Philosophy Education Society Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to The Review of
Metaphysics.http://www.jstor.orgThe Conversation That Never
Happened (Gadamer/Derrida) Author(s): Richard J. Bernstein
Source:The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Mar., 2008), pp.
577-603Published by:Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable
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ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED (GADAMER/DERRIDA)
RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN JLt wasan'improbable' encounter, but
improbablethough it was, ittook place."1
ThisishowDianeMichelfelderandRichardPalmer initially
described"TheGadamer-DerridaEncounter."Letmeremind you of what
happened(or didnot happen). In April1981,Philippe Forgetorganized
aconferenceattheGoetheInstituteinParisthat
broughttogetherHans-Georg Gadamerand JacquesDerrida, aswell
asanumberofotherFrenchandGermanscholarsinterestedin hermeneuticsand
poststructuralism. Atthe time, theseweretwoof themost significant
continental philosophical orientationsofthe twentieth
century:hermeneutics,deeply rootedinGermannine
teenth-centuryphilosophy; and poststructuralism, amovementthat
burst upon theFrenchsceneaftertheSecondWorldWar. Gadamer, already
inhis eighties, andthemuch younger Derridawere respec
tivelyacknowledged tobethe leadingspokespersons ofhermeneutics
anddeconstruction.Gadamer hoped thattheoccasionwould provide an
opportunity to begin aseriousconversationwithDerrida.Inhis lecture,
"Textand Interpretation," Gadamersketchedhisownunder standing
ofhermeneutics against the background oftheir conflicting
interpretations of Heidegger andNietzsche.Heindicatedthat"theen
counterwiththeFrenchscene represents a genuinechallenge forme. In
particular, Derridahas arguedagainst thelater Heidegger that
Heidegger himselfhasnot really brokenwiththe logocentrism of
metaphysics."2Bysketching thedifferentGermanandFrenchread
Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy, NewSchoolforSocial
Research, 79Fifth Avenue, New York, NoewYork10003 xThisisthe
opening sentenceofan earlyunpublished draftoftheintro ductionto
Dialogue andDeconstruction:TheGadamer-Derrida Encounter, ed.DianeP.
MichelfelderandRichardE.Palmer (Albany: SUNY Press,1989).
2Hans-GeorgGadamer, "Textand Interpretation," trans.DennisJ.
SchmidtandRichard Palmer, in Dialogue and Deconstruction, 24.
TheReview ofMetaphysics 61 (March2008): 577-603. Copyright ?2008 by
TheReview of Metaphysics This content downloaded from
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JSTOR Terms and Conditions578RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN ings of Heidegger
and Nietzsche, Gadamer sought to provide abasis foraconversation.
(Derrida's paper attheconferencedeconstructs
Heidegger'sinterpretation of Nietzsche). Buttheconversationnever
really took place. The morning afterGadamer's lecture, Derridabe
gan hisbrief replybydeclaring:"During thelectureandthe ensuing
discussion yesterdayevening, I began toask myself if anything was
takingplace hereotherthanthe improbabledebates,counter-ques
tioning, and inquiries intounfindable objects of thought?to recall
someoftheformulationsweheard.I amstill askingmyself this ques
tion."3Hethenwentontoaskthree questions,"taking offfroma
briefremarkthatGadamermadeabout "good will."4Gadamerwas
clearlyperplexed and began his response toDerrida bysaying: "Mr.
Derrida's questionsproveirrefutably that my remarksontextandin
terpretation, totheextent they hadDerrida'swell-known position in
mind, didnot accomplish their objective. I am finding it
difficultto understandthese questions thathavebeenaddressedto me."5
Ithinkthat anyone, regardless oftheir sympathies withherme
neuticsordeconstructionwouldnotfindinthese exchangesany real
encounter?anymeeting ofminds.Andthisisa greatpity because thereare
important and consequential differencesand points ofcon
tactbetweenhermeneuticsanddeconstruction.Theso-calleden
counterofGadamerandDerridastrikesoneasaclassicinstanceof
non-communication, oftwo philosophersspeakingpast each other;
neither reallymaking substantialcontact.Asweshall see,by thecri
teriathatGadamertakestobea genuine conversationor dialogue,
thisisan example ofwhat happens whenaconversationor dialogue
doesnot happen. MichelfelderandPalmertellthe story ofhowthe papers
fromthe1981conferencewere subsequentlypublished in Frenchand
German, andhow they decidedto publish translationsof the key
textsfromthe1981conference together withothertextsand
commentaries.6GadamerandDerridametonseveraloccasionsafter 3
JacquesDerrida, "Three Questions to Hans-GeorgGadamer," trans.Di
aneMichelfelderandRichard Palmer, in Dialogue and Deconstruction,
52. 4 Gadamerremarks: "Thus, forawrittenconversation basically the
samefundamentalconditionobtainsasforanoral exchange. Both partners
musthavethe good willto try to understandone another"-,Gadamer,
"Text and Interpretation," 33 [emphasisadded]. 5
Hans-GeorgGadamer,"Reply to JacquesDerrida," trans.DianeMich
elfelderandRichard Palmer, in Dialogue and Deconstruction, 55. 6
See especially Fred Dallmayr, "HermeneuticsandDeconstruction:Ga
damerandDerridain Dialogue," in Dialogue and Deconstruction,75-92;
and Hans-GeorgGadamer, "Letterto Dallmayr,"
trans.RichardPalmerandDiane Michelfelder, in Dialogue and
Deconstruction, 93-101. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193
on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and
ConditionsTHE CONVERSATIONTHAT NEVERHAPPENED579 1981,
butthereisnoevidencethat they ever really hadarealdia logue.7 I
wantto imagine theconversationthat might havetaken place. Ormore
accurately, Iwantto explore someofthe key differencesand points
ofcontactbetweenGadamerandDerrida.I hope toshowthat they standina
productive tensionwitheach other;they"supplement"
eachother.Tocharacterizetheir complexrelationship, I employ a
metaphor from Benjamin andAdornothatI haveused before, thatofa
constellation:"a juxtaposed ratherthan integrated clusterof
changing elementsthatresistsreductiontoacommon denominator,
essential core, or generative first principle."8 I accept
theGadamerian principle thatwenever fullyescape fromourown
prejudgments or prejudices when seeking tounderstandand
interpret.9Although Derridadoesn't phrase theissuethis way, I
believehewouldaffirmthisGadamerian thesisfor very
differentreasons.Weriskthese prejudgments inthe eventof
understanding, andof course, evenwithourbesteffortswe may
misunderstandand misinterpret. Thisisanunavoidablerisk. Before
turningdirectly totheencounterthatI wantto stage, I
wouldliketociteonemoretexttosetmise-en-sc?ne.In September 2001,
Derridawasawardedthe distinguished AdornoPrize givenby the city
ofFrankfurt.Derridadeliveredan extraordinarilyinsightful and
movingspeech thatnot only dealtwithDerrida's affinity andin
debtednessto Adorno, butalsoaddressedthe larger issueofthe 7
JeanGrondindescribesthe subsequentmeetings betweenGadamer
andDerridain his Hans-Georg Gadamer:A Biography, trans.JoelWeinshe
imer (New Haven:Yale UniversityPress,2003), 324-8.WhenGadamerdied
onMarch 13,2002, Derrida published anarticleinthe FrankfurterAllge
meine Zeitung(March28,2002)entitled, "Wierechterhatte!MeinCicerone
Hans-Georg Gadamer."Grondincomments: "Breaking a public silenceof
over twentyyears sincetheirfirstencounterbackin
1981,JacquesDerrida, whohad recently receivedthehonorof being
nameda guestprofessor(for the year2003) inthe newly
endowedGadamerChairinthe University of Heidelberg, alsolethimselfbe
heard";Grondin,Gadamer, 338.Afterthe 1981 encounter, Gadamerwas
frequently askedaboutDerridaanddecon struction.Seehisinterviewsin
Richard Kearney,ed., DebatesinContinental Philosophy:
Conversationswith Contemporary Thinkers (New York: Fordham
UniversityPress,2004); and Hans-GeorgGadamer, Gadamerin
Conversation: Refections and Commentary, trans,anded.RichardE.
Palmer (New Haven:Yale UniversityPress,2001). 81 haveusedthe
metaphor ofconstellationin mybook, TheNewCon
stellation:TheEthical-PoliticalHorizons ofModernity/Postmodernity
(Cambridge:PolityPress,1991), 8-9. 9 Although I speak of
understanding and interpretation, I agree withGa damerthatall
understanding involves interpretation. All understanding de mands
highlighting, andto highlight isto interpret. This content
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use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions580RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN
complex relationbetween twentieth-century GermanandFrench phi
losophy. Inhis imaginativestyle Derridatellsus:"If one day Iwereto
writethebookI dreamofto interpret the history, the possibility, and
thehonorofthis prize, it wouldincludeatleastseven chapters," and he
suggests thateachofthese chapters wouldconsistofaboutten thousand
pages.10 His "imagined" fifth chapter isrelevanttoGada
mer.Hereishissketch. 5.Adifferential history oftheresistancesand
misunderstandings be tweenontheonehandthoseGermanthinkerswhoarealso
my re spected friends.I mean Hans-Georg Gadamerand J?rgenHabermas,
andontheothertheFrench philosophers of my generation; foralittle
whilethis history hasbeen largelyover, but perhaps not yet
overwith. Inthis chapter, Iwould try toshowthat despite
thedifferencesbetween thesetwo great debates (direct or
indirect,explicit or implicit), the mis understandingsalways
occuraround interpretation andthe verypossi bility of
misunderstanding?they turnaroundthe conceptof misun derstanding,
ofdissensusas well, oftheotherandthe singularity ofthe event; but
then, asa result,they turnaroundtheessenceof idiom, the essenceof
language,beyond itsundeniableand necessaryfunctioning, beyond
itscommunicative intelligibility. ... Ifthese misunderstandings
about misunderstanding seemtobe calming downthese days, if notto
tallymelting away, inan atmosphere ofamicable reconciliation, we
shouldnot onlypay tributetothe work, the reading, the goodfaith,
and the friendship ofvarious people, oftenthe youngestphilosophers
inthis country.11 Ihave already touchedonsomeofthe major themesI
wanttoex
plore:conversation,understanding,misunderstanding,interpretation
and misinterpretation.Exploring thesewillwidenthecircleofissues
that separate andunitehermeneuticsanddeconstruction.I begin
withabriefstatementofGadamer'shermeneuticsandthen proceed tothe
questions thatDerridashouldhaveasked (thatis, whatIwould
havelikedhimto ask). Letme begin withconversationand
dialogue,concepts thatare centraltoGadamer's
ontologicalhermeneutics, butare barely men tioned by
Derrida.12"Toconducta dialoguerequires firstofallthat the partners
donottalkatcross purposes. Henceit necessarily has 10
JacquesDerrida, "Fichus:Frankfurt Address," in PaperMachine,
trans.Rachel Bowlby(Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress,2005), 178.
11 Ibid. 12 Gadamer frequentlyspeaks of "dialogue"
and"conversation"inter changeably,although he
occasionallyacknowledges differencesbetween them. This content
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use subject to JSTOR Terms and
ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED581 thestructureof
question andanswer.Thefirstconditionoftheartof conversationis
ensuring thattheother person is withus."13 Actually the phrase
"toconducta dialogue" is misleading; itis moreaccurateto say
thatwe?the partners?participatein, orfall into, a dialogue or
conversation.14Gadamer consistently seekstounderminethe legacy
ofaCartesianismthat assignsontological and epistemologicalpri macy
toindividual subjects. Thisis already evidentinhis phenomeno
logicaldescription ofthe concept of play wherehetellsusthatthere
isthe primacy of play overthe subjectivity orconsciousnessofthe
players."Playclearlyrepresents anorderin whichtheto-and-fromo
tionof play followsofitself."15Inthe play of dialogue, the dialogue
it selfhasitsown rhythm, itsownto-and-fromovementthatcarries along
the partners. Thismeansthatinaconversationonemust"allow
oneselftobeconducted by the subject matter [Sache] towhichthe
partners inthe dialogue are oriented."16This subject matter guides
the dynamics of question andanswer. Drawing onhis interpretation
ofthePlatonic dialogues wheredialecticis closely relatedto
dialogue, Gadamertellsus:"Dialecticconsistsnotin trying
todiscoverthe weaknessofwhatis said, butin bringing outitsreal
strength. Itisnot theartof arguing(which canmakea strong caseoutofa
weak one) buttheartof thinking(which can
strengthenobjectionsbyreferring tothe subjectmatter)."17
ThisisthefeatureofdialecticthatGadamer seeksto integrate intohis
understanding of dialogue. Buthoware
thesereflectionsonconversationand dialogue relatedtohermeneu tics?
13 Hans-GeorgGadamer, Truthand Method, 2ndrevised edition, trans.
JoelWeinsheimerandDonaldG. Marshall (New York: Continuum,1997),
367. 14 Gadamer emphasizes thissenseof participation
whenhewrites:"We say thatwe'conduct'a conversation, butthe more
genuine aconversation is, thelessitsconductlies withinthe
willofeither partner. Thusa genuine con versationis
nevertheonethatwewantedtoconduct. Rather, itis generally
morecorrectto say that wefallinto conversation,
oreventhatwebecomein volvedinit.The way onewordfollows another,
withtheconversation taking itowntwistsand reaching itsown
conclusion,may wellbeconductedin some way, butthe
partnersconversing arefarlesstheleadersofitthanthe
led....Allthisshowsthataconversationhasa spirit ofits own,
andthatlan guage in whichitisconductedbearsitsowntruthwithin
it?i.e., thatital lows something to 'emerge' whichhenceforth
exists";ibid., 383. 15 Ibid., 104. 16 Ibid., 367. 17 Ibid. This
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UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and
Conditions582RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN Whatcharacterizesa dialogue,
incontrastwiththe rigid formofstate mentsthatdemandtobesetdownin
writing, is precisely this:thatin di aloguespokenlanguage?in the
process of question and answer,giving and taking,talking atcross
purposes and seeing eachother's point? performs thecommunicationof
meaningthat, with respect tothewrit ten tradition,
isthetaskofhermeneutics.Henceitis morethana meta phor; itis a
memory of what originally wasthe case, todescribethetask
ofhermeneuticsas entering into dialogue withthetext_Whenitisin
terpreted, writtentraditionis brought backoutofalienationin whichit
findsitselfandintothe livingpresent of conversation, whichis always
fundamentally realizedin question andanswer.18 Therearetwo points
thatI wantto emphasize aboutGadamer'sre flectionson
conversation,dialogue, andhermeneutics. First, Gada
merinsiststhathis project isa philosophical one (notmethodologi
cal). Hewantstoanswerthe question?toput itintoKantianterms? howis
understandingpossible? And followingHeidegger hedeclares:
Heidegger'stemporalanalytics ofDasein has, I think, shownconvinc
ingly that understanding isnot just oneofthevarious possible behav
iorsofthe subject butthemodeof being ofDaseinitself.Itisinthis
sensethattheterm"hermeneutics"hasbeenusedhere.It denotesthe basic
being-in-motion ofDaseinthatconstitutesitsfinitudeandhisto ricity,
andhenceembracesthewhole experience ofits experience of theworld.19
Butthereisatensionbetweenthisclaimaboutthe primacy anduni versality
of understanding andtheidealized (normative)description
ofconversationand dialogue. If understandingpresupposes thekind of
dialogue thatGadamerdescribesthenit certainly isnot universal,
butrareindeed?and perhaps, asDerrida mightsuggest,impossible.
Nosuchconversationor dialogue took place betweenGadamerand
Derrida.One might even question whetherwefind examples ofsuch
dialogues in Gadamer'sbelovedPlatonic dialogues. Arethe partners
inthese dialoguesreallyopen toeachotherandare theyguidedby the
subject matter developed intheconversation?Isthere really a recip
rocalrelationbetweenSocratesandhisinterlocutors?Moreoften
thannotthePlatonic dialogues seemtobestudieswherethe partici pants
misunderstandand misinterpret eachother. Second,
whenGadamertellsusthatitis morethana metaphor to
describethetaskofhermeneuticsas entering intoa dialogue witha text,
wecannot gloss overthefactthereisafundamentaldifference 18 Ibid.,
368. 19Ibid., xxx. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on
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ConditionsTHE CONVERSATIONTHAT NEVERHAPPENED583 between engaging
inconversationwitha living person whohastheca pacity to respond
tousandaconversationwitha writtentext.Gada mer acknowledges
thisbuthedoesn'tthinkthatthisdifferencealters the description of
understanding asaconversationwithatext. Itistruethatatextdoesnot
speak tousinthesame way asdoesaThou. Wewhoare attempting
tounderstandmustourselvesmakeit speak. Butwefoundthatthiskindof
understanding,"making thetext speak," isnotan arbitraryprocedure
thatweundertakeonourowninitiative but that, asa question,
itisrelatedtotheanswerthatis expected inthe text. Anticipating
anansweritself presupposes thatthe questioner is part
ofthetraditionand regards himselfasaddressed by it.20
HerewetouchtheheartofGadamer's ontological hermeneutics.
Understanding isaconversationor dialogue withtexts?textsthat speak
to us, textsthat posequestions tousandtowhichwe pose questions.
Intheto-and-fromovementofour dialogue with texts, a textanswersthe
questions thatwe pose. Thisis why the meaning ofa textisnot
something thatissomehowintrinsictoatextand merely
hastobediscovered. Understanding isa happening in which meaning
emerges inand through our dialogical encounterwithtexts.Thetask
ofthe interpreter asa partner intheconversationwithtextsisto"re
awaken"thetext's meaning. "Thusitis perfectlylegitimate to speak
ofahermeneuticalconversation. ... Thetext brings a subject matter
[Sache] into language, butthatit doessois ultimately theachievement
ofthe interpreter. Bothhaveashareinit."21Whattakes place inun
derstanding isafusionofhorizonsofthe partners(whether thisisan
other person ora text). 20 Ibid., 377.NotehowGadamerboth
acknowledges and downplays the significance ofthedifferencebetweena
livingdialogue between persons and the dialogue witha
writtentext.Whenhe compares theconversationbe tween persons
withthehermeneuticaltaskof understandingtexts, hewrites: "Thisis
notto say, of course, thatthehermeneuticsituationin regard totexts
is exactly thesameasthatbetweentwo people inconversation.Textsare
'enduringly fixed expressions oflife'thataretobe understood;
andthat meansthatone partner inthehermeneutical conversation, the
text,speaks onlythrough theother partner, the
interpreter.Onlythrough himarethe writtenmarks changed backinto
meaning.Nevertheless, in beingchanged back byunderstanding, the
subject matterofwhichthetext speaks itself finds expression.
Itislikearealconversationinthatthecommon subject matteris
whatbindsthetwo partners, thetextandthe interpreter, toeach
other,"ibid., 387-8. 21 Ibid., 388. This content downloaded from
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JSTOR Terms and Conditions584RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN Thenotionofa
horizon, whichGadamer appropriates from Nietzscheand
Husserl,deepens our understanding ofhermeneutics. Ahorizonis"the
range ofvisionthatincludes everything thatcanbe seenfroma
particularvantagepoint.... SinceNietzscheand Husserl,
thewordhasbeenusedin philosophy tocharacterizethe way in which
thought istiedtoitsfinite determinacy, andthe way one's range
ofvisionis graduallyexpanded."22 We always haveafinitehis
toricalhorizonthatis continuouslybeingshapedby thetraditionsto
whichwe belong; ourhorizonisinformed by the prejudgments or
prejudices thatweinheritfromtradition.Buthorizonsarenot closed;
they are open. [T]he closedhorizonthatis supposed
toencloseacultureisan abstrac
tion.Thehistoricalmovementofhumanlifeconsistsinthefactthatit
isnever absolutely boundto any one standpoint, andhencecannever
havea truly closedhorizon.Thehorizon is,rather,something into
whichwemoveandthatmoveswithus.Horizons change fora person whois
moving. Thusthehorizonofthe past, outof whichallhumanlife
livesandwhichexistsintheformof tradition, is always inmotion.23
Itis precisely becauseofthe openness ofhorizonsthatwecan enlarge
ourhorizoninand through the happening of understanding. Thisis what
happens ina "genuine"dialogue orconversationwithtexts.Be
causethehorizonsofthosewhoseektounderstandand interpret, al
thoughfinite, arethemselves alwayschanging, it makesnosenseto speak
aboutafinalor completeunderstanding of any text.Atextis alwaysopen
tonewanddifferent understandings and interpretations.
EversinceThomasKuhn published TheStructure ofScientific
Revolutions,24philosophers inboththeContinentaltraditionandthe
Anglo-American traditionhavebeenfascinated (evenobsessed) with
theideaofthe incommensurability of paradigms,languages, frame
works, andhorizons.The picture thathasheld many thinkers captive
isthatwearesomehow prisoners withinthese paradigms andhori zons.
Consequently, wecannot really understandwhatisincommen
surablewiththem.Orif wearetounderstandwhatis genuinely in
commensurableand alien, thenwemustsomehowlearnhowto leap
outofourownhorizonand identify ourselveswiththe radically other 22
Ibid., 302. 23 Ibid., 304. 24 Thomas Kuhn, TheStructure
ofScientific Revolutions (Chicago: Uni versity of
ChicagoPress,1996). This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on
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ConditionsTHE CONVERSATIONTHAT NEVERHAPPENED585 horizonor paradigm.
Kuhnlikenedthistoa "conversion"25 experi ence.ButGadamer
categoricallyrejects this picture ofincommensu
rablehorizons.Heisinbasic agreement withDonaldDavidsonwho has
forcefullychallenged the very ideaofthe incommensurability of
conceptual schemes.26Ourfinitehistoricalhorizonsarenotbarriers to
understanding;they arethe very conditionforthe possibility ofun
derstanding. Thehermeneuticaltaskisto enlarge and expand ourfi
nitehorizons through theencounterwiththetextsandtraditionsthat
weseektounderstand.27"Inatraditionthis process offusioniscon
tinuallygoing on, forthereoldandneware alwayscombining into
something of livingvalue, withouteither beingexplicitlyforegrounded
fromtheother."28 Although therearenobarriersto understanding,
nevertheless understanding is alwayslimited; the meaning ofatext
canneverbeexhausted. Gadamer, inafamous sentence, tellsusthat
"Being whichcanbeunderstoodis language," andhe says this implies
"thatwhichiscanneverbe completely understood. ... Thisisthe
hermeneuticaldimensioninwhich Being 'manifestsitself."29 25 Thomas
Kuhn, TheStructure ofScientific Revolutions (Chicago: Uni versity
of ChicagoPress,1996), 159. 26 SeeDonald Davidson, "Onthe Very
Ideaofa ConceptualScheme," in Inquiries intoTruthand
Interpretation(Oxford: Claredon Press,2001), 183-98.Seealso my
discussionsof incommensurability in"Incommensura bility
andOtherness Revisited," in TheNew Constellation,57-78; andin Be
yondObjectivism andRelativism (Philadelphia:University of
Pennsylvania Press,1983), 79-108. 27 It might seemthatthe very
ideaofthefusionofhorizons presupposes
thattherearedistincthorizonstobefused.ButGadamerdeniesthatthere
aredistinctfixedhorizons.Heraisesthe question:"If, howeverthereisno
such thing asthesedistinct horizons,why dowe speak
ofthefusionofhori zonsandnot simply oftheformationofone horizon,
whoseboundsaresetin the depths oftradition?" Gadamer, Truthand
Method, 306.Gadamer'san swertohisown question issubtle.In seeking
tounderstanda tradition, we "project ahistoricalhorizon."
"Projecting ahistorical horizon,then, is only one phase inthe
process of understanding; it doesnotbecomesolidifiedinto
theself-alienationofa pastconsciousness, butisovertaken by ourown
present horizonof understanding. Inthe process of understanding,
arealfus ing
ofhorizonsoccurs?whichmeansthatasthehistoricalhorizonis pro jected,
itis simultaneouslysuperseded,"ibid., 306-7. Consequently, in under
standing a text, we interpreters, as partners inthehermeneutical
conversation, mustalso "project ahorizon"forthetext?we speak forthe
text.This projected horizon is,however,superseded
inthefusionthattakes place. 28Ibid., 306. 29 Gadamer, "Textand
Interpretation," 25. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on
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Conditions586RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN Gadamer accepts the Heideggerian
claimthat "'Being' doesnotunfold totally inits self-manifestation,
butratherwithholdsitselfandwith drawswiththesame primordiality
withwhichit manifestsitself."30 Wearenowina position
tounderstandthetwo questions that Gadamer poses in"Textand
Interpretation." First, Howdothe communality of
meaning[Gemeinsamkeit des Sinnes], whichisbuilt up in conversation,
andthe impenetrability of theothernessoftheothermediateeachother?
Second,What, inthefi nal analysis, is
linguisticality[Sprachlichkeit]? Isita bridge orabar rier?Isita
bridge builtof things thatarethesameforeachselfover
whichonecommunicateswiththeotherthe flowing streamofother
ness?Orisit abarrierthatlimitsourself-abandonmentandthatcutsus
offfromthe possibility ofever completelyexpressing ourselvesand
communicating withothers?31 One may thinkthatGadamer's answertothe
question: "Isita bridge orabarrier?"is clearly thatitis bridge
andnotabarrier.Allthe paths thathe pursues inhisdiscussionsof
play,dialogue, andthefusionsof
horizonsleadustotherealizationthatwehavethe capacity fromour
limitedfinitehistoricalhorizonstoreachoutandunderstandwhatini
tially strikesusas different,alien, andother.Thisisthedominant
themein Gadamer'shermeneutics.Butif we fullyappreciate whatit
meanstobeafinitehistoricalcreature shapedbylivingtraditions,
thenwemustalsorealizethatitis impossible?ontologicallyimpossi
ble?to speak abouta complete andfinal understanding.Positively
stated, therecanbeno finality totheconversationthatweare.Butif by
a"barrier"wemeana "limit," thentherearelimitstoallunder
standing.Furthermore, itis through theencounterwiththeotherthat we
enlarge ourownhorizonandcometoa deeperself-understanding. Wenever
completelypenetrate theothernessoftheother.Tothink
thatwecandothisistobe guilty of logocentrism?and Gadamercat
egoricallyrejects this.32Butneitherdowestandmuteordumbbefore 30
Ibid. 31 Ibid., 27. 32 Gadamer emphaticallysays:
"AlimitationoftheGreekmodelsof thought canbedetected here,
onethatwas persuasivelypointed out by the Old Testament, Saint
Paul,Luther, andtheirmodern reinterpreters. Itis adi mensionof
dialogue thatstilldoesnotcomeinto conceptual consciousness
evenwiththecelebrated discovery ofSocratic dialogue
asthebasicformof thought. ... [T]he true depth ofthe
dialogicalprinciple firstenters philo sophical consciousnessinthe
twilight of metaphysics, inthe epoch ofGer man romanticism,
andthenisrehabilitatedinour century in opposition to the subjective
biasthatcharacterizedidealism." Gadamer, "TextandInter pretation,"
27.Gadameris summarizing his argument aboutthelimitations ofGreek
logos thathe develops indetailin PartThreeofTruthandMethod. This
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ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED587
theothernessoftheother.Itis throughdialogue orconversationthat
wecanmediatebetweenthe communality of meaning andtheother
nessoftheother. I have attempted to present
afaircharacterizationofsomeofthe main points
Gadamer'shermeneutics?onethat brings forthits strengths. Whatisso
impressive aboutGadameristhe way in which hetextureshis
understanding ofhermeneuticsand integrates themes reaching
backtotheGreeks. AlthoughHeidegger wasdecisivein making the
ontological turnof hermeneutics, acareful reading ofGa
damerrevealshowmuchhehas appropriated from Plato,Aristotle, and
Hegel(as wellasfromthe long andvariedtraditionofhermeneu tics)
toarticulateanddefendhisdistinctive understanding ofunder
standing.Nevertheless, therearetensionsandinternal conflicts, and
Derrida'sdeconstructive practiceshighlight these.Before turning ex
plicitly to questions thatDerrida might have raised, Iwantto
mention something thatGadamerandDerridahavein common, butwhichis
alsoasourceoftheir greatestdivergence.They bothshareanextraor
dinarysensitivity tothenuancesof language.Typically, whatever
topictheyconsider,theybeginbyreflecting on multiplelinguistic ex
pressions.Think, for example, ofthe way in whichGadamerintro
ducesthe concept of play(Spiel) in Truthand Method byspeaking of
children's play, the play of waves, the play of gears, the play of
limbs, the play of forces, the play of gnats, andthe play
ofwords.Hedoes thisinordertoshowhow play is"theclueto
ontologicalexplanation." Language itself"has somethingspeculative
about it"; an"eventof speech" is speculative inthesense"thatfinite
possibilities oftheword
areorientedtowardthesenseintendedastowardtheinfinite."33But
thenthinkofthe very different way in whichDerrida appeals to play
inhisfamous article,"Structure,Sign and Play," wherehetellsus: Play
isthe disruption of presence. The presence ofanelementis always a
signifying andsubstitutereferenceinscribedin a system ofdifferences
andthe movementofachain. Play is always a play ofabsenceand pres
ence, butifitistobe thoughtradically,play mustbeconceivedofbe
forethealternativeof presence andabsence. Being mustbeconceived as
presence orabsenceonthebasisofthe possibility of play andnotthe
other way around.34 33 Gadamer, Truthand Method, 469. 34
JacquesDerrida,"Structure,Sign, and Play intheDiscourseoftheHu man
Sciences," in Writing and Difference, trans.AlanBass (Chicago:
Univer sity of ChicagoPress,1978), 292.See my discussionofDerrida's
concept of play in"Serious Play: TheEthical-PoliticalHorizonof
Derrida," inTheNew Constellation, 171-98. This content downloaded
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to JSTOR Terms and Conditions588RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN
WedetecthereadifferencebetweenGadamerandDerridathatruns deep.
WhenGadamerreflectsontheusesoftheword "play" inorder toelaboratehis
concept of play, itistheto-and-fromovementof play, the
primacy,continuity andthecommunal aspect of play thatheem phasizes.
ButDerridafocuseson play asunstable disruption anddis continuity.
He begins hisarticle byspeaking ofan"event"inthehis tory
of"structure"thathenames "rupture." And throughout, Derrida is
mostconcernedwith play as decentering, as diff?rance. Gadamer's
"conversation,""dialogue,""understanding," and"fusionofhorizons"
are shapedby a metaphorics of overcomingbarriers,achievingagree
ment,commonality, andreconciliation.ButDerrida constantly speaks of
rupture, of abysses, of "possibleimpossibles" and "impossi ble
possibles."Derrida, inhisdeconstructive practices, seemstode light
in locatingdiscontinuities,breaks,obstacles,"contradictorylog
ics"andunstableundecidables.35Solet'sseehowhe might have questioned
Gadamer.RememberthatinhisAdorno lecture, Derrida notedthatthe
misunderstandings betweenGadamerandhimself"al ways occuraround
interpretation andthe verypossibility ofmisun derstanding?they
turnaroundthe conceptof misunderstanding "36 Itis striking how
infrequently Gadamer speaks aboutmisunderstand ing and
misinterpretation. HetendstobedismissiveofSchleierma
cher'sclaimthathermeneuticsis"theartof avoiding misunderstand ings"
andthat "misunderstanding follows automatically and understanding
mustbedesiredand sought at everypoint."37 Gadamer
privilegesunderstanding and prefers to speak aboutthe"failuresof
understanding," thefailuretodowhatneedstobedonetoachieveun
derstanding. ButDerrida might well object thatthereisan implicit hi
erarchicalvalorizationherethatmusttobe challenged. After all, de
spite Gadamer'sclaimthat understanding constitutesour being-in
the-world, if wetake seriously his rigorousrequirements forwhat
constitutes "genuine"understanding and conversation, thenit appears
tobea very rare phenomenon, ifitever really occurs.Misunderstand
ing isnot just afailureto understand, burratherisintrinsictounder
35 ForDerrida'sreflectionsonthe practicalimplications forhis
"prefer ence"of discontinuity over continuity for diff?rance over
reconciliation, see hisinterview "Terror,Religion, andtheNew
Politics," in DebatesinConti nental Philosophy. 36
Derrida,"Fichus," 178. 37 Gadamer, Truthand Method, 185. This
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ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED589 standing.Why? Because
understanding doesn't happen without prej udices.Some prejudices
are enabling andarethe"conditionsof understanding," butthereare
alwaysprejudices thatcanblockordis tort understanding.38 But
integral toGadamer's critique ofthe Enlight enment
"prejudiceagainstprejudice" andhis critique ofCartesian claimsabout
bracketing all prejudicesby anactof self-reflection, is
theclaimthatweareneverina position, onceandfor all, toisolate those
prejudices thatresultin misunderstanding. TheDerridean way of
making this point isnottoreverse Gadamer's hierarchy, notto say
withSchleiermacherthat "misunderstanding follows automatically and
understanding mustbedesiredand sought at everypoint," but
rathertoaffirmthat understanding and misunderstanding are equipri
mordial.Thereisno understanding without misunderstanding andno
misunderstanding without understanding.Furthermore, because
therecanbenofixeddecision procedure for distinguishing whether
weare understanding or misunderstanding, itisinthis respect unde
cidable. This instabilityhighlights anothertensioninhermeneutics
(Derrida wouldcallitan aporia). Oneofthemostinsistentthemesin
Gadamer'shermeneuticsisthe critique ofthe subject-object dichot
omy, whetheritis interpretedontologically or epistemologically.
This is whyplay asthecluefor ontologicalexplanation isso important
for Gadamer, and why heinsists upon the primacy of play overtheindi
vidual players. WhenGadamer applies this concept of play tothe
hermeneutical conversation, he emphasizes thatthereisato-and-fro
movementbetweenthe partners inthe dialogue; betweenthe person
whoseekstounderstandandthetextthatshe attempts tounderstand.
FollowingHeidegger, Gadamerisrelentlessinhis critique of subjec
tivity, somuchsothathe rejects Schleiermacher'sclaimthatherme
neuticsinvolves "divining" theintentional meaning oftheauthorofa
text.39Hermeneuticsisnotconcernedwiththe "psychological" states
ofthecreatorsoftexts.Thetextitselfhas meaning,although the meaning
ofthetextcomesalive only whenitisunderstood by thein terpreter. The
interpreter mustnot only learntheartof asking the rightquestions,
shemustlearnhowtolistentothe way thatthetext answers
her;understandingrequiressubmitting oneselftothe 38 Ibid., 277. 39
Ibid., 184. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24
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Conditions590RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN authority oftradition.Butwhatis
paradoxical, indeed aporetic, is thatthemoreGadamer
critiquessubjectivity, themoreheaffirmssub jectivity.
ThinkofthedemandsthatGadamer places ontheinter
preter-partner(subject?) whoseekstounderstandatext.Shemust
learntheartof asking the rightquestions; shemustriskher preju
dices; shemustlistentowhatthetext says; shemust open herselfto
theclaimoftruthofthetext. Furthermore, shemustbetheventrilo quist
forthetext because, asGadamertells us, "thetext speaksonly through
theother partner, the interpreter"; andshehasthe responsi bility of
changing thewrittenmarks"backinto meaning."40 Gadamer may
notwanttocallthisa "subject," butliketheCartesian ego, thisis a
subject that doubts,imagines,thinks,hears, and speaks forherself
andforthetext.In short, themoreGadamerdeniesthattheinter preter isa
subject, themoreheaffirmsthatshehasallthecharacteris
ticsofthe"classical" philosophicsubject. Buttherearefurther
problems.Despite Gadamer's suggestion thatthe partners
inthehermeneuticalconversationstandina recipro calrelationtoeach
other, theaboveremarks bring outthe asymmetry betweenthetextandthe
interpreter-partner. Thereareahostofdiffi culties concerning
thewrittenandthe spoken word.Gadamer says thatthewrittentext
"speaks"onlythrough theother partner, thein terpreter,
buthealsoinsiststhat"itis perfectlylegitimate to speak of
ahermeneuticalconversation"betweenthetextandthe interpreter.41
Buthowdo I, as interpreter, knowthatI am speaking"correctly" for
thetext? Presumably ifI misspeak,if, for example, Iam imposing
false prejudices, thetextwillanswerme.Butthereis somethingvery
strange herebecauseitisI?the interpreter-partner?who answers
"No"forthetext.Sowefindourselves facing another aporia: Imust
atonceaffirmthatthetext speaks andthatitdoesn't speak(Ispeak for
it). Thedifficultiesare compoundedbecause,although Gadamer says
"thatallthe meaning ofwhatishandeddowntousfindsitscon cretion
(thatis, is understood) initsrelationtothe understandingI," healso
says: 40 Ibid., 387. 41 Ibid, 388. This content downloaded from
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Theintimate unity of understanding and interpretation isconfirmed
by thefactthatthe interpretation thatrevealsthe implications
ofthetext's meaning and brings itinto languageseems, when compared
withthe giventext, tobeanew creation, but yet doesnotmaintain
anyproper existence apart fromthe understandingprocess. ...
[T]heinterpretive concepts are superseded inthe
fullnessofunderstanding because they aremeantto disappear.42 Soit
appears thatthereisno understanding or interpretation without the
"understanding I" and yet thisIis superseded(disappears) inthe
happening of understanding. Inthe concluding sentenceof"Textand
Interpretation," Gadamerdeclares:"The interpreter who gives hisrea
sons disappears?and thetext speaks."43
Gadamerseemstothinkwecandissolvethis aporia oncewerec ognize
thatthehermeneuticalconversationbetweenthetextandthe
interpreter-partner "islikearealconversationinthatthecommon subject
matter [Sache] is whatbindsthetwo partners, thetextandthe
interpreter, toeachother."44"Toconductaconversationmeanstoal
lowoneselftobeconducted by the subject matter [Sache] towhich the
partners inthe dialogue are oriented."45Thetextisnota cipher; it
constrainsus.Unlessweare responsive toits subject matter (Sache),
unlessweshare it, thenthereisnoconversationandnounderstand ing. But
suppose we probe thisideaofacommonSache.Howdo I, as interpreter,
knowthatthere really isacommon subject matterthan bindsmetothetext?
Perhaps I am deludingmyselfbyprojecting false prejudicesupon
thetext.Butifthisis whatI havedonethenthetext willcheck me; it will
say, "No!" But, even according to Gadamer, this isnot quite
accurate.Thetextdoesnot literallysay noto me; itisI as interpreter
who says noonbehalfofthetext.This begins tolooklike a verystrange
conversation.Unlikea"real"conversationwithan other person whohasthe
capacity to sayyes or no, thisisaone-sided
conversationwheretheburdenof answering forthetext always falls onme
(theinterpreter-partner). Derrida might even highlight this apo ria
bynoting thatthisisaconversationor dialogue that begins tolook
moreandmorelikea soliloquy oraninternal monologue whereI play 42
Ibid.,473;emphasis added. 43 Gadamer, "Textand Interpretation," 51.
44 Gadamer, Truthand Method, 388. 45Ibid., 367. This content
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differentroles: interpreter and spokesperson forthetextthatI amin
terpreting.46 The aporiae locatedabovearealsorelevanttothe way in
which Gadamercharacterizesthefusionofhorizons.The very ideaofafu
sionofhorizonsseemsto suggest thereareatleasttwohorizonsthat
needtobefused?thehorizonofthe personseeking tounderstand
andthehorizonofthe text, theworkofartorthehistoricaltradition
thatweseektounderstand.ButGadamertellsusthatthisisnot quite
accuratewhenheassertsthattherearenodistincthorizons.What thenamI
talking aboutwhenI speak ofthefusionofhorizons?Once again,
wedetectan asymmetry andnota reciprocal relation.When
Gadamerdiscussesthe "historicity of understanding" hetellsusthatI
project a"historicalhorizon."Itis I, the interpreter, whodoes this;
it isIwho project. SohowdoI knowthatthe horizonthatI project isin
factthehorizonofthetext?Can'tI bemistaken? According toGada mer, I
certainly canbemistaken.Otherwisetherewouldbenodia logue
withthetextfromwhichIlearnabout my mistaken interpreta
tions.HowdoIfindoutifI ammistakenwhenitisI who speak for
thetext?Gadamertellsus:"Inthe process of understanding, areal
fusing ofhorizonsoccurs?whichmeansthatasthehistoricalhorizon is
projected, itis simultaneouslysuperseded."47 It begins tolookasif
thetextitself drops outofthisfusion. Why? Because I, theinter
preter, fromwithin my ownlimited horizon,project thehorizonfor
thetextthatI am seeking to understand, andthis projected horizonis
"simultaneouslysuperseded." Thefusionhereisnotbetween my ho
rizonandthehorizonofthe text, butbetween my horizonandtheho
rizonthatI project onbehalfofthetext. 46 The difficulty herecanbe
generalized. Gadamer's understanding of hermeneutics requires that
we acknowledge twofundamental principles. Textsexerciseconstraints.
They bindand guide us.Theconstraintsoftexts are compatible withthe
openness of understanding and interpretation inthe sensethatatextis
alwayspotentially open tonewanddifferent interpreta
tions.Unlessthetextexercisedsomeconstraintit wouldnotevenmake
senseto speak of understanding or interpreting
thetext.ButGadamerdoes not reallyexplain
howthetextitselfconstrainsthe interpreter whenitisthe interpreter
whomust speak forthetext.Oncethisis acknowledged thenthe
possibility arisesthatthe interpretermaymisspeak forthetext.Itis
notthen thetextthat constrains, butthetextasunderstoodand
interpreted thatcon strains.The aporiahere,according to Derrida,
isthatGadameraffirmsthat thetextdoesanddoesnotconstrain us. 47
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Butthisisnotthe onlydifficulty withthefusionofhorizons.One
ofthemainfunctionsofthefusionofhorizonsistoshowhowwecan
understandwhatisotherandalienwithout reifying thisothernessor
denying theothernessoftheother. According to Gadamer, itis only
inand through theencounterwiththeotherthatI can enlargemy hori
zonandcometoa greaterself-understanding. But Derrida, inaLevi
nasian spirit,mightquestion whetherthis really does justice totheal
terity oftheother. Despite Gadamer'sinsistencethatthetextandthe
interpreter are partners, wehaveseenthatitis really the interpreter
thatis privileged insofarasshe speaks forherselfand speaks forthe
textsheis seeking tounderstand.48Gadamer does, of course, claim
thatall understanding is limited; wecanneverexhaustthe meaning of
thetext.Buttheothernessoftheother may stillbeviolated. Phrasing the
point inadifferent way, Derrida mightsuggest thatGadameris guilty
ofthat tendency thatliesso deep inthetraditionof Western phi
losophy:reducing theothertothesamebecause understanding neces sary
involves my horizonandthehorizonthatI project onbehalfof
theother.Sonowwehaveanew aporia. Gadameratonceaffirmsbut denies
(undermines) theothernessoftheother.Derridatells us, there are
always "tracesofan alterity whichrefusetobe totally domesti
cated."49At least, withanother person, shecan respond: "Youhave not
really understood me,you are projecting your own concepts and
categories ontome."Butwitha text, it requires the interpreter-part
nerto respond forit. Derrida might also object thatthereis
somethingethically and politicallymisleading aboutthe primacy
thatGadamer gives todia 48 To speakonly ofthe interpreter
andthetextisto oversimplify thesit uation.Weare alwaysbeingshapedby
other interpretations?even conflict inginterpretations.
ThisisconstitutiveofGadamer's concept of wirkungs gechichtliches
Bewusstsein (historically effected consciousness), a
consciousnessthatis doubly relatedtotraditionbecauseitis"affected"
by history;open totheeffectsof history andalso brought into
being?"effected" byhistory.Ibid., 298-304. 49
SeeDerrida'sinterviewwithRichard Kearney, "Deconstructionand the
Other," in DebatesinContinental Philosophy: ConversationswithCon
temporaryThinkers, 148-9.Derridaadds:"Moreoverthe rapport ofself
identity isitself always a rapport ofviolencewiththe other,
sothattheno tionsof property,appropriation, and self-presence,
socentralto logocentric metaphysics, are essentiallydependent onan
oppositional relationwithoth erness.Inthis
sense,identitypresupposesalterity."Derrida, "Deconstruc tionandthe
Other," 149. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24
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Conditions594RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN logue andconversation.Wedonothaveto
deny thatsometimesthere are dialogues
andconversationsthatareorientedtoacommon subject matter (Sache)
that guides theto-and-fromovementofthedia
logue.(Deconstructivepractices donot primarilydeny;theybring forth
complexitiesbyrevealing innertensionsand contradictorylog ics.)
Gadamerstressesthe demanding conditionsfora "genuine" dia logue;
butheseemstothink dialogue andconversationare always possible.
Derrida might even appeal tohissometime adversary, Hab ermas, in
questioning this.Weshouldbealerttothe manyways that dialogue
andconversationare impossible, whenin Habermas's phrase
thereis"distortedcommunication."Putinanother way, thematerial
conditions, theverbal ability, thelevelofeducation (theeconomic,
social,political, andcultural conditions)required for persons toen
gage ina genuinedialogue donot always exist. Theyrarely existeven
inthebestofcircumstances.Too frequently thecallfor dialogue isa
powerplay, ascreenfor doing violencetotheothernessoftheother.50
Thislast pointbrings up oneofthemost important differences
betweenGadamerandDerrida.Gadamerhas always beenconcerned withthe
ethical-political horizonofhermeneutics. Understanding, in
terpretation, and application arethreemomentsofa singlehappen
ing.Application isconstitutiveof understanding. To clarify whathe
meansGadamerdrawson Aristotle's Ethics,particularly BookVIof
theNicomacheanEthicswhereAristotle distinguishesphronesis
fromtechneand episteme. [I]f werelateAristotle's description
oftheethical phenomenon andes pecially thevirtueof moral
knowledge[phronesis] toour investigation, wefindthathis analysis
infactoffersakindof model of the problemof
hermeneutics.Wetoodeterminedthat application isneitherasubse quent
nor merely anoccasional part ofthe phenomenon ofunderstand ing,
butco-determinesit asa wholefromthe beginning. Heretoo appli
cationdidnotconsistin relating some pregiven universaltothe
particular situation.The interpreterdealing witha traditionary text
50 Thismotifhasbeen especially dominantin Derrida's writingsduring
thelastdecadesoflife whereheexaminesthe complexpolitical issuescon
cerningasylum,immigration,homelessness, andthetreatmentofthosewho
are "sans-papiers." See JacquesDerrida,OfHospitality, trans.Rachel
Bowlby(Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress,2000); and
JacquesDerrida, "On Cosmopolitanism," trans.Mark Dooley, inOn
Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, ed.Mark Dooley andMichael
Hughes(London:Routledge, 2001), 1-24.Cf. J?rgenHabermas, The
Theoryof Communicative Action, trans.Thomas McCarthy(Boston: Beacon
Press,1985), vol.2. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on
Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and
ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED595 triesto apply
ittohimself.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatthetextis given forhimas
somethinguniversal, thathefirstunderstandsit perse, and
thenafterwardsusesitfor particularapplications.Rather, theinter
preter seeksnomorethantounderstandthis universal, the text?i.e., to
understandwhatit says, whatconstitutesthetext's meaning and signifi
cance.Inordertounderstand that, hemustnot try to disregard himself
andhis particular hermen?utica!situation.Hemustrelatethetextto
thissituationif hewantstounderstandatall.51 The type of reasoning
characteristicof phronesis withitsmediation (play)
betweentheuniversalandthe particular isthe type ofreason ing
thathermeneutical understandingrequires. Phronesisis impor
tantforGadamerbecauseitenableshimto distinguish hermeneutical
understanding fromthe objectifying methodsofmodernscience.But
Gadameralsowantsusto moveintheotherdirection?torecoverthe
importance of phronesis for practicalphilosophytoday(and toshow
howhermeneuticsistheheirtothetraditionof practicalphilosophy).
Hetellsus:"When Aristotle, inthesixthbookoftheNicomachean
Ethics,distinguishes themannerof 'practicalknowledge'[phronesis].
.. fromtheoreticalandtechnical knowledge he expresses, in myopin
ion, oneofthe greatest truths by whichtheGreeksthrow lightupon
'scientific' mystification ofmodern society of specialization."52
Or again hewrites: In my own eyes, the great
meritofAristotlewasthathe anticipated the impasse
ofourscientificculture by his description ofthestructureof
practical reasonasdistinctfromtheoretical knowledge andtechnical
skill.... [T]heproblem ofour society isthatthe longing ofthe
citizenry fororientationandnormative patterns investsthe expert
withan exag geratedauthority. Modern societyexpects himto provide
asubstitute for past moraland political orientations. Consequently,
the concept of 'praxis' whichwas developed
inthelasttwocenturiesisanawfuldefor mationofwhat practicereally
is.Inallthedebatesofthelast century practice wasunderstoodas
application ofsciencetotechnicaltasks.... It degradespractical
reasontotechnicalcontrol.53 51 Gadamer, Truthand Method, 324. 52
Hans-GeorgGadamer, "TheProblemofHistorical Consciousness,"
trans.JeffL. Close, in Interpretive SocialScience:ASecond Look,
ed.Paul RabinowandWilliamSullivan (Berkeley:University ofCalifornia
Press, 1981), 107. 53 Hans-GeorgGadamer, "HermeneuticsandSocial
Science," Cultural Hermeneutics2 (1975), 312.Fora
moredetaileddiscussionofGadamer's understanding of phronesis andthe
way in whichitdiffersfromtechneand episteme, see my
BeyondObjectivism andRelativism (Philadelphia: Univer sity of
PennsylvaniaPress,1983). This content downloaded from
131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to
JSTOR Terms and Conditions596RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN Derridawould agree
withGadamer'sremarksaboutthe degrading of practical
reasontotechnicalcontrol.His writings aboutthe mentality
andeffectsofwhathecalls"technoscience" support Gadamer's
claims.Butunlike Gadamer, Derridadoesnot appeal to phronesis.(I
amalmostinclinedto say thatheistonedeaftothe significance of
phronesis andoftheAristoteliantraditionof practicalreason). He
stressesthe aporiae?thecontradictorylogics thatweconfrontwhen
everwemake practical decisions.Thisbecomes especially dominant in
his writingsduring thelast decadesofhislife.In hisdiscussionsof
cosmopolitanism,hospitality, and forgiveness, heseekstoshowhow
weareconfrontedwith incompatibleimperatives. Wemust negotiate
betweenthese injunctions in makingresponsible decisions.Butif we
are really confrontedwith contradictorylogics, thenit wouldseem
thatthis paralyzes decisionandaction.Thisisan objection thathas
frequently beenraised against Derrida.ButDerrida emphatically
claims that, onthe contrary, this facing up tothe
contradictorylogics oftheunconditionalandtheconditionalis precisely
whatenablesre sponsible decisionandaction.Whenavariationofthis
objection was pressedagainst Derrida'sclaimthatthe onlything to
forgive istheun forgivable, he responded: The aporia isthe
experience of responsibility. Itis onlybygoing through asetof
contradictoryinjunctions,impossiblechoices, thatwe makeachoice.IfI
knowwhatI haveto do, ifI knowinadvancewhat hastobe done,
thenthereis no responsibility. Forthe responsible deci sion
envisaged or taken, wehaveto gothroughpain and aporia, asitua
tionin whichI donotknowwhattodo.I havetodothisand this, and they
donot gotogether. I havetofacetwo incompatibleinjunctions,
andthatis whatI havetodo everyday in everysituation,ethical,politi
cal, ornot. ... An aporia isan experience,enduring an experience,
in which nothing?such as forgiveness?presents itselfassuch.Thatis
becauseabsolute forgiveness never presents itselfassuchandisirre
ducibletoconditional forgiveness.54 But one mayask, andif
myimagined conversationbetweenGadamer andDerridahadtaken place,
Gadamer might wellhaveasked:"What 54 JacquesDerrida,"Forgiveness:
ARoundtableDiscussionwith Jacques Derrida," in QuestioningGod,
ed.John Caputo, Mark Dooley, andMichael Scanlon (Bloomington:
Indiana UniversityPress,2001), 62.For my discus sionand critique
ofDerrida'sreflectionson forgiveness, see myarticle, "Der rida:The
Aporia of Forgiveness?" inConstellations 13, no.3 (September 2006):
394-406. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May
2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and
ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED597 isthis experience
ofthe aporia? HowdoI decideifI havetoface'in
compatibleinjunctions'?" Derridawrites: [I]f wewantto embody
anunconditional forgiveness in history andsoci ety, wehaveto
gothrough theseconditions.Wehaveto negotiate be
tweentheunconditionalandtheconditional. They cannotbedissoci
ated,although weknow they are absolutelyheterogeneous and
incommensurable.Itis becausetheseincommensurable poles areindis
sociablethatwehavetotake responsibility, adifficult responsibility,
to negotiate thebest response in an impossible situation.55
EvenifGadamer accepted Derrida'sclaimsabout "incompatible in
junctions" and "contradictorylogics" he might stillask:"What pre
cisely do you mean by'negotiation'? Isthisa reasoningprocess?
Whatareitscharacteristics?"GadamerandDerridaboth reject the
ideathatsuch negotiation canbeunderstoodas calculation, asa
means-endtechnical rationality. NeitherGadamernorDerridathinks that
responsible decisionsfollowfromuniversalrules.Gadamer might say
Derrida's negotiation looks suspiciously like phronesis. (And
evenif Gadamerwouldnot saythis, Iwould say itinhis name). To put
theissueina slightly different way, Derridadoesnotthinkthat
negotiating betweentheunconditionalandtheconditionalisacom
pletelyarbitraryprocess. Itisadeliberative process whereI weigh
andevaluatealternativesinordertodecide responsibly whattodoin this
particular situation.Nowevenaftersuch deliberation, thereis stilla
gap between my deliberationand my decision.Butthisisal ways trueof
phronesis asaformof practicalthinking. Theconsider ationstowhichI
appeal in deliberating donotdictateor completely
determinethedecision.Insofaraswe negotiate between incompati ble
imperatives inordertodecidewhattodointhis particular situa
tionweare engaged inadeliberative activity thatisneithertechnenor
episteme. Thereare always risksinvolvedin making sucha practical
decision; but uncertainty isintrinsicto phronesis. Howthen might
weunderstandthetensionthatstillexistsbe
tweenGadamerandDerrida?Iseeitasa productive tension.Onthe on hand,
Gadamer helps ustoseethatthekindof negotiation that
Derridatakestobesofundamentalfor responsible decisionsandac
tionsisaformof phronesis. Butontheother hand, Derrida brings out
complexities andrisksof phronesis-, hewarns againstreducing itto 55
Ibid.,58;emphasis added. This content downloaded from
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JSTOR Terms and Conditions598RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN
technicalcalculationor simplyfollowing auniversalrule.Inhislan
guage, thereis always a gap?anabyss?which wehavetofacein
makingresponsibledecisions, whether they areethicalor political de
cisions. I have attempted toshowhowsuchaconversationbetweenGa
damerandDerrida might have begun. I stress this, becauseI havenot
pursued howGadamerandDerrida might have responded tothe type of
objections thateachraisesabouttheother.Andthereare topics
thatIhavenoteven explicitlyraised, suchastheirdifferentunder
standings oftruth.ButIwanttoconclude by abrieflookattheirdif ferent
readings ofthePhaedrus?thePlatonic dialogue thatissofun
damentalforbothofthemandfortheir respectiveconceptions of
hermeneuticsanddeconstruction. MuchofwhatGadamerhasto say about
conversation,dialogue, understanding,interpretation,
andtextcanbereadasa commentary onPlato'sreflectionsabout writing
and speech?especially asitisdis cussedinthefamous passage
fromthePhaedrus (274c-279c). One mightinitially thinkthatGadamer
simplyaccepts thestandardtradi tional reading wherePlato presumably
introducesthe myth Theuthin orderto argue forthe superiority ofthe
spoken wordoverthewritten word.After all, Gadamerseemstofavor
livingdialogue andconversa
tion.Heconceivesofthehermeneuticaltaskasoneof making writ tentexts
speak. Not onlyinterpreters, buttextsthemselves pose and answer
questions;they are partners inthehermeneuticalconversa tion.
Consequently, Gadamerseemstobe guilty ofthe phonocentrism
thatDerridatakestobeattheheartofthe logocentrism oftheWest ern
metaphysical tradition.Butacareful reading ofGadamershows
thatthisisnot quite accurate?anditisn'tthe way in whichheinter
prets thePhaedrus.Thefirstandforemosttaskofhermeneuticsis the
understanding ofwritten texts, notoralutterances. "[WJriting is
centraltothehermeneutical phenomenon insofarasitsdetachment
bothfromthewriterorauthorandfroma specifically addressedre cipient
orreader gives italifeofitsown."56WhenPlatocriticizes writing(in
the Theuth myth), Gadamernotes: [T]his is obviously anironic
exaggeration withwhichtoconcealhis own writing andhisownart.In
fact,writing and speech areinthesame plight. Justasin speech
thereisanartof appearances anda 56 Ibid, 392. This content
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use subject to JSTOR Terms and
ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED599 corresponding
artoftrue thought?sophistry anddialectic?soin writ ing therearetwo
arts, one servingsophistic, theotherdialectic.There is,then,
anartof writing thatcomestotheaidof thought, anditistothis
thattheartof understanding?which affordsthesame help to whatis
written?isallied.57 Boththewrittenwordandthe spoken
wordhavetheirdistinctive weaknessesand strengths."Writing
isnomereaccidentormere sup plement that qualitativelychangesnothing
inthecourseoforaltradi tion. ... [0]nly a
writtentraditioncandetachitselffromthemerecon tinuanceofthe
vestiges of pastlife, remnantsfromwhichonehuman being can by
inference piece outanother'sexistence."58Withthewrit ten word,then,
itisthereaderthatisthearbiterofitsclaimtotruth.
ThelessontobelearnedfromPlatoisthatthereisasubtle complex
relationbetweenthe spoken andthewrittenword. They donotstand ina
simplebinaryopposition.Writing isakindofalienated speech
andthehermeneuticaltaskistotransformwritten signs backinto speech
and meaning. Thewrittenwordisnota secondary ora degen erateformof
speech. Writtentextsarethevehiclesfor meaning and truth;
itisthetaskofhermeneutical understanding torenewthis meaning
andtruth.Itisthewrittentextthatovercomesthe ephem
eralcharacterofthe spoken word. [T]hemeaning of something writtenis
fundamentally identifiableand repeatable. Whatisidenticalinthe
repetition is only whatwas actually deposited
inthewrittenrecord.Thisindicatesthat "repetition" cannot
bemeanthereinastrictsense.Itdoesnotmean referring backtothe
original sourcewhere something issaidorwritten.The understanding of
something writtenisnota repetition of somethingpast buttheshar ing
ofa presentmeaning.59 Derrida'sfamous essay, "Plato's Pharmacy,"
isatourdeforce?a hundred-page close reading
anddeconstructionofthePhaedrus.We
canevenusethedistinctiveGadamerian concepts to analyze what
Derridais doing.Derrida, like Gadamer, isnotconcernedwithrecon
structing Plato'sintentionsor probing the psychological statesof
Plato'smind.Hefocusesonwhatthewritten text,Phaedrus,says.
AndinafineGadamerianmannerhefocuses closely onthe language
ofthePhaedrustodrawoutwhatitrevealsandconceals.We might 57 Ibid,
393. 58 Ibid, 391. 59 Ibid, 392. This content downloaded from
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JSTOR Terms and Conditions600RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN even say
thathisdiscussion exemplifies themovementoftheherme
neuticalcircleinsofarasthereisaconstant playing backandforthbe
tweenthe part andthewhole. Contrary to many traditional interpre
tationsofthePhaedrusthat complain aboutits apparent disjointedness,
Derridashowshow carefully itisconstructedand howunifieditis.The
question oftherelationofthe spoken andthe writtenwordisnot simply
the subject oftheTheuth myth; itis appar entat everystage ofthe
dialogue, fromthemomentthatSocratesdis coversthatthe speech
Phaedruswantsto try outonhimis actually a recitationofa
writtentextthathehashiddenunderhiscloak.Derr idais engaged ina
dialogical encounterwiththewritten text, aclassic thatstill speaks
tous.He questions thetextand responds tothe way in whichthetext
questions him. Bybringing forthfreshandunex pectedmeaning(s) ofthe
text, Derridashowshownew meanings emerge fromtheto-and-fro play of
interpretation betweentheinter preter-partner andthe
text-partner.Historically effectedconscious ness
(wirkungsgeschichtlichesBewusstsein) isatworkinDerrida's
playfulreading ofthetext. And yet, Derrida's reading
ofthePhaedrusis strikingly different from Gadamer's, and
radicallychallenges Gadamer's understanding of therelationofthe
spoken wordandthewrittenword.Derridadoes precisely whatGadameris
alwaysrecommending thatthe interpreter must do?pay
closeattentiontothe language ofthewrittentext. Spe cifically,
Derrida'sclose reading followsthethreadofthe multiple
conflictingmeanings of pharmakon as poison,remedy, andcure.Fre
quently, translationfroma foreignlanguagerequiresusing different
wordsto convey a word's meaning ina given context.Thetranslator
hasto figure outwhatisthe appropriate wordtouse. (Think, forex
ample, ofhowtranslators struggle to convey the precisemeaning of
Hegel'sAufhebung). ThistruismabouttranslationisnotDerrida's point.
Hemakesa muchmoreradical pointbyshowing thatthecon flicting andeven
contradictorymeanings of pharmakon havetheir
ownuncontrollablesemantic logic. InaGadamerian spirit, heshows
Plato's language hasa logic and spirit ofitsownthathaslittletodo
withPlato'sintentions.SotheissueisnotwhatPlatointendedeach
timeheusedtheword pharmakon, orevenwhetherhewas fully
awareofitsuncontrollableandundecidable multiplemeanings. Con ceding
thatPlato might wellhaveseensomeofthelinkswithinthe word pharmakon,
Derridacomments:"Then again inother cases, This content downloaded
from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject
to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED601
Platocannotseethe links, canleavethemintheshadoworbreak them up.
And yet theselinks go on working ofthemselves.In spite of
him?Thanksto him?In histext?Outsidehistext?Butthen where?
Betweenhistextandthe language? Forwhatreader?Atwhatmo
ment?"60Gadamerhimselfhasaffirmedthat language has something
speculative aboutit"inthatthefinite possibilities ofthewordareori
entedtowardthesenseintendedastowardtheinfinite."61 Buthowarethe
multiplecontradictory anduncontrollablese manticlinksof pharmakon
relatedtotheissueof speech and writing? Before answering this
question I wanttoreiterate something thatI saidatthe beginning
ofthis paper. AsI interpret theconstellationof hermeneuticsand
deconstruction, I donotseeitasan Either/Or, but ratherasaBoth/And.I
donotseethatDerridais reallydenying Gada mer'scharacterizationof
understanding andallthatitentails.RatherI seehimas complicating our
understanding of understanding?of bringing outits
instabilities,difficulties,risks,conflicts,uncertainties,
andundecidables.I haveindicatedthatGadamernotesthe strengths
andweaknessofthe spoken andthe written, buthenevertheless pre
supposes thatwehavea relatively clear understanding ofthediffer
encesbetween speech and writing. Andthisis whatDerrida'sdecon
structionis calling into question. ForDerridathe speech/writing
opposition is closely relatedtoa wholeseriesof oppositions thathave
beeninherentintheWestern logocentricmetaphysical tradition:in
side/outside;good/evil;soul/body;memory/forgetfulness?all of
whichhavetobedeconstructed.Butletusreturntothe speech/writ
ingopposition inthePhaedrus. WhenTheuthoffersthe gift of writing to
KingThamus, hecate goricallyrejects the gift and gives
ahostofreasonstoshowthatwrit ing is not really a remedy orcure
(pharmakon) butis actually a poison (pharmakon) thatwill
encourageforgetfulness andfillmenwiththe falseconceitofwisdom
(doxosophia).Writing is thoroughly con demned; itisan
illegitimatebastard, a dangerouspoison. Butatacru cialand
culminatingpoint inthePhaedruswehavethis revealing ex change
betweenSocratesand Phaedrus, whichDerrida quotes.62 60
JacquesDerrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," in Dissemination, trans.Bar
baraJohnson (Chicago:University of ChicagoPress,1981), 96. 61
Gadamer, Truthand Method, 469. 62 SeeDerrida's quotation
anddiscussionofthis exchange between PhaedrusandSocratesin"Plato's
Pharmacy," 148-55. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on
Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and
Conditions602RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN Socrates:Butnowtell me,
isthereanothersortofdiscoursethatis brothertothewritten speech,
butof unquestionedlegitimacy? Canwe seehowit originates,
andhowmuchbetterandmoreeffectiveitisthan theother?
Phaedrus:Whatsortofdiscoursehave you in mind, andwhatisitsori gin?
Socrates:Thesortthat goestogether with knowledge andis writtenin
thesoulofthe learner, thatcandefend itself, andknowstowhomit should
speak andto whomitshould saynothing. Phaedrus:Do you
meanthediscourseofamanwho reallyknows, whichis living
andanimate?Woulditbefairtocallthewrittendis course only akindof
ghost ofit? Socrates: Precisely. AndDerridacomments: While
presentingwriting asafalse brother?traitor,infidel, andsimu
lacrum?Socratesisforthefirsttimeledtoenvisionabrotherofthis
brother, the legitimate one, asanothersortof writing: not merely
asa knowing,living, animate discourse, butasan inscription
oftruthinthe soul.Itis nodoubt usually assumedthatwhatweare dealing
withhere isa "metaphor." ... Butitisnot any
lessremarkableherethattheso called living discourseshould suddenly
bedescribed by a "metaphor" borrowedfromtheorderofthe verything
oneis trying toexcludefrom it, theorderofthesimulacrum.63
Derrida'sdeconstructive moves suggest amuchmoreradicalcom plexity
of speech and writing. Heisnot onlychallenging this binary
opposition thatdominatessomuchofthe logocentric and phonocen
trictraditions.Hewantstoshow that, insteadofan opposition be tween
speech and writing,speech(thereallygood kindof speech) presupposes
atits very corea type of writing?theinscription en graved
inthesoul.Themorethatonetriestoexclude writing from livingspeech
andto expose itsderivativecharacter?that writing is 63 "Plato's
Pharmacy," 149.Derridaclaimsthatthis metaphoricappeal to writing
inorderto clarify the "living discourse"isnot just anaccidental
slip, butratherreveals a deeppattern thatdominatesWestern
philosophy. "According toa pattern thatwilldominateallofWestern
philosophy,good
writing(natural,living,knowledgeable,intelligible,internal,speaking)
is op posed tobad writing(a moribund,ignorant,external,
muteartificeforthe senses). Andthe good onecanbe
designatedonlythrough the metaphor of thebadone. Metaphoricity
isthe logic ofcontaminationandthecontamina tionof logic," ibid.
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15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and
ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED603 "traitor,infidel, and
simulacrum," themoreoneaffirmsthat"another sortof writing" is"an
inscription oftruthinthesoul.64Gadamerde claresthat writing
isalienated speech, butitis just astrueto say that speech
isalienated writing. I have barely scratchedthesurfaceofDerrida's
playful andbril liantdeconstructionofthe Phaedrus, butI hope I
havesaid enough to begin torevealhowmuchheshareswithGadamerand yet
howradi cally hediffersfromGadamer.Butwhois reallyright? Who
presents abetter interpretation ofthePhaedrus?Whoismore
illuminating abouttherelationof speech and writing,understanding
andmisunder standing,interpretation and misinterpretation?
Ithinkthesearemis guidedquestions. Thereisno Either/Or,
butratheraBoth/And.To parody
Derrida:"Gadamer/Derrida:Hermeneutics/Deconstruction.
Extremesmeet." Togethertheypresent uswitha "juxtaposed rather than
integrated clusterof changing elementsthatresistreductiontoa common
denominator, essential core, or generative first principle."
NewSchool for SocialResearch 64 Ibid. This content downloaded from
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