The Coup of Brumaire

Introduction

The Coup of Brumaire is widely regarded as the moment of Napoleon Bonaparte’s

ascension to power. Although he amassed an extravagant amount of fame and followers as a

result of his successful military service, the coup d’état served to solidify his position and control

of France. While many of the men and women that lived during this significant time in French

history may not have been able to foresee such an occasion, historians always have the benefit of

retrospect in order to understand how such events happened. Antoine-Claire Thibaudeau, a

French revolutionary politician who lived during the time of Napoleon, knew firsthand that

Napoleon was gifted in the way he “identified the weaknesses of his adversaries’ opinions,” not

only in the battlefield, but in the field of politics as well. Thibaudeau wrote that “We were far

from expecting that a man of his age, who had lived in camps, would develop such sense and

aptitude in [such] matters” (Blaufarb, 55).

What I intend to demonstrate is that, based on the conditions of France after the fall of the

Old Regime, throughout the revolutionary period which followed, and finally during the period

of Directorial descent, all the prerequisites were present for the ego-driven General Napoleon to

come to power on 18 Brumaire (November 9th, 1799). Constant revolution in France had tired

the people into borderline apathy. The continual struggle to push France’s borders further

outward into neighboring European states, while economically battling England, had drained

France and put it into a position where it needed to adapt dramatically or risk losing any

remaining chances at hegemony against England – the French opted to work towards the fiscal

and political stability. Every month, every week, and every day from 1795 up to 1799 played a

role in bringing Napoleon to power. Perhaps the Directory was too corrupt and focused on its

own personal gains to ward off Napoleon’s rise. As the 1797 Treaty of Campo-Formio, showed,

he was certainly capable of going over the heads of the Directory, but they undoubtedly

attempted to keep him abroad and at war in order to avoid losing the control that they had.

Despite their efforts, “The Directory could hardly have done more to prepare the way for

Bonaparte if that had been its deliberate intention” (Morton, 22).

At first, this study will quickly and comprehensively cover the French Revolution up to

the Thermidorean overthrow of Robespierre on July 27th, 1974 (9 Thermidore) and the aspects

which served to drive the Revolution forward. Next, I will examine the Directory’s rule from

1795 to 1799 in greater depth for its financial, political, and international problems which helped

pave the way for the rise of Napoleon. An analysis of the forthcoming of 18 Brumaire would not

be complete without taking into account the launch of Napoleon’s career following the uprising

that took place on 13 Vendémiaire (October 5th, 1975). As such, this study will cover the rise of

Napoleon from 1795 up through his expedition into Egypt and onward to the subsequent Coup of

Brumaire. It is also essential to observe the state of France during 1799, not only before

Napoleon’s return from Egypt to Provence on October 13th, but also up to the Coup of Brumaire.

French crises such as economic flaws, military problems, and political strife must all be taken

into account not only in the early stages of the revolution, but directly before 18 Brumaire. In

fact, among the aforementioned causes of the 18 Brumaire, a “’Social’ fear dominated the history

of the Directory and served as a pretext for the eighteenth of Brumaire” (Lefebvre, 6) and it

requires analysis as well. Finally, this work will analyze the coup d’état in its entirety, including

the planning, how it took place, and the ensuing results, before drawing some major conclusions

pertaining to the significance of 18 Brumaire such as the necessity of the coup and what

immediate impact it had upon France.

Chapter One: A Falling Old Regime to a Falling Robespierre

There were many flaws in the organization of the Old Regime which led to the beginning

of the French Revolution in 1789. These are important to note because the resentment which

they created in the peasant and bourgeoisie population is what fueled the Revolution, which led

to the Coup of Brumaire. One may allocate the most important flaws into two categories:

administrative problems, which caused financial issues, and class imbalance. Political

difficulties such as a weak system of absolutism and a diluted administrative system undoubtedly

discredited the monarchy, but a large catalyst for the Revolution was the poor balancing of its

budget and inability to manage taxes. France’s competition with its European neighbors was the

largest expense. When coupled with domestic difficulties, the cost of external defense and

attempts at economic hegemony became a difficulty for France, particularly with England.

France’s role in the Seven Years War (1756-1763) was a source of exhaustion of its resources,

which saw no revitalization for contributions to America’s subsequent victory.

At home, the monarchy faced the problem of trying to finance its domestic endeavors.

To collect taxes, the monarchy established a large, though incredibly inefficient, administrative

network which spanned all of the provinces. The largest flaw with this network was the fact that

each province (and in some cases, each town) had differing laws and privileges which pertained

to taxation. On top of inefficient tax collection, there was the issue of the collectors being

wealthy persons who had a habit of extracting as much money as possible from the population

that they were in charge of. While these collectors undoubtedly were effective in creating a

consistent flow of income for the government, they only provided the minimum amount required

by their agreement with Versailles. This exploitation created a great amount of resentment

among the commoners, “which made up 97 percent of the population” (Popkin, 11).

During the Old Regime, three estates comprised the French population: the peasants, the

nobility, and the clergy. The clergy and the nobility were elevated above the peasantry in their

privileges. Despite the oath of poverty and charitable intentions that one would expect from a

religion, the Catholic Church had a questionable distribution of wealth and land ownership, with

little of the finances used for the benefit of their poorer followers. The nobility received

exemption from some of the higher taxes which drained the peasant population’s resources, as

well as inherited titles bestowed by the monarchy, and offices gained via nepotism. On the other

end of the spectrum, a wide array of levies, such as road tolls, along with the exploited

government taxation, burdened the peasantry. The only section of the peasant estate that was

actually wealthy was the bourgeoisie, which contained lawyers, bankers, merchants, and other

professionals with higher incomes or greater education. The bourgeois population’s disdain for

the privileges of the nobility and the teachings of the church were essential for the progress of

the French Revolution.

Contempt for the privileges of the clergy and nobility increased once the knowledge of

the Enlightenment appeared to the public. People began to apply the works of philosophes to the

societal problems of France, leading people to question Catholic dogmatism towards life style

choices and favoritism in promotions and attainment of offices. The increase in public

institutions for discussion led to the rise of new opinions which did not derived from the

monarchy and did not depend on how high of an office a person held. This growth in public

forums and periodicals allowed greater discussion of the financial shortfalls of the Old Regime

and class imbalances and the forging of the French Revolution from the expressions of the

underprivileged population.

Skipping ahead, the public discontent with the government and class imbalance came to

culmination on July 14th, 1789 during the storming of the Bastille. The establishment of the

National Assembly and the fall of the Bastille marked the beginning of the Revolution. Six

weeks later, the Assembly did away with the privileges that had been hindering effective change,

including the tithes, immunity of deputies, and the sale of public offices, the last of which finally

allowed the clergy and government positions to be accessible to all citizens. On August 26th,

1789, the Assembly began establishing the seventeen articles of the Declaration of Rights of

Man and Citizen. This document defined a new French society based on legal equality and

individual rights with a government based on the people’s participation in making laws and

approving financial aspects such as taxes and expenditures. This was a critical switch from the

absolutist system of the Old Regime, as it protected the rights of the people from arbitrary arrest,

religious persecution, and opportunities lost to a social system based on hierarchy and privilege.

This was the beginning of the Liberal (bourgeois) stage of the revolution, which favored

educated property owners, a one house legislative with a suspensive veto for the King, and

voting rights only for active citizens.

An important establishment by the Assembly during the liberal stage was the attempted

reform of the Catholic Church via the Civil Constitution of the Clergy of July 1790. The

government decided that, because it was taking the responsibility of schooling and aiding the

poor, they were in greater need of the land and finances which the Catholic Church should have

been using for these programs. The Assembly requisitioned the church’s lands, sold them with

assignats to repay debts, redrew the boundaries of dioceses, reformed the church’s hierarchical

structure, and made it mandatory to take an oath of fidelity, which later became an oath to

protect the constitution.

These reforms created opposition towards the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in the

countryside, where many peasants were accustomed to the role which the Church had in people’s

lifestyles. Also, there was increased instability and dissatisfaction with the Assembly’s lack of

fulfillment of the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen. Compounding with domestic chaos

in the countryside, the Assembly had to face tension with its European neighbors as the

Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen challenged monarchies and social privileges

throughout all of Europe. The threat of war led to an increased political tension in France, as any

opposition to the Revolution could have appeared to be treason, but it also made it harder to deny

voting rights to supporters of the Revolution who did not have an “active” status.

In the face of war, the Sans-Culottes pushed for more intense measures against counter

revolutionaries. They urged the Assembly to remove King Louis XVI, who had been dragging

his feet in the hopes that the Austrians would win. An insurrection on August 10th, 1792 against

the Tuileries forced the Legislative Assembly to suspend Louis XVI, get rid of the 1791

Constitution, and award suffrage to all adult males, thus ending the Liberal (bourgeois) stage of

the Revolution and beginning the Radical stage.

This new political direction brought an end to ordinary legal processes for the defense of

the Revolution, while the guillotine became part of the tribunals which superseded the

Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen. Further pressure from the Sans-Culottes and

Montagnard organizations led to the execution of the King on January 21st, 1793, which was only

the beginning of the suppression of counter revolutionaries, such as the Vendée. It also

increased government control of almost every aspect of life by the Committee of Public Safety

and Maximillien Robespierre. Robespierre’s Great Terror of 1794 resulted in over 1,300

decapitations by guillotine in Paris, 17,000 more death sentences occurred between 1793 and

1794, and there was an overall death toll of between 250,000 and 300,000 including suppressed

revolts in the countryside (Popkin, 87). The Great Terror culminated on 9 Therimdor (27 July)

when the Thermidorean deputies accused Robespierre of having attempted to become dictator of

France, which resulted in his overthrow and eventual death by guillotine. Was the Terror any

worse than the strife and corruption that the Directory dealt with afterwards, though? Did the

Consulate not have a certain tone of dictatorship to it? Near the end of his life, while in St.

Helena, Napoleon himself said “General rule: No social revolution without terror. Every

revolution is, by nature, a revolt which success and the passage of time legitimize but in which

terror is one of the inevitable phases” (Herold, 37).

The Thermidoreans helped usher in the Directory, with a return to a political regime of

based on the bourgeoisie, which included the revived expelling of opposition to the Revolution,

particularly the clergy and émigrés. Said deputies intended the Directory to be an executive

consisting of five men which worked with a two-house legislative.

Chapter Two: The Directory Arrives

Before this work delves into the crises and flaws which I believe helped usher in the

Coup of Brumaire and Napoleon’s subsequent attainment of power, I would like to acknowledge

that there are differing perspectives on the effectiveness of the Directory. Martyn Lyons took it

upon himself to demonstrate that, alongside the undeniable failures of the Directory, there were

successes which some historians have either overlooked or chosen to minimize. When one takes

into consideration the struggling French economy, poor harvests resulting in food shortages, and

the war in Europe, the Directory emerged during a time of strife and political inconvenience, as

Lyons demonstrates:

They faced an empty Treasury. The assignats were nearly valueless. Working all through the night, the presses could hardly print enough of them for the government’s use the following day. Taxes were unpaid, and speculation was becoming a national pastime. Food had to be provided for the population of Paris and the Army of the Interior, but the government could not guarantee even a ration of two ounces bread per day, four days a week, to the people of Paris. The hospitals had no income, the roads were impracticable, the forests were being pillaged, education was practically nonexistent (Lyons, 22).

Likewise, Denis Woronoff was considerate of the Directory’s burden, arguing that, while there

were undoubtedly weaknesses in the administration, it was a period with potential for progress

and reform in politics and society. The Directory was more than a corrupt frivolity. It is clear

that one should have at least some sympathy for the situation that the Directory had found itself

in upon its establishment. To relate this to a modern day occurrence, the administration of

President Obama could be deserving of the same sympathy, having inherited a substantial

financial and international crisis.

Let it be known that the aim of this work, specifically this chapter and the one pertaining

to the French crises of 1799, is not to suggest that the Directory is not worthy of its place in

history and that its members should have met their end at the guillotine. What I intend to

demonstrate is that there was a substantial number of issues during the French Revolution,

though I focus mainly on the Directory, which provided Napoleon with the opportunity to rise to

power on 18 Brumaire. More specifically, the overlying issues were rebellions in the

countryside due to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, financial problems at home, the war in

Europe, and political unrest in France.

The Civil Constitution of the Clergy had caused problems for the French government

since its establishment in July of 1790. The requisition of lands and finances from the Catholic

Church caused a schism between practitioners in the countryside and the revolutionaries which

believed that Catholicism had no role in the reformation of France. As mentioned in the

previous chapter, this schism led to rebellions in the countryside by people who felt alienated by

the government’s intrusion into their religious practices. The commoners and clergy alike

viewed attempts by Thermidoreans, and particularly sans-culottes, to remove Christianity and its

sects from France and the Revolution with hostility. The religious alternative which the

Directory had provided was less than appealing to the people and they had become angry with

the bans on religious displays that took place outside of churches, “such as processions and

pilgrimages, inscriptions and crosses, the wearing of ecclesiastical dress, and the ringing of

bells” (Lefebvre, 11-12).

Those in the countryside that opposed the reform brought about by the Civil Constitution

of the Clergy were not alone in their endeavors. Smaller bands of people took part in robberies

and slaughter while larger groups of counterrevolutionaries received propaganda and, on some

occasions, support from France’s European opponents and the Royalists which had fled into said

opponents’ nations. Feeling threatened by the counterrevolutionaries’ efforts, the Directory

sought support from Republicans and “it gave the Jacobins a large place. It treated the Leftist

press sympathetically” until the Jacobins resumed an offensive position against the Directory.

Both parties’ newspapers began to print strong disputes, which caused Directory members to

cease cooperation with the Jacobins for fear of an insurrection in the suburbs (Lefebvre, 25-27).

It seemed that, no matter the direction in which it turned, the Directory was at the distinct

disadvantage of having had to face opposition at all times.

To the Directory, opposition seemed all the more daunting in the face of economic

troubles at home. The people were less likely to support a government against political

adversaries when said people received less than enough food to provide the energy to refute

Jacobin arguments against the Directory. When the Directory was installed, the level of inflation

had reached a point where the “assignat of 100 francs was worth from fifteen to sixteen sous,

and prices were rising hour by hour” (Lefebvre, 28). Martyn Lyons believed that the Directory

was successful in its decision to switch to a metallic currency, which helped put the French

economy back onto a track towards stability. Some historians, such as Lefebvre, would argue

that the withdrawal of the assignat was a brutal blow against an economy which had already

suffered enough and still had to consider how to finance the campaign throughout Europe which

they had planned for the spring.

“Circumstances remained favorable for the agitators,” (Lefebvre, 38) particularly the

Jacobins, who used financial crises to boost resentment of the Directory’s decisions. While the

working class struggled to keep their wages at a level which would at least allow them to

purchase the bare necessities, enmity rose against the rich and the Directory which people

believed had caused the suffering. As hunger riots began to arise, the Jacobins saw the

opportunity to exploit the crises which plagued the already discredited Directory.

The persecution of the Jacobins had opened the way for the revenge of Vendémiaire, all the more so in that the financial situation, which was appalling, made it easier by turning everybody against the government (Lefebvre, 46).

With such a threat of collapse perpetually on the Directory’s doorstep, one cannot help but see

how men such as Barras and members of the bourgeoisie who had attained political offices were

primarily concerned with ensuring that they remained in power with as little blame on them as

possible. Corruption was not an unusual occurrence during the Directorial years. Contractors

frequently manipulated their prices in order to combat the uncertainty of pay from a state in

financial crisis. The hectic conditions of the French economy provoked corruption from many

officials and made the people doubt the integrity and intentions of the government all the more,

which benefited political opposition at the time as well as the future conspirators of the Coup of

Brumaire.

While French military successes in Europe certainly brought benefits, said victories came

with ramifications. Increased conscription in order to meet the demands of Napoleon’s

expansive, yet effective, conquests, led to protests in the more rural parts of France. The reason

is that the more men that had to leave the agriculture-based countryside, the less manpower

families had for planting and harvesting. Apathy was an almost normal thing among rural

populations. People had grown tired with the Revolution at home and the war abroad and they

simply wanted peace or victory, whichever brought a quicker end. Unfortunately, it seemed that

the Directory was unable to provide this culmination, only able to bring home loot from

conquered territories to justify their decisions.

Under Directorial principle, the armies of France lived based on wealth confiscated from

conquered territories, with the remainder sent back to France as war profit. Though this may

have been appealing to the French, it is not a stretch to say that the conquered people, such as the

Belgians, Italians, or inhabitants of the Rhineland, resented the extreme cost that came with

French occupation and imposed liberty. The lack of warm welcome by foreigners preceded the

decision to treat these territories as conquered goods, ripe for exploitation, rather than potential

installations of reform similar to that of the French Revolution. Alongside foreign resentment,

the conquest of lands outside of France’s natural boundaries created a schism between the French

public and her armies. Soldiers became accustomed to living in the military society which came

with constantly being abroad during a conquest of Europe. This created a sort of loyalty between

soldiers and their superiors, which they felt transcended the life of civilians under the

government in France. Lyons demonstrated this when he said “the army of the Directory was

becoming more of a ‘praetorian’ army, following its generals rather than the nation…developing

a professional esprit de corps of its own” (Lyons, 147) and, likewise, Lefebvre believed that

The soldiers followed their generals. Many of them retained a fierce loyalty to the Revolution and to the Republic which now incarnated it. Having shed their blood for these ideals, they considered themselves entitled to protect them against the civilians who elected Royalists: Revolution and Republic were their property…they became separate from the rest of the nation (Lefebvre, 93).

This helps explain why Sieyés felt that he needed a sword for the Coup of Brumaire. Of

course, one can understand why the military would be an ideal source of support during such a

questionably legal procedure. The key factor was that said sword was not only capable of

executing the coup, but also sufficiently popular in order to sway the soldiers to follow him

instead of defending the Directory. What better sword than the famous General Napoleon

Bonaparte? He had expanded the rift between public life and military life the most with his

conquest’s massive requisitions, and all while building a legendary reputation in the eyes of the

people back home that followed his every victory. “Because he was a soldier, he was not

associated with the high way robberies practice by the Directory. Public opinion everywhere

leaned over backward to see only the best in him” (Herold, 82). Much more transpired between

Directorial France and its European neighbors which brought advantages and issues, but this

work will elaborate more on that during the next chapter covering Napoleon’s rise from 1795 to

1799.

Domestically, the Directory faced much opposition as well. Until the coup d’état of 18

Fructidor in Year V (September 4th, 1797), the Directory had favored a means of dealing with

political hostility which Lyons often referred to as the “balance-beam.” With this approach, the

Directory habitually fluctuated between oppressing and arresting Jacobins and Royalists

depending on who the government could benefit more from based on the situation. The problem

was that many people remained shaken from Robespierre’s Great Terror and, coupled with the

Directory’s lack of immediate success in fixing the economy and bringing about peace, the

public were distrusting of some of the more corrupt and self-serving politicians. Cynicism made

it significantly easier for Jacobins and Royalists to use fear-mongering to build support against

the Directory.

The coup of 18 Fructidor was the moment of significant change in the Directory’s

approach to dealing with the abundance of political conflict in France. They opted to revert back

to “the militant republican rhetoric of 1793” (Lyons, 104). In an attempt to oppress crises in the

countryside, the Directory took it upon themselves to declare certain provinces as being under

siege and ineligible for common judicial rights. Even on the night of the coup d’état, during

which Barras led the purging of some moderate members of the Directory, along with the least

conducive right-wing Council deputies and periodicals, there was a noticeable air of military

occupation. Perhaps such a fear of Royalists was justified. Napoleon wrote a letter expressing

the concerns of himself and his soldiers, mentioning that “The men are asking angrily whether

the only reward they are to expect, on their return home, for all their labours, and for their six

years at the front, is the assassination which threatens every patriot” (Baker, 404). Barras made

it known that anyone who planned to try and reinstate the Monarchy, any Royalist party, or even

the 1793 Constitution, would meet a quick execution without trial. On the night of the coup, the

Five Hundred had passed the law to allow it to transpire effectively. It was ratified by the

Ancients on 19 Fructidor (September 5th, 1797) and three days later another law was passed in

order to suppress journalists that wrote articles in opposition to the Directory. Alongside these

oppressive laws, there was a large-scale purge of offices and dissolving of election results:

Altogether, forty-nine departments had their elections totally annulled, and others their representation cut down…the Directory also dismissed a great many administrations.

Sixty-five individuals were sentenced to transportation to Guiana, including…forty-two members of the Five Hundred, eleven members of the Ancients, and three of the accused in the Brottier conspiracy…Altogether, 177 deputies were eliminated and their places left vacant…The opposition did not disappear, but it was decapitated and reduced to a minority…The émigrés, even those who had been provisionally struck off, were given a fortnight to leave France under pain of death…The repeal of the laws of 1792 and 1793 against the clergy was annulled, and the deportees who had returned to France were ordered to go back into exile (Lefebvre, 100).

Clearly, 18 Fructidor demonstrated a failure at establishing liberalism and

constitutionalism on the part of the Directory. This was a blatant shift by the Republic back to

dictatorship. The amount of authority which the Directory received from 18 Fructidor

undoubtedly resulted in an increase of resentment by the public, which, coupled with the already

present apathy, gave people all the more reason to allow their hero, Napoleon, to establish his

Consulate later. In fact, the coup of18 Fructidor increased the likelihood of Napoleon coming to

power. Not only did it strengthen Barras’ position in relation to his purged opposition, it helped

establish Napoleon as a reputable soldier in the eyes of Barras, which gave him all the more faith

in his use of Napoleon, faith that he would not benefit from in two years.

The coup could be seen as one of a series of interventions y the line army in Parisian politics…a precedent for and major step on the road to Brumaire…Fructidor had provided the opportunity for Napoleon, no doubt unwittingly at the time, to play his part in removing one major obstacle to the political ambition which was to unfold in the coup of November 1799 (Ellis, 24-25).

To recap briefly on the problems which the Directory faced which helped usher in the

Coup of Brumaire, aside from political instability at home, there was also chaos in the

countryside. This chaos came in the form of bands of thieves and murderers, rebels working in

coalition with European neighbors and Royalist exiles, and people fighting against the Civil

Constitution of the Clergy. On top of all of this, financial problems not only created resentment

in the French population, but it also made it more difficult for the Directory to effectively combat

resistance, instead having to rely on loot imported from European conquest, which only served to

agitate the population of occupied territories, creating potential allies for the England.

Chapter Three: The Rise of Napoleon

The Corsican-born Napoleon attended École Militaire during his youth and quickly

established himself as a highly adept mathematician and tactician. Through both family ties and

superb progress in his schooling, Napoleon was able to attain recommendation for military

service by his superiors. Having managed to impress his teachers and skip several grades at

École Militaire, Napoleon attained the position of Lieutenant at Régiment de la Fére before

attending the Auxonne artillery academy. With the shortage of officers that resulted from

emigration, he had little trouble advancing within the ranks, which, of course, opened up

opportunities for further promotion during the war against the coalition in 1792.

Emigration depleted the officers’ corps of all the armed services and opened up unhoped-for prospects of rapid promotion to those officers…The emigration, in turn, set off another event—the outbreak of war in the spring of 1792 between revolutionary France (by then a constitutional monarchy) and a coalition of European monarchies…It was the war that enabled Napoleon to prove his military genius, to lead the Revolution to victory, to end the Revolution, and to substitute himself for it (Herold, 33).

His first opportunity to prove his merit came upon his assignment to serve under General

Carteaux in July of 1793. The General’s forces lacked sufficient artillery as it moved towards

capturing Toulon. Dommartin, the current commander of artillery in Carteaux’s army suffered

an injury after two days of laying siege to Toulon. On the recommendation of Deputy Saliceti,

Napoleon took the wounded artillery commander’s position and pushed a new plan forward,

although it did not come to culmination until December 14th, 1793. Napoleon’s superiors

approved his bombardment strategy and by the 18th the English had fled from Toulon, which

allowed him to write to the Ministry of War on the 24th, “I promised you brilliant successes, and,

as you can see, I have kept my word” (Markham, 26), to which the Ministry replied with a

promotion to Brigadier-General. Augustin Robespierre followed up Napoleon’s promotion with

a recommendation for appointment to the position of operational planner for the war effort in

Italy.

The point at which many historians believe that Napoleon officially began to rise to

power was during his defense against the insurrection of 13 Vendémiaire (October 5th, 1795).

The Tuileries were under siege by Royalists who were displeased with the Convention’s Decree

of Two-Thirds, which dictated that two-thirds of the new deputies for the Councils must be from

departing members of the Convention. They designed this decree in order to prevent a complete

purge of republicans, which is exactly what the Royalists sought. When the Convention denied

the votes that were against the decree, a revolt formed against the Tuileries. Chosen by Barras

and the Committee of Public Safety to lead the army against this armed insurrection, Napoleon

killed several of the rebels and quickly suppressed the attack on the Convention. His success on

13 Vendémiaire won him the promotion to Major-General and then later the responsibility of

commanding the Army of the Interior. Jean-Charles-Dominique Lacretelle’s account of the

insurrection gave a brilliant retrospective on how the Republic’s victory on 13 Vendémiaire was

also the creation of the man who would dismantle said Republic.

We were not fully aware of the dangers we faced. It was no longer General Menou, but rather the giant of the century, Bonaparte, whom we had to confront and repel. [Paul] Barras had entrusted the protection of the Convention to him…he had another gift as equal to his genius; nothing could shock or disarm his will…The Republic thought it had triumphed that day, but only under the protection of a warrior who would soon destroy it (Blaufarb, 33-35).

During Napoleon’s time as the General of the Army of Italy, it became even clearer that

he had certain leverage over the Directory and its decisions. At one point, Commissaire Saliceti

informed him that the Directory intended to give the command of Lombardy to another officer,

namely Kellermann, while Napoleon was responsible for continuing into southern Italy to

continue plundering. Napoleon pushed back the Directory’s decision with a threat of resignation

and even said “Let the Directory try to take away my Command, they’ll soon see who is the

master” (Morton, 121). The reason Napoleon was able to make such a defiant move against the

government was that he provided substantial finances for Paris. In a correspondence on May 22,

1796, Napoleon wrote “you can now count on 6 to 8 millions in gold or silver ingots or jewels,

which are at your disposal in Genoa.” There was also the matter that “By July 1796, Italy had

already provided sixty millions of francs. Already in May Napoleon was able to give his troops

half their pay in silver instead of paper assignats…Through political and financial weakness, the

Directory were rapidly losing control over their Generals” (Markham, 43). The plunder of Italy

was of immediate monetary benefit to the Directory, but it also struck back two-fold. For all of

the loot that the government received, it not only lost dominance over its generals, but it had to

rely on them even more in order to save France when the foreign populations ceased to enjoy the

costs of French occupation. The Directory had to submit, to some degree, to the will of the army

and begin to work towards peace negotiations with Austria. Louis Bonaparte wrote that “the

troops are no longer the same, and shout loudly for peace” (Markham, 48). The Directory had to

use the plundered Italy as a bargaining chip to try to acquire Rhine territory from Austria.

Unfortunately, a conclusion in Italy, and with Austria, was not that simple. Before

negotiations for peace even began to form, Napoleon pushed forward to claim Rivoli on January

15th, 1797 when his forces decimated the Austrian army. The next day, Austria suffered another

great loss as they found themselves surrounded at La Favorita. They had to cede Mantua in early

February of the same year, which, along with the success at Rivoli, gave Paris more reason to

support Napoleon and allow him to sign the preliminaries to negotiations at Leoben on April 18th,

1797. Not only did Paris know that Napoleon had amassed significant political independence,

but the Austrians knew it as well, particularly Thugut, the Austrian Chancellor, who said “only

Bonaparte can make peace, and he can do it on any terms he wants” (Markham, 49). On October

18th, 1797, Napoleon went over the heads of the Directory members and signed the Treaty of

Campo-Formio with Austria. This treaty earned France the spoils of Belgium, the Ionian

Islands, Venetian Albania, and Austria’s support of France as it pursued territory in the

Rhineland. The loss of part of Venice did leave Austria with a territorial advantage for future

war efforts, though.

It is relatively easy to see how Napoleon’s success in Italy played into his participation in

the Coup of Brumaire. By attaining command of the Army of Italy, Napoleon expanded his orb

of influence. He forged connections with officers that had previously been his superiors, while

establishing dominance over not only lower ranking soldiers, but also the Austrians which had to

face him on the battlefield and Italians that he politically dealt with. The Italian campaign was

the launching point for the spreading of his fame, not only throughout France, but internationally

as well. Napoleon learned that he had the upper hand and could conduct both war and diplomacy

on his own terms, even if he was technically subject to the political authority of Paris. Based on

how “he put it to Count Miot de Melito on his way back from Italy, ‘I have tasted supremacy,

and I can no longer renounce it’” (Ellis, 29), one can see that Italy was indeed a stepping stone to

18 Brumaire.

The expedition in Egypt was significantly less advantageous for Napoleon and Paris.

Despite England’s obvious naval supremacy, Napoleon set sail on May 19th, 1798 from Toulon

with more than thirty-five thousand troops, almost four hundred transports, thirteen ships, and

more than one hundred and fifty scientists (Markham, 59). The expedition only narrowly

avoided the English fleet led by Nelson, up until the Battle of the Nile on August 1st, 1798 when

Nelson encountered the French army in Aboukir Bay and destroyed eleven French ships –

Napoleon had already arrived in Cairo by the time the news of the battle arrived. Egyptian

resentment arose when the French imposed a number of loans and taxes in order to replace the

loot which had been lost when Nelson sank eleven of the French fleet. Alongside the rise of

hatred, a plague began to decimate Napoleon’s army. Above all else, he feared for the situation

at home in Paris now that Russia and Turkey were openly at war with France and the Russia

army had moved into Italy. On August 24th, 1799, Napoleon sailed for France and arrived on

October 13th in the midst of a national crisis.

Chapter Four: 1799 - A Crisis in France

The year 1799 promised to be stressful for the Directory even before Napoleon had

arrived from Egypt. A lack of efficiency was apparent in the increase of taxes, which, coupled

with the inactivity of the business sector, made financial troubles worse for the population. On

top of those problems, there was also great discontent with the rise in conscription in preparation

for continued war efforts against the ever-changing Coalition. Paris feared a revival of the

Vendée insurrection, so they suspended law enforcement in the countryside, leading to bands of

thieves increasing in number. Before Napoleon’s arrival in October of 1799, France endured the

collapse of the Second Directory, followed by a coup which brought the rise of the Left-wing,

and finally a ferocious push against the Jacobins.

As the Republic fell, France abandoned its Italian territories, invaders neared the French

borders, the Royalists waged guerrilla warfare, financial problems were eminent, and the military

was in shambles as people pointed fingers at one another to explain significant losses. On 27

Floréal (May 16th, 1799), Sieyés was elected, despite his hostility towards the Directors and the

Constitution of Year III. By the 29th, Sieyés already was attempting to push the resignation of

ministers – technically a journée, which succeeded on 13 Prairial (June 18th) in that it reformed

the government to meet the Councils’ needs. The levee en masse of 10 Messidor (June 27th) sent

an estimated 116,000 men to the front while properties were requisitioned and a new loan was

imposed, all of which fostered a great amount of terror and hatred in the public (Markham, 199).

On 24 Messidor (July 12th) the government imposed the Law of Hostages, which allowed for the

arrest, and in some cases, execution, of nobles, émigrés, and rebels from departments which were

considered to be a danger.

Chapter Five: The Coup of Brumaire

Upon his arrival in France, Napoleon was not surprised to find that the public welcomed

him as the savior of France. He did not act upon their hopes, though. Instead, he maintained a

quiet reserve, with the exception of the occasional condemnation of the Directors. This silence

from Napoleon confused the conspiring Sieyés, causing him to suspect that Napoleon had sided

with Barras, despite visits from the entire spectrum of French political factions.

Sieyés and his collaborators were what one might refer to as Moderates:

They were the advocates of a stroke to get rid of the Government but not a military stroke; nor would they have Jacobin methods. Their aim was not the destruction of the Republic, but its establishment on a firm basis…They wanted, most of them, no dictator, but many of them would have had no objection…to a constitutional monarchy (Morton, 207).

While Sieyés worked to attain Napoleon as the “sword” of his coup, it seemed that Barras was

hoping that, in the event of said “sword” playing a role in a governmental change following the

crises of 1799, he would receive an office, or at least a large sum of money, from his old friend

and patron, Napoleon. While Talleyrand was not a friend, per say, of Sieyés, he had faith in the

plan and saw that it was more than likely to succeed with Napoleon’s participation. Fouché, the

Minister of Police, was very careful about which side he was seen supporting during this time.

Occasionally he gave money to Josephine, other times he was friendly with Lucien and Joseph.

Eventually, Napoleon saw the corruption in Barras that everyone else was already aware of, but

Napoleon remained friendly towards Barras to dispel any suspicion pertaining to the fact that he

had decided to work with Sieyés, despite the fact that they had a mutual loathing of one another.

For the next few weeks, the group of collaborators worked on their plan for 18 Brumaire.

Roederer, a revolutionary and a writer for the Journal de Paris, talked strategy every night with

Napoleon and Sieyés, as well as prepared proclamations and pamphlets, while Talleyrand dealt

with the tactics. Sieyés spent much time fooling his colleagues in the Directory into believing

that he had absolutely nothing to hide. Lucien focused his attention on occupying the Five

Hundred and swaying certain members towards helping the coup. Napoleon assigned certain

Generals to attain a following from the military, with Berthier convincing high ranking officers,

Murat working on the cavalry officers, Lannes persuading the infantry, and Marmont coaxing the

artillery. Even Josephine had a hand in the planning, as she occupied Gohier at the rue de la

Victoire (Morton, 211-212).

Despite Napoleon’s aptitude for deceiving those who were not part of Sieyés’ plan, it

seemed that he had a certain fondness for Roederer’s approach to being a Moderate:

A strong Government, of the kind which would satisfy all but the extreme Jacobins; a system in which there would be room for royalists and republicans to work side by side; a Republican Government based on the liberty of the individual and the security of personal property (Morton, 213).

Even if Napoleon did favor one person’s beliefs over the others, he was as careful as possible to

avoid making a scene upon his return. He listened to as many perspectives as possible, but only

gave advice when it benefited him. His intention was to make it so “everyone was caught in my

nets. And when I became the head of the State there was not a party in France which did not

build some special hope on my success” (Morton, 214), effectively avoiding the creation of a

united opposition.

If not for his popularity, Napoleon’s usefulness came from his seemingly unending luck.

They had constructed the plan so poorly that it is no wonder that it unfolded so awkwardly. A

large problem was that they attempted to perform a widely illegal coup in a legal manner, and

without it being neither a constitutional change, nor a military coup. Napoleon illegally received

the garrison troops for the execution of the decree which would allow the Ancients’ transfer to

Saint-Cloud, which passed, due the absence of those who Sieyés believed would have opposed

the transfer. Potential opposition was absent because Sieyés had the Inspectors of the Ancients

forget to summon anyone who was not a supporter. Said garrison also had the value of being

able to forcibly persuade the Five Hundred to reform the Constitution if things did not go

accordingly, but Napoleon wanted to be put in power rather than seize power. He and Sieyés

intended for a smooth success and hoped that “the Chambers would be suspended for three

months, three Consuls would take the place of the Five Directors, and they would make a new

Constitution” (Morton, 221).

The night before the coup, Josephine made a distraction for Gohier by inviting him and

his wife to breakfast on the morning of 18 Brumaire. Barras waited for the last-minute role

which he believed he was to receive, but was left in the cold, while the unsigned letter of his

resignation rested in Talleyrand’s pocket. When the Brumarians presented to the Ancients and

Five Hundred the decree for the transfer of the legislation to Saint-Cloud, it passed the vote.

Only a small amount of hesitation arose to the article which gave Napoleon command of the 17th

military garrison. At Saint-Cloud, the plan to overthrow the Directory went as smoothly as the

conspirators could have hoped, save for Napoleon’s nervous speech, in which he stated,

Citizens and Representatives, the Republic is perishing. You realise (sic) this and your decree will save it. Evil to those who wish for trouble and disorder. I will arrest them…You wisdom has produced this decree; our arms will see that it is executed. We desire a Republic founded on true liberty, on civil liberty, on national representation. We will have it. I swear it in my name and in that of my companions-in-arms (Goodspeed, 121).

The greatest trouble came on the following day, 19 Brumaire, when those who were absent on

the 18th loudly protested and eventually incited chaos upon Napoleon when he attempted to

improvise. To the Elders, he claimed “you summoned me to notify me of the decree of transfer

and charge me with its execution…we flew to your aid…Today slanders are heaped upon me…If

I wanted military government, would I have rushed to lend my support” (Baker, 406-407). He

had to be rescued from the hall and his brother, Lucien, had to step in and save the entire coup by

convincing the guards that there had been an assassination attempt on Napoleon’s life. The

guards forced the Five Hundred from the Orangerie, making room for a commission that passed

the laws to create the Consuls and the new Constitution, the same laws that Napoleon had

manipulated at the last minute in order to out-maneuver Sieyés and Roger-Ducos to attain the

position of First Consul.

The participants of the Coup of Brumaire effectively restricted power to the law of the

Consuls, which eventually passed to the hand of the First Consul, Napoleon. Debating and

voting became the responsibility of three assemblies, with a constitutional check for the Senate,

but overall the Legislature became substantially weaker where the Executive gained power

through the First Consul’s decision making ability. The bourgeoisie, for a time, retained their

control over society and their hand in the establishment of institutions and laws which they had

fought for since the beginning of the Revolution in 1789, but it faced eventual despotism.

Despite this, the Coup of Brumaire still provided what the bourgeois sought in the beginning,

power. A new bourgeoisie arrived and had gained wealth following 18 Brumaire. “Businessmen

found new opportunities to expand their operations by speculating in assignats, foreign exchange

rates, nationalized property, military supplies, and the exploitation of foreign conquests” (Kafker

& Laux, 67-68). For those that doubted the coup, on 21 Brumaire, Napoleon reassured the

people that what he had done was in their best interests when he said,

The Constitution of the Year III was dying. It was incapable of protecting your rights, even of protecting itself. Through repeated assaults it was losing beyond recall the respect of nations. Selfish factions were despoiling the Republic. France, in deed, was entering the last stage of general disorganization…All who could harm you have been cast aside. All who can serve you, all those representatives who have remained pure, have come together under the banner of liberty (Hutt, 21).

Conclusion

In closing, it is clear that, while Napoleon’s rise was incredibly opportunistic and by no

means inevitable, there were a great number of factors which benefited him in his ascension.

Aside from what the Coup of Brumaire did away with, one should note some of the more

important changes that the new Constitution immediately provided for France. Eighty Senators

(the majority of which came from the Consuls’ choices), of at least age forty, held office for life

by the Legislature, Tribunate, and First Consul. These senators chose the legislators, tribunes,

consuls (with the exception of the First), judges, and commissioners, though the Constitution

appointed the second and third Consuls after meeting with Sieyés and Roger Ducos. The

senators also had the ability to sustain or annul acts deemed unconstitutional by the Tribunate or

Government. Said Tribunate was responsible for discussing concerns pertaining to drafts of

laws, either adopting or rejecting them, as well as ways to improve branches of the

administration. These laws were made by secret ballot by Legislature, without discussion, after

speeches made by the Tribunate and Government. The First Consul had the ability to transmit

laws and appoint or dismiss any official, save for the criminal and civil judges (with the

exception of justices of the peace and judges of cassation) whom he could not remove. Anyone

suspect of conspiracy against the State was subject to arrest, but could be released within ten

days on the count of arbitrary imprisonment if not found guilty or even brought to trial. Senate,

Legislative, Tribunate, and Consul functions entailed no responsibility, but personal offences of

corporal or ignominious penalties had persecution with ordinary courts. French houses were

“inviolable sanctuaries,” only entered for emergency or by law for special purpose. Arrests had

to be explained to the arrestee, unauthorized severities were crimes, and they allowed petitions

(Baker, 409-415).

There were numerous changes present in the Constitution of the French Republic, but the

above stood out in contrast to the conditions of the government during the Revolution,

particularly during phases of Terror when the suspension of judicial rights was common. Also,

these were vital to the years following the Coup of Brumaire. As I have demonstrated, the

problems which the Revolution sought to change, which the Directory could not remedy, were

catalysts for the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte, the opportunist. The success of Napoleon created a

beacon of hope for a population which was widely apathetic and simply wanted peace. While he

was certainly not a weak or timid man, and may not have brought peace during the Consulate, he

was not one to wage unnecessary war. The people wanted their hero and believed him to be

better than the Directory, the Great Terror, the Radicals, the Liberals, and the King which

preceded him.