
influence and that Euro-pean expansionism in the Western
Hemispherwould be regarded as “dangerous to [United States]peace
and safety.” The United States would respondin whatever manner was
necessary to protect itself.In May 1904 President Theodore
Roosevelt’s“Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrinerefined the
U.S. view of European expansionism byasserting that the United
States had the “right” tointervene in the Western Hemisphere and
Carib-bean. Thus, the United States has long consideredthe Western
Hemisphere a special region of influ-ence.
Although the Monroe Doctrine was originally di-rected at Western
European expansion, subsequentinterpretations were directed at the
Soviet Unionand the possibility of Soviet expansion in the
region.The 1962 decision to put missiles in Cuba madeCuba the first
Soviet ally to receive ballistic missiles.The United States viewed
this policy as a direct at-tack against its public and private
perceptions of re-gional influence and global balance. “Ever since
theMonroe Doctrine, the United States has perceived aspecial
interest in excluding European militarypower from the Western
Hemisphere. This was apowerful fact of [U.S.] political
consciousness. . . .4
President Kennedy intended to address the Sovietdecision
immediately and firmly. His administrationbelieved that the
missiles would affect global per-ceptions of U.S. strength and
resolve, causing alliesand adversaries to question U.S. ability and
commit-ment to global alliances. Furthermore, the missilesin Cuba
would threaten the global power structurethat the United States
sought to maintain.
The missile balance also contributed to uneasyrelations between
the United States and the SovietUnion. When Kennedy became
president, he
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4444 Gabrielle S. Brussel Case 334
received contradictory evidence and intelligence. Bylate summer
and certainly by fall 1961 the adminis-tration realized that Soviet
missile superiority, whichhad been a campaign issue in 1960, did
not exist—that the United States, in fact, was ahead. Kennedyand
his advisors discussed their options and decidedto inform the
Soviets that they knew the U.S. missilegap did not exist. In
October 1961 Deputy Secretaryof Defense Roswell Gilpatric was
selected to give aspeech disclosing U.S. armed strength and
reveal-ing that the missile gap was actually reversed—theSoviets
were at a military disadvantage, not theUnited States. The United
States briefed its allies,including allies who the United States
knew hadbeen penetrated by Soviet intelligence officers, inorder to
reinforce its position.
U.S. POLICY RESPONSE
The ExComm began by trying to understand whythe missiles were
deployed in Cuba. What couldKhrushchev hope to gain by such a
dangerous gam-ble? If the United States could understand the
moti-vations of the Soviets, it could better manage an endto the
crisis and communicate more effectively withthe opposition.
U.S. Deliberations
Dean Acheson told Charles de Gaulle that the Sovietsplaced
missiles in Cuba because they believed thatthey could get away with
it.5 The discussions aboutthe deployment went deeper than
Acheson’sanswer, however. At the first meetings of theExComm, the
advisors debated five hypotheticalanswers to the question of Soviet
motivation.
The first hypothesis was based on the SovietUnion’s strong
commitment to maintaining a posi-tion in Latin America and,
specifically, to supportingthe social and political revolution in
Cuba. It wasalready sending great amounts of aid to Cuba.Although
the United States had not continued itsplanned military and air
support during the actualinvasion of the Bay of Pigs, it had
sponsored aninvasion of Cuba less than two years before. TheSoviet
government saw an opportunity to defend afirm ally and decided to
take it.
Constant discussions were going on in Congressin the White
House, and in the Cuban exile commu-nity regarding invasion. On
September 4 PresidentKennedy stated that “. . . the Castro regime
will notbe allowed to export aggressive purposes by force orthe
threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever
means may be necessary from taking action againstany part of the
Western Hemisphere. . . .” Threedays later he asked Congress for
standby authorityto call up reserves. On September 13 Kennedy
reit-erated his stand against Cuba and the Castro regime“exporting
aggressive purposes by force or threat offorce” [emphasis added].
One week later Congresspassed a joint resolution on Cuba stating
that theUnited States would “prevent by whatever meansmay be
necessary, including the use of arms, theMarxist-Leninist regime in
Cuba from extending, bforce or the threat of force, its aggressive
or subver-sive activities to any part of this hemisphere.”
Although Kennedy and his administration repeat-edly declared
that the United States would notattempt additional military action
against Cuba, thebelligerent statements Kennedy made
throughoutSeptember 1962 did not persuade the Cuban andSoviet
governments that Cuba’s safety was ensured.Kennedy questioned
whether the U.S. mistake was“in not saying sometime before this
summer that ifthey do this we’re [going] to act.”6
The second hypothesis was that missiles in Cubawould alter the
geopolitical and psychological situa-tion, showing the world
unequivocally that theUnited States was unable to control its
sphere ofinfluence, the Western Hemisphere. These missileswould
tell U.S. allies that the United States could notstop Soviet
influence ninety miles off the coast ofFlorida, in a country that
had been a U.S. territoryand, for more than sixty years, a U.S.
satellite. Theperception that even the Western Hemisphere
wasunmanageable for the United States would have leadthe world to
ask: How could the United States beexpected to extend protection to
its allies all overthe world if it could not protect itself from
missilesin Cuba? The United States considered that even
thisquestion in the minds of allies or adversaries wouldhave
altered the global balance of power.
The third hypothesis raised the possibility thatthe missiles
were placed in Cuba simply to be re-moved. Rusk suggested that “Mr.
Khrushchev mayhave . . . known that [the United States does not]
re-ally live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the ex-tent that
. . . he has to live under fear of ours.”7 Themissiles could be
used as bargaining chips to securthe Soviet borders with Turkey or
traded to obtain amore positive settlement of the Berlin
arrangementfor the Soviets. If the United States made
militaryconcessions, it would diminish its prestige.
Sovietstatements suggested that they would “trade Cubafor Berlin”
support this hypothesis.8
The fourth hypothesis, advanced by Nitze andTaylor, was that the
missiles would, in fact, alter the
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Case 334 The Cuban Missile Crisis 5555
strategic strength of the Soviet Union with relativelylittle
cost. The Soviets knew that the missile gap didnot exist, but they
traded on the fact that the UnitedStates believed it to be true.
The newly announcedU.S. military superiority made them
vulnerable.Placing missiles in Cuba would help the Sovietschange
the balance of missile power. Bases in Cubafor Soviet medium-range
ballistic missiles and inter-mediate-range ballistic missiles
(MBRMs and IRBMs)were a quick and relatively inexpensive means
ofcutting the U.S. warning time. Although the UnitedStates would
still retain a 2-to-1 military superiorityover the Soviet Union,
the missiles in Cuba wouldsubstantially change the appearance of
that superi-ority. Kennedy noted later that “appearances
con-tribute to reality,” and the United States could illafford the
appearance of weakness or decreasingstrength.
The fifth hypothesis assumed that the Sovietswanted the United
States to discover the missilesand attack the island, thereby
splitting the allies andfueling anti-American sentiment through the
world.Questioning this theory, however, PresidentKennedy wondered
“if . . . any other time since theBerlin blockade . . . the
Russians [had] given [theUnited States] so clear provocation . . .
becausethey’ve been awfully cautious really.”9 DiscussingU.S.
policy options for response to the emplace-ment, Robert Kennedy
effectively argued that suchan attack would horrify the world. The
United Stateswas one of two superpowers in the world, he said;for
it to attack Cuba would “destroy” the “essence[of] our history and
our ideals.”10
The ExComm members discussed these five pos-sibilities at
length. In the end they decided that theanswers to the question
were the perceived balanceof military power and a basic testing of
Kennedy’swill. The missiles would embarrass the U.S. govern-ment
and demonstrate its inability to control itssphere of influence.
Furthermore, according to theU.S. advisors, the Soviets believed
that the risk theywere taking was not great. They were testing the
willof a young and relatively inexperienced administra-tion.
Khrushchev thought “Kennedy too young,intellectual, not prepared
well for decision-makingin crisis situations.”11
Soviet Motivations
The ExComm assessments were somewhat accu-rate, though they were
also bound by U.S. percep-tions of reality, which did not coincide
with Sovietand Cuban perceptions. The primary Soviet reasonsfor
deploying the missiles were to defend the Cuban
revolution and to deter a U.S. attack. ExComm poli-cymakers
immediately discounted this motivation.The United States knew it
did not intend to invadeCuba and believed it had communicated this
inten-tion to the Soviets and the Cubans. In fact, it hadnot. The
Soviets believed the United States thoughtit was in its interest to
launch a first strike againstCuba. “We had no doubt the United
States wouldrepeat the attack on Cuba after the Bay of Pigs.12
Furthermore, in the Soviet view, and most especiallyin
Khrushchev’s eyes, the loss of Cuba would “havebeen a terrible blow
to Marxism-Leninism,” dimin-ishing Soviet “stature throughout the
world, butespecially in Latin America.”13
The placement of missiles in Cuba was first dis-cussed in April
of 1962 between Anastas Mikoyan,Soviet first deputy premier and
special envoy toCuba at the end of the Cuban missile crisis,
andKhrushchev.14 Khrushchev continued personal dis-cussions with
advisors throughout the spring. ByJuly some Presidium (now called
Politburo) mem-bers were let in on the discussions with Cuba,
butthere was no written correspondence.15
Khrushchev believed estimates that a Soviet inva-sion of Cuba
would take “three or four days, a week,maybe,” and, therefore, “the
same time would beneeded for a U.S. invasion. [Since t]hat was not
longenough to defend against it, even by retaliatingsomewhere else
. . . [i]t was thought [to] deter aninvasion beforehand.”16 The
Cubans did not agreewith the Soviet defense assessment, asserting
thatthey had 270,000 armed and mobilized troops andcould fight an
invasion much longer than severaldays. In fact, this was double
McNamara’s 1962 esti-mate.17
The Soviets also believed that the missiles wouldrepair the
strategic imbalance in deliverable mis-siles.18 Deploying missiles
on the U.S. peripherywould establish Soviet strength, countering
the U.S.missiles posed on the Soviet borders.19 During his1959 U.S.
tour, Khrushchev asked, “How would [theUnited States] feel if there
were Soviet military basesin Mexico and Canada.”20 The ExComm
discussedthis on Tuesday, October 16. Rusk reminded the
pol-icymakers that McCone “suggested some weeks agothat one thing
Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind isthat . . . we don’t really live
under fear of his nuclearweapons to the extent, that . . . he has
to live underfear of ours. Also we have nuclear weapons nearby,in
Turkey and places like that.”21
Khrushchev maintained exactly that view: “Inaddition to
protecting Cuba, our missiles would haveequalized what the West
likes to call ‘the balance ofpower’ . . . now [the United States]
would learn just
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6666 Gabrielle S. Brussel Case 334
what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing atyou; we’d
be doing nothing more than giving thema little of their own
medicine.”22 Soviet officials latersaid that correcting the nuclear
balance was “impor-tant” to Khrushchev “because there were only
twothoughts: defend Cuba and repair the imbalance.But defending
Cuba was the first thought.”23
U.S. Response
On Tuesday, October 16, members of the ExCommassembled in the
White House Cabinet room fortheir first meeting. CIA analysts and
photo recon-naissance intelligence experts made a formal
pre-sentation. After the initial presentation of the
U-2photographs, the ExComm discussions turned to thesignificance of
the missiles. The men present in theroom had a wide range of
responses. PresidentKennedy was angered by the Soviet actions
andquite aware of the implications of such a ploy. Itwas, he said,
“an effort to materially change the bal-ance of power . . . a
deliberately provocative andunjustified change in the status
quo.”24
Although Kennedy’s advisors were not unani-mous about the U.S.
response, they agreed that thepolitical implications of the
missiles were seriousand that their emplacement was a deliberate
chal-lenge to U.S. prestige and influence. Even AdlaiStevenson,
whose relations with the president werestrained after the crisis25
and who encouraged non-military solutions, said, “No politician
could havemissed the significance of Russian missiles in Cuba.We
just had to get them out of there.”26
The advisors, however, were not in accord on theU.S. policy
response, nor were they all concernedwith the military consequences
of the Soviet actionsMRBMs and IRBMs were placed in four missiles
siteson the southern edge of Sierra del Rosario in westcentral
Cuba—Guanajay and Sagua la Grande (thave three battalions of MRBMs
each), and SanCristó bal and Remedios (to have two battalions
ofIRBMs each). In total there would be forty launchpads—San Cristó
bal and Sagua la Grande wouldeach have twelve, and Guanajay and
Remedioswould each have eight.
The weapons transfers were accomplished in twophases, with the
defensive weapons first and the of-fensive missiles and weapons
later. The plan in-cluded MRBMs with ranges up to 1,100
nauticalmiles; IRBMs with ranges up to 2,200 nautical miles;IL-28s
(Beagle bombers) with ranges of 600 nauticalmiles and the ability
to deliver nuclear or nonnu-clear payloads of 6,000 pounds;
surface-to-air mis-siles (SAMs) with the ability to strike at
targets at
altitudes of 80,000 feet and at a horizontal distanceof 30
nautical miles; Cruise missiles; KOMARguided-missile patrol boats;
and MiG-21 aircraft ca-pable of speeds up to 1,000 knots at 40,000
feet. So-viet technicians, operators, mechanics, and soldierssent
to the four installation points numbered morethan 20,000. The MRBMs
had an estimated ability tohit one-third of the United States,
including the Dis-trict of Columbia, St. Louis, and Dallas; Panama;
andall of Central America. The IRBMs stationed in Cubawere
estimated to be able to hit southeastern Can-ada, all of the United
States, Mexico, Central Amer-ica, Panama, and most of South
America.
The U.S. policy was not one that “came out of theblue”; it was
publicly and privately reiterated bymany advisors. From the
beginning McNamarmaintained that “a missile is a missile. It makes
nogreat difference whether you are killed by a missilefired from
the Soviet Union or from Cuba.”27 He didnot believe that the
Soviets were attempting to alterthe military balance. “The military
balance [has not]changed.”28 McNamara argued in favor of
limitedaction because it could be increased as the
situationwarranted it. At the 6:30 P.M. meeting on that firstday,
he urged the president to consider the conse-quences of an air
strike against Cuba, saying, “Theconsequences of these actions have
not beenthought through clearly.”29 He said further, “I don’tknow
quite what kind of a world we live in afterwe’ve struck Cuba, and .
. . we’ve started it . . . Afterwe’ve launched . . . sorties, what
kind of world dowe live in. . . . I think State and [Defense] ought
towork on the consequences of any one of thesecourses of actions,
consequences which I don’tbelieve are entirely clear.” 30
The options that the ExComm addressedincluded inaction, private
diplomatic advances, anexpression of outrage at the United Nations,
limitedmilitary action in the form of a blockade of Cuba,surgical
air strike against the island, and generalinvasion. The president
did not believe that the mis-siles changed the global military
balance, but he didbelieve that they had serious political
ramifications,and, consequently, the United States had to respondto
their emplacement. After months of reassur-ances against such an
action, the United Stateswould not tolerate a Soviet action carried
out in sucha deliberate and deceitful manner.31
Furthermore,missiles in the Western Hemisphere pointingdirectly at
the United States would not be judged inthe same manner as missiles
similarly targeted butlocated in the Soviet Union.
Kennedy believed that not addressing the Sovietactions would
have severe consequences in Soviet
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Case 334 The Cuban Missile Crisis 7777
military and political expansionism. He said,“[W]hen we said
we’re not going to and then theygo ahead and do it, and then we do
nothing, then . . .I would think that our risks increase. . . .
After allthis is a political struggle as much as military.”32
Soviet expert and newly appointed U.S. Ambassadorto France
Charles Bohlen attended the meetings onthe first two days. In a
memorandum to the presi-dent he noted that “no one can guarantee
that thiscan be achieved by diplomatic action—but it seemsto me
essential that this channel should be testedout before military
action is employed.”33 TheBohlen plan suggested sending a letter to
the Krem-lin before pursuing a military response. AlthoughSorenson
worked on composing such a letter forseveral days, he concluded
that it was impossible towrite a letter to Khrushchev “to which his
replycould not outmaneuver us.”34 Consequently, theBohlen plan as
such was rejected.
Diplomatic advances were not discounted com-pletely, although
they were not considered withoutother concurrent actions. They were
rejected out-right as a preliminary to U.S. actions.
Diplomaticnotes would provide the Soviets and the Cubanswith
warning time and would not change the U.S.position. A private
diplomatic approach would betime consuming, but the administration
feared thepossibility that nothing would be accomplished in apublic
forum. Furthermore, Kennedy and his advi-sors believed that they
had already on many occa-sions warned the Soviets against this type
of action.Bringing the issue to the U.N. Security Council alonewas
discounted because, as a permanent member,the Soviet Union had an
automatic veto and, ironi-cally, Soviet Ambassador Valerian I.
Zorin was serv-ing as the chairman of the Council.
Another alternative, which seemed especially at-tractive in
light of the possibility of disengaging theSoviet-Cuban alliance,
was to approach Castro di-rectly. The ExComm considered sending a
messagethat would highlight the problems for Castro. TheUnited
States saw it as “action [by] the Soviets . . .[which] threatened
[Castro] with attack from theUnited States, and . . . therefore the
overthrow ofthis regime.” The United States would point to
Sovietstatements suggesting the possibility of “bargaining”Soviet
“support [for Cuba] and these missiles,against concessions in
Berlin, and elsewhere, andtherefore . . . threatening to bargain
him away.”35
This approach was not rejected, but it was “setaside” for the
time being as Kennedy believed thisto be a U.S.-Soviet
confrontation and crisis. Sincethe weapons were Soviet-designed,
Soviet-built,Soviet constructed, and Soviet-controlled, he did
not
believe that addressing Castro on this issue wouldbe useful.
Approaching Castro would have affordedthe Soviets advance notice.
Furthermore, Castromight have responded defensively, thereby
forcing afaster or more difficult military confrontation if hehad
not perceived the approach to be genuine 36
The ExComm members next discussed the alter-native of military
action. The hawks believed thatthe Soviet missiles had strategic as
well as politicalvalue. General Taylor and Assistant Secretary
Nitzeargued that the missiles exposed part of the U.S.strategic
bomber force to sudden ground attack andcut the U.S. warning time
from approximately fif-teen minutes to three minutes or less.37
Advocatesof military action against Cuba pointed out that mili-tary
action was the only option that would physicallyremove the
missiles. The direct surgical air strike onthe missiles in Cuba
option came to be known asthe “fast track.” Proponents of this
alternative main-tained that the missiles were not defensive or
placedfor the sake of Cuba but were, in fact, designed toenhance
the Soviet position and to intimidate theUnited States and its
allies.
The other option that claimed ExComm’s atten-tion was the “slow
track.” Advocated by the dovesthis plan called for a limited
military embargo ofSoviet shipments to Cuba, enforced by a
navalblockade of the island. McNamara was one of theearliest
advocates of the blockade. “He argued that itwas limited pressure,
which could be increased asthe circumstances warranted. Further, it
was dra-matic and forceful pressure, which would beunderstood38
yet, most importantly, still leave [theUnited States] in control of
events.”39
Both of these alternatives constituted direct con-frontations
with the Soviets. The naval blockadehowever, would be somewhat less
provocative as itdid not entail the immediate risk of casualties.
Itcould be graduated and tightened, and, although itwould be a show
of force, it would not be immedi-ately life threatening. In
addition, the United Stateshad planned military maneuvers off the
coast ofFlorida that could be used to cover the preparations.
Opponents of the blockade, including Acheson,Taylor, and General
Curtis LeMay, criticized the pol-icy because the Soviets could take
advantage of it.They correctly concluded that it would not
removethe missiles. It could easily drag on while the worlddebated
its legality and legitimacy. At the same time,the Soviets could
continue their missile construc-tion and build-up. Furthermore, if
the Sovietsattempted to “run the blockade,” the United Stateswould
be forced into firing the first shot. Above all,traditional rules
in international relations protected
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8888 Gabrielle S. Brussel Case 334
the freedom of the seas. A blockade was an act ofwar.
Vice-President Johnson had recently character-ized it as such in
response to Republican SenatorKenneth Keating’s demand for an
embargo of Cuba.By Wednesday, October 17, Secretary McNamara,
inRobert Kennedy’s words, “became the blockade’sstrongest
advocate,” arguing that limited pressurcould be increased as the
circumstances warranted.“Further, it was dramatic and forceful
pressure,which would be understood yet, most importantly,still
leave [the United States] in control of events.”40
The “fast track” had advocates as well. At the firstExComm
meeting, the majority of advisors encour-aged an air strike. They
perceived the United Statesas threatened strategically and believed
it wouldhave to respond in a quick military manner that leftno room
for debate; a surprise attack on Cuba wouldhave removed the
missiles and proved to the Sovietsand to the world that the United
States stood by itsword. The United States had warned the
SovietUnion repeatedly against emplacement of missilesin Cuba, and
now the United States should respondin a forceful manner, according
to advocates of theposition. The joint Chiefs of Staff, Acheson,
and Tay-lor remained strong proponents of a surgical airstrike
against Cuba, while other advisors changedtheir opinions
sharply.
Advisors quickly pointed to the ramifications inother U.S.
military posts and situations. Deputy Sec-retary of Defense Roswell
Gilpatric pointed to the“points of vulnerability around the world,”
suggest-ing that “precautionary measures” might have to betaken. He
also said that the measures adopted mustbe military and
political.41 McNamara was also con-cerned with the consequences and
ramifications ofa surgical air attack, suggesting that U.S.
forcesaround the world must be put on alert.”42
Under Secretary of State George Ball was amongthose concerned
with the costs of such a response.On October 17, the second day of
the meetings, hebecame the first firm opponent of an air
strike.43
Ball said that the bombing of Cuba would be in dis-tinct
contradiction of U.S. traditions and historyRobert Kennedy agreed
and became the staunchestadvocate of this philosophy. Kennedy
believed thatthe U.S. response must be consistent with U.S.
val-ues. He maintained that the United States was fight-ing for
something more than just survival and thatall our heritage and our
ideals would be repugnantto such a sneak military attack.”44 In an
argumentwith Acheson, he said that “advocating a surpriseattack by
a very large nation against a very smallone . . . could not be
undertaken by the UnitedStates if we were to maintain our moral
position at
home and around the world.”45 Furthermore, hesaid, “My brother
is not going to be the Tojo of the1960s,” nor would he initiate a
“Pearl Harbor inreverse.”46
Acheson staunchly opposed the analogy of PearlHarbor. He argued
that the United States hadwarned the Soviet government for months
againstplacing offensive weapons in Cuba. The presidenthad
specifically discussed this in his public state-ments of September
4 and September 13, 1962. OnOctober 3 Congress had authorized the
president toprevent “by whatever means may be necessary”Cuba from
endangering U.S. security. FurthermoreAcheson stated, the Western
Hemisphere had, sincethe Monroe Doctrine, been in the U.S. military
andpolitical sphere of influence. The doctrine unequivo-cally
stated that European interference in thatsphere will not be
tolerated by the United States. ForAcheson, these warnings negated
the “surpriseattack” suggestion of the Pearl Harbor analogy. Forthe
president and the attorney general, however,these statements and
warnings were not enough tojustify a surprise attack. In fact, the
attorney generallater characterized President Kennedy’s
decisionagainst the attack as based on “his belief in what isright
and what is wrong.”47
The final option the ExComm considered was ageneral invasion of
Cuba. Few of the advisorsbelieved that the U.S. response should
begin withsuch extreme action, though several advisors saw itas an
opportunity to “take Cuba away from Castro.”This response was
quickly discounted as risking aworld war. At the very least it was
a step that wouldgive the world cause to indict U.S. aggression
andinterventionism for years to come.
Mindful of previous crises during which the presi-dent had not
received complete information, Presi-dent Kennedy set an informal
agenda for theExComm meetings encouraging discussion by allpresent
regardless of rank. Open discussion of allalternatives was
encouraged, with advisors present-ing and updating reports,
analyses, and suggestionsThe president believed that his presence
had a con-straining effect on the discussion, arresting
interac-tion between less senior advisors and theirsupervisors and
overwhelming the possibility for“true give-and-take.” For this
reason and because hewanted to maintain his schedule to convey
theappearance of normality, Kennedy did not attendthe deliberations
during the first days 48 RobertKennedy served as an informal chair
at the meet-ings, although the discussions were rarely directedand
largely unstructured. The president instructedthe group to develop
a consensus in favor of one or
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Case 334 The Cuban Missile Crisis 9999
two specific responses, which he would consider inmaking his
decision. Discussion quickly centered onwhether the immediate U.S.
response should be ablockade or an air strike
On the third day of the crisis, Thursday, October18, Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko calledon the president. During the
meeting, which hadbeen planned weeks before, Gromyko told
Kennedythat the Soviets would do nothing about Berlin or aGerman
peace treaty until after the November 6congressional elections. He
said that U.S. hostilitiesagainst Cuba could lead to problems
between theSoviet Union and the United States. The SovietUnion, he
continued, had given Cuba assistance forpurely defensive purposes.
At that point, Kennedystopped him, saying that the United States
had nointention of invading Cuba and the Soviet Union’ssupplying of
arms to Cuba was having a profoundeffect on the people of the
United States and was asource of great concern.49 Kennedy then
readGromyko his statement of September 4, whichdeclared that Soviet
placement of offensive weap-ons in Cuba would have serious
consequences andthat the United States would go to any length to
stopCuban aggression and Soviet expansionism in LatinAmerica. He
did not ask Gromyko directly whetherthere were offensive missiles
in Cuba. If Gromykowas puzzled by the president’s actions, he did
notappear so. Upon leaving the White House, Gromykodescribed the
meeting as “useful, very useful.”50
As the days wore on, the meetings and debatescontinued. Certain
people, from government ana-lysts to reporters, began to be aware
that a majorpolicy issue was under discussion, although thewere not
quite sure of its content. The presidentordered the armed forces to
stand at DefCon 2, astage of military preparation that is one step
awayfrom actual confrontation. As the United States forti-fied its
position, it publicly defended the build-up aspart of long-planned
naval activities in the Carib-bean—Philbriglex-62.51 Arthur
Sylvester, informa-tion chief of the Defense Department, denied
thesignificance of the build-up, saying that the exercisehad
“nothing to do with any possible imminentaction against Cuba.”52
Time was running short,however.
Speculation centered on Berlin, on India, and onthe Far East as
well as on Cuba. At one point duringthe deliberations W. Averill
Harriman, assistant sec-retary of state for Far Eastern affairs,
was sum-moned to a private anteroom in the west wing ofthe White
House and left there as a decoy to encour-age journalists to
speculate about a crisis in the FarEast rather than in Latin
America. Martin Hillen-
brand of the German Affairs Office and AssistantSecretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs PhilipsTalbot were also called to
the White House in a pub-lic manner as decoys.53 Government
officials dideverything they could think of to avoid publicity.One
evening a mid-level official told Secretary Rusk,“I know there is
something going on that you don’twant to talk about. But if
security is all that tight,maybe you’d better tell all those big
wheels fromacross the river to get their cars off the
street.”54
After that the limousines were left in the basementgarage
On the evening of Thursday, October 18, whenthe State Department
gave a dinner party forGromyko, the ExComm was divided into two
clearcamps—air strike versus blockade. At the beginningthe group
was divided almost evenly. McCone, Dil-lon, Taylor, Acheson, and
Nitze favored a strategic airstrike. Initially McGeorge Bundy had
supported ablockade, but by that time he also favored an airstrike.
Robert Kennedy, McNamara, Gilpatric,Thompson, Ball, and Lovett,
however, believed thatthe United States must pursue a blockade, at
leastbefore resorting to more drastic military action. Theair
strike proponents suggested an advance warn-ing to both the Cubans
and the Soviets through con-tacts in the Swiss government.55
Soviet expert Llewellyn Thompson, resuming anargument he had
supported in earlier meetings,maintained that the missiles were
placed and con-trolled by the Soviets. To consider Castro as a
majorpolicymaker in this crisis, he believed, would befutile. Since
this was a dramatic departure from pre-vious Soviet military policy
(they had never beforeplaced missiles outside the Soviet Union),
Thomp-son argued, the plan must have originated in theKremlin. A
resolution, therefore, had to be negoti-ated with the Kremlin.
Furthermore, attacking theSoviet missiles meant killing Soviets,
and it wasunlikely that Khrushchev would not respond in
kindsomewhere in the world. President Kennedy agreed.During a
briefing with Air Force Chief of Staff Gen-eral Curtis LeMay,
Kennedy said that although heunderstood the position of the joint
Chiefs of Staff incalling for immediate military action, there
would inall probability be some Soviet military retaliation toa
U.S. military action. “They, no more than we,”Kennedy said, “can
let these things go by withoutdoing something. They can’t, after
all their state-ments, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a
lotof Russians and then do nothing.”56
Robert Kennedy, continuing an argument that heand others,
including McNamara and Ball, sup-ported, maintained that the
president was not faced
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11110000 Gabrielle S. Brussel Case 334
with a “zero-sum” choice. Instead, he suggested thatthe
president should begin with responses thatoffered the least risk of
war and increase pressure ifnecessary. The blockade was a limited
action thatcould be tightened or supplemented with an airstrike as
time went on. A turning point occurredwhen Secretary of the
Treasury Douglas Dillonshifted his opinion away from support of an
airstrike to a blockade. “What changed my mind,” hesuggests, “was
Bobby Kennedy’s argument that weought to be true to ourselves as
Americans, that sur-prise attack was not in our tradition. Frankly,
theseconsiderations had not occurred to me. . . .”57
Around 10:00 P.M. the advisors left the State De-partment to
meet with the president. In a meetingthat lasted past midnight,
they presented two policyoptions they had been debating for days:
the airstrike and the blockade. In the course of the meetingthe
advisors were not able to answer all of the presi-dent’s questions,
and their own opinions began toshift again. The president sent them
back to theState Department for further deliberations. The nextday
the advocates of the two plans split up to writerecommendations
outlining the steps each policywould require. Presidential
Assistant TheodoreSorenson was asked to draft a speech that
wouldjustify the blockade. It was to include an analysis ofthe
Latin American countries that could assist in theblockade and the
military procedures that would beused to stop ships. The advocates
of immediate mili-tary action were required to draw up a list of
riot-control equipment that would be used to maintaindomestic
security throughout Latin America; weap-ons that would be barred
from Cuba; an analysis ofthe Cuban exile groups in the United
States; and aproposed communication to Khrushchev designedto
persuade him that it would be inadvisable tomove militarily against
us in the Caribbean, in Ber-lin, or elsewhere in the world.58 The
Justice andState departments were entrusted with the task
ofbuilding the legal defense for the blockade.
The deliberations were not over, however. On Fri-day, October
19, the opponents of a blockade con-tinued to raise criticisms of
the plan and to arguethe futility of such action. Furthermore, they
sug-gested that the “slow track” of a blockade wouldremove any
advantage that the United States mighthave with a surprise
attack.
Reporters were becoming more persistent as theglobal U.S.
military mobilization continued. At 1:20P.M. an alert went out to
Atlantic and Caribbeanbases and commands warning them against
possi-ble attacks. High-level policymakers were
cancelingappointments and speaking engagements. Govern-
ment officials were remaining in Washington whenthey were
scheduled to be in other places. Troopmovements and mobilizations
were being ques-tioned, even though they were covered somewhatby
the naval exercises. The president maintained hisscheduled campaign
stops in Illinois while his advi-sors continued their discussions,
but questions werebeing raised about what was going on. Time
wasrunning out.
International and Legal Ramifications
The ExComm now began a new debate: What couldbe the
justification for the limited response, or “slotrack,” which was,
in fact, an act of war? Further-more, what domestic constitutional
questions wereinvolved? Although the blockade was considered aless
provocative response, it was not in accord withinternational law or
with U.S. traditions. The historyof foreign policy provides
numerous examples of theimportance to governments of freedom of the
seas.Indeed, the United States had fought the War of1812 to protect
American access to the seas.
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbachand State Department
Deputy Legal Advisor LeonardMeeker were responsible for creating a
legal frame-work to justify the naval blockade. Although
theadministration already believed that it was impor-tant for its
actions to have a legal basis, Thompsonemphasized the importance of
this point in dealingwith the Soviet government. He noted that
althoughthe Soviets might manipulate the legal justificationsor
ramifications of a situation, they consistentlysought legal
interpretations to justify their actions inthe international
sphere.
Katzenbach maintained that U.S. military actions(including a
blockade) could be justified on the inter-national principle of
self-defense based on ChapterVII, Article 51, of the United Nations
Charter. More-over, a blockade would not require a declaration
ofwar. Meeker agreed that U.S. actions were valid onthe basis of
“self-defense,” but he maintained that ablockade or “defensive
quarantine”59 would be con-sidered “use of force” prohibited by
Article 2(4) ofthe UN Charter, which states:
All Members shall refrain in their internationalrelations from
the threat or use of force againstthe territorial integrity or
political independenceof any state, or in any other manner
inconsistentwith the Purposes of the United Nations.
There are, however, exceptions to the “use offorce” prohibition,
including self-defense in an
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Case 334 The Cuban Missile Crisis 11111111
armed attack, action by the United Nations itself,and regional
arrangements. The regional arrange-ments exception, stated in
Article 52(1) and Article52(2), sanctions “appropriate” actions for
the main-tenance of regional peace and security. Katzenbachbelieved
that the blockade with a regional sanctionwould provide a solid
legal basis. He also felt thatthe United States could, without the
sanction,defend the blockade in view of a state’s right of
selfdefense
An Organization of American States (OAS) sanc-tion, under the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciproc-ity, or Rio Treaty (a treaty to
which Cuba is asignatory), established cooperative relations and
aforum to deal with internal and external conflictsamong the
American states. Meeker argued that thistreaty would legitimize a
quarantine of Cuba.Meeker especially noted Articles 6 and 8 of the
RioTreaty, which condone measures taken within theorganization
(including the recommendation offorce by one or more members) to
resolve a situa-tion that endangers the peace and security of
thehemisphere:
Article 6: If the inviolability or the integrity of theterritory
or the sovereignty or political indepen-dence of any American State
should be affectedby an aggression which is not an armed attack
orby an extra-continental or intra-continental con-flict, or by any
other fact or situation that mightendanger the peace of America,
the Organ ofConsultation shall meet immediately in order toagree on
measures which must be taken in caseof aggression to assist the
victim of the aggres-sion or, in any case, measures which should
betaken for the common defense and for the main-tenance of the
peace and security of the Conti-nent.
Article 8: For the purposes of this treaty, the mea-sure on
which the Organ of Consultation mayagree will comprise one or more
of the following:recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions;
breakingof diplomatic relations; breaking of consular rela-tions;
partial or complete interruption of eco-nomic relations or of sea,
air, postal, telephonicand radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic
commu-nications; and the use of armed force
The advisors recognized that the language used todescribe the
crisis was critical. Meeker was careful,therefore, to qualify the
naval response as a “defen-sive quarantine” rather than a
“blockade.” A defen-sive quarantine would not necessarily imply a
state
of war, while a blockade would be subject to consid-erable
retaliation as an act of war. Both advisorsunderscored the
statement in Article 2(4), whichoutlaws “use of force” that is
“inconsistent with thePurposes of the United Nations.” They
suggestedthat the quarantine would be “legal” in the contextof
Article 2(4) as it supported the aim of maintaininginternational
peace. Furthermore, within the sanc-tion of the regional
institution, the OAS, a “defensivequarantine” would not be illegal.
Sorenson began adraft that announced a blockade but suggested
thatthe United States would increase the pressure of theblockade
and proceed to more offensive actions ifthe Soviet build-up
continued.
The Presidential Decision
At 2:30 P.M. on Saturday, October 20, after five daysof almost
constant deliberations, the ExComm pre-sented two alternative
proposals to PresidentKennedy:
1. Begin with a naval blockade and increase themilitary pressure
as the crisis demands; or
2. Begin with an air strike of Cuba, probablyaccompanied by an
invasion of Cuba.
Assistant Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatricsummarized the
general opinion of the ExComm:“Essentially, Mr. President, this is
a choice betweenlimited action and unlimited action; and most of
usthink that it’s better to start with limited action.”60
Adlai Stevenson said that the United States shouldbe prepared to
negotiate to remove the missiles. Hesuggested that the president
should consider pro-posing that Cuba be demilitarized, neutralized,
andits territorial integrity guaranteed by the demobiliza-tion of
U.S. forces at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base.Additionally, either as an
alternative or as an accom-panying proposal, the president should
consider dis-mantling the obsolete Jupiter missiles in Turkey
andItaly.
Kennedy discounted both options. He did notwant to give up
Guantánamo at that time, and herefused to be perceived as trading
away an ally forthe safety of the United States, whether the
missilesin the Mediterranean were militarily useful or
not.Primarily, the United States could not and would notnegotiate
under threat. The president did agree,however, that the political
importance of the U.S.negotiating position had to be addressed
andstrengthened. With the exception of Stevenson, theExComm fully
agreed with the president’s refusal to
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12121212 Gabrielle S. Brussel Case 334
include the U.S. missiles in a negotiation package. Astraw vote
revealed that the ExComm remainedsplit, with six advisors voting
for a surgical strikeand eleven advocating a naval quarantine
within acontext of international negotiations.61
That morning the president ordered the U.S. mis-siles stationed
in Turkey to be defused. This ren-dered them incapable of firing
without a directorder by an authority.62 This was done to
consoli-date the responsibility of the crisis into the hands ofthe
executive and to prevent, to the best of theadministration’s
ability, escalation through mistake,misperception, or
miscalculation of an unautho-rized government official. This action
did not affectthe U.S. strategic position or diminish its
securityBy the fall of 1962, only Air Force General LeMaybelieved
that the Jupiters were “good military weap-ons.”63 Turkey
maintained that the missiles were aphysical sign of the U.S.
commitment to NATO, andto Turkey in particular. In May and June
1962 theState Department had broached the subject with theTurkish
government; both times the Turkish govern-ment refused to discuss
it. Although in August 1962Bundy had pursued the subject of how to
removethe missiles, no action had as yet begun.64
President Kennedy decided in favor of a blockadeor “defensive
quarantine.” 65 Although he realizedthat the quarantine would not
remove the missiles,he knew that an air strike would not
necessarilyremove all of them either, thereby forcing an
escala-tion to higher levels of military confrontation. Thiscourse
allowed the United States to increase pres-sure as required. Once
the United States went for-ward with an attack, there would have
been littlerecourse. The quarantine bought some time.
The president was scheduled to make a state-ment on Monday
October 22, but the administrationwas not sure it could keep the
crisis from reachingthe press. James Reston of the New York Times
hadmany of the facts. Alfred Friendly of the WashingtonPost also
had a fair idea of what was going on. Boththe New York Times and
the Washington Post, inaddition to the New York Herald Tribune,
compliedwith the request that they wait on the story until
thepresident had gone public hours later.
The final hours of the weekend were spent draft-ing the
president’s speech to the public; contactingcongressional leaders;
coordinating the militarymobilization and naval buildup;
establishing sup-port systems, including doctors and nurses,
thatwould be needed in the event of a military confron-tation; and
dispatching ambassadors to inform ourallies. Kennedy also sent
personal envoys to FrenchPresident Charles de Gaulle, Canadian
Prime Minis-
ter John Diefenbaker, West German Chancellor Kon-rad Adenauer,
and British Prime Minister HaroldMacmillan. Presidential letters,
sent through U.S.embassies, went to forty-three heads of state.
The president gave a final, last-minute consider-ation to an air
strike during a meeting with GeneralWalter C. Sweeney, Jr.,
commander-in-chief of theTactical Air Command, on the morning of
Sunday,October 21. Sweeney explained that an air attackcould not be
certain of destroying all the missilesites in Cuba. In fact, he
said, approximately tenpercent of the missiles would remain,
necessitatinga U.S. invasion. That confirmed the president’s
deci-sion to begin with the naval quarantine. The airstrike plan as
outlined by the military includedbombing several populated areas as
well as militaryinstallations. Later reports suggested that U.S.
intelli-gence advisors had estimated that 25,000 Cubanswould be
killed if the decision had been made tobomb the missiles sites and
destroy the bases.66
Once the president made his decision, time andenergy were
channeled into reviewing the speechesto be made and deciding on the
exact presentationthe president would make. There were many
ques-tions: How would he explain the U.S. evidence?Would he present
the photographs on television?Should the president admit to illegal
reconnaissanceflights over Cuban air space? Should he state thatthe
United States would continue its blockadewhether it received
regional approval from the OASor not? Should the speech mention
Berlin and try toforestall a retaliatory action there?
Kennedy decided against showing the enlargedphotographs on the
grounds that the viewer wouldprobably not be able to discern the
missile sites inthe photographs. Robert Kennedy later admittedthat
the first time he looked at the photographs hehad to take the photo
reconnaissance analysts attheir word, since what he saw “appeared
to be nomore than the clearing of a field for a farm or thebasement
of a house.” This had been the reaction ofmany of the experts in
the room, including Presi-dent Kennedy.67 Although the public would
haveseen later stages of construction, the president didnot want to
present questionable evidence. At thesame time the administration
did not want toheighten panic, so the president removed any
spe-cific references to Hiroshima and megatonnage.
The speech would admit the secret surveillance ofCuba and would
announce that the United Stateswould increase this surveillance
until the crisisabated. Surveillance was justified in an earlier
OAScommuniqué condemning secret military prepara-tions. Although
the United States would institute the
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Case 334 The Cuban Missile Crisis 11113333
blockade in any event, the ExComm chose not toreview that point
in the speech in the hope that thestatement about “the defense of
[U.S.] security andof the entire Western Hemisphere” would
encourageregional unity and approval. The speech discouragedSoviet
advances in Berlin, stating that the UnitedStates would resist any
hostile retaliations any-where in the world “including in
particular [against]the brave people of West Berlin.”68
At 2:30 P.M., October 21, the National SecurityCouncil formally
ratified the decisions of theExComm. Admiral George W. Anderson
outlined thenavy’s plan for the blockade. Orders from the Penta-gon
readied Guantánamo naval base for a possibleconfrontation,
evacuating family dependents andassigning operational control of
specified army andair force units. In the evening Secretary of
DefenseMcNamara formally approved the procedures andauthorized air
force interceptors flying in the UnitedStates to carry nuclear
weapons.
On Monday, October 22, the political and militarypreparations
continued. John McCloy flew back tothe United States from Europe to
join the Stevensonteam at the United Nations. A
blockade-planningdirective was ordered to the Atlantic fleet, and
theair force missile crews received maximum alertorders. One
hundred fifty-six Inter-Continental Bal-listic Missiles (ICBMs)
were readied for firing. Thebomber force was dispersed, with B-47s
sent toforty civilian airports and the B-52 bomber forceordered
into the air. During the following month asignificant portion of
the B-52s were in the air at alltimes. In addition, the force on
the ground carried afull load of fuel and bombs and was ready to
take offon fifteen minutes notice. Five army divisions wereon full
alert, and 180 ships were deployed in theCaribbean.69
The ExComm met to discuss the presidentialannouncement. Abram
Chayes, the legal advisor ofthe State Department, stressed that the
legal basisof the quarantine was the right of collective
actionfound in the Rio Treaty and in the UN Charter. Heemphasized
the OAS right to take collective actionsto guard the security of
the region and Article 52 ofthe UN Charter, maintaining a state’s
right to makeregional arrangements.
The United States did not point to Article 51 ofthe UN Charter
protecting the right of all nations toself-defense because that
article allowed a broadinterpretation of self-defense.
International justifica-tions and pleas of self-defense had been
establishedover many years. Chayes maintained that a danger-ous and
difficult precedent would be set if theUnited States extended the
interpretation of “self-
defense” to “anticipatory self-defense” in regard tothe
placement of offensive missiles close to U.S.borders when an
attack, although possible in thefuture, was obviously not
imminent.
The legal advisors urged policymakers to supportthe U.S.
position with the other available avenues ofinternational legal
posture. This was agreed upon,and the text of the president’s
speech was changed.Chayes agreed with Meeker’s emphasis on
terminol-ogy, strongly recommending that the U.S. action betermed a
“defensive quarantine” rather than ablockade. The president also
accepted this idea.Action Memorandum No. 196 was approved,
for-mally establishing the advisors as the ExecutiveCommittee of
the National Security Council “for thepurpose of effective conduct
of the operations of theexecutive branch in the current
crisis.”
Later that day President Kennedy met with lead-ing members of
Congress, many of whom had beenflown back to Washington. McCone,
Rusk, andMcNamara began the briefing with a description ofthe
intelligence reports and a report of the U.S.response. Members of
the congressional group werfairly uniform in their criticism of a
blockade. Believ-ing it slow and ineffective, they called for
strongeraction. Some, including Senator Richard Russell ofGeorgia
and Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas(both Democrats), went
so far as to call for an inva-sion.
President Kennedy later suggested that the con-gressional
leaders were responding as the executiveadvisors had at first. He
believed that “if they hadgone through the five-day period we had
gonethrough—in looking at the various alternatives,advantages and
disadvantages . . .—they would havecome out the same way we did.”70
Kennedyresponded to the congressional leaders by statingthat he was
acting by executive order, presidentialproclamation, and inherent
powers, not under aresolution or an act of Congress.”71 He was
seekingbipartisan governmental unity, he explained, but theplanned
U.S. response of a quarantine would con-tinue in any event.
Congressional support wasimportant to Kennedy, but he had already
decidedthat the executive branch would formulate aresponse without
contacting Congress.
The State Department was also preparing brief-ings. Secretary
Rusk left the meeting with Congressfor a meeting with Soviet
Ambassador AnatolyDobrynin. Dobrynin was given an advance copy
ofthe president’s speech. Rusk recalled that Dobrynin“age[d] ten
years right in front of [his] eyes.”72 Infact, Dobrynin’s own
government had not informedhim of the missile deployment. In the
State Depart-
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14141414 Gabrielle S. Brussel Case 334
ment’s international conference room, Under Secre-tary Ball
briefed the ambassadors of forty-six alliedcountries, showing them
photographs of the sites.U.S. ambassadors all over the world,
including FoyKohler in Moscow, were giving similar briefings
At 7:00 P.M. (EST) President Kennedy broadcaston an
international network arranged by the U.S.Information Agency:73
This government as promised, has maintainedthe closest
surveillance of the Soviet militarybuild-up on the island of Cuba.
Within the pastweek, unmistakable evidence has established thefact
that a series of offensive missile sites is nowin preparation on
that imprisoned island. Thepurpose of these bases, can be none
other thanto provide a nuclear strike capability against theWestern
Hemisphere. . . .
This urgent transformation of Cuba into animportant strategic
base—by the presence ofthese large, long-range and clearly
offensiveweapons of sudden mass destruction—consti-tutes an
explicit threat to the peace and securityof all the Americas. . .
.
This secret, swift and extraordinary build-up ofCommunist
missiles—in an area well-known tohave a special and historical
relationship to theUnited States and the nations of the
WesternHemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances,and in
defiance of American and hemisphericpolicy—this sudden, clandestine
decision to sta-tion strategic weapons for the first time outside
ofSoviet soil is a deliberately provocative and unjus-tified change
in the status quo which cannot beaccepted by this country, if our
courage and ourcommitments are ever to be trusted again byeither
friend or foe. . . .
Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be tprevent the use of
these missiles against this orany other country, and to secure
their withdrawalor elimination from the Western Hemisphere. . .
.
The president went on, outlining the initialresponse planned by
the United States, including thenaval quarantine, continued
surveillance, reinforce-ment of Guantánamo Bay, and a
diplomaticapproach consisting of negotiations at the UN,through the
OAS, and in bilateral discussions withKhrushchev. He warned that
the United States wouldretaliate if necessary:
It shall be the policy of this nation to regard anynuclear
missile launched from Cuba against anynation in the Western
Hemisphere as an attackby the Soviet Union on the United States,
requir-ing a full retaliatory response upon the SovietUnion.
Kennedy concluded with a statement reaffirmingthe U.S.
commitment to freedom and peace, “Ourgoal is not the victory of
might, but the vindicationof right; not peace at the expense of
freedom, butboth peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere,and, we
hope, around the world. God willing, thatgoal will be
achieved.”
During the president’s speech, the State Depart-ment continued
addressing world opinion to gain aworld consensus favoring or at
least understandingthe proposed U.S. actions. Ambassador Adlai
Steven-son requested that the Security Council convene taddress the
“dangerous threat to peace and securityof the world caused by the
secret establishment inCuba” of long-range offensive missiles. He
deliveredthis request to the chairman of the Security
Council,Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin.74 The UnitedStates had
ready a draft resolution calling for the dis-mantling of the
missiles under the jurisdiction of theUN Observer Corps. If this
were done, the blockadewould be called off.
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin AmericanAffairs Edwin
Martin briefed the ambassadors of theOAS, while Secretary Rusk met
with members of thenonaligned and neutral nations. Characterizing
theSoviet emplacement as a “gross . . . error of judge-ment,” Rusk
appealed to the nations to “look at thissituation in terms of
national purposes, nationalcommitments, national interests.”
Further, he sug-gested that “one of the issues . . . involved . . .
theindependence of states . . .” and that Cuba was thevictim rather
than the perpetrator of the act.75
McNamara and Ball also held briefings that eveningfor the
correspondents of the State Department andthe Pentagon. When asked
how far the navy wouldgo to stop a Soviet vessel, McNamara
responded, “Ifthere is an indication of offensive weapons onboard”
and the captain refuses another course orport, “we will use
force.”76
The OAS met at 9:00 A.M. on Tuesday, October23, to discuss the
U.S. resolution proposing a U.S.“quarantine” of Cuba. Martin
estimated that theUnited States would get fourteen votes—the
mini-mum necessary to approve the collective actionunder the Rio
Treaty (two-thirds of the twenty-onemember nations). The U.S.
delegation, includingSecretary of State Rusk, urged the OAS to act
in
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Case 334 The Cuban Missile Crisis 11115555
concert for the defense of the entire hemisphere.The nations
discussed the blockade throughout theday. Eighteen favored the
blockade. The Bolivianambassador, under instructions from his
govern-ment to boycott the OAS for reasons relating to anearlier
border dispute, was unable to participate inthe proceeding.
Deciding, however, to take a standon what was viewed as one of the
most importantdecisions the OAS would ever make, he abstainedon a
paragraph and voted with the majority. Uru-guay alone abstained,
making the vote nineteen tozero in favor of a U.S. naval quarantine
of Cuba.
U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS
On Tuesday, October 23, the UN Security Councilheld its first
meeting on the Cuban missile crisisU.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson
denounced theSoviet actions in Cuba, while Soviet
AmbassadorValerian Zorin accused the United States of riskingworld
war and making “false accusations.” TheSoviet ambassador introduced
a resolution callingfor condemnation of the United States for
violatingthe UN Charter and increasing the likelihood ofworld war.
The Cuban ambassador also condemnedthe U.S. actions, announcing
that Cuba would neveraccept UN observers on the island.
The United States estimated that it could dependon seven votes
(including its own) from its alliesamong the permanent members,
France, Great Brit-ain, and China, and Venezuela, Chile, and
Irelandwho, by rotation, were sitting on the council. TheSoviet
bloc on the Security Council consisted ofRomania and the Soviet
Union, which, as a perma-nent member, had an automatic veto. The
otheralternate members during the rotation were neu-tral.77
Secretary General U Thant was asked to medi-ate the crisis.
Edge of the Precipice
In Washington the CIA presented evidence to theExComm that “as
of the day before, four MRBM siteswere ‘operational’ and many
others had ‘emergencycapability.’" The Soviet technicians continued
toimprove the sites. The “emergency capability” wouldbecome “fully
operational” shortly. The ExCommdecided, with the president’s
approval, that if a U-2reconnaissance plane flying surveillance
over Cubawas fired on, the United States would, with
specificpermission from President Kennedy, use bomberand fighter
planes to destroy the Surface-to-Air mis-sile site (SAM) that had
shot down the U.S. plane.
The United States did not know if nuclear warheadswere on the
island, so the administration shaped itsstrategy assuming the
worst. In fact, two-thirds ofthe Soviet warheads were either on the
island or enroute to it. Thirty-six warheads for use on
medium-range missiles and twenty-four launchers were inCuba, as
well as nine Luna short-range, nuclear-tipped missiles with six
mobile launchers. More-over, the local Soviet commander in Cuba had
per-mission to fire a nuclear retaliation in response to
aU.S.-ordered invasion of the island. The atomic war-heads on the
Soviet rockets had yields of six ttwelve kilotons, or 6,000 to
12,000 tons of TNT.
At 11:56 A.M. (EST) the U.S. Embassy in Moscowtransmitted the
response by Chairman NikitKhrushchev to President Kennedy’s public
state-ment:78
[M]easures outlined in your statement representserious threat to
peace and the security of peo-ples. United States has openly taken
path of grossviolation of Charter of United Nations, path
ofviolation of international norms of freedom ofnavigation on high
seas, path of aggressiveactions both against Cuba and against
SovietUnion.
Statement of Government of United States Amer-ica cannot be
evaluated in any other way than asnaked interference in domestic
affairs of CubanRepublic, Soviet Union, and other states. Charterof
United Nations and international norms do notgive right to any
state whatsoever to establish ininternational waters control of
vessels bound forshores of the Cuban Republic.
It is self-understood that we also cannot recog-nize right of
United States to establish controlover armaments essential to
Republic of Cuba forstrengthening of its defensive capacity
We confirm that armaments now on Cuba,regardless of
classification to which they belong,are destined exclusively for
defensive purposesin order to secure Cuban Republic from attack
ofaggressor.
I hope that Government of United States willshow prudence and
renounce actions pursued byyou, which could lead to catastrophic
conse-quences for peace throughout the world. . . .
Kennedy responded immediately, transmitting aletter through the
U.S. State Department to the U.S.
-
16161616 Gabrielle S. Brussel Case 334
Embassy in Moscow. It was delivered in Moscow at7:00 A.M.
October 24 (Moscow time). Briefly dis-cussing the cause of the
crisis, Kennedy firmlyannounced that the quarantine would go
intoeffect:79
I think you will recognize that the steps80 whichstated the
current chain of events was the actionof your government in
secretly furnishing offen-sive weapons to Cuba. We will be
discussing thismatter in the Security Council. In the meantime,
Ihope that we both show prudence and do noth-ing to allow events to
make the situation moredifficult to control than it already is.
I hope that you will issue immediately the neces-sary
instruction to your ships to observe theterms of the quarantine,
the basis of which wasestablished by the vote of the Organization
ofAmerican States this afternoon, and which will gointo effect at
1400 hours Greenwich time Octobertwenty-four. . . .
That evening the president signed the interdictionorders that
were to go into effect the next day. Thematerials to be stopped
included SAMs, bomber air-craft, bombs, air-to-surface rockets and
guided mis-siles, warheads, support equipment for the
bannedweapons, and any other materials so designated bthe secretary
of Defense “for the purpose of effectu-ating this proclamation.”
McNamara, as secretary ofDefense, ordered the quarantine: Any ships
headedfor Cuba would be interdicted. The presidentreserved to
himself the right to order each ship to beintercepted or boarded.
Again, as with the order tdefuse the Turkish missiles, by
completely centraliz-ing the orders the President aimed to reduce
theability of government officials to take matters intotheir own
hands and unwittingly increase the levelsof tension.
The United States asked its African allies to refuselanding
rights to Soviet planes seeking to refuel onAfrican territory. This
was especially important forSenegal and Guinea, the most practical
refuelingstops for planes en route to Cuba from the SovietUnion.
Both nations disavowed the Soviet buildup inCuba and agreed to
refuse landing rights to Sovietplanes.
In Washington, Ambassador Dobrynin met withRobert Kennedy to
discuss the events of the past sixweeks. Kennedy reminded him of
the repeatedSoviet pledges not to place offensive missiles inCuba
and to give Castro only defensive assistance.Dobrynin renewed those
pledges and denied the
existence of offensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedyobserved that
the president had chosen a less bellig-erent attitude toward the
Soviet Union than otherpolitical figures in the United States would
have andsuggested that the Soviet actions had
“devastatingimplications for the peace of the world.”81
Dobryninquestioned the U.S. silence regarding the missilesduring
the Kennedy-Gromyko meeting the previousweek. The attorney general
replied that “there wasnothing the President could tell Gromyko
thatGromyko didn’t already know—after all, why didn’tGromyko tell
the President.”82 The president hadmet Soviet demands for the
“withdrawal of Ameri-can troops from Thailand.” He believed that he
wasnegotiating in good faith and “sneaking missiles intoCuba now
displayed the Soviet leaders as hypocriti-cal, misleading and
false.” Kennedy asked if theSoviet ships were continuing on their
course towardCuba. Dobrynin replied that “that had been
theirinstructions and he knew of no change.”83 Themeeting ended in
a stalemate, neither man securein his knowledge of the other.
That evening the president met with BritishAmbassador David
Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore sug-gested that Kennedy should release the
aerial photo-graphs proving the U.S. position. This would help
torally public opinion behind the U.S. position. It wasabsolutely
imperative that the world accept that themissiles represented a
real crisis rather than a politi-cal attempt to increase public
support before theimportant congressional elections on November
6.The president agreed with the ambassador on thispoint and decided
to publish enlarged versions ofthe pictures the next day.
The quarantine line was drawn at 10:00 A.M. onWednesday, October
24, by nineteen U.S. shipsoperating as Task Force 136. If the
Soviet shipsbound for Cuba continued at their current speed,two
ships would be intercepted before noon.84 Morethan twenty Soviet
ships bound for Cuba had beentracked by navy reconnaissance
planes.
President Kennedy received a warning fromKhrushchev stating that
the Soviet Union would notaccept the U.S. “ultimatum:”85
Having posed these conditions to us with theseconditions, you,
Mr. President, have challengedus. Who asked you to do this? By what
right haveyou done this? Our relations with the Republic ofCuba,
like our relations with other states, regard-less of what sort of
state it may be, concern onlythe two countries between which those
relationsexist. . . .
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Case 334 The Cuban Missile Crisis 11117777
You, Mr. President, are not declaring quarantines,but advancing
an ultimatum and threatening thatunless we subordinate ourselves to
yourdemands, you will use force . . . You are no longerappealing to
reason, but wish to intimidate us. . . .
Reference to the decision of the Organization ofAmerican States
cannot in any way substantiatethe demands now advanced by the
United States.This organization has absolutely no authority orbasis
to make decisions like that of which youspeak of in your
letter.
Consequently, we do not recognize these deci-sions.
International law exists, generally recog-nized norms of conduct
exist. We firmly supportthe principles of international law,
strictly observethe norms regulating navigation on the high seasand
in international waters. We observe thesenorms and enjoy the rights
recognized by allstates.
You wish to compel us to renounce the rights thatevery sovereign
state enjoys, you are attemptingto legislate in questions of
international law, andyou are trampling upon the generally
acceptednorms of this law. . . . What morality, what lawcan justify
such approach by the American Gov-ernment to international affairs?
You cannot findsuch a morality and such a law. . . .
The Soviet Government considers that violationof freedom of the
use of international waters andinternational air space is an act of
aggression,pushing mankind toward the abyss of a
worldmissile-nuclear war. . . . Of course, we shall not besimply
observers of piratical actions of Americanships on high seas. We
will then be forced on ourpart to take the measure we deem
necessary andadequate in order to protect our rights. For thiswe
have all that is necessary.
Just after 10:00 A.M. McNamara announced thatthe ships Gagarin
and Komiles were going to reachthe interdiction line within one
hour. A Soviet sub-marine had moved into position between the
twoships. The U.S. Navy planned to meet the Sovietswith an aircraft
carrier supported by anti-submarineequipped helicopters. The U.S.S.
Essex would signalthe submarine by sonar. If it failed to respond,
depthcharges would be released to force the submarine
tosurface.
The administration had come to the moment ithad carefully
attempted to avoid, the “first exchange
with an Russian submarine.” Even at that momentthe president
asked if “there was some way we canavoid” it. This moment was
characterized as “theedge of the precipice with no way off.”86 The
U.S.government began to make final preparations for aretaliation by
the Soviets in Berlin. At 10:25 A.M.,however, a report stating that
the Soviet ships hadstopped “dead in the water” was received.
Sevenminutes later the report was confirmed. The four-teen ships
closest to the quarantine line had stoppedin the water or had
turned back toward the SovietUnion, although the tankers bound for
Cuba contin-ued. The president was determined to afford bothnations
the time necessary to negotiate their wayout of the crisis. “No
ships will be stopped or inter-cepted. . . . If the ships have
orders to turn around,we want to give them every opportunity to do
so.Get in direct touch with the Essex and tell them notto do
anything . . . give the Russian vessels anopportunity to turn back.
We must move quicklybecause the time is expiring.”87
Avoiding the Confrontation
The U.S. military community was not completelyreassured by the
Soviet actions. Some officers spec-ulated that ships might have
altered their course inorder to rendezvous with Soviet submarines,
six ofwhich had been tracked in the area, and thenattempt to force
their way through the line. Thepresident ordered the Soviet ships
followed but notboarded. This, he believed would keep the
UnitedStates in an alert position, afford Khrushchev timeto plan
his next move, aware of U.S. pressure andrestraint, but not cause
precipitate action.
At 1:00 P.M. the administration released the pho-tographs of
Soviet bases in Cuba. This was espe-cially important in London
where public opinionwas running against the U.S. administration.
Manycritics felt that the Democratic administration wascreating a
propaganda campaign to aid its party dur-ing the upcoming
elections
U Thant, attempting to mediate between the twogovernments,
proposed the simultaneous suspen-sion of the quarantine and the
arms shipments.This, he maintained, would facilitate and
establishthe groundwork for an immediate summit meetingbetween
Khrushchev and Kennedy. Kennedy andKhrushchev responded to the
secretary general thenext day, Thursday, October 25.
Khrushchevaccepted the proposal: “I declare that I agree withyour
proposals which accord with the interest ofpeace.” Kennedy did not:
“As we made clear in theSecurity Council, the existing threat was
created b
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18181818 Gabrielle S. Brussel Case 334
the secret introduction of offensive weapons intoCuba, and the
answer lies in the removal of suchweapons.” First, remove the
missiles then theUnited States will negotiate. Otherwise, the
quaran-tine will remain.
Khrushchev decided to approach the U.S. govern-ment in an
unofficial manner. He settled on invitingvisiting businessman
William Knox, president ofWestinghouse International, to meet with
him onWednesday in the Kremlin. During the ensuing dis-cussion,
Khrushchev presented the Soviet view to aman he viewed as an
informal channel to the U.S.government. Discussing semantic
questions of“offense and defense,” he admitted what his
ambas-sadors and official statements had been denying,namely that
there were missiles and other offensiveweapons in Cuba.
Furthermore, the Soviet Unionwould use them if necessary. He warned
that theywould also sink the American vessels if the UnitedStates
attempted to stop and board the Soviet ships.
On Thursday, October 25, Walter Lippmann’s col-umn in the
Washington Post suggested that therewere “three ways to get rid of
the missiles already inCuba:”—invasion and occupation, total
blockadeand what he termed a “face-saving agreement,” atrade of the
U.S. missiles in Turkey for the Sovietmissiles in Cuba.
At 8:00 A.M. (EST) on Thursday, October 25, aSoviet tanker, the
Bucharest, was intercepted butwas allowed to pass through the
quarantine linewithout a U.S. boarding. An East German
passengership was also allowed through. The United Statesdecided
that since it was only a matter of time untila ship was boarded,
contingency plans would haveto be made. After long discussions the
ExComm, theState Department, and the Pentagon agreed that thefirst
ship to be boarded must not be a Soviet shipnor the ship of a
Western ally, but preferably shouldbelong to a neutral state.
That day at the United Nations, AmbassadorZorin denied the
presence of Soviet missiles inCuba, challenging Ambassador
Stevenson to presentevidence proving their existence. Stevenson
obligedwith a dramatic flair:
Mr. Ambassador we do have the evidence. Wehave it and it is
clear and incontrovertible. . . .You, the Soviet Union, have sent
these weaponsto Cuba. You, the Soviet Union, have created thisnew
danger not the United States. . . .
I remind you that the other day you did not denythe existence of
these weapons, but today . . .
you now say that they do not exist, or that wehaven’t proved
they exist. . . .
All right, Sir, let me ask you one question. Doyou, Ambassador
Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R.has placed and is placing medium and
intermedi-ate range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no?Don’t
wait for the translation, yes or no?
Zorin: I am not in an American courtroom. . . . Indue course,
Sir, you will have your answer
Stevenson: You are in the courtroom of worldopinion right now
and you can answer yes or no.You have denied that they exist and I
want toknow whether I have understood you correctly.
Zorin: Continue with your statement. You willhave your answer in
due course.
Stevenson: I am prepared to wait for my answeruntil hell freezes
over, if that’s your decision. AndI am also prepared to present the
evidence to thisroom.
With that Stevenson turned to a set of easelsbehind him and
presented the enlarged photographsof the Soviet missile sites to
the Security Council.Zorin did not respond. Stevenson said, “We
knothe facts, and so do you, Sir, and we are ready to talkabout
them. Our job here is not to score debatingpoints. Our job, Mr.
Zorin, is to save the peace. Andif you are ready to try, we are.”
The Security Counciladjourned later that day and did not meet
againuntil the crisis had ended.
At 7:00 A.M. (EST) Friday, October 26, the U.S.S.Joseph P.
Kennedy, Jr., stopped the American-built,Panamanian-owned,
Lebanese-registered freighterMarcula. The Marcula was bound for
Cuba with aSoviet charter. It had been tracked since the previ-ous
evening. The encounter had been specificallyplanned by the White
House; it was selected as aneutral ship sailing under a Soviet
charter. The U.S.Navy stopped and searched the vessel. The
Marculacooperated with little protest, presumably underSoviet
instructions. But construction of the missilesites continued at an
increasing pace.
Kennedy stepped up the psychological and politi-cal pressure.
Low-level photo reconnaissance flightsover Cuba were increased to
one every two hours.From Florida to Washington, contingency
planswere made in the event that the United States wasforced to
bomb and invade Cuba. The State Depart-ment was ordered to proceed
w