The Continued Importance of Forward Basing and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Figure 1. Boulding’s Loss of Strength Gradient1

H F G F’ K L M’ G’ L’

M

A E B

Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient shows how a military force whose home base is at position (A) becomes weaker with geographic distance. It can use a forward position (E) to remedy this, bringing greater strength to bear upon its opponent (B). Proximity maximises the strength of the force being deployed.

1 Boulding, Kenneth, Conflict and Defense, (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 262, Fig. 13.3.

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It was Kenneth Boulding, the British-born polymath2, who argued that the amount of

a nation’s military power that can be brought to bear in any part of the world depends

on geographic distance. He devised the Loss of Strength Gradient (LSG) diagram

which demonstrated, in graphical form, that the further away the target of aggression

the less strength that could be made available. It also showed how this loss of strength

could be ameliorated by the use of forward positions.3

But the need for forward basing has been under attack. Proximity is supposedly

becoming less important for prevailing in war. President George W. Bush has said

that American armed forces have become “better able to strike anywhere in the world

over great distances.”4 And the view that distance is becoming decreasingly important

is by no means limited solely to the White House. Even Boulding himself supported

the idea of a decline in the Loss of Strength Gradient.

There are two lines of attack upon the LSG. One of these is that transport is becoming

easier. Another is that combatants have achieved sufficient capacity to defeat the

opponent through strategic air and missile power. Boulding himself said that there had

been a “military revolution” in the 20th century, the significance of which was “a very

substantial diminution in the cost of transportation of organized violence of all kinds,

especially of organized armed forces” and “an enormous increase in the range of the

deadly projectile.”5

There is also a third factor which does not impact upon the slope of the Gradient but

will be addressed by this work as it suggests that forward basing, the solution implied

by Boulding’s diagram, is losing its viability. This is the view that forward basing has

become more vulnerable to enemy threats and to the reluctance of other states to host

them.

2 As well as strategic studies, Boulding contributed to the fields of economics, political science, sociology, philosophy, and social psychology. According to David Latzko, Boulding’s writings “are so rich and varied … they defy generalization”. See Latzko, David A., ‘Kenneth Boulding’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 139(1), March 1995, pp. 69-72, http://www.personal.psu.edu/~dxl31/research/otherstuff/boulding.html 3 Boulding, 1963, p. 262.4 Bush, President George W., speech at Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Cincinnati, 16 August 2004, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040816-12.html5 Boulding, Kenneth, The Meaning of the 20th Century: The Great Transition, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965), p. 87.

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This work will refute the view that the Loss of Strength Gradient, and thus forward

basing, has become less important during the last hundred years, the timeframe which

Boulding himself cited. Where it is reduced in significance it is of only temporary

nature as regards cost and speed of transport or the strategic use of air power. It will

also show that the solution of forward basing implied by the Loss of Strength

Gradient has not lost viability. Forward basing is not becoming any more vulnerable

to enemy threats or to reluctant allies.

Binding these circumstances are two enduring factors that reoccur throughout this

work. One is the competitive nature of war. Where one side benefits from a new

technology or idea, another side will seek to redress the situation. It will counter it or

acquire it, thereby reintroducing balance between both. The other factor is the

impermanence of Great Power status. While a larger state may be less impinged upon

by the Loss of Strength Gradient, this cannot be a permanent state of affairs. A

country might well be a superpower but it cannot remain a superpower indefinitely.

Boulding identified both of these enduring factors. He defined conflict itself as a

“situation of competition”. He spoke of the “impermanence of empire” as “one of the

most striking phenomena in human history”.6 Yet he failed to apply these factors to

the Loss of Strength Gradient.

This is of importance to American forward basing policy. Since the end of the Cold

War, the United States, left as the world’s only superpower, has undertaken

considerable change in its forward basing posture and continues to do so. A troop

presence of 248,000 in Europe in 1989 was reduced to 109,000 by 2002.7 President

Bush has used the belief that distance has decreased in importance as a justification

for withdrawing more uniformed personnel. By 2014, there will have been a further

reduction of 60-70,000 in American forces stationed at overseas bases.8

6 Boulding, 1963, p. 5; Boulding, Kenneth, Stable Peace, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press), 1978, p. 105.7 Jones, General James, Statement, Military Construction Subcommittee Hearing, United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, 29 April 2003, http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?id=203402 8 President George W. Bush, 16 August 2004.

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The call has been made outside the Administration for further reductions. Bandow has

proposed withdrawing all American forces in Europe and in East Asia resting this

partly upon a belief that technology has reduced the value of proximity, as well as a

problem of reluctant allies.9

This work will demonstrate that those who doubt the enduring importance of the Loss

of Strength Gradient are wrong to do so. It will show that no country can withdraw

forces to its homeland and expect to maintain permanently the same power projection

capabilities.

Forward locations for logistics

According to Boulding the phenomenon of cheaper transport was a reason for decline

in the Loss of Strength Gradient. He said that “General improvement in means of

transport are nearly always reflected in a decline in the LSG, simply because the

transport of violence always involves the transport of men and things.”10 Boulding’s

views were little changed more than two decades later. He said that a tremendous

diminution in the cost of transport had totally destroyed traditional national security

and that such security depended upon there being a high cost of transport of the means

of destruction.11

But Boulding was wrong. His failing was to miss the element of competition that

exists in warfare which causes geographic distance to retain its importance despite

falls in transport costs. As a result, national security has not become more difficult.

This work will find that Boulding was correct to identify a long term trend towards

cheaper transport. But, just as this happens, so the competitive nature of warfare

induces both sides to take advantage of this to send more equipment and supplies. In

so doing, they cancel out any improvement in the ease with which logistics can be

carried out over a given distance.

9 Bandow, Doug, ‘Quick and Full Disengagement’, Cato Institute, 23 August 2004, http://www.cato.org/dailys/08-23-04-2.html10 Boulding, 1963, p. 262.11 Boulding, Kenneth, The World as a Total System, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985), p. 129.

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It will also be found that any such easing of transport over a given distance is

hindered by the existence of a proportional relationship between the cost of transport

and goods carried over time. The general trend towards falling transport costs is

mirrored by a general trend towards goods carried also becoming cheaper. This means

that despite transport becoming cheaper, it does not become any less important

relative to goods carried.

It will be found that this relationship exists for civilian items that have a duel military

use such as fuel, construction materials and food, which make up the bulk of all items

required by war. It will also be found that this relationship exists for entirely military

items. In part this is because they have often been stockpiled prior to war, which

means that regardless of their original cost they are pre-paid and thus free from the

point of view of operational requirements. Being free, they can not have anything

other than a proportional relationship over time. The relationship also exists for

military items that have to be purchased, contrary to the view expressed for example

by Paul Kennedy that military manufacturing “is becoming increasingly divergent

from the commercial” and of there being an “upward spiral” in costs.12 To be sure,

military supplies can become more expensive as a result of short production runs

which are prevalent during peacetime conditions. But the phenomenon of the short

military production run is by no means new and need not occur when longer

production runs are required by wartime conditions. It will be found that this is not

causing the LSG to become less important.

Cost is not the only factor that must be considered with regard to the impact of

transport upon the Loss of Strength Gradient. Speed must also be looked at. Greater

speed means quicker response time which can mean that the ultimate logistics

requirement is greatly reduced. If supplies can be moved in quick enough to defend

territory, the load needed will be much less than that needed to reconquer it. The need

to undertake military action during time windows, owing to weather or political

conditions, adds further to the imperative for rapid movement.

12 Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, (London: Fontana, 1989), p. 570.

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Up to the 20th century, speeds underwent great improvements both at sea and on land.

But the speeds of surface transportation modes have hit physical limits. At the

beginning of the 20th century cargo vessels were in operation that could outrun most

such vessels one hundred years later. It will be found that on land too, road and rail

transport have hit physical limitations that have made increased speeds prohibitively

expensive.

Even the invention of air transport has made little impression. This work will counter

the view, put by Hallion with regard to the Gulf War of 1990-91, that it has proved

critical for the delivery of combat strength.13 The cost is too high while the load it can

carry is too small to make much of an improvement upon the situation faced by

surface modes, while it too has hit physical limits to speed. Moreover, its fuel

requirements are such that over trans-oceanic distances it can increase the load that

needs to be prepositioned at forward bases, not decrease it.

To be sure, this work will find that where a larger power is capable of prevailing over

a smaller belligerent, it may be able to afford the diversion of resources towards airlift

away from surface modes. This has been possible for the United States, especially in

the post-Cold War era, supporting, to some extent, Boulding’s view that there has

been an increase in the minimum viable size of a state.14 Yet here too the fact that no

country can expect permanent Great Power status means that it causes little other than

a temporary alteration to the Loss of Strength Gradient.

To be sure, it will find that airlift has made it easier to move personnel, but it will also

find that they comprise a decreasing proportion of the total load that is transported. It

will question the Pentagon’s aim of expanding use of smaller Forward Operating

Bases or ‘Lily-Pads’, while it withdraws troops from existing forward facilities. The

theory is that these will host prepositioned equipment while troops are kept at home to

be airlifted when necessary.15 Unfortunately, this concept assumes a changed security

13 Hallion, Richard P., Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1992), p. 137.14 Boulding, 1963, pp. 261-2.15 Jones, 29 April 2003; Associated Press, ‘Pentagon to close 35 percent of overseas bases: ‘Forward operating sites’ to replace Cold War-era bases’, 23 September 2004, retrieved from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6078936/?displaymode=1006; McKeeby, David, ‘U.S. Reducing Number of Overseas Military Bases’, Bureau of International Information Programs, US Department of State, 22 June 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives

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environment requiring the use of relatively lighter forces, which can only be

temporary given the impermanence of Great Power status. It also assumes a greater

reliance upon precision weapons, which, as will be found with later analysis of the

impact of air power, is countered by the competitive nature of war. It does not cater

for the heavy ground forces that this work will find continue to be needed. Troops

need to be forward based with their heavy equipment in order to be trained and be in a

state of readiness for battle.

The need for transport infrastructure to avoid the occurrence of bottlenecks will also

be investigated. This work will find that this provides further advantage for forward

positioning and thus continued importance for the Loss of Strength Gradient. Yet

again, the reason is the competitive nature of warfare as each side makes every effort

to get its supplies forward, creating bottlenecks in the process. It will be found that, in

order to alleviate this, additional transportation infrastructure is required in forward

positions. Thus, even where an attempt is made to use transport in preference to

forward based prepositioning, it is still advantageous to have forward basing, albeit of

another variety.

According to Libicki, improved information could reduce the supply load with the

potential that a future war might be supplied entirely by airlift.16 According to Blaker,

the possibility of improved information could allow forces to be stationed further and

further away from the area of potential conflict.17 This work will refute the view that it

has become any easier to gather information that will help calculate logistical needs or

allow forces to be located further away from the outbreak of conflict. It will

demonstrate that the competitive nature of war means that both sides will attempt

countermeasures to thwart their opponent’s information gathering capabilities, in

addition to a continued capacity for making incorrect assumptions.

The possibility that miniaturisation might be used to reduce the load, put forward by

Edgell et al, will also be argued against.18 The competitive nature of war means that

16 Libicki, Martin, ‘The Emerging Primacy of Information’, Orbis, 40 (1996), p. 261. 17 Blaker, James R., ‘Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America’s 21st Century Defense’, Defense Working Paper 3 Progressive Policy Institute, Washington, January 1997, p. 25, http://www.ppionline.org/documents/Understanding_RMA.pdf 18 Edgell, J. L.W., S.K. Spangler, G. F. Dragoo, & L.W. Jackson, ‘Logistics in 2025: Consider It Done!’, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1996, pp. 26-28,

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no side can keep hold of a technological advance permanently without its opponents

finding a countermeasure or replicating it, in which circumstance both will produce as

much as they can.

This work will find even that living off the land cannot reduce the load because of the

competitive nature of war. A belligerent that uses this will take advantage of it to

bring as much other supplies as is possible.

It will be found that it is possible to deter an opponent with a reduced load. A small

force can be forward positioned where it can be used as a trip-wire that triggers the

deployment of larger forces when an attack occurs. But given the impermanence of

Great Power status, opponents will not always be so much smaller that they will fear

such a deployment. Alternatively, one may be able to take advantage from an

opponent that believes or is fooled into believing that such a force is stronger than it

really is. But such a circumstance cannot be relied upon. It will also be found that

aggressors have still been prepared to undertake attack upon such smaller forward

positioned forces in the belief that the other side will be unwilling to pursue the matter

further. Deterrence does not always succeed with a reduced load.

Forward positions for fighting

This work will argue against the view that air power can be used strategically, thereby

denying a role for forward based ground forces. It will find that, with the possible

exception of the Kosovo War in 1999, the only success for strategic air power has

been that of the nuclear attacks upon Japan in 1945. But their further use is hindered

by ethical considerations and the fact that an attack against another nuclear armed

state risks self destruction and, on a sufficient scale, the possibility of global

devastation. To commit suicide is not strategic.

The view that conventional aerial bombardment could be used to defeat an opponent

has origins that can be traced back to the beginning of the air power era. Early 20th

century supporters of strategic bombing such as Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell

http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/volume2/chap01/vol2ch01.pdf.

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argued that an enemy could receive a knockout blow from afar.19 De Seversky said

that the development of long-range bombers could have avoided need for the

American island-hopping campaign of the Second World War, essentially eliminating

need for forward basing.20

Advocates of an American Revolution in Military Affairs in the post Cold War era

suggested again that technology had advanced such that victory in conflict need not

require forces on the ground or else lightly deployed ground forces would merely be

enablers for air power.

Hallion said that air power won the Gulf War of 1991, demonstrating the ability to

hold territory and to seize it by controlling access and movement across it.21 The

Pentagon’s Joint Vision 2010 document, published in 1996, stated that “Long-range

precision capability, combined with a wide range of delivery systems, is emerging as

a key factor in future warfare.”22 This was described by Blaker as having the

capability for “dismantling” an enemy, and viewed by him as “perhaps the most

profound change” brought about by the Revolution in Military Affairs.23 Christopher

Bowie said that high-technology weaponry such as the B-2 bomber equipped with

advanced munitions could carry out paralysing and disarming blows from the United

States upon locations worldwide. To do this, bases would not be needed in theatre.24

Then, in 1999, came the Kosovo War. Keegan, formerly sceptical of strategic air

power, described the conflict as a turning point in the history of warfare, proving that

it could indeed be won by air power alone.25 The 2001 Afghan War has also been used

19 Douhet, Giulio, The Command of the Air, trans. D. Ferrari, (London: Faber & Faber, 1943); Trenchard, Hugh, Air Power, (London: Air Ministry, 1946); Mitchell, William, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Airpower, Economic and Military, (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925).20 de Seversky, A. P., Victory Through Air Power, (New York: Simon and Schuster Press, 1942) 21 Hallion, Richard P., Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), pp. 1, 253.22 Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2010, (Washington: DoD, 1996), p. 11, http://www.dtic.mil/jv2010/jv2010.pdf23 Blaker, 1997, p. 16.24 O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Can High Technology Bring US Troops Home?’, Foreign Policy, No. 113 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 73.25 Keegan, John, ‘Please, Mr Blair, never take such a risk again’, Daily Telegraph, London, 6 June 1999, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/1999/06/06/wkee06.html

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as an example of strategic air power reliant just on lightly deployed Special

Operations Forces and a local ally to provide target information.26

The circumstances of these conflicts will be explained in greater detail in later

chapters. This work will disagree that aerial bombardment had the capacity to win the

Gulf War of 1991 without the use of ground forces. It will also argue that the failure

on the part of the Iraqis to make greater use of cover provides further reason that the

war cannot be used to make a general argument in support of strategic air power.

It will accept that the Kosovo War was possibly won through strategic air power but

not definitively. It will offer an explanation in the capability for precision air attack to

cause destruction while minimising casualties and for this to cause domestic pressure

to be directed towards the country’s leadership. Serbia was vulnerable to this as it was

a regime which lacked totalitarianism such as that in Iraq. But even this cannot be

entirely detached from the use of forward positioned ground forces. Air power was

not the sole factor involved and there was pressure from ground force action both

current and planned.

To be sure, the possibility that strategic air power can win wars without the use of

ground forces cannot be entirely discounted. However, it will be argued that even if

air power was key to success in the Kosovo War, the chances of this occurring again

are greatly inhibited by the two enduring factors that reoccur throughout this work.

The competitive nature of war and the impermanence of Great Power status mean that

strategic air power success can be of only occasional occurrence.

The competitive nature of war means that just as advances are made with precision

weapons, so advances are made with efforts to counter them. Better weaponry on the

part of the Serbs could have prevented NATO from achieving air superiority over

their country. Moreover, although this is another demonstration that Boulding was

correct, to some extent, to say that there had been an increase in the minimum viable

size of a state, one cannot expect always to face such small opponents. The Kosovo

26 Biddle, Stephen, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, Strategic Studies Institute monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle PA, November 2002, pp. 1-2.,http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/afghan.pdf

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War saw the United States, joined in coalition with most of Western Europe against a

much lesser sized adversary. By comparison, this work will provide the Falklands

War as an example where the armed forces of a former Great Power were unable even

to deny airspace to enemy aircraft.

This work will show that air power has not shown itself capable of defeating a

military force that takes measures to conceal itself on the ground. Even during the

Kosovo War, if air power was sufficient to create domestic pressure upon a

government, what it did not do was defeat the Serb army of occupation in Kosovo.

Likewise, the Afghan campaign of 2001 will be used to show how the Taliban could

hide their positions from spotters on the ground guiding aircraft, just as they could

from the planes themselves.

To be sure, it is noteworthy that even Boulding did not go so far as to ascribe aerial

bombardment with strategic capability. He questioned whether air power could be

used without ground forces, adding that “the power to destroy from the air is not the

same as the power to occupy with an invading army”. He pointed to the possibility

that “we may run into the paradox that nations can be destroyed without being

conquered.”27

But Boulding did believe that the airplane and the missile had brought about a

“revolution of quite unprecedented dimensions”. He did point out that the LSG for air

power was very much less than it was for land power, which meant that it could

reduce the LSG overall.28 However, the continued ability of ground forces to

withstand enemy bombardment, from before the air power era onwards, will show

that air power has not gained importance at land power’s expense.

Moreover, in the exceptional circumstances that air power can be strategic, even this

need not mean a reduction in the LSG. This work will show that air power still takes

advantage from forward positioning and can have a significant logistical requirement

much like that of ground forces as a result of its heavy fuel usage. This will counter

27 Boulding, 1963, p. 268.28 Ibid., pp. 268, 272.

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the view that the LSG for air power is less than that for surface power and that this

should reduce the LSG overall.

This work will argue not only that air power has been unable to diminish the

importance of ground forces for attack but also that it cannot offer a permanent

alternative to ground forces as a means of territorial defence. The impermanence of

Great Power status means that invading opponents possessing their own air

capabilities will not always be vulnerable to air attack. And even in the Gulf War,

where greatly superior air power was available for deployment, it will be shown that

because the logistical requirement for this was no less difficult to move than that for

land power, sufficient air defences could not be put in place earlier than surface

forces. In so doing, it will counter Hallion’s view that, in this conflict, air power

demonstrated it could hold territory from being seized by the opponent.

Arguments that it has become increasingly difficult to operate forward bases and

therefore benefit from their advantages as implied by Boulding’s diagram, will be

investigated. There is the threat from the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles

which Krepinevich has said “will quite probably over time, increase substantially the

dangers of operating from such facilities”.29 It will be shown however that just as air

power has been unable to defeat an opposing armed force on the ground that makes

use of cover, likewise forward based forces can do the same against precision

capabilities possessed by the opponent. The countermeasures that arise out of the

competitive nature of warfare are available to both sides. The proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction has been pointed to as a further source of vulnerability

for forward bases on land.30 But this also has a countermeasure. A state can be

deterred by ones own WMD capability.

29 Krepinevich, Andrew, ‘The Quadrennial Defense Review, Rethinking the USMilitary Posture’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, 2005, p. 42., http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20051024.QDR06/R.20051024.QDR06.pdf; For an earlier example of this argument see Andrew Krepinevich, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 2002, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/transformation/krepinevich.htm30 Krepinevich, 2005, p. 42.; See also Clark, Adm. Vern, ‘Sea Power 21 Series - Part I: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities’, Proceedings, October 2002, http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROcno10.htm;

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There is the threat from asymmetric organisations, described variously by

Krepinevich as “radical groups” and “small groups of irregular forces, terrorists and

transnational criminal organizations”, that could be empowered with WMD.31 But this

does not alter the importance of the Loss of Strength Gradient. To be sure, stateless

actors do not have a state to worry about over the possibility of retaliation. Even so,

they are unlikely to pose an increased threat to forward based forces. This is because

stateless actors also have to work in a competitive environment. The potential

empowerment of such groups is checked by pressure from law enforcement agencies

deploying their own countermeasures.

Krepinevich has pointed to what he sees as a trend for countries to deny access to US

forces, using the failure of the Turkish government to allow the opening of a second

front against Iraq in 2003 as evidence of this difficulty.32 He has gone on to attribute

this to the collapse of the Soviet Union which formerly provided a “bonding effect on

America and its allies”.33 But this work will find that foreign base access for the Iraq

invasion was no worse than that for the bombing of Libya in 1986 or the aerial supply

of Israel in 1973.

That there is no trend for states to refuse forward base access will be attributed to

several factors. There is competition for the benefits such hosting can provide, not

only in war but in the peacetime world order. There is also the fact that states are no

less likely to have shared beliefs and ideologies. Moreover, it will be found that, even

with the demise of a superpower, there can be just as many states looking for allies.

New states able to break free from the control of the former superpower can acquire a

new frontline status for being closest to it geographically. And just as the

impermanence of Great Power status implies the fall of states, it also implies the rise

of others. The likelihood of new threats also means the possibility of bonds created

with new allies.

31 Krepinevich, 2005, p. 22.; Latter quote from Stephen Kosiak, Andrew Krepinevich and Michael Vickers, ‘A Strategy for a Long Peace’, Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assessments, Washington DC, 30 January 2001, Executive Summary at http://www.csbaonline.org32 Andrew Krepinevich, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington DC, 2003, p. i., http://www.csbaonline.org33 Krepinevich, 2005, p. 90.

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In the face of perceived threats to facilities on land, sea basing has been increasingly

seen as a viable alternative and has been given a central role as part of the US Navy’s

Sea Power 21 initiative.34 It has been described by the Navy as an alternative to

political and military barriers to access ashore that are said to be growing

worldwide.35 Barnard has even gone so far as to describe the concept as a “revolution

in power projection”.36 The Pentagon’s sea basing concept envisages the functions of

a bridgehead, such as that provided by Kuwait for the Iraq War, being moved offshore

after 2015.37

Yet sea basing cannot be seen as equivalent to that on land. A base at sea is less able

to hide and is more vulnerable to destruction. Moreover, the nature of human

existence as creatures which dwell on the land shows no signs of changing. The sea

must interconnect with the land. Bases are still needed ashore and where the land is

not under the control of friendly forces, sea power is at the disadvantage of needing to

engage in amphibious landing. Here too it will be found that the sea continues to be at

as much of a disadvantage as in the past. It remains comparatively just as hard to

engage in an amphibious landing as ever.

This is not to support the view that sea basing is actually becoming more difficult.

According to Krepinevich “large Navy surface combatants” will be increasingly

vulnerable to enemy threats close to shore. He prefers another concept at sea, the

Mobile Offshore Base, which would be larger still, operating “at extended ranges”

away from shorelines.38 But the competitive nature of war means that just as advances

have been made in enemy weaponry, so sea vessels have evolved defensive

capabilities such that they are not under greater threat. Basing at sea is becoming no

less, if not also no more, an alternative to that on land.

34 Clark, 2002.35 Moore, Vice Adm. Charles W. Jr., US Navy logistics chief, and Lieut. Gen. Edward Hanlon, Marine Corps, ‘Sea Power 21 Series - Part IV: Sea Basing: Operational Independence for a New Century’, Proceedings, January 2003, http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles03/PROseabasing01.htm36 Barnard, Richard C., ‘Sea Basing Concept Promises a Revolution in Power Projection’, Sea Power, June 2004, http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/jun_04_10.php.37 Hilburn, Matt, ‘The ‘Floating Beach’’, Sea Power, June 2006, http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/jun06-20.php38 Krepinevich, 2005, pp. 38, 130.; For an earlier example see Kosiak, Krepinevich and Vickers, 2001.

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Methodology

The following five chapters will explore the continued importance of the Loss of

Strength Gradient and thus of forward basing. Two chapters will be used to

investigate the areas of attack that have been identified: the argument that transport is

itself becoming easier and quicker, and the argument that defeat of the opponent

through strategic air and missile power has become possible.

Chapter 2 will investigate the first of these. It will be used to refute the view that

falling transport costs should make the supply of war any easier. It will also show that

transport speeds have come up against physical limitations that have made it difficult

to rely upon further improvements and that airlift has made little difference to this

situation. Further need for forward locations will be found in the continuing

requirement for transport infrastructure in order to avoid bottlenecks. The chapter will

also look at the reasons why the logistics load cannot undergo permanent reduction,

whether through improved information, miniaturisation or even by living off the land,

and will investigate why it will not always be successful when used for deterrence.

Chapter 3 will tackle the second of the areas of attack upon the Loss of Strength

Gradient. This will look at the possibility of strategic bombardment as an alternative

to ground forces, allowing control of territory to be taken from afar. It will look at the

Kosovo War of 1999 as an example where political factors may have supported defeat

by air power alone. But it will also show that those political factors as well as the

conflict’s military circumstances need not be repeated. It will find that the only other

possibility for strategic bombardment is that of nuclear attack, but accompanied by

the risk of devastating retaliation as well as inhibitions about its use.

Chapter 3 will also be used to tackle the issue of whether the forward base itself is

coming under increasing threat from enemy weapons capabilities and from attacks by

asymmetric actors. It will investigate too the possibility that there is a growing

problem of base access denial by foreign states. In none of these cases will it find that

there is a trend towards the forward base becoming less viable. The chapter will also

look at the alternative of sea basing. It will find that this is not becoming any more

feasible as an alternative to its counterpart on land.

15

Three case studies will be dealt with in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. As Boulding referred to

transport improvement and the increased range of the projectile as being significant in

a military revolution in the 20th century, so it is from either end of the 20th century that

each of the three case studies is drawn. The choice of conflicts has been made with

specific reference to the situation of a power with global reach.

The first two of the case studies focus upon the Boer War of 1899-1902 and the Gulf

War of 1990-91. The Boer War is an example of the pre-eminent military power of

the era prior to the invention of heavier-than-air flight, Britain, using its global reach.

The choice of the Gulf War allows for comparison with the forward basing needs of

the United States as the pre-eminent power at the other end of the 20th century. Both

conflicts saw movement of forces, their equipment and supplies, over a similar trans-

oceanic distance. The choice of these conflicts will be used to demonstrate one of the

enduring factors that reoccur throughout this work: the competitive nature of war.

They will show whether, in the face of this competitive pressure, the technological

advancements of the 20th century actually lessened the importance of proximity for a

global superpower.

The third case study is that of the Falklands War of 1982. This has been chosen in

order to demonstrate not only the competitive nature of war but also the other of the

two enduring factors: the impermanence of Great Power status. It is an example

showing that no power pre-eminent in a particular era can always expect this to

remain so. More than eight decades after the Boer War, Britain had retained global

reach and had experienced technological advance, but it had seen faster growth in

military strength among competitors. It tests not only the importance of proximity for

a non-superpower but also provides a potential scenario for the United States, if it

were to undergo relative military decline, a circumstance that cannot be ruled out

indefinitely.

As such, the Falklands War is used in preference to examples of the pre-eminent

power acting against much smaller opponents such as Serbia in 1999, Afghanistan’s

Mullah Omar in 2001 or Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003. In each case the disparity in

strength was such that the weaker side was territorially contained prior to the conflict

16

and the United States and its allies could act at a time of their choosing. Such

disparities in the strengths of opposing sides cannot always occur.

Together, these case studies will demonstrate that Boulding was wrong to suggest that

the Loss of Strength Gradient had declined over the 20th century. They will also show

that the Bush administration, which is taking advantage of what it believes to be

diminution in the importance of geographic distance, is wrong to use this as anything

more than temporary grounds to reduce forward basing.

17

CHAPTER 2

THE ADVANTAGE OF FORWARD LOCATIONS FOR LOGISTICS

Boulding said that there was a “military revolution” in the 20th century, part of which

was because of a very substantial reduction in the cost of transportation. This means,

therefore, that the Loss of Strength Gradient which he himself devised must have

undergone decline. As transport has become cheaper so it should have become easier

to move armed forces. The advantages of sourcing supplies from forward positions

should have become less and less with time.

This chapter will demonstrate that Boulding was wrong. The Loss of Strength

Gradient has not undergone decline because of falling transport costs. It will use

evidence from commercial trade. This is appropriate because, like military logistics, it

involves the transport of items, many of which are the same, in a competitive

environment. It will show that although the cost of moving an individual item does

indeed fall with time, competition causes advantage to be taken of this to send more

items. This cancels out any improvement in the ease with which equipment and

supplies can be carried over a given distance.

It will also explain that any such easing of transport is hindered by a proportional

relationship between transport and goods costs over time. The general trend towards

falling transport costs is mirrored by a general trend towards goods carried also

becoming cheaper. This means that although transport becomes cheaper, its cost does

not become any less important relative that of goods carried. It will be found that this

relationship exists not only for civilian items that have a duel military usage, but also

for entirely military items, contrary to the view such as that expressed by Kennedy

that this has undergone divergence.

As well as transport costs, this chapter will also investigate the impact of transport

speed. Given that the logistics needs of defence are less than those of attack, if

supplies can be moved in time to defend a territory, the load needed will be much less

than that needed to reconquer it. Increased speed also means that action is more easily

undertaken within the time constraints provided by weather or political conditions.

18

This chapter will however provide evidence that transport speeds have hit physical

limits. It will explain why sealift has seen little improvement in a century. It will also

show that any further increases for road and rail can be obtained only at

disproportionate cost.

Despite airlift’s greater speed, this chapter will counter Hallion’s view that it can be a

critical means of delivering combat strength. It is too expensive and the load it can

carry too small to make much of an improvement upon surface modes of transport,

while its fuel requirements can even increase the load that needs to be prepositioned at

forward bases, not decrease it. A Great Power in the midst of war with a much smaller

opponent may be able to afford the diversion of resources towards airlift away from

surface modes but given that Great Power status cannot be permanent, neither can this

situation.

This chapter will look at the Pentagon’s concept of using smaller Forward Operating

Bases to preposition equipment while keeping troops at home to be airlifted when

necessary. It will show that this is undermined by the impermanence of Great Power

status.

The need for forward located transport infrastructure will be investigated. It will show

that this provides yet further reason for the continued importance of forward basing.

Such infrastructure will be found to be necessary to avoid bottlenecks that arise from

the competitive pressure to send as much into theatre as possible.

It will also find the possibility that improved information about logistical needs could

allow a future war to be supplied entirely by airlift, as argued by Libicki, is

undermined by the competitive nature of war. Likewise for Blaker’s view that

improved information could allow forces to be stationed further away from the area of

potential conflict.

This chapter will counter the view of Edgell et al. that miniaturisation might be used

to reduce the load. It will show that such efforts are cancelled out by the competitive

pressure of war, urging the supply of as much as possible of new innovations as well

as the adoption of countermeasures. It will be found too that the competitive nature of

19

war has meant that even past attempts at living off the land could not reduce the

logistics load.

This chapter will show that while a reduced load can be used as a means of deterring

an opponent, this can occur only temporarily. This is owed in part to the

impermanence of Great Power status as well as failure to convince the opponent that

an attack will trigger a larger conflict than it expects and the fact that deceptions about

the strength of such forward forces cannot always be maintained.

Cost of transport has not weakened the LSG

The cost of transport is an important factor that places continued advantage upon

forward locations and thus maintains continued importance for the Loss of Strength

Gradient. Boulding was correct to point out that transport costs have shown a long

term downwards trend. Yet the long term production costs of items carried have

observed a similar trend. There is a proportional relationship between the two over

time. The result, combined with a competitive environment in which as much as

possible is carried, is that geographic distance remains just as important. Boulding

was wrong to use falling transport costs as a reason to argue that the Loss of Strength

Gradient was undergoing decline.

One can see this effect in international trade. Evidence from this is appropriate

because, like war, it is a competitive environment, and it involves the movement of

many of the same goods. In 1962, an average of internationally traded goods,

measured by value, excepting oil, moved by land, sea and air, travelled 4,790

kilometres. By 2000 this was little altered at 4,938 kilometres.39 Distance had barely

changed at a little less than 5,000 kilometres or approximately 3,000 miles.

Another measure, albeit excluding land and air transport, but including oil, provides

added confirmation of this phenomenon. In 1972, an average of international seaborne

freight, measured by weight, travelled 4,302 miles or 6,922 kilometres. By 2003, 39 Carrère, Céline & Maurice Schiff, ‘On the Geography of Trade: Distance is Alive and Well’, 3 February 2004, World Bank Working Paper No. 3206, p. 40, Table 1, http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?id=33022

20

distance was not greatly changed at 4,216 miles or 6,784 kilometres. This was despite

the fact that there had been a considerable increase in international freight transport

over this time. In 1972, international seaborne trade totalled 11.9 trillion tonne-miles.

By 2003 it was 25.9 trillion tonne-miles.40

Civilian traded items are an important part of the logistics load in war. One such

internationally traded commodity is fuel. Between 1965 and 1969 this made up

approximately 40 percent of the supply load sent to Vietnam. Out of 36 million short

tons of supplies, 14 million was of bulk petroleum.41

Construction materials can be an important part of the load. In 1965 and 1966, they

constituted some 40 percent of the total tonnage of materials coming into Vietnam.42

Wood is one such important construction commodity. When Camps Bondsteel and

Monteith were set up in Kosovo in 1999, timber was brought in from Austria for the

construction of 250 South East Asia huts to house 7,000 soldiers, along with support

structures including guard towers and a 30,000-square-foot headquarters building.43

Heavier construction materials also need to be moved. In Afghanistan, US forces flew

in cement needed for proper repair of the runway at Baghram airfield, while cold

patch, made up of asphalt, aggregate, and a solvent, was used for repair of the

Kandahar runway.44

Warfare requires that the personnel themselves be sustained. From October 1967 for

example, US forces were served by a refrigerator cargo service involving the arrival

of four vessels at Cam Ranh Bay every 15 days. A similar service also sailed to Da

Nang.45

40 1972: 13,104 billion ton-miles (multiplied by 0.907 to convert from short tons to metric = 11,885 billion tonne-miles) / 2,763 million tonnes = 4,302 miles; 2003: 25,854 billion tonne miles / 6,133 million tonnes = 4,216 miles. For kilometres multiply by 1.609. Calculated from statistics in Fearnley Shipbrokers, Fearnleys Review 1983, Oslo, 1984, p. 24., and Fearnley Shipbrokers, Fearnleys Review 2004, Oslo, February 2005, retrieved from http://www.fearnleys.com/asset/68/1/68_1.pdf41 Heiser, Lt. Gen. Joseph M., Logistic Support, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1991), First Published 1974, p. 157, http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/logistic/index.htm#contents 42 Ibid., p. 17. 43 McClure, Robert L. ‘The Engineer Regiment in Kosovo’, Engineer: The Professional Bulletin for Army Engineers, April 2000; Haugsboe, Maj. Haakon, ‘The biggest camp there is’, NATO-KFOR website, 27 September 1999, www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html; Pike, John, ‘Camp Bondsteel’, globalsecurity.org, 1 January 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-bondsteel.htm 44 McNulty, Major Dennis J., ‘Repairing Runways and Clearing Mines in Afghanistan’, Engineer: The Professional Bulletin for Army Engineers, July 2002.45 Heiser, 1991, p. 199.

21

Military forces also require many manufactured items similar to those that are

internationally traded. The US military maintains a considerable fleet of support

vehicles. There are over 12,000 10 ton Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks and

in excess of 85,000 2 ½ ton and 5 ton Medium Tactical Vehicles.46 Its fleet of light

vehicles is also large. The High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle fleet is over

100,000.47 Rail equipment is a requirement of war. In 1966, two hundred rail cars and

ten switching locomotives were sent to Vietnam to supplement the country’s rolling

stock for the handling of military cargo.48

Numerous other items, similar to those used commercially, also need to be supplied to

military forces. When Camp Bondsteel was constructed in Kosovo in 1999, armoured

combat earthmovers were used to create a perimeter berm while scrapers, dozers,

graders and compactors levelled hills and a ravine inside the base.49 Repair of the

Baghram airfield in Afghanistan in 2001 involved the use of a forklift truck for lifting

and removing replacement slabs into place, a concrete saw, a compactor, an

excavator, a ditching machine to dig trenches for cable lines, and a concrete vibrator.50

There are many other commercially traded items required by military forces from

pallets to wire fencing and even nails. In a single year during the Vietnam War, 1967,

US military forces purchased more than 1,600,000 wooden pallets.51 The building of

US bases in Kosovo in 1999 required 17 kilometres of fencing and 200 tons of nails.52

46 Pike, John, ‘Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT)’, globalsecurity.org, 10 December 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/hmett.htm; Pike, John, ‘Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)’, globalsecurity.org, 10 December 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fmtv.htm47 Pike, John, ‘High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)’, globalsecurity.org, 10 December 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/hmmwv.htm48 Dunn, Lieutenant General Carroll H., Base Development in South Vietnam 1965-1970, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1991), http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/basedev/index.htm#contents, p. 109.49 Pike, 1 January 2002.50 McNulty, July 2002.51 Lucas, John T. & Walter B. Wallin, ‘The Department of Defense Market for Wooden Pallets 1967’, USDA Forest Research Paper NE-131, Upper Darby, PA., 1969, p. 5., http://www.fs.fed.us/ne/newtown_square/publications/research_papers/pdfs/scanned/OCR/ne_rp131.pdf 52 McClure, April 2000.

22

There is much evidence of a proportional relationship between the costs of transport

and goods carried over time. As one has fallen, so has the other, with the result that

transport has not become any less important as part of total costs.

Surface transport has shown a long term trend for becoming cheaper. A reduction in

costs can be seen with a range of commercial commodities transported by sea. The

shipment of rubber from Malaysia to Europe fell in constant dollars from $130 per ton

in 1963 to $99 per ton in 1996. Tea from Sri Lanka to Europe fell from $217 to $80

per ton over the same period. The cost of shipping coffee from Colombia to Europe

fell from $111 per ton in 1970 to $95 per ton in 1996.53 Needless to say, trucks,

whether used for military or civilian haulage, have rubber tyres. And tea and coffee, if

only a very modest proportion of a load sent into war, provide examples of

agricultural foodstuffs required to sustain troops.

This trend can be found even when one looks back over several centuries. One survey

by Fouquet and Pearson which looks at improvements to horse drawn and then rail

transport identifies a drop in the cost of freight transport conducted by these modes of

approximately 6 times between 1750 and 2000.54

But just as transport prices tend to fall with time so the cost of goods carried also

continues to fall. Lomborg has demonstrated that the vast majority of industrial

products have been falling in price over the last 150 years. As an example of this, an

inflation adjusted price index gathered by the Economist for the period between 1845

and 2000, has shown a price fall of some 80 percent for processed raw materials

including aluminium, copper, cotton, timber and hides.55

That transport and goods carried are related in price is confirmed when comparing

freight rates to the value of the previously mentioned agricultural goods. The shipping

53 Hummels, David, ‘Have International Transportation Costs Declined?’, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, November 1999, Table A2., http://www.mgmt.purdue.edu/faculty/hummelsd/research/decline/declined.pdf54Fouquet, Roger & Peter J. G. Pearson, ‘Long Run Trends in Energy Services: The Price and Use of Road and Rail Services in the United Kingdom (1250-2000)’, Proceedings of 2003 British Institute of Energy Economics Conference: Government Intervention in Energy Markets, St. John’s College, Oxford, 2003, www.biee.org, Figure 1. 55 Lomborg, Bjorn, The Skeptical Environmentalist, (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 137-8, citing the Industrial Price Index in the Economist, London, 31 December 1999.

23

price of rubber transported from Malaysia to Europe was 7.6 percent of the goods

price in 1963 and was little changed at 8.9 percent in 1996. For tea transported from

Sri Lanka to Europe it was 5.8 percent in 1963 and 5.6 percent in 1996. For coffee

moved between Colombia and Europe it was 4.5 percent in 1970 and 4.9 percent in

1996.56

Indeed, in the year 2000, if one looked at the cost of sea transport relative to the value

of all traded goods, including agricultural products, raw materials and manufactures,

little change could be seen from previous decades. In 1980 the cost of sea transport

stood at 6.64 percent. In 1990 it was 5.22 percent, and in 2000 6.22 percent.57

The same is to be seen when looking at all modes of transport, by surface and by air.

New Zealand, used as an example because it has the lengthiest time series, saw

transport rates on imports by sea and air between 1964 and 1996 fluctuate between 7

and 11 percent. Transport rates did not decline with time. The same is to be said for

the United States where transport rates on imports between 1973 and 1996 also failed

to show a decline. Although the 1973 oil shock caused a subsequent rise to 6 percent

during the middle of that decade, transport rates have otherwise remained stable at

about 4-5 percent.58 This suggests that the overall costs of transport are closely

aligned with the costs of goods carried.

The result of the proportional relationship between transport and goods costs over

time, combined with competitive circumstances which cause as much as possible to

be sent, is that geographic distance retains its importance.

However, while a reduction in the price of transport goes hand-in-hand with a similar

reduction in the price of civilian traded goods, this is not always seen in items

produced solely for war. The $2.1 billion stealth bomber deployed in 1993 provides

one very expensive example of a rise in the cost of such equipment at the end of the

20th century.59

56 Hummels, 1999, Table A2. 57 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime Transport, 2003, Geneva, p. 73, Table 41, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2003ch1_en.pdf 58 Hummels, 1999, p. 5 & Figure 1. 59 Federation of American Scientists, ‘B-2 Spirit’ fact sheet, Washington, 30 November 1999, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/b-2.htm

24

To be sure, it is difficult to make comparison with items that were used in earlier

conflicts. There is difference for example in the requirements and thus also the

manufacture of a B-2 compared to a World War Two B-29. The development of the

latter did not involve an attempt at a reduction in its radar signature. Comparison is

therefore best made with contemporary commercial traded products that use related

technology. Even so, when one does this it is found that the cost of such military

equipment diverges from these.

Paul Kennedy, for example, has said that there is an “upward spiral”, at work in “all

areas” of military production which “is becoming increasingly divergent from the

commercial”. The desire for ‘state-of-the-art’ weaponry is meant to have pushed up

the cost. Yet the competitive nature of warfare has always compelled military forces

to seek the most up-to-date equipment, whether the Byzantine development of Greek

Fire or the American development of the Tomahawk cruise missile. There is instead

another reason whose influence Kennedy has not scrutinised fully. This is the fact

that, as he acknowledges, they are “less numerous” than advanced technology items

produced for the civilian sector, where, despite initial heavy investment in prototypes,

average unit costs are pushed downwards by volume production.60 This divergence

with civilian manufacturing is only temporary.

The high expense of military equipment can be explained by the use of short

production runs that are often prevalent in peacetime. Ironically, these are the result of

efforts to economise. The price tag for the B-2 stealth bomber can be understood in

large part by the fact that the original order for 132, itself made in the peacetime of

the Cold War 1980s, was cut to just 21 in the even more peaceful 1990s. Yet each

plane still had to cover the costs of research and development. Such a small number

also meant that when production was started the benefits of economies of scale and

experience could not be realised.61 The issue of the short production run is addressed

later in the chapter on the Boer War, confirming that this phenomenon is by no means

new.

60 Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, (London: Fontana, 1989), pp. 570-1.61 Barefield, James L., The Heavy Bomber Industrial Base: A Study of Present and Future Capabilities, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, March 1997, p. 15, retrieved from Federation of American Scientists website: www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber97-0070.pdf

25

There is much evidence to suggest that, like civilian supplies, the cost of military

equipment is pulled downwards as production is increased or continued over time.

Production of the M1 Abrams tank, measured in 1997 prices, started at $3.546 million

per unit in 1979 but fell to less than $1.162 million by 1983, less than a third of the

original price. This was due to a learning curve effect in production of the tank over

several years.62 Economies of scale are another factor. The cost of constructing the

Joint Direct Attack Munition or JDAM was cut by more than half by mass producing

87,496 of them at a fixed unit price of $14,000. Usually the Pentagon would pay a

higher price for fewer initial products. Indeed, the JDAM has been described as ‘The

Bargain Basement Bomb’. It is said to have outperformed laser-guided bombs and

cruise missiles costing between $350,000 and $1 million during the 1999 Kosovo

War.63

Evidence of a downward trend in military production costs is provided by the DoD

Manufacturing Technology Program.64 For example, the implementation of an

automated material handling system has reduced production costs of artillery

propellant by a quarter.65 A $10.9 million cost saving has been made in Commanche

helicopter engine production with a reduction in the number of manufacturing steps

from 31 to 21, the number of subassembly parts from 13 to 6, and a production lead

time from 29 to 11 days.66 Body armour plate has been reduced from $850 to $525 by

the development of processes to allow mass production from boron carbide and

siliconised silicon carbide.67 Advances in design and production have saved a quarter

of the manufacturing cost for microwave amplifiers used in electronic warfare

62 Watkins, Patrick N., ‘The Persistence of Learning and Acquisition Strategies’, Acquisition Review Quarterly, Winter 2001, pp. 28-9, http://www.dau.mil/pubs/arq/2001arq/watkins.pdf63 Sloyan, Patrick J., ‘The Bargain Basement Bomb’, Long Island Newsday, 14 November 1999, p. 23, retrieved from Federation of American Scientists website: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/docs/e19991115bargain.htm 64 Department of Defense Manufacturing Technology Program, Washington, 19 August 2003, http://www.dodmantech.com/successes/ 65 Department of Defense Manufacturing Technology Program, ‘Munitions Manufacturing – Development of Manufacturing Technology for MACS Combustible Case’, fact sheet, Washington, 19 August 2003, http://www.dodmantech.com/successes/Army/03-07/MACS.pdf66 Department of Defense Manufacturing Technology Program, ‘Advanced Thin Wall Casting Manufacturing Process’, fact sheet, Washington, 4 February 2004, http://www.dodmantech.com/successes/Army/army_Adv_Thin_Wall_Cast_Mfg_Process.pdf67 Department of Defense Manufacturing Technology Program, ‘Enhanced Manufacturing Processes for Body Armor Materials’, fact sheet, Washington, 19 August 2003, http://www.dodmantech.com/successes/Army/03-07/BodyArmor.pdf

26

systems such as towed decoy applications.68 Kennedy’s “upward spiral” is not

witnessed by these items.

Even the B-2 could be produced much more cheaply. In 2001, Northrop Grumman

offered to build a further 40 B-2s for a reduced price of $735 million each.69 A larger

production run, necessitated by an emergency wartime need to produce as much

weaponry as possible, could get the price down much further. Aircraft manufacturing

costs are typically brought down by a fifth with every doubling of production. A

comparison can be made with commercial transportation systems. In the civil aviation

industry it takes the production of 500-600 aircraft before a model earns a profit. As a

result, such planes sell for between $50 million and $250 million ranging from 120

seaters to jumbos.70 Applying a similar calculation to the B-2 one finds that the

construction of 600 of these aircraft could be carried out at a unit cost of

approximately $300 million.

To be sure, a conflict where one side is far better resourced than another may see that

better resourced side able to prevail despite the fact that it economises with short

production runs. It may not be affected by the emergency need to devote every

resource to the fight. The United States, for example, never devoted its full industrial

capabilities to the wars in Korea or Vietnam. It is, however, a continuing theme of this

work that no power can retain superior military strength in relation to selected

opponents on a permanent basis. Superpowers do not always remain superpowers.

Military production costs thus need not vary greatly from the civilian. The previously

explained relationship that exists between the costs of transport and civilian goods

over time is therefore also relevant to military equipment and supplies. Price falls in

one will tend towards price falls in the others.

68 Department of Defense Manufacturing Technology Program, ‘Lean Production Methods for Electronic Warfare Systems’, fact sheet, Washington, 19 August 2003, http://www.dodmantech.com/successes/Joint/03-07/EWarfare.pdf69 Pike, John, ‘B-2 Production’, globalsecurity.org, 28 April 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b-2-production.htm70 Economist, ‘Boeing v Airbus: Nose to Nose’, London, 23 June 2005, http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4102185

27

Figure 2. The advantage of the forward location for sourcing supplies

1,000,000 t 980,000 t 900,000 t 882,000 t 833,000 t

10,000 km 1,000 km 0 km 1,000 kmCountry Forward Front Country A Location Line B

The effect of the price of both transport and goods upon the need for forward locations is presented here in a modified version of Boulding’s Loss of Strength Gradient diagram. ‘Country A’, which might be considered to be the United States or another power with global reach, is located 10,000 kilometres away from the place where it expects a possible fight with an enemy ‘Country B’, that is half way around the world. Country A has only $1 billion available for the purchase of supplies and transport. It costs $1,000 to buy a tonne of supplies. Its $1 billion would be enough to buy 1 million tonnes of supplies were there no transport involved. However, it costs $200 to transport each tonne the whole distance. This means it can deliver only 833,000 tonnes because the remaining $167 million will be needed to transport it.

Country B is just 1,000 kilometres from the conflict zone. It has only $900 million to spend on supplies and transport. But because it is able to spend much less on transport, $20 a tonne, it can transport more supplies giving it almost a 50,000 tonne advantage.

The solution for Country A is to source supplies closer to the conflict zone. At 1,000 kilometres from the front line it too needs only to spend $20 per tonne allowing it to transport approximately 980,000 tonnes of supplies. This gives it almost a 100,000 tonne advantage.

Moreover, if both the cost of supplies and of transport falls by 50 percent, both sides will still compete to get as much to the front line as possible. The result will be a doubling in the logistics load moved on both sides, including that which could be sourced from the forward location. The proportionate advantage of using the forward location will thus remain the same.

28

However, not all supplies need to be purchased in the midst of war. Stockpiles might

already have been built up beforehand. Such use of pre-paid stocks provides yet

further reason for the continued advantage of forward basing and thus the importance

of the Loss of Strength Gradient.

The use of pre-paid supplies does not lessen the importance of the Loss of Strength

Gradient because, with regard to operational expenses, they cost nothing. Again there

is a proportional relationship between goods costs and transport costs. Because goods

costs are zero, it does not matter whether the cost of transport rises or falls in a given

era. Both will always be in proportion with each other. Zero multiplied by any number

is always zero. Indeed, as the diagram below shows, the advantage of a forward

location is even greater in this circumstance as transport costs are all of the expense.

To be sure, conflicts of high intensity and lengthy duration may have to rely mostly

on supplies that are produced while they are ongoing. The First and Second World

Wars provide examples of this. But smaller wars of shorter duration where

belligerents have already stockpiled sufficiently for the outbreak of conflict are able to

rely on pre-existing supplies. The US invasions of Grenada in 1983 or Panama in

1989, for example, were small enough to be almost wholly reliant on existing stocks.

Indeed, in such circumstances, the use of existing pre-paid supplies overrides the

previously mentioned, albeit temporary, impact upon the importance of the Loss of

Strength Gradient of short production runs. While a superpower is most likely to be

able to afford fighting a war without devoting every resource to the fight, it is also a

superpower that is most likely to have built up the pre-paid stocks sufficient for a

given conflict. The case study of the American effort in the 1990-91 Gulf War in

Chapter 5 will provide an example of this, as indeed will even the former superpower,

Britain, in the 1982 Falklands War in Chapter 6.

29

Figure 3. The advantage of the forward location for positioning pre-paid supplies

1,000,000 t 1,000,000 t 500,000 t

100,000 t

10,000 km 1,000 km 0 km 1,000 kmCountry Forward Front Country A Location Line B

The diagram above shows the importance of the Loss of Strength Gradient and the advantage of a forward base for the movement of pre-paid supplies. Like Figure 2, it shows Country A with an initial one million tonnes of supplies. It has $20 million which it can spend on the transport of supplies that were stockpiled before the war. As in Figure 2 it costs $200 to move every tonne the whole 10,000 km. It can move all of its one million tonnes over a distance of 1,000 kilometres, but can deliver only 100,000 tonnes the full distance to the front line.

Compared to Figure 2, there is, in this instance, even greater advantage to be had from prepositioning supplies at a forward base despite the fact that the cost of transport is the same in both cases. A base located just 1,000 km from the front line can deliver ten times what can be delivered from the homeland.

Country B has $10 million which it can spend on transport of supplies that were bought before the war. Given a cost of transport at $20 per tonne over 1,000 km this pays for the movement of 500,000 tonnes. Despite half the expenditure of Country A this would still allow it a 5-1 superiority in supplies at the front line if its opponent had to transport everything from its homeland. But it is beaten 2-1 when its opponent makes use of prepositioning also 1,000 km away.

Moreover, should the price of transport fall by half so that it costs just $100 to move every tonne over 10,000 kilometres, the advantage of the forward base will not be altered. The amount that can be moved by both sides will be doubled. This will still leave Country A with the same proportionate superiority of supplies at the front line.

30

Speed of transport has not permanently altered the LSG

Speed of transport is another factor that has caused forward basing and thus the Loss

of Strength Gradient to be of continued importance over the last century. This is

because the speed at which force can be delivered has little changed over this period.

Despite the introduction of airlift, Hallion is wrong to argue that this has proved

critical for the delivery of combat strength, as he has said with regard to the Gulf War,

dealt with further in Chapter 5.71 By far most movement continues to be conducted by

sea, a mode of transport that has seen little improvement in speed since the beginning

of the 20th century.

The time that forces need to reach the conflict zone is important in large part because

of the advantage that the defender has over the attacker. While the defender can

conceal its position by remaining hidden, the attacker is at the disadvantage that in

order to move it must reveal its position and in the process is more likely to be hit.

Thus, it is advantageous to be able to get to a territory quickly in order to defend it,

rather than have to retake it later.

An understanding of the advantage of defence can be found as far back as Sun Tzu in

the first millennium B.C. It is because of this that he set out a “rule of numbers” in

battle. When ten times larger, one could intimidate the opponent into surrendering by

surrounding them. When five times larger, one could attack. But when only double

the size, one had to scatter the opponent so as to take them on in parts.72 Similarly, in

the late 20th century, American doctrine would be that an attacker should be at least

three and possibly up to five times stronger than a defending opponent.73

The Battle of Thermopylae in 480 B.C. during the first Graeco-Persian War saw a

larger attacking Persian force of perhaps 75,000 held back by 10,000 Greeks for

enough time, possibly two weeks, during which cities to the south could be evacuated.

The Greeks were able to use the fact that in order to move south the Persians had to

71 Hallion, Richard P., Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, (Washington, Smithsonian Institution, 1992), p. 137.72 Sun Tzu, The Art of Strategy, trans. by R.L. Wing, (London: Thorsons, 1997), p. 47.73 Pagonis, Lieutenant General William G., Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), p. 126.

31

pass through a defile at this point, which, at its narrowest, was only 13 metres wide.74

Well over two millennia later the difficulty of taking defended positions still held. Just

6,600 US Marines and South Vietnamese soldiers at Khe Sanh in 1968, with air

support much of the time hindered by poor weather, were able to hold out for more

than two months against up to 40,000 North Vietnamese.75

The defender has much to gain from a speedy mobilisation. As said, if one makes use

of American doctrine, a defender has at least a three times advantage to an attacker.

But because this can translate into a three times disadvantage if territory has to be

retaken, there is an overall advantage for the defender from a speedy mobilisation of

at least nine times. As figure 4 shows, while a territory may be defended by a force

only one third the size of the opponent, that force has to be increased in size by nine

times in order to retake that territory if it has been previously lost. In each one of the

case studies, the Boer War, the Gulf War, and the Falklands War, we will see

examples where forces could not be got to a territory quick enough, only to need

greater forces in order to mount a reconquest. In theory, faster transport should make

it easier to carry out such a defence.

To be sure, in order to mobilise for such a defence, one needs prior intelligence about

the opponent’s likely action. Such information will not always be available and, as

will be argued later, there is no prospect for improvements in intelligence gathering

that will alter this situation. In theory therefore, the attacker too could benefit in such

circumstances from quicker movement. Faster transport would provide the possibility

of undertaking the conquest of territory at greater distances, before the defender has

had the chance to learn of the attack and undertake mobilisation. And having

conquered territory, they too would be able to capitalise upon the advantage of being

the defender. Either way, it would mean a reduction in the Loss of Strength Gradient.

The advantage of defence over attack is not the only reason that the speed of

deployment can provide assistance in war. The case studies on the Gulf and Falklands

74 Gabbert, Janice J.; 'Graeco-Persian Wars', Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography, ed. Franklin D. Margiotta, (Washington & London, Brassey’s: 2000), p. 388. 75 Winters, Harold A., with Gerald E. Galloway Jr., William J. Reynolds, and David W. Rhyne, Battling the Elements: Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War, (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 68-72.

32

Wars will both demonstrate further factors. The requirement for speed can be

influenced by political considerations. There may be a concern that action should be

undertaken before domestic support for it falls away. There may be a need for

international support which is presently available but cannot be expected indefinitely.

Both of these will be observed with regard to the Falklands case study. A deadline

might have been set by which the opponent has been told it must comply. This will be

found with regard to the Gulf War case study. Weather is another factor. It will be

found that this was a concern for the British conducting operations in the South

Atlantic, apprehensive over the onset of wintry conditions that would have made their

task of retaking the Falklands more difficult. In theory, faster transport should make

these all these factors less constraining.

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Figure 4. The advantage of the forward location for saving time

1,000,000 t 333,333 x 3 = 1,000,000 t equivalent 500,000 t 333,333 t

100,000 / 3 = 33,333 t equivalent

10,000 km 1,000 km 0 km 1,000 kmCountry Forward Front Country A Location Line B

Using US military doctrine that the attacker should be at least three times larger than the defender, Figure 4 provides an example of how time saved could impact upon the Loss of Strength Gradient previously shown in Figure 3. On this occasion, Country A has only 333,333 tonnes of supplies at the forward base to counter the threat of invasion from Country B. However, because it is the defender, Country A’s forward based supplies are effectively three times stronger, equivalent to one million tonnes. Such an increase in strength is not available for those supplies transported from the homeland which it is assumed arrive too late to defend the territory. Indeed, the three times advantage for supplies at the forward base has become a three times disadvantage because it is now the enemy defending the territory. Thus the forward base provides a nine times advantage.

34

However, advancements in speed, in particular in the 20th century, have often proved

themselves disproportionately expensive. As a result, the last hundred years have seen

little alteration caused to the Loss of Strength Gradient and the advantage to be had

from forward positions. This is due in large part to a lack of increase in the speed of

sea transport.

The use of water for the supply of forces can be seen from the Graeco-Persian Wars

of the fifth century B.C. to the Iraq War in the 21st. In part, its importance is due to

geography. Human habitation on islands and different continents means that it is often

the only choice of surface transport. Continental foes: Philip II’s Spain, Napoleon’s

France, and Hitler’s Germany, had no other choice in their attempts to invade an

offshore opponent on an island such as Great Britain. Likewise, European powers and

the United States have had to cross the Atlantic to fight in each other’s continents.

Disputed territory on peninsulas may also be most easily accessible by sea, either

because of the peninsula’s length or because the land between is occupied by another

state. When Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden landed with his army in Pomerania in

1630 during the Thirty Years War it was by crossing the Baltic Sea. The far lengthier

land route north of the Gulf of Bothnia, which would have taken him close to the

Arctic, was not worth considering.

Moreover, unlike the land, the seas allow for global transit. Since the 16th century,

when the Spanish and Portuguese were able to acquire possessions in the Americas,

Africa and Asia, states have used the sea to demonstrate global reach.

But the importance of water as a means of transport has been not only due to physical

geography but also because it was and remains more economic than movement by

land. Evidence for this is available from as far back as the classical era. Water

transport was considerably more economic than the use of Roman roads such that the

latter were not viable for much long distance trade. It was cheaper to send a 1,200

pound wagon load of grain the length of the Mediterranean than to take it 75 miles by

road. According to Diocletian’s Price Edict of A.D. 301, such a 1,200 pound wagon

load of grain doubled in price after a road journey of 300 miles. Water transport, by

35

river or sea made more sense financially for most long distance transport across the

Empire.76

This remains the case in the 21st century. Even when compared to river transport,

which has greater infrastructure costs than at sea because of greater need for dredging

and lock maintenance and often meandering routes, costs are only a fraction of those

on land. A load transported by road from New Orleans to Memphis, costing $40, can

be sent by barge up the Mississippi River for just $6. The advantages of water are

such that within Europe, 40 percent of inland commercial container traffic is carried

by water.77

Water is advantaged because movement upon it has less friction than movement on

land. It also needs less infrastructure construction, given that most waterways are

naturally occurring. Furthermore, in open sea it is able to capitalise on the ‘cube law’

which means that for a doubling of dimensions the carrying capacity is cubed. Design,

construction and operating costs do not increase in proportion with size, such that a

500,000 tonne ship may only need the same number of crew as a ship one twentieth

the size.78

Any improvements in water transport that allow an increase in speed will have a

greater affect upon the Loss of Strength Gradient than any other mode of transport.

But so will a lack of such an increase.

Technological advancement has improved the speed of craft on water, thereby

reducing the advantage of forward basing for saving time in an emergency

circumstance, but only up to the twentieth century. In the age of sail, wind could not

always be relied upon and when it did occur it did not always blow in the direction

required. A ship could rarely sail more than six points, or 67.5 degrees, off the wind.

76 Smith, N.A.F., ‘Roman Canals’, Transactions of the Newcomen Society, London, 1977-8, p. 75. 77 Roberts, Dan, Christopher Parkes and Jeremy Grant,’The just-in-time supply chain model is unravelling as truckers, port operators and train companies struggle to cope.’, Financial Times, London, 16 November 2004,http://news.ft.com/cms/s/d7309348-3773-11d9-a8bb-00000e2511c8.html 78 Hilling, David, & Browne, Michael, ‘Ships, Ports and Bulk Freight Transport’, in Hoyle, Brian and Knowles, Richard; Modern Transport Geography, 2nd ed. (Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, 1998), p. 246.

36

Exceptions arose only with a favourable tide or current.79 Thus the route taken by a

sailing ship was often dictated by the prevailing winds. The quickest passage from

Jamaica to Barbados was normally available via London or New York in the 18th

century even though both islands were only 1,000 miles from each other.80 Where

land and channels necessitated travelling in more than one direction this added to the

difficulties. Sailing from London into the Atlantic involved moving eastwards north

of Kent and sailing westwards down the English Channel, which required different

winds.81

During the course of the 19th century a number of innovations allowed speed to

increase. Iron hulls allowed for finer bows. Steam power made it possible for ships to

travel by the shortest routes across water. Improved propulsion design came with the

screw propeller, replacing the paddle wheel and still in use at the beginning of the 21st

century.82

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, competition between British and German

shipping companies pushed merchant vessels to speeds faster than most ships would

be capable of a hundred years later. The fastest at the turn of the 20th century were the

Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, which was launched in 1897 and was achieving an

average speed of 21.9 knots on its trans-Atlantic crossings in 1899, and the

Deutschland, which recorded 23.5 knots on an eastbound journey after it was

launched in 1900.83 In 1906, Britain’s Cunard Line launched the Lusitania which

achieved 24.0 knots on its first westbound voyage. Another Cunard ship, the

Mauretania, launched the same year but later improved with new propellers bettered

this with average trans-Atlantic speeds in excess of 25 knots between 1909 and

1911.84

79 Rodger, N. A. M., ‘Weather and Geography in the Age of Sail,’ Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy, eds. Colin S. Gray & Geoffrey Sloan (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 178.80 Ibid., p. 193.81 Ibid., p. 185.82 United States Naval Academy (USNA), ‘Resistance and Powering of Ships’ Chapter 7, Course en200, Department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering, USNA, Annapolis, MA, 13 January 2003, http://www.usna.edu/NAOE/courses/en200/ch07.pdf 83 Bonsor, N. R. P., North Atlantic Seaway, Vol. 1, (London: David & Charles, 1975), p. 367, Vol. 2-5, (Jersey, Channel Islands: Brookside, 1978-80), Vol. 2, p. 525.84 Ibid., pp. 101-2.

37

As an example of the lack of progress in ship speeds since that time, the US Navy

Bob Hope class roll on/roll off sealift ships built during the 1990s travel at just below

this at 24 knots.85 Costs rise with speed so much that freight that needs to be

transported faster than about 25-26 knots will usually have to be sent by air.86

The reason for this is due primarily to the physics of water. As speed is increased so

there is a disproportionately rapid increase in the thrust required for propulsion. The

main causes are the friction resistance of water, wave making resistance, and to a

lesser extent, air resistance. An FFG-7 class frigate of 408 feet needs 20,000 shaft

horsepower to achieve 25 knots. To achieve 29 knots however it needs 41,000 shaft

horsepower, a doubling over just 4 knots. Wave making resistance, whereby the

ship’s power goes into making waves rather than its own movement, can be reduced

by building a longer vessel. But the need for a larger engine to produce the greater

speeds this would allow for is outweighed by space, weight, fuel and centre of gravity

concerns.87

This is not to say that ships are not physically capable of faster speeds. In 1952, the

SS United States set a new trans-Atlantic record steaming eastbound at an average of

35.6 knots.88 It remains unbeaten by any deep draught merchant vessel. Some

exceptionally fast vessels approaching this speed were to be used in both the

Falklands and Gulf Wars to be discussed later. But most would have been unable to

beat vessels that were used at the beginning of the 20th century.

Higher speeds are possible, but not for sealifting supplies over trans-oceanic

distances. A demonstration of this has been provided by the development of the wave

piercing catamaran. Three Australian built vessels took the Blue Riband from 1990

onwards, the last of which was Cat-Link V which crossed the Atlantic at an average

85 Pike, John, ‘T-AKR USNS Bob Hope Large, Medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships [LMSR]’, globalsecurity.org, 25 June 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/takr-300.htm 86 Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), ‘High Speed Freight Ships’ fact sheet, 1 December 2003, http://www.bimco.dk/Corporate%20Area/Seascapes/Ships%20that%20serve%20us/High%20speed%20freight%20ships.aspx87 United States Naval Academy, 2003, p. 7-19. 88 Bonsor, 1979, Vol. 4, p. 1539.

38

speed of 41 knots in 1998.89 But a catamaran is not capable of such speed at trans-

oceanic distance when fully loaded with equipment and supplies.

The first wartime use of such a craft was by the Australian navy during the East

Timor crisis in 1999. The catamaran vessel HMAS Jervis Bay travelled from Darwin

to the East Timorean capital of Dili, providing logistical support at a speed of 43

knots but only across the 400 mile wide Timor Sea. The US followed by ordering its

own catamarans. The US Army’s Joint Venture was involved in providing support for

the 2003 Iraq invasion, ferrying supplies from Bahrain just 250 miles from Kuwait.90

Catamarans are able to attain higher speeds than conventional craft because they have

less contact with the water. But there is a cost in higher fuel consumption. On its runs

to Dili the HMAS Jervis Bay got through 125,000 gallons per hour.91 This fuel

consumption limits their range unless they travel much more slowly. The US Navy’s

HSV2 Swift, delivered in August 2003, can travel 1,100 nautical miles at 35 knots.

But in order to travel at its maximum of 4,000 nautical miles it has to slow to a fuel

saving transit speed of 20 knots.92 For the state fighting conflict at trans-oceanic

distances the introduction of the wave piercing catamaran has had little impact upon

the importance of the Loss of Strength Gradient. Rather than causing forward basing

to become less important, such vessels provide a time advantage only if they are

already stationed at forward positions.

Unlike sealift, land transport does not provide the same opportunities for global reach.

But it too has witnessed physical limits to speed. An improvement that occurred prior

to mechanical transport modes was that of the adoption of the horse. All-cavalry

89 Helmore, Phil, ‘Record for Incat Ship’ & ‘The Blue Riband and the Hales Trophy’, The Australian Naval Architect, Vol. 2, No. 2, July 1998, pp. 16-8, www.rina.org.uk/rfiles/ANA/anajul1998.pdf; Thurlow, Steve, ‘Stop Press: Another Incat Ship Record’, The Australian Naval Architect, Vol. 2, No. 2, July 1998, p. 35, www.rina.org.uk/rfiles/ANA/anajul1998.pdf.90 International Catamarans (Incat), ‘HMAS Jervis Bay Stands Down After A Distinguished Naval Career’, press release, Tasmania, 11 May 2001, http://www.incat.com.au/news/pv.cgi?s=63025&a=63078; Tiron, Roxana, ‘Efforts to Deploy Sea Bases Could Draw Lessons from Special Warfare’, National Defense Magazine, February 2005, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Feb/Efforts_to.htm 91 Polson, William, ‘Navy goes Down Under, explores future of amphib warfare’, US Seventh Fleet News, 16 September 2000, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2000/09/16.html92 United States Navy, ‘High-Speed Vessel - HSV’, fact file, 19 February 2004, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1400&ct=4; Kennedy, Harold, ‘Navy Tests Coastal Warfare Systems Aboard New Catamaran’, National Defense Magazine, July 2004, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Jul/Navy_Tests.htm

39

forces unhindered by the need to keep up with slower moving foot soldiers could

travel and fight over a considerable distance. The horse made it possible for the

Mongols to operate across Eurasia. Yet it was limited by the need to sustain it where

its food did not grow beneath its feet. Cavalry operated best over grassland areas such

as the Eurasian steppe stretching over a vast area from Hungary to Manchuria. It has

been argued for example that it was lack of pasture that caused the Mongols never to

return to central Europe after Batu’s forces retreated eastwards with the death of the

Great Khan Ogedei in December 1241. Even the one available area of open grassland,

the Hungarian plain, may not have provided a large enough area to support

permanently a Mongol force of sufficient size, given that each soldier would have

possessed several horses.93

The invention of the railway improved upon animals for speed whether movement

was required across grassland areas or not. The use of the train during the American

Civil War allowed for the rapid movement of troops to disparate front lines. The

Battle of Chickamauga in 1863, for example, won by the Confederacy, saw the South

bring 9,000 men via railway from Richmond, Virginia, through the Carolinas and

Georgia before arriving in Tennessee, doubling their numbers in a confrontation that

they subsequently won.94

Motorised road vehicles improved the speed of transport on land still further, initially

complementing the railways by their ability to move supplies from the railhead to the

front line. By the Second World War, the railways retained their superiority over

roads only at distances over 200 miles. Unlike trains, road vehicles were not limited in

their movement by the existence of tracks and were especially useful as an alternative

where these had been destroyed. 69,400 tons of motor transport was used to support

47 divisions in France in 1944 which could not be supplied by the country’s bombed

out railway system.95

Railways continue to be better suited to longer distances. A comparison of their

commercial usage in the United States in 1993 saw road and rail haulage take a

93 Sinor, D., ‘Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History’, Oriens Extremus, 19 (1972), pp. 181-294 Jones, Archer, Civil War Command and Strategy, (New York, Free Press, 1992), pp. 175-6.95 Van Creveld, Martin, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, (Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 143-4.

40

similar tonnage over trips of 250 miles to 499 miles with rail remaining dominant at

distances greater than that.96 That rail is still more important over longer distances is

due to line-haul cost, its cost when in motion, being cheaper than for road. A single

train driver can haul a greater load than a single truck driver. Trains also have reduced

air resistance and rolling resistance. Air resistance is reduced because of a train’s

greater length and rolling resistance lessened because steel wheels on steel rails

encounter less resistance than rubber tyres on asphalt. But it is terminal cost,

concerned with convenience to the final location and ease of loading, where the train

often cannot compete with road transport, causing it to be less economic at shorter

distances.

There are limits to further improvements in speed on land. As is the case for transport

on water, physics causes there to be disproportionate increases in costs as speeds

become faster. The impact of air resistance and rolling resistance on truck speed

means that for every one mile per hour increase over 55 mph, there is about a two

percent reduction in fuel efficiency.97 Indeed it would be more efficient to run trucks

much slower than this but for the fact that drivers are a large proportion of the total

costs and many more would otherwise be needed to cover increased journey times.98

As rail is less affected by air and rolling resistance it is, in theory, capable of higher

speeds provided there is a straight flat track. Yet trains rarely have such infrastructure

and thus encounter their own problems with physics causing costs to increase

disproportionately with speed. There is grade resistance, which is the force required to

overcome gradient, and curve resistance, which they face as they travel around bends

in the line.99 In fact, when one looks at the speed of rail freight, the combination of

physics and the reduced need for drivers means that trains are actually most efficient

at speeds slower than road haulage. The average speed of a freight train in the United

96 Turton, Brian & Black, William R. ‘Inter-Urban Transport’, in Hoyle, Brian and Knowles, Richard; Modern Transport Geography, 2nd ed. (Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, 1998), p. 179.97 Bridgestone Firestone North American Tire, ‘Large Truck Fuel Economy’ fact sheet, Nashville, Tennessee, 2005, http://www.trucktires.com/us_eng/technical/bftechnical/fuel_economy_f.asp 98 According to one report on the commercial sector in the EU, wages were responsible for over 40 percent of trip costs: Coopers & Lybrand, ‘Road Freight Transport’, The Single Market Review Series, Report on behalf of European Commission, Brussels, March 1996, Summary retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/studies/stud4.htm99 American Railway Engineering and Maintenance of Way Association (AREMA), Practical Guide to Railway Engineering, Landover, Maryland, 2003, chap. 2, p. 57., http://www.arema.org/eseries/scriptcontent/custom/e_arema/Practical_Guide/PGChapter2.pdf

41

States was only in the range between 20 and 25 mph during the 1990s.100

Technological advances in modes of transportation on land have reached limits that

are not threatening the Loss of Strength Gradient with decline.

Airlift has provided speed far beyond that available by surface modes of transport.

Yet it has not made forward basing any less important. Its problems are its expense,

the relatively small loads that aircraft can carry, and the fact that over trans-oceanic

distances the requirement for fuel at forward locations is actually greater than what

can be brought in.

Certainly, for most commercial movement requirements, airlift cannot compete with

surface transport. Worldwide, the importance of sealift is so great that in 2002, for

every one tonne taken commercially by air transport, two hundred tonnes were taken

by sea.101 The reason for this is that the cost of airlift is considerably greater than that

of sealift. Figures in 1995 for example showed that it was fourteen times more

expensive.102 Such a disparity means that even if an airlift is capable of moving

supplies to a forward location quick enough to defend a territory under attack, it may

still be more affordable to wait for sealift to bring a larger supply load and reconquer

the territory later. It has already been said that US military doctrine that an attacking

force should be at least three times stronger suggests a difference of at least nine times

can be planned for in the strength required to hold off an attacker and the strength

required to reconquer that territory if forces do not get there in time.

There are further concerns with airlift that place it at a disadvantage to sealift. While

initial flights may get to the forward location more quickly, what an aircraft can

deliver is small. A C-130 Hercules can carry just 12.5 short tons of cargo. Even a C-5

Galaxy carries just 102.5 short tons.103 By comparison, the Cape Florida, part of the

100 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), Freight Rail Bottom Line Report, Washington, 2002, p. 39, Figure 25. http://freight.transportation.org/doc/FreightRailReport.pdf101 Observatoire de la Finance, Yearbook, Geneva, 2002, p. 30, http://www.obsfin.ch/yearbook/13_ang.pdf102 European Environment Agency, ‘The Price of Transport’, Copenhagen, 20 August 2001, p. 6., http://themes.eea.eu.int/Sectors_and_activities/transport/indicators/cost/TERM20,2001/Transport_prices_TERM_2001.doc.pdf103 FAS (Federation of American Scientists), C-130 Hercules, Washington, 20 February 2000, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/c-130.htm; FAS (Federation of American Scientists), C-5A/B Galaxy, Washington, 26 September 2000, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/c-5.htm

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US Navy Ready Reserve Force, can carry over 25,800 short tons.104 It would take

more than 250 flights for a Galaxy cargo aircraft and in excess of 2,280 Hercules

flights to achieve the equivalent supply delivery of this vessel. As a result, airlift’s

ability to deliver a large load quickly in order to fight off an opponent must be

questioned. We will find in Chapter 5 that the airlift carried out in the first weeks after

the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would not have been sufficient to stop an enemy advance

into Saudi Arabia.

Where a state is able to take advantage of airlift as an alternative to surface modes of

transport it is because of a large discrepancy in the resource capabilities of both sides.

The overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 saw light US forces operating in a landlocked

country to which neighbouring Pakistan had denied overland access. The US managed

to supply them by air instead. This provides an example demonstrating that Boulding

was, to some extent, correct to say that there was growth in the minimum size of the

viable state. Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would not have been so vulnerable without the

existence of airlift.

But one cannot always assume that opponents will be so much smaller than oneself, a

situation made more likely by the impermanence of Great Power status. And even in

the case of the war against the Taliban, US forces did not fight alone but in support of

a local ally, the Northern Alliance, which relied upon resources mostly from within

their own country. Given the expense of airlift, not only did subsequent Coalition

operations in Afghanistan make use of overland transport across Pakistan once that

had become available, but they even relied upon a rail link across Eurasia, from

Germany to neighbouring Uzbekistan. On one day, 2 July 2002, there were 1,025

shipping containers in surface transit to Afghanistan of which 726 were being moved

by rail from the German port of Bremerhaven.105

104 Matthews, James K. & Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), p. 261.105 United States Military Traffic Management Command, ‘MTMC ramps up Afghanistan shipments’, Translog: Journal of Military Transportation Management, July-August 2002; General James Jones stated that the rail link facilitated “the efficient movement of bulk supplies and heavy equipment.” See Jones, General James, Statement, Military Construction Subcommittee Hearing, United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, 29 April 2003, http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?id=203402

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In addition to this, trans-oceanic flight actually creates a requirement for forward

based prepositioning of fuel of a tonnage greater than the supplies which it is able to

carry. The C-5 Galaxy needs 161 short tons of fuel to transport its 102.5 short ton load

over 2,150 nautical miles. Then there is the return journey for which fuel is required

but no supplies are carried. The Galaxy can fly 5,165 nautical miles when empty.106

This means that a flight delivering supplies from North America to Europe must

refuel in the Azores part way there and refuel again in Europe before returning. The

amount of refuelling needed is more than that first put aboard in the continental

United States, an amount greater than the load carried. This need for forward based

fuel stocks is even greater over longer distances such as that to South West Asia. In

this respect therefore, the use of airlift not only fails to reduce the importance of

forward basing and the Loss of Strength Gradient but actually does the reverse,

causing it to acquire even greater importance.

To be sure, aviation fuel is widely available and other countries are more likely to

provide it than host forward based military equipment. American aircraft had access

to Ireland’s Shannon Airport including its fuel stocks during the 2003 Iraq invasion,

even though the country maintained a stance of neutrality. But a belligerent cannot

always expect the availability even of forward based fuel, as was demonstrated in

1973 when all of America’s NATO allies bar Portugal refused landing rights for the

airlift in support of Israel. A prolonged conflict may also exhaust locally available

stocks. That the Vietnam War saw fuel constitute a large proportion of the supplies

brought in owed itself to the fact that the country did not produce its own oil.

Moreover, just as physics limits the speed of craft on water and on land, so it does in

the air as well. The speed of freight aircraft developed since around 1960 has little

changed. This is because wave drag is too great at speeds approaching the sound

barrier, forcing the cost of operating an aircraft to increase greatly. Thus the C-141

Starlifter, deployed in 1964, has a speed of 500 miles per hour. The C-5 Galaxy,

operational from 1970, has a speed of 541 miles per hour. The speed of the C-17

Globemaster III, deployed in 1993, is still only 500 miles per hour. And even the C-

106 FAS, 20 February 2000; FAS, 26 September 2000.

44

130 Hercules, deployed in 1955, remains in service at the beginning of the 21st

century despite a speed of 375 miles per hour.107 The speed of airlift has stalled.

Airlift does provide the capacity to move essential equipment and supplies. Precision

guided munitions or cruise missiles, for example, may have an effect upon the course

of a war out of all proportion to their weight. However, it must be borne in mind that

such weapons usually work only in conjunction with the total load of fuel, heavy

equipment and other supplies that are generally sent by surface modes in order to fight

a ground campaign. They cannot be said to have the capacity to prevail over an

opponent alone and thus have little effect upon the Loss of Strength Gradient. The

rare exception of a strategic air campaign, fought without ground forces, will be dealt

with in the next chapter, but it will be found that even this can depend upon the

transport of a heavy fuel load.

There is one area in particular where airlift has become the dominant means of

movement. Unlike most equipment and supplies, personnel can be transported

economically over long distance by air. Compared to rail passenger transport, for

example, air provides a cheaper commercial alternative for distances above 400-500

kilometres.108 Unlike supplies which may need only to be kept dry, or in the case of

food, cool or frozen, people require rest and sustenance whilst in transit, which causes

costs to rise during a long journey. Costs are minimised by keeping them in transit for

as short a time as possible. On a flight lasting hours rather than days, people need only

a place to sit and minimal food and liquids. Thus while both the First and Second

World Wars saw most troops sent from North America to Europe by ship, by the

Vietnam War most soldiers were being sent by aircraft.

But personnel are a diminishing portion of the load taken into battle. While the

Athenians who fought against the Persians at Marathon took whatever they could

carry, US troops who went into battle in Vietnam were accompanied by their fuel,

107 FAS (Federation of American Scientists), ‘C-141B Starlifter’, Washington, 8 July 1999, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/c-141.htm; FAS, 26 September 2000; FAS (Federation of American Scientists), ‘C-17 Globemaster III’, Washington, 25 April 2000, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/c-17.htm; FAS, 20 February 2000. 108 Turton and Black, 1998, p. 166.

45

vehicles, ammunition, construction materials and food. While airlift has proved

suitable for personnel, their share of the total load has become less and less.

Moreover, this does not mean that forward basing has become less important for the

troops themselves. It does not mean that it has become more viable to use the option

being implementation by the Pentagon of using austere Forward Operating Bases or

‘Lily-Pads’, with smaller numbers of personnel and prepositioned war material. Camp

Bondsteel in Kosovo is an example of this type of facility where personnel can be

flown when needed, as opposed to the permanent stationing of large numbers of

troops.109

The problem with this form of basing is that it fails to envisage the continued need for

heavy ground forces. It rests upon an assumption of a changed security environment

where, according to General James Jones, we are moving from “symmetrical to

asymmetrical response options”.110 As has been said before, it is an enduring factor of

war that no state will always face opponents much smaller than itself, a situation

made more likely by the impermanence of Great Power status. One cannot therefore

assume an end to the need to respond to symmetrical threats.

A further problem is an assumption that, as Jones has put it, we are moving from “the

principle of mass to the principle of precision”.111 As will be argued in Chapter 3, the

possibility for strategic success using precision weapons may well have occurred in

the Kosovo War of 1999, but the circumstances were exceptional and have not been

repeated in other conflicts. As will be found there, the concept of precision warfare is

undermined by the competitive nature of war.

Thus, although the concept of the smaller Forward Operating Base may be feasible

when used against a much smaller opponent, preparation is still necessary for conflict

involving heavy ground forces against larger opponents. This means that personnel

109 Jones, 29 April 2003; Associated Press, ‘Pentagon to close 35 percent of overseas bases: ‘Forward operating sites’ to replace Cold War-era bases’, 23 September 2004, retrieved from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6078936/?displaymode=1006; McKeeby, David, ‘U.S. Reducing Number of Overseas Military Bases’, Bureau of International Information Programs, US Department of State, 22 June 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives 110 Jones, 29 April 2003.111 Ibid.

46

must also be forward positioned. It was necessary to undertake the permanent

stationing of large numbers of American troops in Germany throughout the Cold War.

Even though the confrontation with the Soviet Union was long enough to see the

increased use of airlift as a means of transporting personnel, this did not diminish the

importance of having troops close to the front line. Duplication of equipment to be

used for training at home as well as for troops to use abroad would have involved

extra resources that, in the competitive circumstances of such a confrontation, would

have provided advantage to the opponent. Training within the terrain of northern

Europe, the territory which had to be defended, also allowed troops to familiarise

themselves with the environment they would have to operate within in the event of

war.

Forward located transport infrastructure continues to be needed to avoid

bottlenecks

Just as the competitive circumstances of war cause advantage to be had from the

forward sourcing and prepositioning of equipment and supplies, so it also causes

advantage to be had from forward located transport infrastructure. Seaways, canals,

roads and railways, as well as airfields, all support the movement of supplies to the

front line. Inadequacies in this infrastructure, or complete lack of it, can result in

bottlenecks that slow the rate at which supplies are moved or halt their progress

entirely.

Examples of sea freight infrastructure include the Suez and Panama Canals. British

control of the Suez Canal until its nationalisation by the Egyptian government in

1956, allowed it to guarantee the safe passage of British shipping while denying that

of others. In 1905 for example they were able to block the Russian Baltic Fleet from

taking the shortest route to the Far East where it was to engage the Japanese.

Natural seaways also often require the protection of a local force presence. It was for

this reason that British bases were set up at Gibraltar and Singapore. In the Second

World War, British control of the Straits of Gibraltar as well as the Suez Canal meant

47

that they controlled access to the Mediterranean, supporting the sealift of supplies to

North Africa.

Points are required where ships can be refuelled and maintenance and repair carried

out. The US Navy facility at Yokosuka in Japan was one such forward base that

performed these tasks in the western Pacific during the Korean and Vietnam

conflicts.112

Further infrastructure requirements for sealift are to be found in shallow waters.

Lighthouses are used to mark out rocks and coastline. Buoys indicate the location of

shipping lanes and can also be used to mark the presence of enemy obstructions.

Buoys were put in place during the Normandy D-day landings in 1944 in order to

mark out obstacles to allow for the follow up transport of personnel and supplies.113

Port access may require considerable dock expansion and dredging. During the

Vietnam War, port facilities were expanded with new construction not only at South

Vietnam’s one pre-existing ocean going port, Saigon, but also at Cam Ranh Bay, Da

Nang, Qui Nhon, Vung Tau and Vung Ro. In all, military operations required a

fivefold increase in the country’s port handling capability. And in addition to this,

South Vietnam required one of largest dredging operations in the world at that time

with more than fourteen dredgers used to clear and deepen harbours as well as rivers

and canals for inland navigation.114

On home territory too there will be a need for extra capacity in port facilities.

Britain’s dedicated military port, Marchwood, provides an example, used in the

deployment of equipment and supplies for the Iraq invasion of 2003.

The need for forward based transport infrastructure is greater still when on shore. To

facilitate movement by truck or by train, roads and railways are needed. Construction

112 Pike, John, ‘Yokosuka, Japan’ fact sheet, 26 April 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/yokosuka.htm 113 Blackwell, Lt. H. L., ‘Report on Naval Combat Demolition Units [NCDUs] in Operation “Neptune” as part of Task Force 122’, submitted 15 July 1944, in ‘D-Day, the Normandy Invasion: Combat Demolition Units’, Naval Historical Center, Washington, 4 June 2001), http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/norman1.htm#utah114 Dunn, 1991, p. 143.

48

of both was necessary during the Vietnam War. By the spring of 1970, the US had

11,000 men involved in a highway construction programme with the aim of linking all

of South Vietnam’s major population centres with paved roads.115 The US also

reconstructed much of the South Vietnam railway system, reopening it in areas where

security could be restored.116

On home territory, road and rail infrastructures are built to include surge capacity for

the movement of logistics in time of war. The Strategic Highway Network or

STRAHNET is meant to provide highway capacity beyond that which is needed for

civilian traffic.117 Defence needs have kept the rail lines of the US Strategic Rail

Corridor Network or STRACNET in operation. This is evidenced by the reversal of

potential abandonments. In sixty-four cases between 1976 and 1999, private owners

were persuaded to keep lines open with the prospect of future defence usage.118

Extra infrastructure is required for the continued running of roads and railways. A

truck used by Germany in the invasion of the Soviet Union could take six days to

travel a distance of 1000 kilometres to the front and back. It required stops where

refuelling could take place, the driver could rest, and repairs could be carried out. This

was especially important given the weather conditions of autumn mud, then intense

cold and deep snow during the Soviet winter.119

Both roads and railways require mechanisms, traffic lights or points and signalling to

reduce the likelihood of road vehicles or trains crashing. The main railway line from

Brest-Litovsk to the German front line as it neared Moscow during 1941, saw points

changes at several towns along its route: Baranowice, Minsk, Orsha, Smolensk and

Vyazma, each of which had to be managed in order to allow trains through.120

115 Ploger, Major General Robert R., US Army Engineers 1965-1970, (Washington: Department of the Army, 2000), pp. 116-7, http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/Engineers/116 Dunn, 1991, p. 109.117 Federal Highway Administration, ‘FHWA Teams Up To Ensure National Defense Mobility’, Focus, September 2002, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, http://www.tfhrc.gov/focus/sep02/index.htm118 Korpanty, Robert S. ‘Preserving Strategic Rail Mobility’, Army Logistician, Vol. 31, Issue 6, November/December 1999, Army Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, VA, http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/NovDec99/MS455.htm119 Van Creveld, 1977, p. 152; Winters, Harold A., with Gerald E. Galloway Jr., William J. Reynolds, and David W. Rhyne, Battling the Elements: Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War, (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 90.

49

Even signposts need to be put up and maintained, the importance of which was shown

during the Kosovo War in 1999. Their removal by Greek supporters of Serbia in the

Thessalonica area caused NATO convoys difficulties on their way to their forward

position in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.121

Further forward based logistics capacity is provided by pipelines. NATO forces in

Germany had available to them a widespread infrastructure of pipelines for the

movement of fuel in the event of conflict.122 Even the tunnel system used by

Vietnamese communists provides an example of forward based transport

infrastructure. The Viet Cong maintained structures dating as far back as the Second

World War. The Cu Chi network stretching from Saigon to the Cambodian border

allowed the movement of fighters across South Vietnam.123

Airlift too has a requirement for forward based infrastructure. Its need for forward

located fuel stocks, discussed earlier, means also a need for forward located air fields

along its route. An airfield is also needed for the aircraft to land at its final destination

in theatre. To be sure, there are ways around this. The use of accompanying tanker

aircraft from the same home air base can avoid need for intermediate airfields.

Supplies can be dropped by parachute rather than landed at an airfield in theatre. As

will be seen in Chapter 6, the Falklands War saw use of both of these, but by far most

airlifted supplies made it no further by aircraft than the nearest shore-based air field

on Ascension Island. The use of accompanying tanker adds to the expense of what is

already the most expensive mode of supply. Parachutes, meanwhile, take up space on

board, reducing the supply load. There is also the potential for damage once hitting

the surface, while wind conditions can mean that landing is made some distance away

from an intended site.124

120 University of San Diego Department of History Online map collection, ‘Eastern front – map of German gains on’, Illustrated London News, 28 March 1942, p. 381, retrieved 31 March 2002, http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Index/picindexmapsi.html121 Norton-Taylor, Richard, ‘Enforcing Napoleon’s first rule of warfare’, Guardian, London, 12 June 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,207571,00.html122 Thompson, Julian, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict, (Oxford: Brassey’s, 1991), p. 335.123 Heilig, Donald M., Maj., Subterranean Warfare - A Counter To U.S. Airpower, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB., AL, April 2000, p. 6, http://www.au.af.mil/au/database/projects/ay2000/acsc/00-078.pdf124 Uhle-Wettler, Reinhard, ‘Airborne Land Forces’, in Franklin D. Margiotta, ed., Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare, (Washington & London: Brassey’s, 2000), p. 11

50

Aircraft require facilities for repair and maintenance as well as emergency landing. A

C-5 Galaxy, which suffered an on board explosion while involved in the evacuation

from Saigon in 1975, was forced to conduct an emergency landing in a paddy field

because it was unable to reach an air base.125

The LSG is not permanently affected by attempts to reduce the load and increase

advance warning

If it is possible to reduce the tonnage of supplies needed in war, then it is possible to

reduce the advantage from forward sourcing and positioning of such supplies and of

transport infrastructure to get them to the front line. There are three possible means of

reducing the supply requirement for conventional ground forces. These are living off

the land, the application of miniaturisation, and improved information about the

opponent. Improved information might also be used to provide advance warning of

impending action and allow forces to be based further away from the front line.

However, in each case the competitive nature of war precludes any decline in the Loss

of Strength Gradient.

The possibility for a conventional army to live off the land was reduced as non-

agricultural items came to make up an increasing proportion of the total load in the

era up to the early 20th century. According to Van Creveld, the fact that figures on the

consumption of ammunition in the two centuries prior to the French Revolution are

hard to obtain suggests it was not important. It was to remain insignificant in

comparison to sustenance until well after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 when

the weight of artillery ammunition used was still small enough that the amount that

German troops carried from the outset was sufficient for most of their needs in five

months campaigning. It was only on the next occasion that German troops invaded

France in 1914 that the need for ammunition had increased and supply had to come

from the rear.126

125 Pike, John, ‘C-5 Losses’, globalsecurity.org, 27 April 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/c-5-loss.htm126 Van Creveld, 1977, pp. 35, 102-3, 125-8.

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This did not mean that the possibility for living off the land disappeared completely in

the 20th century. Forces continued to find advantage from such localised sustenance.

Living off the land finds a place, if a limited one, in the Falklands case study in

Chapter 6.

In any case, the competitive nature of war means that living off the land does not

provide a way for reducing the load. Each side will still aim to bring as much as it can

into battle. This was certainly so even in the Napoleonic era. In planning his invasion

of Russia, Napoleon aimed to make every use of the land to supply his troops and

animals. This did not reduce the load brought into battle. Instead, he used it as an

opportunity to increase the load, bringing as many men, animals, equipment and

supplies as he could, creating the largest invasion force up to that time.

Another means of potentially reducing the load, miniaturisation, has been put forward

by Edgell, Spangler, Dragoo and Jackson. In theory, munitions and food should have

the same firepower and nutrition but only a fraction of the weight and volume, with

the result that the supply requirement should also be reduced.127

However, the competitive nature of warfare means that miniaturisation cannot reduce

the load on a permanent basis. Opponents will seek to acquire or match new items of

equipment and supply, and having done so, will compete to send as much as possible

into theatre. They will also attempt to find countermeasures to the creation of such

new items. The result is that the effect of miniaturisation is cancelled out and logistics

tonnage is not reduced.

The development of the machine gun provides an example of miniaturisation, packing

the firepower of multiple weapons into a single device. The British under Kitchener

used it at the Battle of Omdurman, Sudan, in 1898 to defeat a much larger opposing

force. But the competitive nature of war meant that when both sides were able to

127 Edgell, J. L.W.; S.K. Spangler, G. F. Dragoo, & L.W. Jackson, ‘Logistics in 2025: Consider It Done!’, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1996, http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/volume2/chap01/vol2ch01.pdf, pp. 26-28; Examples of this argument specific to logistics load are later found in Shipbaugh, C., ‘Thinking Small: Technologies That Can Reduce Logistics Demand’, Rand Arroyo Center, 2000, http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApr00/MS523.htm & Ronis, Sheila R., ‘What the Army Needs to Win the Logistics Battle’, National Defense, July 2003, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2003/Jul/What_the_Army.htm

52

acquire this weapon, as was the case in the First World War, the result was not fewer

soldiers and less guns. Instead of reducing the load, the machine gun was produced,

and along with soldiers, was deployed in as large numbers as possible. As the war

progressed, moreover, countermeasures were devised. Barrage techniques were

developed involving heavy consumption of shells, as well as the introduction of the

tank, that increased the logistics load still further.128

Even Martin Libicki, who has looked to the increased use of “small objects” for the

collection of information on the battlefield, has argued for their mass production and

deployment in the “millions”. This is as should be expected given the competitive

circumstances of war. Despite his hope that there should be too many to kill, one must

expect that the threat they pose will provide an impetus for opponents to find ways to

counter them as in the past.129

Improved information about the opponent has been put forward as a possible way to

reduce the load. US forces left much equipment behind after the Second World War,

Korea and Vietnam. Likewise, a great deal of equipment was sent to South West Asia

in 1990-91 but was never used.130 In theory, transport requirements could be reduced

if supplies surplus to requirements were not sent in the first place. According to

Libicki, better gathering and processing of information aided by improved technology

could reduce the load, even making it possible to avoid surface transport entirely in

favour of airlift.131

However, there was to be no such information advantage aiding American and British

forces when they went to war with Iraq in 2003. Initial planning for the war assumed

that Saddam Hussein’s government would collapse within several weeks, with law

and order within the country subsequently kept by the country’s security personnel,

aided by international forces. This would have allowed a speedy reduction in

128 Stephenson, David, 1914-1918 The History of the First World War, (London, Penguin, 2004), pp. 192, 446-7.129 Libicki, Martin, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in aTime of Free Silicon (Washington: National Defense University, Institutefor National Strategic Studies, 1994), Chapter 2, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/mcnair/mcnair28/m028ch02.html130 Pagonis, 1992, p. 156.131 Libicki, Martin, ‘The Emerging Primacy of Information’, Orbis, 40 (1996), p. 261.

53

American and British troops. Instead, although Saddam Hussein’s government did

indeed collapse within several weeks, American and British forces were compelled to

stay on as insurgencies among Sunni and Shia groups appeared and international

forces were not forthcoming in the numbers hoped.

As will be said in the following chapter, there are always difficulties with attaining

intelligence about a potential or actual opponent. The competitive nature of war

means that just as attempts are made to improve intelligence gathering, so the

opponent attempts to improve its countermeasures, whether by hiding, providing false

information or countering the method of intelligence gathering itself. In addition to

this, incorrect assumptions can be made about an opponent.

As a result, in the case of Iraq, information on the country’s weapons of mass

destruction programme, used as a reason for mounting the invasion in the first place,

was found to be incorrect. In addition to this, the likelihood that the burden of military

occupation following the invasion, in the words of US Secretary of Defense

Rumsfeld, would be “a small one”, was proved to be inaccurate.132 War has not seen

the effort to gather information about the opponent become any easier, and therefore

the possibility of reducing the logistics load become any more likely.

Blaker has suggested that improved information would provide knowledge of a

situation earlier, allow forces more time to be sent to the front line and therefore to be

stationed further away.133 However, it is not getting any easier to find out about

aggressive actions in advance. Just as the US was not aware that it was about to be

attacked by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor in 1941, neither was it aware of Al-Qa’eda’s

impending attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. It had no more time to

move forces against either of the states behind these attacks, whether Japan or

Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

132 Rumsfeld, Donald, US Secretary of Defense, ‘Prepared Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees regarding Iraq’, Washington, 18-19 September 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020918-secdef.html133 Blaker, James R., ‘Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America’s 21st Century Defense’, Defense Working Paper 3, Progressive Policy Institute, Washington, January 1997, p. 25, http://www.ppionline.org/documents/Understanding_RMA.pdf

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Similarly, as will be found with regard to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or the

Argentine invasion of the Falklands in 1982 in Chapters 5 and 6, both came as a

surprise to the Americans and the British. Intelligence gathering about opponents is

not getting any better.

A reduced load can deter, but not permanently

It is possible to use a reduced load to deter a potential enemy. This can be achieved

with smaller forces than those of the opponent by the very fact of existing upon a

disputed territory, through acting as a trip-wire for conflict. When an attacker mounts

an invasion, war occurs automatically as locally based forces have to be defeated to

secure conquest. This was the aim behind the deployment of 500 US troops to

Macedonia in 1993.134 Any aggressive act from Serbia to the north could have

overwhelmed the Americans based here, but would have brought a response from US

forces based elsewhere.

Without such forward positioned forces, such an invasion no longer causes war to be

automatic. Instead it rests upon a political decision that may leave some room for

belief by the potential invader that a defence might not be mounted. In July 2002 for

example, Morocco took control of the undefended Spanish islet of Perejil. Although

its judgement was to be proved wrong, Morocco had taken the risk that an otherwise

stronger Spain might not use force to cause its return.

Even so, where such a trip-wire force does exist, deterrence can still fail because it is

believed that there is a lack of willingness to defend territory. As will be found in

Chapter 4, this occurred when the Boers chose to invade British territory. They had

the precedent of a previous government under Gladstone failing to react to the defeat

of British forces two decades earlier at Majuba.

134 Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, (Washington: Department of Defense, 1995), Chapter 3, ‘Force Structure in Europe: Essential Role of U.S. Forward Presence’, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/europe/chapter_3.html

55

The impermanence of Great Power status, moreover, means that the ability to use

such basing can only be temporary. A base acting as a trip-wire depends upon the

force that is available elsewhere being seen as sufficiently capable for the aggressor to

believe its action will fail. The British were, for example, unable to deter Argentina

from carrying out its invasion of the Falklands in 1982, as will be found in Chapter 6.

The Argentine plan for the invasion was drawn up in the belief that the British would

be unable to fight for their return, as well as brought forward some months by a

further belief that they would be unwilling to fight for them.

Forward based forces need not be real for them to act as a deterrent provided that the

defender can give the attacker the impression of their existence. A fifth century

Persian force under Chosroes was deterred from invading Palestine by the belief that

their route at Carshemish on the upper Euphrates, was sufficiently opposed. Despite

being at least a tenth and possibly a twentieth the size of its opponent, the Byzantine

army under Belisarius was spread out and kept in movement to give a visiting envoy

the impression they were much larger than they were in reality. Liddell Hart

contended that “Never was an invasion, potentially irresistible, more economically

defeated.” 135

Such a deterrent will however last only so long as the deception can be maintained. In

1942, Singapore was believed by the British to be impregnable, but this did not stop

the Japanese taking control having judged that it was vulnerable to overland attack

given that neighbouring Malaya had the best road network in South East Asia.136 As

the British found, imagination about basing strength can also be held by the defender.

135 Liddell Hart, B. H., Strategy: The Indirect Approach, (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), pp. 68-69.136 Elphick, Peter, Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1995), p. 25.

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CHAPTER 3

THE ADVANTAGE OF FORWARD POSITIONS FOR FIGHTING

There was another part to Boulding’s 20th century “military revolution”. As was said

in the introductory chapter, not only did he point to a substantial reduction in the cost

of transport of armed forces but also to “an enormous increase in the range of the

deadly projectile.” This forms the basis for a further chapter exploring the possibility

of strategic air power. It will question whether this part of the “military revolution”

too has had any impact upon the Loss of Strength Gradient.

This chapter will contest the view that air power can provide an alternative, as argued

whether by its early 20th century advocates, Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell and de

Seversky, or by more recent supporters such as Hallion, Blaker or Bowie. The

advance of aerial bombardment has been undermined by both of the enduring factors

identified by this work: the competitive nature of war and the impermanence of Great

Power status.

It will support the possibility, as put by Keegan, that the Kosovo War may have been

won by air power. But it will contend that this occurred under exceptional

circumstances that do not suggest a general trend away from the need for forward

based ground forces. It will question too the capability of air power as a means of

territorial defence, as put by Hallion, without the support of surface forces. Following

this, it will even consider the impact of nuclear weapons upon the LSG, questioning

Virilio’s assertion that they would lead to the possible abandonment of advanced

bases.137

Although Boulding himself was not an advocate of strategic air power, this chapter

will fail to find evidence of a “military revolution”. By demonstrating that opposing

armed forces have remained able to survive bombardment, it will show that ground

forces continue to be just as important and that overall the Loss of Strength Gradient,

which he himself devised, remains unchanged.

137 Virilio, Paul, Speed and Politics, (Columbia University New York: Semiotext(e), 1986), originally published as Vitesse et Politique, (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1977), p. 144.

57

This chapter will look at further arguments that question the viability of forward

basing. It will counter the view put by Krepinevich that forward based facilities are

under increasing threat from enemy bombardment and that there is a need to cope

with an empowerment of small non-state actors with weapons of mass destruction and

disruption. The forward base remains as feasible as ever because of the competitive

nature of war.

This chapter will investigate the argument also put by Krepinevich that there is a trend

of access denial to forward bases caused by the decline of the Soviet Union. It will

find that the demise of a superpower need not mean there are fewer countries looking

for allies as new states freed from its control acquire frontline positions. In addition,

the emergence of new Great Power threats can create the same circumstances for

bonding with allies as in the past.

With basing on land no more vulnerable than in the past, this chapter will question the

Pentagon’s policy of expanding use of sea bases. It will show that the competitive

nature of war exists at sea as well as on land. The disadvantages of bases on water

compared to those ashore are not becoming any less with time.

Air power has not permanently altered the LSG

It has been argued that an opponent can be prevailed over through the use of strategic

bombardment rather than that of forward located ground forces. Giulio Douhet put

forward the possibility for air power to determine the outcome of war independently

through its effect on morale in 1921.138 Boulding did not agree that it could replace the

power to occupy of an invading army. But he did believe that air and missile power

had brought about a “revolution of quite unprecedented dimensions” and that the LSG

for air power was very much less than it was for land power.139 To be sure, there is

evidence from the Kosovo War to suggest that, at least in this case, Douhet may have

138 Giuliot Douhet, Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari, (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983). 139 Boulding, Kenneth, Conflict and Defense, (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 268, 272.

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been right after all. However, air power has failed to prove itself a permanent

alternative to the use of ground forces. Moreover, it too is advantaged by forward

basing and can even have logistical requirements comparable to surface power. The

Loss of Strength Gradient has not been permanently altered.

Douhet’s strategic bombardment argument was not to be borne out by the bombing of

Germany during the Second World War. Rather than causing demands for an end to

the war, attitudes were hardened. Moreover, people who had been made homeless

became more dependent on the state. Area bombing of the civilian population

tightened political ties.140

The creation of precision weaponry, aimed at structural rather than civilian targets,

may have provided independent air power the ability to act strategically that it

previously lacked. By avoiding collateral damage, the effect of strengthening the ties

of the population to government seen in the Second World War can be avoided.

Technology has caused considerable improvement in the accuracy of bombs. The

circular error probability of a 2000lb dumb bomb used in the Second World War was

3,300 feet. In the Gulf War of 1990-91, the subject of Chapter 5, a precision-guided

munition had a CEP of 10 feet.141

It has been suggested that this view has been vindicated by the Kosovo War of 1999.

John Keegan described the conflict as a turning point in the history of warfare. The

capitulation of Serbia “proved that a war can be won by air power alone.”142 There

were anti-war and anti-conscription demonstrations in southern Serbia. There was

evidence of a ‘peace party’ emerging in Belgrade. Overt criticisms were made by

certain provincial and civic leaders.143 There was the possibility that Milosevic’s

supporters, who profited from the sanctions regime, could turn against him.144 The use

140 Pape, Robert A., Bombing to Win, (Ithaca &London: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 272-74.141 Hallion, Richard P., Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), p. 10. 142 Keegan, John, ‘Please, Mr Blair, never take such a risk again’, Daily Telegraph, London, 6 June 1999, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/1999/06/06/wkee06.html 143 Ritchie, Sebastian, ‘Air Power Victorious? Britain and NATO Strategy during the Kosovo Conflict’, in Air Power History, eds. S. Cox & P. Gray, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 324.144 Gray, Peter W., ‘The Balkans: An Air Power Basket Case’, in Air Power History, eds. S. Cox & P. Gray, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 339-40.

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of precision weapons may thus have forced defeat on the country by breaking the

morale of its people.

An explanation of how precision weapons can do this is offered by Rip and Hasik,

who, using American examples, have described the difference of response as a result

of receiving attacks upon different targets. The killing of 268 US marines in their

barracks in Beirut in 1983 led to the withdrawal of US forces from the country. By

comparison, the killing of only a few US servicemen in a Berlin discotheque in 1986

led to President Reagan ordering the bombing of Libya. While the marine barracks

was seen fundamentally as a legitimate military target, the discotheque was a civilian

location. An attack here was seen as “gratuitous and criminal”. By destroying regime

and economic targets in Serbia but minimising civilian destruction, precision

weaponry thus produced the effect associated with the Beirut bombing rather than the

Berlin discotheque.145

Strategic bombardment, as apparently demonstrated over Serbia, is not actually a new

phenomenon. As will be discussed within the case study on the Boer War in Chapter

4, there is evidence to suggest that artillery bombardment used in the pre-air power

era could also demonstrate strategic capability. This lessens still further its impact

upon the Loss of Strength Gradient in the 20th century. Like Kosovo, this too required

exceptional circumstances in which it was possible to destroy economic livelihoods

without inflicting civilian casualties. It will be found responsible for the surrender of

the Boers at the last major battle fought at Paardeberg in February 1900. But it was

not repeated elsewhere, and it did not by any means lead to the end of the war which

was fought on as a guerrilla campaign.

There were also other forms of pressure during the Kosovo War that may explain how

a capitulation could occur without need for forward-based ground forces. Influence

could have come from outside diplomatic pressure. Milosevic’s loss of Russian

support during the course of the conflict was one such factor. In the view of Britain’s

Lieutenant General Jackson, it was Russia’s decision on 3 June to back the West’s

145 Rip, Michael Russell & James M. Hasik, The Precision Revolution, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002), p. 336.

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position and urge Milosevic to surrender that was the single event that had “the

greatest significance in ending the war.”146 Surrender came the same day.

Milosevic’s indictment by the UN as a war criminal may have been an additional

factor. Even if it did not influence him in its own right, it made the likelihood of

Russia resuming diplomatic support even less likely.147

It is arguable that Milosevic was helped by an improved deal. Under the Rambouillet

Agreement, prior to the war, NATO forces were to have right of transit, bivouac,

manoeuvre, billet, and utilisation across Serbia. By the time he capitulated, forces

were to have access only to Kosovo proper. There was no longer to be a referendum

on Kosovo’s status that might lead to its independence. The international civil,

although not security, presence in the province, which was previously assigned to the

OSCE in cooperation with the EU, was to be under UN control. Milosevic felt that

Serb interests could thus be better protected by an organisation in which Russia had

the power of veto.148

Psychology may provide a further reason. Decisions need not always be taken

rationally. A newspaper report alleged that Milosevic was finally sent over the edge

by a video sent to him via a friendly intermediary showing what a fuel-air explosive

could do to his forces. This has been questioned both on the basis that this presumed

that Milosevic saw his troops as a particularly valued asset when there are indications

he did not, and that such explosives are not currently maintained in the US munitions

inventory.149 But whether or not US psychological operations were undertaken and

were successful, mental state cannot be ruled out as a reason why a leader might

accept defeat.

It must be said that Kosovo cannot be used as a conclusive example of strategy

succeeding without the use of ground forces. There was pressure exerted from the 146 Gilligan, Andrew, ‘Russia, not bombs, brought end to war in Kosovo, says Jackson’, Telegraph, 1 August 1999, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/1998/04/02/nsprin02.html147 Lambeth, Benjamin S., NATO's Air War For Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment,

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp. 69-70, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1365/148 Hosmer, Stephen T., The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), p. 117, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1351/149 Lambeth, 2001, pp. 71-2; Walker, Tom, ‘Bomb Video Took Fight out of Milosevic’, Sunday Times, London, 30 January 2000.

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presence of forward-based troops and the potential for more to be deployed ready for

a ground invasion. It is possible that the actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army,

supported by NATO air power, may have applied some pressure upon Milosevic.

Successes were reported in carrying out attacks against Serb forces. A border post at

Kosare in the north west was captured that allowed for a supply line to be set up into

the province. Territory was taken subsequently in the Junik area. The KLA also

penetrated a few miles into the south western Mount Pastrik area. Even so, most of

the province remained under Serb control.150 The KLA could not have been

instrumental in causing a Serbian withdrawal.

Greater pressure may have come from the possibility of a NATO ground invasion.

NATO forces were already being built up in Macedonia and Albania to carry out

peacekeeping in Kosovo once the war had finished. However, they were also

available to be used as part of a larger invasion force. A NATO plan for a ground

invasion, code name Plan B-minus, was developed in case the air war failed and it has

been suggested that leaks in the alliance meant that Milosevic was fully informed.151

Although, it would have had to force entry into a region of mountain and forests,

advantaging the defender, the Serbian leader would also have had on his mind the fact

that NATO would have been fighting among a supportive population.152 Not all

Albanians had been forced out of the province, despite Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing

campaign.

General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said that he was

“convinced” planning and preparations for ground intervention “in particular, pushed

Milosevic to concede.”153 Certainly, even if Milosevic had not been aware of such

planning, his capitulation occurred shortly after it became publicly clear that a ground

invasion was being discussed. News came out on 2 June of a meeting, to be held

between President Clinton and his four service chiefs for the first time, to discuss

150 Hosmer, 2000, pp. 88-9.151 Wintour, Patrick & Peter Beaumont, ‘Revealed: The Secret Plan to Invade Kosovo’, Observer, London, 18 July 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,207925,00.html & Beaumont, Peter & Patrick Wintour, ‘Leaks in NATO - and Plan Bravo Minus’, Observer newspaper, London, 18 July 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,207915,00.html152 Daalder, Ivo & Michael O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, (Washington: Brookings 2000), pp. 140-1.153 Clark, General Wesley, Waging Modern War, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 305, 425.

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options for a ground force deployment in case the air war failed. The meeting took

place the following day, that same day that Milosevic decided to give in.154

Milosevic never gave the exact reasons why he accepted defeat before he died in

2006. As General Clark put it when asked why Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo,

“You’ll have to ask Milosevic, and he’ll never tell you.”155 However, the defeat of

Serbia cannot be seen to have occurred entirely without the use and potential use of

forward-based ground forces.

Moreover, the importance of air power for other conflicts is further undermined by the

unique domestic political circumstances of Serbia. While domestic reaction to the air

strikes may have been the most important reason for the withdrawal from Kosovo,

other ruling elites need not be so susceptible. States can suppress dissent. The

totalitarian nature of Iraq’s political system under Saddam Hussein provides one

example. A regime that is unconcerned about the welfare of its people may not be

persuaded to change its actions whatever the inconvenience caused by the destruction

of civilian infrastructure. Saddam was defeated in 2003 with the use of ground forces

having previously held out against air strike campaigns over a period of more than 12

years.

Much the same can be said for the war against the Taliban in 2001. While many

Afghans may have hated the Taliban regime, the foreign fighters who supported them

were undeterred by public opinion. As Stephen Biddle has put it, in their minds they

were waging a jihad whose legitimacy “was unrelated to the political views of

Afghans, and they fought hard regardless”.156

Terrorists or guerrilla organisations are another form of opponent who need not be

defeated by public morale. They move within and may exercise influence over a

154 Lambeth, 2001, p. 74.; Perlez, Jane, ‘Clinton and the Joint Chiefs to Discuss Ground Invasion’, New York Times, 2 June 1999; BBC online news ‘Clinton considers Kosovo invasion’, 2 June 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/359481.stm155 Ignatieff, Michael, ‘The Virtual Commander: How NATO Invented a New Kind of War’, The New Yorker, 2 August 1999, p. 31.156 Biddle, Stephen, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, Strategic Studies Institute monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, November 2002, p. 17,http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/afghan.pdf

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population but they do not need to be answerable to it. A supportive regime may be

brought down, whether or not because of public pressure, but a group such as Al-

Qa’eda, harboured by Afghanistan when it was ruled by the Taliban, has shown itself

capable of continued operation, as indeed have the Taliban who have since reformed

as a guerrilla organisation.

In 2006, the Israelis found that air attack against infrastructure targets in Lebanon was

an insufficient means of attacking another guerrilla group, Hezbollah. A hoped-for

Kosovo-style air power victory was not to be repeated here. Whatever effect it might

have with regard to putting public pressure upon the country’s government, that

government could not compel a guerrilla group, which it did not control, to leave their

positions along the border with Israel. This was achieved only when ground forces

were sent across the frontier to seize territory. Other objectives demanded by Israel

had to be abandoned. Despite 34 days of air strikes, Israel was able to compel neither

the disarming of Hezbollah nor the return of two soldiers whose seizure on 12 July

had sparked the conflict.

Just as potential opponents cannot all be expected to share a susceptibility to public

pressure so they cannot all be expected to share a susceptibility to diplomatic pressure

in the midst of an air campaign. If Milosevic was influenced by diplomatic pressure,

this was not so in the case of Mullah Omar. Even Pakistan, which had been

instrumental in the Taliban’s coming to power in Afghanistan, was not able to

persuade him that he should hand over Osama Bin Laden.

If Kosovo was indeed won by air power, without impact from forward based ground

forces, the model it provided cannot be applied to all conflicts. It must be said that

there is no certainty of a permanent trend towards weaker authoritarianism and

democracy, producing the sort of states that would be most prone to precision air

power. The growth of democratic government after the First World War was followed

by the growth of dictatorship in the years up to the Second World War. A growth in

democratic government in the post-Cold War era cannot be seen as permanent.

Enemy land forces will therefore have to be defeated. But the use of precision air

power has limitations when used against an army on the ground. Information about

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the location of the enemy is a problem. The competitive nature of war means that just

as attempts are made to improve the gathering of information about the opponent, the

opponent will do what it can to improve countermeasures.

Physical geography can be used to hide from air power. In 1999, the Serb army,

which was able to withdraw from Kosovo at the end of the war largely unscathed

despite Milosevic’s capitulation, made use of natural cover afforded it by the

province’s mountains and forests. In 2003, Iraq used urban areas to provide cover for

its forces. Darkness, cloud, fog and artificially created smoke add further to the

difficulty in finding the enemy hiding on the ground, all of which hindered visual

sighting during the Kosovo War. And while infrared and radar detection could see

through these, cloud, fog, heavy rain and smoke all presented a further difficulty by

precluding the use of laser-guided weapons.157

The Serbs set up decoys to fool both visual and infrared detection. Fake tanks were

built, for example, using old tyres, plastic sheeting and logs. Small portable heaters

provided diversionary sources of infrared.158 Decoys absorbed much ordinance during

the campaign while most of the Serb army remained hidden. NATO radar

reconnaissance, meanwhile, was limited to finding vehicles and troop formations that

were on the move. The Serbs thus minimised movement to avoid detection.159

The difficulty with finding an enemy on the ground is enhanced by the use of

dispersal. Just as Serb forces were dispersed across Kosovo so the Iraqis in 2003 were

dispersed within urban areas throughout the country. The task of finding the enemy is

therefore multiplied. If one enemy location is found there are still others that can

continue to hold out.

An attempt to find out enemy positions can be carried out through espionage or

through breaking the opponent’s codes. But it is difficult even for one’s own side to

157 BBC News online, ‘Weather outwits smart weapons’, 31 March 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/308069.stm 158 Associated Press, ‘NATO Attack on Yugoslavia Gave Iraq Good Lessons’, published in Globe and Mail, Toronto, 20 November 2002, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/front/RTGAM/20021120/wless1120/Front/homeBN/breakingnews159 Rip and Hasik, 2002, p. 405.

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be aware of the precise co-ordinates of all its equipment and every one of its

personnel at a given time. However carefully plans are laid out, as Clausewitz argued,

countless minor incidents occur in war that can never be foreseen.160 The positioning

and movement of forces will be influenced by local decisions made on the ground at

different times.

Moreover, the enemy can provide false information. In 1944, the Allies used double

agents and false radio traffic as well as fake equipment that could be seen from the air

to persuade the Germans that a ‘First United States Army Group’ was located in south

east England, opposite the Pas de Calais. With Hitler convinced of the position of his

opponents, forces were kept back during the Normandy landings in the belief that this

was merely a feint for the true location of the invasion.161

Even when correct intelligence is available, this does not mean that it will be used and

that mistakes will not be made. The precision bombing of the Chinese Embassy in

Belgrade in 1999 provides an example. Its position was not secret and NATO should

not have had difficulty in gathering information of its whereabouts. Yet this did not

stop it being confused for another target, the Federal Directorate of Supply and

Procurement.162

Assumptions can also be made from one’s own experience, which are not applicable

to another’s. The strategic bombing of Germany in the Second World War provides

an example of this. The Allies failed to understand that the Germany economy ran on

coal rather than oil, and that this was transported by railway, essential to which were

the marshalling yards.163

It has been argued that the information problem can be overcome. Afghanistan in

2001 has been put forward as an example. Precision weapons played a greater role in

Afghanistan than in Kosovo. They constituted 60 percent of munitions used from the

160 Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, ed. & trans. Michael Howard & Peter Paret, (London: Everyman, 1993), p. 138.161 Young, Martin & Robbie Stamp, Trojan Horses: Deception Operations in the Second World War, (London: Bodley Head, 1989), pp. 28-9, 41, 235.162 Rip and Hasik, 2002, pp. 398-9.163 Mierzejewski, Alfred C., The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944-1945: Allied Air Power and the German National Railway, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), p. 180-1.

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air, up from only 35 percent used against Serbia.164 Information about enemy positions

was provided with the help of special operations forces and a local ally, the Northern

Alliance, such that air power is said to have won the war. Ground forces merely had

to take abandoned positions.165

Yet such a view underplays the importance of forward based ground troops in this

conflict. While helped by air power, territory did not fall into the hands of the

Northern Alliance without them fighting for it. Despite heavy bombardment, this still

had to be teamed with skilled ground manoeuvre to exploit their effects and

overwhelm the surviving enemy.166

Biddle makes the point that the importance of bombardment for the destruction of

enemy positions has not changed with time. Information gathered from afar, even if

gathered on the ground, is insufficient for it to have strategic effect. In 1917, German

defences at Messines on the Western Front absorbed bombardment of more than a

kiloton of explosive power per mile of frontage. Yet they were still able to halt the

ensuing British offensive. On 18 July 1944, the Allies deposited more than eight

kilotons of firepower on just seven kilometres of German frontage in Normandy in

less than three hours as part of Operation Goodwood. Yet the subsequent British

armoured advance was still halted.167

A more recent example can be found from Chechnya in 1999-2000. Despite heavy

bombardment, the defenders of Grozny were still able to rely upon underground

facilities built in Soviet times for civil defence, refurbished and reinforced since the

last war with Russia. In addition, even though many buildings had been in large part 164 Tirpak, John A., ‘Enduring Freedom’, Air Force Magazine, February, 2002.165 Biddle, 2002, pp. 1-2; For representatives of this view Biddle cites articles in a range of publications: Michael Gordon, ‘‘New’ U.S. War: Commandos, Airstrikes and Allies on the Ground,’ New York Times, 29 December 2001, p. 1; Paul Watson and Richard Cooper, ‘Blended Tactics Paved Way for Sudden Collapse’, Los Angeles Times, 15 November 2001; Thom Shanker, ‘Conduct of War is Redefined by Success of Special Forces’, New York Times, 21 January 2002, p. 1; Vernon Loeb, ‘An Unlikely Super-Warrior Emerges in Afghan War’, Washington Post, 19 May 2002, p. 16; John Hendren, ‘Afghanistan Yields Lessons for Pentagon’s Next Targets’, Los Angeles Times, 21 January 2002, p. 1; Rajiv Chandrasekaran and John Pomfret, ‘Aided by U.S., Pashtun Militias Move Closer to Kandahar’, Washington Post, 27 November 2001, p. 6; Ann Scott Tyson, ‘U.S. is Prevailing With Its Most Finely Tuned War’, Christian Science Monitor, 21 November 2001, p. 1; Joseph Fitchett, ‘Swift Success for High-Tech Arms’, International Herald Tribune, 7 December 2001, p. 1; ‘Afghanistan: First Lessons’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 December 2001.166 Biddle, 2002, p. viii.167 Ibid., pp. 36-7.

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destroyed, holes were created between adjoining structures at basement and ground

floor levels. The bombardment failed to remove hiding places for the Chechen

defenders necessitating a fight between ground forces, with the Russians often unable

to advance more than 100 metres in a day.168

In Afghanistan too, bombardment was still unable to destroy the opponent’s ability to

defend territory. At Bai Beche on 5 November 2001, in spite of over two days of

heavy American air strikes, Al Qa’eda defenders were still able to repel a cavalry

charge by the Northern Alliance. The defenders had local cover and concealment

good enough to prevent special operations forces from locating all their individual

fighting positions. Success came only when a second cavalry charge took advantage

of smoke and dust created by further air strikes to surround the enemy.169 The

defenders were defeated by ground force manoeuvre combined with bombardment;

not by bombardment alone.

Precision bombardment need not work even against a future opponent with political

conditions similar to Serbia. The impermanence of Great Power status, one of the

enduring factors that re-emerge throughout this work, means that one cannot always

expect the balance of forces that occurred in the Kosovo War. The United States, in

coalition with the countries of NATO that included most of the Western Europe,

confronted a much smaller opponent. The success of the air war demonstrated that

Boulding was, to some extent, correct to say that there was an increase in the

minimum viable size of a state that can defend itself. But one cannot always expect to

be a superpower with opponents so much smaller than oneself. Any impact this has

had upon the Loss of Strength Gradient is therefore only temporary.

Failure to gain air superiority is a factor that will hinder an air strike. One cannot

always expect much weaker opponents that are unable to deny this. The greater the

opponent’s strength, the more difficult the operation becomes. The RAF’s Bomber

Arthur Harris, for instance, postponed heavy bombing of Berlin for a year until

168 Oliker, Olga, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp. 47, 66, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1289/169 Biddle, 2002, pp. 27, 38-9

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November 1943, because he lacked sufficient numbers of aircraft to take the city

on.170

A heavy bomber in particular is vulnerable to fighters which are smaller, faster and

more manoeuvrable and can be produced in greater numbers. A raid upon the

Schweinfurt ball bearing plant in August 1943, carried out by 228 bomber aircraft

beyond the range of accompanying fighters, saw 36 lost against heavy fighter defence.

Another visit in October of the same year with 280 aircraft saw 62 lost.171

Their ability to carry a heavy bomb load remains important. In Iraq in 2003, despite

flying just 2 percent of the missions, the B-1 was responsible alone for 50 percent of

the JDAMs dropped.172 Yet despite improved speed and manoeuvrability, such a

bomber remains at a disadvantage against yet faster and more manoeuvrable enemy

fighters. Had a B-1 bomber faced a Serbian MiG-29 during the Kosovo War it would

have been up against an opponent which presented a smaller target than itself and

outflew it by Mach 2.3 to Mach 1.2.173 That they did not face this threat was because

Serb fighters rarely attempted to engage NATO aircraft after several losses on the first

night and B-1s were only brought in at the start of the second week.174

Ground defences can hinder the ability of aircraft to reach their targets. To be sure,

NATO aircraft were able to employ countermeasures to survive the threat of 1950s

and 1960s designed SA-3 and SA-6 missiles during the Kosovo War.175 However, had

Milosevic been able to obtain the more up-to-date weapon that he had wanted from

170 Harris, Sir Arthur, Bomber Offensive, (London: Greenhill, 1990), pp. 135, 186.171 United States War Department, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War) (Washington: US War Department, 1945); Graver, W. F., & D. L. Cates, eds., The United States Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 2 Torch to Pointblank, (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 1949), p. 703.172 Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales, Maj. Gen., The Iraq War, (Cambridge MA & London: Belknap, 2003), pp. 177-8.173 FAS (Federation of American Scientists), ‘MiG Fulcrum (Mikoyan-Gurevich)’, fact sheet, Washington, 29 August 2000, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/mig-29.htm; United States Air Force, ‘B1-B Lancer’, fact sheet, June 2003, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=81174 Lambeth, 2001, pp. 23, 27.175 Lambeth, Benjamin S., ‘Kosovo and the Continuing SEAD Challenge’, Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 2002, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/sum02/lambeth.html; FAS (Federation of American Scientists), ‘V-75SA-2 GUIDELINE’, fact sheet, Washington, 23 June 2000, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/v-75.htm; FAS (Federation of American Scientists), ‘ZRK-SD Kub 3M9SA-6 Gainful’, fact sheet, Washington, 20 April 1999, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/sa-6.htm

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Russia, the SA-10, it would, in the words of Lieutenant General Short, the Kosovo

War’s air component commander, “have profoundly changed the balance of the threat

and our ability to maintain air superiority.”176 The SA-10 is much more resistant to

jamming, its launchers pack more firepower by carrying multiple missiles, and the

missiles themselves are capable of longer range, higher speed and greater agility.177

Despite the use of countermeasures, a low-stealth aircraft such as the B-1 could not

operate survivably in the face of such a weapon.178

General Richard Hawley, the commander of US Air Combat Command during the

Kosovo War, has said that the answer is to use an all stealth bomber force.179 Stealth

technology used in the B-2 bomber and F-117 fighter involves the use of radar

absorbent material and a shape formed of flat plates that minimises still further the

radar waves reflected back to the enemy. Stealth is also a feature of the cruise missile,

which, as well as hugging terrain to avoid radar detection, makes use of flat surfaces

to reflect away radar waves.

However, while stealth technology can minimise the signature made by a craft, it

cannot get rid of it completely. Even the stealthiest aircraft or missile will be to some

extent detectable by radar depending on the aspect angle. Even if this alone were to

cause it to be confused for a bird, it would continue to emit an infrared heat signature

and produce sound which can be exploited by the opponent. The sound wave

signatures vary such that this can be analysed to give away the presence of an enemy

craft.180 It is possible that it was a more primitive method of acoustic detection that

brought down an F-117 stealth fighter during the Kosovo War. Spotters at various

locations listening for aircraft could have reported the presence of the fighter. By

working out its flight path they could ready an attack ahead of it.181 Stealth represents

an advance that allows an aircraft or missile to attack targets with reduced risk from

176 Bowie, Christopher J., ‘Destroying Mobile Ground Targets in an Anti-Access Environment’, Analysis Center Papers Series, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Washington, December 2001, p. 4. http://www.capitol.northgrum.com/files/mobile_ground_targets.pdf177 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 178 Hawley, Gen. Richard, United States Air Force (retired); speaking at Cato Institute Policy Forum, ‘The Future of the Bomber Force’, Washington,17 October 2001, video and audio of speech at http://www.cato.org/events/011017pf.html179 Hawley, 17 October 2001.180 Lambeth, 2002. 181 Ibid.

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surface-to-air missiles, but it has not proved invulnerable to countermeasures created

under the competitive pressure of war.

As well as using stealth to hide from enemy defences, speed is another option for the

attacker. A ballistic missile can travel fast enough to outrun missile defences. During

Desert Storm in 1991, Iraqi Scud missiles, designed to travel at Mach 5, proved

capable of surviving attempts at interception mounted by the Patriot missile, also

designed to travel at Mach 5. It is possible that not a single Scud warhead was

destroyed.182 Patriots did shoot down four out of six Ababil-100 missiles fired at

Kuwait in 2003, but these were slower than the Scuds and therefore easier to

intercept.183

Faster technologies may become available. Hypersonic weapons capable of travel

beyond Mach 5 are under development.184 But because both SAMs and the incoming

missiles they have to defend against can adopt the same technology, the same

difficulty in destroying an incoming missile with another missile will remain.

Even if the correct coordinates of a position are known, precision weapons are

vulnerable because of their need for external guidance. There are problems with the

use of a combination of Inertial Guidance System (INS), Terrain Contour Matching

(TERCOM) and Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) as well as with

the alternative of satellite navigation.

INS measures accelerations and changes in direction in order to calculate position and

will get a weapon most of the way to its target. TERCOM supports INS at intervals

during the flight, using a radar-altimeter to compare the elevation of the land which is

being flown over with the elevation data pre-recorded into its on-board memory.

182 Postol, Theodore A., ‘Postol/Lewis Review of Army's Study on Patriot Effectiveness’, Letter to Congressman John Conyers Jr., Chairman Committee on Government Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, 8 September 1992, retrieved from Federation of American Scientists website: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/pl920908.htm183 Murray and Scales, 2003, p. 166; Bernstein, Lewis, & Roy McCullough, ‘Space and Missile Defense Command Contributions and Lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom’, US Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) Report, Arlington VA, 14 October 2003, retrieved from globalsecurity.org website: http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2003/bernstein_mccullough.htm184 Hecht, Jeff, ‘Hypersonic weapons projects to begin test flights’, New Scientist, 4 January 2007, http://space.newscientist.com/article/dn10889-hypersonic-weapons-projects-to-begin-test-flights.html

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DSMAC is then used for terminal guidance. This involves the use of a camera and an

image correlator to compare the visual appearance of terrain and target.

TERCOM is however unable to correct INS over water. A target on or very close to a

coast does not provide fixes if flying directly from the sea.185 Because DSMAC relies

upon contrast, its ability to correlate a scene with its onboard memory is hindered if

the target area is obscured by cloud, mist, sandstorms or smoke. Moreover, both

TERCOM and DSMAC need intensive mapping. The contrast of a ground scene can

vary between night and day, or with the changing seasons so that the imagery must be

specific to those conditions.186 For a cruise missile flying at low altitude to avoid radar

the process can be especially lengthened because the targetter might find a promising

path only to run into obstacles and have to start again.187

Satellite guidance, by comparison, works in coastal areas as well as inland and does

not rely on contrast or mapping, needing only the coordinates of the target. But it will

not always be possible to depend upon it. Satellite guidance is susceptible to jamming

by transmitting a more powerful signal on the same frequency. The GPS satellites are

situated at 20,200 kilometres altitude, causing the signal produced by them to be

greatly weakened once it reaches the Earth. In 2003 it was alleged that a Russian

company, Aviaconversiya, had supplied jamming equipment to Iraq.188 To be sure,

any effect they had during the war in the country that year was only temporary. Six

jammers were destroyed by the US Air Force. Their problem was that by transmitting

a signal they revealed their position and so could be found and attacked.189 Even

without destroying them it is possible to counter such jammers. The use of a null-

steering antenna can still allow bombing to be carried out under satellite guidance.

The direction from which the jamming is occurring is determined and the signal from

that direction blocked.190 185 Friedman, Norman, Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-Centric Warfare, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), pp. 268-9.186 Pike, John, ‘Cruise Missile Support Activity (CMSA)’, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, 11 Nov 1997, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/usjfcom/cmsa/187 Friedman, 2000, pp. 268-9.188 Slevin, Peter, ‘3 Russian Firms’ Deals Anger U.S.: Iraq Purchased Jamming Gear, Missiles, Night-Vision Goggles’, Washington Post, 23 March 2003, Page A19, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A13057-2003Mar23 189 Vizard, Frank, ‘Safeguarding GPS’, Scientific American, 14 April 2003, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=00079DD3-DAA0-1E96-8EA5809EC5880000190 Raytheon Systems Ltd, ‘Navigation Systems – Defence’, Harlow, England, 2004, http://www.raytheon.co.uk/what_we_do/navigational_systems_defence.html

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Yet a null-steering antenna cannot block out jamming entirely, only reduce the range

at which it is effective.191 The Russian transmitters weigh three kilograms and can be

mass produced.192 Their survivability could also be improved by adopting techniques

used by the Serbs during the Kosovo War that kept their radar operational throughout

the conflict. To make it more difficult to find they switched the signal on and off and

when under attack reflected it off heavy farm machinery.193 The effort required to

destroy the jammers would thus be lengthened, postponing precision strikes on other

targets as well as depleting precision weapons stocks. Until the jammers are destroyed

there will always be the danger that they are restarted during a precision strike,

causing bombs to miss their targets and producing collateral damage that strengthens

support for the regime instead of weakening it.

There are other options for countering jamming. The GPS signal may be boosted

locally through the use of pseudo satellites or pseudolites, installed on aircraft. But

this depends on conditions of air superiority having been achieved.194 Their emissions

mean that they cannot hide, however stealthy the aircraft. Another option is to

improve the GPS signal from the satellites themselves.195 But this process, which

involves launching new satellites, can be easily countered given the ease with which

jammers can be produced, either by increasing the jamming signal from each device,

or producing more of them.

Spoofing, the transmission of deceptive signals, can also reduce the effectiveness of

satellite guidance. In order to counter this, military signals sent through GPS are

encrypted. The use of the Selective Availability Anti Spoofing Module, a GPS

receiver made mandatory for US forces in 2002, is an example of the efforts made to

191 Pike, John, ‘Navstar Global Positioning System’, globalsecurity.org, 30 June 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/gps.htm192 Gershanoff, H., ‘Russian GPS Jammer Introduced’, Journal of Electronic Defense, August 1999, http://www.ericorp.com/PDF/JEDAug99.pdf; The possibility of mass production was evidenced by reported Pentagon worries prior to the 2003 Iraq War that up to four hundred such devices had been sold to Baghdad. See Baier, Bret, and Molly Henneberg, ‘Iraq May Have Devices to Throw Off US Smart Bombs’, Fox News, 11 January 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,75187,00.html193 Associated Press, 20 November 2002.194 Vizard, 2003. 195 Knight, Will, ‘US plans to boost GPS satellite power’, New Scientist, 8 May 2002, http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99992261

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improve encryption.196 Yet such efforts can always been countered by efforts at

codebreaking. It is in the nature of encryption that just as one side knows how to

decipher a code, so there is the potential for an opponent also to learn how to decipher

that code. Advancements in the development of the German Enigma code and efforts

at deciphering it up to and during the Second World War provide an example. The

code was first broken by the Poles in 1932. The Germans were able to counter this

with further development of Enigma by the outbreak of the Second World War. But

during the course of 1940 the British broke various Enigma ciphers. The Germans

made further improvements yet every time they did so the cipher was eventually

broken. In 1943, the construction of the first electronic computer, ‘Colossus’, allowed

the British to go on to break the Germans’ teleprinter ciphers.197 Any advancement in

encryption cannot provide permanent advantage to one side, leaving open the

potential for false signals that lead pilots and precision weapons astray.

There are further factors that can inhibit air power, which were demonstrated during

the Kosovo War, although not every belligerent need be affected by them. The

opponent on the ground can take advantage from the ethical concerns of the air power

user. The Serbs in Kosovo exploited NATO’s strict rules of engagement by using

ethnic Albanians as human shields to protect targets. Civilians were, for example, tied

to Serb vehicles. NATO could not bomb radar reflections that looked like tanks until

sure that civilians would not be killed.198 But there was a limit to which the air power

user could be affected by this. When ethnic Serbs volunteered to be human shields by

placing themselves around the Crvena Zastava car factory that produced ammunition,

they were deemed by NATO to be enemy combatants and the factory was bombed.199

The air power user can make missions harder for itself by imposing rules of

engagement in order to minimise loss of life on ones own side. Casualty aversion

during the Kosovo conflict was such that aircraft were flown above 15,000 feet to

avoid the killing envelopes of surface-to-air missiles even though their radars were

196 Callaghan, Steve & Hugo Fruehauf, ‘SAASM and Direct P(Y) Signal Acquisition’, GPS World, 1 July 2002, http://www.gpsworld.com/gpsworld/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=25974&pageID=1197 Smith, Michael, Station X: The Code Breakers of Bletchley Park, (London: Pan, 2004), pp. 23-189; see also Smith, Michael, ‘The History of Bletchley Park’, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers History Center, http://www.ieee.org/organizations/history_center/milestones_photos/bletchleypark.html198 Rip and Hasik, 2002, pp. 405.199 Ibid., pp. 403-5.

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not always switched on.200 As a result, the task of finding Serb military forces hiding

on the ground was made harder than it needed to be, contributing still more to the

success they had in surviving NATO air power.

To be sure, this did not affect the ultimately successful outcome of the conflict. Serb

military forces did not have to be destroyed to defeat Milosevic. But against another

opponent that does not give up until its military forces have been destroyed, as was

the case with Saddam’s Iraq, this could only make air power even less capable of

being strategic.

Air power has proved itself as a means of defending territory, as opposed to attacking

that occupied by someone else. However, while Hallion has said that, in the Gulf War,

to be discussed further in Chapter 5, it demonstrated it could “hold territory by

denying the enemy the ability to seize it”,201 this too does not mean any permanent

reduction in the importance of forward positioned surface forces.

For example, the Royal Air Force played an important role in denying Britain from

German invasion in 1940, although, even in combination with the United States Air

force, it could not bring about Germany’s capitulation later in the war without the use

of ground forces. But this does not mean that Britain could defend itself without

surface forces. In the competitive circumstances of war, the growth of air power on one

side is matched by that on others, resources permitting. It is not a replacement for the

forward basing of heavy surface forces, but instead an additional factor which has to be

fought over.

The RAF could not have stopped a German invasion had Britain been joined to

continental Europe, taking on bombardment of invading ground forces while it was

already in an all out battle against the Luftwaffe. In combination with its French

counterpart it had been unable to halt the German invasion of France earlier that year.

Yet it was able to do so when Britain came under attack. The difference was its

surface capabilities, most specifically those at sea. Even though the Battle of Britain

saw the RAF fully occupied in the air, Germany could not launch an invasion for fear

200 Lambeth, 2001, pp. 21-2.201 Hallion, 1992, p. 253.

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of the Royal Navy. Britain was therefore saved by forces on the surface as much as

those in the skies.

The competitive circumstances of war have also seen the development of means by

which invading ground forces can fight back against air power. In 1973, the Egyptians

were able to cross the Suez Canal and reoccupy territory on the east bank in the face

of superior Israeli air power. They had created a protective shield of surface-to-air

missiles.

To be sure, this denial of Israeli air power was geographically constrained. The

missile batteries, located on the west side of the canal, could not be easily moved.

When the Egyptians advanced beyond the protective shield they suffered heavy losses

from the Israeli air force. But even this latter success for defensive Israeli air power

cannot demonstrate anything more than a temporary reduction in the advantage of

forward located ground forces. No state can expect always to face invaders with air

power assets much weaker than its own, a situation made all the more likely by the

impermanence of Great Power status. And it must be added that air power did not act

alone in this instance. Israel air success was augmented by armour on the ground.202

Even if air power does demonstrate a capability as an alternative to ground forces, as

may well have been the case in the Kosovo War, one must question whether there is

any impact upon the Loss of Strength Gradient. Air power is itself advantaged by

operating from forward bases. Fighter aircraft in particular are aided by proximity.

While a B-52 has an unrefuelled range of 8,800 miles, for the F-15E this is only 2,400

miles.203 As was the case during the Schweinfurt raids, fighters are still unable to

match heavy bombers for more than part of their range.

Even if they are in range, fighters have the disadvantage that the further they are from

home, the more time they need to get to the contested airspace and the less time they

can be there to fight off their opponent. This was one factor that helped the Royal Air

202 Van Creveld, Martin, Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives, (Beverly Hills, CA & London: Sage, 1975), p. 17.203 United States Air Force, ‘B-52 Stratofortress’, fact sheet, September 2003, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=102; United States Air Force, ‘F-15E Strike Eagle’, fact sheet, Washington, April 2003, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=102

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Force hold out against their larger, but continent-based, German opponent in the skies

above the south east of England during the Battle of Britain in 1940.

Extra fuel tanks or in-flight refuelling do not provide options that even up this

disadvantage of greater distance. Fuel tanks attached to the outside of a fighter aircraft

not only reduce the bomb load but also produce drag, compromising their

effectiveness enough to rule them out of combat operations. In-flight refuelling is

carried out by tanker aircraft, but these cannot be flown within range of enemy

fighters. Being larger and slower, they would be vulnerable to attack, leaving ones

own fighters the possibility that they would be unable to return to base.204

The result of this is that air power continues to be advantaged by the availability and

use of forward bases. During the 1999 Kosovo conflict, by far most sorties were

flown from neighbouring countries, in particular Italy. Similarly, coalition forces

would have preferred the use of Saudi air fields for combat missions in Iraq in 2003

had they been available. Air power also has a considerable requirement for fuel at

forward locations. This is needed, whether to refuel attack aircraft stationed there or

to resupply those en route from further afield. A B-2 bomber mission flying from the

United States to Iraq in 2003 still required refuelling by forward based tankers five

times for the round trip. Even those flying from Diego Garcia needed it twice.205

To be sure, as said in the previous chapter, aviation fuel is widely available and even

otherwise neutral countries are more likely to provide this than host forward based

military hardware. But other states cannot always be relied upon to provide fuel,

either because they refuse to do so or because a prolonged conflict in a region without

its own petroleum resources may exhaust locally available stocks. In addition, there is

also a difficulty for military aircraft that arises from the fact that much of what they

require is of specialist fuels. In part this can be satisfied by mixing in additives with

locally acquired kerosene. Preparation for the Iraq invasion, for example, saw the

movement of such additives in order that they were available to produce the required

204 Spick, Mike, Brassey's Modern Fighters, (Washington: Brassey’s, 2000), p. 10.205 Stern, Seth, ‘A New Flight Path for the ‘Invisible’ Bomber’, Christian Science Monitor, 12 May 2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0512/p25s01-usmi.html

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fuels at forward locations.206 But it will be found in the Gulf War case study in

Chapter 5 that a lack of refining capacity meant that specialist fuels still needed to be

brought in. And in the Falklands War case study in Chapter 6, it will be found there

was no such fuel whatever to be found within theatre. These cases will counter

Boulding’s view that there is a lesser LSG for air power than for surface forces which

could reduce the LSG overall.

Nuclear weapons and the LSG

Along with the possible exception of the Kosovo War, nuclear weapons have

provided the one other means by which air power could be used to reduce need for

forward basing and the importance of the Loss of Strength Gradient. In 1945, their use

upon the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought about the surrender of Japan and

the end of the Second World War. Given this demonstration of their strategic

capability plus the development of delivery systems with global reach, Paul Virilio

later suggested that they produced a tendency towards geographic disengagement

which would possibly see the abandonment of advanced bases.207

But the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was carried out in a world

where not only was Japan unable to retaliate with its own atomic weapons but no

other could do so. This circumstance changed when the Soviets tested their first

atomic bomb in 1949. If used against another state that also has nuclear weapons the

possibility exists that devastation may be wrought upon both countries. Indeed, in a

confrontation between heavily armed nuclear powers, nuclear war, even when at first

restricted, may lead to global catastrophe.

In 1957 Henry Kissinger advocated limited use against an invading Soviet

conventional force. Because an enemy advance would have to concentrate to be most

effective, this would provide an appropriate circumstance for the use of a nuclear

206 Hampton, Lana D., ‘Direct Delivery Fuels and Bulk Fuels Support the Warfighter’, Fuel Line, Defense Energy Support Center, Fort Belvoir, VA, Spring 2003, pp. 5-6, http://www.desc.dla.mil/DCM/Files/FLVol203.pdf 207 Virilio, 1977, p. 144.

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weapon.208 Yet it would be difficult to avoid escalation to all-out war. One’s own

forces could be dispersed to avoid being destroyed in a counter attack but they would

still have supply lines that could be targeted from where the war could spread into

communications networks and cities. By 1961 even Kissinger himself had become

unconvinced of limited nuclear war under a circumstance of Great Power conflict.209

In this situation it is still theoretically possible to ‘survive’ a nuclear war albeit with

the possibility of heavy casualties on both sides. Numbers are important, as are

delivery systems such as bombers or missiles. Gray has argued that the fragility of

Soviet command and control may have been such that the United States might have

‘survived’ a nuclear attack in the 1950s, the 1960s and perhaps even beyond that,

although with appalling risks involved.210

Even when only a proportion of the world’s arsenal is used, nuclear war still offers the

potential for global catastrophe. Carl Sagan estimated that this could occur with the

use of upwards from 500 to 2000 warheads.211 When both sides can enact complete

devastation upon each other, actual use by either side becomes suicidal for both, at

which point strategy becomes meaningless.

This does suggest that a “sub-threshold” nuclear war would be possible without

leading to global catastrophe.212 That such a threshold could be calculated is however

open to dispute213 and the possibility of limiting the numbers used in a situation of

confrontation between the most heavily armed nuclear powers, as said before, is

uncertain.

Thus, during the Cold War, while nuclear weapons were used as a deterrent against

possible Soviet aggression, the West felt unable to rely upon them solely.

208 Kissinger, Henry, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 178.209 Freedman, Lawrence, ‘Henry Kissinger’, Makers of Nuclear Strategy, eds. J. Baylis & J. Garnett, (London: Pinter, 1991), p. 108.210 Gray, Colin S., 1999a, p. 314.211 Sagan, Carl, ‘Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implications’, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983-84, p. 285.212 Ibid., p. 277.213 Thompson, S.L, & Schneider, S.H, ‘Nuclear War Reappraised’, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1986, pp. 981-1005.

79

Conventional forces were also deployed at forward bases. The existence of the

nuclear weapon had not removed need for forward basing in this instance and had not

caused a decline in the Loss of Strength Gradient.

Indeed, nuclear weapons were themselves forward based in threatened countries by

the US. In the event of invasion they would have to be used if they were not to be lost

to an advancing enemy and in so doing they acted as a deterrent by threatening early

escalation to nuclear war.214

However, this does not rule out the possibility that a state might see gain to be made

from a nuclear attack in the era since the end of the Cold War. There are states that

continue not to have nuclear weapons or have very limited arsenals. During the Cold

War a scenario of nuclear attack would have presented the possibility of escalation to

all out nuclear conflict as such action would have been interpreted within the context

of superpower confrontation. In the post Cold War world, devoid of Great Power

confrontation, such escalation cannot be ruled out but it would be less likely.

Israel provides an example of a nuclear power surrounded by potential enemies that

are not similarly armed. Such an attack here would be, at least in theory, feasible,

although dangers would arise from fallout, given the small area of the region, being

blown back upon the very state that used them. In 1999, Gray said that, in theory, one

could not dismiss the possibility that the United States, for example, could be able to

achieve victory, in the early twenty-first century, over potential foes such as Iraq,

Libya, Iran, or North Korea, if they were to become nuclear armed, or possibly even

China.215

Means of defending against a nuclear missile attack are limited. As said before, the

problem with hitting a missile is that it is difficult to hit an object with another object

travelling at the same speed. This is shown by the fact that despite President Putin’s

concern over the location of American missile defence facilities within former

Warsaw Pact states, Russia has in the past indicated that it would have sufficient

214 Luttwak, E.N, Strategy; The Logic of War and Peace, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1987), p. 124.215 Gray, Colin S., The Second Nuclear Age, (Boulder, Colorado & London: Lynne Rienner, 1999b), p. 160.

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numbers to overwhelm such a system.216 A country that is without its own nuclear

retaliatory capability cannot place confidence in a defensive system to protect it from

nuclear attack.

Given the competitive nature of war there has been therefore an impetus to acquire

such weapons. Certainly, since their creation, they have proliferated. And as more

countries have such weapons, so there are fewer against whom an attack might be

undertaken without the certainty that it would not lead to a similarly destructive

response.

There is concern that wider possession of weapons of mass destruction may put

forward bases at increased risk. This view has been put by Krepinevich who has said

that they could allow “rogue state militaries to hold key forward” facilities.217 But to

precipitate a devastating counterattack having attacked a US base, for example, is not

strategic.

One cannot rule out the possibility of an accidental launch or of the leadership of a

nuclear armed power deciding upon their use, having become mentally incapacitated.

But again this cannot be seen as strategic. This makes no difference to the LSG.

It must also be said that there are ethical inhibitions towards the use of nuclear

weapons. To be sure, judgement of morality and therefore the appropriateness of their

use is subject to rival interpretations and may vary between polities. Ethical concerns

need not apply in all circumstances.218 Even so, there may well have been a ‘taboo’ or

even a tradition of ‘nonuse’ concerning nuclear weapons since 1945 that has

prevented states from using them. A break in the tradition of nonuse might reduce

such inhibitions allowing further use in future although we cannot know whether this

216 BBC News online, ‘Putin steps up missiles warning’, 27 April 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6599647.stm; Menshikov, Stanislav, ‘Missile Defense: A Russian Perspective’, ECAAR-Russia Paper, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 21 July 2002, p. 3., http://www.ecaar-russia.org/UNdraft.PDF; Ivanov, I, ‘The Missile Defense Mistake’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2000, p. 17217 Krepinevich, Andrew, ‘The Quadrennial Defense Review, Rethinking the USMilitary Posture’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, 2005, p. 42., http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20051024.QDR06/R.20051024.QDR06.pdf218 Gray, Colin S., 1999a, p. 68.

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would be true given the very fact they have not been used again. Indeed it is possible

that a one off detonation might reinforce the taboo against their use.219 Evidence for

this may be found following the use of chemical warfare in World War One. This

created inhibitions for its use in the subsequent World War.220

A sense that their use should be proportional to a threat may be especially important

for nuclear weapons given that their capability for indiscriminate mass killing has led

them to be described as “immoral” and to be therefore unusable for just war.221 Israel,

as suggested earlier, could be able to use such weapons without fear of return attack,

but may be hindered by such ethical considerations from any desire to use them.

Their use could be found acceptable only in extreme circumstances that might be

described as equally immoral. These may include the prevention of the take over of a

state combined perhaps with the indiscriminate killing of citizens.

The attacks upon Japan in 1945 demonstrated that nuclear weapons offered a means

for prevailing over an opponent without need for large forward based conventional

forces. But their use as a deterrent during the Cold War was carried out in conjunction

with rather than as an alternative to forward based ground forces. To be sure, in the

post Cold War era, one cannot rule out their future use, but concerns remain regarding

the possibility of a devastating retaliatory strike, if not world devastation, combined

with ethical difficulties regarding their use. Certainly, no state has yet been prepared

to use them once more. The possibility of their being obtained and used by

asymmetric actors, moreover, discussed below, is likely to be rare if ever. They can be

seen only to have had a limited impact upon the Loss of Strength Gradient.

Forward bases are not becoming more vulnerable to enemy attack

The forward base is not becoming any less useful as a means of fighting the opponent.

But it has been suggested that such bases are becoming increasingly vulnerable to

219 Gray, Colin S., 1999b, p. 163.220 Mandelbaum, M., The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima, (Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 37.221 Walzer, M, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (New York: Basic books, 1977), pp. 44 & 272.

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enemy attack. Krepinevich has said that the threat from the proliferation of ballistic

and cruise missiles “will quite probably over time, increase substantially the dangers

of operating from such facilities”.222

Yet, as said before, war is a competitive circumstance. Air power capability whether

by missile or aircraft faces the potential for countermeasures. Stealthy cruise missiles

and even stealth fighters are unable to completely hide their signatures from an

opponent. Moreover, although the enemy may well already know the positions of

such fixed bases, this does not mean that missiles will find their way to their targets.

Guidance either by GPS or through a combination of Inertial Guidance, Terrain

Contour Matching and Digital Scene Matching can also be countered. Fixed forward

bases within reach of enemy attack through the air can still be defended.

The likelihood of the empowerment of small groups of irregular forces, terrorists and

transnational criminal organisations with weapons of mass destruction and disruption

has been raised by Krepinevich.223 A non-state actor could use them in the knowledge

that they do not have territory which could be retaliated against.

However, non-state actors in the era since the end of the Cold War have failed to

demonstrate that they are able to cause more casualties than their predecessors.

Terrorism such as that committed in the name of Al-Qa’eda is not a new

phenomenon. Parallels can be found with the anarchist movement one hundred years

earlier that was likewise inter-continental and which also claimed hundreds of lives.

Their destructiveness was shown by the number of world leaders whose lives they

took. Anarchists killed the French President Sadi Carnot in 1894, the Spanish Prime

Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo in 1897, the Austrian Empress Elizabeth in

222 Andrew Krepinevich, ‘The Quadrennial Defense Review, Rethinking the USMilitary Posture’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, 2005, p. 42., http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20051024.QDR06/R.20051024.QDR06.pdf; For an earlier version of this argument see Kosiak, Stephen, Andrew Krepinevich & Michael Vickers, A Strategy for a Long Peace, Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, 30 January 2001, Executive Summary retrieved from http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/R.20010130.A_Strategy_for_a_L/R.20010130.A_Strategy_for_a_L.htm223 Ibid., p. 22.; For an earlier version see Kosiak Krepinevich and Vickers, 2001.

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1898, the Italian King Umberto in 1900, the American President William McKinley in

1901 and another Spanish Prime Minister, José Canalejas y Méndez, in 1912.224

In making this case, moreover, it is worth emphasising that Al-Qa’eda’s most

destructive attacks on 11 September 2001 were carried out with the backing of a state,

which demonstrated the risks involved when it was subsequently overthrown by the

US. Since that time, Al-Qa’eda, now a non-state actor, has been unable to carry out

similarly devastating assaults.

To be sure, this is not to dismiss the possibility of a major attack upon a forward base

with a weapon of mass destruction, but there is evidence to suggest that if it was to

happen it would most likely be an isolated incident rather than part of a general trend.

The problem for terrorism, as indeed for all warfare, is that of competition.

For one thing, non-state actors without their own territory are under constant

competition from law enforcement organisations within the territories they operate.

This brings with it problems of secrecy which limit the numbers who can be involved

in any one project and adds to the difficulty of organising especially large attacks. For

every effort at maintaining secrecy they face efforts by law enforcement bodies to

find out their activities. It has always been possible to intercept communications. Just

as letters sent through the postal system can be opened, so phones can be tapped and

emails can be picked up. It has always been possible too to use human intelligence.

Even when it has been difficult to recruit informants or send undercover agents into

the most secretive organisations, whether they be Al-Qa’eda or the Mafia,

interrogation of individuals taken into custody has offered another means of

extracting information. The impact of this competitive pressure can be seen from

successes in capturing Al-Qa’eda figures such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in 2003,

alleged to have masterminded the 9/11 attacks, Abu Faraj al-Libbi in 2005, alleged to

be the third most important individual in the organisation, and Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi in

2006, alleged to be another of the group’s most senior operatives.225

224 Economist, ‘For jihadist, read anarchist’, 18 August 2005, http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4292760225 BBC News online, ‘Pakistan ‘catches al-Qaeda chief’’, 4 May 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4512885.stm; BBC News online, ‘US holds ‘senior al-Qaeda figure’’, 27 April 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6600751.stm

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Competition has also meant that while the potential for destruction wielded by a

terrorist has increased, so have the means for prevention. The twentieth century

terrorist faced such concerns as body searches, sniffer dogs and x-ray machines. In the

twenty-first century the potential for the smuggling of nuclear material has attracted

further effort at countermeasures. One such system which has been developed at Los

Alamos can look through steel containers and even lead shielding. It involves the

detection of muon particles which are deflected by the heavy nuclei of uranium and

plutonium atoms.226

What non-state actors have been capable of has therefore been limited. The Japanese

Aum Shinrikyo cult, which Krepinevich himself cites as an example of “the

proliferation of the means of mass destruction”,227 carried out two Sarin gas attacks on

a residential neighbourhood in 1994 and then the Tokyo subway in 1995. Yet

fatalities were no greater than in a conventional terrorist attack with just seven and

twelve killed respectively.228 The anthrax attacks following 9/11 carried out by an

unknown individual or group, which Krepinevich cites as another example of

“America's increased vulnerability”, killed only five.229 The competitive nature of

warfare means that forward based forces are no more vulnerable than before.

Base access on foreign territory is not getting harder

It has been suggested that there has been a movement towards countries refusing use

of their territory for forward basing. Krepinevich has said that Iraq in 2003 “provided

a clear lesson for what has been a growing trend” of denying US access to overseas

bases.230 Saudi Arabia was unwilling to host an invasion force for Iraq. And a vote in

the Turkish Parliament meant that US forces were unable to use this country to set up 226 Los Alamos National Laboratory, ‘Los Alamos Muon Detector Could Thwart Nuclear Smugglers’,news release, New Mexico, 19 February 2005, http://www.lanl.gov/orgs/p/pdfs/muon_rls.pdf; Economist, ‘Muon-assured defence, Using cosmic rays to spot nuclear weapons’, 24 February 2005, http://www.economist.com/science/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3690647227 Krepinevich, 2005, p. 22.228 Olson, Kyle B., ‘Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat’, Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, July-August 1999, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/olson.htm 229 Krepinevich, 2005, p. 23.; National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, ‘Anthrax’, fact sheet, US Department of Health and Human Services, Bethesda, MD, December 2005, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/anthrax.htm

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a northern front against Saddam Hussein. This trend has since been attributed to the

collapse of the Soviet Union which is said to have formerly provided a “bonding

effect on America and its allies”.231 There is however no such trend.

In the first instance it has to be said that the 2003 invasion of Iraq actually involved

the use of bases and transport infrastructure in a considerable number of countries.

The invasion itself was carried out from Kuwait. Special forces operated from Jordan.

US military Central Command was hosted by Qatar. US naval forces in the Gulf were

supported by the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. As well as Kuwait and

Qatar, air strikes were carried out from Oman, British Diego Garcia and Britain. The

United Arab Emirates allowed reconnaissance assets to operate from its territory.

American prepositioned supplies were sent to the South West Asia region from

forward bases in countries including Italy and Germany.232 Egypt honoured its

international obligations concerning the Suez Canal and allowed ships to pass through

on their way to the Persian Gulf. 233 Special forces established a forward operating

base in Romania.234 A number of countries helped by supporting airlift refuelling

including the Portuguese owned Azores, Spain, Ireland, and Bulgaria. Overflight

rights were given by countries across Europe, including France, allowing travel over

the entire continent.235

230 Krepinevich, Andrew, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment’, Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003, p. i., http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/R.20030916.Operation_Iraqi_Fr/R.20030916.Operation_Iraqi_Fr.pdf231 Krepinevich, 2005, p. 90.232 Knights, Michael, ‘Basing Restrictions Shape Concept and Conduct of War’, Policy Watch no. 737, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 31 March 2003, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1615; Pike, John, ‘US Forces Order of Battle – 17 March’, globalsecurity.org, 15 May 2003, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_030317.htm 233Khalil, Nevine, ‘Walking a tight rope’, Al Ahram, Cairo, 3-9 April 2003, Issue No. 632, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/632/eg1.htm 234 Murray and Scales, 2003, p. 178.235 Fournier, Ron, ‘Bush, Blair, Aznar, to meet in Azores’, Associated Press, published in Detroit News, 14 March 2003, http://www.detnews.com/2003/nation/0303/14/nation-108828.htm; Goodman, Al, ‘Spain: No combat role in Iraq War’, CNN online edition, 18 March 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/18/sprj.irq.spain/; Cowan, Rosie, ‘Passion for neutrality fires anti-war campaign’, Guardian, 4 February 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/antiwar/story/0,12809,888512,00.html; Grier, Peter, ‘Lighter Footprint, Longer Reach’, Air Force, October 2003, Vol. 86, No. 10, The Air Force Association, Arlington VA, http://www.afa.org/magazine/oct2003/1003lighter.asp; Bermin, Russell A., ‘“Old Europe” Revolts’, Hoover Digest, No. 2, 2003, http://www.hooverdigest.org/032/berman.html

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While the Saudis did not allow coalition aircraft to fly combat missions they still

managed to provide considerable help for the campaign. The kingdom hosted the

main headquarters for the air war at the Prince Sultan air base. A substantial number

of tanker missions were also flown from their territory, an effort numbering 7,525

sorties delivering 46 million gallons of fuel.236 And while the Turks would not allow

air strikes from their territory they did allow overflight rights.237

Certainly, if one compares the Iraq War with the preceding fight with Saddam

Hussein in the Gulf War of 1990-91, happening as it did prior to the collapse of the

Soviet Union, base access was a more difficult issue for Coalition forces. Access

during the Gulf War will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

However, if one looks back across the Cold War, one does not see a subsequent trend

of countries denying access to the US. There was the US airlift in support of Israel

during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, referred to in the previous chapter. All but one of

America’s NATO allies refused landing and overflight rights. The exception was

Portugal, which allowed use of the Azores Lajes Field.238 Krepinevich himself

concedes that the bombing of Libya in 1986 was badly affected by base access

denial.239 Spain, Italy and Greece all refused the use of bases on their territory and,

with France, all refused overflight rights. The F-111s that took off from Britain were

thus forced to undertake a 6,300-mile, 14-hour trip flying around the Iberian

Peninsular to carry out their missions.240

There are a number of factors which mean that there is no long term trend for or

against ease of access to bases in other countries.

The competitive circumstances of war mean a state will seek what support it can,

including foreign forces, because it may be necessary for its very survival. Thus,

while Saudi Arabia may not have allowed the basing of ground forces in 2003 when it

236 Murray and Scales, 2003, p. 73.237 CNN online edition, ‘Turkey Opens Airspace to US’, 20 March 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/03/20/sprj.irq.turkey.vote/ 238 Boyne, Walter J., The Two O’Clock War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift That Saved Israel, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002), p. 120. 239 Krepinevich, 2005, pp. 89-90.240 Boyne, Walter J., Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the U.S. Air Force 1947-1997, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 286.

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was not under threat of invasion from its northern neighbour, it did so in 1990 when

there was such a threat. Such acceptance of another country’s forces is also by no

means new. The Crimean War of 1853-56 provides a past example when the Turks

sought such help. The Ottoman Empire allowed British, French and Austrian forces

onto its territory in the Balkans to defend against Russia as well as to support the

subsequent operation by the British, French and Sardinians in the Crimea.

Competition is a driving force behind forward base access not only for the benefits of

outside military support but also for benefits that are financial and political. In the

words of Albert Breton, “that the world order is competitive … has, to my knowledge,

never been denied.”241 Governments will compete to provide financial enrichment and

political power and prestige to themselves or else both themselves and their

populations. Hosting a foreign forward base can provide all of these.

In 2001, for example, Uzbekistan was persuaded to host an American presence at

Karshi-Khanabad to support operations in neighbouring Afghanistan through the use

of financial inducements. $15 million was paid for the right to use the air base

itself.242 Although not publicly linked to base access, American aid to the country

peaked at $160 million per year while it was in operation.243

In competing with each other for political power and prestige, countries may accept

forward bases in return for a perceived leverage over decision making. Britain has

accepted American bases in return for the belief that this allows it to be heard louder

in Washington. According to former British foreign secretary Lord Hurd, Britain is

able to gain influence in the United States through the usefulness it shows that

country, part of which comes through forward bases such as that on Diego Garcia.244

Competition cannot explain every circumstance in which another country allows

forward base access. In such cases, a government may have beliefs or an ideology that

241 Breton, Albert, Competitive Governments, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 267.242 Wright, Robin & Ann Scott Tyson, ‘U.S. Evicted from Air Base in Uzbekistan’, Washington Post, 30 July 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/29/AR2005072902038.html 243 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Uzbekistan’, fact sheet, 2004, http://cfrterrorism.org/coalition/uzbekistan.html244 Hurd, Lord Douglas, BISA News, British International Studies Association, May 2002, http://www.bisa.ac.uk/bisanews/0205/bisa0205_9.htm

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coincides with the military action being undertaken by the belligerent which seeks use

of its territory. Tony Blair’s doctrine of ‘international community’, used to support

intervention on the grounds of humanitarianism in Kosovo and the establishment of

democracy in Iraq, was a factor in the British support of American forward base

access in both the Kosovo and Iraq Wars.245 This phenomenon is by no means new, as

is shown by a past Western intervention in the Middle East. The Crusader states of the

11th and 12th centuries, Jerusalem, Tripoli, Antioch and Edessa, were maintained by

troops from Europe bound by a common ideology. They were not only accepted as a

necessity for the strategic survival of these states, they were also there because they

were bound by a commonly held ideal that the Holy Land should be under Christian

control.

To be sure, some states find it harder to gain forward base access than others. They

may not be able to provide the above benefits or it might be perceived that there are

risks involved that outweigh any benefits.

One reason for rejecting a forward basing request from another country is that it may

be too weak to secure its strategic interests and might encourage aggression from an

opponent. Norway and Sweden both rejected British and French transit rights to help

Finland during the Winter War with the Soviet Union in 1939-40. In gaining such

access the Allies had also hoped to deprive Germany of Swedish iron ore. But they

were not seen as sufficiently capable of protecting against German invasion which, in

the case of Norway, was to befall it in April-May 1940.246

A government might fear that allowing access to foreign forces could be an invitation

to occupation. In 1939, Poland refused the Soviet Union the right to fight on its

territory in the event of war with Germany, fearing it would annex part of the country

if they allowed it entry.247 The Soviet Union and its predecessor, Tsarist Russia, had

not provided its neighbour with a history with which it could be confident. Those

245 Blair, Prime Minister Tony, ‘Doctrine of the International Community at the Economic Club, Chicago’, 24 April 1999, 10 Downing Street website: http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1297.asp; Blair, Prime Minister Tony, ‘Prime Minister warns of continuing global terror threat’, 5 March 2004, 10 Downing Street website: http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page5461.asp246 Trotter, William R., A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940, (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin, 1991), pp. 237-9. 247 Keegan, John, The Second World War, (London: Hutchinson, 1989), p. 43.

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fears were borne out by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact that split the country between

Moscow and Berlin the same year.

A country, however, need not be affected by such a concern where it has shown a

track record of leaving a host government in place and even withdrawing having left

the host political system as it found it. The United States, for example, withdrew its

forces from Saudi Arabia in 2003, with the exception of training personnel, having

left the same autocratic government that it found when deploying troops there in

1990.248 Other states with political systems which are not similar to that of the United

States have been willing to host US forces. Uzbekistan is also governed by an

authoritarian regime. When in July 2005 the Uzbek government demanded a US

withdrawal within six months, the Americans complied, leaving before the end of the

year.249

According to Krepinevich, it was the collapse of a superpower that caused Turkey’s

unwillingness to host a northern front against Saddam in 2003. Freed from the Soviet

threat and thus the competitive instinct to survive, it no longer felt the need to support

American policy.

However, one must question the extent to which this affected Turkey’s decision.

Certainly, Turkish support in the 1990-91 Gulf conflict came at a time when Moscow

retained its border with the country. Yet the collapse of its neighbour at the end of

1991 did not cause Turkey to be an unwilling base for US and British aircraft

patrolling the no-fly zones across Iraq in the years up to 2003. Even if this was a

factor in the Turkish decision to withhold support for an American northern front

against Saddam, the assumption that base access in future conflicts is made harder has

to be questioned.

The demise of a superpower need not mean that there are fewer states that feel

threatened by it. This is because, although the frontline may have moved back, there

are still states on that frontline. The collapse of Soviet power has meant that countries

248 Kelley, Matt, ‘Most troops to leave Saudi Arabia in major shift of America’s Gulf presence’, Associated Press, published in the San Diego Union Tribune, 29 April 2003, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20030429-1450-us-saudiarabia.html249 Wright and Tyson, 2005.

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have been released from Moscow’s influence and control, but it is those countries that

are now closest to it geographically. While western Europeans no longer have Russian

troops on their borders, eastern Europeans do. It is because of this, prior to the Iraq

War, that US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was able to point to the “center of

gravity” in Europe “shifting to the east” where NATO’s “new members” were more

supportive of US policy than those of “old Europe”.250

There are also still threats from other third parties. For the Gulf Arab states, all of

which provided base access for coalition forces during the Iraq invasion, such a

danger continues to exist across the Persian Gulf in Iran. As an official of the United

Arab Emirates government puts it, “There has always been an acknowledgement of

the threat in the region”. 251

Moreover, while Great Power competitors certainly fall, new ones also rise. It is to be

noted that Krepinevich views China as a potential threat for the future.252 He says that

“the focus of great power competition has shifted from Europe to Asia.”253 If so, one

must expect that as confrontation with this new Great Power becomes more likely, so

there will be neighbouring countries whose interest in allowing base access for the US

will increase. Yet not only does Krepinevich present the fall of one superpower as

reason for base access to be more difficult, he also fails to acknowledge that this

argument means that the rise of another superpower would therefore make it easier to

obtain. For him, Asia is a region where it will be harder for the US to find allies.254

This is not borne out by the evidence from countries here which have become more

supportive of the US following the collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s growth

as a military power. Krepinevich himself describes India as an ally, a country that was

a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement.255 And one-time foe Vietnam has

strengthened its military ties with the Washington. According to a former China chief

250 Rumsfeld, Donald, US Secretary of Defense, News Transcript, US Department of Defense, 22 January 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1330251 Fattah, Hassan M., ‘Arab States, Wary of Iran, Add to Their Arsenals but Still Lean on the U.S.’, New York Times, 23 February 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/23/world/middleeast/23gulf.html?ex=1329886800&en=1f68b3c69bbe16d6&ei=5088252 Krepinevich, 2005, p. 42.253 Ibid., p. 90.254 Ibid., p. 42.255 Ibid., p. 51.

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at the Pentagon, the country now provides “another potential access point” for

American forces in the region.256

Another concern Krepinevich raises relates to the difficulty of obtaining base access

from democracies. He has expressed the view that they find it more difficult to initiate

military operations in the absence of aggression or clear provocation, as was the case

prior to the Iraq invasion.257 However, whether a country is run by a democratic or

authoritarian government does not appear to affect preparedness to accept forward

basing.

Certainly, governments can be susceptible to public pressure with the spread of

democracy. Although the Turkish government gave its approval for the northern front,

the parliament was unable to provide support in the face of strong public opposition.

Even so, when public support is lacking, this does not mean that forward bases need

be unavailable. Germany’s forward base support during the Iraq invasion provides an

example. Despite using domestic opposition to the prospective war as a plank for

winning re-election in autumn 2002, the German Social Democrat government still

allowed use of bases on its territory. In a democracy, lack of popular support will not

always mean that base access is denied.

To be sure, a more authoritarian state is less likely to be affected by public opinion.

But this does not mean that they are any more likely to allow forward base access.

Individual leaders or ruling groups can also be of the opinion that they do not wish to

support a conflict. While Uzbekistan hosted US forces during the 2001 Afghan War,

Turkmenistan chose not to, with President Niyazov claiming a policy of neutrality.

Moreover, the chances are greater that the state seeking forward base access will have

hostile relations with such a country. Coalition forces did not seek access to bases in

Iran to enter Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, despite long borders with both. Indeed,

military confrontations are more likely to occur with such authoritarian regimes. If

256 David Blumenthal, former China chief at the Pentagon, in Reuters, ‘Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said on Monday that U.S.-Vietnamese ties had reached a "new level" and that the former battlefield enemies would boost military exchanges and training.’ 6 June 2006, retrieved from IISS website: http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2006/june-2006/us-vietnam-ties-at-new-level257 Krepinevich, 2005, p. 83.

92

one is to take the following actions fought by the United States since the end of the

Cold War; Iraq 2003, Afghanistan 2001, Serbia 1999, the Bosnian Serb Republic

1995, and Iraq 1991, all were fought against authoritarian governments of varying

degrees. Such regimes have greater reason to be wary of allowing use of their territory

by an outside military force.

Where Krepinevich is right is in pointing to the difficulty in initiating military

operations in the absence of aggression or clear provocation. In the case of the 2003

Iraq invasion, hosting a forward base offered the same opportunity for financial

inducements and leverage over American policy as in previous conflicts. The problem

for the United States was that other countries did not share the same belief about the

need for the conflict. For example, France under Jacques Chirac and Germany under

Gerhard Schroeder both played an active part in the Kosovo War by sending bombing

raids over Serbia, despite playing a more limited role during the Iraq War, providing

only the overflight and base access that have been mentioned. The same leaders

agreed with military action against Serbia but disagreed with the imperative to use it

against Iraq. As the French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin put it to the

United Nations, there was a belief that the weapons inspection being undertaken in the

country meant there was “still a clear and credible prospect for disarming Iraq

peacefully.”258 A disagreement concerning the appropriateness of going to war on this

occasion did not amount to a longer term trend against support for American forward

basing.

Fighting from the sea continues to be disadvantageous

With basing supposedly becoming more difficult on land, basing at sea has been given

a central role in the US Navy’s Sea Power 21 strategy. According to the Navy, it will

reduce the vulnerability that forces face on land and avoid the problem of gaining

base access from other countries.259 Barnard has even claimed that the basing of 258 de Villepin, Dominique, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, speech to the United Nations Security Council, New York, 19 March 2003, retrieved from the website of the French Embassy in London: http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/article.php3?id_article=4917259 Clark, Adm. Vern, ‘Sea Power 21 Series - Part I: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities’, Proceedings, October 2002, http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROcno10.htm; Moore, Vice Adm. Charles W. Jr., and Lieut. Gen. Edward Hanlon, ‘Sea Power 21 Series - Part IV: Sea Basing: Operational Independence for a New Century’, Proceedings, January 2003,

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equipment and supplies offshore offers a “revolution in power projection”.260 The

Pentagon aims to have the functions of a bridgehead, such as that for the Iraq

invasion, moved offshore after 2015.261

However, it has already been explained that the competitive nature of war means that

military threats to the forward base on land are not growing. Political access too does

not show a trend for becoming any harder. And sea bases are more vulnerable than

those ashore.

At sea, there are fewer possibilities for either side to hide or take cover. To be sure,

coastal features can be utilised. The Battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. provides an

example from as far back as the classical era. The Greeks used the irregularities of the

coast of the island of Salamis to hide their vessels and so allow them to ambush their

Persian opponent. In open sea, however, there is no such terrain.

There is the Earth’s curvature. In 1942, when the Japanese fleet began their effort

aimed at capturing Midway Island, they were unaware of American aircraft carriers

situated over the horizon. The ensuing battle saw four Japanese carriers sunk against

one American, forcing the remainder of the Japanese vessels to retreat westwards.262

The ability to hide behind the Earth’s curvature is however also available on land

where it cannot be seen as an alternative to the use of positions that lie below the

horizon. Territory still has to be fought over at close quarters in order to gain control

over it.

A vessel is harder to find if it hides under water. But a submarine cannot carry a load

equivalent to a ship on the surface, let alone act as a seaborne airfield. During the

Second World War the Japanese diverted many for supplying garrisons in the Pacific

and even produced a new type of cargo carrying vessel. But their use for carrying

http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles03/PROseabasing01.htm260 Barnard, Richard C., ‘Sea Basing Concept Promises a Revolution in Power Projection’, Sea Power, June 2004, http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/jun_04_10.php261 Hilburn, Matt, ‘The ‘Floating Beach’’, Sea Power, June 2006, http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/jun06-20.php262 Van Der Vat, Dan, Pacific Campaign, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 190-92.

94

cargo was in the face of protest from submarine commanders who would have

preferred them to be deployed against American shipping.263

Sea vessels can be hidden by night. It was the cover of darkness that allowed a

Japanese naval squadron to sail undetected into the sound between Guadalcanal and

Florida in the Solomon Islands in August 1942. Their success was such that they left

four Allied cruisers sunk or sinking as well as two destroyers and another cruiser

damaged. With the exception of one Australian cruiser left sinking, the rest were

American, amounting to the worst naval defeat for the United States since 1812.264

During the Battle of Jutland in 1916, the Germany High Seas Fleet made use of

smoke bombs and mist to hide their movements from the British.265 But darkness,

smoke and mist need not hide vessels, just as they need not hide facilities on land. The

use of radar and infrared detection, as described earlier, has made it possible to see

through all of these.

Sea basing is more vulnerable than that on land not only because it can be found more

easily. It is also easier to destroy. While a facility on land can always be repaired, a

base afloat is lost entirely when sunk. This was demonstrated during the Battle of

Midway. Despite the carrier losses, Midway Island took heavy bombardment but was

never sunk.

Moreover, sea basing has to be seen only as an adjunct to basing on land. As Corbett

held, naval power is only an aid to power on land, the human environment, where war

will be, in most cases, ultimately won.266 Ships have rarely proved to have strategic

capability, except when working with land power. A failed attempt to prove that naval

forces can have strategic effect on land without ground forces is found from the First

World War. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, initially thought that

naval bombardment of the Dardenelles in 1915 would be sufficient to knock out guns

on shore and allow passage of the Royal Navy to Constantinople. The Ottoman guns

however proved themselves quite capable of holding out.267

263 Spector, Ronald H., Eagle Against the Sun, (London: Cassell, 2000), pp. 486-7.264 Ibid., p. 194.265 Beatty, David, Admiral, The Beatty Papers, Vol. 1, ed.: B. McL. Ranft, (London: Navy Records Society, 1989), pp. 328-9. 266 Corbett, Julian S., Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (London: Brasseys, 1988), pp. 15-16.267 Ponting, Clive, Churchill, (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994), pp. 171-178

95

In the air power era, ships have been used as alternatives to land-based airfields.

Vessels were first modified to take aircraft during World War I, with the first purpose

built aircraft carrier, the HMS Argus, entering service in 1918.268 However, as has

been previously said, air power has rarely proved itself capable of strategic effect.

While aircraft carriers situated offshore in the Adriatic during the 1999 Kosovo War

combined with land based air power may well have acted strategically in this instance,

as said before, this conflict was an exception. Air power has more often been unable

to act alone strategically except in conjunction with ground forces, needing the Croats

in Bosnia in 1995, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001, or Coalition ground

forces in Iraq in 2003.

The alternative is take control of territory with troops on the ground. But it is much

more difficult to attack an enemy from the sea against an opposed coastline than to

attack across land. In both cases, the attacker is at a disadvantage to the defender. The

disadvantage for an attacker on land has been explained already. To move forward,

the attacker must break cover while the defender can remain hidden. The former is

thus more likely to be seen and therefore targeted and hit.

The amphibious attacker may have rough seas to contend with. The Normandy

landings were postponed by a day because of an anticipated cyclone. It was only

when that changed direction, allowing for calmer seas, that General Eisenhower gave

the order for the invasion.269

The sea provides the attacker with no natural hard cover from which an advance can

be started, or that can be used while the advance is under way. Further to this, a beach

may extend some distance from the hide tide mark, creating open space where the

attacker may still be unable to find cover. The chances of being seen, targeted and hit

are thus increased. The landing at Omaha, the most intensely fought of the Normandy

landings, was not helped by the fact that it took place at low tide when the beach was

up to 300 to 400 metres in width.270

268 Armitage, Michael, ‘Airpower, History of’, Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography, ed. Franklin D. Margiotta, (Washington & London: Brassey’s, 2000), p. 20269 Winters, 1998, pp. 26-8.270 Ambrose, Stephen E., D-Day, (London: Pocket, 2002), p. 320.

96

Low tide can also cause craft to run aground far from the shoreline, a situation

compounded by dangers hiding beneath the water. At Tarawa in 1943, it was a

combination of low tide and coral that caused American boats to get stuck and

become sitting targets for Japanese fire.271 As well as coral reefs, coastlines also

frequently have mudflats or cliffs. As a result only about 20 percent of the world’s

coastlines are suitable for amphibious assault.272

To be sure, the disadvantage of sea basing has not precluded its use within range of

land based forces. The United States used the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait in

1996 to deter a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan. Yet the fact that the US could use

its navy in this instance was due to a disparity of force available to both sides. The

Chinese were not prepared to start a war with a stronger America.273

This need not be possible in all circumstances as the impermanence of Great Power

status takes effect. The resources at the disposal of a potential Chinese invasion of

Taiwan may be greatly increased in future, in which case the vulnerability of sea

power versus that on land would be more obviously apparent. One country cannot

always be stronger than another, a factor repeated throughout this work. Certainly, the

United States never used its aircraft carriers close to the shores of the Soviet Union

during the Cold War as it did against China in 1996. Instead, it relied upon ground

bases to protect its allies.

While sea basing is disadvantageous in comparison to its counterpart on land, this is

not to say that it is necessarily becoming harder. Krepinevich is not right to say that

larger Mobile Offshore Bases, from which aircraft can operate at greater ranges,

should be given serious consideration over conventional vessels operating closer to

shore.274

271 Spector, 2000, pp. 259-67.272 O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan’, International Security, Vol. 25, No 2, Fall 2000, p. 63.273 Chang, Parris H., ‘Lessons From the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis for the U.S., Japan and Taiwan’, Harvard Studies on Taiwan, Papers of the Taiwan Studies Workshop, Volume 3, 2000, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~fairbank/tsw/chang.html274 Krepinevich, 2005, pp. 38, 130.

97

When one looks at actual attacks on aircraft carriers it is not clear that conventional

vessels have really become more vulnerable to enemy firepower than in the past.

Enemy attacks were particular destructive in the Second World War. As said before,

the Battle of Midway saw the Japanese lose four carriers and the Americans one.

Carriers also proved themselves susceptible to the threat from under the water’s

surface. The Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 saw two Japanese carriers,

including the Taiho, the largest in the Imperial Navy, sunk by American

submarines.275

To be sure, there has been nothing comparable in scale to the Pacific War in the years

since 1945. However, the heavy loss of warships to aerial and underwater attack in the

Second World War suggests that they were no less vulnerable at that time than in later

years. Indeed, by comparison, the Falklands War, the subject of Chapter 6, saw no

carriers sunk at all.

The competitive nature of warfare means that just as measures are developed that can

destroy vessels, so countermeasures are also developed. Sea vessels do not become

more vulnerable. Protection for carriers against enemy aircraft and missiles is

provided by their own aircraft, missile systems, and countermeasures such as chaff

and flares. Accompanying vessels provide further protection. Like their counterparts

in the air, it is even possible for ships to employ stealth features. The Visby Corvette,

developed by the Swedish Royal Navy, claims a 99 percent reduction in radar

signature as well as masking of heat sources to reduce infrared and measures to lessen

detection by sonar from under the waves.276

If there is a greater problem for the US Navy, it is a symptom not of technological

change but instead of the success of the United States in the post Cold War era in

which it has become the world’s only superpower. Krepinevich himself has said that

while the Cold War saw the US Navy operating far out at sea, it now finds itself

manoeuvring closer to shore in order to support ground and air forces where the risk

of enemy attack is greater.277 In other words, owing to the lack of a peer competitor at

sea, it has been given a riskier role acting nearer to land. Yet, as even he has conceded 275 Spector, 2000, p. 310.276 Summers, Chris, ‘Stealth ships steam ahead’, BBC News online, 10 June 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3724219.stm

98

elsewhere, “periods of extended military dominance are rare in history, and the

current period will likely prove no exception.”278 As said before, no power can be

stronger than others indefinitely.

277 Krepinevich, Andrew, ‘Arming America’s Soldiers for a New Kind of War’, New York Times, 26 October 2001, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/O.20011026.Arming_Soldiers_fo/O.20011026.Arming_Soldiers_fo.htm278 Kosiak, Krepinevich and Vickers, 2001.

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CHAPTER 4

A SUPERPOWER AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY: BRITAIN

AND THE BOER WAR 1899-1902

Whether fighting at the beginning of the 20th century or at any time since, the

importance of forward basing and the Loss of Strength Gradient has been little

changed. The Boer War of 1899-1902 has been chosen as a conflict fought at trans-

oceanic distance by a superpower of its era, Great Britain, at the start of a century

which Boulding said had witnessed a “military revolution”. It was fought prior to the

invention of heavier-than-air flight, yet one finds that despite the different

technologies of the time, geographic distance was little more of a problem than in

later eras.

This chapter will find that geographic distance was no more a hindrance to supply. It

will show that the British put much effort into sourcing supplies locally rather than

transporting them across the world’s oceans. This minimised the cost of sealift and

also the time that it took items to reach the theatre. It will show that those items sent

had proportional cost relationships over time with transport, meaning that movement

costs were as important as ever in logistics. This will counter Boulding’s view that

cheaper transport should have been causing a fall in the Loss of Strength Gradient. It

will also find that the speed of transport could be little improved upon. The cost and

time advantages from forward basing were thus little different at the beginning of the

20th century from its end.

It will look at the forward located transport infrastructure requirements of the era only

to find that these were no less important at the beginning of the 20th century. There

will be evidence of the difficulty in attempts to reduce the logistics load, such as

efforts at living off the land, miniaturisation and gathering improved information. The

possibility that the latter might have been any worse at providing advance warning of

impending conflict will be countered. Evidence too, will be provided that the load

could not be reduced for the purpose of deterring the opponent.

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Both sides had the means to bombard their opponent from afar but this did not make

forward basing any less important. This chapter will provide evidence undermining

the views of Douhet and more recent strategic air power supporters. In most cases,

remote bombardment could not provide an alternative to ground troops. It will be

found that soldiers had to be sent in to take and occupy territory as they had in

previous and future conflicts. There will be one exception, the Battle of Paardeberg,

which will show that strategic bombardment is a possibility, although the fact of its

exception will demonstrate its rarity.

It will also be found that enemy bombardment and the threat from asymmetric actors

was a problem for the forward base, but these could be overcome as much as they

could a century later. Early evidence of trends for or against foreign base access will

not be found. It will be shown too that the use of basing at sea as a means to retake

South Africa, had the whole territory come under Boer control, would have put the

British at as much a disadvantage as at any time since.

This chapter will provide little evidence that the forward base was any more

advantageous at the beginning of the 20 century than it was at the end.

Historical overview of the war

The Boer War of 1899-1902 began with the invasion of British held Natal and Cape

Colony by the two Boer republics; Transvaal and Orange Free State, on 11 October

1899. This was not the first conflict between the Boers and the British. The Orange

Free State and the Transvaal had been created by Cape settlers of largely Dutch

descent who had objected to the end of slavery throughout the British Empire in 1834.

From 1835 to 1837 around 5,000, taking with them a similar number of slaves, made

the Great Trek north-eastwards beyond British control.

The British annexed one area where the Boers had concentrated, Natal, in 1843 but

recognised the independence of the Transvaal in 1852 and the Orange Free State in

1854. The Transvaal was later annexed in 1877, but an uprising led by Paul Kruger

re-established independence in 1881. In London, newly elected British Prime Minister

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Gladstone was unwilling to pursue the policy of the previous Disraeli government and

rejected any further attempt at adding the Transvaal to the Empire.

It was the consequences of the Rand gold rush of 1886 that provided a new a source

of dispute with the British government leading to the outbreak of war again in 1899.

Foreign workers, known as Uitlanders, many of whom, although not all, were of

British origin, moved into the Transvaal and may have outnumbered male Afrikaner

voters in the Republic.279 Kruger, now Transvaal president, limited extension of the

franchise in 1888 by raising the residence qualification from five to fourteen years

and denying the vote to the newcomers.

A failed attempt to start an uprising by the Uitlanders, the Jameson Raid, was

undertaken in December 1895 - January 1896. While unaided by the British

government, the Chartered Company of Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Beit, which

launched the Raid, had British annexation as its aim. The Transvaal subsequently

embarked on an arms build up concerned by the possibility of future British attack.280

1899 saw negotiations between Britain and the Transvaal over extension of the

franchise. The Transvaal offered to lower the residence qualification back to five

years but with a condition that the British should end their claim to suzerainty and

promise not to intervene on behalf of British subjects in the Republic. This was

rejected by the British, as was a subsequent Transvaal proposal that it should put a

seven year franchise in place with a possible joint enquiry. With the break down of

talks, both parties saw war as inevitable. The Boers issued a two-day ultimatum for

the immediate withdrawal of British troops from their borders as well as the further

withdrawal of forces from South Africa. The British rejected this and with it the two

Republics attacked on 11 October.281

The war saw initial successes for the Boers. In Natal, they were aided by the

positioning of British forces in the north of the colony, despite being warned by

General Redvers Buller to pull back to the Tugela River which could have been used

279 Pakenham, Thomas, Boer War, (London: Abacus, 1992), p. 64.280 Ibid., p. 41.281 Ibid., pp. 82-109.

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as a natural line of defence.282 After pushing back British forces closest to the border,

the Boers laid siege to Ladysmith where supplies and troops had been concentrated

and which were thus separated from forces further south that might have used them.

The Boers then crossed the Tugela, penetrating another thirty miles to Mooi River, at

which point they were halfway to the coast. In the west they crossed the border into

the Cape Colony, laying siege to the diamond town of Kimberley, and to Mafeking,

close to the base for the Jameson Raid less than four years previously.

The arrival of overseas reinforcements aided the British although it took several

months to retake lost territory. The sieges at Kimberley and Ladysmith were lifted in

February 1900. Mafeking waited until May. The push to take control of the Boer

Republics was launched from the Cape. The British took Bloemfontein, the capital of

the Orange Free State, in March, and declared the Republic’s annexation two months

later. The Transvaal capital, Pretoria, fell on 5 June 1900 with the formal

proclamation of the Transvaal’s annexation declared in October.

Yet this did not bring the war to an end. The fighting entered a new phase of guerrilla

warfare that took longer to quell than the previous part of the conflict. A system of

blockhouses was constructed. This divided the veldt, impeding movement of the

Boers, isolating them and allowing for their capture. The civilian population was also

rounded up so that they could not provide the guerrillas with support. It would

however take until 31 May 1902 for the Boers to sign surrender terms.

According to the Royal Commission Report on the war, a total of 448,435 troops

fought on the British side during the period of the conflict. There was a pre-existing

garrison of 9,940 in South Africa while a further 50-60,000 were raised there. But

most came from overseas. Of these, 337,219 came from the British Isles. Another

18,534 British were sent from India while 30,328 were raised elsewhere in the

Empire, mostly in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.283

282 Buller, Gen. Sir Redvers, ‘General Buller’s account of events from his appointment as Commander in Chief, South Africa, in June 1899, until his occupation at Standerton on 22 June 1900’, National Archives, London, date given as ‘post 1900’, WO 132/24.283 RCSAW (Royal Commission on the War in South Africa), (London: HMSO, 1903), Vol. I, p 35.

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PART 1 – THE ADVANTAGE OF FORWARD LOCATIONS FOR

LOGISTICS

Use of forward located supplies

The Boer War involved a global logistical effort. According to Alfred Thayer Mahan,

the transportation required by the war in South Africa was “an incident

unprecedented, and in its success unsurpassed, in military history.”284 The British had

to transport their animals, equipment and supplies, as well as personnel, across the

world’s oceans. As a result they found it advantageous to make as much use as they

could of that which was locally available, demonstrating the importance of forward

locations as implied by Boulding’s Loss of Strength Gradient.

Within the conflict zone much transport was provided by locally acquired horses,

mules and oxen. 159,000 horses out a total of 519,000 were sourced for the campaign

within South Africa.285 Local sourcing was increased towards the end of 1900 as what

was described as a “prejudice” against South African horses, which were smaller and

thought less capable, was overcome, and enemy horses were captured.286

45,000 mules and donkeys out of a total of 151,000 were sourced for the campaign

within South Africa.287 Trek oxen, meanwhile, were almost entirely sourced from

within South Africa. Colonel Sir W. D. Richardson, Deputy Adjutant General for

Supplies and Transport during the first phase of the conflict, said in his evidence to

the Royal Commission on the war that 150,000 trek oxen were used in the first 15

months, more than double the combined number of locally sourced horses and

mules.288 Only 54,000 horses and 18,500 mules had been acquired in South Africa by

this point.289

284 Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Story of the War in South Africa 1899-1900, (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1900), p. 85.285 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2, p. 258, Appendix No. 38a.286 Smith, F, Maj.-Gen., A Veterinary History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, (London: H & W Brown, 1919), pp. 132-3.287 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2, p. 258, Appendix No. 38a.288 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 1, p. 139.289 Calculated from statistics in Smith, F, Maj.-Gen., A Veterinary History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, (London: H & W Brown, 1919), p. 142.

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Much transport equipment was obtained locally. Following the Boer invasions in late

1899 there were still 563 engines, 779 coaches, plus the equivalent of 7,041 short

trucks in the Cape and 1,363 six and eight wheeled trucks in Natal, all on the British

side available for military use. Moreover, orders for further rolling stock to be built

during the war were placed within South Africa. Manufacture was carried out at Salt

River in Cape Town, Uitenhage outside Port Elizabeth, and East London.290

The British also made use of what rolling stock was captured from the enemy.

Lieutenant Colonel Percy Girouard, the Director of Railways, said of one incident in

which eight locomotives and 200 trucks were found at Elandsfontein near

Johannesburg that these had been of “incalculable value”. More rolling stock was

found elsewhere within the newly occupied territories. Their importance was that they

provided relief to a supply line that became increasingly stretched as the advance into

the Boer Republics progressed.291

Off-rail transport was also greatly dependent upon locally procured equipment. The

British bought 1,400 ox wagons in South Africa up to March 1900, and a total of

2,163 other wagons and carts within the region during the war. Local companies,

principal of which was Julius Weil, were contracted as suppliers.292

The British relied upon stocks of coal that were already available in South Africa to

supply ships and trains. The naval base at Simon’s Town near Cape Town for

example had a reserve of 13,000 tons at the start of the war. Mined coal was also

sourced from within South Africa once the collieries of northern Natal and the

Transvaal were in British hands.293

Construction material was in part locally sourced. The repair of railway bridges

within the Transvaal was conducted with the use of locally available railway material

and timber. In one instance, a temporary bridge was constructed across the Vaal River

at the Transvaal border using the dismantled headworks of a nearby coal shaft.294

290 Girouard, Lt-Col. Sir E. P. C., History of the Railways During the War in South Africa, 1899-1902, (London: HMSO, 1903), pp. 53, 55.291 Girouard, 1903, pp. 40-1, 54.292 Calculated from statistics in RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2, p 222, Appendix No. 33.293 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2. Minutes of Evidence, p. 384; Girouard, 1903, p. 21.294 Girouard, 1903, pp. 39-40.

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Much food was bought locally. The supply of meat to the troops at the Cape was

contracted out to the South African Cold Storage Company.295 The British also grew

and raised their own locally produced food. During the guerrilla phase of the war they

took control of 70 vacant Boer farms for this purpose. Even land around blockhouses

and lines of communication was cultivated.296

The advantage of sourcing supplies from forward locations was not much different to

any period in the subsequent one hundred years. This was because it did not present a

greater saving whether measured in terms of cost or in time saved. The fact that the

impetus to derive supplies from forward positions was much the same as in the

following case studies on the Gulf and Falklands Wars provides evidence showing

that Boulding was wrong to argue that his Loss of Strength Gradient was undergoing

decline.

Cost of transport

In Boulding’s view, cheaper transport was meant to be a reason for a decline in the

LSG. Falling transport costs over time should have meant easier movement and

reduced reliance upon forward locations for the sourcing of supplies. But the supplies

sent in support of the Boer War do not provide evidence to support this argument.

Items shipped to South Africa were for the most part those, established in Chapter 2,

that possess proportional cost relationships with transport over time. This means that

as the price of such items falls so there is the tendency for the price of transport to fall

by the same amount. The result of this in the competitive circumstances of war in

which as much as possible will be sent, is that geographic distance remains as

important as ever.

Such items that possess a proportional cost relationship with transport include goods

with a duel use in civilian life. Coal was an important constituent of the war’s supplies

295 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 1. Evidence, pp. 269-71.296 Ibid., Vol. 2. Evidence, p. 357.

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and because the early part of the war saw coal production situated in the Transvaal

and northern Natal cut off from the British territories, it was an important part of the

load sent from Britain. Ships were heavy consumers. The Umbria, for example, one

of the faster ships that took part in the build up, was ordered to steam at 17 knots in

order to save fuel. Even so, it still managed to consume 235 tons of coal a day, all of

which had to be sourced from Britain.297 It was important too for the railways. One

train of the eight that were required daily as the British advanced through the northern

Orange Free State carried coal.298

The coal trains also carried construction materials, some of which were transported

from Britain as well. Having assessed locally available supplies would not be enough

for railway reconstruction, between 40 and 50 girders and enough timber to rebuild

destroyed bridges along the whole length of the Orange Free State was shipped to

South Africa.299 There were also items to aid the various forms of construction work

involved in the war. Up to September 1900, 27,404 felling axes, 39,435 pick axes,

47,028 shovels and 14,645 spades had been purchased in Britain and sent to the

conflict zone.300

As has been mentioned, animals were an important part of the load needed for the

campaign. Up to 360,000 horses were sourced from outside South Africa, principally

from the United States, followed by Britain, then the Empire, Austria and South

America. Up to 111,000 mules and donkeys were also sourced from outside South

Africa, mostly from the US.301 Further supplies associated with animals, bought from

trade and sent to South Africa up to 30 September 1900, included 42,826 mule

harness sets, 23,249 saddlery sets, and 82½ tons of wagon grease.302 2,233 wagons

were also sent from Britain.303

Numerous other items with a duel use in civilian life are to be found in the Royal

Commission report on the war. There was equipment sent for eating, drinking,

297 Calculated from statistics in RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 1. Minutes of Evidence, p 407-8.298 Girouard, 1903, pp. 39-40.299 Ibid., pp. 8, 39-40.300 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2, p 187, Appendix No. 28.301 Calculated from statistics in RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2, p. 258, Appendix No. 38a.302 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2, p 187, Appendix No. 28.303 Calculated from statistics in RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2, p 222, Appendix No. 33.

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cooking and cleaning. By 30 September 1900, 298,019 water bottles, 41,105 camp

kettles, and 384,062 bars of soap had been purchased in Britain and sent to South

Africa. Tents and bedding were bought within Britain for the campaign. Up to 30

September 1900, 20,647 tents, 942 marquees, 466,055 blankets, and 303,254

waterproof sheets had been sent.304

Many more items were pre-paid. As also established in Chapter 3, items that are

purchased before war must have a proportional relationship over time with transport

costs for the reason that their own costs from the point of view of the operation are

zero. Food was one such item. The British were able to draw upon pre-paid food

reserves that were kept at Woolwich prior to the war sufficient to feed a force of

40,000 men and 20,000 horses. There were 50 days supply of preserved meat, 30 days

supply of groceries and 15 days supply of biscuit, as well as 25½ days supply of hay

and compressed forage.305

Of the purely military supplies, much also came from pre-existing stocks. 117,745

rifles, 8,480 carbines, and 2,297 pistols were sent out between 1 June 1899 and the

end of the war.306 Britain also had an available stock of approximately 172 million

rounds of small arms ammunition at the start of the war.307

The length and intensity of the war was however to prove too great for Britain’s pre-

existing weapons stockpile with much of the war’s needs met from new production.

Ammunition was to prove a particular concern as some 66 million rounds of the pre-

war stock were found to be defective, leaving a remaining 106 million which were

insufficient to cover the amount demanded in South Africa. Approximately 139

million rounds of small arms ammunition were sent to South Africa between 1 June

1899 and 1 June 1902. The government owned ordnance factories as well as the

private sector were called upon to meet the shortfall.308

304 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2, p 187, Appendix No. 28.305 Calculated from statistics in RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2, p 219, Appendix No. 33.306 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 1, p. 93.307 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 86.308 Calculated from statistics in RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 1, pp. 85-6.

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The demands in autumn 1899 for the build-up for the planned advance from the Cape

also exposed difficulties in supplying artillery ammunition. On 20 November, the

Secretary of State for War cabled Buller telling him that all gun ammunition would be

exhausted within eight weeks. A total of 427,838 rounds were used during the war

relying again on production by the ordnance factories and private companies as well

as pre-existing stocks.309

To be sure, supplies in the later case studies are nearly all either dual use civilian

goods or pre-paid items. There is little reliance upon wartime production for the Gulf

in 1990-91 or the Falklands War of 1982. This will itself show the continued

importance of the LSG between the conflicts looked at in this work because both dual

use civilian and pre-paid goods have already been demonstrated to have a

proportional relationship with transport costs over time.

However, even if this were not the case, there is evidence from the Boer War that

backs the argument made in Chapter 2 that Kennedy’s “upward spiral” in military

equipment costs, causing it to diverge from the civilian, is the result of short

production runs and is therefore only temporary.310 The price of military equipment

was pushed up by short production runs and pushed down by long production runs in

this era just as it could be at the other end of the 20th century. The two leading

commercial suppliers of guns and ammunition during the conflict, hoping to increase

peacetime government orders, both gave evidence about this to the Royal

Commission following the war.

Lieutenant Arthur Dawson, Managing Director of Vickers, Sons and Maxim, argued

that the production of military supplies in larger volumes over a longer time frame

with people continually employed, increased efficiency and reduced cost to the

government. The use of short production runs incurred extra expense because of the

need, for example, to cover the cost of new gauges and jigs for items they had not

previously produced.311 Sir Andrew Noble, Chairman of Sir William Armstrong,

Whitworth and Company, said too that men had to be trained and tools and gauges

309 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 1, pp. 87-8.310 Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, (London: Fontana, 1989), pp. 570-1.311 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2. Minutes of Evidence, p. 490.

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had to be provided, all of which took a great deal of preparation.312 Dawson also

pointed to the fact that after the war government factories were producing explosive

powder on three shifts continuously to keep prices down: evidence of economies of

scale in action.313

Although this is not of concern for comparison with the remaining two case study

chapters, this provides yet more substance to the argument that divergences of

military manufacturing costs from civilian manufacturing costs such as that in the late

20th century, previously discussed in Chapter 2, are not permanent.

Speed of transport

The time that it took troops to reach South Africa was important. Forces were needed

to defend Britain’s South African colonies from the possibility of attack. Moreover,

the very act of sending them was an encouragement to the Boers. When the decision

was made to send troops on 8 September 1899, the British Prime Minister, the

Marquis of Salisbury, expressed the concern not just that war might begin when

troops arrived at the front but also that the Boers might rush Natal when they heard

they were being sent.314 Indeed the Transvaal saw this very opportunity in a plan

presented by Jan Smuts, the Republic’s state attorney, at the beginning of September

1899.315 It was only because the Transvaal was initially unable to get the support of

the Orange Free State as an ally that the attack was not carried out earlier than it was.

Despite receiving news on 9 September of the sending of British reinforcements, it

was not until 2 October that the Free State mobilised.316 It was of advantage to Britain

that it should get its forces to the region as quickly as possible.

Mahan’s estimate from 162 records of vessels sailing from Britain was that the

average length of a transport’s voyage to Cape Town in 1899 was 22 days.317 Several

312 Ibid., Vol. 2. Minutes of Evidence, p. 487.313 Ibid., Vol. 2. Minutes of Evidence, p. 492.314 Pakenham, 1992, p. 94.315 Smuts, Jan, Selections from the Smuts Papers I, eds. Hancock, W.K., & Van Der Poel, J., (Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 325-6.316 Ibid., pp. 102-3.317 Mahan, 1900, p. 106-7.

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more days were then needed to reach Natal. The first brigade from Britain arrived at

the Cape on 9 November, reaching Durban only by the 15th.318 Advantage was thus to

be had from forward prepositioning. In this the British were able to rely upon troops

based in India to get to the front line first. While Britain was 7,000 miles by sea from

Natal, the distance between Bombay and Durban was just 4,000 miles. More troops

came from Egypt, Malta and Crete, also closer to Natal than Britain. It was with the

help of the more rapid deployment allowed for by forward basing that most of the

ships docked at Durban by 9 October, the day of the Boer ultimatum to the British.319

Extra days at sea could have allowed the Boers to take much more territory beyond

northern Natal and the border areas of the Cape Province. Certainly, Smuts expressed

the hope that the British would be driven from the whole of South Africa.320 The

quicker the British arrived, the less lost territory they had to reconquer.

And the time saved by prepositioning at a forward location was not greatly different

from that at the end of the 20th century. Everything sent from Britain, or from parts of

the British Empire other than South Africa, had to be transported by sea. It was the

same situation for imported supplies from elsewhere in Europe or the Americas. In

this era, sealift was approaching limits imposed by the physics of water, beyond

which disproportionate effort is required for increased speed. As a result, as discussed

in Chapter 2, there was to be little improvement over the next century.

The fastest of the civilian ships used as transports for the Boer campaign was the 20

knot White Star Line ship, Majestic. Purpose designed for conversion to an armed

merchant cruiser, the vessel held the trans-Atlantic record in 1891 of 5 days, 18 hours

and 8 minutes. Steaming at a speed of 20 knots, Majestic would have beaten most of

the cargo ships used a century later in the Falklands War and the Gulf War.321

To be sure, a comparison of Mahan’s estimate with that of the ships that sailed to

South West Asia in 1990-91, reported in the next chapter, shows that the time vessels

took to reach South Africa was 15 to 30 percent less, mile-for-mile, than those which

supported the Gulf War. Not all the vessels available to the British had yet reached the

318 Ibid., p. 106-7; Pakenham, 1992, p. 161. 319 Pakenham, 1992, pp. 103.320 Smuts, 1966, pp. 325-6. 321 Haws, Duncan, Merchant Fleets in Profile, (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1978-80), Vol. 2, p. 190.

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technological advancement of trans-Atlantic liners such as the Majestic. They ranged

as low as the 10 knots of the British India Steam Navigation Company’s Uganda.322

And there was also a shortage of coal which slowed vessels more than would

otherwise have been the case. As was said earlier with regard to the Umbria, with

South African coal production largely in Boer-held territory, vessels were compelled

to steam more slowly to save fuel. As a result, the Majestic could not translate its top

speed capability into a top sailing time. The record from Britain to the Cape, set in

1893 by the 18 knot SS Scot of the Union Line at less than 15 days, continued to be

held throughout the war.323

Even so, in terms of capability, most vessels in subsequent years could add little to the

fastest of those in the era of the Boer War. Sealift technology at this time had pushed

speed to a point where physics allowed for little further alteration to the Loss of

Strength Gradient.

Having docked at South Africa’s ports, most of the journey to the front was then made

by railway. Services at the outbreak of war made the 500 mile journey between Cape

Town and De Aar, a location where supplies were stockpiled, in a time of between 23

and 27 hours.324 This implied average speeds of 19 to 22 miles per hour. The

Governor of Natal reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1898 that the

average speed of a train for the transmission of troops and stores on the Natal

Railway, not helped by the existence of steep gradients and sharp curves on the line,

was around 20 miles per hour.325 These speeds are little different to the 20-25 miles

per hour average for American freight trains a century later, spoken of in Chapter 2.

The remainder of the journey on land was most often conducted by animal power. It is

here where there is significant variance with speeds achieved in later decades. Pack

animals could not compare with motorised trucks. Across the veldt, mules could be

322 Haws, Duncan, Merchant Fleets: Vol. 11. British India S. N. Co. (Hereford, England: TCL Publications, 1987), p. 82.323 Haws, 1978-80, Vol. 3, p. 31.324 Cape Government Railways, Official Pocket Time Table, Cape Town, October 1899.325 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2, p 358, Appendix No. 54.

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expected to do only up to sixteen to eighteen miles in a whole day. Oxen were worse

still, able only to do up to twelve miles.326

The horse could travel distances much more speedily, but even where cavalry were

used in this war they had frequently to wait for the pack animals that carried or pulled

the extra equipment and supplies from the railheads. Those sent on 10 January 1900

as part of the movement prior to the Battle of Spion Kop, had another five days of

waiting before the necessary equipment and supplies were in place ready for a battle

that was still to be a defeat for the British.327

The horse came to be comparatively more important in the guerrilla stage of the war.

The British relied less on heavy equipment than upon mobility across the veldt which

the horse provided them. The British proved capable of mobile columns that could

survive almost independently for up to six days.328 But with this exception, most effort

was required for supplying fixed positions best served by the railways or else by

mules and oxen. There were the blockhouse lines, which were used to limit Boer

mobility and clear them from entire districts as well as protect the railways

themselves. Ports and towns, not only in the Boer Republics, but also in the Cape

Colony where Afrikaners made up the majority of the white population, also needed

protection from guerrilla attack.329

Motorised road haulage made an appearance in the war. 31 traction engines were

brought from Britain, with one more bought in Cape Town and another requisitioned

in Bloemfontein. However, according the Deputy Adjutant General for Supplies and

Transport, Colonel Sir W. D. Richardson, the traction engine was “unfitted for field

service.” Although at times it was useful for moving heavy artillery from place to

place, it ruined roads in the towns and on the veldt it could not travel more than a few

miles from water.330

326 Maurice, Major General Sir Frederick and Captain Maurice Harold Grant, History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, Official History, (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1906-10), Vol. 1, p. 416.327 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 2, p. 341-2.328 Pakenham, 1992, p. 540.329 Ibid., p. 496. 330 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2, p. 212, Appendix No. 32 & p 245, Appendix No. 35.

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Reliance on the pack animal for the final leg of the journey did not mean that the Loss

of Strength Gradient was much steeper than later in the 20th century. Most land

transport was by rail and even this was very short compared to the total distance from

Britain. Of the distance over which personnel, animals, equipment and supplies were

sent to South Africa, land transport made up only a small fraction compared to water.

While it was 6,000 miles from Britain to the Cape, it was only 570 miles from Cape

Town to Orange River close to where the Boers had pushed westwards into British

territory, less than 10 percent of the journey. The route was shorter still when other

ports were used. Port Elizabeth was 409 miles from Orange River, and 326 miles from

the southernmost Boers at Stormberg. And East London was closer still to Stormberg

at approximately 221 miles. Shortest of all was the journey required to cross Natal.

After a 7,000 mile voyage from Britain to Durban, the final leg to the Tugela River

was only over 150 miles by rail, just 2 percent of the journey.

Distances on land were greater as the British later pushed into the Boer Republics.

Pretoria was 741 miles by railway from Port Elizabeth. But when Buller’s forces

pushing north from Natal met with Field Marshall Lord Roberts pushing west in the

Transvaal in July 1900, the overland supply line to the city was reduced in length to

511 miles. This length of railway leading from Durban was not even 7 percent of the

total journey from Britain.

Even if the distance to the ports within Britain, the main source of supply, is added to

these calculations, it makes little difference. Nowhere in Britain was far from a port.

Even centrally-located Birmingham was only 90 miles from Liverpool. Sealift was by

far the most important means of transport.

It is to be added that the sea would have been the far cheaper option even if there had

been an alternative overland route from Britain to South Africa. In the financial years

between 1899 and 1903, the British Army saw expenditure on sea transport of over

£28 million while that on land transport in South Africa was over £13 million.331 This

was almost half as much even though the distance involved was comparatively far

less.

331 Ibid., Vol. 2, p 335, Appendix No. 50.

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Infrastructure and bottlenecks

The extent of forward located transport infrastructure required was not greatly

different to the later wars to be investigated in the next two chapters. The competitive

impetus to get supplies to the front line meant there was advantage to be gained from

this just as there would be at the end of the 20th century.

Ports were needed. By far, most vessels sailed from British ports at Southampton, the

Mersey and the Thames. There were intermediate coaling stations at Las Palmas in

the Canary Islands and São Vicente in the Cape Verde Islands. The British kept a

warship at each during the conflict to watch over the transport effort.332 Ports were

needed in South Africa. Cape Town was the largest of these, with Port Elizabeth, East

London and Durban also used. That the British could have done with more forward

located transport infrastructure was shown by the fact that bottlenecks arose as it

proved unable to cope with the exceptional demand placed upon it by war.

The official history of the war described Cape Town as ranking “among the great

commercial harbours of the world”.333 But this did not mean that it was capable of

meeting the demands placed upon it. Between October 1899 and June 1901, the port

handled 147,000 tons of supplies and stores, 73,000 animals, and 372 guns, as well as

the arrival of 211,000 military passengers that were then sent on by rail to the conflict

zone.334 Congestion at the port was such that ships were often kept waiting two

months for discharge. In contrast with the official history, Mahan’s contention was

that it was a merely a “third-class port”. It was not equivalent in capacity to Liverpool

or London from which it derived much of the supplies. He said that it could not be

suddenly raised to the business of one of the first class’s description.335

The issue of port capacity was worse elsewhere in the Cape Colony. Because Port

Elizabeth and East London were closer to the conflict zone, the British placed heavy

reliance upon them. In terms of supplies and stores alone, both ports actually handled

332 Mahan, 1900, p. 95-6.333 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 1, pp. 56-7.334 Girouard, 1903, p. 60.335 Mahan, 1900, p. 99.

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more than Cape Town. Between October 1899 and June 1901, 232,000 tons passed

through Port Elizabeth while 185,000 tons passed through East London. Port

Elizabeth also sent on 65,000 animals, 9 guns, and 47,000 military passengers, while

East London sent on 55,000 animals, 65 guns, and 41,000 military passengers.336

All this had to be achieved with poor sealift facilities. Port Elizabeth had no true

harbour but only an open roadstead exposed to the south-east gales prevalent on that

coast. East London had only a small harbour. Ocean steamers could moor alongside

the railway wharf, but the water area was limited and a sandbank at the mouth of the

river here barred vessels exceeding 4,000 tons.337

Problems were to be found with onshore port capacity. This difficulty was illustrated

by the experience of the Louisiana which arrived at East London on 11 March 1900.

The War Office had proposed charging its owner for stores which it said had not been

delivered. However, the congested state of the wharves meant that its cargo was

stacked on top of and around the cargoes of other vessels. It was not possible to verify

the amount delivered. Without room to stack the stores for a recount much was loaded

onto railway trucks direct, leaving no chance to rectify errors before leaving the port.

The master of the vessel also saw pilfering from the cases left exposed on the

dockside. The Director of Transports recommended exemption for the ship from

being charged “in consequence of the war”.338

The ports were poorly connected to each other by railway. Natal’s railway

infrastructure was unconnected to that of the Cape despite both colonies being

contiguous with each other. Maurice, one of the authors of the official history,

claimed that this was of “little consequence” to a power that had command of the

sea339, but as already said, congestion at the ports did not make transfer of equipment

and supplies an easy affair. A concentration of forces in either of the colonies would

have been difficult to achieve. Supplies already landed at the Cape could not easily be

moved to Natal and vice versa. In this regard the Boers were advantaged by their

336 Girouard, 1903, p. 60.337 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 1, pp. 56-7.338 War Office, ‘Stores shown on receipted bills of loading as short delivered at Cape Ports from ships engaged to convey government cargo. Proposal to exempt ship from charges on account of, in consequence of the war,’ 18 December 1900, National Archives, London, 1900, MT 23/124.339 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 1, p. 57.

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interior lines of communication. In a letter sent in December 1898 prior to the war, to

Lieutenant General Sir W. Butler, who was then commanding in South Africa, the

War Office in London recognised that, as a result, fighting in both colonies had to

operate from separate bases.340

This had implications for use of the port at Durban. Pre-war improvement here had

removed a sandbank that had barred larger ships much as was still the case at East

London.341 This aided Buller’s fight in Natal but could not support the invasion from

the Cape Colony. Between October 1899 and June 1901, 92,000 military passengers,

76,000 animals, 166 guns, were sent north by rail from the port to the conflict zone.

However, it is a most striking effect of the redirection of support to the Cape that it

handled just 1,305 tons of supplies and stores.342

The Cape ports were, by comparison, connected to each other by railway. There were

two branch lines; De Aar – Naauwpoort, connecting the lines running north from

Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, and Rosmead – Stormberg, connecting the lines

running north from Port Elizabeth and East London. Despite his previous contention

that the lack of a rail connection with Natal was of little consequence, Maurice

emphasised the importance of these lines, by saying that they had “a significance

hardly inferior” to that of the three Cape ports themselves.343

The reliance upon the railways for land movement necessitated a continuous

infrastructure just as reliance upon roads, in combination with railways, would

increasingly do so later in the twentieth century. The value of the rail infrastructure

was such that its existence greatly dictated the planning of the war. The British

realised its importance for advancing into the Boer Republics. A memorandum

entitled ‘The Direction of a Line of Advance Against the Transvaal’ of 3 June 1899

prepared by the Intelligence Division of the War Office contended that a lack of any

railway between Fourteen Streams, north of Kimberley, and the Transvaal capital

eliminated that route from consideration. By comparison, a route through the Orange

Free State had the advantage that it could be fed by three railways from three ports,

340 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 36. 341 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 57.342 Girouard, 1903, p. 60.343 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 1, pp. 56-7.

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that is Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London. The memorandum concluded

“the main line of advance against the Transvaal should be based on the Cape Colony,

and should follow generally the line of railway through the Orange Free State to

Johannesburg and Pretoria.”344

However, that rail connection, which ran from the south of the Free State, was

inconvenient for Kimberley to the west. Kimberley was to be relieved before pushing

on to Bloemfontein. For this Buller would build a new railway east from the Cape to

Kimberley line. He telegraphed Lieutenant General Methuen, Commanding Officer of

the relief expedition for Kimberley on 16 December 1899 suggesting that he should

lay a few miles of railway to his right flank. Buller wanted initial construction as far

as Jacobsdaal approximately 10 miles to the east. This was to improve his lack of

mobility as the front was pushed east. The line was then to be extended the further 90

miles to Bloemfontein.345

Roberts was appointed to replace Buller as Commander-in-Chief in South Africa on

18 December, leaving the latter in command only of those forces in Natal. Buller’s

plan for the railway had now to be approved by his successor. In a memorandum of

28 December 1899, Buller reported to Roberts that “there is no such thing as a rapid

advance anywhere in South Africa, except by railway.” Roberts ridiculed the idea. His

plan was instead to carry out an overland march towards Bloemfontein along the same

route from the west, but without using a railway. The aim was to surprise the Boers,

which could not be achieved by constructing a new rail line.346

Amery, who later approved of Roberts’ decision in the Times History, wrote in

December 1899 that the British let the existence of railways completely paralyse their

movements. He said that to improvise other transport required thinking out afresh as it

was not in the original programme and so was not done.347

344 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 39-40.345 Buller, ‘post 1900’, pp. 38, 43.346 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 1, p. 416; Pakenham, 1992, pp. 380-1.347 Amery, Leo, The Leo Amery Diaries, John Barnes and Davis Nicholson, eds., (London, Hutchinson, 1980), Vol. 1; Amery, Leo, ed., Times History of the War in South Africa, (London: Sampson, Low, Marsten & Co., 1900-09), Vol. 3, p. 340.

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Activities were carried out to convince the Boers that that an advance towards

Bloemfontein would be made along the one existing railway from the south.

Intelligence papers captured in Natal in October 1899 suggested this route. In the few

weeks after Roberts was appointed the only fierce fighting was around Colesberg to

the south, suggesting a wish to secure the passage of the Orange River at Norval’s

Pont, also necessary for this route. The distribution of troops showed Norval’s Pont to

be the central point of the front of such an attack. The fighting forces left around

Colesberg were used as a screen for the removal of troops from the Naauwpoort -

Colesberg region to the Kimberley railway.348 Bogus telegrams were sent ‘in clear’

and then cancelled in cipher. Rumours were spread among the soldiers and off-the-

record briefings were given to a journalist known for publishing confidential

information.349

The attempt to fool the Boers had only partial success. The records of the Orange Free

State railway show that between 27 December and 13 January only 2,700 men passed

through Bloemfontein on their way south to Norval’s Pont.350 Free State President

Steyn proposed the despatch of reinforcements south from Magersfontein, near the

Kimberley railway, at the end of January. General Christiaan De Wet refused, fearing

that if Magersfontein was weakened, the British would make Kimberley their point of

attack instead.351

Indeed Roberts’ ruse would arguably have posed a considerable risk to the British had

it worked. The railways that supplied them from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East

London, including the connecting branch lines, ran close to the Free State’s southern

border. De Aar, in particular, was the point where the Cape-Kimberley railway

connected with the other ports and was the chief railway junction in the north of the

colony. Buller had arranged for the accumulation of supplies not only at Orange

River, closest to where Roberts planned to launch his attack, but also at De Aar, Port

Elizabeth and East London, allowing for new lines of supply to be opened as they

moved eastward.352 A concentration of Boers in the southern Free State, deliberately

348 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 1, pp. 429-30.349 Pakenham, 1992, p. 317; Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 1, pp. 411-2.350 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 1, p. 435.351 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 435.352 Buller, ‘post 1900’, p. 19.

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encouraged by the plan, posed a risk to the supply dump at De Aar as well as the

likelihood that further resupply from the ports would not be possible.

It should be added that Roberts’ plan was by no means devoid of the need for rail

infrastructure construction. The redeployment of 30,000 soldiers between 26 January

and 12 February 1900, plus horses, mules, oxen, guns, and transport, was the largest

troop movement carried out by the railways in the war. To this had to be added further

troops and supplies being forwarded from the ports. Handling all of this required the

construction of 10 miles of railway sidings at points between the Orange and Modder

Rivers from where the overland march was to begin. Then, having arrived at

Bloemfontein, more new sidings were required to handle supplies once the railway

linking the Free State capital to the Cape ports had been reopened.353

Having set off on 11 February, disaster struck Roberts’ army four days later at

Waterval Drift. After much difficulty in crossing the Riet River owing to steep,

broken river banks and soft, sticky mud, Roberts’ oxen-pulled supply convoy was left

behind on the north bank to graze and recuperate. A Boer raiding party led by General

De Wet stampeded the oxen. This was nearly a third of the transport available to

Roberts for the advance on Bloemfontein.354

Men and horses were put on half rations largely because of Waterval Drift.

Unsatisfied by their ration of half a water bottle a day, soldiers drunk water wherever

they could find it with the result that many contracted typhoid.355 Shortages affected

the use of ammunition. By 21 February, Roberts was impressing on the artillery

officers at the Battle of Paardeberg the importance of economising ammunition,

weakening the bombardment of General Piet Cronje.356 It was Buller’s view that the

advance might even have been abandoned but for General French who had kept the

supply for his cavalry separate from the others.357

353 Girouard, 1903, pp. 25, 34.354 Pakenham, 1992, p. 319.355 Ibid., pp. 381-2.356 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 3, p. 31.357 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2. Evidence, p. 218.

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The disaster might well have been avoided if the transports had not been concentrated

owing to a belief by Roberts and Kitchener that the regimental system, allowing each

battalion to have its own carts, must be extremely wasteful.358 But even if Waterval

Drift had not happened, demand for animals would still have grown as the distance

between them and the railway grew. Between 1st and 13th March, 254 artillery horses,

500 cavalry horses, 728 mounted infantry cobs, 369 Indian ponies, and 572 mules had

been issued to Roberts’ force to replace casualties. Yet by March 13th, when the army

took Bloemfontein, their needs were even greater. They required 1,000 cavalry and

500 artillery horses, 1,000 mounted cobs, and 1,000 mules.359

According to Maurice, had the British been able to take advantage of the

demoralisation and disorganisation of their enemy with a general pursuit, the war

could now probably have been brought to a speedy termination. But the overland

march had left soldiers exhausted and animals dead. And even if the troops had been

in condition for such a pursuit, a halt was inevitable without the opening of the

railway linking Bloemfontein south to the Cape ports. This could not be considered

safe until the Boer commandos had been forced from the surrounding region.360 It was

not until 3 May that Roberts felt able to order a move north towards Kroonstad.361 The

halt in Bloemfontein was 50 days long.

Despite this, it cannot be said for certain that Buller’s proposed railway would have

been faster. In a letter of 6 January 1900, he said that construction had already

begun.362 An offer made to the British Government by a private firm, held out the

possibility that the railway could have been finished in as short a time as a month.363

But one must include the possibility that the construction might have been subject to

Boer attack causing delay to this timetable. And although fewer pack animals would

have been needed, the supplies required for railway construction still had to compete

with the need for other logistics. Girouard, Director of Railways, said the railway

could have been built at the rate of one mile a day, without reducing other supplies

358 Pakenham, 1992, p. 318 359 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 3, p. 31.360 Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 242-3.361 Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 38.362 Buller, Gen. Sir Redvers, letter to Cabinet, National Archives, London, WO 132/6, 6 January 1900.363 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 1, pp. 413-4.

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forwarded.364 This implied a construction time of more than three months and thus a

finish date possibly in April 1900. With additional time needed to transport equipment

and supplies forward, the move north to Kroonstad might not have occurred any

earlier than it did. Whether the British followed the plans devised by Roberts or

Buller, there were difficulties operating logistics without a pre-existing railway along

the chosen route of advance.

Roberts showed what could be achieved after he started his advance from

Bloemfontein on 3 May along the railway line that led north to the Transvaal.

Kroonstad was occupied on the 12th, Johannesburg was captured within the month on

the 31st and Pretoria a few days later on 5 June. This was carried out over a distance of

250 miles in a period of time shorter than that spent at Bloemfontein.

To be sure, railways also suffered from bottlenecks. A problem for Roberts supplying

Bloemfontein was that he had not ordered extra rolling stock from outside South

Africa. Loaded trucks lay in their hundreds at various stations south of the Orange

River, waiting to cross the border into the Free State.365 It was only on 20 March,

having been in Bloemfontein for a week, that he cabled Britain for twenty-five

engines to haul them north as well as another three hundred wagons as a matter of the

highest urgency.366

The use of railways was hindered where there was not complete control of the

surrounding countryside. As said, the railway south of Bloemfontein had to be cleared

of the enemy before it could be used. An attempt was made by the British to use trains

alone to defend track in Natal. The Boers were able to derail one, which included then

war correspondent and future Prime Minister Winston Churchill among its

passengers, by scattering rocks on the line ahead. With the engine immobilised, the

British were tied down to their position on the track while mounted Boers were able

to hunt down and capture British troops who tried to escape.367

364 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2. Minutes of Evidence, p. 177.365 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 3, p. 30.366 Pakenham, 1992, p. 381.367 Ibid., pp. 171-2.

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Damage to the line was to be another factor that hindered use of the railways. For

example, in the initial push from the Cape Colony, the British were advantaged by the

fact that the railway bridge over the Orange River had survived the Boer invasion. It

was essential to the supply of Methuen’s forces up to the Battle of the Modder River

on 28 November 1899.368 However, the need to build a new temporary bridge across

the Modder River held back the subsequent Battle of Magersfontein. This was

completed only on 10 December with the preliminary bombardment upon

Magersfontein that afternoon.369

Even when Roberts made his advance north from Bloemfontein, he was hindered by

damage that had been caused to the railway by the retreating Boers. The line as far as

Kroonstad had suffered the destruction of twenty-seven spans and twelve masonry

piers of four bridges, while sixteen culverts had been blown up. The Boers had also

destroyed most water tanks, pumps and signalling equipment. Rails had been torn up

and twisted, and points damaged. The main body of Roberts’ force had to wait at

Kroonstad for ten days, checked by a lack of supplies rather than the enemy, until the

railway behind could be repaired.370

Even so, there was no less advantage to be gained from forward located transport

infrastructure in this era than in either of the later wars dealt with in the next two

chapters.

Reducing the load and increasing advance warning

The Boer War did not provide evidence of means by which the logistics load could be

reduced. Living off the land did not help while the load could not be lessened by the

use of items with an increased ratio of firepower to weight. Better information too

about the war was not a likely means of reducing the load. Nor was it able to provide

sufficient advance warning of the conflict, allowing forces and supplies to be

prepositioned further away.

368 Ibid., p. 317369 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 1, pp. 304-5, 312.370 Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 62-3.

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The use of animals for overland movement meant it was possible to live off the land

through reliance upon grazing. But there were limitations to this. In the winter months

the grass on the veldt dried up. All animals became solely dependent on carried

fodder. Water too became scarce, placing extra strain upon the animals. When grass

grew in the summer, animals suffered from overgrazing because the same roads were

travelled over and over again. All of these factors contributed to their high death

rate.371 It was estimated that 35 percent of mules, 47 percent of trek oxen, and 67

percent of horses were lost during the war.372

Moreover, not all animals could be solely reliant on grass. Oxen could rely on grazing

alone but had drawbacks. They had to graze in the daytime, limiting the hours of

working and so the length of a march. Mules were therefore preferable for speed and

could feed at any time of the day or night. But even when grazing was available

during the war, it was found to be insufficient for keeping them in working condition

without the need for feed to be brought in.373

The use of animals has also to be placed in relation to other modes of movement. As

most transportation by far was carried out by ship and by train, grazing thus had only

a small role in the South African War. And even if grazing had been more important,

the competitive nature of war, fighting against an opponent who also put what

reliance it could upon living off the land, still provided an impetus to send as much

supply as possible. As said earlier, Mahan saw the war as unprecedented in terms of

its transport requirements. Living off the land did not reduce the load.

The Boer War failed to provide evidence to support the view of Edgell et al. that

technological advance resulting in miniaturisation could lessen the total logistics

load.374 This was despite the availability of greater firepower from smaller weapons.

To be sure, both Afrikaners and British had been at considerable advantage to the

majority African population because of more up-to-date weaponry. In 1879 for

371 Goldmann, Charles Sydney, With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa, (London: MacMillan, 1902), p. 450.372 Smith, 1919, pp. 141, 143. 373 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 1, p. 416.374 Edgell, J. L.W.; S.K. Spangler, G. F. Dragoo, & L.W. Jackson, ‘Logistics in 2025: Consider It Done!’, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1996, pp. 26-28, http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/volume2/chap01/vol2ch01.pdf

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example, the Zulus were ultimately to lose against the British, despite early success

against them at the Battle of Isandlwana. They were disadvantaged through reliance

upon obsolete firearms forty or fifty years old as well as the use of spears against an

army aided by its first use of the Gatling gun.375

But the competitive impetus in warfare will cause a side which is deficient in

weaponry to find countermeasures as well as to match the opponent with the same

weapons and surpass them if possible. In such circumstances both will then compete

to get as much into theatre as they can. As will be described later with regard to their

defences against artillery bombardment, the Boers built earthworks including trenches

and emplacements as means of countering British firepower and benefited from

smokeless fire in hiding their positions. Moreover, both sides armed themselves as

much as they could with their own machine guns and artillery. In the case of the

Boers, it was the failed Jameson Raid of 1895-6 that gave them the impetus to build

up their weapons and the proceeds of the Rand goldmines gave them the means to do

this. Through buying European manufactured equipment, such as the French-built

Creusot guns, they were able to arm themselves with technologically up-to-date

weapons and build as large a stockpile as they could to face their future opponent

within South Africa.376 The Boer War demonstrated that no side could reduce its

weapons load permanently through advancing technology.

The war did not provide evidence for a trend towards better information about

logistical needs. It did not give early support for Libicki’s argument that by avoiding

the transport of supplies that end up as surplus to requirements, the logistical load

might be reduced. London was unable to collect accurate information about the length

and intensity of the conflict as well as the actions its opponent might undertake. After

‘Black Week’ which saw defeats at Stormberg and Magersfontein in the Cape, and

Colenso in Natal, on 10, 11 and 15 December 1899, the British found that they had

actually underestimated the needs of the conflict.377

The War Department’s intelligence report prior to the war, ‘Military Notes on the

Dutch Republics’, said that while used to fighting Africans the Boers were not used to 375 Knight, Ian, The Zulu War, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2003), pp. 31-2, 60, 215.376 Pakenham, 1992, p. 41.377 Ibid., p. 252.

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fighting with the large bodies of men required to fight the British. The report gave the

general impression that the problem of defending the colonies was to be of checking

‘raids’ by two to three thousand Boers. Although it was expected that the British

might have some trouble against the Boers in the broken country of the Natal frontier

it was thought they could be easily beaten on the open plains of the veldt.378

Underestimating the capacity of the enemy to fight was still a problem more than a

century later with the Iraq War that began in 2003.

This means too that the Boer War does not sustain the argument put by Blaker of

better information permitting more time for deployment and so allowing forces to be

based further from the potential conflict zone. To be sure, even though the British

were not aware of Smut’s plan for an early attack, they had accepted the possibility of

a Boer invasion by sending troops in early September. Yet the Transvaal had been

engaged in an arms build-up since the Jameson Raid, precisely in preparation for war

with the British. London had been aware of this and had sufficient time to do

likewise. The ‘Military Notes’ showed that they knew much about the equipment that

had been purchased.379 Yet they had failed to bolster their presence in the region.

Misinterpreting the information they had available to them meant that they

underestimated the size of the threat posed by the Boers with the result that troops

could not be got to South Africa quick enough to forestall enemy attack. This is no

worse than the circumstances encountered in the conflicts covered by next two case

studies.

378 Pakenham, 1992, p. 77.379 Ibid., p. 77.

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A reduced load and deterrence

The Boer War showed that any hoped for use of a smaller load as a means of

deterrence could only be temporary. The Boers were aware that they were opposed by

smaller enemy forces within South Africa and were not deceived into believing those

forces were more powerful than they really were. Writing on 4 September 1899,

Smuts put the number of British troops in the whole of South Africa at 15,000, with

just 8,500 in Natal, as well as 3,500 in the Cape and 3,000 in Bechuanaland and

Rhodesia. By comparison, the two Republics could put 40,000 troops into the field;

25,000 from the Transvaal, and 15,000 from the Free State. They had a superiority

approaching three-to-one against the British in the whole of South Africa which was

enhanced further if they attacked “with all their force” against Natal.380

Also, they believed that a past reluctance by the British to see through conflict with

the Boers would mean that defeat of Britain’s forces in the region would not act as a

tripwire to greater conflict. Even though the British were the world superpower of the

era, a situation which itself was not to be permanent, the Boers were not deterred. As

said before, the Transvaal won its independence in 1881 after rising up against four

years of British rule. British garrisons in the Transvaal were besieged. In response, the

Liberal government in London, then led by Gladstone, who had opposed the original

annexation under his Conservative predecessor, Disraeli, decided in principle to

restore the Transvaal’s independence. The principle of independence then became

reality with the defeat of a British force sent from Natal. The Boer victory at Majuba

Hill close to Natal’s border with the Transvaal led to Britain signing a truce with the

Republic.381

The Boers thus had a precedent from which to believe that if they inflicted a defeat on

British forces in South Africa it need not lead to further military action, despite the far

greater resources of the British Empire. Had the British shown a past willingness to

continue fighting, the Boer Republics could have been less sure of the outcome of

another such defeat in battle.

380 Smuts, 1966, pp. 324-6.381 Barthorp, Michael, Slogging Over Africa, (London: Cassell, 1987), pp. 33-43.

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To be sure, Smuts felt that the British might not only be reluctant but also unable to

send reinforcements. Convinced of the advantages of acting offensively, he felt there

was every chance that the Afrikaners of the interior districts of the Cape Colony

would rise up, forcing the British “to begin again as in 1806”; that is to drive the

British from South Africa entirely. He suggested that the repercussions of this for

subject peoples throughout the British Empire, would make it more difficult to spare

forces to fight the Boers. He added too the possibility of trade and military threats to

the British from France, Germany, Russia and the United States, all of whom he said

“will try to take advantage of a defeat inflicted on England.”382

Smuts’ plan for an attack in early September was however never enacted. As said

before, the Orange Free State did not provide its support, waiting until 2 October to

mobilise. By the outbreak of war there were 27,000 British troops in South Africa

with further reinforcements arriving at Durban and the Cape ports.383 The Free State’s

late mobilisation meant that they had lost the overwhelming advantage in numbers

needed for Smuts’ plan to get to the coast.

But even then the Boer Republics still felt that there was gain to be had from starting

war. The British had forces based too far forward where they were locally weaker

than the opponent. Despite the arrival of troops at the coast, the Boers across the

border retained superiority over the British in northern Natal of 21,000 versus

13,000.384 Armed with longer range French-built Creusots, they were superior in

artillery as well. With the triangular shape of northern Natal meaning that it was

bordered by the Boers on two sides they felt they had an opportunity to trap and

defeat the British in this area. As said already, they had the precedent of 1881 to

suggest that a victory over the British in battle had the potential to dissuade them from

further military action.

General Sir Redvers Buller, who had been given command of the force in South

Africa, had given orders that troops were not to be placed at positions close to the

borders of the Boer Republics. Instead he had wanted the British in Natal to move

back and form a defensive line along the Tugela River further south. The forward 382 Smuts, 1966, pp. 325-6.383 Evans, Martin Marix, The Boer War, (Oxford: Osprey, 1999), p. 14.384 Pakenham, 1992, pp. 106, 150.

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location of troops was partly due to over confidence by their commander on the

ground, Major General Sir Penn Symons, and in part because of concern expressed by

the Natal government. It was unwilling to see its territory given up to the Boer

Republics and was also concerned that the Afrikaners who made up most of the white

population of the area, or else the colony’s Zulus, might be encouraged to rise up

against British control.385

In addition to this, the use of forward based forces as a deterrent was at odds with the

desire on the part of some British for the Boers to be provoked into fighting.

Pakenham has argued that Alfred Milner, High Commissioner for South Africa and

Lieutenant Governor of the Cape Colony, worked intentionally towards starting the

war with the Boers with the aim of creating a unified British dominated Union of

South Africa. Milner is said to have aimed towards this outcome mostly through

diplomatic means in communications with the Boers and with London. But Pakenham

has also suggested that troops were forward based as further provocation. Soldiers

were stationed at Mafeking and Kimberley close to the Boer Republics to encourage

the Boers to invade the Cape Colony.386 Past experience provided further reason for

this to be seen as provocative. The failed Jameson Raid had been undertaken from a

camp at Pitsani, just 25 miles north of Mafeking.

Had the British positioned themselves further from their opponent’s territory, the

Boers would have been more hesitant about attacking Imperial territory. The Tugela

River and the hills around would have offered an important defensive barrier in Natal

had Buller’s initial orders been followed. Evidence of the importance of the Tugela

can be seen by the reaction of the Boers once they had reached the river after laying

siege to Ladysmith. Even without the defensive line envisaged by Buller it was still

seen as a barrier to their advance. Orange Free State commandants held a council of

war separate from their Transvaal allies and refused to go south of the river. A raid of

2,000 led by the Transvaal’s General Louis Botha did go south of the Tugela. Its

successes included the ambush of the train carrying Winston Churchill. But with

British reinforcements landing at the coast, the Boers withdrew, forming their own

385 Ibid., p. 108.386 Ibid., p. 118.

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defensive line using the hills along both sides of the Tugela River similar to what

Buller had hoped the British would do.387

The British could potentially have dissuaded Boer action by using the Tugela as their

line of defence. The temptation of victory in Natal over a weaker British force located

too far forward would have been removed. In addition, the location of British forces

further from the Boer Republics’ borders would have been less provocative, that is if

the British had been intent on deterring war in the first place. Smaller forces are of no

use as a deterrent if they actually encourage the other side to believe they can benefit

from fighting.

387 Ibid., p. 170.

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PART 2 – THE ADVANTAGE OF FORWARD POSITIONS FOR FIGHTING

Use of artillery bombardment

The Boer War, occurring prior to the era of heavier than air flight and thus also before

the writings of air power theorists such as Douhet, did not see remote bombardment

being argued for as a strategic weapon in place of ground forces. The available range

of guns was still too short to provide for the possibility of bombardment across a

whole country. The French built 115mm Creusot guns used by the Boers and known

by the British as ‘Long-Toms’, had an effective range of 11,000 yards.388 Servicemen

who used the British 4.7-inch Q. F. Gun gave effective ranges for it of between 9,500

and 12,500 yards.389 The effective range of the British-made ‘pom-pom’, the Vickers-

Maxim 1-pr. Automatic Gun, but used by both sides, went up to 5000 yards although

it was sighted only up to 3000 yards, beyond which it was reported that the shooting

became inaccurate.390

But it was hoped that bombardment could destroy an opponent, at least within the

limits imposed by the range of guns at the time. In so doing it would replace the

attacker’s need to fight an opponent at close quarters. The requirement for forward

positions from which cover could be taken as an advance was underway would be

removed. Territory could be conquered from afar. This view was to be proved wrong

in this conflict, for much the same reasons that the theory of strategic bombardment

would in later wars, as discussed in Chapter 3. There was competition from the other

side’s ability to undertake evasive measures. The opponent was able to use cover to

protect himself and hide his position. And intelligence about that position could not

always be gained.

The Battle of Magersfontein fought in the Cape Colony on 11 December 1899

provided an example of the importance of intelligence despite the availability of

means of heavy bombardment. The barrage that the British carried out at

388 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. I, p. 90; Evans, 1999, p. 29.389 Taken from the views expressed by servicemen in Reports on Artillery Equipment in South Africa; Heavy Artillery, National Archives, London, 1901, SUPP 5/137, p. 48. 390 Taken from the views expressed by servicemen in Reports on Artillery Equipment in South Africa; Vickers-Maxim 1-pr. Automatic Gun, National Archives, London, 1901, SUPP 5/138, p. 53.

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Magersfontein involved twenty-four field guns, four howitzers, and a 4.7 inch naval

gun, dubbed ‘Joe Chamberlain’, in honour of the British Colonial Secretary who was

most closely associated with the war. “Onlookers were told by the naval gunners that

Old Joey would kill every man within 150 yards of where his shells struck.”391

However, the Boers were not hiding in the Magersfontein Kopje as the British had

thought, but in a line of trenches close by. The bombardment that targeted the kopje

did not hit the Boers. Such a bombardment was only as good as the information the

British had of Boer positions. After previous experience of battle at Belmont and

Graspan to the south west, fought before they reached the Modder River, they

assumed that the Boers would occupy high ground and so missed most of the

enemy.392

In the belief that the Boers had suffered heavy casualties, British troops were sent to

take the Magersfontein Kopje, only to be caught by surprise by their opponent’s real

position. The 3,500 British soldiers were outnumbered by perhaps 8,200 Boers. With

little forward located cover other than rocks and ant hills, the British were poorly able

to make an advance upon the enemy. Further bombardment was undertaken, but the

problem of poor information only compounded their problems. Believing that their

own forces were at the base of the kopje when they were actually climbing up, the

British artillery attacked, killing their own soldiers. The British lost the battle,

withdrawing back to the Modder River the following day. It was to be three months

before the Boers evacuated Magersfontein.393

As had been the case in the Cape Colony, faith in the capability of bombardment for

destroying the enemy was to be misplaced in Natal. This was demonstrated at the first

effort to break the Boer line at the Tugela, the Battle of Colenso on 15 December

1899. General Buller believed that the enemy riflemen should be silenced with heavy

bombardment from the new lyddite high explosive fired from the naval guns that they

had requisitioned from warships at Durban, but this was not to be the case. Part of the

problem was technical. The British artillery were more numerous but the lyddite

391 Pakenham, 1992, p. 203.392 Ibid., p. 203.393 Ibid., pp. 200-4; Bailes, 1980, pp. 81-2.

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shells fired from the naval guns produced a blast that was too concentrated and thus

ineffective against dispersed troops.394

However, the British also lacked intelligence about enemy positions. Before battle,

the British were still unable to estimate Boer numbers or their positions.395 In battle,

smokeless fire from the enemy’s guns, both field guns and rifles, meant that their

positions were difficult to locate. Boer guns were also concealed behind

emplacements, a practice new to late nineteenth warfare in which field artillery had

formerly fought in the open.396

The Boers’ use of bombardment was even less effective than that of the British. They

fired over 8,000 projectiles during the Siege of Kimberley but killed just 9 and injured

only 22.397 If the town was to have fallen into Boer hands, it would have been unlikely

that bombardment could have played a major role. More important in all three sieges

was the supply of food. Lieutenant General Sir George White of the Ladysmith

garrison estimated they could have held out into April, more than a month after their

actual relief on 28 February. This was the time it would have taken for their supplies

of mealies and horsemeat to run out.398

British forward located forces were, for the most part, unthreatened by opposition fire

power just as the Boers were unthreatened by the British. Besieged soldiers and

residents found ways to take cover. Those in Kimberley found protection in the

town’s two diamond mines.399 The guns themselves were also not immune to

counterattack. On the night of 7 December 1899, the besieged garrison at Ladysmith

sent out five hundred men destroying two Boer guns; a Creusot ‘Long Tom’ and a 4.7

inch Howitzer. Three nights later they destroyed another Howitzer.400 The competitive

nature of war, the impetus behind these countermeasures against the Boers, and the

reason that 100 years later Krepinevich is wrong to point to an increasing threat to

394 Pakenham, 1992, p. 229.395 Ibid., pp. 207-8.396 Ibid., p. 229.397 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 2, p. 69.398 Pakenham, 1992, p. 353.399 Ibid., pp. 326-7.400 Ibid., pp. 270-71; Amery, 1900-09, Vol. 3, pp. 167-71.

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forward bases from enemy firepower, was present in this era as it would be at the end

of the 20th century.

The British in Natal eventually found artillery to be most useful not by itself but used

in conjunction with infantry. In other words, it was not an alternative to soldiers

attacking and taking control of territory, but instead it was a means of assisting them.

After two months of failed attacks at the Tugela, Buller found the solution was to link

the use of artillery and the movement of infantry into continuous interlocking assaults

upon each hill, carried out over two weeks from 14-27 February 1900. As soon as

shelling had finished in a location the infantry moved. Once a hill had been

consolidated the next was worked upon.401 The front collapsed with the taking of

Hart’s Hill, Railway Hill and Pieter’s Hill on the 27th. Pieter’s Hill saw Buller use a

creeping curtain of shell fire sent over the heads of advancing infantry to destroy

everything 100 yards ahead of them.402 Buller’s tactic of the creeping barrage,

described by Pakenham as “revolutionary”, was not to be attempted by the British

again until a year into the First World War at Loos on the Western Front in September

1915. With further development of this technique by 1918, it was to be a factor in the

collapse of the Germans in that year.403

The official history of the war suggests that bombardment, used by itself, was

responsible for at least one British victory, that of the war’s last major battle at

Paardeberg in the Orange Free State between 17 and 27 February 1900.404 The

circumstances bore similarities to those experienced in the Kosovo War of 1999, even

in an era before the advent of air power or of precision bombing. But at the same

time, it also suggests the need for exceptional circumstances in order for an instance

of strategic bombardment to be repeated. There is little impact upon the importance of

the Loss of Strength Gradient.

The British resorted to bombardment after mounting a disastrous frontal assault on 18

February 1900 under General Lord Kitchener which, in a single day, saw the worst

401 Bailes, 1980, p. 90.402 Pakenham, 1992, pp. 361-2.403 Ibid., p. 361, Stephenson, David, 1914-1918 The History of the First World War, (London, Penguin, 2004), pp. 192, 446-7.404 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 2, pp. 176-7.

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casualties of the war. 1,270 were wounded with 303 men killed. By comparison, the

entire 10 days of battle and bombardment saw the Boers lose only an estimated 117

dead and 297 wounded, demonstrating both the advantage of being the defender in

battle and the capacity for protection from enemy artillery.405

The Boers proved themselves quite able to survive bombardment. They built

extensive earthworks by digging into the walls of the Modder River, rising 30 to 40

feet above the water.406 On 19 February, after the British had rejected a Boer request

for a truce to bury the dead, General Piet Cronje even sent a message of defiance that

the British could bombard as they pleased.407

However, it was not just men and their women followers who needed protection from

enemy artillery. The Boers also had with them their wagons and horses. In many

cases, these were all that they possessed. Indeed, the wagon possessed a value for the

Boer far beyond the material wealth it represented as the means by which, in the face

of adversity, they had always been able to move on.408

These possessions were to be an important factor during the battle. When an escape

route was opened up by the capture of Kitchener’s Kopje on 18 February by General

Christiaan De Wet, less than 100 men took the opportunity to escape, while more than

4,000 stayed.409 De Wet later wrote of his frustration that Cronje refused to join him

but pointed to the problem that he would have been obliged to leave everything

behind in order to cross over.410

De Wet’s escape route was closed on the 21st. Still, Daniel Theron, leader of the Boer

Intelligence scouts, managed to cross the British lines, spending the day with Cronje

on the 25th. After returning safely he sent a telegram to President Kruger reporting on

conditions inside. He spoke of a lack of “proper food” and said that according to

Cronje there was hardly sufficient food for that day. Theron proposed a plan from De

Wet to break through the British lines with which Cronje agreed. Yet in the face of a

405 Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 143, 604.406 Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 108-10.407 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 148.408 Pakenham, 1992, p. 340; Amery, 1900-09, Vol. 6, p. 372. 409 Pakenham, 1992, p. 341. 410 De Wet, Gen. Christiaan, Three Years’ War, (London: Constable & Co., 1902), p. 57.

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supposed food shortage, neither of them could persuade the men. Despite making

every effort, Theron found them to be disheartened to the point where half no longer

minded falling into enemy hands. Some even said straight to him that if Cronje broke

out they would disobey orders, stay in the trenches and surrender to the British

instead. The food situation did not motivate the men to escape. Nor could fear of

starvation have caused their eventual surrender. There were 100 horses, which Theron

reported were inside the camp where they were protected from British artillery, which

could have been slaughtered for meat had the siege lasted longer. There was no

problem yet either with ammunition.411

However, Theron mentioned what had happened to the Boers’ possessions. To be

sure, after the 21st, when De Wet’s escape route was finally closed, Roberts had

relaxed the attack in order to economise ammunition.412 But what Theron saw was that

most of the wagons had been burnt and most of the horses killed, left to rot where

they had died. While the besieged men and women were mostly unharmed by enemy

artillery, the river bed proved too small to provide shelter for everything they owned.

Instead they had been forced to leave these on the veldt where the danger from enemy

bombardment and gunfire was much greater.413 Although Cronje was prepared to

continue the siege, pressure mounted from his men. As has been explained with

regard to the Kosovo War, while it may be difficult to bombard an army on the

ground, attacks upon the economic livelihood of people can produce pressure for

leadership to capitulate.

Boer leaders were open to such pressure. Cronje depended upon the support of his

men in order to continue. On the morning of the 26th, a Council of War was held.

Cronje argued that the men should fight their way out, but found little support for the

proposal. Instead, he found that he had to fight off a call for surrender. This he

managed to postpone for two days due to the fact that the 27th was the anniversary of

their victory over the British at Majuba. But this broke down after another two hour

411 Telegram from Daniel Theron to President Kruger in Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 2, pp. 170-1.412 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 3, p. 31.413 Telegram from Daniel Theron to President Kruger in Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 2, pp. 170-1.

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period of bombardment. As a result of this last artillery assault, the Council of War

decreed to give in the following day.414

Bombardment at Paardeberg had succeeded where it failed at Ladysmith, Kimberley

and Mafeking. The Boers had not yet run out of food nor had they run out of

ammunition and they were well protected by the walls of the Modder River. They

could be confident of their personal safety. But they were unable to protect the

possessions which they used to make a living. Similarly, in Serbia 99 years later,

people would also put pressure on their own leadership as precision air strikes left the

population unhurt but damaged their economic wellbeing.

However, much as the circumstances that allowed strategic bombardment to occur

during the Kosovo War were exceptional and should not be seen as part of a trend so

the same has to be said for Paardeberg. It was unique in all the battles fought during

the Boer War that the British should have been able to use artillery to bombard the

valued possessions of their enemy without also inflicting heavy casualties.

Threat to the forward base from asymmetric warfare

Following on from the conventional phase of the war, asymmetric attack posed

another threat for the British in South Africa. As has been said, the guerrilla campaign

waged by the Boers for two years after the fall of Pretoria was an important feature of

the conflict.

A guerrilla conflict such as this goes well beyond the problem that Krepinevich

identifies with small groups of irregular forces, terrorists and transnational criminal

organisations which have to act within jurisdictions under the control of civil law

enforcement agencies. However, just as will be found for the smaller scale

asymmetric actors found in the later chapters, so guerrillas here were also faced with a

competitive situation. The asymmetric actor has not become more powerful in relation

to its conventional opponent over time.

414 Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 2, pp. 176-7.

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Boer commandoes could rely upon the help of their fellow Afrikaner people for

shelter, clothing and food. The British therefore employed countermeasures to this

within the occupied Boer Republics. A policy of farm burnings was instituted as a

discouragement and, beginning in March 1900, Boer women and children were

rounded up and put into concentration camps. The policy of removing the population

from the land was reversed at the end of 1901. Outbreaks of disease had caused loss

of life in the camps which had political repercussions for public support for the British

government at home.415

Outside the occupied Boer Republics, the British could not control the population in a

similar way. The Afrikaner government in the Cape Colony would not have allowed

it. Even so, the British controlled the distribution of clothing so that this could not be

passed on by sympathetic farmers.416

The British combated the Boer commandoes in other ways. Originating in January

1901 as a line of fortified posts used to protect the railways, the blockhouse system

was used as a means of dividing the veldt into sections which could be cleared of

guerrillas. The blockhouse lines involved forts of concrete and tin construction, each

situated within rifle range of each other, with barbed wire in between. At the end of

the war in May 1902, there were over eight thousand blockhouses, stretching 3,700

miles.417 New technology in the form of the telephone was used as a means to

maintain communication between the blockhouses and help keep track of guerrilla

movements.418

When trapped, great sweeping movements were employed to corner and defeat the

commandoes. By the end of October 1901, most of the central parts of the new

colonies, Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, were clear. Natal too was clear,

while in Cape Colony the guerrillas were isolated in the extreme west and extreme

north west.419

415 Pakenham, 1992, pp. 440, 493-5, 548.416 Ibid., pp. 521-2. 417 Ibid., pp. 499, 537 418 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 2. Minutes of Evidence, pp. 371-3.419 Pakenham, 1992, p. 537.

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It may be questioned whether the combination of blockhouse line and sweeping

movements had the effect of ending the war more quickly than otherwise. Commando

leader General Christiaan De Wet described it as the ‘blockhead’ system, which

incurred costs in construction and in providing for soldiers to man it. He said it

prolonged the war by three months. The Boers found they were able to cut their way

through the barbed wire lines. De Wet said that when “it became necessary for us to

fight our way through, we generally succeeded in doing so.”420

The British also made use of African intelligence and from May 1901 instituted a new

raiding tactic of reacting rapidly to attack guerrillas while resting at night. It was these

night time raids that De Wet said he feared more than the blockhouse system.421

Whatever tactic was more effective it still demonstrated that the competitive

circumstances of war produce reactions to asymmetric warfare as they do to

conventional warfare. As a result, although weapons change, asymmetric fighters do

not gain increasing capabilities over time relative to their opponents.

Base access on foreign territory

As will be found in each one of the case studies, there is little evidence of trends for

or against countries allowing forward base access that might be linked to that put by

Krepinevich at the beginning of the 21st century. The Boer War itself saw Britain face

much hostility from its neighbours in Europe. However, Britain was not without allies

entirely, and the lack of support from others proved to be an exception when

compared to other conflicts it fought both before and after. Difficulties in acquiring

forward base access owe themselves to specific circumstances rather than to trends.

It must be said that Britain was helped most by the existence of its own imperial

possessions contiguous to the Boer Republics. It was, therefore, from these territories

that it carried out its two advances onto enemy territory. But other countries did

provide base access. Spain and Portugal gave support through coaling stations in the

Canaries and Cape Verde Islands respectively, mentioned earlier. Portugal also

420 De Wet, 1902, pp. 321-2. 421 Ibid., pp. 323-4. Pakenham, 1992, p. 541.

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supported the British through the channelling of supplies via Portuguese East Africa.

Until the Siege of Mafeking was lifted in May 1900, Rhodesia, being situated north of

the Transvaal, was cut off from the sea. Supplies were sent into the colony via the

Beira railway linking it to the Indian Ocean port of that name. The British even

undertook railway improvement on Portuguese territory in support of their war effort.

The railway was narrow gauge from the coast to Umtali on the Rhodesian border.

This underwent widening so that trains could run on the broad gauge railways in

British territory.422

To be sure, this did not mean that Portugal was willing to be fully co-operative with

regard to transport along the railway. Men, animals and stores built up at Beira in

early 1900 as the authorities there stopped their transit into the interior. Restrictions

were removed only at the end of March.423 The Portuguese also allowed support to be

provided to the Boers via the port of Lourenço Marques at Delagoa Bay, from where

another railway led into the Transvaal. Volunteers for the twin Republics arrived via

this line. But the Portuguese were to be more helpful to the British during the guerrilla

phase of the war. Between January 1901 and June 1901, 33,000 tons of sealifted

military supplies were entrained at Delagoa Bay bound for the newly occupied

territories.424

Britain was also able to rely upon the cooperation of other countries. Troops, as well

as logistical support, came from Canada, Australia and New Zealand within the

British Empire. Supplies came from a wider range of countries. The United States,

Argentina, Spain, Italy and Austria-Hungary were all sources of animals for the

campaign. Of 110,000 horses that had been brought into South Africa by December

1900, approximately 80,000 had come from ‘overseas’, that is from outside the

Empire. Of nearly 64,000 mules that had been brought into South Africa by the same

date, practically all were from outside the Empire.425 Saddles were sourced from a

range of countries including the United States and Canada, France, Austria, Germany

422 Carrington, Lieut-General Sir F., Commanding Rhodesian Field Force, letter to Field-Marshall Roberts, National Archives, London, WO 32/7944, 25 August 1900.423 Milton, W. H., Mashonaland Administrator, Salisbury, Rhodesia, telegram to the British South Africa Company, National Archives, London, WO 32/7939, 16 May 1900; Jones, J. F., Secretary, British South Africa Company, letter to War Office, National Archives, London, WO 32/7940, 30 May 1900. 424 Calculated from statistics in Girouard, 1903, p. 60.425 Calculated from statistics in Smith, 1919, p. 142.

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and Belgium. Horse shoes were sourced from Germany and Sweden. Mule shoes were

bought from the United States. Tents were sourced from the United States and

Germany.426 The British were even able to obtain 18 batteries of guns from a firm in

Germany, although according to Field Marshall Wolseley it turned out that they did

not get those they wanted.427

There was hostility to the British. Although France sold supplies to the British, they

alongside Russia, even proposed to intervene if Germany would join them, an offer

which Germany refused.428 No-one actually came directly to the aid of the Republics.

In February 1900, the Boers believed that they had news that Russia was prepared to

invade Afghanistan on their behalf. It was hoped that by occupying Herat in the

country’s north west that the Russians could exert pressure upon the British position

in India, forcing London to come to terms. But this action was never carried out and

even if it had, while Herat was close to the Russian border it was the furthest city in

Afghanistan from India.429

Even so, the Boers were able to rely upon volunteers from across the European

continent, commanded by a Frenchman, Colonel, later promoted to General, Count

Georges de Villebois-Mareuill. Units were set up for volunteers from the Netherlands,

Germany, Scandinavia, Italy, France and Russia. Many were already in the Transvaal,

attracted by its pre-war wealth much as the British Uitlanders had been, and by March

1900, the month Bloemfontein was taken, 2,000 were estimated to have joined them

from overseas.430

The British government could not even stop its own people from volunteering for the

enemy. Although recruits from Ireland played a prominent part on the British side,

others, aided by their pre-war presence as mineworkers on the Rand, volunteered for

the Boers. An Irish Brigade was set up, commanded by an Irish-American graduate of

West Point, Colonel John Blake. It was an Irish ‘wreckers corps’ led by their second

in command, Major John McBride, which undertook the destruction along the

426 RCWSA, 1903, Vol. 1. Minutes of Evidence, pp. 73-4, 78.427 Ibid., Vol. 1. Minutes of Evidence, pp. 85, 364.428 Pakenham, 1992, p. 256.429 Ibid., p. 388 .430 MacNab, Roy, The French Colonel, (Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 153-4, 160-70.

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Bloemfontein-Kroonstad railway that held up Roberts in the latter town for ten

days.431

Yet the lack of support within Europe was by no means part of a trend for the British.

Britain had been part of large coalitions within Europe in the past and would be again

in the future. British alliances in the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars saw the basing of

its forces on the territories of others. Likewise, little more than a decade after the end

of the Boer War, the First World War saw Britain part of a large coalition that

included at various times, France, Russia, Italy, as well as Japan and the United

States. In that war, British troops fought upon allied territory in France, Belgium,

Italy, Greece and Serbia. In the competitive circumstances of war, each sought as

much support from an ally such as Britain which did not seek its own territorial

acquisitions from these countries, as was possible.

The lack of support for the British in the Boer War owed itself to its specific

circumstances rather than any trend. On this occasion they were engaged in their own

territorial acquisition. Moreover, the fact that it occurred in an era of colonial

expansion did not mean that support was any more forthcoming from other states. As

Amery identified at the time, the other European powers were “territorial competitors

of England” whose own expansion outside Europe had been “met with British

opposition.” The growth of the British Empire, the largest of them all, had meant less

territory for the others where “a European population could create a new home and

add strength to the mother country”.432 The competitive relationship between

European states meant that just as it was in their interests to ally with Britain in the

other mentioned wars, it was not in their interests to do so in the Boer war. The

conflict did not signify a trend.

431 MacNab, 1975, p. 165; Pakenham, 1992, p. 106, 421-2; Maurice and Grant, 1906-10, Vol. 3, pp. 42-64; Evans, 1999, p. 13.432 Amery, 1900-09, Vol. 3. pp. 51-3.

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Fighting from the sea

With foreign basing on land no more or less viable than a century later, there was no

evidence from this case study to support the view held at the beginning of the 21st

century that sea basing could be an increasingly viable alternative to that on land.

The British were advantaged by having friendly territory upon which they could

forward base. This situation would have been altered had the Boers been successful in

taking control of Natal and the Cape Colony, as Jan Smuts had originally hoped. The

British could only have retaken these territories, as well as the twin Republics, from

the sea.

The problem was that despite their naval superiority over any other state, let alone the

landlocked Boer Republics, neither of which could possess a navy, the British would

have been at a disadvantage had they been left with no option but to launch an

opposed amphibious attack on the South African coastline. Bases at sea could not

have been of equivalence to bases onshore. While the Boer War does not provide an

example of the difficulty that would have been encountered, the failed landings at the

Dardanelles, thirteen years after the end of the Boer War, illustrates the point. Here,

British and French ships had command of the sea beyond the Straits. But landings

carried out on 25 April 1915 made little progress beyond their initial narrow

beachheads. They evacuated between 28 December 1915 and 9 January 1916, having

no where to retreat to but back into the Aegean Sea.

In South Africa too, the British would have found it much harder to fight the Boers

but for the availability of contiguous territory. It provided the British with land

beyond the range of enemy fire where forces and supplies could be built up. Terrain

provided them with more opportunities for cover than to be found on water when they

attacked. It provided them with territory behind them where they could retreat to

when they had setbacks and from where a future offensive could be launched at a later

date, again aided by terrain to provide cover. Thus when Buller failed in his attempt to

break the Tugela line at Colenso, and Methuen failed to push the Boers from

Magersfontein, they could still rely on territory to retreat back to beyond the reach of

the enemy’s weapons, from where the next offensive could be launched. Reliance

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upon forward basing at sea to take control of territory could only have been a poorer

alternative to forward basing on land.

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CHAPTER 5

A SUPERPOWER AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY: THE UNITED

STATES AND THE GULF WAR 1990-1991

Like the Boer War at the beginning of the 20th century, the Gulf War in the final

decade of that century saw a Great Power with global reach fight a war at the other

end of the world against a much smaller opponent. Yet despite technological advance

in the intervening time, this chapter will find that the competitive nature of war

caused the importance of forward basing and thus the Loss of Strength Gradient to be

little altered.

This chapter will show that geographic distance was almost as much of a hindrance to

supply as it was in the Boer War. It will find that the Americans also put much effort

into sourcing supplies locally rather than transporting them across the world’s oceans.

Again this minimised the cost of shipping and also the time that it took items to reach

the theatre. Again, it will be found that those supplies sent had proportional price

relationships over time with transport, keeping movement costs as important as ever

in logistics, countering Boulding’s view that cheaper transport should have caused a

fall in the Loss of Strength Gradient. This chapter will also find that the speed of

transport was little improved upon, even with the addition of airlift. The cost and time

advantages from forward positions were thus little different at the end of the 20th

century compared to its beginning.

To be sure, airlift was a mode of transport which meant that what had formerly taken

weeks on the surface could now be achieved within hours. Equipment and supplies

could be moved rapidly to the front. But this chapter will find that Hallion was wrong

to suggest that it was critical to the early delivery of combat strength. It was too

expensive and the load it carried too small to make forward basing less advantageous.

This chapter will look at the forward located transport infrastructure requirements of

the conflict only to find that these were just as important as they had been at the

beginning of the 20th century.

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Evidence of the difficulty encountered in attempts to reduce the logistics load, such as

improved intelligence and miniaturisation, will also be found. It will show that Libicki

is wrong to argue that better information could allow airlift to take on a greater

proportion of the load. Evidence will likewise be presented to show that better

information could not provide advance warning to allow more time for deployment. It

will also show how a reduced load was used to act as a deterrent to a possible Iraqi

invasion of Saudi Arabia but that the situation did not offer evidence of a permanent

trend.

This chapter will counter the view put forward by Hallion that air power won the Gulf

War. In so doing, it will undermine the views of strategic air power supporters going

back to Douhet that forward based ground forces need not be necessary to prevail

over an opponent. And while it will accept that there is evidence that air strikes played

an important role in defeating the Iraqi army, albeit in conjunction with ground

troops, it will question the applicability of those circumstances that were faced in the

Gulf to other conflicts. It will also counter Hallion’s view that air power was able to

defend territory. Its logistical requirements will be shown to be so great that it could

not achieve this in Saudi Arabia any earlier than ground forces.

Threats to the forward base posed by enemy bombardment and asymmetric actors will

be explored. The Gulf War will not provide evidence that there is a trend towards

either of these becoming worse. It will be found too that the willingness of countries

to allow the stationing of foreign troops upon their territory resulted from the

conflict’s specific circumstances rather than any trend. This chapter will also be

unable to demonstrate that sea basing is becoming an increasingly viable alternative to

that on land.

This case study on the Gulf War will provide little evidence that forward basing was

much less advantageous at the end of the 20 century than it was at the beginning.

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Historic overview of the war

The Iraqi claim to Kuwait had origins in the Ottoman era. Kuwait was formally part

of the southern Mesopotamian province of Basra, but was allowed autonomy in return

for recognising Turkish suzerainty. It was gradually able to break free of Ottoman

authority by accepting British influence in 1899, culminating in recognition of Kuwait

as an independent principality under British protection in November 1914.433

Mesopotamia itself was conquered by the British during the First World War after

which its three provinces were united as ‘Iraq’ and given independence in 1932, but

without Kuwait. It was not to be until 1961 that Kuwait gained full independence and

when it did so it found itself under threat from its northern neighbour. Abdul Qassim,

who had seized power in Iraq three years earlier, massed troops on the border. Britain

responded by moving forces into Kuwait to ward off a possible attack. The task of

defending the Emirate was then handed to Arab League troops until the threat was

removed with the overthrow of Qassim in 1963 and Iraq’s subsequent recognition of

its southern neighbour’s sovereignty.434

Saddam Hussein was to use Iraq’s historic claim to Kuwait as reason for invasion in

1990. But there was also a more immediate concern regarding Iraq’s economic

problems and the potential that the seizure of Kuwaiti oil reserves would address

these. Having acquired full control of Iraq in 1979, Saddam invaded Iran the

following year, taking the opportunity of the Islamic Revolution to grab territory that

could bring extra oil reserves under Baghdad’s control as well as an Arab population

around the city of Ahvaz in Iran’s south western border region. Iran, however, proved

more resilient than expected and the war lasted for eight years at a heavy financial as

well as human cost. Saddam bought more than $60 billion worth of arms over the

period leaving Iraq heavily indebted. And the spending continued after the war was

over. Iraq restocked on armaments and maintained an army that was in terms of

personnel, the world’s fourth largest.435 An invasion of his wealthy southern

433 Schofield, Richard, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1993), pp. 12, 16-49.434 Munro, Alan, An Arabian Affair: Gulf War from Saudi Arabia, (London & Washington: Brassey’s, 1996), pp. 16-8.435 Cordesman, Anthony H., and Abraham R. Wagner, Lessons of Modern War Vol. IV: The Gulf War, (Boulder, Co, Westview Press, 1996), pp. 34-5.

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neighbour would settle not only a historic claim but also provide an opportunity to

relieve Iraq’s financial position.

It was arguments over war debt owed by Iraq to Kuwait and oil extraction that served

as the prelude to the invasion. Saddam was unwilling to pay back loans that the

Kuwaitis had given during the war with Iran. As Friedman has put it, “He was, in

effect, a debtor canceling his debt by robbing the bank.”436 It did not help that Kuwait

was breaching its OPEC production quota at a time when Saddam wanted these

lowered in order to force up the oil price. He also accused the Kuwaitis of stealing oil

from the Rumalia oilfield which straddled the Iraq-Kuwait border. At the May 1990

Arab League Summit held in Baghdad, he demanded $27 billion in compensation

from the country.437

Demands were also made of the other Gulf States. In late June, a senior Iraqi official

toured the region to press for lower production quotas and demanded that each

country pay Baghdad $10 billion. The United Arab Emirates in particular, like

Kuwait, was producing oil well above its agreed limit.438

Saddam attacked on the early morning of 2 August 1990. By the 4th, the southern

border had been sealed. Iraq’s announced pretext was that it had aided a non-existent

democratic uprising in Kuwait. This was dropped on 8 August and in its place

Saddam invoked the historic territorial claim declaring Kuwait to be the nineteenth

province of Iraq.439

Fearing that Saddam would move into Saudi Arabia, allowing him control of half of

the world’s oil reserves, the Saudis accepted the deployment of US forces on their

territory.440 These were built up initially for the defence of the country from a

potential Iraqi attack. However, on 29 November, the United Nations Security

Council passed a resolution authorising all necessary means to expel the Iraqis if they

436 Friedman, Norman, Desert Victory, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 33.437 Pagonis, Lieutenant General William G., Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), pp. 3-4; Friedman, 1991, p. 32.438 Friedman, 1991, p. 32.439 Munro, 1996, p. 65.440 Friedman, 1991, p. 40.

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had not withdrawn from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. Preparation was now made for

possible offensive action.

The deadline passed without Saddam acceding to the demand to withdraw. On the

early morning of the 17th, the Coalition began its attack. For the next 38 days,

Coalition aircraft hit military and regime targets throughout Kuwait and Iraq. During

this time, Coalition ground forces were moved westwards in readiness for a ‘Left

Hook’ manoeuvre, the aim of which was to cut off the enemy in Kuwait. An Iraqi

encroachment into Saudi territory was also made on 29 January but was pushed back

by the 31st.

The ground attack got under way on 24 February. With Saddam’s forces concentrated

upon the defence of Kuwait in the east, the Coalition’s Left Hook advanced deep into

Iraq, meeting little resistance and reaching as far north as the Euphrates River before

heading east to cut off the enemy. However, even in Kuwait, the Coalition made rapid

progress with Kuwait City taken on Wednesday 27 February. Early on the 28th, one

hundred hours after the ground attack had begun, Washington declared the attack at

an end. The Iraqis were in full retreat northwards from the country that they had

invaded almost seven months earlier. They were not yet cut off and subsequent days

were to see further fighting, but the objective of Kuwait’s liberation was achieved.

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PART 1 – THE ADVANTAGE OF FORWARD LOCATIONS FOR

LOGISTICS

Use of forward located supplies

The conflict saw a considerable demand for logistics evidenced by the fact that United

States sealift and airlift moved 9.7 million short tons of supplies. Of that, 6.1 million

was of fuels and lubricants with the remaining 3.6 million short tons being dry

cargo.441 Supplies which were already forward located were of considerable

importance. Much reliance was therefore put upon sourcing within the South West

Asia region or else prepositioned stocks close-by. This provides evidence, contrary to

Boulding, that geographic distance was still as much a hindrance to transport. The

Loss of Strength Gradient had undergone little decline over the 20th century.

In one respect more than anything else, the countries of the South West Asia region

were capable of providing for the needs of the Coalition forces. As the world’s most

important oil producing region the Gulf States were able to supply most of the fuel for

the campaign. Three quarters of the deliveries of fuel made by US Military Sealift

Command were actually shipments brought to the area of responsible in north eastern

Saudi Arabia from elsewhere in the Gulf.442 Supplies were also moved by truck and

by pipeline within the region. Saudi Arabia, which provided most of all, supplied fuel

to the Coalition worth $1.9 billion. In the view of Prince Khaled, the commander of

the Saudi forces, without locally available supplies the Western allies would have

needed to mobilise the world’s tanker fleets.443

The Americans and allies who arrived in the kingdom were fortunate as well to be in a

country which, because it had to cope with more than a million pilgrims for the hajj

each year, was used to the arrival of large numbers of people. Saudi Arabia provided

generous support with regard to food. A local company, Astra Foods, which already

supplied the Saudi military, was contracted by King Fahd to support US forces. The

441 Matthews, James K. & Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), p. 13.442 Ibid., pp. 13, 126.443 Khaled Bin Sultan, Prince, Desert Warrior, (London: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 286, 297-9.

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Saudis were also able to handle the provision of processed water that was especially

necessary in the desert environment. American forces were supplied with 2 million

gallons of drinking water each day.444

Many of the trucks required to support the campaign were derived from the region.

Prince Khaled’s estimate was that 22,000 vehicles were contracted from the private

sector within Saudi Arabia. They included heavy equipment transporters, mainly

leased from the oil and construction sectors, used to move tanks and armoured

personnel carriers up to and along the border area. The Americans got 1,000 of these,

an important contribution given that the US Army and Marines had only 146 of their

own. Along with smaller donations made by Germany, Egypt and former Eastern

Bloc countries that brought the US total up to 1,200, the importance of these vehicles

was acknowledged by Lieutenant General Gus Pagonis, the person responsible for the

American logistics effort. In his words, “We might not have made it in the Gulf

without” them.445

3,000 water tankers were used to carry supplies from Saudi Arabia’s desalination

plants. 2,500 fuel tankers operated out of the country’s oil refineries. A particular

need of a desert campaign was that for refrigeration vans. The Americans were

fortunate to find that the Saudis had more than 2,000 available for lease. Other

vehicles that were hired locally included flatbeds, bulldozers, trailers, buses, mobile

homes for headquarters staff, cars and 4x4s.446 Had these not been available in the

region, the logistics load that had to be transported into the region would have been

greater still.

Mobile kitchens were manufactured by Saudi Arabia’s National Metal Industry. The

importance of local supply went even so far as to the provision of latrines, showers

and sinks. By October, Saudi contractors were producing respectively 600, 300, and

200 of these daily.447

444 Ibid., pp. 284-5, 287; Pagonis, 1992, pp. 113-5.445 Khaled Bin Sultan, 1995, p. 302; Pagonis, 1992, pp. 203-4.446 Khaled Bin Sultan, 1995, pp. 294, 298-9, 301; Pagonis, 1992, p. 205.447 Khaled Bin Sultan, 1995, p. 296; Lafferty, Brad, Richard Huhn, Ghoneim Al-Shaibani, Todd Behne, and Margaret Curran, Gulf War Logistics: Theory into Practice, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, April 1995, p. 16.

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In addition, the United States was able to rely on its own supplies within the region.

Air force munitions, for example, were already deployed at depots in Oman, Turkey

and Diego Garcia.448 Other prepositioned supplies in Oman included shelters, tents,

generators and water purification equipment.449

Pagonis had high regard for the prepositioned ships at Diego Garcia which sent a

variety of equipment and supplies necessary for the sustenance of the initial forces

that arrived in the region. He said that they were “absolute lifesavers” that “enabled us

to survive during those first few weeks in Saudi Arabia”.450 Items carried by these

ships included 5.5 million gallons of jet fuel, small arms ammunition, 3,000 land

mines, machine guns and mortar rounds. They also brought 16 bread ovens, cranes,

refrigerated vans, forklifts, 6,000 sleeping bags, uniforms and overalls, seven field

laundry units, fuel bars for heating food, medical supplies, cots, blankets, tents, stencil

machines, microfiche viewers, file cabinets and radio units. In addition to this, they

delivered 450,000 board feet of timber and 1,800 sheets of plywood. There was food

as well, namely 124,000 Class-1 rations ‘Meals Ready to Eat’ or MREs.451

Cost of transport

According to Boulding, cheaper transport was a reason for his belief that the Loss of

Strength Gradient should undergo decline. As transport costs fall over time, so

movement should become easier and reliance upon forward locations for the sourcing

of supplies should become less. But the Gulf War does not provide evidence to

support this view.

The types of items sent were for the most part those that possess proportional cost

relationships over time with transport. This means that as the cost of such items falls

so there is the tendency for the cost of transport to fall by the same amount. The

result, in the competitive situation that is war in which as much as possible will be

448 Winnefeld, James A., Preston Niblack, Dana J. Johnson, A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), p. 232.449 Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 17.450 Pagonis, 1992, pp. 70, 208.451 Ibid., pp. 70-1.

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sent, is that geographic distance remains as important as ever. As previously discussed

in Chapter 2, such items include civilian traded products with dual military usage.

These constituted most of the load in the Gulf War. Moreover, in this conflict much

was derived from pre-paid stocks. As also previously discussed in Chapter 2, items

whose cost is zero at the time of the operation must have a proportional relationship

over time with transport costs regardless of whether those costs go up or down.

Principal among these, as already mentioned, was fuel. Although that which was

brought from outside the Middle East equated to one quarter of the total fuel load

moved by US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), with the rest shipped

from within the region, this was still 1½ million short tons, much the same as the total

amount of dry goods sealifted from the United States for the conflict. The fuel was

shipped from stores in Spain, the Azores, the Caribbean and the continental United

States. As it was paid for before the start of the conflict it was therefore of zero cost at

the time of the operation.452

That so much had to be moved to a region that was the world’s most important source

of crude oil was principally because of a problem with aviation fuels. Kerosene, also

known as JET A-1, used in commercial aviation, was the primary jet fuel available in

the region. But while this was useful to the US-led Coalition, there was little suitable

refining capacity in the Gulf for the specialist fuels also required by military

aviation.453 Had a similar war been fought in a region that did not produce its own oil,

fuel would have been an even more important part of the load.

There were many other supplies with duel military/civilian usage which had been paid

for prior to the conflict. Combat Equipment Group Europe sent more than 12,000

light engineered items such as generators and light sets as well as 6,500 radios and

7,000 chemical protective overgarments. In addition, they sent 3,400 high-mobility

multipurpose wheeled vehicles.454 900 5-ton trucks were brought in by the Maritime

452 Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 126, 281-2.453 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, (Washington: DoD, April 1992), pp. F-16, F-30. 454 Brame, Maj. William L., ‘Building the Storm’, Army Logistician, January-February 1993, pp. 15-6.

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Prepositioning Ships that sailed in from their anchorages at Saipan and North

Carolina, as well as Diego Garcia.455

Equipment and supplies with solely military applications were also for the most part

pre-paid. The US had available sufficient items such as tanks, artillery, warships and

strike aircraft for it not to require the manufacture of more for the needs of the war.

This was demonstrated when the decision was taken in November 1990 to increase

the American presence in the region in order to provide what President Bush

described as “an adequate offensive military option”. This meant a doubling of the

ground force, including a tripling of the number of tanks, as well as a doubling of the

naval force and an increase in air power by a third.456 This involved pre-existing

equipment. Much of the augmentation of the ground force for example was carried

out by the transfer of the VII Corps from Germany where it had formerly faced the

Red Army. The fact that military equipment was mostly already paid for and therefore

of zero cost at the time of the operation meant that the proportional relationship with

transport costs over time was maintained.

Speed of transport

The amount of time it took to get supplies to the Persian Gulf was also little altered

from a century earlier. This meant that forward basing continued to provide a similar

advantage to that in the Boer War.

Getting personnel, equipment and supplies to South West Asia as quickly as possible

was a priority for much of the time between August 1990 and March 1991. As

Pagonis put it, the Coalition’s challenge, at least for the first month of Desert Shield,

was to rush enough troops and equipment into the theatre to deter or resist the

anticipated Iraqi onslaught against Saudi Arabia. By the middle of September, it was

felt that they had deployed enough combat troops in northern Saudi Arabia to

withstand an assault by Iraqi troops.457 It was at this point, according to Schwartzkopf,

that “there was a clear indication that Iraq was abandoning the idea of invading Saudi 455 Ibid., p. 118.456 Schwartzkopf, Gen. Norman, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, (New York: Bantam, 1993), p. 437.457 Pagonis, 1992, pp. 6, 125.

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Arabia and assuming a defensive posture.”458 As this was achieved, so the pace of

supply slowed somewhat. Total monthly expenditure on transport which peaked at

$421 million in September 1990 fell back to $360 million by November.459

Then on 29 November, a date was set for Saddam to leave Kuwait. The UN Security

Council passed a resolution authorising all necessary means to expel the Iraqis if they

had not withdrawn from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. With a time limit in place there

was a need to get sufficient force into the theatre as fast as possible. Expenditure on

transport shot up to $650 million in December, peaking at $903 million in January

when Operation Desert Storm began.460

Being closer to the war zone meant time could be saved, allowing forces to be got into

theatre more quickly. Prepositioning in the region or at a port close by could shave off

weeks from the journey needed to reach the Gulf. Hence the importance that Pagonis

placed on the prepositioning vessels at Diego Garcia. The Maritime Prepositioning

Ships force stationed at the Indian Ocean island took just seven days to arrive in Saudi

Arabia. These were followed by further prepositioned ships stationed at Diego Garcia

also carrying dry cargo which arrived in an average of just nine days.461

By comparison, vessels sailing from Bayonne, New Jersey, to Ad Dammam, the

largest port on the Saudi Gulf coast, took an average of 24 days. From the Sunny

Point Military Ocean Terminal in North Carolina to Ad Dammam they took 27 days.

Sailings from Jacksonville, Florida, to Ad Dammam and Jubail, also on the Saudi

Gulf coast, took 27 days as well. The situation was worse for sailings from the

American west coast. Those from Oakland to the Persian Gulf took 31, and from

Long Beach they took an average of 37 days.462

The speed at which such journeys could be undertaken had little improved during the

20th Century. It is worth emphasising that when compared for speed capability to the

most advanced ships used to supply the Boer War there was practically no advance

458 Schwartzkopf, 1993, p. 58.459 Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 201.460 Ibid., p. 201.461 Pagonis, 1992, p. 156.462 Calculated from statistics in Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 285-301.

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whatever. The fastest ships used by the British in 1899 were actually faster than most

cargo vessels used by the Americans in 1990-91. The 20 knot Majestic, mentioned in

the previous chapter, which set a trans-Atlantic record in 1891, could have outraced

every one of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships that sailed from Diego Garcia and the

Mariana Islands in the Pacific.463

Getting supplies from one end of the world to the other still took a matter of weeks.

To be sure, a comparison of the journey time from the American east coast to the Gulf

over a distance of 9,000 miles offered some amount of improvement to the 22 days

that Mahan calculated for the progress of British ships reaching the Cape in 1899 after

6,000 miles steaming. Mile-for-mile, it had been cut by 20-30 percent. But this may

well have been less if it had not been for the coal shortage that forced vessels used in

the Boer War to slow down to conserve fuel.

The fastest of the British ships used at the end of the 19th century encountered the

limitations placed upon sealift by the physics of water. The result was that during the

following nine decades cargo vessels stopped advancing in terms of speed. The

advantage that was to be had from forward prepositioning of sealifted supplies could

be little altered. Not only was it difficult for sealift to react much more quickly than it

had almost a century before but the slow progress of vessels meant that many that set

out from the United States were subject to u-turns in mid-ocean when the war was

over. The supplies they carried could not be got to South West Asia fast enough. Of

the 1.6 million short tons of dry cargo sent from the continental US, 265,000 short

tons, or 16 percent, was sent back in u-turned vessels. There were 37 ships from the

continental United States at sea when the war ended. Of these, 21 had set off from

Sunny Point and 5 had started from Concord in the San Francisco Bay area.464 As a

result, both ports had the distinction of sending more ships that u-turned in transit than

arrived in the conflict zone.

The United States made use of equipment and supplies stationed in Europe where

they had been located in readiness for a potential Soviet thrust westwards. With the

463 Military Sealift Command, ‘Prepositioning Ships’, Washington: retrieved 13 May 2005, http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/inventory.asp?var=PM3; Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 267.464 Calculated from statistics in Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 285-301.

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Soviet threat removed by the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and

the subsequent withdrawal of the Red Army, these were available to be used

elsewhere and could reach the Persian Gulf quicker. While 1,646,000 short tons of dry

cargo put to sea was sourced from the United States, the Americans moved in excess

of 929,000 short tons of dry cargo by sea from Europe.465

US sailings from the German port of Bremerhaven reached the Gulf in an average of

19 days. Those from its sister port of Nordenham across the Weser River took 20

days. From Rotterdam to Ad Dammam it was 22 days and from Antwerp, 20 days.

Ports on the Mediterranean offered a shorter journey from Europe. From Livorno in

Italy to Ad Dammam it was just 16 days.466 But, as these journey times suggest, even

European ports were some distance from the Gulf. The North Sea ports were 7,000

miles from Ad Dammam. Livorno was 5,000 miles away. And again they offered only

a modest improvement upon speeds achieved for a conflict at the beginning of the

century. Sailings from Rotterdam offered only an approximate 15 percent time

reduction, mile-for-mile, on Boer War supply ships, even with the latter’s need to

slow down due to the coal shortage.

The distance from Europe still meant that there were vessels on their way at sea at the

end of the conflict. 170,000 short tons, or 18 percent, of dry cargo shipped from

Europe was sent back in u-turned vessels.467 Four European ports, Amsterdam and

Emden in the Netherlands, Ridham Dock on the Swale in the UK, and Cartagena in

Spain, had the distinction of seeing none of the combined 10 US ships they sent to sea

arrive in time for the conflict.468

To a far lesser extent, the United States relied upon equipment and supplies forward

positioned in the Pacific and East Asia. These too were still located far from the Gulf.

The Maritime Prepositioning Ships called from the Mariana Islands carried 53,000

short tons in an average of 19 days. 15,000 short tons of dry cargo made it to Saudi

Arabia from Guam in an average 15.5 days sailing, although another shipload of less

than 5,000 short tons failed to reach the Persian Gulf before the conflict was over. The

465 Ibid., pp. 281-2.466 Ibid., pp. 285-301.467 Ibid., pp. 281-301.468 Ibid., pp. 285-301.

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one shipload of dry cargo sent from Hawaii on 11 February also never made it in

time.469 Supplies were sourced from stocks on Okinawa and Kyushu in Japan, as well

as Korea and the Philippines. 60,000 short tons of dry cargo was sent out to sea bound

for the Gulf, but 13,000 of this failed to reach the conflict zone in time. Sailings from

East Asia ranged from an average of 15 days from Subic Bay and Sasebo on Kyushu

to an average of 27 days from the neighbouring ports of Pusan and Chinae in Korea.470

The use of Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), capable of a top speed of 33 knots, proved to be

the most rapid means of logistics delivery on water in the Gulf War. They were the

fastest cargo ships in the world.471 An average sailing from Bayonne to the conflict

zone by FSS was just 15 days. By comparison, the average from this port for all other

vessels was 10 days longer at 25 days. Another example showed a similar

circumstance elsewhere. The average FSS sailing between Jacksonville and Ad

Dammam made the journey in 17 days. The average for all other cargo vessels

travelling to the Gulf from this port was again 10 days longer at 27 days.472

Yet they did not represent a speedier means of sea transport that could be adopted in

all circumstances. In part this was because the reality of their operation saw them

actually average only about 23 knots due primarily to bad weather and navigational

considerations such as speed limitations on the Suez Canal.473

But a bigger problem was that there were only a handful of these vessels. The US had

just eight of these ships, of which one, the Antares, ended up spending the war at

Gibraltar under repair by a commercial contractor.474 Although each could operate

with greater frequency than slower vessels, the remaining seven managed to move

only 13 percent of all the cargo transported between the US and Saudi Arabia during

and after the conflict.475

469 Ibid., pp. 267, 285-301.470 Ibid., pp. 285-301.471 United States Navy, ‘Fast Sealift Ships - T-AKR’, fact file, 22 September 2003, http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-takr.html472 Calculated from statistics in Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 285-301.473 Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 119.474 Ibid., p. 121.475 United States Navy fact file, 22 September 2003.

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With so few ships they could make only a small impact upon average sailings. At

Bayonne, three FSS sailings brought down the average transport time by just one day.

At Jacksonville, its three FSS sailings could not bring down the average even by a

single day. Houston saw more Fast Sealift sailings than any other port. Yet its 9 FSS

sailings were less than a quarter of its total of 38, such that an average journey from

here for all ships was brought down only from 28 to 26 days. Only the smaller port of

Savannah, Georgia, saw more than half its sailings made by FSS; that is 7 out of 12.

This reduced average sailing times by at least four days from 23 to 19, but there were

too few of them to make much of an impact elsewhere.476

That the United States could not rely more heavily on such ships was due to their lack

of commercial viability. In the Gulf War the United States relied on privately-owned

shipping for most of its sealift needs, as indeed had the British in the Boer War. But

because ship owners operate in a competitive environment they will not build and

operate vessels that will not make a profit. And the high cost of running fast sealift

meant that there were no such ships anymore in private service.

The vessels used in the Gulf War were originally built as container ships for Sea-Land

Services, Inc. of Port Elizabeth, New Jersey. But having found that their high fuel

consumption meant that they were not cost-effective as merchant ships, the company

then sold them on to the US Navy.477 While in this instance, the US Navy had the

good fortune that a private company had already built these vessels, no more had been

ordered since that could have carried more of the load required in the Gulf. Fast sealift

could not therefore make much difference to the Loss of Strength Gradient.

On land, the railways played a vital role in the Gulf War as they had done nine

decades earlier. In all, equipment and supplies were carried on to US ports on 16,000

commercial railcars as well as the 1,421 heavy-duty flatcars of the Defense Railway

Interchange Fleet. Rail was important for the movement of American equipment and

supplies within Europe as well. The commander of the Military Traffic Management

Command (MTMC) Bremerhaven Terminal estimated that 10,000 rail cars were used

to transport equipment to that port.478 476 Calculated from statistics in Matthews and Holt, pp. 285-301.477 United States Navy, 22 September 2003.478 Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 166, 168.

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Land transport had been improved further. Equipment and supplies were carried to

ports in the US on 54,000 commercial trucks, while in Germany, an estimated 9,000

trucks were used to transport equipment to Bremerhaven.479 The capacity of road

haulage for point-to-point delivery meant that it replaced the use of pack animals as

seen in the previous case study and could provide cheaper movement than rail over

distances of several hundred miles, as previously discussed in Chapter 2. It also

offered an alternative mode of movement where rail transport was not available at

greater distances. The 101st Airborne Division, based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky had

its gear moved by road 780 miles to Jacksonville. The reason for this was that the 22

mile branch line that connected it to the commercial rail system was found to be too

light for the mobilisation loads and was in a state of disrepair.480

Meanwhile, across South West Asia road haulage was often the only mode of

transport available. Rail transport was used in Saudi Arabia. According to Prince

Khaled, commanding the Saudi forces, the Dhahran-Riyadh railway carried

passengers and cargo, relieving congestion on the country’s main east-west

highway.481 But it did not connect with the front line area.

Had there been a rail infrastructure linking the ports with the front line areas, the

Coalition would have used it. Early on in the build-up the Americans considered the

construction of a railway westwards along the border, abandoned only because of the

diversion of resources it would have involved.482 Although road haulage was clearly

an advance in terms of speed upon the use of animals, this was less so against a

railway, a technology available at the time of the Boer War, whose construction was

still considered to be an alternative.

Further evidence that improvements to land transport had little affected the Loss of

Strength Gradient comes from the fact that in order to supply a conflict being fought

at the other end of the world, the distances moved on land could only be a fraction of

479 Ibid, pp. 166, 168.480 Ibid, pp. 166, 170-1.481 Khaled Bin Sultan, 1995, p. 300.482 Lafferty et al., 1995, p. 23; Atkinson, Rick, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1993), p. 257.

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those on water. The distance overland in Saudi Arabia was still relatively short.

Although it was 500 miles from Ad Dammam to Rafha at the far west of the Left

Hook and the distance to the front line was made greater still by the transit of

equipment and supplies via Riyadh, adding a further 200 miles, this could not

compare to sealift, given at least a 9,000 mile voyage from the United States.

Distances were greater within the continental United States. Even so, the 780 mile

road trip for the 101st Airborne Division on its way to Jacksonville was much shorter

than its journey at sea. The overland distance for American equipment and supplies in

Europe too was relatively short. US bases such as those at Mannheim, Kaiserslautern

and Karlsruhe in the south west of Germany were around 300 miles from

Bremerhaven and less than this from Rotterdam and Antwerp. Overland journeys

could be longer. The 12th Combat Aviation Brigade at Wiesbaden in Germany was

deployed by rail through France to Livorno in Italy a distance of up to 600 miles.483

But this was still only a small proportion of the overall journey given that the voyage

from there was 5,000 miles.

Moreover, even for this early stage of the journey to the Gulf, water transport played

an important role. The Rhine played an especially prominent part in the deployment

of American supplies from Europe. MTMC estimated that between 35 percent and 40

percent of all cargo was moved by river barge. These were loaded at MTMC-Europe’s

Rhine River Terminal at Mannheim, from where they proceeded on a three-day trip to

Rotterdam or Antwerp.484

Where there was the possibility to utilise land transport in favour of sealift in South

West Asia, the former was left unused. USTRANSCOM tested whether it could send

loads by road from the western Red Sea port of Jeddah rather than continue sea

journeys around the Arabian peninsular. It was approximately 750 miles across Saudi

Arabia. This could save a sea journey of approximately 2,700 miles around the

peninsular. They found it was quicker by as much as seven days. But they discovered

the cost to be much greater. It added $400 to $500 per container. This, plus problems

clearing customs, convinced USTRANSCOM to rely on the sea.485 Thus, water was 483 Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 169.484 Ibid., p. 168.485 Ibid., p. 184.

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chosen even though it took longer. Whatever improvements might have occurred to

transport on land, it was transport at sea that mattered most.

A preference for sealift was to be found even when compared to the use of airlift. This

was despite the fact that it offered a far shorter delivery time compared to that on

water. Hallion was wrong to suggest that airlift was “critical” in the first few weeks

after the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait for being “the only rapid mobility tool that could

deliver significant strength at long ranges within hours.”486

The most important aircraft used were the C-5 Galaxy and the C-141 Starlifter.

From August 1990 to February 1991 the C-5 transported 218,000 short tons or 42.3

percent of the total airlift. The C-141 Starlifter delivered 149,000 short tons or 28.9

percent of the load.487 Commercial aircraft made up most of the remainder. The most

important of these by far was the Boeing 747 which delivered 88,000 short tons over

the same time period.488

As said in Chapter 2, the C-5 Galaxy has a speed of 541 miles per hour and the C-141

Starlifter has a speed of 500 miles per hour. The Boeing 747 flies at 567 miles per

hour.489 No sea craft could compare for swiftness. The first airlift mission, a C-141,

was launched from Charleston Air Force Base in South Carolina on 7 August. It

arrived at Dhahran the following day. Even prepositioned ships based at Diego

Garcia, the fastest of which arrived in 7 days, could not beat this. The first of these

arrived only on 15 August.490

The problem was that it cost too much and delivered too little. The expenditure

required by the airlift for the Gulf War was huge. The United States spent $4.57

billion on transport during the whole campaign from August 1990 to March 1991. Of

this, more than half, $2.37 billion, went on airlift. Sealift was actually less well

486 Hallion, Richard P., Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1992), p. 137.487 Calculations from statistics in Lund, John, Ruth Berg, Corinne Replogle, Project Air Force Analysis of the Air War in the Gulf: An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency R-4269/4-AF, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), p. 13.488 Calculation from statistics in Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 47.489 Boeing website, ‘747 technical specifications’, retrieved 30 May 2005, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/747family/technical.html490 Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 38, 267.

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financed with $2.01 billion, while $194 million went on ground transportation. To

these figures must also be added foreign contributions to American transport, but

again airlift amounted to more than half with $73.9 million versus donated sealift

worth $72.1 million.491

Airlift made only a minor contribution to the initial build-up required to defend Saudi

Arabia from a possible advance southwards. In the first month, up to 4 September

1990, the United States brought in 634,000 short tons of supplies including both dry

cargo and fuel from all sources. Of this, just 47,000 was brought by air. That was 7.4

percent of the total. The situation was little improved the following month with

69,000 short tons carried by air, or 8.3 percent, out of a total delivered of 829,000

short tons. Moreover, these figures do not add in the supplies provided locally by the

Saudis, in particular fuel. Even taking into account the entire 544,000 short tons

brought in by air throughout the campaign, airlift could not have succeeded in

establishing the supplies put in place by mid-September sufficient to deter an attack

south by Saddam.492 As said before, this was the point at which it became clear to the

Americans that they could withstand an assault by Iraqi troops.

Even though less than half the cost of transport in the Gulf War was attributable to

sealift, 94.4 percent of all cargo deliveries throughout the war were made by sea. Only

5.6 percent came by air. To be sure, the effort both made is not directly comparable.

Two thirds of the load sent by sea was fuel and, of that, three quarters was moved

within South West Asia. That puts airlift responsible for approximately one tenth of

the load moved from outside the region. But even if fuel is entirely excluded from the

equation, the importance of transport on water remains overwhelming. Of dry cargo

sent into theatre 84.9 percent was delivered by sea and just 15.1 percent by air.493

The arrival of airlift, entirely unavailable to the early 20th century strategist, had not

made much difference to the Loss of Strength Gradient. Indeed its need for forward

based fuel within South West Asia would have been such that the weight of

requirements in theatre would have been greater than the weight of supplies it brought

in. As was said in Chapter 2, a C-5 Galaxy, fully loaded on the way out and then 491 Ibid., p. 201.492 Calculated from statistics in Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 13.493 Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 13.

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returning empty, could not fly the complete distance from North America to the Gulf

and back again without receiving a greater weight in fuel from forward located supply

positions.

Airlift proved beneficial to the United States for the movement of critical equipment.

For example, after the start of the air war in January the Army found that it was still

short of the heavy equipment transporters which it needed for the movement of forces

west along the Iraq border in preparation for the ground attack. It was too late to use

sealift so it was decided to move them by air instead.494 The advantage of speed

provided by airlift was shown by another incident during the air war phase of Desert

Storm. It allowed for the rapid deployment of Patriot missiles to Israel, twenty-four

hours after that country had been attacked by Scuds.495 This forestalled any possible

entry of that country into the war that could thereby have caused pressure on the Arab

members of the Coalition to withdraw their support.

However, such missions have to be measured against the totality of supplies

transported. While some items may indeed have been critical to the success of the

campaign, they could not have done this in isolation. As already said, many other

items were also required. The great bulk of fuel, the largest constituent of the

logistical load, as well as ammunition and armoured vehicles, could not all have been

transported by air, and the war could not have been won without them.

Moreover, given tighter financial constraints, a lack of supplies sourced from in

theatre, or a larger opponent, it is likely that the proportion sent by air would have

been even smaller than it was. The American-led effort during the war was supported

with considerable financial aid from other countries. Of a total of $55 billion, the Gulf

States provided $37 billion while another $17 billion came from Japan and

Germany.496 General Schwartzkopf said that without Japanese funding, Desert Shield

would have run out of money in August 1990.497 As said earlier, the US was also able

to derive much of its supplies from the South West Asia region. The burden placed

494 Lund et al., 1993, p. 18.495 Lund et al., 1993, p. 17-8.496 Using figures in Freedman, Lawrence, and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991, (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), p. 361. 497 Schwartzkopf, 1993, p. 424.

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upon its transport modes was thus much reduced. And given the impermanence of

Great Power status the US cannot be certain that it will always face opponents so

much smaller than itself, in which case the supplies required for a future conflict may

be increased further still. The next case study on the Falklands War will be of a

country that did not receive financial donations, could not source much of its supplies

from in theatre and faced a relatively larger opponent. It will be shown that its

proportionate reliance on airlift, even excepting infrastructure constraints, was far

less.

The preference for surface transport in the Gulf War was to be found for intra-theatre

as well as intercontinental movement. The alternative to moving equipment and

supplies overland was to use intra-theatre air transport. But the load carried was too

small to take much pressure off the Saudi road system. The amount moved was less

even than that carried by air into the region in the first place. US intra-theatre airlift

from the beginning of the build-up to 15 January 1991 moved 142,000 short tons of

cargo. During Desert Storm after 15 January, the intra-theatre airlift was more intense,

but even so, only an additional 159,000 short tons was moved.498

While airlift played only a marginal role in the overall movement of equipment and

supplies it was the dominant mode of transport for the movement of people. 500,720

American personnel were carried by air to South West Asia.499 A lesser number

travelled by sea. Most of the 98,000 naval personnel travelled in their assigned ships,

as did 17,000 Marines in assault shipping.500 Airlift was also important for moving

personnel within theatre. From the beginning of the build-up to 15 January 1991 airlift

flew 134,000 passengers. During Desert Storm after 15 January, 184,000 passengers

were flown.501

Yet in weight terms, people were not an important part of the load in this conflict. For

every person flown into South West Asia there were approximately 12 short tons of

supplies brought into the region by American transport, both sealift and airlift. This

498 Cohen, Elliot A., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 3: Part I, (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1993), p. 153.499 Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 13.500 Winnefeld et al., 1994, p. 27.501 Cohen, 1993, Vol. 3: Part I, p. 153.

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was about 120 times the weight of a soldier weighing 200 pounds.502 In other words,

airlifted personnel could account only for a very small proportion of the weight of

everything sent to the Gulf. While it is in human nature to focus upon other humans,

the effort to transport soldiers is proportionately very small in modern warfare. While

personnel are vital to fighting war, so are equipment and supplies.

The evidence of the Gulf War does not support the Pentagon’s concept of smaller

Forward Operating Bases, or ‘Lily-Pads’, with light forces flown in when required.503

As was demonstrated by the movement of the VII Corps from Germany, heavy

ground forces were a requirement of this war. One cannot assume that future

opponents will be relatively smaller than those in the past. The stationing of the VII

Corps in Europe was itself part of the US forward basing effort used to counter the

threat from the Red Army from across the iron curtain. As said in Chapter 2, it was an

example of how personnel were not located separately from equipment even with the

increased availability of airlift during the Cold War for movement. The use of heavy

ground forces requires troops to be stationed with the equipment which they will use

in battle in order that they can train with it.

Infrastructure and bottlenecks

Forward located transport infrastructure was to be no less advantageous in the Gulf

War than in the Boer War. With most equipment and supplies sent by sea, ports were

necessary. Over half of the dry cargo sent by sea from the US, including ships that u-

turned in mid-ocean, was loaded at four ports. These were Sunny Point, which

handled 376,000 short tons, Jacksonville with 221,000, Houston with 214,000 and

Bayonne with 157,000.504 Ports at forward positions in Europe were also necessary for

transport from that continent. More than two thirds of US supplies sourced from

Europe were loaded at three ports. Bremerhaven/Nordenham on the Weser River in

502 Calculated from statistics in Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 13, 126.503 Jones, General James, Statement, Military Construction Subcommittee Hearing, United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, 29 April 2003, http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?id=203402504 Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 218.

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Germany alone accounted for close to half the load with 423,000 short tons, while

Rotterdam handled 151,000 and Antwerp, 103,000.505

Whether supplies were derived from North America or Europe, the ships that carried

them made their way to the Persian Gulf, for the most part, via the Suez Canal. This

was a piece of forward positioned transport infrastructure that was therefore vital to

the campaign. There was particular concern about keeping the Suez Canal open.

Egypt posted guards every kilometre along its length and employed drastic measures

against suspicious vessels. When the authorities found that the Kuwaiti based

Fathulkair carried high explosives and military hardware not listed on its manifest, it

was ordered to unload the explosives before entering the canal. The cargo was trucked

and reloaded at the other end.506

Sea transport called upon forward positioned repair facilities. It has already been said

that one of the Fast Sealift Ships, the Antares spent the war undergoing repair in

Gibraltar. Such repair facilities were augmented by the forward deployment of repair

ships. One such vessel, the USS Yellowstone, deployed to Jeddah, performed more

than 10,000 repair jobs on 30 US and allied ships over seven months.507

The United States and its allies were greatly advantaged by the port facilities available

to them in South West Asia. In the words of General Pagonis, the Saudi infrastructure

“was absolutely first rate.” Ad Dammam and Jubail handled fully-loaded ships from

dozen of ports around the world, but “those two ports were up to the task, and then

some.”508 The Commander in Chief of the British forces, General Sir Peter de la

Billière, described Jubail as “an immense, modern port built for show” that was only

now being used to capacity for the first time.509

Ad Damman had 60 piers while Jubail had another 20. Together they handled most of

the sealift that arrived in the country. Up to 8 November, Ad Dammam took 84

percent of all cargo with Jubail handling 12 percent. After this date Ad Damman’s

505 Ibid., p. 282.506 Ibid., p. 208.507 Naval Historical Center, ‘U.S. Navy in Desert Shield/Storm’, Part IV, Washington, 16 August 1997, http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/ds4.htm508 Pagonis, 1992, p. 210.509 De La Billière, General Sir Peter, Storm Command, (London: HarperCollins, 1992), p. 44.

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share fell but it still led, handling 72 percent of all cargo with Jubail at 25 percent.510

The transportation of equipment and supplies had been made much easier by the prior

construction of transportation infrastructure in forward positions by the host country.

Bottlenecks related to lack of capacity were therefore largely avoided. Pagonis said

there were only some brief shortages of warehouse space.511

Movement over land was also greatly enhanced by the existence of forward located

infrastructure. Saudi Arabia possessed a road infrastructure of a standard up to that of

Western Europe and North America. One of the two Main Supply Routes (MSRs)

followed the coastal highway north of the major ports of Ad Damman and Jubail and

then along the Tapline Road. US forces were particularly fortunate with the existence

of the Tapline Road. It did not link any major settlements but instead had been built

across an almost uninhabited environment as an access road alongside the Trans-

Arabian Pipeline. This had supplied oil to a Mediterranean terminal in Lebanon until

1975 and was completely shutdown following Jordan’s support for Iraq in the present

conflict. It just so happened that the route of the Tapline Road also ran parallel to the

Iraqi border. This was to be of great benefit for the movement of forces required for

Schwartzkopf’s Left Hook involving an attack deep into the Iraqi desert west of

Kuwait.

Even so, this route alone did not have sufficient capacity for the transport required by

the war. Another, longer Main Supply Route, known as MSR Dodge, made use of

Saudi Arabia’s main east-west highway between Dhahran and Riyadh. From the

capital it then followed a road north to the King Khalid Military City, a Saudi military

base, and beyond that intersected with the Tapline Road. From Ad Dammam to the

point where they both crossed over in the desert close to the Iraqi border, the Tapline

Road MSR was 334 miles while MSR Dodge was 528 miles.512

Pagonis restricted use of the Tapline Road to tactical support, involving the transport

of combat personnel, tanks and armoured vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and some

fuel. All other supplies were moved along MSR Dodge, which, given the four lane

510 Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 19-20.511 Pagonis, 1992, p. 210.512 Lafferty et al., 1995, p. 23

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highway between Dhahran and Riyadh, he said actually turned out to be the shorter

route.513

But Saudi road infrastructure still required improvements. The Tapline Road had to be

upgraded to meet the demand for increased traffic. The route’s capacity was increased

by resurfacing an older version of the highway which ran parallel to it. Access roads

were also built where there had been none before to supply forward positions in the

desert.514 Almost 500 new traffic signs were erected along the Saudi Arabian road

network during the Gulf War. ‘Combat Convoy Support Centers’ were established for

road users. These were truck stops providing fuel, maintenance and repair as well as

food, latrines, showers and a place to rest for drivers. The aim of these was both the

efficient delivery of supplies and improved road safety.515

There was special concern regarding what was termed the ‘the mother of all

intersections’, paraphrasing Saddam Hussein’s reference to the coming Operation

Desert Storm as ‘the mother of all battles’. The problem was that in order to put

Schwartzkopf’s Left Hook in place ready for the ground attack, the XVIII Airborne

Corps had to be moved westwards along the Tapline Road while crossing the heavier

VII Corps, who were meant to be making their way north. All this had to be hurriedly

achieved in the midst of the air campaign.516

Consideration was given to building an overpass so that both corps could cross each

other without hindrance. But it was decided that this was not the best use of limited

engineering resources and that, in any case, there was not enough time to do it.

Instead, the Americans had to make do with a timetable charting the movements of

the individual divisions, with responsibility for adhering to it assigned at divisional

level. The movement of both corps began on 20 January and was completed a month

later on 20 February with the VII Corps having moved more than 330 miles and the

513 Pagonis, 1992, p. 122.514 Honec, Maj. Robert B., Oral History Interview DSIT AE 068, Interviewee: Ellis, LTC Frank D., Commander, 20th Engineer Battalion, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Conducted near Rafha, Northern Province, Saudi Arabia, 15 March 1991, US Army 116th Military History Detachment, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC and US Army Center of Military History, Washington, 1991, http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/SWA/DSIT/DSIT068.htm515 Pagonis, 1992, pp. 2, 128.516 Ibid., p. 143.

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XVIII Airborne Corps having travelled 500 miles, but with the feared bottleneck

having failed to materialise.517

The heavy usage made of the desert MSRs was such that on the northern route which

included the Tapline Road there was an average of 18 trucks passing a single point

every minute, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.518 Without the existence of such

transport infrastructure it would not have been possible for Schwartzkopf to carry out

his Left Hook manoeuvre.

Road haulage was not the sole overland mode of transport used in South West Asia.

Pipelines were also used. The region already had an extensive infrastructure for the

movement of crude oil but more was needed for the movement of refined fuel. During

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Americans laid more than 127 miles of tactical

pipelines to respond rapidly to urgent requirements and to enable movement of larger

quantities of fuel.519 The Saudis laid an even greater length of pipelines in order to

guarantee the flow of fuel. One was built 150 miles between the al-Safaniya refinery on

the Gulf coast and the King Fahd airport. Another was laid over 400 miles from al-

Safaniya to al-Qaisuma on the Tapline Road.520

As said previously, a lack of rail transport in theatre, with the exception of the

Dhahran-Riyadh railway, meant that this mode did not figure highly in the conflict.

The plan to build a railway westwards along the border was abandoned in favour of

the easier alternative of carrying out improvements to the country’s already well

developed road infrastructure.

Air transport required infrastructure. Planes needed runways from which to take off

and land. They also needed to refuel. A lack of en route bases on the way from the US

was a constraint on the airlift flow. Just four bases handled 75 percent of the traffic.

Half the total went through two; Torrejon in Spain which handled 29 percent and

Rhein-Main in Germany with 21 percent. The next quarter went through Zaragoza,

Spain, with 16 percent, and Ramstein, Germany, with 9 percent. Lund et al. have said

517 Ibid., pp. 143, 146.518 Ibid., p. 146.519 Cohen, 1993, Vol. 3: Part I, p. 286.520 Khaled Bin Sultan, 1995, pp. 298-9.

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there were no other bases in Europe that had the right combination of facilities; ramp

space, refuelling systems, maintenance, and crew quarters, and were also the proper

distance between the United States and South West Asia. Bases in Italy were too far

from the US. Bases in Britain were too far from the Persian Gulf, although there was

some use of Mildenhall and Fairford in that country. Being too far from either end of

the airlift meant that more fuel had to be taken on and therefore less cargo.521

An added difficulty for these bases was that they received aircraft both going to and

returning from the theatre. Torrejon was the busiest air base of the war for airlift

sorties, ahead of Dhahran in Saudi Arabia, while Rhein-Main was in third place. An

average delay of 4.25 hours per sortie at Rhein-Main became 8.5 hours per mission.

At Ramstein it was higher still at 4.5 hours per sortie and thus 9 hours per mission.522

Delays occurred in part because problems at any of the bases used affected the flow.

Thus a backlog in theatre would feed through to Europe. But the European bases were

themselves the cause of delays owing to weather and air traffic problems. There were

also night time restrictions on flights from several civilian airfields in Germany, such

as Nuremberg, which was a major aerial port of embarkation point for the VII Corps.

Sharing with civilian flights for slot times was a further constraint.523

If aircraft did not land to refuel, the alternative was to do so in mid-flight. But the

tankers that did the refuelling needed intermediate bases to operate from. This

contributed to the fact that Lajes Field in the Azores provided support for 12,000

aircraft of all kinds during the campaign, in large part because it was the sole base for

tanker aircraft in the mid-Atlantic.524 Because of their short range, fighter aircraft were

particularly reliant on refuelling. Marine fighters and A-10s stopped at Rota or Moron

in Spain, but the rest flew non-stop, reliant entirely upon en route located tanker

aircraft.525

521 Lund et al., 1993, pp. 47-8.522 Ibid., pp. 48-9.523 Ibid., pp. 49-50.524 Bailey, SSgt. R. “Beatle”, ‘The 1990s and the Gulf War’, The History of Lajes Field, 65th Air Base Wing History Office, http://www.lajes.af.mil/history/pages/history7.htm, Lajes Field, Azores, Portugal 26 February 2001525 Winnefeld et al, 1994, pp. 43-4.

171

Had it been possible, tankers would even have been used to alleviate the lack of air

facilities in theatre, including staging bases required for air crew to rest. It was hoped

that en route refuelling would reduce time spent on the ground, allowing quicker

return to staging bases in Europe. However, tankers were in high demand, not all

crews were air refuelling qualified and there was a particular difficulty with changing

airlift schedules that was accentuated by inadequate communication links.526

The lack of a stage base in theatre had repercussions upon on crew availability. Planes

were sent out from Europe with three rather than two crew so that flying could be

shared. But because personnel had limited flying hours for safety reasons this used up

crew flying time at a much greater rate. According to Lund et al, the call up of

reserves on 23 August “came just in time to avoid a complete breakdown of the

system” as existing personnel had used up most of their monthly allotted time. But

mission delays continued to result from crew rest requirements in the following

days.527

Bases in theatre were a bottleneck in the system. It was at Saudi insistence that

offloads went in large part to Dhahran International Airport, on the Gulf coast,

although other airfields were to be increasingly used and construction was carried out

to improve capacity.528 Up to 8 November, 46 percent of the airlift went to Dhahran,

12 percent to Jubail, 9 percent to King Fahd, also in the Gulf coast region, and 6

percent to Riyadh. After 8 November, 39 percent of the airlift went to Dhahran, 22

percent to Jubail, 13 percent to Riyadh and 7 percent to King Fahd.529 The north

eastern airfields were the most convenient for the front line. While greater use of air

infrastructure elsewhere in the kingdom would have eased congestion it would also

have entailed greater need for road haulage or intra-theatre airlift to get supplies

where they were required. And intra-theatre airlift also had forward located

infrastructure requirements. New airstrips had to be constructed throughout the front

line region. Even sections of highway were used. A new airstrip was, for example,

created out of the Tapline Road.530

526 Lund et al., 1993, pp. 27-8.527 Ibid., pp. 31-4.528 Ibid., p. 27; Winnefeld et al., 1994, p. 39; Khaled Bin Sultan, 1995, p. 299.529 Matthews and Holt, p. 20.530 Khaled Bin Sultan, 1995, p. 299; Winnefeld et al., 1994, p. 229; Cordesman, Anthony H., The Gulf War, 26 September 2003, p. 613., http://www.csis.org/burke/reports/941015lessonsgulfIV-chap08.pdf

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But there was a more general problem for airlift as a whole which manifested itself

back in the United States. It was simply not big enough to carry out all the demands

placed upon it. The very attraction of rapid supply offered by airlift, aided by the

American willingness to spend heavily on this mode of transport, actually caused it to

be prone to bottlenecks.

A priority system had to be set up to make sure only the most urgently needed items

were sent by air. In mid-November 1990, US Central Command issued a logistics

guidance that 90 percent of sustainment should be moved by sea and 10 percent by

air, with the exception of repair parts for which the proportions were reversed. But as

the US Army Depot Systems Command reported in December, it was receiving “bulk

quantities of sand bags, fence posts, toilet paper, T-shirts, mittens, sweat shirts, and

admin supplies” to send by plane. On 6 December General Hansford Johnson,

Commander in Chief of United States Transportation Command and Military Airlift

Command, told Defense Secretary Dick Cheney that air sustainment requirements

were “approximately 300 tons per day above available airlift.” Many items were

redirected for transport by sea. Even so, the backlog in the United States was to peak

at 10,300 short tons by 23 January, resulting in greater delay of high-priority items.531

Like sealift, airlift was greatly advantaged by the prior existence of larger air facilities

in forward locations, both en route and close to the front line in north eastern Saudi

Arabia. More infrastructure might well have helped it further but it is worth repeating

the point that it was a minor contributor to the overall logistics load compared to

sealift. Transport on water was the more important of the two, and by extension, so

was forward based seaport infrastructure.

The potential for bottlenecks was a factor for all transport modes, whether at sea, on

land or in the air. The Gulf War showed the necessity for sufficient transport

infrastructure to cope with it, just as was the case in the Boer War. And, like that

previous case study, its importance was such that it influenced the choice of locations

where the campaign was fought, aiding the movement of forces required in order for

Schwartkopf to carry out the Left Hook manoeuvre.

531 Matthews and Holt, pp. 84-7.

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Reducing the load and increasing advance warning

The Gulf War did not provide evidence of means through which the logistics load

might have been reduced over the last century, whether by living off the land,

miniaturisation technology, or the acquisition of better information. Nor could the last

of these have provided increased advance warning of the conflict, allowing forces and

supplies to be prepositioned further away.

It was demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 4 that if there is scope to live off the land, the

competitive environment of war means that this is countered by an impetus to

transport a greater load into theatre. Even so, in the Gulf War there was a further

reason why it could not be a cause of decline for the Loss of Strength Gradient. The

opportunity to do so was much less for forces at the end of the 20th Century than at the

beginning. Grazing animals, with their need for pasture, had ceased to be used for

transport or in battle as they had in the Boer War, and in any event would have found

little to eat in the desert environment. There were only a few camels used on the Iraqi

side. Several robed Iraqis mounted on camels carried out an unsuccessful

counterattack upon the British 7th Armoured Brigade on 27 February.532

Water for human consumption was still drawn locally. Wells drawing upon

underground aquifers were located and dug.533 But, as said before, the Coalition relied

for the most part on the provision of water trucked in from the coastal desalination

plants.

As was the case in the Boer War, there was no evidence to suggest that

miniaturisation, as argued by Edgell et al., could reduce the load permanently.534

Because war is a competitive situation, the opponent will try countermeasures or else

develop or acquire new technologies that are already in its enemy’s possession. No

532 Atkinson, p. 464.533 Khaled Bin Sultan, 1995, p. 294.534 Edgell, J. L.W.; S.K. Spangler, G. F. Dragoo, & L.W. Jackson, ‘Logistics in 2025: Consider It Done!’, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1996, pp. 26-28, http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/volume2/chap01/vol2ch01.pdf

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side can hope for a permanent reduction in logistics load through possessing superior

technology. The Americans certainly had more up-to-date weaponry. But, as will be

explained later with regard to the use of precision air power, Iraqi countermeasures

were capable of thwarting advanced weaponry. Moreover, Iraq had made efforts to

arm itself with its own technologically advanced equipment. They had, for example,

Dutch produced night vision equipment, if only in limited numbers, as well as an

infrared jammer.535

Better information was no more available to forces at the end of the 20th Century than

at the beginning. Martin Libicki used the example of the Gulf War for his argument,

mentioned in Chapter 2, that improved information about war conditions could allow

a lighter load to be transported. He noted that most of the supplies moved by sea were

sent back home without being used, and even that a similar war in future could be

supplied by air alone.536

Yet the competitive impetus in war to limit enemy intelligence gathering means that a

belligerent cannot expect to rely on improved information collection. Prior to the

ground invasion, the Americans could not be sure about what the Iraqis were doing or

were planning to do. General Schwartzkopf expressed concern that they might “make

victory extremely costly”.537 He could not have certainty about the effort that would

be required to retake Kuwait. If Saddam had been prepared for the Left Hook,

Schwartzkopf’s westward outflanking movement, the war could have lasted longer

and the supplies consumed greater. As said previously in Chapter 2, the

unpredictability of strategy is demonstrated even more so by comparison with the

invasion of Iraq in 2003, which saw the same opponent, in a weakened state, taken on

for a second time. The conflict could not be brought to a close in anywhere near the

four days that the ground attack took in 1991.

The difficulties of relying upon intelligence also undermines another argument, put by

Blaker, that better information collection could provide early warning of events,

allowing for bases further away from the potential front line. Even when intelligence

535 Friedman, 1991, p. 111.536 Libicki, Martin, ‘The Emerging Primacy of Information’, Orbis, 40 (1996), p. 261. 537 Schwartzkopf, 1993, p. 439.

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is accurate, this does not mean that it will be acted upon. It is still open to alternative

interpretations. The US did detect Iraqi military movements prior to their attack. Even

so they did not believe that this provided sufficient intelligence of an invasion. They

deferred to “an almost universal consensus” held by Arab leaders and area experts

that this would not lead to a use of force or else it would be used only for very limited

aims. Certainly, even the Kuwaitis were unaware that they were about to be invaded

in August 1990, let alone the United States. Despite threatening speeches made by

Saddam in mid July, they did not make preparations for a defence of their country.538

A reduced load and deterrence

There is the possibility that despite the small load sent into theatre by airlift, this

deterred Iraqi action. The urgency of the situation in early August 1990, when only

airlift could reach Saudi Arabia, persuaded Schwartzkopf of the value of having light

forces in place that would “assert a U.S. presence”. It was a calculated risk that it

would deter the Iraqis. As Schwartzkopf put it, the job of the first airlifted troops was

“a dangerous mission” because if Iraq attacked they “would be no match for

Saddam’s tanks.”539

These light forces acted as a trip-wire that could have unleashed greater conflict, as

was the intention for those deployed to Macedonia during the 1990s, explained in

Chapter 2. Even if Saddam could have defeated the American forces that had arrived

in South West Asia, he should thus have feared a greater war with the US resulting

from this. But the possibility of such a trip-wire effect can only be temporary. The

impermanence of Great Power status, tested in the following chapter, will show a

state cannot always expect that it will face opponents much smaller than itself who

fear provoking a fight with it.

Moreover, Friedman doubts Saddam believed that attacking such light forces would

have led to greater conflict with the US. He says that the Iraqi leader had been

impressed by what he saw as the weakness of the United States in withdrawing from 538 Cordesman, Anthony H., and Abraham Wagner, Lessons of Modern War Vol. IV: The Gulf War, Boulder, Co, Westview Press, 1996, pp. 44, 47.539 Schwartzkopf, 1993, p. 349.

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Vietnam. He had certainly noted the weak reaction of Washington to an attack upon

the USS Stark by one of his aircraft in 1987 that had resulted in the loss of 37

American servicemen.540

Instead, Friedman offers another explanation for Iraq’s failure to take the opportunity

to invade. Saddam may well have grossly overestimated the rate at which US forces

brought into Saudi Arabia could develop combat potential. He says that it is likely

that he did not understand the extent of the logistical effort required and in so doing

missed the opportunity to invade when he had it.541 As was said in Chapter 2 with

regard to the Japanese attack upon Singapore in 1942, not every opponent is likely to

suffer such an overestimation of their enemy’s capabilities. Any potential deterrent

effect that resulted from a miscalculation of the supplies needed by US forces and

airlift’s ability to transport them could not be used as evidence that the Loss of

Strength Gradient had undergone permanent decline.

PART 2 – THE ADVANTAGE OF FORWARD POSITIONS FOR FIGHTING

Use of aerial bombardment

The argument, which can be traced back to Douhet, that advances in aerial

bombardment might have undermined the need for ground forces, had its supporters

following the Gulf War. General Merrill McPeak said this was the first time in history

that a field army had been defeated by air power. James Coyne said that there were

strong grounds for arguing that air power was the decisive factor. And according to

Richard Hallion, “Simply (if boldly) stated, air power won the Gulf War.”542

540 Friedman, 1991, pp. 108-9.541 Friedman, 1991, p. 69.542 As quoted in Clodfelter, Mark, ‘Of Demons, Storms, and Thunder: A Preliminary Look at Vietnam’s Impact on the Persian Gulf Air Campaign’, Airpower Journal, Winter 1991, p. 17; Coyne, James P., Airpower in the Gulf, (Arlington VA: Air Force Association, 1992), p. 178; Hallion, 1992, p. 1.

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To be sure, Boulding was not a supporter of the concept of strategic air power, but the

evidence of the Gulf War suggests that he was wrong to assert that it was a

“revolution of quite unprecedented dimensions” or that the LSG for air power was

very much less than it was for land power. This is let alone the view that it could be

strategic.

In the first instance, air power was forward located. To be sure, the conflict was to see

the longest strike mission in the history of warfare when B52 bombers flew to South

West Asia all the way from Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana.543 But such a

mission flown from the continental United States was to be very much the exception.

Fighter aircraft needed airfields in the Arabian peninsular and Turkey to be within

range of Iraq and occupied Kuwait. These could not undertake missions from bases in

North America. While air strikes were underway, advantage was taken of airfields

within the theatre that were located closest to the enemy. Forward locations were set

up at Al-Jouf, King Khalid City, and King Fahd International Airport in order to

generate more sorties. Instead of returning to their home bases elsewhere within the

South West Asia region after a strike, aircraft landed at these bases to refuel, rearm, and

so return to combat as quickly as possible. It was at the end of their combat day, or

when needing maintenance, that the aircraft returned to their normal operating bases.544

There was a considerable logistics requirement for this forward based air power. As

was previously discussed, there was a lack of the specialist fuels in theatre required

for military aviation. The result of this was that most of the fuel sealifted into theatre

was not for surface forces but for combat aircraft. That much of the effort to transport

supplies was to sustain air power does not support Boulding’s view that it should have

an LSG very much less than that for land power. Thus, in the unlikely event that air

power really had won the war, this does not provide evidence for a reduction in the

LSG overall.

Even if it had been possible to source this fuel locally, air power could not have

provided a replacement for ground forces. Air power was an important factor in this 543 United States Air Force, ‘B-52 Stratofortress’, fact sheet, September 2003, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=102 544 Winnefeld et al., 1994, pp. 176, 235-6.

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war. Circumstance made it particularly destructive in its use against the Iraqi army.

But by no means did it win the war itself, nor could the example of the conflict be

used to make a general argument that the forward basing of ground forces was proved

to have been made less important.

The success of the air campaign against Iraqi front line forces may well have caused a

25-30 percent desertion rate prior to the start of the ground war. According to analysis

of enemy prisoner of war interviews, many if not most of the remaining troops were

prepared to offer minimal or no resistance to Coalition ground forces. Stephen

Hosmer has emphasised its psychological impact on Iraqi troops who endured seeing

aircraft constantly overhead and bombing that went on around the clock, day in day

out. This they saw to be accurate and felt it was impossible to defend against.545

Armour in the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations was devastated by air strikes prior to the

ground offensive. The assessment of ARCENT (US Army Component, Central

Command) was that 1,772 tanks, 948 armoured personnel carriers, and 1,477 artillery

tubes had been destroyed by air power at this point. Depending on estimates of Iraqi

strength prior to the campaign this was between 36 and 42 percent of tanks, 30 and 34

percent of armoured personnel carriers and 45 and 48 percent of artillery.546

Again the nature of the terrain was important. One has to emphasise the fact that

Saddam Hussein’s forces were for the most part stationed in barren desert where there

was little cover that they could use to hide and protect themselves from enemy attack.

Compared to the example of the Kosovo War that followed eight years later and saw

the Yugoslav Army emerge largely unscathed from its hiding places in the province’s

mountains and forests, the targets were more visible and accessible.

But the Iraqis could still have hid themselves better. Before the war began, an exercise

codenamed Night Camel was undertaken in which American air crews carried an

infrared targeting system called Pave Tack. It had little success finding US tanks in

545 Information provided to Winnefeld et al., 1994, p. 159.546 Winnefeld, 1994, p. 159, Table 6.2. Lower figures based on lower estimate of initial Iraqi strength from ARCENT, higher figures based on higher estimate from CENTCOM (US Central Command).

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the Saudi desert which were dispersed and had their engines shut down. Iraqis,

however, sometimes kept their engines running at night for warmth and power.547

Even the Iraqi use of sand to hide equipment had problems which meant that armour

could be found with infrared technology. Beneath sandbags, metal still absorbs heat

during the day and releases it at night at a different rate to the sand. The Iraqi practice

of building protective revetments from sand was also faulted by the fact that the rate

at which recently dug sand cools in the early evening is different to that surrounding

it.548

It did not help that the Iraqis had no experience of serious air attack during the

previous Iran-Iraq War. As Friedman puts it, “for reasons difficult to imagine”,

Saddam seemed to assume that his national air defence plus the soldiers’ own air

defences, largely made up of hand-held missiles, would be sufficient to defend against

air attack.549

And for all the faults of the Iraqi army in defending itself from Coalition air power,

one still has to remember that it did not force Saddam to withdraw. Within the

Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations, most of his troops had not surrendered and most of his

armour had survived by the time the ground invasion had begun. The occupation of

Kuwait continued, and as such, ground troops were still necessary to retake the

country.

Moreover, north of the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations, the so called ‘Scud Hunt’

demonstrated how measures could be used to improve survivability against Coalition

air power. The Iraqis launched 88 Scud attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia during

the war. Despite 2,493 sorties launched against them, the Coalition could not stop the

attacks. They suffered from a lack of intelligence about enemy positions. The time it

took for launch vehicles to leave launch sites was overestimated. Rather than half an

hour it took five to six minutes, allowing them to hide more easily from Coalition

aircraft. Launchers were exposed only briefly for launches, dashed out and back to

cover. Eighty percent of Scud launches were carried out at night, to provide more 547 Atkinson, 1993, pp. 263-4.548 Ibid., p. 264.549 Friedman, 1991, p. 117.

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cover. Launchers, missiles and support equipment were dispersed, often deployed in

urban areas in warehouses or garages. The Iraqis made life even more difficult for the

Coalition by the use of decoys which diverted attacks.550 Mistakes were also made

during the Scud hunt. A claimed kill of Scud launch vehicles for example, was later

believed to have been that of a group of fuel trucks.551

The problem of intelligence was by no means limited to the search for Scuds. It was

similar for the attempt to destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability. Post-

war inspections by the UN found there were a large number of Iraqi facilities that had

not been attacked and destroyed. This was both because there were facilities unknown

to Allied intelligence and because some elements of the programme were dispersed.552

Had the Iraqis made a greater attempt at countermeasures in the Kuwaiti Theatre of

Operations here too Coalition air power might have been less destructive.

Any possibility of a Kosovo-style victory through air power must be discounted. As

explained in Chapter 3, while NATO air power failed to destroy the Yugoslav Army

occupying Kosovo, there was much evidence to suggest that it was pressure from the

Serbian population and members of the regime that forced Milosevic’s eventual

capitulation. Psychological pressure was created by destroying targets which were

symbolic of the regime along with others which impaired daily living standards. They

also avoided civilian casualties which would otherwise have strengthened the resolve

of the population to fight on, not weakened it.

Yet Saddam’s Iraq was not Milosevic’s Yugoslavia. To be sure, symbols of the

regime such as government buildings and elite residences were destroyed, as were

facilities that impacted on people’s daily lives such as oil refineries, power stations

and bridges. Mistakes during the campaign such as the attack upon the Al Firdos

shelter in south western Baghdad on 13 February led to civilian casualties. But the use

of precision weaponry meant that it was possible to minimise collateral damage,

comparing favourably against bombing campaigns in Vietnam or in the Second World

War.

550 Winnefeld et al., 1994, pp. 132-4.551 Keaney, Thomas A. & Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Summary Report, (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1993), pp. 122-3.552 Winnefeld et al., 1994, p. 158.

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However, one must consider the nature of the regime that the Coalition was up

against. It was a totalitarian state whose leader was much less likely to capitulate

because of public pressure. As said in Chapter 3, Saddam Hussein’s regime proved

quite capable of withstanding further air campaigns that were to be carried out against

Iraq in subsequent years, just as it had during Desert Storm, until the launch of the

2003 invasion. A Kosovo-style capitulation was not to occur here.

A peace initiative was undertaken by Washington’s former Cold War adversary, the

Soviet Union, prior to the ground attack in February 1991, but this did not suggest

that Saddam was about to give in. The Iraqi foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, agreed to a

withdrawal from Kuwait at talks in Moscow on the early morning of 22 February.

However, the conditions that Aziz proposed suggested that the Iraqis were not serious

about doing so, despite enduring five weeks of air strikes. Aziz insisted that they be

given six weeks to carry out the withdrawal, a timeframe which the Iraqis knew

already was unacceptable to the Americans. Washington had insisted on a much

shorter period of four days for fear that a lengthy time for withdrawal may have been

seen by Saddam as an opportunity not only to halt air strikes but break the

international alliance that had been brought together against him. Both Soviet premier

Mikhail Gorbachev and his Middle East envoy Yevgeny Primakov were said to have

pressed him to reduce the withdrawal period without success.553

Stronger evidence that air strikes were not working comes from the fact that Aziz also

insisted that all UN sanctions be lifted after only two thirds of Iraq’s occupation

forces had left Kuwait.554 Thus they were to be lifted before Saddam had relinquished

control of the Emirate. This was not an indication that Coalition air power had caused

a desire for genuine withdrawal.

The ability to survive enemy air attack in the Gulf War also counters another

argument, put by Krepinevich, that the forward base is becoming more vulnerable to

enemy attack. If it was possible for the Iraqis to use countermeasures against enemy

aerial attack, so certainly could the Coalition.

553 Atkinson, 1993, pp. 347-8. 554 Ibid., pp. 347-8.

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As it was, the greatest aerial threat posed by Iraq was that of their Scud missiles. With

the exception of Dhahran, where a missile hit a barracks killing 28 soldiers, they were

too inaccurate to target Coalition forces and were mostly fired at urban areas. They

turned out to have a political use to the Iraqis, which did lessen Coalition air attacks.

42 of the 93 Scuds were fired at Israel with the aim of luring that country into a

retaliatory attack so as to cause the withdrawal of Arab and Muslim members from

the war. Under Israeli pressure, the US was therefore forced to expend much of its air

power hunting down these weapons. But they posed little threat to forward based

forces.555

A further argument has been put with regard to the use of air power as an alternative to

ground forces during the Gulf War. According to Hallion, it demonstrated the ability to

defend territory by denying the enemy the ability to seize it.556 However, it took two

months for the USAF to build up operational strength to a level nearly equal to that of

the Iraqi air force, and most of this occurred in the second of those months.557 It is the

assessment of Winnefeld et al that sufficient potential to protect Saudi Arabia from

armoured attack was not in place until late September.558 As was said earlier, it needed

specialist aviation fuels which were not available in the region and made up a large

proportion of the load sent by sea into South West Asia. Air power was in no more of a

position to halt an Iraqi advance into Saudi Arabia than the US ground forces that were

deployed to the region in the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait.

Moreover, even at the height of the Desert Storm campaign, Coalition air power was

unable to deny the Iraqis the seizure of the Saudi town of Khafji, carried out on 29

January. The possession of larger air resources will not always be sufficient to defend

territory against a surprise attack carried out before that air power arrives. And it must

be said that the fact that the Coalition was able to achieve such air superiority, whether

to attack or defend, is not something that could always occur in war. The impermanence

of Great Power status is explored in the next chapter. Any possibility that this might

555 Hallion, 1992, pp. 185-6.556 Ibid., p. 253.557 Cordesman and Wagner, 1996, p. 63.558 Winnefeld et al., 1994, p. 53.

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provide an alternative to the use of forward positioned ground forces is therefore only

temporary.

Threat to the forward base from asymmetric warfare

The Gulf War brings into question the view, expressed by Krepinevich that there is an

increasing danger from small groups of irregular forces, terrorists and transnational

criminal organisations possessing weapons of mass destruction and disruption.

There was expectation of terrorist attacks outside Iraq. As previously explained,

precautions were undertaken at the Suez Canal. In addition to this, personnel,

American and Allied, were posted for security at ports and airports in North America,

Europe and the Middle East, as well as on ships themselves, to protect from possible

terrorist attack. The only instances of terrorism that did occur were bomb attacks early

in 1991 at the MTMC Outport Headquarters in Istanbul, as well as two each at the

MTMC Terminals at Izmir and Iskanderun also in Turkey. There were no injuries and

no one claimed responsibility for the attacks, with the exception of those at

Iskanderun, undertaken by a Turkish group, Dev Sol.559

This confirms the argument expressed in Chapter 3 that while potential

destructiveness might have increased over time, casualties have not. Such acts were

no worse than those committed by anarchist groups in the late 19th or early 20th

century. Those asymmetric actors operating in Turkey would have been hindered by

having to work in competition with that country’s internal security services and the

terrorism countermeasures they would have deployed. Whether or not these attacks

were coordinated with Baghdad, they did not provide evidence of asymmetric actors

wielding increasing capacity to threaten forward based forces.

Base access on foreign territory

559 Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 205.

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The Gulf War cannot be used to support the view expressed by Krepinevich that base

access has become harder for the United States since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

To be sure, as was said in Chapter 3, a comparison with the Iraq invasion of 2003

does show that countries were more willing to accept American forward based forces.

But a broader look at operations that occurred before the Gulf War, such as the air

strikes on Libya in 1986 and the airlift to Israel in 1973, finds there to be much in

common with what happened in 2003.

Indeed, not all of Iraq’s neighbours had been more willing to support base access in

1990-91. To be sure, Saudi Arabia was of particular importance both in bordering

occupied Kuwait as well as having a lengthy border of its own with Iraq allowing the

Coalition room to carry out the Left Hook manoeuvre that defeated the enemy ground

forces. There was considerable support from the other states in the region. Every Arab

state along the Gulf coast, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman,

allowed the basing of Coalition forces. The Turks allowed air strikes to be carried out

from their territory. Measuring the support obtained in 2003 against this, it is evident

there was a decline in base access. The Saudis refused to allow ground forces and the

Turks would not even allow air support from their territory, let alone the ground

invasion which was requested of them.

But among Iraq’s other neighbours, there was no trend against support for American

base access following the Gulf War. Syria’s unwillingness to stop the movement of

insurgents across its border with Iraq following 2003 may contrast with its actions in

1990-91 when it sent troops to join the Coalition in Saudi Arabia, but even then it did

not provide base access on its own territory. Iran has provided more active support to

insurgents in Iraq560, but in 1990-91, it was by no means prepared to support Coalition

basing. The US did not request access from Iran and the Iranian government would

most likely not have given it if asked. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 had brought to

power a government which stood on a platform of ideological opposition to American

influence in the country. Saddam was able to buy Iran’s neutrality by returning the

territory won from it during the Iran-Iraq war that had ended in 1988. Iraq even felt

560 James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, Iraq Study Group Report, Washington DC, 2006, p. 25, http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf; See also BBC News online, ‘Iran ‘is training Basra killers’’, 12 October 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4333246.stm

185

confident enough to send its fighter aircraft to the country for safety from the

Coalition air campaign, albeit without them ever being returned.

As for Jordan, the situation was the reverse of Saudi Arabia or Turkey. In 1990-91,

King Hussein of Jordan could not provide the Coalition with access for fear of the

reaction of the country’s majority Palestinian population which supported Saddam as

a hope for the liberation of their lost homeland. Iraq was thus allowed one open

border with the outside world through which external supplies could not be cut off

without also cutting off a neutral country.561 That Jordan should have allowed itself to

be used as a base for Coalition special forces in 2003 showed that changes in support

for US-led basing were not all in the one direction argued by Krepinevich.

Outside the Gulf region there was considerable support for the campaign in 1990-91

that manifested itself in the provision of base access. Aircraft used for the application

of US air power over Iraq were deployed in Egypt, Spain, Britain and the British

island of Diego Garcia.562 As was previously mentioned, Germany played a major role

for American forces as the location from where many of the troops and their

equipment were redeployed. Spain and Germany also played a prominent role in the

airlift to the Gulf. There were other countries that helped the campaign’s logistics.

Foreign flagged ships carried over 21 percent of US dry cargo to the Persian Gulf. 177

vessels from 34 countries were chartered. Chief among these were Cyprus with 28,

Norway with 21, Panama also with 21, Greece with 17 and the Bahamas with 13.563 In

addition to its previously mentioned financial support for the multinational force and

frontline states, Japan was chief among those countries that went so far as to donate

sealift and airlift.564 Support for the campaign was such that a number of countries

outside South West Asia even provided combat forces for Desert Storm. These were

Britain, France, Canada, Italy, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Senegal, Bangladesh and

Pakistan.565

561 Friedman, 1991, pp. 53-4.562 Winnefeld et al., 1994, p. 294.563 Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 123-4.564 Ibid., p. 202. 565 Cordesman and Wagner, 1996, pp. 156-209.

186

It has to be said that this experience was by no means unique to this conflict. The

United States was part of large coalitions in both World Wars. Nor did the United

States experience a downward trend that saw it unable to participate in large

coalitions in subsequent years. The Kosovo conflict in 1999 was launched through the

collective decision of all 19 members of NATO as well as involving the basing of

forces in neighbouring Macedonia and Albania.

Such extensive support as was seen in 1991 or again in 1999 does not provide

evidence of a trend. Rather the level of international support relates to the specific

circumstances of the conflict. As was said in Chapter 3, that Saudi Arabia supported

the Coalition owed itself to the fact that it was under threat of invasion. But in 2003,

the competitive pressure for state survival which allowed Coalition ground forces to

be based on its territory was no longer influenced by a threat from its northern

neighbour.

That so many other countries which were not directly threatened by Iraq should have

supported the Coalition in 1991 but failed to do so in 2003 owed itself to a belief

about the appropriateness of military intervention that was sufficient to provide

support for the first war but not the second. As was also said in Chapter 3, a state such

as France was prepared to support the Kosovo War. It was prepared to support the

Gulf War in 1991 as well. However, while both previous situations saw the opponent

presently engaged in aggressive military acts, France did not see the imperative to

resort to a military response against Iraq in 2003, believing that it could be disarmed

peacefully by UN weapons inspection. This is not evidence of a trend towards greater

difficulty for the US in gaining forward base access.

Fighting from the sea

The Gulf War did not provide evidence demonstrating that sea basing could be an

increasingly viable alternative to that ashore. Not only did the war fail to show a trend

towards the base on land becoming less feasible, but it failed to show that sea bases

were any more an alternative through the use of amphibious attack or that in the close

confines of the Gulf they were better able to defend themselves. Geography and the

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competitive circumstances of war were maintaining the disadvantages of bases afloat

to bases ashore.

Regional geography meant that there was no waterway between the Iraqis and Kuwait

or Saudi Arabia. Despite the United States having the world’s largest navy, it could

not act as a deterrent or means of defence against amphibious invasion. It could act

only to blockade Iraq from potential resupply by sea. Between August and the start of

the air strikes in January, naval vessels intercepted 6,000 ships and boarded 1,000 in

their enforcement of such a blockade of the opponent.566

The use of sea based air power was also to prove inferior to that based on land. Six

US aircraft carriers were deployed to South West Asia in support of the air strikes.567

Yet the geography of the region was not ideal for their deployment. With the

exception of a narrow outlet onto the Persian Gulf, Iraq is almost entirely landlocked.

Much of the country was not easily accessed by air power based at sea. US Navy

aircraft depended upon land-based tanker aircraft to attack targets in Iraq and even

Kuwait.568

The Persian Gulf was also too small for the carriers’ defensive bubbles. In this

instance, it was not Iraq that proved most threatening. Its limited sea frontage at the

north of the Gulf meant it was still possible to stay sufficiently far away from this

opponent. But there was increased vulnerability from Iran, with its coastline running

the whole length of the Gulf. The country possessed its own large air force and

Silkworm missiles that could sink ships. Saddam’s border settlement with Tehran plus

the evacuation of Iraqi fighter aircraft to Iran at the beginning of the war increased

anxieties about the country. Aided by the cover of coastal mountains, naval vessels

would have had only 90 seconds to react to a sneak Iranian air attack.569

As has been previously said, air power was not enough to win this conflict. A ground

force was also required. This too could have been provided from the sea but would

566 Atkinson, 1993, p. 150.567 Ibid., p. 150.568 Marolda, Edward J., ‘The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf’, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, retrieved 3 April 2005, http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/sword-shield.htm.569 Atkinson, 1993, p. 151.

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have been at a disadvantage to forces attacking from contiguous territory had it been

used.

The scope for amphibious attack was limited given that the coastline of occupied

Kuwait, plus Iraq’s own short seafrontage on the Al Faw peninsular, extended over a

straight line distance of just 100 miles. Nature helped the Iraqis still further. The

shallow waters to be found along much of the Kuwaiti coast meant that it was

unsuitable for amphibious attack. Ships could not get close to shore and landing craft

could not therefore beach quickly. 570

A suitable site for an amphibious attack with deep water existed at the port of

Shuaiba, 20 miles south of Kuwait Bay. But there were further problems. The short

coastline and coastal approaches of Kuwait had been quickly fortified. Underwater

mines had been planted, requiring a lengthy clearance process. Iraqi missile batteries

and shore guns needed to be destroyed before minesweeping helicopters and ships

could be deployed. Vice Admiral Stan Arthur estimated that this would take a week

while the minesweeping itself added another eighteen days.571

Further in shore, the Iraqis had laid barbed wire and dragon’s teeth to rip the bottoms

of landing craft. Shoreline buildings were bricked up to create pillboxes. These

included high rise structures which had been fortified. And there was a liquefied

natural gas plant beside the port itself which could have exerted considerable

destruction upon the Marines if this had been blown up during an attack. These could

have been destroyed beforehand with naval gunfire and air strikes, but this would

have meant another three to five days before the assault could take place.572

The preparations would have helped lessen the disadvantage that the amphibious

attacker has from being unable to use terrain to provide cover while undertaking an

advance. Yet they would have pushed a landing at least into early March, long after

the overland attack was to occur. In addition to this, the destruction of civilian

570 Ibid., p. 172.571 Ibid., pp. 172, 237.572 Ibid., pp. 172, 237-9.

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buildings along the coast met with resistance from Schwartzkopf who did not want

more ruin inflicted upon Kuwait than necessary.573

The disadvantages of attacking from the sea thus meant that the amphibious landing

was cancelled. Preparations for an attack on the Kuwaiti coast were instead carried

out only as a feint, diverting seven Iraqi divisions away from the Saudi border.574 To

be sure, an American-Kuwaiti task unit was the first to capture enemy troops with the

seizure of offshore platforms in the ad-Dorra oilfield. Sea launched helicopter teams

also took control of Qurah Island.”575 But assault by naval forces was limited only to

targets out in the Persian Gulf.

573 Ibid., pp. 172, 239.574 Marolda, 3 April 2005.575 Ibid.

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CHAPTER 6

THE IMPORTANCE OF FORWARD BASING TO A FALLEN

SUPERPOWER: BRITAIN AND THE FALKLANDS WAR 1982

Unlike the previous two chapters, the following case study is that of a former

superpower. It had retained global reach and was able to fight a war at the other end

of the world. But it could no longer manifest the margin of superiority in resources to

its opponent that it could in its superpower heyday. It also lacked local allies upon

whose territory it could forward base its forces and was almost entirely reliant upon

basing at sea. As a result it was widely held that this power would fail in the task it

had before it. Admiral Woodward, who commanded the British fleet, said that the

British Army, Royal Air Force, the Ministry of Defence and the Secretary of State for

Defence, as well as from outside the UK, the United States Navy, all “initially

suspected the operation was doomed.”576

This chapter will demonstrate that it was not only the competitive nature of war that

had caused the importance of forward basing and thus the Loss of Strength Gradient

to be little altered over the 20th century. It will show also that there was a further

enduring factor that must be addressed: the impermanence of Great Power status.

This chapter will find that geographic distance was as much a hindrance to logistics as

it was at the beginning of the century. Despite a lack of forward located supplies, it

will show that the British put what effort they could into local sourcing rather than

transport across the length of the Atlantic Ocean. Again this minimised the cost of

shipping and also the time that it took items to reach the theatre.

It will again find evidence of the factors that keep transport costs as important as ever

in logistics, countering Boulding’s view that cheaper transport should have caused a

fall in the Loss of Strength Gradient. This chapter will also find that the speed of

transport was little improved upon. Indeed, it will show that the addition of airlift as a

faster alternative to sealift was even less important than in the Gulf War, countering

yet further the view expressed by Hallion in regard to that conflict that this mode of

576 Woodward, Admiral Sandy, One Hundred Days, (London: HarperCollins, 2003), p. xviii.

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transport could be critical for the delivery of combat strength. It will demonstrate,

even more than the previous case study, that the cost and time advantages from

forward basing were little different at the end of the 20th century than at its beginning.

This chapter will also look at the forward located transport infrastructure requirements

of the war. It will find that the lack of them placed limitations upon the British,

demonstrating that these were as important as at any time in the century.

Evidence of the difficulty encountered in attempts to reduce the logistics load, such as

improved intelligence and miniaturisation, will be found again. Increased reliance

could not be placed upon airlift as a result of better information. Likewise, improved

intelligence could not offer a means by which greater advance warning would allow

more time for deployment. The chapter will show too that the load could not be

reduced for the purpose of deterring the opponent.

This chapter will provide further evidence that strategic air power cannot replace

forward based ground forces, so countering the views of its supporters going back to

Douhet. It will show how an air force could have difficulty achieving air superiority

over a disputed territory, let alone embark upon a strategic bombing campaign upon

the homeland of its opponent. It will also provide evidence of air power being in no

more of a position than ground forces to conduct a defensive deployment.

Threats to the forward base from enemy bombardment and asymmetric actors will be

investigated. The Falklands War will not provide evidence of a trend towards either of

these becoming worse.

This chapter will strengthen this work’s contentions in other areas. It will look at

Britain’s difficulties in acquiring regional support, but will show that this was due to

the specific circumstances of the conflict, not to any trend. Moreover, although

Britain had no alternative but to use sea basing, this chapter will not find that it had

become any more viable as an alternative to that on land.

Neither could Britain, nor any state, rely upon superpower status indefinitely. By

showing the circumstances faced by a fallen superpower, this case study on the

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Falklands War will provide yet further evidence that forward positions retained their

importance throughout the 20th century.

Historic overview of the war

The origins of the war were to be found both in the long standing conflicting claims to

the islands and also in Argentina’s domestic political circumstances prior to the

invasion.

Argentina’s perceived legal title to the Falklands could be traced as far back as the

Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 which recognised Spain’s, and therefore its successor

states’ control of territories in the Americas, including the Falklands.577 The Argentine

claim was further strengthened by the fact that although the islands were first settled

by the French, the colony they founded was subsequently handed over to the Spanish

with compensation paid. It was Antoine de Bougainville of France, sailing from St.

Malo in 1764, who established the first permanent presence on the archipelago.578 The

Spanish demanded they leave under the terms of Utrecht and as allies of Spain at that

time, the French duly complied, with a handover ceremony in 1767 and a payout

made to de Bougainville.579

In the meantime British Commodore John Byron arrived in 1765, naming a site for

settlement, Port Egmont, on Saunders Island, north of West Falkland, before sailing

away. Unaware of the French presence on East Falkland, Captain John McBride then

arrived a year later to set up a fort on the islands as well as eject any other settlers.580

The British were evicted by the Spanish in 1770 when they sent a force of five ships

with 1,400 troops to the islands, an event that led to the first Falklands crisis, with

both sides threatening each other with war. It took a year of diplomatic efforts to bring

about a compromise whereby the Spanish allowed the British back to Port Egmont.

577 Hastings, Max & Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (London: Pan MacMillan, 1997), p. 14.578 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 14.579 Ibid., p. 15.580 Smith, Gordon, Battles of the Falklands War, (London: Ian Allan, 1989), p. 13; Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 15.

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The proviso was that they should remain only temporarily, something which the

British observed, evacuating the settlement in 1774 after three years.581

That the Falklands should later become British owed itself not to this but instead to a

dispute with American sealers in 1831. By this time, following independence from

Spain, the islands had passed into the administration of Argentina. The dispute saw

the Argentines confiscate an American vessel which, in turn, led to the USS

Lexington, which happened to be in port in Buenos Aires, being dispatched to the

main town of Puerto Soledad on the Falklands. There it arrested most of the people,

sacked the settlement, and declared it free of government. Then, when Buenos Aires

sent its next governor to the islands the following year, he was murdered by the

remaining inhabitants.582

Aware of the lawlessness under which the Falklands had fallen, the British took the

opportunity to regain control of the islands. They arrived on 2 January 1833 with two

warships commanded by Captain James Onslow. The Falklands were settled with

people from the British Isles and a coaling station was later set up to fuel ships on the

voyage around Cape Horn.583

Argentina was never to give up its claim to the islands. The issue was taken to the

United Nations where, in 1965, a resolution was passed specifying that the islands

were a colonial problem and calling for a negotiated settlement. The British entered

into negotiations but by this time they had a strong legal claim to the islands. There

had been a continued British presence on the islands since 1833 and there was also the

issue of self determination. The descendents of the British settlers continued to

support their status as a British Dependency in preference to becoming part of

Argentina and were resistant to moves by London which might have transferred

sovereignty.584

In 1981, the military Junta that ran Argentina agreed that the following year should be

‘the year of the Malvinas’, the Spanish name for the islands. Further attempts at

581 Smith, 1989, p. 14; Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 15-6.582 Smith, 1989, p. 15; Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 17-8.583 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 18.584 Smith, 1989, p. 15; Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 19-20.

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negotiations were to continue but otherwise they would seize the islands by force. The

main driver behind this policy was Rear-Admiral Jorge Anaya, who, as a Captain as

far back as the late 1960s, had authored a draft plan for an invasion of the islands. By

now he was able to put the plan into action. He had seen it rejected twice before by

the military government but the difference this time was that he had himself become a

member of the Junta while his old school friend General Leopoldo Galtieri had

become president. The invasion was to serve as a useful distraction for the country

from recession and the Junta’s participation in an internal repression since it had come

to power in 1976. But most importantly, it was the presence of these individuals in

government with their willingness to resolve the dispute by force which led to war.585

The invasion itself occurred earlier in the year than initially envisaged. The Junta

decided that an incident on South Georgia, an island 700 miles to the east that was

administered from the Falklands and was also claimed by Argentina, presented an

opportunity to be used as justification for the action. Argentine scrap metal merchants

on an unrelated commercial venture arrived on the island on 17 March where they

failed to obtain a landing permit despite repeated requests to do so from the nearby

British Antarctic Survey base. The Royal Navy vessel HMS Endurance was sent from

the Falklands with two dozen marines, arriving on 24 March. In response, Argentine

troops were sent to the island on board the Bahia Paraiso, arriving the next day. Both

parties engaged in a standoff.586

The possibility that Argentines were to be forcibly removed from an island they

claimed as their own provided the excuse, so the Junta felt, for an early invasion of

the Falklands. The plans for this were therefore brought forward.587 The Falklands

were taken on 2 April after an overnight landing of 904 Argentine troops easily

outnumbering the 103 personnel defending the islands.588 Reinforcements sent to

South Georgia allowed that island to be taken the following day.589

585 Middlebrook, Martin, The Argentine Fight for the Falklands, (Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword, 2003), pp. 1-2; Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 46, 62-3.586 Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 7-13; Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 72-3.587 Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 10-13.588 Ibid., p. 19; Middlebrook, Martin, The Falklands War 1982, (London: Penguin, 2001), pp. 43, 45.589 Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 41-2.

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The Junta assumed that the British would not be willing to send the scale of forces

necessary to retake the islands half way across the world. Yet the response of the

British government was to dispatch a Task Force of more than 100 ships and 25,000

personnel with exactly that aim.590

An early victory for the British was obtained when South Georgia was retaken on 25

April. Hostilities with regard to the Falklands began a few days later with air strikes

on 1 May conducted from Ascension Island as well as two British carriers located

offshore. The Argentine navy withdrew into shallow waters close to the mainland for

fear of submarine attack after its second largest vessel, a cruiser, the General

Belgrano, was sunk on 2 May. The Argentine air force, however, remained a threat to

the Task Force, managing to sink some six British vessels during the conflict,

although failing to sink either of the carriers, a circumstance which, as explained later,

would have been sufficient to cause a British withdrawal.

Despite failing to gain air superiority, the British conducted a successful amphibious

landing at San Carlos on East Falkland on 21 May. From there troops moved south

east to Goose Green, the second largest settlement on the islands, where they defeated

an Argentine garrison on 28-29 May. The next major land engagements were then

carried out west of Stanley where the British assaulted the Argentine defences on the

nights of 11 and 13 June. Defeat for the Argentines here led to their surrender at

Stanley on 14 June.

590 Middlebrook, 2001, pp. 399-405; Woodward, 2003, p. 492.

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PART 1 – THE ADVANTAGE OF FORWARD LOCATIONS FOR

LOGISTICS

Use of forward located supplies

The British would have put considerable reliance upon sourcing of supplies from as

close to the occupied islands as possible, if only they had been able to do so. Like the

previous case study on the Gulf War, there was evidence, contrary to Boulding’s

argument, that the Loss of Strength Gradient had undergone little decline over the 20th

century. Geographic distance was still as much a hindrance to the transport of

supplies.

Merchant ships sent to the South Atlantic alone carried 100,000 tons of freight and 95

aircraft as well as 9,000 personnel. The supply chain also carried 400,000 tons of

fuel.591 It would have been of considerable usefulness to the British had much of this

been already forward positioned. While they faced an 8,000 mile journey from north-

western Europe to the South Atlantic, the Falklands were just 400 miles from the

Argentine coast. To be sure, the disputed islands were more distant from Argentina’s

main population centres. They were 1,200 miles from Buenos Aires. But this was still

only a fraction of the journey that British supplies faced.

Where there were forward located supplies, the British made use of them. They even

went so far as to visit deserted whaling stations. After South Georgia was taken, the

oil rig support ship, Stena Seaspread, called in at the old whaling stations on the

island at Leith and Stromness that had been abandoned two decades earlier.

Stromness had been a repair base for the whalers and provided steel and other repair

material which was requisitioned.592 Later, the despatch vessel Iris visited, loading up

with scrap metal for delivery to the tug, repair and logistic area situated east of the

Falklands.593 On the Falklands themselves, as is discussed later, the British were to

make use of tractors belonging to farmers on the islands. There was however little

else available in forward locations. The British were forced to bring almost everything

591 MoD (Ministry of Defence), The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, (London: HMSO, 1982), p. 6.592 Thompson, Julian, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict, (Oxford: Brassey’s, 1991), p. 257.593 Smith, 1989, p. 80.

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they required. Whatever the advantages from forward prepositioning, the British were

not in a good position in this conflict to gain from them.

The nearest forward base was on the British island of Ascension. Although, the

facilities there were American-run, Washington released its strategic stockpiles on the

island, allowing the British to make use of what supplies were already there. Chief

among these was the provision by the US Air Force of aviation fuel. The Americans

provided a total of 12.5 million US gallons or about 40,000 tons for use by British

aircraft.594 But the island was still situated 3,800 miles from the Falklands. It was the

equivalent of the British conducting the Boer War from Sierra Leone or the

Americans conducting the Gulf War from the Azores.

Beyond Ascension there was Gibraltar. The first supply vessel to be sent to the

Falklands, the fleet replenishment ship Fort Austin, was sent from there on 29

March.595 The Rock saved 1,000 miles off the journey from the English Channel but

this still left another 7,000 miles to the South Atlantic.

Cost of transport

In Boulding’s view, cheaper transport is a reason for what he believed to be a decline

in the Loss of Strength Gradient. As transport costs fall over time, so movement

should become easier and the advantage of forward locations for the sourcing of

supplies should decrease. But the Falklands War does not provide evidence to support

this view. Items sent were, for the most part, those that possess proportional cost

relationships over time with transport. Any easing of movement resulting from falling

transport costs would thus have been cancelled out by the falling cost of items carried,

combined with the competitive impetus in war to send as much as possible.

As was shown in Chapter 2, such a proportional relationship exists for civilian traded

goods with duel military usage. These made up the bulk of supplies moved by the

British, the largest component of which, by far, was fuel. Food was another such item. 594 Cordesman, Anthony H. & Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War: Volume III, The Afghan and Falklands Conflicts, (London: Mansell, 1990), p. 262.595 Middlebrook, 2001), p. 64.

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The refrigerated stores ships, the Saxonia and the Geestport, were for example

dedicated to this.596 Tents were another dual civilian/military item sent from Britain,

many of which were lost when the Atlantic Conveyor, a container ship, was sunk by

an Argentine Exocet missile on 25 May. Even fresh water was a constituent of the

logistics load sent to the South Atlantic. The Fort Toronto served as a water tanker for

the Task Force.597

Most purely military items too could not have had anything other than a proportional

relationship over time with transport costs. The reason for this was that they were

mostly pre-paid and therefore of zero cost with regard to the operation. As the British

government put it following the campaign, they were able to meet “all the demands of

the task force”. It was given “first call” on pre-existing stocks including those built up

for NATO operations.598 Britain, like the US in the previous case study, had been

building up for a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

To be sure, British stocks were insufficient to provide for all the war’s needs. Some

weapons were procured from the United States. However, most were not paid for. An

agreement with the US allowed for items to be transferred to American depots in the

UK and Ascension where they remained under US control until the day the British

determined they actually needed them. Only then did the British pay. And the British

ordered much more than was needed, working on a worst case assumption of a 25

percent loss of ships and aircraft.599 As Defence Secretary John Nott put it, valuable

weapons systems such as the Sidewinder missile, were supplied by the Americans

“without cost ever being mentioned.”600 As such weapons were also of zero cost

during the operation, these too could not demonstrate anything other than a

proportional relationship over time with transport costs. The LSG remained unaltered.

596 Smith, 1989, p. 96.597 Ibid., p. 53.598 MoD, 1982, p. 25.599 Freedman, Lawrence, Official History of the Falklands Campaign, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2005), Vol. 2., pp. 382-3.600 Nott, John, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow, (London: Politicos, 2002), p. 270.

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Speed of transport

Britain’s difficulty in fighting over the distance to the South Atlantic was the result

not only of the financial and material difficulty of transport but also of the time such

transport took. There was concern regarding the Argentines’ ability to strengthen the

islands’ defences. A slower response by the British might have allowed time to

lengthen the runway at Stanley. As will be discussed later, the operation of the Task

Force in the South Atlantic, let alone a landing on the islands, would have been made

all the harder if Argentina’s high performance jets could have attacked the British

from the islands themselves.

Another reason for speed was the weather. According to Admiral Woodward, the

government in London understood the “tyranny” of the timetable under which the

Royal Navy was operating. He said it would effectively have been “out of action”

because of the winter weather from late June.601 This meant there was a time period of

less than three months during which the Task Force had to be sailed to the region and

then carry out the operation to retake them.

A slower deployment to the South Atlantic would have given the Argentines a greater

chance to source supplies from those countries that were still prepared to trade with it

such as Libya, Israel and South Africa, as well as from the black market. It was a

particular concern for the British throughout the war that the Argentines should not

augment their stock of Exocet missiles. According to Defence Secretary John Nott,

British agents were authorised to work clandestinely, posing as purchasers of

equipment on the international market, ensuring that they outbid the Argentines.

Other agents were said to have identified Exocet missiles in various markets and

covertly rendered them inoperable, based on information from the French who

manufactured them. Britain was said to have succeeded in intercepting and preventing

the supply of further equipment to the Argentines.602 But such efforts could not have

been expected to work indefinitely without some weapons falling through.

601 Woodward, 2003, p. 331.602 Nott, 2002, p. 305.

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There was concern too about the international political situation. Britain could not be

assured that economic sanctions would last indefinitely. The European Economic

Community put in place an import ban and suspension of trade preferences but only to

last for six weeks. The sanctions had to be renewed after that time. The US, moreover,

was not to put its sanctions in place for almost a month owing to what was to be a

failed attempt to act as mediator between the two sides. Their sanctions began only on

30 April.603

The need to get the Task Force to the South Atlantic was compounded by domestic

political circumstances. The British government was determined to send the ships

while there was the public and political will to do so. Moreover, the Royal Navy was

keen to prove its worth in the face of looming expenditure cuts. Britain was planning

to phase out its carrier and amphibious assault groups which would have meant that

the sending of the Task Force would have been impossible within a few years. A

senior defence ministry official was quoted as saying that for the navy it was not just

the Falklands that were at stake.604

The conflict provides evidence that forward basing, had it been available, would have

been as important for saving time as it was more than eight decades earlier. As was

found in the case study on the Gulf War, here too most vessels were comparable with

ships used at the beginning of the 20th century. Yet again the 20 knot Majestic, the

1891 trans-Atlantic record holder and the fastest merchant vessel used in the Boer

War, could out have outraced most of the supply ships used in a conflict close to the

end of the 20th century. Of the 22 Royal Navy-owned Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships sent

to the South Atlantic, only two would have been just slightly faster. The fleet

replenishment ships ships, Regent and Resource were capable of 21 knots. Two more,

Fort Austin and Fort Grange, would have equalled it at 20 knots. Of the remaining 18

vessels, none could have matched the older Majestic for speed with the five Appleleaf

class tankers that were sent capable of just 15 knots.605

There were a total of 54 ships taken up from trade or STUFT. Many of these too could

not have beaten the Boer War’s fastest merchant vessel. The Europic Ferry, Baltic 603 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 125, 167.604 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 80, 88, 114.605 James, Tony, Royal Fleet Auxiliary 1905-85, (Liskeard, Cornwall: Maritime, 1985), pp. 87-125.

201

Ferry, and Nordic Ferry, for example, were requisitioned from trans-Channel and

trans-North Sea freight services and travelled at 18 knots.606 The repair ship Stena

Inspector, designed as a Multipurpose Support Vessel for North Sea oil operations,

sailed at just 12 knots, just two knots more than the slowest vessel to sail in the Boer

War. The Royal Navy was to be by no means disappointed with the ship, which did

not reach the South Atlantic before the war was over, purchasing the repair vessel

after the conflict.607 The slow pace of sealift was evidenced by the fact that when the

war ended there were still four merchantmen, as well as two minesweepers with a

further support ship, making their way to the conflict zone.608

To be sure, the conflict saw the use of what was still described in 2005 as the world’s

fastest merchant vessel. The QE2 had a cruising speed of 28.5 knots and was capable

of steaming up to 34 knots, speedier even than the 33 knot Fast Sealift Ships used to

transport supplies in the Gulf War of 1990-91.609 It sailed from Southampton on 12

May, arriving in the South Atlantic just 11 days later on 23 May.610 The other cruise

liner requisitioned for the war, Canberra, was slower but could still steam at up to 29

knots.611 Yet these vessels were very much exceptions. Both had been built

specifically to carry people as opposed to freight. Not one of the cargo vessels used in

the war, including those owned by the Royal Navy, could match their speeds.

The rapid pace of the QE2, furthermore, was aided by the availability of forward

located refuelling that had been already established by the Task Force. Had the ship

set off earlier in the war it would not have been able to sail as fast as it did. With the

British unable to rely upon forward situated ports to refuel their ships, the first naval

vessels sent to the South Atlantic were dependent upon their accompanying tankers

606 Monopolies and Mergers Commission, European Ferries Limited, Sealink Limited: A Report on the Proposed Merger, (London: HMSO, 1981), Appendix 1., http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1981/fulltext/146appendices.pdf607 (MoD) Ministry of Defence, ‘Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service: Forward Repair Ships’, Defence Suppliers Directory website, retrieved 23 July 2005, http://www.armedforces.co.uk/navy/listings/l0028.html; Smith, 1989, p. 91. 608 Smith, 1989, p. 115.609 Cunard Line press release ‘QEII Sails Home for Birthday Party’, Southampton, England, 5 April 2005, http://www.cunard.com/AboutCunard/NewsReleases.asp?Cat=&View=ViewArticle&Mode=News&ContentID=5116&Active=News 610 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 306.611 McCart, Neil, 20th Century Passenger Ships of the P&O, (Wellingborough, England: Stephens, 1985), p. 194.

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which steamed at only 15 knots.612 The first warships to head south which had been

involved in a naval exercise off Morocco, needed eight days just to reach Ascension,

while ships from Britain took three to four days longer.613 The initial slow pace of the

British Task Force provides further evidence that the ability of sealift to respond to an

emergency had little altered over the course of a century as well as of a continued

advantage to be had from forward based refuelling.

As was the case for the Gulf War, both road and rail were used to get supplies to the

ports. In the first week of April alone, 39,108 tons of freight was moved by road

within Britain. From the second week the Royal Corps of Transport used the railways,

with 44 special trains being hired.614 Yet transport on land was of small significance

when compared to the need to move supplies across 8,000 miles of ocean. Distances

within Britain, an island where no town is more than 100 miles from the sea, were

small. Moreover, until the landing at San Carlos, there was no land in the conflict

zone for supplies to be moved across whatsoever. The front line was itself at sea.

Even after the landing at San Carlos, just 50 miles from Stanley, little use was made

of overland transport. The roads were poor and the close proximity of the coastline to

the high ground west of the islands’ capital allowed for delivery to be made using

coastal water transport instead. After the landing, it was intention of Brigadier

Thompson, commanding the British land forces, to make maximum use of the sea

flank in order to move supplies forward. Teal Inlet was opened up after 1 June,

allowing for a shuttle service of logistics ships to undertake a continuous build up of

supplies. A distribution point was set up at Estancia at the south east end of the

waterway. This was at the north-west end of the starting positions prior to the battle

for Stanley. Sea deliveries were carried out as well in the Bluff Cove/Fitzroy area to

the south west.615

Land transport was for the most part used only to move supplies the final few miles to

the front line positions where they were needed. The boggy as well as rocky nature of

612 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 137.613 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 89.614 Oakley, Derek, The Falklands Military Machine, (Tunbridge Wells, England: Spellmount, 1989), p. 100.615 Thompson, 1991, pp. 266, 281; Middlebrook, 2001, pp. 282-3, 301.

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the terrain was such that according to Thompson, a lightly loaded Land Rover was

lucky to be able to cover four miles in one hour while a wheeled vehicle that was

loaded with ammunition or towing a gun could not move at all. Overland carriage of

heavy equipment on the Falklands had to be undertaken using tracked oversnow

vehicles, supplemented by requisitioned local tractors.616

The slow pace of British movement on land was emphasised yet further by the

experience of the troops of 45 Commando Brigade and the 3rd Battalion Parachute

Regiment (3 Para). With the sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor, three Chinook

helicopters which had remained on the vessel and had been earmarked for the task of

moving them forward were no longer available.617 Circumstance here meant that this

final part of the journey for the troops was carried out in a similar fashion to that of

soldiers on the march to Bloemfontein in the Boer War. With Teal Inlet not yet

opened up and no other alternative available, the troops had to make their journey

from San Carlos to the area west of Stanley on foot. What land transport was used in

the Falklands War made little change if any to the Loss of Strength Gradient over the

20th century.

Helicopters could surpass surface transport for speed. The conflict saw 10,381

helicopter sorties with 21,049 flight hours.618 The one Chinook that made it to the

Falklands alone flew 109 hours between 27 May and 14 June during which it carried

2,150 troops and more than 550 tons of stores and equipment.619 Yet helicopters

played only a junior role to that of sea transport and would still have done so even if

the three Chinooks that had sunk with the Atlantic Conveyor had made it to the

islands. In the first instance their use was only for a fraction of the total 8,000 mile

supply line. Secondly, even within the theatre, a Chinook flying from the San Carlos

Bay area could not compete with a coastal vessel. Just one delivery by a Logistic

Landing Ship, Sir Tristram, at Fitzroy on 7 June, supplied 1,500 tons of artillery

ammunition.620 Certainly, the available helicopter lift from San Carlos Bay was

616 Thompson, 1991, pp. 253, 281.617 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 299, 300; Middlebrook, 2001, pp. 274-5, 282.618 Calculated from figures in Watson, Bruce W., and Peter M. Dunn, Military Lessons of the Falklands War: Views from the United States, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 169.619 Hamilton, John, Helicopter Story of the Falklands Campaign, (London: David & Charles, 1990), p. 74.620 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 301.

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insufficient to maintain a substantial force in contact with the enemy at Stanley. Once

the coastal transport was in place, helicopters were often used no more than as a

complement to this for the final few miles to the front line positions.621

While most ships were no faster than vessels at the beginning of the century, longer

distance airlift offered the British a much faster alternative for the journey to the

southern hemisphere. A fleet of 54 C-130s and 13 VC-10s, owned by the RAF made

up part of the airlift used during the conflict. Extra transport capacity was provided by

chartering Boeing 707s and ex-RAF Belfast freighters that had been previously sold

to the commercial sector.622 As said before, the C-130 is capable of 375 miles per

hour. The Belfast freighter was another turboprop aircraft, flying at a cruising speed

of 317 miles per hour. The other two were jet aircraft. The VC-10 flew at 518 miles

per hour and the Boeing 707 in excess of 550 miles per hour.623

But the Falklands War provides evidence that bolsters the findings of the previous

chapter that Hallion is wrong in his suggestion that airlift can be critical for the

delivery of combat strength. Over the course of the war the RAF delivered 6,600 tons

of stores and 5,800 personnel to Ascension Island. Civil air carriers carried a further

350 tons of freight.624 Yet sealift was by far the most important mode for the transport

of supplies in this conflict. As was said earlier, merchant ships sent to the South

Atlantic alone carried 100,000 tons of freight and 95 aircraft while the supply chain

also carried 400,000 tons of fuel. British airlift constituted only a very small

proportion of the load, at less than one and a half percent.

The contribution of airlift was made smaller still by the fact that very little was

airlifted as far as the South Atlantic. There were 40 airdrops to the Task Force carried

out by C-130 aircraft during the course of the war. However, it is worth emphasising

621 Thompson, 1991, pp. 277, 281.622 Oakley, 1989, p. 95; Smith, 1989, p.45; Anderson, Duncan, The Falklands War 1982, (Oxford: Osprey, 2002), p. 26.623 Royal Air Force, ‘Aircraft of the RAF: VC10’, 27 February 2004, http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/vc10.html; Boeing website, ‘707 Specifications’, retrieved 24 July 2005, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/707family/product.html; Belfast freighter calculated from Frawley, Gerard, International Directory of Civil Aircraft 1999/2000, (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1999), p. 190.624 MoD, 1982, pp. 6, 26.

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that C-130s and VC10s alone carried out more than 600 sorties to Ascension.625 Most

airlifted supplies only travelled half way.

Even looking solely at the proportion airlifted as far as Ascension, it was a lot less

than what the US transported into South West Asia in 1990-91. The British were

under greater restraints. As said before, they were unable to place similar reliance

upon the sourcing of supplies from within the region where the conflict was situated,

placing a greater burden upon their transport modes. They could not rely upon

financial aid from other countries which paid for much of the effort in the Gulf. And,

unlike its former self in the Boer War, and the United States at the present time,

Britain was not a superpower. The impermanence of Great Power status had seen its

potential adversaries become relatively bigger. While the Iraqis could not match the

United States for what they could put into the field in 1991, the British were not so

advantaged. During the battle for Stanley, as will be explained later, the difficulties of

supply meant they were unable to deploy material superiority. In a contest with

sealift, which delivers more for less expense, airlift could play only a very small role.

Air transport was also heavily reliant on forward based fuel supplies. The distance of

4,000 miles from Britain to Ascension meant that an airlift could not be carried out

without the weight of forward located fuel stocks being greater than the weight of

supplies carried in. This could be seen from the fact that the 40,000 tons of fuel on the

island handed over by the US Air Force was insufficient to support air operations.

Even the addition of further supplies provided by American tankers during the

operation was not enough. British cargo aircraft used the opportunity of landing at

Dakar or Banjul in West Africa so that they could top up there to avoid drawing down

reserves on the island.626 In this respect the Falklands airlift demonstrated how air

transport could increase rather than decrease the importance of forward basing and the

Loss of Strength Gradient.

In support of airlift as a force for reducing the importance of the LSG is the fact that it

could deliver vital supplies when necessary. The success of this meant that according

to Brian Goodson, Fleet Supply Officer in London, there were no serious shortages

625 Ibid., p. 6.626 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 91.

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during the campaign. Vital items such as Harrier avionic spares always made it to the

South Atlantic.627 Yet the air delivery of such parts could not be decisive in war alone.

The British still needed the hundreds of thousands of tons of fuel and other supplies

that were sent by sealift in order to fight in the South Atlantic. Airlift could not, for

example, be used to bring replacement supplies for those lost when the Atlantic

Conveyor was sunk. Air transport of vital items could only have made a marginal

impact on the Loss of Strength Gradient.

As previously indicated, airlift proved itself important as a means of transporting

personnel. Yet measured against the tonnage of equipment and supplies sent to the

South Atlantic they were only a very small proportion of the total load. Placing the

5,800 airlifted troops against the 500,000 tons of fuel and merchant shipped supplies

mentioned earlier, this represents close to 90 tons per person. The weight of logistics

sent to the South Atlantic was thus at least in the region of 1,000 times the weight of

an adult male. This is much more even than the multiple of 120 seen in Gulf War. In

part, the reason for this was that troops had to be moved by sea as a result of there

being no airfields available in theatre. Had the 9,000 men transported by merchant

shipping been flown to Ascension they would still have had to wait for their ships to

arrive from Britain to take them on the second half of the journey. But even if these

could have been added to those who were flown to Ascension, airlifted personnel

would still only have been a very small proportion of the total load sent to the South

Atlantic.

A lack of airfields in theatre would also have made the Pentagon’s concept of the

austere Forward Operating Base or ‘Lily-Pad’, with troops flown in only when

needed, rather problematic. The nearest such base could only have been beside the

nearest airfield which was located on Ascension Island. Even before the invasion the

British could not have airlifted lightly armed troops to the Falklands. London was

alerted to the possibility of it on 27 March, five days before the islands were taken.

They learnt of extraordinary activity at Argentine ports, movement of troops by air

within the country, and of ships sailing south from naval manoeuvres being conducted

off Uruguay.628 As a result, on 29 March, the three nuclear submarines Spartan,

627 Ibid., p. 325.628 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 64.

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Splendid, Conqueror, were ordered to the South Atlantic.629 But the problem for airlift

was that although the Stanley runway was long enough to take C-130 Hercules these

could not be refuelled in the air.630

This is not to say that the concept of an austere Forward Operating Base on the

Falklands would have been feasible even if it had been possible for aircraft to reach

the islands. After the recapture of the Falklands, the British government undertook

construction of a new air base at Mount Pleasant that was opened in 1985, improving

the air link with Ascension and with Britain. Yet, in the early 21st century, Britain

continues to maintain a presence of 1,000 troops on the islands, plus 500 support

staff.631 This is larger than the original Argentine invasion force in 1982 and happens

to represent one defence employee for every one-and-a-half islanders. Although it is

now possible to conduct an emergency airlift of personnel, the British still choose to

keep a large garrison in theatre. Like US forces which remained in Europe throughout

the Cold War despite the growing availability of airlift, here they can undertake

training with their equipment, which is not so easily moved by air, and familiarise

themselves with the terrain.

Infrastructure and bottlenecks

A lack of forward located transport infrastructure was to be a hindrance for the British

supply effort during the Falklands War. While Britain’s port and airport facilities

were sufficiently capable of handling the load sent southwards, the same could not be

said at the receiving end in the South Atlantic. With the Falklands and South Georgia

both occupied, there were no such facilities in the region. And an amphibious landing

required that supplies be combat-loaded ready for use after making it ashore.

Unfortunately, in the British government’s determination to put the Task Force to sea

while there was there was the public and political will for it, such combat loading

629 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 78, 80-1.630 Ibid., p. 88.631 BBC News online, ‘Where are British troops and why?’, 25 March 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4094818.stm; Economist, ‘A breezy, squid-rich paradise’, London, 28 March 2002, http://www.economist.com/world/la/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1056781

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could not be carried out in Britain, with crates put on ships unmanifested. The

necessary restowing had to be undertaken at Ascension Island. But Ascension had no

harbour, while the island’s one jetty, which was not always useable because of the

Atlantic swell, was insufficient for the task.632 The stacking and initial sorting out of

supplies required for restowing could not therefore rely upon use of a shoreline

location. Ships were moored offshore, and while part of the restowing effort was

carried out using Mexeflote freight rafts and locally hired lighters, much had to be

conducted using helicopters which could carry loads for resorting within the island’s

interior.633

Even away from the shoreline, Ascension posed difficulties for the restowing effort.

The island had the unfortunate combination of a dry climate and of being at the

meeting point of the South American and African tectonic plates, as the result of

which it possessed 40 extinct volcanoes. Helicopters could not be landed anywhere on

Ascension except on the Wideawake airfield, located three miles from the jetty, due to

the fear that they would ingest the island’s volcanic dust.634

The airfield was therefore of importance to sealift as well as airlift. Indeed both were

interconnected. With no airfield south of Ascension, the choice of the island for

restowing allowed airlifted items to be integrated with those that had arrived by ship

for the remainder of the journey. The other airfields that supported the airlift were

located at intermediate positions along the way in Gibraltar, Dakar and Banjul.

Gibraltar was used as a refuelling stop in the first week until Dakar became

available.635 As already said, landings at Dakar or Banjul were carried out to avoid

running down fuel supplies at Ascension.

The various demands placed upon Ascension by the campaign meant that the airfield

became congested. According to Don Coffey, manager for Pan-American, which

operated the airfield, in terms of aircraft movements, including the helicopters used in

the restowing effort, Wideawake became the world’s busiest airport during the

632 Vaux, Nick, March to the South Atlantic, (London: Buchan & Enright, 1986), p. 52; Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 113-4. 633 Smith, 1989, p. 39.634 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 90; Thompson, Julian, No Picnic, (London: Cassell, 2001), p. 15; Hamilton, 1990, p. 14. 635 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 69.

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campaign, surpassing Chicago O’Hare. At its peak, there were 400 aircraft

movements a day.636 But the airfield became crowded with aircraft and incoming

freight which threatened to swamp the airfield’s existing facilities.637

In order to cope with the requirements of the war, new construction was undertaken.

Extra hard standing was provided at Wideawake for parked aircraft.638 Royal

Engineers also built new surface transport infrastructure on the island in the form of a

3½ mile fuel pipeline system along with a 180,000 gallon storage farm that was

supplied by the visiting tanker ships, and a desalination plant.639 Aircraft that were not

required at a given time, meanwhile, were often parked back at Gibraltar or in the UK

in order to free up space on the island.640

There were further options for the British had they wished to mount a larger airlift.

There were other British mid-Atlantic possessions, which were not used for their lack

of good airfields, but where part of the ship-to-ship restowing could have been

moved, relieving pressure at Wideawake. St. Helena, located 700 miles southeast of

Ascension, was slightly closer to the Falklands and had better beaches.641 Tristan da

Cunha, located at the same latitude as Buenos Aires province, was closer still at 2,100

miles from the Falklands and 1,400 miles from South Georgia. But such efforts were

not necessary. As said before, airlift was given only a very small role within in the

logistical effort compared to that of sealift with its greater capacity and lesser

expense.

With the recapture of South Georgia, the British had territory available to them in the

South Atlantic. The refrigerated stores ships, the Saxonia and the Geestport, used the

island as an anchorage to transfer their loads to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship Regent

for the final leg of the journey.642 The 5th Infantry Brigade on board the QE2 used it

for transferral to Canberra and Norland for their final passage.643 But the island

offered no hope for airlift. There was no airfield on the island and building one would

636 Ibid., p. 90-1.637 Vaux, 1986, p. 52.638 Oakley, 1989, p. 98.639 Smith, 1989, p. 38; Oakley, 1989, p. 98. 640 Freedman, 2005, Vol. 2., p. 63.641 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 90.642 Smith, 1989, p. 96.643 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 306.

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have taken time and resources which Freedman has said would have “made no sense

in the context of the current operation.”644

Having landed on the Falklands, British forces were advantaged by the islands’

natural geography of submerged valleys, formed when sea levels were lower. The

previously mentioned Teal Inlet played a vital role in supplying the British forces

west of Stanley because it provided a transportation route stretching some 25 miles

inland. But forward located facilities had to be created for the operation of the

waterway. Despite the Inlet’s full length, it was only 15 miles to its southern shallows.

A regular shuttle service carried out by the Logistic Landing Ships Sir Percival and

Sir Geraint had therefore to transfer supplies to Mexeflote for the remainder of the

journey to the distribution point at Estancia. A forward brigade maintenance area was

thus set up at Teal Inlet settlement, where the transfer to smaller boats could be

made.645

As previously said, road infrastructure was problematic. There were only 12 miles of

metalled roads in the Falklands, all located around Stanley. The Argentines managed

to destroy some infrastructure that would have been of help to the British. 2nd

Battalion Parachute Regiment (2 Para) engineers had to repair the bridge at Fitzroy in

order to re-establish ground access to Bluff Cove and the track that led from there to

Stanley.646

The British too managed to destroy transport infrastructure that they needed. Before

the final assault west of Stanley on the night of 13/14 June, the bridge over the

Murrell River collapsed under the weight of an armoured recovery vehicle which was

loaded with ammunition. This closed the only main supply route by which tracked

vehicles could reach 3 Commando Brigade’s forward units. The Royal Engineers had

to build an air portable bridge at Fitzroy and fly it by Chinook to replace the damaged

bridge.647

644 Freedman, 2005, Vol. 2., p. 255.645 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 283; Thompson, 1991, p. 281; Woodward, 2003, p. 433.646 Oakley, 1989, pp. 98, 100, 110.647 Thompson, 1991, p. 285.

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Helicopter lift also required the construction of infrastructure. An air strip was built at

San Carlos. Named HMS Sheathbill and declared open on 2 June, it was supported by

a pumping station and storage system constructed to supply fuel which, at its peak,

dispensed 50,000 gallons a day to helicopters as well as Harriers. A forward fuelling

and re-arming point was established at Teal Inlet settlement, which meant that light

helicopters avoided a 90 to 100 mile round trip back to San Carlos to be

replenished.648 But, as already said, helicopter lift was incapable of easing British

supply difficulties.

The difficulty with moving logistics across the Falklands impacted upon the ability of

the British to fight the war. After taking Two Sisters, Mount Harriet and Mount

Longdon on the first night of the battle for Stanley on 11/12 June, a pause had to be

enacted in order to wait for supplies. Major General Jeremy Moore, commanding the

British forces by this stage, had originally intended that the second phase of the attack

be carried out the following night. But it took a full day for Sea King helicopters to

bring ammunition forward for their 30 guns, none of which had finished the first night

with more than a few rounds left. And even then, the amount moved was barely

sufficient for another night’s fighting.649 It was as a result of this that battle was

resumed only on the night of 13 June.

When the last line of defence around Stanley had been broken by the following day,

the British were again down to their last rounds of ammunition. With the Argentines

pushed back to their base of supplies at the islands’ capital, they were superior in

munitions and could have held off the British. If their morale had held they need not

have surrendered that day.650

Forward located transport infrastructure showed itself to be of considerable

importance in the Falklands campaign by the fact that the British supply effort was

hindered because of the lack of it. Indeed, but for water transport via the naturally

occurring inland waterway of Teal Inlet and from the coast at Bluff Cove/Fitzroy, the

battle for Stanley and the war itself could not have been won when it was.

648 Oakley, 1989, p. 98; Thompson, 1991, pp. 275, 281.649 Anderson, 2002, p. 68.650 Ibid., pp. 86-7.

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Had the war been of longer duration, the British could have built more transport

infrastructure to ease their logistics difficulties. There had been a proposal to build

facilities which would have aided the flow of supplies onto the islands, although not

across them. Concern that a United Nations resolution would order an immediate

freeze on military operations by both sides meant that Admiral Woodward initially

considered plans for a defensively sustainable base that would have been sited well

clear of Port Stanley but in a location from where an attack could be carried out

should the situation change again.651

An airstrip was to have been constructed, initially to take Harriers as was eventually

the case at San Carlos, but it was then to be extended to take C-130 Hercules as well

as Phantom fighters, which the carriers were too small to take.652 The site for it was to

be beside a harbour which could be defended against Argentine land, sea and air

forces.653 Several locations were proposed for the creation of such an enclave.

Woodward suggested Stevelly Bay, in the north west of West Falkland, and Low Bay

in Lafonia, the southern part of East Falkland island.654 The planning for the creation

of a long term base was dropped on 12 May when instructions made it clear that the

Task Force was to remove the Argentines from the Falklands rather than just re-

establish a presence there. Woodward says the words ‘with a view to repossessing’

were dropped from their General Directive regarding the basic objective of the Task

Force and were replaced with the more precise instruction simply to land and

repossess the islands.655

651 Woodward, 2003, p. 256.652 Ibid., pp. 113-4.653 Ibid., p. 257.654 Ibid., pp. 127, 257-9.655 Ibid., p. 301.

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Reducing the load and increasing advance warning

The Falklands War, like the Gulf War, did not provide evidence of means by which

the logistics load might have been reduced over the last century. What little use was

made of living off the land could not affect this, nor could the use of miniaturisation

technology. It was also no more possible to collect better information about the war,

whether to reduce the weight of supplies or provide advance warning of the conflict

that might have given the British more time to move and so lessen the disadvantage

they had from their lack of forward based forces and supplies.

Living off the land was possible in the Falklands. A survival guide for the islands was

issued by Major Ewan Southby-Tailyour who had sailed around them five years

previously. The troops could rely on over 600,000 sheep on the islands while all the

settlements had potato patches. On the coast, mussels, limpets, lobsters and crabs

were to be found. Scurvy grass which grew all over the islands and was high in

Vitamin C, could help make up for a deficiency in fruit and vegetables. With most of

the arctic tents lost with the Atlantic Conveyor, there were soldiers who used the

stones and peat which the islands abounded in to build their own Celtic-style

roundhouse shelters.656

But there were particular problems with water. Each 24 hour pack of Arctic rations

issued to the troops required eight pints of water to reconstitute its contents.657

Lieutenant Colonel Nick Vaux, commanding 42 Commando, said that almost all the

high ground was sodden with brackish water, rather than drained by fast flowing

streams. This meant that drinkable water was almost non-existent.658

If the British could supplement their needs from the land, so could the Argentines.

Troops, especially those who had been posted away from Stanley and received

inadequate supplies owing to poor transport, helped themselves to the islands’

sheep.659 Neither side could be at advantage over the other in reducing their logistics

load if both made use of locally available resources.

656 Anderson, 2002, p. 71.657 Oakley, 1989, p. 110.658 Vaux, 1986, p. 129.659 Middlebrook, 2003, p. 221.

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More importantly, living off the land was of little significance in fighting a modern

war on these islands. The needs for fighting and transportation equipment,

ammunition and fuel, greatly outweighed what soldiers could forage from the local

environment. As said before, the troops themselves were only a very small fraction of

the total load moved by the British to the South Atlantic.

As was found in the previous case studies, there was no evidence to suggest that

miniaturisation, as has been argued by Edgell et al., could reduce the load on a

permanent basis.660 Both sides had access to often similarly advanced equipment. The

British did deploy superior weaponry to the Argentines, packing considerable

capability into items that were of relatively low weight when compared to the total

logistics load. The Sidewinder missile was important in providing Harriers superiority

over Argentine aircraft. But the Argentines were also able to deploy highly capable

small-sized equipment. Its possession of Exocet missiles was a considerable threat to

British vessels. Another example was the Argentine possession of ample night-vision

equipment that was superior to anything the Task Force carried.661

The Falklands War demonstrated that one side cannot assume technological

superiority over another. In the competitive circumstances of war, both sides will

attempt to deploy the very best equipment and to deploy as much as they can.

Argentina could not get hold of Sidewinder missiles which the British were provided

with by the United States. As is explained later, they faced an embargo that had been

put in place by Washington before the war. But they did have other advanced

weaponry and made every effort to gain more during the conflict, as was the case for

their attempts at acquiring further Exocet missiles. The war also demonstrated how

the effect of such items can be minimised by the deployment of countermeasures. The

British use of chaff provided a means to reduce the risk of ships being hit by Exocets.

Neither side was in a position to cut back on the supplies they needed to fight this

conflict. Miniaturisation did not reduce the load.

660 Edgell, J. L.W.; S.K. Spangler, G. F. Dragoo, & L.W. Jackson, ‘Logistics in 2025: Consider It Done!’, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1996, pp. 26-28, http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/volume2/chap01/vol2ch01.pdf661 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 206.

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As with the Gulf War in the previous chapter, better information was no more

available to forces in the Falklands War than to those at the beginning of the 20th

century. Libicki’s argument that improved information could be used to avoid sending

supplies surplus to requirements could not have applied in this conflict. Information

was still subject to the competitive circumstances of war.

The British, for example, underestimated the force they were to face at Goose Green,

their one major land engagement with the Argentines before Stanley. The intelligence

available to the British suggested that there were two or possibly three companies of

infantry with limited artillery. But 2 Para met fiercer resistance than expected. They

found at Goose Green the equivalent of a reinforced battalion.662 The experience

showed that an opponent was still just as capable at hiding information. Improved

scope for estimating the load required for battle and thus avoiding the transport of

excess supplies had not materialised.

In any case, unlike the US in the Gulf War, the British, no longer the Great Power

they had been at the beginning of the century, were unable to bring supplies sufficient

for them to have material superiority over their opponent on the islands. As was

previously said, the Argentines were superior in munitions at Stanley and could well

have held off their opponent. The British did not have a surplus which might have

been reduced by the availability of better information about how the war would

progress.

Evidence from the Falklands War also counters another argument, put by Blaker, that

better information collection could provide early warning of potential threats,

allowing for bases further away from the front line. As the Franks Report, undertaken

after the war, found even with the standoff between British and Argentine forces on

South Georgia, the British had not expected that the invasion of the Falklands would

follow.663 A potential enemy was no less capable of hiding its intentions than in the

past.

662 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 253.663 Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, (London: HMSO, January 1983), p. 73.

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A reduced load and deterrence

The Falklands War showed that any hoped for use of a smaller load as means of

deterrence could only be temporary. It demonstrated how a small force located at a

forward position need not always be successful in deterring an opponent by acting as

a trip-wire to a larger conflict. While the United States might have counted upon this

following its deployment of 500 US troops to Macedonia to deter Serbian attack

during the 1990s, this is not a means of reducing the logistics load permanently. The

Argentines did not believe that the British would be willing to attempt reconquest or

even that they would be capable of doing so. As this case study demonstrates, the

impermanence of Great Power status, which affected Britain during the 20th century,

means that a state cannot assume it will always encounter smaller opponents fearing a

military confrontation with it.

Argentina faced a small British garrison on the Falklands of 80 men plus 23 of the

islands’ territorial defence force.664 The number that faced the Argentines on South

Georgia was even smaller. It was defended by just 22 marines.665 These troops could

not possibly defend against an Argentine attack. Indeed the government in Buenos

Aires was so confident of victory that the impending conquest of the islands was

announced before it had even occurred.666

The Argentines also felt that they could cope with a British response to a loss of the

islands. To be sure, two previous attempts to persuade the military Junta in Buenos

Aires to launch an invasion had been overridden by concerns regarding their potential

opponent’s nuclear submarines. A plan for a surprise attack on the Falklands was put

to the Junta by Admiral Massera who was then in charge of the navy, and Admiral

Jorge Anaya, just after the 1976 coup and again following Argentina’s 1978 World

Cup victory.667 By the time of the Falklands invasion however, Anaya was in a much

stronger position as the naval representative on the three-man Junta, with his old

school friend, General Leopoldo Galtieri, president of the country from December

1981. The new leadership was able to agree that the Falklands should come under

664 Ibid., pp. 43, 45. 665 Ibid., p. 58.666 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 92.667 Ibid., p. 46.

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Argentine control, either diplomatically or by force, preferably before the 150th

anniversary of the British seizure of the islands in January 1983.668

Although they did not expect a military response from the British, the Junta were

prepared to take them on should they have wished to reconquer the islands. Their

original plan was to invade after the Naval Air Arm’s main strike unit had been re-

equipped with fourteen French-built Super Etendard aircraft and fifteen Exocet

missiles by September 1982.669

That said, the Junta were convinced that London would be unwilling even to attempt

to take back the Islands. According to Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo, who was put in

charge of planning the invasion, the Junta did not think there would be a military

reaction by the British.670 This gave them sufficient confidence to act in April, even

before the Naval Air Arm’s re-equipment was complete.

The Argentines had evidence which they believed suggested that the British would

not react. They had previously taken possession of British territory, albeit undefended,

without any attempt at their eviction. In late 1976, Argentina put fifty personnel on

Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Group. This was located 800 kilometres south

east of South Georgia, which itself was 1,400 kilometres east of the Falklands. Thus

they had a precedent which showed that the British were not prepared to react to

Argentine conquest of their territory. To be sure, the Prime Minister of the time,

James Callaghan, sent a naval task force in November 1977, comprising two frigates,

two support ships and a submarine, fearing possible further island seizures. But as the

Argentines did not make a further attempt upon British territory, the presence of the

task force was kept quiet. It could not have informed Buenos Aires of a British

willingness to send another task force in future.671

A further public indication that Britain was losing interest in the region was to be

provided by the present government of Margaret Thatcher. This was that the Royal

668 Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 1-2; Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 62-3.669 Middlebrook, 2003, p. 5.670 Ibid., pp. 1, 3-4.671 Freedman, 2005, Vol. 1., pp. 84-5.

218

Navy’s only vessel in the region, the Atlantic Survey ship HMS Endurance was to be

withdrawn from the South Atlantic following its 1981-2 tour.672

In this instance, a small force that was forward positioned, where it could act as a trip-

wire to greater conflict, failed to deter aggression. With rearmament underway,

Britain would no longer be seen as capable of reversing an Argentine invasion.

Moreover, there were not indications sufficient for the Junta to believe Britain was

even prepared to go to war in the event that its small forward based forces had been

overrun.

672 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 58.

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PART 2 – THE ADVANTAGE OF FORWARD POSITIONS FOR FIGHTING

Use of aerial bombardment

When the possibility for strategic bombardment as an alternative to the use of forward

positioned ground forces is considered, the Falklands War provides a stark contrast to

the Kosovo War of 1999. As was said in Chapter 3, only that one air campaign,

mounted over Serbia, has appeared to demonstrate a success for strategic

bombardment by air power, aided by political circumstances within the enemy

country that helped cause its capitulation. But air power cannot always overcome

hindrances from the enemy’s air force and ground defences. And the political

circumstances within the enemy country will not always be conducive to a Kosovo-

style capitulation.

Boulding was not a supporter of the concept of strategic air power, but the evidence of

the Falklands War, even more than the Gulf War in the preceding chapter, suggests

that he was wrong to assert that air power had provided a “revolution of quite

unprecedented dimensions” or that the LSG for air power was very much less than it

was for land power. This is let alone the view that it could be strategic.

In the first instance, the Royal Air Force could have done with having forward bases

from where air strikes could be carried out. Britain’s problem was that its nearest air

base was 3,800 miles away at Wideawake airfield on Ascension Island. A single

bombing mission from Ascension required multiple refuellings and therefore the

backup of a fleet of aircraft all operating from the same base. The plan for the first

Vulcan bomber mission carried out on 1 May, required eighteen sorties flown by

fifteen Victor refuelling aircraft as well as a second Vulcan as a reserve and a Nimrod

maritime patrol aircraft to guide the last two Victors to rendezvous with the Vulcan

off Brazil on its return flight. The whole mission required seventeen separate fuel

transfers and a total of 925 tons of fuel.673

Such a complicated operation meant that problems with just a few of the aircraft could

put everything at risk of failure. During the first mission, the primary Vulcan had to

673 Middlebrook, 2001, pp. 118-20.

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return as did one of the Victors. If a third aircraft had been forced to turn back, the

whole mission would have been abandoned. Two more Victors developed fuel

troubles and were saved only by two further Victors sent out from Ascension to

replenish them on their return.674 It is appropriate to add that this demonstrates that

even an attempt at strategic bombardment, which is meant to eliminate the need for

forward based ground forces, is still advantaged by forward basing.

Given the difficulties of sending a single bomber aircraft, there was no likelihood of

sending Britain’s large fleet of fighter aircraft on missions of this distance. The job of

clearing the skies over the islands of enemy aircraft was left instead to the Navy

Harriers on board the two mini-carriers sent to the South Atlantic, Hermes and

Invincible. Those aboard Hermes performed combat air patrol over the islands while

those on Invincible did so over the Task Force. The situation was somewhat improved

only after landing on the islands, with the construction of the new air strip at Port San

Carlos. HMS Sheathbill saw as many as 120 Harrier movements a day at the peak of

the campaign. 675

Not only did air power require forward bases but it had a logistical requirement that

was in large part indistinguishable from that of surface power. Together they were

significant users of fuel which accounted for most of the load sent to the South

Atlantic. One has to consider that fuel was used not only by the aircraft themselves

but also that it was used indirectly by the Task Force which was protecting the two

aircraft carriers. And that same Task Force was providing land power with a platform

from which to retake the islands. This does not support Boulding’s view that air

power should have an LSG that is very much different from that for land power. Even

in the very unlikely event that air power could have won the war, this does not

provide evidence for a reduction in the LSG overall.

That said, the Harrier force proved itself to be at an advantage to the Argentine air

force in the skies over the Falklands. Although they used three existing airfields on

the islands, the hard surface airport at Stanley plus grass fields at Goose Green and

Pebble Island, north of West Falkland, none could accommodate Argentine aircraft of 674 Ibid., pp. 120-23.675 Godden, John, Harrier Ski Jump to Victory, (Oxford: Brassey's, 1983), p. 4; Oakley, 1989, pp. 53, 98, 101.; Freedman, 2005, Vol. 2., p. 540.

221

similar high performance. The only aircraft that could be positioned on the Falklands

were the Pucará, Aeromacchi and the Turbo-Mentor. There were 50 of these stationed

on the islands but they were designed for counter-insurgency operations and were no

match for the British.676

None of their more advanced aircraft, the Mirages, Daggers, Skyhawks and Exocet-

carrying Super Etendards, had the Harrier’s ability for vertical take off and landing or

short take off when carrying a heavy bomb load. With no airfield capable of

accommodating their best aircraft, the Argentines were forced to rely on mainland

bases. This put them at the limit of their ranges. Argentina’s entire air refuelling

capability was limited to two KC-130 tankers, which meant that only six strike

aircraft could be supported at a time. Although the Harrier had a short range, it could

fly combat air patrol for 40–60 minutes, while the Argentine attackers had, at best, a

few minutes to find and engage their targets. Argentina’s Mirages and Daggers

moreover, were not capable of aerial refuelling and had to fly at the absolute limit of

their range to reach the British fleet. Neither could either of these aircraft use their

afterburners to employ their Mach 2 speed advantage against the subsonic Harriers.

The extra fuel consumed would have meant they could not return to base.677

Even when the best Argentine aircraft engaged the British, plane for plane they were

still at a disadvantage. The Sidewinder AIM-9L missiles carried by the British put

them a generation ahead of their opponent.678

The Harriers carried out bombing raids on the Falklands from soon after the first

Vulcan attack on 1 May through to the end of the campaign six weeks later. Yet aerial

bombing raids alone, whether by conducted by Harrier or by Vulcan, could not force

the Argentines to surrender. This could only be achieved by forces on the ground. The

amphibious landing at San Carlos on 21 May and subsequent ground battles were to

be vital for the eventual defeat of the Argentines on the islands on 14 June.

676 Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 62-3.677 Corum, James S., ‘Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational View’, Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2002, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/corum.html678 Ibid.

222

In part, the problem continued to be that the British were unable to gain air

superiority. While Sidewinder-armed Harriers proved to be superior to Argentine

aircraft they had difficulty bombing in the face of heavy fire from the ground. The

Harriers could only bomb from low level and were at risk from the anti-aircraft units

around Stanley. Although none were destroyed during their first bombing raids on 1

May, the intensity of fire was such that the British Harriers subsequently carried out

few of their missions in the area, instead preferring to keep at a safe altitude above

20,000 feet to avoid Argentine Roland anti-aircraft missiles.679 Even so, on 1 June, a

Sea Harrier was to stray too close, becoming the only such Harrier to be shot down by

the anti-aircraft units around Stanley during the war.680

Only the Vulcan bombers flying from Ascension Island could bomb from a safe

enough altitude. But throughout the conflict these managed to fly just seven missions.

The first British air attack carried out by a Vulcan bomber in the early morning of 1

May involved an attempt to drop twenty-one 1,000 pound bombs at Stanley airport.

Of these just one hit the runway. The next Vulcan raid was carried out on 4 May and

this time it scored no hits on the runway whatsoever.681 The one bomb that hit the

airfield produced a crater 65 feet across, which was useful to the British. It lessened

any likelihood that the Argentines might want to extend it for the use of their high

performance aircraft stationed on the mainland, which would have threatened the

carriers and, as explained later, thereby the whole campaign. The runway could not be

easily repaired with locally available resources. But there was still 60 feet of runway

at the point where the bomb hit, which was enough for the use of C-130 transports as

well as smaller aircraft.682

The weather caused problems for air strikes. Heavy low cloud and fog inhibited the

Harriers in their efforts at attacking airfields and other military positions.683 Bad

information was another difficulty for aerial bombardment. It has been claimed that

Argentine engineers, who built the airfield with British approval years before the

invasion, mistakenly plotted its position 1,000 metres from its true location. As a

679 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 184-5.680 Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 201-2.681 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 169-70, 178; Smith, 1989, p. 96.682 Middlebrook, 2003, p. 78; Moro, Rubén, The History of the South Atlantic Conflict, trans. Michael Valeur, (New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 93.683 Freedman, 2005, Vol. 2., p. 435.

223

result the error was to be found on the maps used by the British pilots.684 The British

were also faced with a deliberate effort by the Argentines at deception. Circles of sand

and earth were put on the runway to look like craters, making it appear that the air

strikes had had greater success than was actually the case.685

The Argentines found other ways to reduce the likelihood of being attacked. A Vulcan

strike was carried out on the night of 31 May with the intention of hitting the main

Argentine radar at Stanley with Shrike missiles. The Argentines avoided being hit by

placing it among houses in the town, thereby risking the possibility of civilian

casualties which would have been unacceptable to the British. They also switched it

off when the Vulcan was overhead or reduced the signal to draw it in lower so that it

would be within reach of their air defences. The Vulcan’s two missiles were released

without causing damage. A second attack was attempted three nights later but only

succeeded in destroying a much less important radar set that was not important to the

Stanley defences.686

British Harriers also made use of precision weaponry. Their first use of laser-guided

bombs on 13 June resulted in claims of direct hits on an infantry command post on

Tumbledown Mountain and an artillery position near Moody Brook to the west of

Stanley.687 An Argentine source has said that their use was effective.688 Yet whether

they were accurately hit or not, Tumbledown was still taken, not by air power, but

only after one of the hardest fought land battles of the war.689

However precise the weaponry it was only as accurate as the information the British

had about the whereabouts of their enemy. They could not know every position

defended by the Argentines who had dug trenches, built shelters of stones and turf or

used the naturally occurring rocks within the hilly terrain, helping them blend into the

landscape as well as provide protection from attack. One must doubt whether the

British might have had more success if they had been able to carry out further aerial

684 Anderson, 2002, p. 37.685 Cordesman and Wagner, 1990, p. 274.686 Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 207-8.687 Ibid., p. 249.688 Moro, 1989, p. 309.689 Middlebrook, 2001, pp. 357-66; Middlebrook, 2003, p. 223; Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 341-3; Anderson, 2002, p. 85.

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bombardment. More frequent bombardment came from naval guns on vessels located

offshore while the aimed fire of land based artillery was considered by the Argentines

the greatest danger of all.690 Yet remote bombardment of whatever kind could not

dislodge the Argentines from their positions.

The Falklands War was therefore similar to the Kosovo War in that it too provided

evidence that military forces on the ground could survive aerial bombardment. Yet

Kosovo, unlike the Falklands, still saw the enemy capitulate in the face of air power

without recourse to ground forces. The difference was that the air war was extended

across the homeland of the opponent with evidence suggesting that this created

pressure within the country’s political system for capitulation.

Argentina in 1982 may well have represented a political system that was susceptible

to precision air power as was Serbia in 1999. While it was authoritarian, it was not

totalitarian. Power was not held by one individual as was the case in Iraq under

Saddam Hussein. Instead there was a collective leadership. As president, General

Galtieri depended upon his fellow members of the country’s three-man Junta. Each of

these in turn represented the three services. While Galtieri represented the army,

Anaya represented the navy, and Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo the air force. Each was

answerable to a service council and it was from these that the Junta derived its

legitimacy.691 The government was therefore susceptible to domestic pressure.

Its weakness was demonstrated by the fact that all three members of the Junta were

forced to stand down after the conflict while the military regime was itself to end the

following year beset by criticism over the failure of the war.692 Serbia’s Slobodan

Milosevic was also to be forced out after just a year in contrast to the totalitarianism

of Iraq where Saddam Hussein remained in place only to be overthrown by outside

intervention.

But whether or not Argentina’s political system might have been susceptible to a

Serbian style capitulation, Britain did not have the means to attempt it. Its Victor

bombers, flying from Ascension, had only been able to fly a limited number of 690 Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 220, 228-9.691 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 134-5.692 Middlebrook, 2003, p. 287.

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missions to the Falklands and would also have been constrained by the distance to

mainland Argentina. Moreover, any air strike on a mainland target would have faced

an air force with 223 combat aircraft.693 Gone would have been the constraint placed

upon Argentina’s air power by its lack of refuelling capability. Britain’s larger,

slower, less manoeuvrable Victor bombers would have been vulnerable in an

environment with so many fighters. The Harriers could not have helped. They were

too few and the carriers would have been vulnerable to enemy air power had they

been brought nearer to the Argentine coast to bring them within range.

If the physical difficulties of launching air strikes upon Argentina were not enough,

the British were resolved to limit the conflict on the basis of its legality. Britain’s

Attorney General had given his opinion to the war cabinet that an attack on the

mainland could be seen as falling outside Article 51 of the UN Charter, under which

Britain could act in self defence.694 It was important to London that it maintained

international support for its campaign as it sought to hinder Argentine efforts to obtain

equipment abroad, in particular the Exocet missiles that were a threat to the Task

Force.

A strategic air power campaign relying on bombardment from afar, was not a

possibility for the British at war with Argentina. Forward based ground forces were

essential to the British recovery of the Falkland Islands.

And just as the Argentines could not be dislodged by the use of air power, the same

could be said for the British after they had landed on the islands, providing evidence

yet again that Krepinevich is wrong to argue that forward bases are under increasing

threat from enemy firepower. The ability of the British to survive in the face of the

threat of Argentine air attack demonstrated the competitive circumstances of war.

While aerial threats may undergo technological advance, so ground forces respond to

this competitive pressure by improving measures to counter these.

The British land forces were able to fight back against Argentine air power. The SAS,

already operating on the islands, managed to bring down a Pucara ground-attack

693 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 252.694 Ibid., p. 190.

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aircraft with a Stinger missile near Goose Green, on the first day of the San Carlos

landing.695 At San Carlos itself, the forces there were armed with Rapier and

Blowpipe missiles and also opened up with general purpose machine guns and even

rifles when enemy aircraft flew into the vicinity. Between 22 and 27 May they were

able to bring down at least five enemy aircraft.696

British land forces found other means of defending themselves against Argentine air

power. At San Carlos, they dug trenches to provide cover from enemy air attack. The

effectiveness of this was shown when an attack by parachute retarded bombs managed

to kill two men and wound three, but avoid much heavier casualties.697 The British

also took measures to hide themselves. A rigorous blackout, for example, was

enforced, minimising the danger should the Argentines have been willing to attempt

attack during the daily 16 hours of darkness.698

The Falklands War provides evidence too of the difficulty of the argument put by

Hallion with regard to the Gulf War, that air power can replace the need for ground

forces through a capacity for denying territory to the enemy. Even if aircraft which

could have used the runway at Stanley airport, such as the Harriers, could have got to

the Falklands before the invasion, courtesy of multiple refuellings along the way, the

fuel they would have needed could only have arrived several weeks later by sealift.

The Argentines themselves needed to bring in jet fuel after they had taken the

islands.699

And even had such fuel been already available, it would have been difficult for the

British to stop an Argentine invasion. The Argentine air force could have distracted

their planes while the landing, unopposed by ground forces, was under way. It is

worth pointing out that the stationing of fighter aircraft at the Mount Pleasant air base

on the Falklands, built after the war, is carried out in conjunction with, and not an

alternative to, the presence of ground troops. In the event of a future invasion the

695 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 219.696 Ibid., pp. 230-1. Calculation here is based upon statistics in Ethell, Jeffrey and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983), Appendix 6.697 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 255.698 Ibid., p. 254.699 Middlebrook, 2003, p. 69.

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British have not been prepared to leave the defence of the islands solely to air

power.700

Threat to the forward base from asymmetric warfare

The Falklands War also brings into question again the view, expressed by

Krepinevich, that there is more to fear from the increasing destructive capability of

asymmetric actors. Asymmetric attack was attempted during the war but was thwarted

by the competitive environment under which it had to operate.

A mission was sent by Admiral Anaya to Spain with the aim of carrying out an attack

upon a British warship in Gibraltar. The team was however foiled by Spanish police

hours before they were to attach limpet mines to a frigate that had entered the

harbour.701 This demonstrated the competitive threat that asymmetric warfare

personnel face from the law enforcement agencies of the country in which they are

situated. The Falklands War failed to provide evidence that asymmetric actors could

carry and use weapons that made forward based forces any more vulnerable than

before.

700 Royal Air Force, ‘Overseas Royal Air Force Stations’, 13 December 2005, http://www.raf.mod.uk/stations/os_base.html 701 Tremlett, Giles, ‘Falklands War almost spread to Gibraltar’, Guardian, London, 24 July 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/falklands/story/0,11707,1268201,00.html

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Base access on foreign territory

Another argument made by Krepinevich, that there is a post-Cold War trend for

countries to deny forward base access, is also countered by the evidence from the

Falklands War. The experience of Britain in this conflict, like the Boer War in

Chapter 4, demonstrates that difficulties in acquiring forward base access owe

themselves to specific circumstances rather than to trends.

Forward base access was particularly problematic in this conflict. In the first instance,

it is to be emphasised that an archipelago such as the Falklands is inevitably without

contiguous territories from which a reconquest can be undertaken. As a factor of

natural geography this is a circumstance that is unchanged over time and will reappear

whenever an operation requires the conquest of an island.

But the British were also lacking territory that they could use within the region.

After Argentina itself, Chile was the closest country to the Falkland Islands. Punta

Arenas, with its port and airport, was just 450 miles away. Better still, Chile’s long

border with Argentina meant that its territory could have been particularly convenient

to the British as a base from which to harass their opponent. Three Argentine air bases

were especially close to the Chilean border. Both Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande, the

Super Etendard base, were less than 40 miles from Chile. Ushuaia was even closer at

just 10 miles from the border. This would have made it much easier for Britain to

carry out the special forces raids which it had hoped would hinder the Argentine air

threat to the Task Force. As it was, they got no further than a reconnaissance mission

launched from Invincible, which had to be abandoned after detection by Argentine

radar. Chile was of use only in that the men made it across the border where they set

fire to their helicopter and handed themselves in to the authorities.702

The Chileans did provide the British with some support, in return for which they

received military equipment including eight Hawker Hunter jet fighters, two Canberra

aircraft and a radar, all at reduced price.703 The British were allowed to undertake

three reconnaissance missions from the Chilean Pacific island of San Félix, refuelling 702 West, Nigel, The Secret War for the Falklands, (London: Little Brown, 1997), pp. 135-49; Woodward, Admiral Sandy, One Hundred Days, (London: HarperCollins, 2003), p. 321.703 Freedman, 2005, Vol. 2., p. 397.

229

at Concepción on the mainland before flying on to the South Atlantic where limited

but significant information was said to have been obtained. The missions were carried

out on 9, 15 and 16 May using a Nimrod, supported by a VC10. Admiral Woodward

had wanted the aircraft to fly on the nights of the 19th to 21st when the landing at San

Carlos was to take place but the Chileans insisted that they were discontinued.704

Chile provided further support to the British during the war. They delayed the

handover from Britain of two vessels meant to have taken place on 6 and 7 April. One

was that of HMS Norfolk, which with only a small Royal Navy crew, low stores, poor

communications and a lack of weapons was not seen as that helpful. The other,

however, was a tanker, the Tidepool, which was fully manned and, after loading with

fuel at Curaçao in the Caribbean, sailed on 14 April to rendezvous with the Task

Force.705

The Chileans also monitored Argentine air activities, passing on the information via a

direct satellite link with the Task Force. They turned a blind eye as the US made

available the use of electronic facilities in the south of the country.706 A border dispute

with Chile meant that Argentina kept two elite battalions of mountain commandos

stationed on their frontier. Thus, throughout the war, the Junta kept some of its best

winter-trained commando troops away from the Falklands. Many of the elite Naval

Infantry Corps who had originally invaded the islands were also transferred back to

the Chilean border.707

The possibility was raised that the British might conduct a conquest of the Argentine

half of Tierra del Fuego, taking advantage of the fact that enemy forces on the island

were geared towards attack from Chile. The Beagle Channel, with its disputed islands,

was on its southern side. The island was less well defended than the Falklands and,

with Chilean help, the territory appeared to the British at first to be an easier military

objective.708 Having taken control, its port and air facilities at Rio Grande and Ushuaia

could have been used to accelerate the build up. It was sparsely populated and the

704 Ibid., Vol. 2., pp. 397-8.705 Ibid., Vol. 2., p. 391.706 Ibid., Vol. 2., p. 397; Richardson, Louise, When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During Suez and Falklands Crises, (London: MacMillan, 1996), pp. 149-50. 707 Cordesman and Wagner, 1990, pp. 263-4; Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 63-4.708 Freedman, 2005, Vol. 2., p. 391.

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RAF could have been deployed to defend the acquisition from future air or sea attack

as well as hinder Argentine air operations against the Task Force and carry out strikes

upon enemy positions in the Falklands. It had an oilfield producing 24,000 barrels a

day and would have been a blow to Argentine national pride as well as a possible

bargaining chip in any negotiations.709

But to have taken the island, the British would have had to undertake intensive

operations against Argentine sea and air power, the latter of which proved difficult for

conducting an amphibious operation on the Falklands, let alone against an island from

which many enemy combat missions were flown. And Chile could not be relied upon

to acquiesce in such an operation in the face of regional pressures.710

Other Latin American countries could also have been useful to the British.

Montevideo, with Uruguay’s main port and airport, was 1,200 miles from the

Falklands, approximately the same distance as Buenos Aires. Rio Grande, Brazil, with

that country’s southernmost port and airfield, was only 250 miles further away. Both

countries also shared land borders with Argentina. But apart from Chile, no other

Latin American country provided support to the British. Uruguay’s only role was as a

prisoner transit point where captured Argentines were sent before repatriation to their

home country.711 Brazil provided even less help. When mechanical failure of

refuelling equipment for a Vulcan bomber returning to Ascension Island meant that it

had to land at Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian government allowed the return of the plane

only after the British agreed to the supply of Lynx helicopter parts. And even then

they continued to impound the plane while they decided how to respond to an

Argentine request that they should not release it. The aircraft and its crew were

eventually allowed to leave after seven days with the Vulcan forced to leave behind

its unexpended missiles.712

Outside the South Atlantic region, the British were still able to count on considerable

support from other countries. Britain’s most important ally for the provision of

forward basing was not any country in South America but was instead the United

709 Ibid., Vol. 2., p. 391.710 Ibid., Vol. 2., p. 391.711 Middlebrook, 2003, p. 278.712 Freedman, 2005, Vol. 2, p. 543; Middlebrook, 2001, p. 293.

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States. As said earlier, the facilities used on Ascension were American-run, despite

the island itself being British. The airfield had been built by the US in the Second

World War initially as a staging post between Brazil and Africa. The runway was

subsequently extended to over 10,000 feet to take heavy transport aircraft mainly

serving American satellite and missile tracking facilities that were built on the

island.713

The British also benefited greatly from US supplies. As said before, aviation fuel at

Ascension was made available to them, topped up by more pumped ashore from

American tankers. Most food on the island was supplied by the United States. Other

supplies included 4,700 tons of airfield matting as well as air refuelling parts and drop

containers for carrying out C-130 airdrops. Offensive equipment included the 200

Sidewinder AIM-9L missiles that gave the British Harriers the edge over Argentine

fighter aircraft. Less sophisticated versions of the Sidewinder, 600 of the D variant

and 1,750 of the H variant, were also provided to Britain. Shrike anti-radiation

missiles came with Argentine radar frequencies. Among other items there was even

an American laser gun supplied to Hermes, designed to blind pilots and confuse an

approaching heat seeking missile.714

American intelligence was important. The British, whose intelligence capabilities

were geared towards the Soviet Union, had little in the region and had few Spanish

speakers. Use was made of the previously mentioned electronic facilities in Chile. The

Americans moved a military satellite to cover the Falklands. Communication was also

supported by US space systems. Military channels were allocated to the UK while $4

million in satellite dishes and encryption equipment was sold to the British.715

There was indirect support as well. US tanker aircraft were assigned to NATO in

order to free up British Victor aircraft. American support for the British was such that

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger held what were known as ‘what-can-we-do-

for-Britain-today meetings’ on a daily basis. Fifteen stages in the normal supplies

713 Smith, 1989, p. 39.714 Cordesman and Wagner, 1990, pp. 262-3; Middlebrook, 2001, p. 91; Richardson, 1996, pp. 125-6, 146. 715 Cordesman and Wagner, 1990, p. 263.

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authorisation process were cut out so that orders placed by the British could be acted

on as quickly as possible.716

The Americans were important for what they did not supply to the Argentines. US

military supplies had been denied since the Carter administration due to Argentina’s

human rights record. The impact of this was to be seen in the failure of many

Argentine bombs to explode on contact with British ships. Of 25 bombs, only 11 were

dropped properly and exploded on contact. A manual from the American

manufacturers that would have showed them the modest technical alteration they

required was denied them by the US embargo.717

And the Americans were not alone in their active support of the British. As said

before, the other nine members of the European Economic Community actually put in

place economic sanctions against Argentina a month before the United States.

France and Germany both froze orders for military equipment that had been placed

with them by the country. This meant no more Super Etendards and Exocets from

France while two frigates due to be built in Germany were put on hold.718 As said,

France also helped supply information in the British effort to deny Exocet missiles to

the Argentines.

Britain gained the support of the United Nations on 3 April, the day after the invasion.

Security Council Resolution 502 called for an immediate withdrawal of Argentine

forces from the islands and for both countries to find a diplomatic solution to their

differences. It was passed by the two thirds majority necessary with Britain securing

the support of the US, France, Ireland and Japan as well as third world nations,

Jordan, Togo, Zaire, Uganda and Guyana. The remaining third whose support it failed

to gain were the Hispanic states on the Council, Spain and Panama, and the

communists, China, Poland and the USSR. The Soviets decided against using their

veto, choosing neutrality in a conflict between a leading member of NATO and a

right-wing military Junta.719 Argentina was not even to find support forthcoming from

the Organization of American States. On 28 April the OAS voted on a resolution

716 Richardson, 1996, pp. 128-9, 146.717 Middlebrook, 2003, p. 286; Hastings, 1997, pp. 167, 262.718 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 124.719 Ibid., pp. 122-3.

233

calling for both sides to honour UN Resolution 502.720 Yet, for all this support, it did

not translate into forward base access for the British in the Southern Cone of South

America. Throughout they had to rely on Ascension, and later South Georgia, as their

nearest bases on land.

That Britain could not gain access to the territories of these countries was not

evidence of a general trend against British base access in this era, just as lack of

support during the Boer War had not been symptomatic of a general trend in that era.

Britain has found it harder to gain base access than the United States, faced by beliefs

held by other countries relating to its imperial history. The fact that Britain was a

European colonial power and that the Falklands War involved the reconquest of a

colonial possession was a concern for the countries of South America. It fostered the

idea that colonialism was still present in the region.721 A similar situation arose prior

to the Iraq War in 2003. While the Turkish government was willing to accept the

stationing of American troops to open a second northern front against Iraq, a measure

later voted down by the country’s parliament, they were not prepared to consider the

stationing of British forces. Britain’s historic involvement in the region was a problem

too for the Turkish military.722

Elsewhere this has not hindered British forward basing. Prior to the war, Britain had

troops permanently based in a number of countries including Germany, Cyprus, and

Belize. Troop levels in Germany were reduced with the end of the Cold War but

subsequent years have seen other countries allow the stationing of British forces.

They were accepted by the Gulf States during the Gulf War, Macedonia during the

Kosovo War, and Kuwait prior to the Iraq War of 2003. There is no evidence of a

trend for or against British forward base access.

720 Ibid., p. 165.721 Gamba, Virginia, The Falklands/Malvinas War, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 49.722 Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales, Maj. Gen., The Iraq War, (Cambridge MA & London: Belknap, 2003), p. 135.

234

Fighting from the sea

With bases unavailable in neighbouring countries, the British were forced to rely on

the sea. But this does not provide evidence to support the Pentagon in its move

towards sea basing, based upon a belief that it is an increasingly viable alternative to

that on land. Not only does the Falklands War fail to demonstrate a trend against the

feasibility of basing on land, but there is also no evidence to show that sea-going

vessels had become better able to defend themselves or carry out an amphibious

attack. It demonstrates how, in the competitive circumstances of war, attempts to

improve the defence of vessels are matched by attempts to destroy them. The British

Task Force proved vulnerable both to bomb and missile attack from Argentine air

power.

More than 150 Skyhawk and Dagger sorties were sent on anti-ship bombing raids, of

which approximately 100 reached the target area, resulting in the sinking of several

ships.723 The frigate, HMS Ardent, was hit in Falkland Sound on 21 May by ten

bombs, of which most exploded.724 Another frigate, HMS Antelope, was hit in San

Carlos Water on 24 May by two bombs that failed to detonate. However, one of the

bombs exploded in the attempt to defuse it, igniting a fire and eventually setting off

the other bomb.725 The destroyer, HMS Coventry, was hit north of Pebble Island on 25

May by three bombs, all of which exploded.726 On 8 June, the landing ship, the Sir

Galahad was hit at Fitzroy. Although the two bombs that hit it failed to explode, they

burst open and the contents burnt fiercely enough to destroy the ship.727

Had more of the 25 bombs which were dropped exploded on contact the casualties

would have been higher. On 12 May one bomb smashed through the destroyer HMS

Glasgow, offshore from Stanley. The ship took water and was forced away from the

campaign for repairs, but worse damage was avoided because the bomb failed to

explode.728 Two ships hit on 21 May in Falkland Sound during the landing at San

Carlos Water were to survive in similar circumstances. HMS Antrim was hit by a

723 Middlebrook, 2003, p. 286.724 Woodward, 2003, pp. 370-1.725 Ibid., pp. 389-90.726 Ibid., p. 408.727 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 306.728 Hastings, 1997, pp. 186-7.

235

bomb which crippled all its anti aircraft missile systems, but it failed to do worse

damage because it did not explode. HMS Argonaut was hit by two bombs, the first of

which caused a boiler to explode and made her unable to move, while the second

caused at least three missiles to explode. Yet neither of the bombs exploded

themselves, allowing the ship to undergo repair.729 The 24th May saw the Sir Galahad

and the Sir Lancelot hit by one and two bombs respectively at San Carlos, none of

which exploded.730 When the Sir Galahad was attacked again at Fitzroy, another of its

sister ships also managed to survive being hit. While one of the two bombs that struck

the Sir Tristram burst open inside, the other passed through the vessel without

exploding.731

The risk for the British was that had one of the carriers been sunk, there would have

been only sufficient capability for air protection of the fleet. Combat air patrol over

the islands could no longer have been available, with the result that the whole

operation would have had to have been called off. Both Admiral Woodward and the

Fleet Staff at Northwood in London had agreed that the loss of one of the carriers

would have meant abandoning the entire Falklands operation.732 This conflict

continued to demonstrate the vulnerability of basing at sea over basing on land, where

an airfield, unlike an aircraft carrier, however badly bombed, can never be sunk.

There was additional carrier capacity brought on with the southward sailing of the

Atlantic Conveyor, along with the Atlantic Causeway, Contender Bezant, and

Astronomer. All were commercial vessels with flat deck areas that had been altered to

carry Harriers. The Atlantic Conveyor, which on 13 May was the first to arrive, had

two operational deck spots, one of which was manned by an armed Sea Harrier during

transit from Ascension Island to the Task Force. The ships, however, were not used to

carry out operations and as previously said, the Atlantic Conveyor was to be sunk by

an Argentine Exocet. The Astronomer sailed in June and was not to arrive in time for

the war. Of greater relief to the carriers was the construction of the Harrier strip on the

islands. 733

729 Ibid., pp. 237, 240, 244-5, 330-1.730 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 249.731 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 306.732 Woodward, 2003, p. 6.733 Godden, John, Harrier Ski Jump to Victory, (Oxford: Brassey's, 1983), p. 4; Oakley, 1989, pp. 53, 98, 101.; Smith, 1989, pp. 94-6; Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 398.

236

Had the conflict lasted longer, the British could also have relied eventually upon the

arrival of a third mini-carrier. Illustrious, which was under construction on the Tyne,

was finished by 20 June.734 There was even the possibility raised of a replacement

from the United States, although the problem of training British personnel for a ship

handed over without its American crew meant the proposal was not pursued further.735

It was questionable whether the campaign could have continued long enough to wait

for such replacements. As said earlier, there was concern that the Task Force would

have been effectively “out of action” because of wintry conditions from late June.

With bad weather there was the potential for more things to go wrong. In particular,

salt spray could attack electrical circuits and salt crystals clog mechanical systems.

Fortuitously, the war was to be fought before that winter weather arrived. It came only

on the day of the Argentine surrender.736

There was also the effect that the sinking of one of the carriers might have had on

support for the war within Britain, regardless of available replacements at sea or on

land. The sinking of the destroyer HMS Sheffield by an Exocet missile on 4 May

showed how such an incident could have dissuaded the British from further military

action. The reaction of the government in London was to respond favourably to a

peace proposal from Peru and also to put forward their own concessionary package

that would have seen the islands placed under UN administration. This was rejected

by Buenos Aires which did not expect that they were soon to lose the islands in

battle.737

Argentina did have its own mini-aircraft carrier, the Veinticinco de Mayo, which on 1

May, had its best opportunity to strike against the British Task Force. It was close

enough and many of the British aircraft were devoted to the opening attacks on the

islands. Yet there was to be no strike that day and a plan for a dawn raid the next day

was to be cancelled.738

734 Oakley, 1989, p. 27.735 Freedman, 2005, Vol. 2., p. 382.736 Woodward, 2003, p. 472.737 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 196-7, 201-2.738 Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 98-9, 102-3.

237

In part, the difficulty was that their Skyhawks required a minimum wind speed of 15

knots to take off with a weapons load of two 500 pound bombs and enough fuel to

attack a target 200 miles away. Both the 1st and 2nd May had calm weather conditions

providing insufficient wind to launch the aircraft. It meant the only alternative was to

move in closer to the British Task Force, something Rear-Admiral Allara,

commanding the Argentine navy from the Veinticinco de Mayo, was not prepared to

do for fear of endangering his ships.739

A further difficulty was that only a few of the aircraft were serviceable. While

Woodward on Hermes expected an attack from as many as ten Skyhawks and perhaps

even Exocet-armed Super Etendards from the enemy carrier,740 in reality there were

only six Skyhawks available to carry out the attack. Having realised by dawn on 2

May that the British attacks of the previous day were not the start of an attempt to

land on the islands and that the Task Force and its Harriers were concentrated, the

attack was called off. According to Allara, the Argentines did not envisage an all-out

engagement between the two fleets. He said that the difference in strength made that

impossible and that his orders were to carry out limited operations.741

That the Task Force was not to be threatened again by Argentine carrier-based air

power was due to the threat posed by Britain’s submarines. After the cruiser General

Belgrano was sunk on 2 May, the Argentine navy was kept in shallow waters close to

the mainland.

Argentine success against British ships might have been better had they more Exocet

missiles. With just five of the air-launched version carried by Super Etendard aircraft,

they managed two kills. HMS Sheffield was hit by a missile fired by one of two Super

Etendards flying out from the Argentine mainland. It did not explode but did ignite

fuel on board, causing it to be abandoned.742 The other Exocet kill was the previously

said Atlantic Conveyor.

739 Ibid., pp. 99, 102-3.740 Woodward, 2003, p. 204.741 Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 102-3.742 Woodward, 2003, p. 239.

238

To be sure, the British ships were able to shoot down attacking aircraft. The

Argentines hit Glasgow only after losing three Skyhawks downed by Brilliant which

was partnering the ship as it bombarded the shore.743 Coventry was hit on the same

day that it had shot down three enemy aircraft using its Sea Dart missiles.744 The

British also managed to repel incoming Exocets. The missile that sunk the Atlantic

Conveyor had been initially deflected away from several warships that fired chaff. It

was unfortunate that in being forced to veer sharply it headed for the Atlantic

Conveyor, one ship that possessed no chaff.745 One Exocet was even shot down in

mid-flight. On 30 May, the frigate HMS Avenger managed to shoot down an Exocet

missile using its 4.5 inch gun.746

As mentioned before, the British had their Harriers to protect the Task Force as well

as to carry out patrols over the islands. But despite this, the British were never able to

achieve air superiority. Indeed, of the Super Etendards which had threatened the Task

Force with their Exocet-launching capability, not one was shot down. As said before,

had one of their missiles managed to sink one of the carriers, Britain would have been

forced to withdraw from the war.

Dispersal was used to counter the air power threat to the Task Force. The transfer of

troops from the QE2 to the smaller Canberra and Norland at South Georgia on 28

May spread the risk of losses that could have occurred from the sinking of a single

ship. The government in London was unwilling to risk Britain’s largest cruise liner on

the final approach to the Falklands.747

The British were to make use of natural phenomena to hide themselves from

Argentine air attack. The journey to the landing site at San Carlos was helped during

the preceding day by mist that obscured the vessels from above while the final

approach was made under cover of darkness.748 The British were aided by the fact that

enemy aircraft were unable to navigate in obscured conditions or at night. Because the

Argentines had to adopt low level flying to avoid the Sea Darts, air attack at sea only

743 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 186-7.744 Ibid., pp. 258-60.745 Ibid., p. 261.746 Ibid., p. 331.747 Ibid., p. 306.748 Middlebrook, 2001, pp. 204, 208-209

239

came during daylight and in clear visibility. That said, Woodward points out that this

need not have been a problem and that equipment was available which would have

allowed them to overcome the difficulty involved with flying in low visibility

conditions.749

Another threat came from under the waves, although the Task Force was familiar with

techniques to combat this. It was said previously that the existence of Britain’s

nuclear submarines had dissuaded Argentina’s previous military rulers from

undertaking an attack on the Falklands. And after the sinking of the Belgrano, the

Argentine navy stayed close to the country’s shoreline away from the British Task

Force. Yet according to Admiral Woodward, himself a former submariner, Argentine

vessels need not have been so vulnerable.

The Belgrano steamed with its two destroyer escorts both to starboard. Had they been

at either side, the attack by the submarine, Conqueror, would have been more

difficult. The ships did not have their sonars switched on and travelled at a steady

speed of 13 knots which made it easier for a submarine to follow. By zig-zagging

determinedly, varying speed dramatically up to 25 or more knots and also slowing

right down at other times, Conqueror would have found it harder to follow and could

have been listened for when the ship slowed. In addition to this, the Belgrano

remained in deep water ideal for the nuclear submarine following it. Had it moved

north onto Burdwood Bank to the south of the Falklands, where the waters were just

150 feet deep, the submarine would have been far less able to keep up without leaving

a clear wake of disturbed water on the surface. To follow at a speed of 25 knots, a

nuclear submarine such as Conqueror had to stay at least 200 feet deep.750

Although there was an Argentine claim that one of their submarines, the San Luis,

attacked a British ship, none of the Task Force vessels were damaged. The claim is

regarded with scepticism by Woodward who is surprised that they did not make a

positive sighting or definite classification while undertaking the attack or even of any

British ship during the campaign.751

749 Woodward, 2003, p. 243.750 Ibid., pp. 210-11, 220-1.751 Ibid., p. 197.

240

Argentine submarines were not only to fail to sink a single British warship but were

themselves to sustain a casualty to British ship-launched helicopters. On 25 April, the

British attacked an Argentine Guppy class submarine, the Sante Fe, heading out of

Cumberland Bay, South Georgia. Three sea-launched Lynx helicopters attacked with

depth charges, torpedoes, a missile which destroyed the vessel’s conning tower and

machine guns. The submarine managed to head inshore but only for it to be

beached.752

In addition to its vulnerability to Argentine aircraft, British sea power was at further

vulnerability with regard to the need to undertake an amphibious landing. While an

attacker is at a disadvantage to a defender on land, the drawback of attacking a

defended coastline is even greater. To be sure, the Falklands case study, unlike the

Boer or Gulf Wars, is the only one where there was no option but to carry out an

amphibious attack in order to re-establish control over lost territory. There was no

alternative of overland attack. However, although an amphibious attack was

unavoidable, the British still tried as much as they could to use overland assault as

their means to attack the Argentines at Stanley. For this they chose a landing site far

from Stanley, providing the opportunity to take territory under their control before

launching their final assault from land rather than water.

The danger of undertaking an amphibious attack in the Port Stanley area was made

apparent later in the war by the experience of HMS Glamorgan. On 12 June it was hit

by a ship-launched version of the Exocet that had been set up on land outside Stanley.

The destroyer had been providing 45 Commando with gunfire support as it fought for

Two Sisters mountain in the early morning. Although the vessel suffered serious

structural damage it survived the attack. However, the Argentines had another three of

the missiles available. They did not get further opportunities to use them during the

remainder of the war but the incident showed how they could have inflicted casualties

upon any attempt by the British to come ashore in the area.753

With the environs around Stanley ruled out, other possibilities had to be investigated

for the amphibious attack. Away from the main town the coastline was more poorly

752 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, p. 155.753 Ibid., pp. 335-6; Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 246-7.

241

defended but it still presented difficulties. Three sites were looked at of which a

landing at the north end of Berkeley Sound to the north offered the shortest distance

to Stanley. The area of Cow Bay and Volunteer Bay further north was another

possibility. But the navy became concerned from intelligence reports that Berkeley

Sound and possibly Cow Bay were mined.754 They also feared that both were within

range of Argentine 155 mm shells.755 And there was the risk, being so close to Stanley

that the Argentines could move upon the beachhead before the British had time to put

enough forces ashore to provide it with an adequate defence. As a result, it was the

third option, San Carlos Bay, on the west coast of East Falkland, at the opposite end

of the island from Stanley, which was eventually chosen. The 50 miles distance to

Port Stanley meant it was well beyond the reach of enemy fire from the main town

and offered the least risk of an attack by Argentine forces while the landing was

taking place.756

On the night of the landing at San Carlos, 20-21 May, the British undertook

diversionary attacks in order to minimise the likelihood of the Argentines

concentrating a defence on the shoreline. These included a bombardment of the area

north of Berkeley Sound carried out by HMS Glamorgan and a barrage of machine-

gun, mortar and Milan missile fire on the Argentine garrison at Darwin, near Goose

Green. As the British entered Falkland Sound, further diversionary bombardment was

undertaken upon West Falkland.757

The British encountered few Argentine forces in the San Carlos area. The landing

initially involved taking a 20-strong Argentine position at Fanning Head, a high point

overlooking San Carlos Bay, using a party of Special Boat Squadron and SAS, aided

by salvos from HMS Antrim. A further force of 42 Argentines who were stationed at

Port San Carlos brought down two British helicopters, a Gazelle reconnaissance and

attack craft and a Sea King, before managing to flee the area.758

754 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 213-4.755 Woodward, 2003, p. 259.756 Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 213-4.757 Ibid., pp. 226-7.758 Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 147-8.

242

With the coastline quickly brought under British control it could be used as a means

of defending ships against Argentine air power. Ships were moored so that Argentine

aircraft coming in across the hilly surrounding land had difficulty lining up for attack.

Further protection came from hills obscuring the view from Falkland Sound. As a

result, aerial attack upon vessels in the Sound did not necessarily hinder activities in

the Bay.759

Even so, the British foothold on East Falkland was a precarious one. Despite the

success of the initial landing, the process of getting more than 10,000 tons of supplies

on to land at San Carlos meant that it was six days before the bulk of the forces could

move out their initial lodgement. This was more than enough time for the Argentines

to counterattack by air and by land.760

One difficulty is that the success of sea basing is put at added risk by the vulnerability

of supply vessels. Civilian craft in particular, commandeered to maximise the

resources available to the attacker may not be capable of their own defence, as was

demonstrated by the sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor. The Argentines made an

important mistake during the San Carlos landing by emphasising attack upon the

warships. This allowed transport vessels, including the Canberra on the first day, to

continue sending their troops and supplies ashore. Had the Argentines made a

determined effort to hit those ships they could more easily have hindered the landing.

They were, in Admiral Woodward’s words, “there for the taking” and in failing to do

so they “screwed this operation up very badly indeed”.761

Another threat to the British position could have come from a strike out of Argentine

troops from Stanley. But despite superior numbers at the other end of the island, their

helicopter-borne reserve was made of just one infantry company. Although the British

had their own shortage of helicopters with a total of more than 200, the Argentines

had just 26. The British were fortunate in their enemy’s lack of mobility. In addition

to this, the Argentines wrongly assessed that the landing was smaller than it was.

They believed it involved less than a brigade.762

759 Middlebrook, 2001, pp. 216, 221, 226760 Ibid., p. 237.761 Woodward, 2003, p. 374.762 Middlebrook, 2003, pp. 64, 166.

243

Amphibious attack was considered again for the attack on Goose Green. But with the

British already on land, this time they had a choice between attacking overland and

attacking from the sea. Attack from the sea was discounted. Major Southby-Tailyour

provided the Paras with his reckoning that there was only a 50/50 chance of success

for a landing from the sea owing to kelp and submerged rocks on the approach.763

Again, basing at sea was shown not to be an equivalent to that on land.

763 Middlebrook, 2001, p. 254.

244

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The Loss of Strength Gradient, and therefore forward basing, was as important at the

end of the 20th century as it was at the beginning. Boulding was wrong to assume that

the Gradient, which he himself identified, should have undergone decline during this

era. Others, including the Bush administration, are likewise also wrong to assume that

proximity has become less important in war except only on a temporary basis.

This work has investigated the two lines of attack upon the continued importance of

the Loss of Strength Gradient. Both arguments relate to what Boulding called a

“military revolution” in the 20th century, regarding a reduced cost of transport and an

increased range of the deadly projectile. One of those arguments is that transport has

become easier and quicker so reducing the difficulty of moving forces over a given

distance. The other is that air and missile power have reached a position where they

have become strategic, thus removing need for heavy ground forces.

This work has also investigated a further argument that forward basing has become

increasingly difficult to carry out because of enemy threats and the reluctance of other

states to host them. Although not affecting the slope of the Gradient these would

mean that the advantages of forward locations implied by the Boulding diagram could

not be realised.

This work has found that none of these lines of attack had a permanent affect upon the

LSG and the advantage of forward basing during the 20th century. The reason was to

be found in enduring factors in warfare. These were the competitive nature of war and

the fact that no state can maintain superiority over other states indefinitely.

It was found that the cost of transport does not make forward positioning any less

important. This is, in part, because it was found to possess proportional relationships

with items carried over time, with the result that reductions in the cost of transport are

paralleled by reductions in the cost of items supplied. The competitive nature of war,

furthermore, means that any advantage from the reduction of such costs is offset by an

increased load as both sides compete to get as much as possible to the front line. The

245

result is that the advantage of a shorter distance from a location near to a conflict zone

compared to a longer distance from a location further away remains the same over

time.

The advantage of forward basing can be reduced by greater speed of transport. The

advent of airlift in the 20th century greatly increased the speed at which it was possible

to respond to a circumstance across the globe, thereby reducing the benefit from using

forward locations. But this advantage could occur only temporarily. Airlift is much

more expensive and can carry far less than surface modes of transport. It is therefore

only able to provide advantage where one side is much better resourced than its

opponent, a situation that no side can expect to retain in all circumstances indefinitely.

Meanwhile, sea transport, the only alternative means of global reach, witnessed little

increase in speed over this time.

It was found that strategic air power could eliminate the need for forward located

ground forces but that this could only be of occasional occurrence. It looks possible

that this occurred in the Kosovo War of 1999, but this was an exceptional

circumstance both because of the political nature of the regime involved as well as the

fact that a match between such uneven sides cannot always occur. The only other

demonstration of strategic air power occurred with the nuclear attacks upon Japan in

1945, a weapon whose further use is hindered by ethical considerations and the

danger of self destruction when used against another nuclear armed state as well as,

on a sufficient scale, the possibility of global devastation.

It was found that forward bases had not come under greater risk from enemy threats.

The competitive nature of warfare means that such threats, whether from conventional

state actors or asymmetric non-state actors, are not becoming any more of a problem.

Competition was found even to be a factor countering a perceived increased

reluctance on the part of allies to host forward bases. The competitive nature of

warfare means that states will seek others to help them, provided they do not

themselves also pose a threat. The competitive nature of politics, in addition to the

existence, in some cases, of shared beliefs and ideologies, as well as bonding resulting

from the continued existence of third party threats, also serves to provide states with

an incentive to support forward basing. As a result, one can see little change in the

246

degree to which countries have been willing to host another’s forward bases over

time.

Evidence that forward basing, and therefore Boulding’s Loss of Strength Gradient,

was of continued importance came from analysis of three case studies from across the

century. The first two were the Boer War of 1899 to 1902, and the Gulf War of 1990

to 1991. Each was chosen as an example of a superpower, Britain in the former, the

United States in the latter, with global reach at opposite ends of the 20th century. A

comparison of both allowed for analysis of whether technological advance during the

century had reduced the importance of forward basing in the face of one of the

enduring factors that was to reoccur throughout this work; the competitive nature of

war. It was found that the Gulf War provided little evidence of change to the

importance of the LSG when compared to the Boer War.

The third case study was the Falklands War of 1982, analysed because it provided an

example of a former superpower that had still retained its global reach. The choice of

Britain at the end of the 20th century demonstrated the second of the enduring factors

that was to reoccur throughout this work; the impermanence of Great Power status. It

cannot be ruled out that the United States too will face a similar scenario against a

peer competitor after undergoing relative decline. It was found that any possibility

that the LSG could be altered by greater use of speedier airlift, let alone a belief that a

Kosovo-style war might be won again solely by air power, could only be temporary.

The continuing advantage of forward locations for logistics

Boulding’s contention that there was a general improvement in the means of transport

causing a decline in the Loss of Strength Gradient was found to be wrong. Proof of

this was derived from each of the case studies. At both ends of the 20th century,

despite their global reach, both Britain and the United States still chose to obtain

much of their needs from local sources. While much of the supply load for the Boer

War was obtained in South Africa, much of that for the Gulf War was obtained in

South West Asia. In the case of the Falklands War, the British were far less able to

source supplies close to the conflict zone, being forced to operate from the sea.

247

However, where there was the chance to use locally available supplies they took it,

including not only the use of American donated fuel on Ascension, but even repair

material acquired from abandoned whaling stations on South Georgia.

That this impetus for local sourcing of supplies should reappear in conflicts at both

ends of the 20th century provides evidence of the continued advantage to be had from

the forward location and thus the continued importance of the Loss of Strength

Gradient. It occurred because the overall cost and speed of transporting logistics had

been little altered over this time.

That the cost of transport should not affect the LSG is due to the fact that it possesses

proportional relationships with the costs of the supplies carried over time. This means

that if its price falls, so the price of the items it carries also have a tendency to fall.

Moreover, as the prices of both fall, so the competitive circumstances of war mean

that advantage will be taken of the falling costs to send more supplies. The result of

this is to neutralise any easing of transport such that geographic distance retains its

importance as a hindrance to movement.

Evidence of this was presented in Chapter 2. Figures from the latter half of the 20th

century showed that in the commercial world the average distance travelled by

internationally traded goods, via land, sea and air, had remained constant at around

3,000 miles. Further evidence was presented to show that civilian traded goods costs

have an enduring proportional relationship with transport costs over time. The

relevance of commercially traded goods was shown in each of the case studies, which

confirmed that civilian items were of considerable importance in war. Fuel was an

important example of this, whether coal in the Boer War or oil-derived fuels in the

Gulf and Falklands Wars. Other items included transport equipment, construction

materials and food.

Another proportional relationship shown in Chapter 2 was that of transport costs with

pre-paid supplies. It is because the cost of such items is zero that they maintain a

constant relationship with transport costs regardless of any changes over time. Such

supplies were important in all three case studies. In the case of the Boer War, most

guns and much of the ammunition had been bought before the conflict. In the cases of

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the Gulf and Falklands conflicts, all but a few exceptional items had been bought

prior to the conflict. The Americans in 1990-91, as well as the British in 1982, could

rely upon the resources they had built up in anticipation of conflict with the Soviet

Union.

A further proportional relationship was also discussed in Chapter 2, although this was

of little relevance when comparing the case studies. Kennedy has argued that military

manufacturing is becoming increasingly divergent from the civilian and that it is

experiencing an “upward spiral” in costs. But this divergence is a result of short

production runs prevalent in peacetime conditions pushing up manufacturing

expenses, which need not be experienced when longer production runs are needed for

wartime requirements. Evidence for the phenomenon was observed by this work not

only in the late 20th century but also in the Boer War case study. Even so, military

production costs were of little bearing in either the Gulf War in 1990-91 or the

Falklands War in 1982. In both cases, for the most part, the United States and Britain

could draw upon pre-existing stocks.

The speed of transport was found to have had only a limited effect upon the LSG.

Speed is important because the faster that a given location can be reached, the greater

the chance a reduced load can be used to defend it rather than have to reconquer it

with an increased load later. It also provides an increased opportunity to use time

windows provided by weather or by political conditions.

Speed had indeed increased during the 20th century. Airlift had made it possible to

transport supplies across the world in a matter of hours which at the beginning of the

century took a matter of weeks. Yet the overall pace at which logistics could be

delivered had been little altered. Hallion was wrong to argue with regard to the Gulf

War that airlift had proved critical as a means of delivering combat strength, a

situation confirmed even more so with regard to the Falklands War. The reason for

this was that sealift continued to dominate in the conflicts at the end of the century as

it had at the beginning and its speed had little improved, having hit limits imposed by

physics.

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As speed on water is increased so there is a disproportionately rapid increase in the

thrust required for propulsion. This is observed especially at speeds upwards of 25

knots. A ship will need more than double the horsepower only to increase its speed to

29 knots. Fast sealift ships capable of such speeds were therefore the exception rather

than the rule in the conflicts looked at in the late 20th century.

As a result, the fastest ships used by the British in the Boer War could have outraced

most of the supply ships used in the Gulf and Falklands conflicts. The 20 knot

Majestic, which set a trans-Atlantic record in 1891, could have outraced every one of

the Maritime Prepositioning Ships that sailed from Diego Garcia and the Mariana

Islands for the Gulf War. Most supply ships sent to the Falklands would also have

failed to outrace this vessel which was built in the previous century.

Improvement in speed had occurred on land. At the beginning of the 20th century the

British were forced to rely upon animals for the final journey from railhead to front

line. The introduction of mechanised road transportation during the century did away

with animal transport. Yet here too, it was found that there were limits to speed

imposed by physics for road transportation, as well as for rail. Moreover, in all three

case studies, land transport amounted only to a very small proportion of the total

distance. The interconnected oceans allowed for global transit impossible by land

alone.

Airlift was much faster than sealift. The problem was that it cost too much and

delivered too little. In the first month of the Gulf logistics effort, it moved just 7.4

percent of the total transported by the US, and in the second month just 8.3 percent. It

was sealift, as well as locally sourced supplies, that were relied upon to create a

defence against a possible Iraqi advance into Saudi Arabia. It was prepositioned ships

at Diego Garcia, not the airlift, which Pagonis described as “lifesavers” in the first

few weeks of the operation. For the war as a whole, airlift was responsible for

approximately 10 percent of supplies brought in by the US from outside South West

Asia.

There were exceptional circumstances in this war, without which there would have

been pressure to rely even less upon airlift. The financial circumstances of the war

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eased the expense of this mode of transport. The United States managed to spend

$2.37 billion on the airlift, which was more than half the total $4.57 billion spent on

transport during the whole campaign. But the burden of paying for this was alleviated

by the fact that the US received considerable financial as well as in kind support from

other countries. Financial pledges for the campaign, principally from the Gulf, Japan

and Germany, amounted to $55 billion. In addition to this was the fact much of the

supply requirement for Coalition forces was sourced within the region. Had this not

been possible, the burden placed on US transport modes would have much higher.

The United States and its allies were also faced with a smaller opponent which they

could easily outmatch in terms of logistics effort. No state can assume that it will

always face opponents smaller than itself, a situation made more likely by the

impermanence of Great Power status. It is less likely that it will be able to afford to

divert such financial resources towards airlift, faced with a more comparably sized

opponent, when sealift can deliver a greater load more cheaply.

Certainly, when the US faced the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, forces deployed

there were light enough to be able to rely on airlift. But while such a capability

increased the vulnerability of the regime, thus supporting Boulding’s view that the

minimum viable size of a state had undergone increase, one will not always face such

small opponents.

The British could not afford much reliance upon airlift during the Falklands War. It

constituted only a very small proportion of the load, at less than 1½ percent of all

supplies moved as far as Ascension Island. And at that point, most airlifted items had

to be reloaded onto ships for the remainder of the journey. The British did not have

allies who were prepared to pay for much of the cost of the war. They were unable to

source much of their supplies from the South Atlantic, so placing much more of the

logistics burden upon their transport modes. And the 20th century had seen the country

subjected to the impermanence of Great Power status. Argentina was a country they

could be less certain of defeating. Faced with the need to get everything they possibly

could to the South Atlantic, they could not afford the luxury of a transport mode that

delivered less for greater expense. As a result, the contribution of airlift was a lot

smaller in the Falklands War than in the Gulf War, let alone in Afghanistan in 2001.

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To be sure, the British also faced infrastructure constraints concerning the capacity of

Wideawake airfield on Ascension Island. But they could have found ways to increase

the size of the airlift if they had so wanted. This alone was not the prime reason that

airlift made a proportionately smaller contribution to the logistics of this conflict.

This is not to say that this work did not find airlift useful for the movement of

personnel who were largely delivered by air by the end of the 20th century. But the

impact of this upon the Loss of Strength Gradient was limited by the fact that it made

up only a very small proportion of the load. In the Gulf War, the transport load was

approximately 120 times the weight of personnel brought in. In the Falklands War the

ratio was even higher. Fuel and merchant shipped supplies were alone in the region of

1,000 times that of personnel.

The Pentagon’s policy of expanding use of austere Forward Operating Bases or ‘Lily-

Pads’, prepositioning equipment and supplies while troops are flown in when

required, was investigated. It was found that this rests on an assumption that the

threats these would counter are increasingly of the asymmetrical variety. A state

cannot assume that it will always face opponents much smaller than itself, a situation

made more so by the impermanence of Great Power status. Nor will opponents be

more easily handled by precision warfare, another of the assumptions used, a situation

countered by the competitive nature of war as was found in this work’s later analysis

on air power. Heavy ground equipment will still be needed and this cannot be easily

separated from the personnel that need to train with it, as was demonstrated by the

forward basing of NATO troops in Germany throughout the Cold War.

This work also investigated the extent to which forward located transport

infrastructure continued to be necessary for the avoidance of bottlenecks in the

movement of logistics. With the competitive nature of warfare causing every effort to

be made to get supplies forward, it was found to be of continued importance across

the century. The Boer War necessitated the use of port facilities and railways as well

as the construction of additional rail infrastructure within South Africa. The reliance

upon this was shown by the increased supply difficulties had as a result of the

overland march to Bloemfontein, away from the railway system. The Gulf War

likewise required the use of ports as well as airfields within South West Asia and

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additional road construction. The importance of existing infrastructure was shown by

the fact that Schwartzkopf’s ‘Left Hook’ manoeuvre, across the desert west of

Kuwait, was made possible because the existence of the Tapline Road.

The Falklands War, meanwhile, demonstrated the difficulties of a deficient transport