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Freedom and Eschatology 85
Freedom and Eschatology:The Contribution of Karl Rahner and Hans
Urs von Balthasar to the Question of Human Freedom in the
Eschatological Fulfillment
Klaus Vechtel S.J.Germany, St. Georgen Universität
1. Introduction
2. Rahner’s anthropological vision of eschatology
3. Balthasar’s theodramatic eschatology and
the question of freedom
4. Concluding reflections
1. Introduction
The subject of this treatise is the question of the role of
human freedom in the eschatological fulfillment. In the final and
definitive encounter with God is human freedom capable of decisions
which are still relevant for human salvation? First of all, I would
like to present a brief sketch about the contributions of Karl
Rahner
특집: THEOLOGIA, Hic et Nunc
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86 신학과 철학 제25호
and Hans Urs von Balthasar with regard to this question. Both,
Rahner and von Balthasar, belong to the most important theologians
for the renewal of Catholic theology in the last century. Their
influence on eschatology is remarkable. In the neo-scholastic
theology of the pre-Vatican II era, the treatise on eschatology –
called ‘De Novissimis’ (On the last things) – was a harmless
appendix to the theological curriculum in which the biblical
eschatological statements were taken as realistic descriptions and
as a report on what was going to happen in the future. Rahner’s
essay on ‘The hermeneutics of eschatogical assertions’1) is one of
the most significant contributions in catholic theology for the
renewal of the neo-scholastic concept of eschatology. Central in
Rahners hermeneutical framework is the thesis that the source of
all eschatological knowledge is the present situation in the
history of salvation caused by God’s salvific action and
self-communication in Christ. Thus Christology is the basic
hermeneutical principle for all eschatological assertions.
Eschatology is “not a supplementary piece of information added to
dogmatic anthropology and Christology, but simply there as
transposition into the guise of fulfillment”.2) Hans Urs von
Balthasar shares this Christocentric concentration of eschatology.
He criticizes the neoscholastic vision of ‘last things’ when he
maintains: God in his self-revelation in Christ “is the Last Thing
of the creature. Gained, He is paradise; lost, He is hell; as
demanding, He is judgment; as cleansing, He is purgatory”.3) The
traditional doctrine of the eschatological “things” – final
judgment, purgatory, heaven and hell – has to be understood in
terms and categories of a personal relationship and qualitatively
not as temporally distinct moments of the definitive encounter of
the single person and the entire humankind with God. As a
1) K. Rahner, “Theologische Prinzipien der Hermeneutik
eschatologischer Aussagen”, in Schriften zur Theologie, Bd. IV,
(Einsiedeln, 1960), 401–428. According to Wolfhart Pannenberg K.
Rahner’s Essay is the most significant contribution for an
anthropological foundation and interpretation of eschatological
assertions; See: Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie,
Bd.3, (Göttingen, 1993), 583-587.
2) K. Rahner, “Theologische Prinzipien”, 415.3) Hans Urs von
Balthasar, “Umrisse der Eschatologie”, in Verbum Caro, Skizzen zur
Theologie,
Bd.1, (Einsiedeln, 1960), 276–300, 282.
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Freedom and Eschatology 87
consequence of this hermeneutical framework based on personal
categories contemporary theology is confronted with the question
about the role of human freedom in the eschatological fulfillment.
What follows:
· First, I would like to sketch Rahner’s anthropologic and
christocentric vision of eschatology: the question of human freedom
gets relevant especially in the theology of death and the
conception of purgatory.
· Secondly, I focus on von Balthasars theodramatic vision of
eschatology: here the question of human freedom is raised in the
doctrine of the final judgment and Christ´s descent into hell.
· And finally, I would draw some brief conclusions on the role
of freedom in the eschatological fulfillment.
2. Rahner’s anthropological vision of eschatology
2.1. The problem of the definitiveness of human death
Christian faith sees death as the end of the human being’s
earthly pilgrimage and the beginning of an unchangeable eternal
destiny. The traditional doctrine of death as the end of the
pilgrim’s state developed, in the history of theology, inexorable
and unmerciful forms.4) Death in the traditional understanding
signifies the end of all human actions and decisions relevant for
salvation. The existence of the human being and his choices reach a
definitive form in death. Therefore penance and conversion become
impossible for the dead. The German sociologist of religion Michael
N. Ebertz points out in a study of the nineteenth-century
conceptions of the afterworld church proclamation maintained an
irreversibility of moral-religious state of human beings.5) The
divine attributions of mercy and justice are divided at the
4) See: Eva-Maria Faber, “Das Ende, das ein Anfang ist. Zur
Deutung des Todes als Verendgültigung des Lebens”, in ThPh
76(2001), 238–252.
5) See: Michael N. Ebertz, “Tote haben (keine) Probleme? Die
Zivilisierung der Jenseitsvorstellungen
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boundary between life and death. While God can show his mercy to
the sinner until the moment of death, God fulfills only his justice
after the death of the human being. Through death life becomes
irrevocably fixed in a certain state of good or bad. The dead do
not have the freedom to change their decisions. In judging the
human soul God wants only to exercise his justice not his
mercy.
Following Martin Heidegger Rahner argues that death must be
understood as a personal act.6) Rahner sees a link between human
death, freedom, time and eternity.7) Human freedom, according to
Rahner’s transcendental anthropology, is more than the possibility
to choose between different options. Freedom is basically the
capacity of the person to determine and to realize oneself in a
definitive way.8) Every human being realizes through the history of
choices and decisions one’s single and unique form as a subject and
person. Human freedom is realized both categorically through the
single choice and particularly through choices in human life and
transcendentally in relation to God as the horizon of absolute
Goodness in
in katholischer Theologie und Verkündigung”, in Lucian Hölscher,
ed., Das Jenseits. Facetten eines religiösen Begriffs in der
Neuzeit, Geschichte der Religion in der Neuzeit, Bd.1, (Göttingen,
2007), 233–258; Michael N. Ebertz, “Endzeitbeschränkungen. Zur
Zivilisierung Gottes”, in Edmund Arens, ed., Zeit Denken,
Eschatologie im interdisziplinären Diskurs, QD 234, (Freiburg,
2010), 171–189.
6) According to K. Rahner the traditional doctrine sees human
death merely as the separation of body and soul and thus as a
person’s indifferent transition from one state into another, a
transition without any anthropological significance and without any
value for a theological investigation. Death in K. Rahner’s view
strikes the whole person, because human beings are an absolute
unity of body and soul. See: K. Rahner, Zur Theologie des Todes, QD
Bd.2, (Freiburg, 1958); “Das Leben der”, (Toten, 429–437), in
Schriften zur Theologie Bd. IV, (Einsiedeln, 1960), 429–437; “Zu
einer Theologie des Todes”, in Schriften zur Theologie Bd. X,
(Zürich, 1972), 181–199; “Das christliche Sterben”, in Schriften
zur Theologie Bd. XIII, (Zürich, 1978), 269–304; to K. Rahners
eschatology; see: Harald Fritsch, Vollendete Selbstmitteilung
Gottes an seine Schöpfung. Die Eschatologie Karl Rahners,
(Würzburg, 2006); Peter C. Phan, Eternity in Time. A Study of Karls
Rahner’s Eschatology, (London–Toronto, 1988); Morwenna Ludlow,
Universal Salvation. Eschatology in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa
and Karl Rahner, (Oxford, 2000).
7) See: Peter C. Phan, “Eschatology”, in Declan Marmion - Mary
Hines, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, (Cambridge,
2005), 174–192.
8) See: K. Rahner, “Theologie der Freiheit”, in Schriften zur
Theologie Bd. VI, (Einsiedeln, 1965), 215–237, here: 221–225; Peter
C. Phan, Eschatology, 180.
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Freedom and Eschatology 89
which every particular good is chosen.9) In this view of freedom
death plays a decisive role: Only through death – and not after
death – a final validity and meaning of human existence is
achieved. Only through death is human freedom capable of realizing
something definitive and irrevocable. Death according to Rahner
ends time by being its consummate validity and therefore
eternity.10) Eternity is deeply misunderstood in terms of an
endless temporal sequence; eternity is rather the consummation and
definitiveness of time, the mature fruit of time.11)
But what happens if human beings fall short of their own
possibilities “and leave unrealized in the individual acts of one’s
life what could be realized at this moment in the sphere of moral
maturing”?12) What if the things definitively realized during one’s
lifetime remain incomplete and fragmented? Do we have to admit that
a human person remains reduced to an “eternal truncation”13) and
fixed to a state of eternal incompleteness? Rahner asks if we are
forced to regret in eternity what we failed to do during our
lifetime, considering our moral maturing and our relationship with
God and our neighbors: “… will the person I am really sorrowfully
salute from afar and for all eternity the one I might have
become?”14)
If eternity is not an endless continuation of time but the
finality and definitiveness of what a human person has chosen to be
in time, then the time of a person would not yet be finished as
long as there are unused possibilities of freedom still available
for a human being. If eternity is not an endless sequence of time,
but rather the mature fruit of time, then the time of a free human
person would not have become eternity as long as the person has not
yet realized the
9) See: K. Rahner, “Theologie der Freiheit”, 216–221; K. Rahner,
Grundkurs des Glaubens, Einführung in den Begriff des Christentums,
(Freiburg, 1976), 46–53, 97–113.
10) See: K. Rahner, “Das Leben der Toten”, 429–434; Zur
Theologie des Todes, 26–30.11) See: K. Rahner, “Ewigkeit aus Zeit”,
in Schriften zur Theologie, Bd. XIV, (Zürich, 1980), 422–
432.12) K. Rahner, “Trost der Zeit”, in Schriften zur Theologie,
Bd. III, (Einsiedeln, 1956), 180.13) Ibid., 180.14) Ibid.
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authentic Love of God and neighbors. For this reason Rahner
postulates a ‘fulfilled fulfillment’ (“vollendete Vollendung”15)):
God will lead everyone in such a way that a person can find his
complete perfection. A ‘fulfilled fulfillment’ – a complete
perfection – means that, a human being in the eschatological
fulfillment would be able, to realize as a free subject his love
towards God and his neighbors which can give his life a
completeness and definitive personal identity. This realization of
a complete perfection can be connected according to Rahner with the
traditional catholic doctrine of purgatory.
2.2. Purgatory as integration of the whole person into the
fundamental option
for God
Rahner maintains that purgatory cannot be reduced to a “payment
of debt of punishment due to sin”.16) The traditional point of view
that purgatory does not improve the human being is not correct. The
doctrine of purgatory allows us to think about a ‘development’ and
an improvement of human beings after – or more precisely – in or
with death. According to Rahner, the catholic doctrine of purgatory
not only maintains that death brings about a definitively free and
matured attitude towards God. Catholic doctrine also maintains that
the many dimensions of the person do not attain their perfection
simultaneously, but that there is a full ripening of the individual
after death which penetrates his whole personality and his whole
freedom.17) In Rahner’s conception, which he develops especially in
his studies on indulgence, purgatory can be conceived “as
integration of all the manifold dimensions of man into the basic
decision of man”.18)
15) K. Rahner, “Trost der Zeit”, 183.16) Ibid.17) See: K.
Rahner, “Das Leben der Toten”, 436; Phan, Eternity, 122–123.18) K.
Rahner, “Trost der Zeit”, 183; see: K. Rahner, “Bemerkungen zur
Theologie des Ablasses”,
Schriften zur Theologie, Bd. II, (Einsiedeln, 1955), 185–210;
“Kleiner theologischer Traktat über den Ablass”, in Schriften zur
Theologie, Bd. VIII, (Einsiedeln, 1967), 472–487; “Zur heutigen
kirchenamtlichen Ablasslehre”, in Schriften zur Theologie, Bd.
VIII, (Einsiedeln, 1967), 488–518;
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Freedom and Eschatology 91
For Rahner the decisions a human being takes from his innermost
‘kernel’ – the innermost center – of his personal freedom, take
shape in dimensions of his being which are not simply identical
with the center of personhood. The person acquires attitudes and
habits. A person gives his character a distinctive form and
objectifies through the acts in which he exercises his freedom, by
imposing them into his environment. Because of the manifold and
multileveled structure of a human person, when a person turns back
to God in the act of conversion, this act of conversion does not
simply undo or break up all the ingrained attitudes, all the
encrustations and the after-effects of our former decisions. A
transformation of the whole human being, in all his manifold
aspects, therefore must be seen as a process of healing and
reconciliation. This process of integrating and of transforming all
aspects of our lives and all our free choices into a basic
orientation towards God can be understood in traditional terms as
the temporal punishment due to sin. Hence, the temporal punishment
due to sin in Rahner’s conception is not an extrinsic punishment
imposed by God but rather the intrinsic consequence of sin itself.
This very process of overcoming the intrinsic consequences of sin
does not simply end with the death of the individual person. It can
be thought of as an ongoing process of healing and reconciliation
with God after death, which the catholic doctrine calls purgatory.
Purgatory can be seen as a “maturing process of the person, through
which, though gradually, all the powers of the human being become
slowly integrated into the basic decision of the free person”.19)
This process of maturing and integration of all powers requires the
contribution of the free person and of human freedom itself. It is
the human being as a free subject that has to mature. The subject
can facilitate or hinder this process of maturing. The concept of
purgatory requires that the dead are capable of a truly personal
and conscious life.
Phan, Eternity, 122–134; Ludlow, Universal Salvation,
189–207.19) K. Rahner, “Bemerkungen zur Theologie des Ablasses”,
207.
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In his later publications Rahner becomes more skeptical towards
the traditional doctrine of the inter-mediate state and understands
the process of personal-maturing – purgatory – as a theological
aspect of death.20) Nevertheless in his only extended article on
purgatory he asks, if the doctrine of purgatory puts a “peculiar
reservation”21) into the eschatological concept that with death and
the particular judgment a person’s history comes to its definitive
completion. This small intermediate state between the
definitiveness of the human being’s history and his complete
perfection opens up the possibility of a post-mortal ‘history’ of
freedom. Moreover the doctrine of purgatory could be connected with
the religious traditions of mankind – and also the doctrine of
reincarnation – which maintains that there is for the dead a
further development and an enduring relationship to their former
personal and physical world.22) Rahner underlines that every human
being has to reckon in his earthly existence with the possibility
of a free acceptance or free rejection of God. But he also asks:
What happens to those persons who never reached finality and a
definitiveness of life as a result of self-enactment of freedom?23)
Rahner mentions in this context the destiny of all the infants who
died before they came to a proper and free decision for God and
raises the theological problem of limbo – the limbus puerorum – the
destiny of the children who died without baptism. If purgatory is
not something which exists on behalf of a formal
20) See: K. Rahner, “Über den Zwischenzustand”, in Schriften zur
Theologie, Bd. XII, (Zürich, 1973), 455–466.
21) In this article on purgatory we find not a kind of
straightforward investigation on purgatory. Rahner represents his
ideas in the form of dialogue between two theologians on the
subject of purgatory. Where the first theologian represents Rahners
more securely established ideas the second theologian represents
more an exploration of new theories on purgatory. In the following
I would like to focus more on these new ideas. K. Rahner,
“Fegfeuer”, in Schriften zur Theologie, Bd. XIV, (Zürich, 1980),
435–449, here: 444.
22) K. Rahners asks if the catholic doctrine of purgatory leaves
space for a modified (and tempered) doctrine of reincarnation. From
the catholic doctrine of purgatory one might ask if the doctrine or
reincarnation which spread throughout human history contains a
certain truth. See: K. Rahner, “Fegfeuer”, 447–448.
23) K. Rahner, “Fegfeuer”, 446.
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Freedom and Eschatology 93
and external divine decree but rather exists as a connatural
consequence of the manifold structure of human existence, then
Rahner concludes: “I could imagine that it might offer
opportunities and scope for a post-mortal history of freedom
(post-mortale Freiheitsgeschichte) to someone who had been denied
such a history in his earthly life”.24)
It is Rahner’s conviction that salvation occurs in a historical
and dialogical situation between God’s self-communication and the
human being’s free acceptance of God’s Grace. This leads to the
conclusion that eschatological fulfillment and the perfection of
the person can be realized only through an enactment of human
freedom. The opportunity for such an enactment of freedom in a
post-mortal history is opened by purgatory.25) Does the doctrine of
purgatory also open the possibility for a post-mortal conversion, a
radical change of the fundamental attitude of a person towards God?
I would like to discuss this question in the following point.
2.3. Purgatory and the possibility of an eschatological
conversion
It is evident that Rahner correlates the doctrine of purgatory
with the concept of reincarnation only “insofar he is admitting the
coherence of a personal development (and thus of decision for God)
after death”.26) One of the major questions Rahner’s
24) Ibid., 447.25) See: Klaus von Stosch, “Auf der Suche nach
einer neuen Form eschatologischen Denkens,
Verlegenheit und tastende Antworten”, in Rudolf Englert, Rudolf
u.a. ed., Was letztlich zählt – Eschatologie, Jahrbuch der
Religionspädagogik, 26, (Neukirchen–Vluyn, 2010), 119–136, here:
121–122.
26) M. Ludlow, Universal Salvation, 204. Rahner himself stresses
the unity of the human person as body and soul, the uniqueness of
human history and the priority of grace in the salvation of man in
such a way that a mediation of the Christian eschatological belief
and the doctrine of reincarnation seems to be difficult. See:
Fritsch, Vollendete Selbstmitteilung, 478–479, who delivers many
examples for Rahners critical thoughts on the concept of
reincarnations. See also Klaus Vechtel, “Seelenwanderung oder
Auferstehung? Christliche Auferstehungshoffnung angesichts
westlicher Reinkarnationsvorstellungen”, in: GuL, 74 (2001),
106–119; Medard Kehl, Und was kommt nach dem Ende? von
Weltuntergang und Vollendung, Wiedergeburt und Auferstehung,
(Freiburg, 1999), 46–71.
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94 신학과 철학 제25호
theory on purgatory raises is to whom exactly the possibility of
freedom and choice will be given. For Morwenna Ludlow it is
difficult to see why the opportunity of post-mortal decisions
“should be a possibility for some people and not for others”.27)
Why should God not provide the possibility to change their
decisions for those who previously rejected God?28) The American
Theologian Jerry Walls develops with reference to Rahner a concept
of purgatory as a ‘second chance theory’: Walls maintains that the
traditional doctrine of purgatory should be “modified to include
the opportunity for post-mortem repentance and conversion”.29)
According to Walls God would provide the possibility of a
post-mortem conversion for those who did not come to a conversion
during their life-time.30)
For Rahner a ‘second chance theory’ of purgatory undermines the
uniqueness of the human history of freedom and the definitiveness
of human freedom in death. A radical change of the fundamental
attitude of the human subject towards God in a post-mortal history
remains unthinkable. Even though Rahner denies the possibility of a
post-mortal conversion he maintains (like von Balthasar) a
universal hope for salvation, based on the consummated redemption
in Christ and the grace offered in God’s self-communication to all
human beings.31) This universal hope is supported by Rahner’s
metaphysical and personal conception of freedom. The rejection of
God
27) M. Ludlow, Universal Salvation, 205.28) See: M. Ludlow,
Universal Salvation, 204–205.29) Jerry Walls, Purgatory, The Logic
of Total Transformation, (Oxford–New York, 2012), 150. 30) God
gives to all persons what Walls calls ‘optimal grace’. God knows
how to elicit a positive
response from each person without overriding their freedom. This
optimal grace given by God includes according to Walls also the
opportunity of post-mortem decision and a post-mortem conversion
See: Walls, Purgatory, 123-129, 140-141, 150-152.
31) “Christian eschatology is not the parallel prolongation of a
‘doctrine of two ways’ […] to reach the two termini of these two
ways. Its central affirmation is concerned only with the victorious
grace of Christ which brings the world to its fulfillment, though
couched indeed in terms which safeguard God’s mystery with regard
to individual men as still pilgrims and do not say whether the
individual is included in this certain triumph of grace – or ‘left
out’. Hence on principle only one predestination will be spoken of
in a Christian eschatology, and it contains only one theme which is
there on its own behalf: the victory of grace on redemption
consummated”. K. Rahner, Theologische Prinzipien, 340.
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Freedom and Eschatology 95
cannot be considered as a possibility what is of ontological
equality with the acceptance of God.32) The rejection of God is
based on a self-contradiction of human freedom, which in the very
act of rejection necessarily affirms God as the last ground of
freedom. This self-contradiction of human freedom in the rejection
of God renders possible the hope that the rejection of God was not
complete, and there remains still an openness of the person towards
God, which can be relevant for salvation in the ultimate encounter
with God.
With Rahner it would maintain the relevance of the personal
history of freedom which becomes definitive in death. I would like
to distinguish between the definitiveness of the human person in
death and the fulfillment, the complete perfection of the human
person. The transition of the definitiveness of a human life into
the fulfillment and complete perfection, which lies beyond
empirical time, can be seen as an opportunity of human freedom to
take a position towards God and towards one’s own history of life.
I surely cannot undo the history of my life and of my personal
choices, but I can see them with other eyes, with the eyes of God’s
mercy and love. The question of a post-mortal conversion becomes
even more urgent in Hans Urs von Balthasars eschatology, which I
want to discuss in the following point.
3. Balthasar’s theodramatic eschatology and the question of
freedom
3.1. The judgment as dramatic encounter of human and divine
freedom
Human freedom according to von Balthasar has to be understood as
self-possession and subjectivity, similar to Rahners conception of
freedom.33) More
32) Hell must be understood as the ultimate and definitive
failure of the person’s to attain their fulfillment in God. Hell is
not an extrinsic punishment by a cruel und unmerciful God but the
consequence of human rejection of God and hence the ultimate
possibility of human freedom. See: K. Rahner, “Art. Hölle”, in
Sämtliche Werke, Bd.17 (= SW 17), Enzyklopädische Theologie. Die
Lexikonbeiträge der Jahre 1956–1973, (Freiburg u.a., 2002),
1088–1091; “Hinüberwandern zur Hoffnung”, in Sämtliche Werke,
Bd.30: Anstöße, systematischer Theologie, Beiträge zur
Fundamentaltheologie und Dogmatik, (Freiburg, 2009), 668–673.
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accentuated as in Rahners theology of freedom von Balthasar
underlines the personal and dialogical mediation of human freedom.
Freedom is realized through dialogue with another person.
Paradigmatic is von Balthasar’s phenomenological analysis of the
relationship between mother and child34): The subjectivity and
freedom of the child arise through the love of the mother.
Responding to the loving ‘Thou’ of the mother, the ‘I’ – or
respectively the subject – takes possession of itself, arises to
self-possession, self-identity and freedom. This primal, loving
encounter with the ‘Thou’ can be seen as a disclosure of an
infinite horizon of being as such, a disclosure which opens the
whole reality of being including the divine reality: “There is no
encounter […] which could add anything to the encounter with the
first-comprehended smile of the mother. […] The first experience
contains the unsurpassable, id quo majus cogitari non potest”.35)
It is the experience – according to von Balthasar – that love is
the core of all being.36) Similar to Rahner’s transcendental
experience, von Balthasar’s theology also is determined by a
transcendental, primal experience of being which becomes relevant
for the foundation of Christian faith.37)
Human freedom according to von Balthasar is realized in dialogue
with another person and with a reality, it is realized in a mutual
relationship of acceptance between the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’. It
follows that freedom necessarily has to choose whether to accept
the other, the ‘Thou’, or to abuse the other as a means for
one’s
33) On von Balthasars conception of human freedom, see: Hans Urs
von Balthasar, Theodramatik, Bd II, Die Personen des Spiels, Teil
1: “Der Mensch in Gott”, (Einsiedeln, 1976), 170-288; Theologik,
Bd. I. Wahrheit der Welt, (Einsiedeln, 1985), 78-141.
34) See: Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Bewegung zu Gott”, in Spiritus
Creator. Skizzen zur Theologie, Bd. III, (Einsiedeln, 1967), 13-50;
Herrlichkeit. Eine theologische Ästhetik, Bd. III/1. Im Raum der
Metaphysik, Teil 1, (Einsiedeln, 1965), 943-956.
35) von Balthasar, Herrlichkeit, III/1, 946-947.36)
Programmatic: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Glaubhaft ist nur Liebe,
(Einsiedeln, 1963); see also:
Werner Löser, “Das Sein – ausgelegt als Liebe”, in IKaZ
Communio, 4 (1975), 410-424.37) This correspondence between Rahner
and von Balthasar is emphasized by: Thomas Möllenbeck,
“Endliche Freiheit, unendlich zu sein. Zum metaphysischen
Anknüpfungspunkt der Theologie mit Rahner, von Balthasar und Duns
Scotus”, PaThSt Bd.53, (Paderborn u.a., 2012), 185-208.
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Freedom and Eschatology 97
own purpose. Human freedom is called to an ultimate indifference
in which the person accepts his or her own finitude and
creatureliness in relation to God and the other human beings.38)
With this conception of human freedom we touch a decisive point in
von Balthasar’s theology. The center of his theology is the
‘theo-drama’: God’s revelation must be understand in an action
which includes the human action; God’s revelation must be
understood as a dramatic encounter of divine and human freedom.39)
This concept is highly significant for von Balthasar’s eschatology
and especially for his doctrine of a divine judgment.40)
The divine judgment according to Balthasar is the decisive
aspect of the caesura into which every human being enters at the
moment of death. No one will be saved (or gain salvation) without
passing through God’s judgment (1Cor 3,13). Judgment completes what
has begun in death: there is the caesura or a hiatus between the
earthly life and its goal – a fulfillment in God – “for the
individual, it is death; for history the end-times; for both, the
purifying and decisive judgment.”41) von Balthasar wants to
overcome the traditional separation of the individual judgment
after death and the universal judgment at the end of times:
According to the Bible there is only one
38) See: von Balthasar, Theodramatik, Bd. II/1, 190-192,
206-219.39) See: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theodramatik, Bd. I:
Prologomena, (Einsiedeln, 1973), 15-22,
113-118; to von Balthasars Concept of the theo-drama see: Edward
Oakex, Edward, Pattern of Redemption. The Theology of Hans Urs von
Balthasar, (New York, 1994), here especially: 211-273; Ben Quash,
“The Theo-drama”, in Edward Oakes - David Moss ed., The Cambridge
Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar, (Cambridge, 2004),
143–157.
40) von Balthasars Doctrine of the judgment is developed in:
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theodramatik, Bd. IV. Das Endspiel,
(Einsiedeln, 1983), 33-41, 174-182, 264-273, 315-337; “Eschatologie
im Umriss”, in Pneuma und Institution, Skizzen zur Theologie, Bd.
IV, (Einsiedeln, 1974), 410-455, here: 431-444; “Gericht”, in IKaZ
Communio, 9 (1980), 227–235; to von Balthasars eschatology in
general and to his doctrine of the jugdment see: Daniela Engelhard,
Im Angesicht des Erlöser-Richters. Hans Urs von Balthasars
Neuinterpretation des Gerichtsgedankens, (Mainz, 1999); Robert
Nandkisore, Hoffnung auf Erlösung. Die Eschatologie im Werk Hans
Urs von Balthasars, Tesi Gregoriana, Serie Teologia Bd.22, (Roma,
1997); Sabbioni, Luigi, Giudizio e Salvezza nell’Escatologia di
Hans Urs von Balthasar, (Milano, 1990).
41) von Balthasar, Eschatologie im Umriss, 411; see also:
Geoffrey Wainwright, “Eschatology”, in Edward Oakes - David Moss
ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar, (Cambridge,
2004), 113-127, here: 118-119.
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98 신학과 철학 제25호
judgment, in which the destiny of the individual person and the
destiny of all human beings are in a dynamical way connected with
each other.
Balthasar sees the divine judgment as an inter-subjective event
of divine and human freedom which underlines – more accentuated
than in Rahner’s conception – the character of the eschatological
fulfillment as a personal and dialogical encounter. As we have
already seen: The free self-possession of the person is realized
and mediated through encounter with the other person. Freedom as a
loving acceptance and recognition of the other in the context of
judgment means: The person has the opportunity to recognize and to
accept the truth of his/her own existence in the definitive
encounter with God in Christ, to whom the Father has given the
authority of judgment. Christ according to von Balthasar is the
“judged judge”42) (der gerichtete Richter), the one who experienced
in his death at the cross the inner consequences of sin and of the
sinner’s rejection of God.
Christ, the judged judge, knows our miserable and sinful
identity in a personal way and thus he is able to restore the
broken relationship between the sinner and God. In the definitive
encounter with Christ the sinner has the possibility of recognizing
the sinful truth of his existence, but at the same time he has the
opportunity to recognize his own true identity in Christ who is the
new Adam. The person can realize in Christ the true image of God
and has the opportunity to identify with his true identity
represented in Christ. The Sinner recognizes himself in Christ,
“the lamb without blemish and without spot” (1Pet 1,19), as the one
he is in the eyes of God and should become in God’s salvific plan.
This conception of the judgment, intended as an event of mutual
personal acceptance between the sinner and Christ, includes a
moment of free decision. The insight and recognition of truth,
offered to all sinners by Christ, contains the choice to open to a
process of repentance and of purification. Purgatory therefore has
to be understood as an inner aspect of the judgment. In a short but
instructive article on judgment von Balthasar maintains: Before the
vision
42) von Balthasar, Eschatologie im Umriss, 441.
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Freedom and Eschatology 99
given to the sinner in Christ, a vision that shatters all human
arrogance, it comes to a last decision: Or the sinner gives himself
away into flames of God’s love, who shall purify him and make the
person God wants him to be, or he will hate this image offered him
by Christ and remain encapsulated in his ego in a timelessness,
that will be as long, as the sinners will not to surrender to God’s
love.43)
Does von Balthasar’s conception of the judgment, intended as
dramatic encounter of human and divine freedom, disclose the
possibility of an eschatological conversion, a radical fundamental
attitude of the human towards God? Is there a significant
difference between Rahner’s and von Balthasar’s eschatological
point of view? I want discuss this questions looking at von
Balthasar’s highly significant contribution to the question of a
universal hope for the salvation of all human beings, which he
delivers in his interpretation of Christ’s descent into hell.
3.2. Christ’s descent into hell
The most crucial question in the dramatic encounter of human and
divine freedom according to von Balthasar is: How can human freedom
realize itself all the way to a rejection of God’s love and mercy?
How can God respect human choice and still be able to save human
beings by receiving them into his triune life?44) The answer to
this question lies in the article of the creed that proclaims
Christ’s descent to the dead or Christ’s descent into hell.45) The
realm of death – in 43) See: von Balthasar, “Gericht”, 234–235:
“Und erst angesichts dieser für seinen Hochmut
niederschmetternden Schau entscheidet sich das Letzte. Entweder
stürzt er sich freiwillig und dankbar in die Flammen Gottes, die
ihn zu dem läutern sollen, was er werden möchte, aber noch nicht
ist, gleichgültig, wie weh es tun und wie lange es dauern wird –
oder er hasst dieses Bild seiner selbst in Gott, er will nicht
“sich selbst entfremdet” in Gott, sondern bei sich selber er selber
sein, und dann kann die Flamme Gottes ihn erfassen, in einer
Zeitlosigkeit, die ebenso dauert wie sein Wille, sich zu bewahren
und nicht zu kapitulieren.”
44) See: von Balthasar, Theodramatik, Bd. IV, 47-49, 171-173;
Werner Löser, Im Geiste des Origenes. Hans Urs von Balthasar als
Interpret der Kirchenväter, FTS, Bd.23, (Frankfurt, 1976),
237-246.
45) See: Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Mysterium Paschale”, in
Johannes Feiner - Magnus Löhrer ed., Mysterium Salutis. Grundriss
heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik, Bd. III/2, (Einsiedeln, 1969),
133–326; “Abstieg zur Hölle”, in Pneuma und Institution, Skizzen
zur Theologie, Bd. IV, (Einsiedeln,
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100 신학과 철학 제25호
terms of the Old Testament: the scheol – can be considered as a
state of separation from God, a state of being completely forsaken
by God, in which the dead cannot praise God anymore. This realm of
death according to von Balthasar can be identified with hell,
precisely because the essence of hell is separation from God, the
loss of all relationships, a complete loneliness, in which the
sinner chooses his ego rather than live-giving relationship with
God.
In addition to the crucifixion on Good Friday, von Balthasar
understands the mystery of Holy Saturday in which Christ descended
into hell as the final act of his self-emptying (kenosis) in a
total and final solidarity with all sinners, in a total
self-enstrangement from the Father: “In sheol, in the Pit, all that
reigns is the darkness of perfect loneliness. […] if Jesus has
suffered through on the cross the sin of the world to the very last
truth of sin (to be forsaken by God), then he must experience, in
solidarity with the sinners who have gone to the underworld, their
(ultimate hopeless) separation from God”.46) von Balthasar
maintains that this last solidarity of Christ with the sinners and
the damned in his descent to hell does not override human freedom
and the choice in which the sinner has chosen his last loneliness.
In contrast to his passion and his death on the cross Christ does
not play an active role in his descent to hell. Furthermore, in
contrast to the tradition of the eastern churches von Balthasar
considers Christ’s descent to hell not as a triumphant conquest of
hell, but strictly as a passive Being-with-the-Dead. In an ultimate
expression of love Christ is dead with the dead and thus he is
disturbing the
1974), 387-400; “Über Stellvertretung”, in Pneuma und
Institution, 401–409; “Theologische Besinnung auf das Mysterium des
Höllenabstiegs”, in Hans Urs von Balthasar ed., Hinabgestiegen in
das Reich des Todes. Der Sinn dieses Satzes in Bekenntnis und
Lehre, Dichtung und Kunst, (München–Zürich, 1982), 84–98; Susanne
Hegger, Sperare contra spem. Die Hölle als Gnadengeschenk Gottes
bei Hans Urs von Balthasar, BDS, Bd.51, (Würzburg, 2012); Mauro,
Jöhri, Descensus Dei. Teologia della croce nell’opera di Hans Urs
von Balthasar, CorLat, Bd.30, (Roma, 1981); Karl-Heinz Menke,
“Balthasars Theologie der drei Tage”, in IKaZ Communio, 39 (2010),
5-22; Michael Greiner, “Für alle hoffen? Systematische Überlegungen
zu H.U. von Balthasars eschatologischem Vorstoß”, in Magnus Striet
- Jan - Heiner Tück, ed., Die Kunst Gottes verstehen. Hans Urs von
Balthasars theologische Provokation, (Freiburg, 2005), 228–260.
46) von Balthasar, Abstieg zur Hölle, 395.
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Freedom and Eschatology 101
loneliness the sinner has chosen. In this way, Balthasar
maintains, the “freedom of the creature is respected but, at the
end of the passion, it is overtaken (eingeholt) and grasped from
below (untergriffen).” 47) The sinner’s attempt to realize an
absolute loneliness or a so to speak “counter-absoluteness”48)
(Gegenabsolutheit) against God has failed. In the absolute
loneliness and weakness of the Son, in his abandonment by the
father, God offers human freedom his infinite and absolute
love.
The descent of Christ into hell establishes the Christian hope
of salvation for all human beings.49) von Balthasar does not intend
to teach apokatastasis as doctrine.50) Against the harsh criticism
that his theology of the Holy Saturday would maintain a
apokatastasis – von Balthasar speaks of his critics as
‘infernalists’ – he defends the Christian obligation to hope for
the salvation of all human beings which has to be distinguished
from any kind of knowledge or theological ‘system’ of
apocatastasis-doctrine.51) Why does the theology of Holy Saturday
not lead to the doctrine of apocatastasis? von Balthasar believes:
“We will not be saved against our will.” 52) It is my opinion that
Christ’s descent into hell does not lead to the conclusion that all
human beings will be saved only if it is put into the context of an
eschatological relevance of human freedom: If it is true that
salvation occurs in the
47) von Balthasar, “Über Stellvertretung”, 408–409.48) von
Balthasar, “Theologische Besinnung auf das Mysterium des
Höllenabstiegs”, 98.49) See von Balthasars programmatic books: Was
dürfen wir hoffen, (Einsiedeln–Trier, 1989²); Kleiner
Diskurs über die Hölle, (Einsiedeln–Freiburg, 1999³),
Neuausgabe; see also: von Balthasar, Abstieg zur Hölle, 399-400;
“Über Stellvertretung”, 408-409; “Theologische Besinnung auf das
Mysterium des Höllenabstiegs”, 98; “Mysterium Paschale”, 250-255.
Alyssa Pitstick recently accused von Balthasars theology of
Christ´s descent into hell of being heterodox. See: Alyssa Lyra
Pitstick, Light in Darkness. Hans Urs von Balthasar and the
Catholic Doctrine of Christ’s Descent into Hell, (Grand
Rapids–Cambridge, 2007). In my opinion wether Pitsicks theological
concept of tradition nor her interpretation of God´s impassibility
are tenable. For the critical discussion with Pitstick see: Edward
Oakes, “The Internal Logic of Holy Saturday in the Theology of Hans
Urs von Balthasar”, in International Journal of Systematic
Theology, 9 (2007), 184–199; Hegger, Sperare Contra Spem,
360-377.
50) See: Robert Nandkisore, Hoffnung auf Erlösung, 267-268;
Daniela Engelhard, Im Angesicht, 220-222; Sebastian Greiner, Für
alle hoffen, 242.
51) See: von Balthasar, Kleiner Diskurs über die Hölle,
59-70.52) von Balthasar, Theodramatik, Bd. IV, 261.
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102 신학과 철학 제25호
context of the person’s free will, then Christ’s descent into
hell has to be intended as the ultimate eschatological offer of
God’s grace. God would maintain his universal salvific will and the
offer of his grace even at the ‘place’ of abandonment from God, at
the ‘place’ of forsakenness from God. If the belief that the
already has an openness and capability to accept this offer, is
something that goes beyond human knowledge it still remains an
object of hope. Thus, von Balthasar’s theology of the Holy Saturday
includes a concept of vicarious representation that does not
overrule human freedom. Christ descent into hell enables the sinner
to realize his own salvation.
3.3. Open questions
Nevertheless, there are still open questions in this view of
Christ’s descent into hell, concerning human freedom and the
definitiveness of human history in death. Balthasar writes for
example: “God gives man the capacity to make a negative choice
against God that seems for man to be definitive, but which need not
be taken by God as definitive.”53) How can human being’s not be
taken as definitive by God without overwhelming human freedom?
Wouldn’t this undermine the definitiveness of human freedom in
death, that was emphasized by Rahner? In a recent major study,
Alyssa Pitstick, maintains that the theology of the descent of
Christ expresses the possibility of an eschatological conversion –
a kind of second chance for the sinner. According to Pitstick von
Balthasar emphasizes the passivity of the human being in the
process of redemption in such a way, that Christ’s descent into
hell must lead to an apocatastasis.54)
First: Several passages in von Balthasars works incline towards
a limitation of the relevance of subject, its freedom and autonomy.
In his eschatological writings he refers to Adrienne von Speyr and
her visions of a ‘decomposition’ or ‘destruction’ of the ‘I’
53) von Balthasar, “Über Stellvertretung”, 407; see also: von
Balthasar, “Eschatologie im Umriss”, 443-444.
54) See: Pitstick, Light in Darkness, 266-268.
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Freedom and Eschatology 103
in the process of purification (purgatory).55) Is there any
correspondence between such expressions and the conception of
judgment as a free acceptance of Christ? Balthasar tries to
emphasize the redeeming work of God in his revelation and to stress
the passive role of the subject in the very process of salvation,
especially when he refers to the stauro-centric mystic of Adrienne
von Speyr. This one-sided emphasis can lead to misunderstandings.
Therefore it seems to me important to distinguish very clearly
between the weakness and soteriological powerlessness of the sinner
on the one hand and the role of the human being as subject and
person in the dialogical mediation of salvation on the other hand,
which cannot be overruled, even in his weakness as sinner.56)
Second: It is my opinion that the theology of Holy Saturday does
not diminish the definitiveness of human life and human history in
death. According to von Balthasar the negative decision of a person
towards God depends, in the very act of rejecting him on a
self-contradiction of what it means to be human, just as it is the
case in Rahner’s theology of human freedom.57) There is only one
aim for the human being as Gods creature: to share in God’s triune
life as it’s eternal fulfillment. Thus an ultimate choice in which
the sinner decides to live on his own remains a contradictory act
of his freedom. This self-contradictory act of human freedom is, in
von Balthasar’s conception of Christ’s descent into hell, the
reason for hope, hope that the choice of an ultimate loneliness and
the rejection God on behalf of the sinner did not have a definitive
character (even if it seems to be
55) See: von Balthasar, Theodramatik, Bd. IV, 33: “Das Ich ist
so zersetzt, dass das Du allmählich Umrisse bekommt […] Das Ich […]
ist das, was zu verbrennen hat. Mein im Fegfeuer zerstörtes Ich
wird mir von Gott als ein neues in Gott zurückgegeben.”
56) Magnus Striet, “Wahrnehmung der Offenbarungsgestalt,
Annäherungen an die Ästhetik Hans Urs von Balthasars”, in Magnus
Striet – Jan - Heiner Tück, ed., Die Kunst Gottes verstehen. Hans
Urs von Balthasars theologische Provokation, (Freiburg, 2005),
54-81, here: 57-64; see also: Michael Schulz, “Sein und Trinität.
Systematische Erörterungen zur Religionsphilosophie G.W.F. Hegels
im ontologiegeschichtlichen Rückblick auf J. Duns Scotus und I.
Kant und die Hegelrezeption in der Seinsauslegung und
Trinitätstheologie bei W. Pannenberg, E. Jüngel, K. Rahner und H.U.
v. Balthasar”, MthS.S, Bd.53, (St. Ottilien, 1997), 720-731,
771-778.
57) See: von Balthasar, Theodramatik, Bd. II/1, 216-219;
Theodramatik, Bd. IV, 272-274, 283-286; with reference to Rahners
conception: Kleiner Diskurs über die Hölle, 94-95.
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104 신학과 철학 제25호
definitive choice). In the fourth volume of his Theodramatic von
Balthasar uses a metaphorical expression for his point of view:
“The shell [of the sinners self-closure against God] is not hard
enough, because it is made of a contradiction; maybe someone, who’s
shell can still break open, is not already in hell but only in
defiance (obstinacy) against God, turned towards hell”.58) In von
Balthasar’s conception, the sinner’s decision against God has got
an inchoative character and did not penetrate his whole life and
his very essence of being God’s creature. This renders possible the
hope that even the sinner with his rejection of God is still
capable of accepting God’s eschatological offer of grace in
Christ’s descent into hell.
The hope of an eschatological salvation of all human beings does
not represent a kind of postmodern ‘second-chance’ or
‘anything-goes-theory’: It presupposes that the human being through
the history of his free choices is still capable of accepting God’s
offer of grace. So I would argue that even von Balthasar’s theology
of Christ’s descent into hell corresponds to the definitiveness of
human freedom emphasized by Rahner.
4. Concluding reflections
· Both, Rahner and von Balthasar, did make a remarkable
contribution to contemporary eschatology: they overcome the
limitations of the neo-scholastic doctrine of the ‘last things’ by
understanding the eschatological fulfillment as definitive
encounter with God which can be interpreted in personal and
dialogical categories. Against the traditional separation of the
individual and universal judgment, both underline the connection
and unity between individual and eschatological fulfillment.
Against a neo-scholastic vision of death as separation of body and
soul both emphasize the unity of the human being as body and soul
and the death as a definitive end of human existence. A
58) von Balthasar, Theodramatik, Bd. IV, 286.
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Freedom and Eschatology 105
Christian eschatology based on personal categories raises the
question about the role of the human in the eschatological
fulfillment. If there is no human freedom divine judgment and the
purification of a person make no sense, if they are perceived as
distinct aspects of a personal encounter with God. A truly personal
encounter cannot be seen as something that reduces the person to
absolute passivity and powerlessness.
· With Rahner I would underline the definitiveness of the
person’s history in death - against ‘second-chance-theories’ or
attempts to mediate Christian eschatology with the doctrine of
reincarnation. The definitiveness reached in death (just as Rahner
maintains) cannot be seen as something in a rather arbitrary
temporal moment of dying. Definitiveness of human existence
requires also the aspect of reflection and of acceptance on behalf
of the person. The person has to recognize the truth of its own
existence and must have the freedom to accept this truth in painful
and remorseful process or to reject the truth of its own existence.
More than Rahner does in his theology of death I would like to
distinguish between the definitiveness of the human person in death
and the fulfillment, the complete perfection of the human person.
My thesis is: It is the transition of definitiveness of the human
existence into fulfillment and complete perfection - a transition
which lies beyond empirical time - that can be seen as the
possibility of the human person taking a position towards God and
towards one’s own life history. This does not mean that I can undo
choices and things I did in my lifetime, but I can adopt God’s view
at my life, his justice and mercy.
· With von Balthasar I would like to underline – more explicit
by Rahner – the dialogical character in the eschatological
fulfillment of the human being in the divine judgment. According to
Ratzinger the judgment can be conceived as the revealing of truth
in the encounter of the person with Christ. Thus the truth of human
existence is not simply a neutral fact but rather a personal
Christ. This
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106 신학과 철학 제25호
personal truth came to save all human beings. Ratzinger
concludes that the truth of the human does not become definitive by
the simple fact of death as a natural event. The truth of the
person becomes definitive in the judgment, in the acceptance of the
revealed truth of life mediated through personal encounter with
Christ.59) Therefore I would understand the divine judgment with
reference to Medard Kehl as the eschatological event in which the
search for identity of the human being becomes definitive in a way
that allows the person to bring to completeness all the different
and fragmentary aspects of his/her existence in the healing and
loving presence of God.60) A dialogical and personal view of the
divine is open to conceive the judgment as an inter-subjective
event, where there is even hope for reconciliation between the
perpetrators and their victims.61) The hope of salvation for all
human beings can be founded, I maintain with Rahner and von
Balthasar, in the fact that the person has only one goal:
fulfillment in communion with the triune God of love. If the
rejection of God remains a self-contradictory act of human freedom,
then we can dare to hope, that there remains in the sinner an
openess towards God that allows him to accept the revealed truth of
his life in a process of repentance and reconciliation.
59) See: Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatologie – Tod und ewiges Leben,
Regensburg, 1977, 168-171.60) See: Medard Kehl, Eschatologie,
(Würzburg, 1986), 283-285.61) See: Magnus Striet, “Versuch über die
Auflehnung. Philosophisch-theologische Überlegungen zur
Theodizeefrage”, in Harald Wagner ed., Mit Gott streiten. Neue
Zugänge zum Theodizee-Problem, QD 169, (Freiburg, 1998), 49–89,
hier 65–79; Jan-Heiner Tück, “Versöhnung zwischen Tätern und
Opfern. Ein soteriologischer Versuch angesichts der Shoa”, in ThGl,
89 (1999), 364–381; “Das Unverzeihbare verzeihen? Jankélevitch,
Derrida und die Hoffnung wider alle Hoffnung”, in IKaZ Communio, 33
(2004), 174–188; Ottmar Fuchs, Das Jüngste Gericht. Hoffnung auf
Gerechtigkeit, (Regensburg, 2007); Dirk Ansorge, Gerechtigkeit und
Barmherzigkeit Gottes, Die Dramatik von Vergebung und Versöhnung in
bibeltheologischer, theologiegeschichtlicher und
philosophiegeschichtlicher Perspektive, (Freiburg, 2009);
“Vergebung auf Kosten der Opfer? Umrisse einer Theologie der
Versöhnung”, in SaThZ, 6 (2002), 36–58; Philipp Höfele, “Vergebung
für die Täter. Überlegungen zur intersubjektiven Dimension des
eschatologischen Gerichts”, in ThPh, 85 (2010), 242–260.
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Freedom and Eschatology 107
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Freedom and Eschatology 113
자유와 종말론: 종말론적 충만함에 있어서 자유의 문제에 대한
칼 라너와 한스 우르스 폰 발타사르의 공헌
클라우스 페히틀 S.J.
지난 50년 동안 가톨릭의 종말론에 있어 괄목할만한 변화가 일어났다. 종말론의 “자리들” 최후의 심판, 연옥,
천국과 지옥에 대한 전통적 가르침들은 개별 인간 및 전체인류의 하느님과의 결정적 만남, 그리고 시간적으로 구분되는
만남으로서가 아니라, 질적으로 그리고 인격적 관계라는 카테고리의 용어로 이해되었다. 인격적 카테고리에 기초한 이러한
해석학적 틀은 결과적으로 현대의 신학으로 하여금 종말론적 충만함에 있어
서 인간 자유의 역할에 대해 질문하게 한다. 인간의 자유는 하느님과의 궁극적 그리고 결정적 만남에서 인간 구원을
위해 여전히 중요한 어떤 결정들을 할 수 있는 것인가? 칼 라너와 한스 우르스 폰 발타사르는 지난 세기 가톨릭 신학의
쇄신에 있어서 가장
중요한 신학자들 중의 하나이다. 라너와 폰 발타사르 둘 다 모든 이를 위한 보편 구원에 대한 희망을 강조한다. 본
논문에서는 종말론에 있어 그리고 특별히 종말론적 충만함에 있어서 인간 자유의 역할을 검토하였다.
주제어: 종말론, 인격적 카테고리, 자유, 하느님과의 결정적 만남, 보편적 희망
초 록
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114 신학과 철학 제25호
Klaus Vechtel S.J.
In the catholic eschatology of the last fifty years a remarkable
change has taken place. The traditional doctrine of the
eschatological “places” - final judgment, purgatory, heaven and
hell - has to be understood in terms and categories of a personal
relationship and qualitatively not as temporally distinct moments
of the definitive encounter of the single person and the entire
mankind with God. As a consequence of this hermeneutical framework
based on personal categories contemporary theology is confronted
with the question about the role of human freedom in the
eschatological fulfillment. Is human freedom capable of decisions
which are still relevant for human salvation in the final and
definitive encounter with God? Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von
Balthasar are among the most important theologians in the renewal
of catholic theology in the last century. Both, Rahner and von
Balthasar, are stressing the hope for a universal salvation of all.
Their contribution to eschatology and especially to the role of
human freedom in the eschatological fulfillment will be
examined.
Key Words: Eschatology, Personal categories, Freedom, Definitive
encounter with God, Universal hope
Freedom and Eschatology: The Contribution of Karl Rahner and
Hans Urs von Balthasar to the Question of Human Freedom in the
Eschatological Fulfillment
Abstract
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Freedom and Eschatology 115
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