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27Existential Threat Scenarios to the State of Israel | Ofir
Winter, Editor
The Creation of a Regional Coalition Against Israel: Obstacles
and
Warning Signs
Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
In April 2018, the IDF Strategy document was published, which
assessed that “in recent years and in looking to the coming years,
Israel’s strategic standing is solid and has a ‘positive balance
sheet’ that is better than all of its enemies in the region.”
According to the document, the implication of such a balance sheet
“diminishes the potential for war against a military-political
coalition.”1
Indeed, an analysis of the overall regional situation, which
includes Israel, and individual analyses of the states that could
be a central threat reference show that Israel is unlikely to face
a broad regional Arab-Islamic coalition in the foreseeable future
that would pose an existential—not even serious—threat to its
security. The reasons for this are varied, including the absence of
a hegemonic, conventional ideology that champions this objective;
Israel’s military advantage and the lack of sufficient military
power and resources among its potential enemies; inherent and
unbridgeable internal divisions and rifts within the Arab and
Islamic camps; great support for Israel by the United States; the
weakness of the Arab state framework and the inward focus of the
states in the region; the view among some of the Arab states that
Israel is an ally—albeit covertly—in addressing shared strategic
threats, which they see as more important than the conflict with
Israel; and the
The authors are grateful to the members of the research team:
Dr. Yoel Guzansky, Dr. Mark Heller, Dr. Gallia Lindenstrauss, Dr.
Raz Zimmt, and Mr. Assaf Shiloah for their assistance in writing
this chapter.
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28 I Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
diminished effectiveness of using Israel (the so-called “Zionist
entity”) as a scapegoat for domestic problems and for diverting
public opinion toward an external enemy.
In theory, this situation could be reversed by intense regional
changes—unlikely in the short term—such as the Arab states reducing
their focus on their internal affairs, which has characterized them
since the outset of the Arab Spring; mitigation of the Sunni-Shiite
conflict; or the fall of pragmatic regimes friendlier to Israel.
Without such processes, even extreme events that would arouse
severe anti-Israel sentiment within the public opinion in countries
throughout the region—such as intentional damage to the Al-Aqsa
Mosque, killings of large numbers of Palestinians attributed to
Israel or to Israelis, or the unilateral annexation of territories
in Judea and Samaria—are unlikely to cause the regimes to shift
their policy and create a broad regional coalition that would seek
to pose an existential threat toward Israel, although they
certainly would severely condemn Israel and undertake punitive
steps, such as recalling ambassadors and downgrading peaceful
relations.
Background: The Regional Situation in Historical
PerspectiveDuring the years 1948–1979, from the War of Independence
to the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt, there was a real
possibility that the Arab states would establish military alliances
aimed at posing an existential threat to Israel. During most of
this period, pan-Arabism, led by Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel
Nasser, and the Ba’ath parties in Syria and Iraq, dominated the
Arab world. According to this ideology, Israel is an artificial
colonialist entity that was established in the heart of the Arab
world with the West’s support to serve foreign interests. The Arab
regimes that advocated this ideology saw Israel as a threat to its
neighbors and its surroundings, and as an impediment to realizing
the long-awaited Arab unity and the yearnings of the Arab nation.
Despite the aversion expressed by the Arab monarchies, such as
Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan, toward the revolutionary regimes
that championed the pan-Arab ideology, Pan-Arabism had wide support
among the Arab population, and the monarchies were forced to toe
the line. The rifts that appeared within the pan-Arab ideological
family, especially between Egypt and Syria following the break-up
of the United Arab Republic (1967), only bolstered the struggle
against Israel as the essential “unifying glue” that helped blur
the differences between both states and leaders.
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The Creation of a Regional Coalition gainst Israel: Obstacles
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The Six-Day War was a milestone in the standing of pan-Arab
ideology. It led to processes of ideological change that had a dual
and contradictory effect on how the conflict with Israel was
perceived. On one hand, the defeat of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan on
the battlefield aroused self-criticism and accelerated the decline
of the pan-Arab ideology that had reigned during the days of
Nasser, following its total failure to realize its objectives and
aspirations in the political and military sphere. This change led
the Arab states to place greater emphasis on their own particular
interests and to reassess uncompromising positions regarding the
conflict with Israel, which harmed their own interests. On the
other hand, and in parallel, the sense of humiliation that followed
the Arab defeat in 1967 coupled with Israel’s continued control of
the territories that it had conquered strengthened anti-Israel
sentiments and increased the interest in the conflict. It
solidified the Arab world’s personal connection with the conflict
and strengthened religious aspects of the conflict; the Arab
states’ sense of self-righteousness was bolstered, as was their
commitment to continue the struggle against Israel. They continued
to deny Israel’s existence, while they cultivated animosity and
desire for revenge, and increased the demonization of Jews and of
Zionism.2 As a result, the Arab states increased the military
cooperation between them in order to reconquer the territories that
they had lost in the war and “to erase the traces of [Israeli]
aggression.” These factors contributed to the cooperation between
Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and to the
willingness of additional Arab states—such as Jordan—to send
forces, even if symbolic, to aid the war effort. In addition, the
Palestinian guerrilla struggle against Israel, which intensified
after the Six-Day War, especially from Jordanian territory, was
popularly received by the Arab street, although it received limited
support from the Arab governments.3
The partial achievements that Egypt attained in the Yom Kippur
War—which in Egyptian public opinion, with government
encouragement, erased the sense of humiliation following the 1967
defeat—contributed to the public’s willingness to consider new
courses of action in the conflict with Israel. In addition, despite
the initial surprise, the IDF’s recovery on the battlefield—with
superpower support from the United States—strengthened the
understanding, especially in Egypt, that continuing the military
struggle against Israel was futile.4 The combination of the
declining status of pan-Arabism and these processes of change led
to the gradual disintegration of
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30 I Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
the unified Arab front against Israel and increasing Arab
willingness to reach pragmatic diplomatic settlements with Israel.
During the years 1974–1977, interim agreements were concluded
between Israel and Egypt and Syria, and Jordan and Israel held
talks on reaching a territorial settlement in the West Bank, but
the understandings were limited. As a result, Jordan was pushed
from the center of the peace process, and Egypt assumed its place.5
As a result of negotiations that began following Sadat’s visit to
Jerusalem in November 1977, Egypt signed a pioneering peace
agreement with Israel in March 1979, despite broad Arab opposition.
Although this led to Egypt’s temporary removal from the Arab
League, it was the first crack in the Arab states’ united front
against Israel and in their fundamental opposition to peace,
recognition, and negotiations with it, as stated in the “Three
No’s” at the Khartoum Summit in September 1967. During the 1980s,
the Arab states’ categorical opposition to peace with Israel
continued to gradually erode, culminating with implicitly
recognizing Israel with the approval of the Fahd Plan at the Arab
League Summit held in Fez in September 1982.6
Alongside the erosion of the united front against Israel, the
cracks, fissures, and tensions in the Arab and Islamic world had
become more pronounced. In 1980, Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, began
an eight-year war against Iran, and in 1990, it invaded Kuwait, a
sister Arab state, out of economic considerations. In response,
Arab states joined the international coalition against Iraq.
Meanwhile, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of its
support, as well as the transition to a world dominated by one
superpower—the United States—led the Arab states to abandon the
idea that they could defeat Israel militarily and encouraged some
states in the region to turn to the path of peace. In October 1991,
these trends led to the Madrid Conference and later to negotiations
between Israel and its neighbors, followed by the signing of the
Oslo Accords in August 1993 and September 1995, and the peace
agreement between Israel and Jordan in 1994.7
The ideological vacuum as a result of the decline of pan-Arabism
was partly replaced with the Islamist alternative. The most
prominent representative of this ideology among the Sunnis is the
Muslim Brotherhood, which was established in Egypt in 1928 and
spread to additional states under the slogan “Islam is the
solution.” The Muslim Brotherhood called for perceiving Islam as
the source of authority for conduct in all areas of life and as the
cure for the political weakness of the Arab nation and the Islamic
community
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The Creation of a Regional Coalition gainst Israel: Obstacles
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in the modern era. The refusal to recognize the existence of a
Jewish state and the obligation of jihad to eliminate it are
fundamental principles of the Islamist ideology, and it provides a
basis for collective Arab-Islamic action against Israel. Although
the Arab public has lent support to Islamist ideas, the Islamist
parties have had difficulty assuming power. As a result, their
influence has been expressed in the establishment and flourishing
of radical non-state movements: Some are violent movements, such as
al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (Daesh), which advocate the use of
force to implement their ideology within the Arab states and do not
limit their ambitions to a single state, and some are more
social-political movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas,
and Hezbollah, which see political measures, social instruments and
religious preaching as the preferred means of achieving influence
and ultimately coming to power. These two types of movements did
not contribute to the unification of the Arab world against Israel;
rather, on the contrary.
The Arab regimes most fully expressed their acceptance of the
existence of Israel in the Arab League peace initiative of 2002, in
contrast to the Islamist forces. At the same time, many Arab
regimes have perceived Islamist forces as a threat and as their
main enemy. Iran, which has been controlled by a Shiite Islamic
regime since 1979, has served as a source of ideological,
financial, and operative inspiration for the Islamist movements and
has taken a militant stance toward Israel. Sunni regimes also have
seen Iran as a challenging, threatening, and even hostile force.
Iran’s policies have deepened the Sunni-Shiite rift in the Arab
world and have increased the significance of this schism to the
point that it has become a central issue in Arab politics and has
pushed the Arab-Israeli conflict to the margins.
The upheaval of the Arab Spring, which began at the end of 2010,
further strengthened this regional trend. While the Muslim
Brotherhood succeeded in assuming power through free elections in
Egypt in June 2012, the dominant establishment forces quickly
counter reacted with popular support, led to their overthrow and
restored the army’s hegemony. In other states, such as Syria,
Libya, and Yemen, civil wars broke out in which Islamist and
Salafi-jihadi organizations played a central role, resulting in the
formation of opposing coalitions within those states—with regional
and international support—that fought each other, thus reversing
most of their achievements vis-à-vis the regimes. Hezbollah, Iran’s
ally and proxy in Lebanon, became popular on
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32 I Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
the Arab street following the Second Lebanon War in 2006;
however, the role that it played in the civil war in Syria and
Yemen created cracks in its image as a “resistance” movement that
sees the struggle against Israel as paramount.8
With the perspective of nearly a decade, the developments of the
Arab Spring led mainly to the intensification of internal struggles
within Arab states, to their focus on rehabilitation and
stabilization of their internal situation, and to their involvement
in regional issues in which Israel is not at the center, such as
Iran, the forces of political Islam, and Salafi-jihadi
organizations. At this stage, the trends described above seem to
have created opportunities for cooperation between Israel and
states in the region rather than having created a regional
coalition against Israel. The domestic problems and regional
struggles have highlighted the shared interests that the Arab
states have with Israel, as an ally in the struggle against the
Islamist movements and Iran, and have rendered the Palestinian
problem a lower priority for the Arab states and their populations
than in the past. In these circumstances, Israel has become a
member of the regional “stability camp” along with pragmatic Sunni
Arab states, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United
Arab Emirates.9
Responses in the Arab world to important developments in the
Israeli-Palestinian arena have remained weak, including the
reactions to the ongoing deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian
diplomatic process; the Trump administration’s pressure on the
Palestinians; the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem, and the
expansion of the settlements. Saudi Arabia has pressured the
Palestinians to accept some of Israel’s demands; Egypt has
cooperated with Israel in dealing with the challenges in the Gaza
Strip and the Sinai; and even the overt normalization of relations
between Israel and the Gulf States has increased. In the past,
assumingly when the Arab regimes had domestic problems, they
employed animosity toward Israel to divert the public’s attention
and to prevent any focus on the opposition to the government. This
phenomenon has diminished considerably and seems to be partly the
result of changes in how the populations of the Arab states see the
sources of internal and external problems. Polls clearly show that
changes are taking place among the younger Arab generation, which
is exposed to new media and is not afraid to examine more critical
approaches to traditional state narratives regarding Israel.10
However, the pace of change among the
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The Creation of a Regional Coalition gainst Israel: Obstacles
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Arab population is still notably slow compared to that of the
positions of the Arab governments.
In summary, in terms of the regional picture, there is no
coalition of Arab and Islamic states on the horizon that would pose
an existential threat to Israel. Firstly, among the states there is
an absence of a hegemonic, conventional ideology that aims to
destroy Israel. Secondly, there is a lack of resources that would
enable preparing and implementing joint actions against Israel.
Thirdly, Israel has strengthened its position among some of the
Arab states as an ally in coping with domestic and external
threats; in other words, today a significant group of Arab states
sees the struggle against Israel as being far more costly than
beneficial. Finally, the idea of the struggle against Israel as a
convenient means of distracting public opinion in Arab states from
domestic problems—such as the economic, health, education, and
welfare situation, violations of human and civil rights, and
deterioration of personal security—has diminished. Instead, the
most likely military threats to Israel include a limited coalition
of non-state actors, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, perhaps with the
support of Iran and Syria.
The Situation in Prominent States in the RegionThe four states
that could pose the most severe threat to Israel, given their
military might, are Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.11 We can
add Jordan to this list, as it shares the longest border with
Israel. Even though Egypt and Jordan have stable peace agreements
with Israel, their regimes are coping with forces that challenge
their standing, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood, while they are also
trying to stabilize the economic and military spheres. Jordan
suffers from a relatively weak regime, which could enable internal
and external groups that are hostile to Israel to take over. Saudi
Arabia is armed with up-to-date American weapons, but it is largely
preoccupied with its front in Yemen, where its army has performed
poorly against the Houthi rebels. As for Iran and Turkey, they are
both Islamist powers with strong armies and ideologies that are
hostile to varying degrees toward Israel and are patrons at
differing levels of violent non-state groups that are struggling
against Israel. The danger posed by Iran to Israel is more severe
than that of Turkey, as Iran is an enemy state that openly has
declared its desire to destroy Israel; is advancing a program to
develop long-term missiles that can reach Israel; is working to
consolidate its military presence in Syria;
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is providing weapons and training to Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas,
and the Islamic Jihad; and—above all—has not given up on its
strategic ambition of attaining nuclear weapons.
EgyptExamining Egypt’s potential role in a regional coalition
against Israel is necessary due to its proximity to Israel, its
size, and the strength of its army; the fact that it sees itself as
a regional leader; its close relations with Russia; and its history
of having led joint Arab actions against Israel (namely the 1948,
1967, and 1973 wars). Egypt’s joining of a military effort would
therefore be a significant and even decisive factor in the ability
of the regional states to form an effective regional military
coalition against Israel and would pose a severe and even
existential threat to Israel.
Moreover, even though Egypt has maintained a stable peace treaty
with Israel for the past forty-one years—based on strong military,
diplomatic, and economic foundations and on the basic notion that
peace with Israel is a strategic interest for Egypt—it is a
“lukewarm” peace, which lacks a strong civilian basis and does not
include broad, multidisciplinary normalization and reconciliation
between the nations. This issue—along with Egypt’s continued
military buildup, the gradual erosion (with Israel’s consent) of
the limitations on military deployments in the Sinai Peninsula
included in the military appendix of the peace agreement, and the
fundamental hostility among a significant segment of Egypt’s
population toward Israel and any attempts to normalize relations
with it—do not completely negate the possibility of Egypt’s joining
a regional coalition against Israel in the long term. A poll of the
Arab Barometer from June 2019 shows that 54 percent of Egyptians
see Israel as the central threat to their country.12 The two
revolutions that Egypt has experienced since 2011—alongside the
challenges that continue to threaten the stability of the regime in
Cairo—serve as a warning sign that the current reality could
change, and Egypt’s policy toward Israel could be reversed.
In addition to the basic factors that increase the threat to
Israel’s peace with Egypt and create a risk that it will join a
military coalition against Israel, Egypt has experienced a series
of processes and trends in recent decades that indicate that the
risk of such a scenario is very low, at least in the foreseeable
future, and especially under the current regime. First, the
political turbulence
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The Creation of a Regional Coalition gainst Israel: Obstacles
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that Egypt has experienced since the January 2011 revolution, as
well as economic and demographic challenges, require that it focus
on domestic, economic, and internal security issues and on
stabilizing the state and the regime. Second, the status of
supra-national ideologies (pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism) has declined
in Egypt in particular and in the region in general.
Third, despite being lukewarm, the peace between Israel and
Egypt has proven over the course of four decades a strategic value
to both countries and is stable and resilient, given the wide range
of intra-Egyptian and bilateral challenges and the rounds of
serious violence between Israel and the Palestinians and between
Israel and Hezbollah. The strategic value of peace currently
includes unprecedented relations of trust and cooperation in
dealing with the shared challenges in the struggle against the
threat of Salafi-jihadi and Islamist terrorism in Sinai and the
Gaza Strip. In the diplomatic sphere, the close relations between
Israel and the administration in Washington have strengthened
Egypt’s perception of the value of peace with Israel. In the
economic sphere, the long-term natural gas deal that Egypt and
Israel signed in February 2018 increases the material value
inherent in peace—beyond its basic importance in the guarantee of
American financial aid to Egypt and the QIZ agreements (industrial
areas in Egypt, which are exempt from taxes on exports to the
United States).
Fourth, the peaceful relations between Egypt and Israel are
backed by a supportive regional axis, which includes the pragmatic
Sunni Arab states that see Israel as a partner in the struggle
against Iran and the Salafi-jihadi movements and as an anchor for
regional stability. Fifth, the deep rifts between Egypt and Turkey
and Qatar, the states of the Islamist axis, and to a lesser extent
with Iran make it very difficult for them to create a united front
against Israel.
The joining of Egypt in a military coalition against Israel
would require translating a supra-Egyptian (Arab nationalist or
religious-Islamist) sense of identity into solidarity, commitment,
and ultimately effective action. In practice, the identity
discourse that Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s regime has constructed since
the June 2013 revolution suggests an opposite trend: On one hand,
an effort has been made to form an Egyptian identity that is a
counter-image of the Islamist identity advocated by the Muslim
Brotherhood. If during the Nasser era, the “West,” “colonialism,”
or “Zionism” were the principle “other,” opposite which Egyptian
identity was constructed, today
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36 I Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
the Muslim Brotherhood fulfills that function. At the same time,
Egyptian national identity is at the center, and the idea that it
is based on a diverse mosaic of seven pillars—pharaonic,
Greco-Roman, Coptic, Islamic, Arab, Middle-Eastern, and African—is
emphasized. This identity construction is new and contrasts with
the Nasser era’s emphasis on Egypt’s Arab identity as well as with
the significance placed on the Islamic element of Egypt’s identity
by the Muslim Brotherhood. The current identity discourse, if it is
indeed incorporated, is likely to positively influence relations
between Egypt and Israel, given the religious tolerance inherent in
it, including toward Judaism, and thanks to the economic issues
that this discourse emphasizes when the shared geographical spheres
of the two states are discussed, mainly the significance of the
eastern Mediterranean with its natural gas fields.13
JordanDespite the twenty-five-year-long peace treaty between
Israel and Jordan, geopolitically the latter can still pose a
potential risk in a scenario of joining a coalition against Israel.
The reasons include the long border between the states and its
proximity to important areas in Israel; the Palestinian refugees
who make up about half of the population of Jordan, who disapprove
of recognizing Israel; and the traditional weakness of the
Jordanian regime in the face of internal and external pressures.
Historically, Jordan has repeatedly been dragged several times into
serving as a platform for collective Arab action against Israel and
has even actively participated in fighting, although generally
against both the will of its leadership and the interest of the
Hashemite Kingdom. The most dramatic example was in 1967, when King
Hussein joined the Arab coalition led by Egypt and as a result lost
the West Bank. Years later, in 1990, King Hussein supported the
president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, in the Gulf War. Because of
Jordan’s domestic and foreign weakness, King Hussein saw both cases
of cooperation with the radical Arab leaderships as an inevitable
necessity and as the best of the worst scenarios compared to other
options.14
During 2018 and 2019, the Jordanian regime’s policy toward
Israel negatively shifted. This shift occurred as a result of
Israel’s policy toward Jordan and the Palestinians but also because
of political instability and internal unrest. The internal unrest
rose from economic hardship—caused partly by the pressure placed on
resources by the flow of refugees mainly from
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Syria—and from the public’s growing distress over the country’s
corruption and growing distrust of the monarchy. These factors have
aroused resentment even among the Bedouin tribes that over the
years were considered the pillar of the Hashemite Kingdom. One of
the consequences of this internal unrest was King Abdullah’s
decision in October 2018 not to renew the “special regimes” that
were established in border areas in the peace agreement with
Israel—a step that should be seen as an attempt to satisfy the
majority of the Jordanian public who disapprove of the peace treaty
with Israel. King Abdullah took this step, even though it involved
risking Jordan’s main interest in economic and strategic
cooperation with Israel. Currently, most of this cooperation takes
place out of the public eye.15
However, despite significant pockets of opposition to peace with
Israel within the Jordanian public, and despite the weakness that
Jordan has demonstrated recently in the face of pressure, the
Jordanian royal kingdom does not have any strategic interest nor
resources to actively participate in a military coalition against
Israel. It rather cooperates with Israel against its perceived
enemies. It will presumably continue to maintain cool relations
with Israel at the public level while cultivating close and
beneficial relations at the strategic levels and will refrain from
entering an anti-Israel military coalition that could threaten its
essential interests and even its very existence. Should the current
reality continue, Jordan is likely to persist in playing the dual
role of an intermediary state that connects all the adversaries on
that side of the world while also serving as a buffer zone that
separates them.
IranAlthough Iran is not part of the Arab world, it does strive
to expand its influence in the Middle East and even to achieve
hegemonic standing there. Iran poses a threat to Israel with its
ideological approach that denies the existence of the state of
Israel, its military nuclearization efforts, and its advanced
capabilities in the field of long-range missiles. In addition, Iran
has the ability to establish military infrastructure and advanced
strategic systems (for example in the fields of missiles and
unmanned aerial vehicles for the purposes of gathering intelligence
and engaging ground targets) in states bordering Israel, namely
Lebanon and Syria. In exceptional circumstances, Iran could even
send limited military forces (usually led by the Revolutionary
Guard) beyond its borders, as it has done in Syria in recent
years.
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38 I Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
Alongside the direct Iranian threat, Iran provides extensive
military and economic aid to its proxies active in the region,
namely Hezbollah in Lebanon, the pro-Iranian Shiite militias in
Iraq, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis in Yemen, who
potentially endanger Israel’s shipping in the Red Sea. As a rule,
Iran prefers to use proxies to strengthen its regional influence in
order to shroud its direct involvement in the region and to refrain
from risking its fighters in the combat zones in which it is
involved. Iran also strives to refrain as much as possible from
direct conflict with Israel, which could lead to an Israeli attack
on targets within its territory. As a result, this decreases the
likelihood that Iran would be directly involved in an Arab
coalition against Israel by launching surface-to-surface missiles
from its territory toward Israel, and even more, by sending
military forces into combat. However, we can assume that in any
scenario of an Israeli-Arab conflict, Iran would aid the forces
fighting against Israel as much as it could.
TurkeyTurkey could pose a significant threat to Israel on its
own—having the second largest army in NATO after the United States
and consistently investing some two percent of its GDP in military
spending, in accordance with NATO states commitments—and as part of
a broader coalition. But despite these capabilities, it is doubtful
that Turkey has active hostile intentions toward Israel, beyond the
rhetorical level. From a rational perspective, Turkey has no
interest in engaging in conflict with Israel, as it is a status-quo
player that is interested in increasing stability in the Middle
East in order to increase its trade with the region. NATO is also a
factor, restricting Turkey from becoming an enemy state that would
exercise military force against Israel. Although the Mavi Marmara
incident in Gaza waters in 2010 demonstrated the possibility of a
direct confrontation between Israel and Turkey, the fact that no
similar events have occurred since then supports the supposition
that even though Turkey and Israel have had adversarial relations,
Turkey clearly has not allowed its relations to further
deteriorate. Although the eastern Mediterranean has the potential
for conflict between the two countries, following the discovery of
energy resources there and the ongoing conflict with Cyprus, the
nature of a conflict in the sub-region most likely would result in
gunboat diplomacy and not reach outright conflict.
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As for the internal Turkish arena, the regime believes that it
is still in danger and that the struggle following the failed coup
attempt in July 2016 is not yet over. The narrative promoted by
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his supporters is that since
Erdoğan’s rise to power, Turkey has become too strong in the view
of the West, and, therefore, the Western states (including Israel)
are working together to weaken it. This narrative is based on
anti-Israel views that already exist among the Turkish public, and
the regime fosters them. Indeed, in public opinion polls conducted
in Turkey during recent years, the vast majority of respondents
have expressed a negative opinion of Israel16 and have considered
Israel “one of the central threats to Turkey.17 Although
anti-Israel sentiment is a convenient platform for adopting a
militant policy—if Erdoğan were interested in such—so far it has
only been channeled into a policy of non-violently challenging
Israel.
A scenario in which Turkey becomes a revisionist force18 like
Iran would be exceptional, considering its history and Ataturk’s
legacy. Even though Erdoğan and his supporters are undermining
Ataturk’s legacy in many areas, when it comes to foreign policy
toward the Middle East, they seem to have less leeway, as this is a
system full of regional powers with opposing and restraining
aspirations. Turkey’s withdrawal from NATO would clearly reflect
revisionist conceptions, but currently Turkey has made no signs of
this. Furthermore, unlike declarations regarding the possibility of
stopping the negotiations with Brussels over Turkey’s joining the
European Union, Ankara has not made any similar declarations
regarding withdrawal from NATO.
Saudi ArabiaThe likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining an Arab
coalition against Israel is low due to a number of circumstances
and conditions, mainly that the two states are both in the
pro-American camp in the region and share concerns about Iran’s
intentions and activities. Despite this optimistic situation
assessment and the strategic opportunities inherent in it for
Israel, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia is
characterized by risk-taking, and, thus, it is difficult to predict
its future actions. While Saudi Arabia’s unpredictable behavior has
advantages for deterring Iran, as of 2019, the costs of this policy
for the kingdom have outweighed its achievements and have increased
its vulnerability. In addition, while Israel’s cooperation with
the
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40 I Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
kingdom has borne some fruit, its strategic value should not be
exaggerated nor should Israel be overly dependent upon it.
The Iranian threat is the main common denominator between Saudi
Arabia and Israel. The struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia is
mainly indirect, but the two states also engage in a direct
struggle that includes mutual attempts at subversion using various
means. Saudi Arabia has significant economic capabilities, a
certain ability to do damage, and the means to prompt third parties
to take action. In addition, Saudi Arabia (along with the United
Arab Emirates and, to a lesser extent, Israel) sees the
pro-Islamist axis, led by Turkey and Qatar, as a threat to its
standing and stability and is working against it. Israel and Saudi
Arabia are also active in other arenas of shared interest, such as
the Syrian-Lebanese arena and that of the Red Sea.
However, several factors make Saudi Arabia a poor ally. In the
regional domain, the kingdom’s standing has been harmed by the
failure of some of bin Salman’s actions, such as his attempt to
lead an effective Arab boycott of Qatar and his involvement in the
civil war in Yemen. In the international sphere, Saudi Arabia’s
connection with Israel does not replace the strategic relationship
that it has with the United States, upon which it is dependent to a
certain extent. In the military realm, although the kingdom’s
military budget is among the largest in the world, its military
power remains limited because its army is small and untrained and
relies upon foreigners. Furthermore, it is very vulnerable due to
its long and porous borders. Internally, bin Salman—the ruler in
practice—has yet to stabilize his rule. This process will take
time, and it is rife with dangers. Additional risks for Israel are
posed by the Saudi buildup of modern conventional and
unconventional weapons. In the conventional field, Saudi Arabia
desires to acquire high-quality weapons, especially
surface-to-surface missiles, attack UAVs, and precision-guided
munitions; in the nuclear field, Saudi Arabia openly desires to
acquire nuclear power reactors and insists on maintaining the
option of enriching uranium. These capabilities might pose
significant risks to Israel, if Saudi Arabia becomes a hostile
state.
Possible Causes for the Emergence of Regional ThreatsAn analysis
of the regional situation in general and of the states that could
potentially threaten Israel in particular shows that the formation
of a regional military coalition against Israel in the foreseeable
future is unlikely. Moreover,
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The Creation of a Regional Coalition gainst Israel: Obstacles
and Warning Signs I 41
significant changes to the existing regimes and their guiding
agenda would have to occur for this assessment to change. However,
when analyzing the security pillars that stave off the formation of
a regional military coalition that seeks to destroy Israel, several
possible turning points could be considered. These turning points
could, in the future, lead to changes in the current trend and
generate or accelerate processes that create threat scenarios or at
least increase their likelihood. These turning points are as
follows:
The undermining of the stability of the pragmatic Arab regimes
(Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia)One of the most significant
anchors that prevent the formation of a regional coalition against
Israel is its strategic relations with states in the region, based
on a variety of shared interests: a pro-American orientation; the
desire to reduce Iran’s influence; the struggle against the
Islamist and Salafi-jihadist movements; and the quest for stability
and economic well-being. These common interests between Israel and
the region’s states could change following the fall of rulers and
regimes and the rise of leaders or forces with an alternative
agenda that is hostile to Israel, such as an Islamist agenda. In
Egypt, for example, five years after the Muslim Brotherhood was
outlawed, defined as “terrorists,” and denounced, about a third of
the public still has “somewhat positive” opinions about the Muslim
Brotherhood, and it still serves as a prominent political
alternative to the existing order.19 In addition, the rise of
Islamists in one state could affect other states in the region.
Furthermore, the very existence of a real threat to the stability
of the pragmatic Arab regimes—certainly if it is accompanied by a
serious escalation of events in the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians, the worsening of economic and social challenges, or a
fundamental change in the web of shared interests with Israel—could
also lead these regimes to renew the old practice of trying to
channel internal public anger toward Israel, the external enemy,
despite its limited effectiveness since the Arab Spring.
Israel’s main concern of an upheaval in the Arab states focuses
on its two neighboring partners in peace, Egypt and Jordan. The two
countries could change their policy toward Israel should two
developments occur: first, if they respond to internal political
pressure to fulfill a role—even if symbolic—in a campaign against
Israel, including one that is organized and led by others; second,
if a regime change occurs, which leads to significant
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42 I Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
redefining of the state’s strategic interests. As for Jordan, in
both possible scenarios, it could become a platform for action
against Israel, if not an active participant. The likelihood of
such developments is difficult to estimate. Since the 1940s,
assessments about the instability of Jordan’s regime and its
impending collapse have been repeatedly unfounded. The regime even
successfully avoided the wave of revolutions that other Arab states
experienced after 2011 as part of the Arab Spring (in part by
sacrificing prime ministers—a step that repeatedly has served as a
replacement for painful reforms). Of course, a regime’s ability to
survive thus far does not guarantee that it will be successful in
the future, but it does demand that predictions of the imminent
demise of the royal house be more cautious. In addition, despite
its challenges, the Hashemite Kingdom has succeeded in maintaining
a cool but constructive relationship with Israel, based in part on
Jordan’s dependence upon Israel for water and energy. The cutting
of all sources of foreign economic aid withstanding, it is
difficult to imagine any event—except for an especially outrageous
Israeli provocation—that would fundamentally change the dynamic of
the relations between the two states.
Another concern is that regime changes could lead to the
development of cooperation between the new regimes and more distant
regional powers, especially Iran and Turkey. Without any change of
government in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, it is difficult to imagine a
scenario of Turkish-Arab military cooperation against Israel,
beyond continued Turkish diplomatic support for Hamas. In addition,
it is more likely that Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and even Greece
and Cyprus would cooperate in order to block Turkey from expanding
its influence in the Middle East and in the eastern Mediterranean.
Even if another revolution occurs in Egypt and a leader from the
Muslim Brotherhood assumes power, we can suppose that—as during the
rule of President Mohamed Morsi—it would not necessarily lead to
harmonious relations between Turkey and Egypt but rather to
competition over regional leadership. Large-scale Iranian-Turkish
military cooperation against Israel also appears unlikely given the
competition between these two regional powers for influence in the
region and given Iran’s preference for operating via proxies.
Revisionist conceptions would be evident if Turkey were to withdraw
from NATO, which would enable it to more freely engage in activity
against Israel.
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The Creation of a Regional Coalition gainst Israel: Obstacles
and Warning Signs I 43
The erosion of Israel’s military and technological advantage The
Arabs’ lack of motivation to engage in military action against
Israel can be also contributed to Israel’s military power and the
Arab states’ relative weakness. These two factors have greatly
strengthened Israel’s deterrence. Israel’s qualitative military
edge (QME) is based on its advanced weapons and trained
high-quality personnel, in addition to the commitment of the United
States to maintain Israel’s QME. As for the weakness of the Arab
armies, to some extent, this is a result of the events of the Arab
Spring. In states that have experienced civil strife, such as
Syria, Libya, and Yemen, the armies have collapsed or have focused
on internal security and fighting rebels, thus neglecting classical
military capabilities. States that have maintained their military
establishment, such as Egypt, have prioritized their focus on
internal security and fighting subversive elements over maintaining
their military competence vis-à-vis other state militaries.
However, we must not ignore the threat to Israel’s qualitative edge
as a result of the advanced weapon systems (American, European,
Chinese, and Russian) that some Arab states have acquired.
Indeed, there are signs that some elements of Israel’s
qualitative edge are possibly eroding due to the buildup of
different armed forces in the region, especially those of Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran. These states all seek to obtain
some sort of regional leadership, which can be achieved partly by
building up an offensive military force. This buildup is possible
because the United States has removed previous limitations on
providing certain categories of weapons to states that it considers
allies, such as Egypt and the Arab Gulf states, some of which have
considerable financial resources and because Russia and China are
developing weapon systems in innovative categories, such as missile
defense, terminally guided munitions, and attack UAVs.
States in the region, US allies or foes, enjoy these
technological developments in Russia and China, which compete with
those of the United States and Israel. Neither Russia nor China are
hesitant to provide advanced technologies to Arab states including
Israel’s adversaries; they are even willing to sell weapons systems
to countries whose main source of procurement is the United States,
but it refuses to sell them so that Israel can maintain its
qualitative edge.20 These processes do not pose an immediate threat
to Israel, as a result of several factors, including the IDF’s
simultaneous buildup of its
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44 I Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
own capabilities; the current preferences of most of the
region’s regimes to maintain strategic relations with Israel
(Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) or to challenge Israel mostly via
proxies (Iran) or through non-military means (Turkey); the focus of
these states on internal security problems; the lack of sufficient
common denominators unifying the region’s states, which are divided
among themselves; and the international commitments of the states
mentioned above (peace agreements with Israel in the case of Egypt
and Jordan and Turkey’s NATO membership).
Changes in the military balance and political shifts in the Arab
states could alter their preferences and considerations in the
future. For example, changes in the balance of capabilities between
Israel and its neighbors—from improving the level of their human
capital to significantly reducing the technological gaps—could, in
theory, erode Israel’s deterrence and also affect the balance of
intentions. Factors that could accelerate such changes include a
serious undermining of the US commitment to maintain Israel’s
qualitative edge over its neighbors; the end of US military aid to
Israel; a brain drain from Israel and the dwindling of Israel’s
human capital due to socialeconomic reasons; a significant
improvement in the human capital, military technology, and the
force capabilities of militaries in the region; or an external
military force from out of the region with advanced weapons (such
as the Russian army) joining an anti-Israel regional coalition.
Undermining international support for Israel Relations with the
international community, and especially with the United States, are
a significant component of Israel’s security. They are manifested
by the economic relations with the Western states, extensive
international support for Israel, recognition of Israel’s right to
exist, and US diplomatic and military support. These relations
assist Israel in building up its military and diplomatic power,
strengthening the pragmatic regional trends of recognizing Israel
as an undeniable fact, and as a mitigating element that reduces a
regional coalition against Israel from developing, in part, due to
the dependence of the regional states on the West in general and
the United States in particular. Consequently, a shift in Israel’s
standing in Washington and a significant change in American aid to
Egypt and Jordan could diminish the importance that regional
leaders attribute to the peace agreements with Israel.
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The Creation of a Regional Coalition gainst Israel: Obstacles
and Warning Signs I 45
Processes of international isolation, erosion of Israel’s
legitimacy in the international community, and undermining its
moral backing would weaken Israel’s power in the diplomatic,
military, and economic spheres; increase its vulnerability; and
could encourage regional forces to act against Israel—whether
motivated by ideology or specific interests. Israel’s international
standing is mainly influenced by its historic relationship with the
United States—a relationship that is being challenged today because
of a range of intra-American processes, including support for
Israel’s policies having become a topic of dispute rather than
consensus between the Democratic and Republican parties; the rise
of new forces that are threatening the historic alliance between
Israel and the United States; the focus on “America first” at the
expense of the US role in the Middle East; and the weakening of the
connection between Israel and American Jewry.
Developments in the international system and in the balance of
power between the world powers could also harm Israel’s
international support. The main threat lies in the weakening of the
United States, the strengthening of Russia, and particularly in
China’s becoming the main competitor of the United States. In
certain parameters, especially the economy, China is expected to
surpass the United States in the not-too-distant future. The United
States is a cornerstone of international support for Israel, and
its weakening would immediately affect Israel, given the absence of
another global power that is willing and able to take its
place.
Support of a global power for an Arab coalition against Israel
Russia and China are the two main global powers besides the United
States. Russia, unlike its precursor the Soviet Union, maintains a
balanced relationship with both Israel and the regional states that
are hostile to Israel. The most prominent example is Russia’s
policy in Syria, which demonstrates that Russia acts mainly
according to its interests. Currently, it is extremely difficult to
imagine a scenario in which Russia would have an interest in
joining an Arab coalition aimed at harming Israel. Similarly, China
maintains very good relations with Israel, even though it has
interests—mainly energy related—requiring it to maintain good
relations with both the Arab world and Iran. Moreover, China’s
foreign policy typically has refrained from aiding or joining
forces against another state in regions outside of Southeast Asia,
as it does not have any central strategic interest to do so.
Consequently, the
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46 I Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
probability that China would actively support a regional
coalition against Israel is very low, even lower than that of
Russia. Before such scenarios could be considered, immense changes
would need to occur in the nature and mode of Russia’s policies and
activities—and certainly of China’s.
The disintegration of Israeli society Israel society is still
considered a cohesive one, with a high level of social solidarity,
especially in the face of external threats during times of war and
crises. However, the growing societal and political rifts could
negatively affect the way that Israel’s enemies perceive it. A loss
of solidarity involves two main dangers: First, the polarization in
Israeli society could intensify and accelerate a brain drain and
the transfer of resources outside of Israel, thus weakening its
ability to cope with external threats; second, the undermining of
Israel’s internal cohesion could affect its deterrent reputation in
the eyes of its neighbors and could lead to hostile actions against
it. In this context, the aspirations of different states in the
Middle East to attain the status of regional leadership should be
noted, as these countries could see the perceived disintegration of
Israeli society as an opportunity.
Unexpected extreme eventsExtreme events could affect some Arab
relations with Israel due to the gap between the regimes’ pragmatic
approach toward Israel and the hostility of significant segments of
the public. Consequently, events that could stoke public rage in
these states—such as damaging al-Aqsa Mosque or the mass killing of
Palestinian civilians, which might be attributed to Israel—could
cause friendly Arab regimes to adjust to the public mood and take a
more forceful stance toward Israel. In addition, widespread
demonstrations along the fence and attempts to penetrate into
Israel from the Gaza Strip—if hundreds of thousands of people
participate—could pose a serious challenge for Israel, although
Israel has proven thus far that it has reasonable technological and
military responses to such threats. Even though the toll of coping
with these threats could be heavy in terms of both diplomacy and
public morale, they do not pose an existential threat. The
likelihood that these incidents would immediately lead to the
establishment of a regional military coalition against Israel is
very low, but they could turn volatile if they are accompanied by
serious undermining of Israel’s central security pillars (as
previously
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The Creation of a Regional Coalition gainst Israel: Obstacles
and Warning Signs I 47
mentioned) or if they lead to such changes, accelerate them, or
catalyze their development.
Conclusion and RecommendationsThe situation in the region and in
the different states indicates that the likelihood of a regional
military coalition against Israel emerging in the foreseeable
future is very low, especially without sweeping changes in the
regimes and in Israel’s relations with the United States. Potential
turning points that could shift the current assessment include the
possibility of erosion of Israel’s qualitative military and
technological edge; deterioration of the strategic relationship
between Israel and the United States as well as with the pragmatic
regimes in the region, and the break down of Israel’s social
solidarity. Therefore, the following steps should be taken to
maintain and strengthen Israel’s security pillars vis-à-vis the
scenario of a regional coalition against it:
1. Strengthening the region’s pragmatic camp and weakening the
radical camp. Israel must strive to enhance its strategic relations
with Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states, and help strengthen the
stability of their regimes. Israel has an interest in its neighbors
having pragmatic, friendly, and stable regimes that enjoy domestic
and international legitimacy. This interest relates mainly to the
states that belong to the “stability” camp, mainly Egypt, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In the short term and
medium term, these states do not pose a concrete threat to Israel
and sometimes even serve as overt or covert partners in struggles
against regional forces that do threaten stability, such as Iran,
Hamas, Hezbollah, branches of the Islamic State, and, to a lesser
extent, Turkey and Qatar.
At the same time, Israel’s influence on the processes of
stabilization or destabilization in the Middle East is notably
limited for several reasons. The main factors that influence the
stability of the region’s states are internal (economic, political,
ethnic), and Israel’s ability to affect them is slight, if not
nonexistent. In addition, Israel tends, and justly so, to refrain
from using military force in attempts to overthrow or install
regimes, especially since its failed attempt in the First Lebanon
War. Moreover, Israel has little influence on the relations between
Arab regimes and the international community. Consequently, Israel
must also continue to prepare for the unwanted and dangerous
possibility that pragmatic leaders and regimes might fall,
states
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48 I Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
will become chaotic, and leaderships supportive of peace will be
replaced by hostile ones.
Despite the understanding that Israel has little influence on
the processes that endanger the stability of states in the region
and its leverage is limited, it can employ several measures:
provision of diplomatic support—preferably discreet—in
strengthening the legitimacy of pragmatic regimes via its
connections in Washington and other capitals around the world;
military, security, and intelligence cooperation with the pragmatic
regimes against destabilizing elements in their states; provision
of material aid as well as knowledge and experts for coping with
domestic, economic, and infrastructural challenges that could
threaten the stability and public standing of the pragmatic
regimes; advancement of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process that
would strengthen regional stability, enable regional processes of
integration between Israel and its neighbors, strengthen the
foundations of peace, and undermine radical ideological and
political forces, which are buttressed by the ethos of the struggle
against Israel in order to castigate pragmatic regimes and
undermine the stability of the region and its states.
Israel should focus on the arenas in which it has the greatest
ability to influence; that is, mainly vis-à-vis Jordan and the
Palestinian Authority—two relatively small entities that are close
to Israel. It is recommended that emphasis should especially be
placed on Jordan. The erosion of the standing of the Hashemite
royal house in recent years; the economic, social, and demographic
challenges that the kingdom faces; the long border shared with
Israel; and a significant Palestinian population within Jordan
could significantly threaten Israel, but these factors can also be
seen as an opportunity. Unlike Egypt, given the relatively small
size of Jordan and its problems, Israel can more effectively help
improve its stability. As for the Palestinians, Israel’s ability to
influence that arena is even greater. Israel can affect their
balance of motivations in the military, economic, and diplomatic
spheres. It can also influence Palestinian political developments
by strengthening “positive” (moderate) Palestinian elements while
working against “negative” (extremist) ones.
As for Saudi Arabia, its regional and domestic difficulties
should dampen Israel’s enthusiasm for the regional perspectives
that tout Riyadh as the backbone of the Sunni camp, which—alongside
Israel—is taking on Iran and is seen also as being able to help
advance a breakthrough in the diplomatic
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The Creation of a Regional Coalition gainst Israel: Obstacles
and Warning Signs I 49
process with the Palestinians. All scenarios that undermine the
Saudi regime are negative for Israel. The possibility that the
kingdom will become a failed state or be ruled by a hostile regime
would endanger the US position in the Middle East and subsequently
harm Israel. Furthermore, it is feared that Saudi Arabia’s advanced
weapons would reach hostile forces, which then would direct them
against Israel. Beyond the possible harm to the limited cooperation
between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the undermining of the kingdom’s
stability would send shockwaves that could affect stable regimes,
mainly those of Jordan and Egypt, in which Israel has an interest
in their preservation. In addition, the more vulnerable the Saudi
kingdom is internally, the less capable it will be of publicly
cooperating with Israel, if only because it will seek to appease
the different groups that criticize its relations with Israel and
could challenge its stability. In the scenario of an internal coup,
assuming that the kingdom is still ruled by a regime that operates
according to the rules of realpolitik, the objective interest of
cooperation with Israel would likely be maintained. Therefore,
Israel and the Western states must ask themselves what should be
done to help the Saudi royal house survive, and how should they
operate if Saudi Arabia is weakened and becomes a less significant
actor in the pragmatic camp facing Iran.
In addition to strengthening the regimes in the pragmatic
“stability” camp, Israel must continue its campaign to weaken the
military buildup of the radical camp (Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and
Hamas) and work to reduce Turkey’s influence in the region. It
should be noted, however, that unequivocally stating that Turkey is
an “enemy state” is not beneficial, and allocating resources to the
struggle against it should be done with extreme caution so that the
damage of such an action does not outweigh its benefit. As long as
Turkey does not become an active enemy of Israel, the emphasis
needs to be on preventing any escalating hostility between the two
states. Israel can strengthen alliances with other states in the
eastern Mediterranean basin, especially Greece and Cyprus, but not
at the expense of relations with Turkey. Furthermore, Israel does
not need to express hostile intentions toward Turkey; rather,
Israel should create deterrence against Ankara and prepare the
ground for coordination and cooperation should Turkey manifest
aggression toward Israel.
2. Improving Israel’s regional standing. Israel must work to
strengthen its significance and utility as an ally to the regional
states, improve its image
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50 I Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
among the populations in the neighboring Arab states—especially
Egypt and Jordan—and emphasize the fruits of peaceful relations
with it. Israel can do this by improving its public diplomacy
vis-à-vis the public opinion in the Arab states and by striving to
enhance and expand normalization and cooperation in the military,
economic, technological, infrastructural, and environmental
spheres. Israel would do well in successfully changing its branding
from being a regional “threat” to an “asset,” and it should
allocate dedicated resources for this. Israel can help provide
solutions to regional problems, thanks to its soft power on shared
issues, such as water technologies, desert agriculture, renewable
energy, employment, health, science, and innovation. A peace that
is mainly conducted between leaderships and armies and does not
have strong popular and civilian foundations will have eventually
difficulty surviving crises, revolutions, and changes of regimes
and rulers. Advancing a solution to the Palestinian problem, if
possible, is likely to greatly contribute to reducing the
traditional hostility in the Middle East toward Israel and to
advancing normalization with greater legitimacy, while weakening
popular and institutional motivations for engaging in military
action against Israel.
3. Steps for preparing for extreme events. Israel should improve
the protection of religious holy sites, especially the al-Aqsa
Mosque and its compound; form a strategic diplomatic umbrella that
includes regional elements; and create shared protection mechanisms
between Israel and the Arab and Islamic states for these sites.
Israel should prioritize the fight against terrorism, including
Jewish terrorism; refine military procedures that help minimize
killings of uninvolved citizens as part of the asymmetric fight
against Palestinian terrorism and Hezbollah; and create permanent
steering committees that are responsible for predicting extreme
events, preparing for them, and preventing them.
4. Fostering the bipartisan relationship with the United
States—in accordance with the recommendations in chapter 4.
5. Fostering Israel’s internal resilience and fostering the
social solidarity of its residents—in accordance with the
recommendations in chapter 5.
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The Creation of a Regional Coalition gainst Israel: Obstacles
and Warning Signs I 51
Notes1 Chief of Staff’s Office, The IDF’s Strategy (April 2018),
13, https://www.idf.il/
media/34416/strategy.pdf [Hebrew].2 Yehoshafat Harkabi, ed. Arab
Lessons From Their Defeat, 3rd ed. (Tel Aviv: Am
Oved, 1972), 12–17, 35 [Hebrew]; Yossi Amitai, Egypt-Israel – A
Look From the Left (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, Haifa University, 1999),
163 [Hebrew]; Shimon Shamir, Egypt under Sadat: The Search for a
New Orientation (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1978),188–189 [Hebrew].
3 ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Hamza, Secrets of King Hussein’s Positions and
Decisions (Cairo, np, 1999), 125.
4 Shamir, Egypt under Sadat, 77–79; Yoram Meital, Egypt’s
Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change 1967–1977 (Gainseville:
University Press of Florida, 1997), 133–134.
5 Yossi Melman, A Hostile Partnership: The Secret Relations
Between Israel and Jordan (Tel Aviv: Mitam, 1987), 88–99
[Hebrew].
6 Avraham Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle
East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1998), 274–279, 280, 284,
293–294.
7 Ibid., 327–328, 335–337.8 Udi Dekel, Nir Boms, and Ofir
Winter, Syria’s New Map and New Actors: Challenges
and Opportunities for Israel (Tel Aviv: Institute for National
Security Studies, 2016), 18, https://www.inss.org.il/wp
content/uploads/ systemfiles/memo156_5.pdf.
9 On the concept of the “stability camp,” see Eran Lerman, “The
Keystone: Sisi, Egyptian Stability and the Future of the Eastern
Mediterranean, Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security,”
October 26, 2018, https://bit.ly/3bOuXRf.
10 Moomen Sallam and Ofir Winter, “Egypt and Israel: Forty Years
in the Desert of Cold Peace,” Strategic Assessment 20, no. 3
(October 2017): 25-28,
https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/egypt-and-israel.pdf.
11 According to the “2019 Military Strength Ranking,” GFP,
https://bit.ly/2AsSd9c. 12 “The Arab World in Seven Charts: Are
Arabs Turning Their Backs on Religion?,”
BBC News, June 24, 2019, https://bbc.in/2X26KPk. 13 Ofir Winter
and Assaf Shiloah, “Egypt’s Identity during the el-Sisi Era:
Profile of
the New Egyptian,” Strategic Assessment 21, no. 4 (January
2019): 65–78, https://bit.ly/2X7GarE.
14 Melman, Hostile Partnership, 63.15 Gilead Sher and Mor
Ben-Kalifa, “Challenge to the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty,”
INSS Insight no. 1102, October 28, 2018,
https://bit.ly/2X0fOIf.16 Jacob Poushter, “The Turkish People Don’t
Look Favorably Upon the U.S., or Any
Other Country, Really,” Pew Research Center, October 31, 2014,
https://pewrsr.ch/305SszF.
https://www.inss.org.il/wp content/uploads/
systemfiles/memo156_5.pdfhttps://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/egypt-and-israel.pdfhttps://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/egypt-and-israel.pdfhttps://bit.ly/2AsSd9chttps://bbc.in/2X26KPkhttps://pewrsr.ch/305SszFhttps://pewrsr.ch/305SszF
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52 I Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter
17 “2017 Kadir Has University: Survey on Social and Political
Trends in Turkey,” Kadir Has University, January 31, 2018,
https://bit.ly/2H89mX4.
18 For more on revisionist forces, see Randall L. Schweller,
“Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,”
International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 72–107,
https://bit.ly/2VQ4eg5.
19 David Pollock, “In Egypt, One-Third Still Like the Muslim
Brotherhood; Half Call U.S. Ties ‘Important,’” Washington
Institute, December 10, 2018,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/in-egypt-one-third-still-like-the-muslim-brotherhood-half-call-u.s.-ties-im.
20 See, for example, Eldad Shavit and Gallia Lindenstrauss, “At
a Boiling Point? Growing Tensions over Ankara’s Determination to
Acquire the S-400, INSS Insight no. 1157, April 2, 2019,
https://bit.ly/2UyJdHI.
https://bit.ly/2H89mX4https://bit.ly/2VQ4eg5https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/in-egypt-one-third-still-like-the-muslim-brotherhood-half-call-u.s.-ties-imhttps://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/in-egypt-one-third-still-like-the-muslim-brotherhood-half-call-u.s.-ties-imhttps://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/in-egypt-one-third-still-like-the-muslim-brotherhood-half-call-u.s.-ties-im
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