The Collapse of the Israeli Intelligence's Conception: Apologetics, Memory and History of the Israeli Response to Egypt's Alleged Intention to Open War in May 1973

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The Collapse of the Israeli Intelligence'sConception: Apologetics, Memoryand History of the Israeli Response toEgypt's Alleged Intention to Open Warin May 1973Yoav Gelber

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ARTICLE

The Collapse of the IsraeliIntelligence’s Conception:

Apologetics, Memory and Historyof the Israeli Response to Egypt’sAlleged Intention to Open War

in May 1973

YOAV GELBER*

ABSTRACT This article attempts to contradict the commonly accepted assumption inIsrael and the West that in April–May 1973 Egypt and Syria were about to open waragainst Israel and were deterred by a series of measures that Israel took, includingpartial mobilization of the Israel Defence Force (IDF) reserves. The article ventures toseparate the apologetics and (flawed) memories from the information provided by thenow available documentary evidence. After presenting the prevailing Israeli version, thearticle analyses the memoirs on the Egyptian side about the preparations for war anddetermining D-Day, to refute this version. Based on the contemporary protocols ofgovernment and general staff meetings and political-military consultations, it arguesthat the Israeli government, general staff and intelligence community did not regard atthe time the outbreak of war as an imminent threat. The steps they took concerned the

*Email: [email protected]’s comment: Some of the references below refer the reader to private archives (PA).These are protocols that are still inaccessible to the public in the Israel State Archives or theIDF archives. Thirty-seven years ago they were copied for a preparatory work that I did forthe Agranat Commission and I used the copies. The commission’s materials are presentlyunder review before opening them to the public, and eventually will become accessible and itwill be possible to check them by the dates. In a few other cases I rely on the AgranatCommission’s report, which is open to the public in the IDF archives. The commission reliedon original documents that are still under review before opening them. I saw and read thesedocuments. For the purpose of future reference I mention their exhibit numbers, which willmake it easy to trace them.

Intelligence and National Security2012, 1–27, iFirst

ISSN 0268-4527 Print/ISSN 1743-9019 Online/12/000001-27 ª 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.699289

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medium and long run, and were irrelevant in the short run. Similarly, the mobilizationof reserves was not connected to the alarm of war but to the Day of Independenceparade in Jerusalem. The article claims on the basis of these protocols that the reasonfor the excitement was the collapse of the Israeli intelligence’s conception that Egyptwould not resume hostilities before it could hit at the interior of Israel, and Syria wouldnot go to war without Egypt. The arrival of Libyan Mirages and Iraqi Hunters to Egyptin April fulfilled this condition and the possibility of war could not be dismissedoffhand. Israel responded to the new situation by the book. It shared the informationand analysis with the White House and the CIA; it refreshed the IDF planning down tothe divisional level and the IDF general staff held a series of thorough discussions toestimate the situation. The bottom line of this process was a government directive tothe IDF to prepare for war at the end of the summer of 1973 (as it actually happened).In the latter portion of the article I explain why this directive was ignored when it wasput to test in late September and early October of 1973.

Israel’s Image of Egypt and Sadat

In the fall of 1972, Egypt’s President, Anwar Sadat, decided to resort to waragainst Israel and on 24 October he instructed the Supreme Council of theEgyptian army to prepare for it. For almost a year, until the outbreak of waron 6 October 1973, Israel was unaware of Egypt’s determination to go towar. This ignorance was not due so much to a successful Egyptian deception,but mainly due to the Israelis’ illusion since the end of the Six Day War thatthe Arabs acknowledged their military inferiority and despaired of defeatingIsrael on the battlefield.

The hubris was not limited to the Israel Defence Force (IDF) and thepolitical leadership. With very few exceptions, it characterized the public atlarge, including academe and the media, to say nothing of the man in thestreet. Stories about the inferiority of the Egyptian officers and other ranksthat spread among the troops after the Six Day War were stamped with ascientific approval by a comprehensive psychological, sociological andpolitical study of the Egyptian prisoners of war. The research was done inthe POW camp on behalf of the Israeli military intelligence (AMAN[Hebrew initials for intelligence wing]) by a team of university experts inthese fields. The academics wrote in their final report that the examinedtopics were dynamic and likely to change with time. The sponsors of thestudy, however, preferred to adhere to the static picture of mediocrity thatemerged from the findings and characterized the Egyptian army of 1967.1

The War of Attrition in 1969–1970 that might have disillusioned theIsraelis did the reverse. Most Israelis interpreted its outcome as anachievement: the IDF found proper responses to the Egyptian initiativesand forced a ceasefire through the bombing of targets in the Nile valley anddelta. The Egyptians felt the opposite way, and the army’s Chief of

1Aman’s document titled ‘The Egyptian POWs of the Six Day War – A Summary ofPsychological, Sociological and Political Studies’, April 1972, quoted in Yossi Ben-Ari, ‘TheInput of Academic Experts to the Shaping and Dissemination of the Israeli Perception of theArab-Israeli Conflict from the End of the War of Attrition (August 1970) to the Yom KippurWar (October 1973)’, unpublished PhD dissertation (University of Haifa 2004) pp.107–122.

2 Intelligence and National Security

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Operations, General Abdel Ghani Al-Gamasy, remarked that ‘Egypt’soverall military and political situation by the end of the War of Attrition wasbetter than it was at the beginning’.2

The Israeli intelligence community, experts on Middle Eastern affairs inthe academe and political leaders also belittled Egypt’s new ruler, AnwarSadat, who succeeded Gamal Abd Al-Nasser following his death inSeptember 1970. Sadat was an enigma to the Israelis. When he seizedpower, AMAN prepared an unfavourable personal profile that portrayedNasser’s successor as intellectually low-level, narrow-minded and lackingindependent political thinking; a mediocre statesman. The profile depictedhim as ignorant, devoid of talent and unable to make a contribution to theconduct of policy, and summed up: ‘Sadat has no skills of politicalleadership and basic qualifications for really holding the reins of governmentand for being accepted in Egypt as a leader and the heir of Nasser’.3

The author of this profile was Prof. Shimon Shamir, then a reserve officerin AMAN’s research department, a leading academic expert on Egypt, andlater Israel’s ambassador to Egypt and Jordan and a biographer of Sadat. Atabout the same time, AMAN gave an original handwritten piece of Sadat(without disclosing the writer’s identity) to a graphologist, who gave a farmore accurate profile of his anonymous subject.

Israeli analysts also played down the significance of Sadat’s public rhetoric.The good access to his inner circle notwithstanding, they failed to appreciatehis resolute personality and continued to underestimate him. The chiefanalyst of AMAN at the time, Tat Aluph (Brigadier General) Arye Shalev,admitted after many years that on the basis of this underrating, ‘AMANestimated that Sadat would not make so crucial a decision as going to war’.4

The Israeli Version of the Events of April–May 1973

The common Israeli version of the events leading to the war mentions twofalse alarms before April 1973: in the fall of 1971 (emanating from Sadat’spublic rhetoric about ‘a year of decision’) and in November 1972(apparently distorted echoes of Egypt’s decision in October to go to war).On the second occasion, Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan warned thatEgypt might renew the fire at the beginning of 1973, and also stressed thecooperation and coordination between Egypt and Syria.5

2Muhammad Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy, The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshal El-Gamasy of Egypt (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press 1993) p.125.3AMAN’s document titled ‘Outlines of Sadat’s Personality’, October 1970, quoted in Ben-Ari, ‘The Input of Academic Experts’, pp.94–98.4Arye Shalev, ‘Intelligence Tested: Personal Testimony’, in Anat Kurz (ed.) Thirty YearsLater: Challenges to Israel Since the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: University ofTel Aviv 2004) p.19.5Dayan in a consultation summoned by PM Golda Meir on 1 December 1972, quoted inArieh Baron, Moshe Dayan in Milchemet Yom HaKipurim [Moshe Dayan in the Yom KippurWar] (Tel Aviv: Idanim 1993) p.17.

Collapse of Israeli Intelligence Conception 3

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In April 1973, AMAN once again received reports about an allegedintention of Egypt, and possibly also Syria, to open war in the spring of thatyear. Nonetheless, AMAN’s analysts maintained that the information wasfalse. The Egyptians, they insisted, would not resume the fighting, and Syriawould not go to war without Egypt. The apparent realization of AMAN’sassessments in April–May was a common excuse for exonerating theunanimous and unconditional acceptance of its estimates in the fall, beforethe outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. The ubiquitous explanation ofthe apologetic literature on that war (mostly memoirs and biographies basedon selective source material) portrayed the chain of events as follows.

In April 1973, when AMAN got information about Egypt and Syria’sintention to initiate a war against Israel, its chief, Aluf (Major General) EliZeira, dismissed the news. The Chief of Staff, Rav Aluf (Lieutenant General)David Elazar, firmly asserted that the threat was real and took variousmeasures to raise the level of IDF preparedness, including partial call-up ofreserves. These steps received the code name ‘Blue White’. Within a few weeksit was evident that Zeira was right and no war broke out. The reservists weresent home, and in August 1973 the IDF called off ‘Blue White’. The state ofalert and the reserves’ call-up cost a huge amount, which appeared a waste or,alternately, deterred the Arabs and justified the expenditure. However, thesecond alternative was seriously considered only in retrospect, after the war.

As the story goes on, at the beginning of September 1973 a new flow ofinformation from various sources reached AMAN, warning of an imminentwar that Egypt and Syria intended to launch in early October. Again, Zeirainsisted that the information was sham: Egypt and Syria were not going towar; the ado concerned an exercise of the Egyptian army and no more.Although the Syrian army deployed in emergency defensive positions thatcould easily become a point of departure for an offensive, Syria would not goto war alone. The Syrian moves, however, were a new variable that had noparallel in April–May. At the time no one doubted AMAN’s appraisal on thegrounds that perhaps Syria was not going to war alone, and its army’sdeployment should put a serious question mark on AMAN’s confidence thatthe Egyptian army was only exercising.

This mixture of apology and flawed memory suggested that since AMAN’sassessments had proven right in the spring, and because of the huge cost of the‘Blue White’ alert, Elazar did not overrule AMAN’s estimate of the situationin September–October. He did not take steps similar to those he had taken inApril–May, and until the last moment avoided any mobilization of reserves.Much of this line of argumentation appears in Arye Shalev’s book, publishedas late as 2006. Its main purpose was to put the blame on the politiciansrather than on the army and/or the intelligence community.6

Twenty years after the war, Zeira published his memoirs and explainedwhy in April 1973 he had estimated that Egypt and Syria were not heading

6Arieh Shalev, Kishalon Ve-Hatzlacha Ba-Hatra’ah: Ha’arachat Ha-Modi’in Likrat MilchmetYom Ha-Kipurim [Success and Failure in Early Warning: The Israeli Intelligence Assessmentstowards the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot 2006) pp.187–192.


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for war. On the one hand, he wrote, rested Sadat’s public declarations of ‘ayear of decision’ and statements of his determination to go to war if thediplomatic efforts failed. In the fall of 1972, agents’ reports reinforcedSadat’s public rhetoric. Similar information flowed in April 1973. On theother hand, since 1970, AMAN had excellent knowledge of Egypt’s view ofthe situation from reports of a very good source. This informant was recentlyexposed by Zeira as Nasser’s son-in-law, Ashraf Maruwan.7 Among othertopics, his reports described the preconditions that Egypt considered crucialfor resuming the war against Israel, and AMAN knew that these pre-conditions had not yet been fulfilled. Zeira stressed that with the passage oftime the credibility of the alarms about an imminent war diminished, whilethe reliability of Maruwan’s information increased.8

Academic studies of the 1973 War concurred with this general mode ofpresentation and reinforced it, primarily Uri Bar-Joseph’s The WatchmanFell Asleep and The Angel. He reviewed the various warnings that Israeliintelligence received until January 1973 and again in April of that year andfocused on two concrete dates, 15 and 19 May 1973, which two agentsmentioned as the D-Day for war. Bar-Joseph claimed that one of them wasAshraf Maruwan, but brought no reference. Based on my personalknowledge, I doubt very much that Maruwan was the source of any ofthese alerts. Accepting the warnings without any reservation, Bar-Josephconcluded that Egypt probably planned to start a war on the later date, 19May.9

The alleged D-Days did not attract too much attention in the first place. Inthe course of the Israeli general staff’s meeting on 14 May 1973, Zeiramentioned three other dates (5 and 7 May and 2 June). Two of them hadalready passed and none of the participants treated the third date seriously.10

Contrary to the Israeli retrospective consensus on Egypt’s allegedintention to open war in April–May 1973, there is no similar agreementabout the reasons that caused Sadat to back off and postpone the campaign.A common explanation ascribed the retreat to the precautions taken by theIDF, first and foremost the call-up of reservists. Tat Aluf (Brigadier General)Yoel Ben-Porat, who in 1973 commanded AMAN’s SIGINT unit and laterdevoted many years to study the reasons behind the Israeli intelligence’sfailure to sound the alarm, assigned the delay to the summit meetingbetween Nixon and Brezhnev on 12 June 1973. The Soviets, he maintained,prevailed on Egypt and Syria to suspend the war until the summit was

7Verdict of Supreme Court Judge Theodor Or, the arbitrator in the libel lawsuit of Zeiraagainst the former chief of the Mossad, Zvi Zamir, for accusing Zeira of disclosing the agent’sidentity, Private Archive (hereafter PA). Meanwhile, following the revelations, Maruwan diedmysteriously in London in 2006.8Eli Zeira, Milchemet Yom Ha-Kippurim: Mitos Mul Metziut [The Yom Kippur War: Mythvs. Reality] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Acharonot 1993) pp.85–88.9Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources(New York: State University of New York Press 2005) pp.66–67.10Protocol of the IDF’s General Staff meeting, 14 May 1973, PA.


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over.11 Some scholars, such as Yoram Meital and Moshe Ma’oz, claimedthat the reason was Hafiz Assad’s request from Sadat to delay the war untilthe Syrian army was ready.12

The Egyptian Version

In contrast to the Israeli interpretation of the events of April–May 1973 andthe general consensus about their meaning, the Egyptian literature on thewar hardly mentions that period. None of the Egyptian authors of memoirsreferred to any intention to go to war in May 1973. In their books, thepreparation of the war is portrayed as a long and tedious procedure thatmatured toward the end of August 1973.13

Egypt’s ambition to re-occupy Sinai went without saying, but since 1968the Egyptian army’s leaders had hesitated to undertake it and blamed theRussian restrictions on re-arming Egypt for their inability to launch anoffensive against the IDF. They satisfied themselves with the War ofAttrition in 1969–1970, and after the ceasefire agreement Egyptbombarded the Russians with requests for more advanced weaponsystems. At the beginning of 1972, Sadat went twice to Moscow andpleaded to the Russian leaders to replenish and upgrade the Egyptianarsenal. In May 1972, Marshal Grechko, the Soviet minister of defence,visited Cairo and signed an arms deal that included SAM-6 mobile anti-aircraft missiles, T-62 tanks and Sukhoy-22 aircraft. The supply’stimetable spread over the rest of 1972 and the whole of 1973. Six weekslater, in July, Sadat announced his decision to send the bulk of the Russianpersonnel in Egypt back home.14

Three months after the expulsion of the Russians, on 24 October 1972,Sadat convened the supreme council of the armed forces to announce andexplain his decision to go to war with the means at Egypt’s disposal. Twodays later, he purged the generals that expressed reservations about hisdecision, first and foremost the minister of defence, General Sadek. Theywere replaced with officers loyal to Sadat and ready to implement what wasseen at the time as a risky gamble.

In October 1972, preparations for war began in earnest. Sadat defined thewar aims and the general staff translated them into military objectives. De-tailed planning progressed based on a thorough study of what the Egyptians

11Yoel Ben Porat, ‘Ta’ut Be-May Ve-Hafta’a Be-October [An Error in May and a Surprise inOctober]’ Ma’arachot 299 (1985) pp.2–9.12Yoram Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967–1977 (Gaines-ville: University Press of Florida 1997); Moshe Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995).13Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Ballantine Books1976); el-Gamasy, The October War; Hassan El Badri et al., The Ramadan War (NewYork: Hippocrene Books 1978); Saad El Shazli The Crossing of the Suez: The OctoberWar, 1973 (San Francisco: American Mideast Research 2003).14El Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, pp.155–156.


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perceived – to a large extent, correctly – as the Israeli defence doctrine. Theypinpointed its vulnerabilities and devised solutions to the problems it posed.The war aims were modest compared to the unrealistic ambition thatcharacterized previous Egyptian planning. Sadat refused to expose his troopsto the Israeli air force and limited their advance to eight miles east of theSuez Canal, a strip that remained under the umbrella of AA missilesdeployed west of the canal.15

Egypt mobilized the full participation of Syria in the war and the militaryand/or financial backing of other Arab countries. Relations with Russia thatsuffered a setback in the summer of 1972 improved. Another major armsdeal, including SCUD missiles, MIG-23 aircraft, Sager anti-tank missiles,modern personnel armoured carriers, more AA missiles and heavy artillerywas completed and signed in March 1973. In April, the military aidpromised by several Arab countries also began to materialize.16

Determining D-Day

According to the Egyptian official history of the war, as early as 21 March1973 D-Day was determined as 6 October, the day the war actually brokeout.17 This was true as far as staff work was concerned, but it still requiredthe concurrence of the higher military echelons, as well as Sadat andAssad’s approval, which was given tentatively in early April and finally inSeptember 1973.

General Gamasy, who before and during most of the war was the directorof the G branch of the Egyptian army’s general staff, until he succeededGeneral Shazli as CoS on 20 October 1973, devoted an entire chapter of hismemoirs to the problem of determining D-Day. The official historyunderscored the scientific accomplishment in exploring the tide and ebb,the strength of the water flow in the Canal, the differences betweenthe various seasons and the effects of the moon.18 Gamasy added threefactors that had not been mentioned in the (originally) 1974 book: thefasting of Yom Kippur, the Israeli elections to the Histadrut (in September)and the Knesset (scheduled for late October 1973) and the month-long fastof Ramadan that overlapped the Jewish holidays and was supposed to boostthe Egyptian soldiers’ morale and stamina.19

Gamasy’s addenda appear as a kind of retro-active activism or, worse, asplain ignorance. If the Egyptians planned to launch a surprise attack, theDay of Atonement was the worst possible choice to launch it. This is the onlyday of the year in which most Jews (namely IDF reservists) would be at their

15El Badri et al., The Ramadan War, pp.18–23; Danny Asher, Li-Shbor Et Ha-Konzeptzia[Break the Conception!] (Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot 2004).16El Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, pp.197–199.17El Badri et al., The Ramadan War, p.25.18Ibid., pp.34–41.19el-Gamasy, The October War, pp.179–181.


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homes or in the synagogue; the empty roads would be clear of any traffic,and conditions of mobilization would be ideal. Had the Egyptian plannersknown anything about Jewish holidays they would not have chosen this day.One can only imagine with horror how the war might have developed hadEgypt and Syria started it six days later, on the long weekend of Tabernacles.Hundreds of thousands of Israelis, many of them reservists, spread with theirfamilies and friends along the Mediterranean and Sinai’s beaches, rushing atone and the same time on roads blocked by traffic jams to bring theirfamilies home before reporting at their units’ assembly centres.

According to Gamasy, by the end of March 1973 his plannersrecommended 6 October as the preferred D-Day. They did not take a lookat the Jewish calendar, and focused on the hydro-physical data. Alternativebut lesser options that had been dismissed were May and September. At thebeginning of April, Sadat and Assad met in Burgh al-Arab. General AhmadIsma’il, Egypt’s Minister of Defence, presented the alternatives and his staffofficers’ recommendations, and the two leaders approved 6 October onprinciple. This date was finally ratified at a meeting of the Egyptian andSyrian staffs in Alexandria in August 1973.20

General Shazli’s account ignores April and May as well as the Jewishcalendar. He describes the meeting of staffs in August in Alexandria, andsays that at the end of the talks the officers presented to Sadat and Assad twoalternative D-Days: between 7 and 11 September or between 5 and 10October. They asked to be notified 14 days in advance of the chosen date.The leaders preferred October, and informed the ministers of defence andchiefs of staff of their decision on 22 September.21

The Egyptian sources make no bones that Egypt did not intend to go towar in April–May 1973. After the leaders’ meeting in April, Israeliintelligence received a report from Maruwan that related to Egypt andSyria’s intention to go to war at the beginning of October. There is nomention of that piece of information in the protocols of the variousdiscussions in April–May 1973. Apparently a report that concerned animprobable war months ahead appeared irrelevant at the time, when thediscussants coped with the here and now. Only on the eve of war, Zeirarevealed that old piece of information to the cabinet.22

The Conception

In view of the wide gap between the Israeli and Egyptian narratives, whatactually happened in April–May 1973 and why? Did the IDF’s precautionsreally obstruct an attack that Egypt intended to launch in the spring andcause Sadat to back off?

20Ibid., pp.181–183.21El Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, pp.201–205.22Questions of Chaim Bar Lev and Shlomo Hillel, and Zeira’s answer, protocol of theministers’ consultation, 5 October 1973, 12.00 pm.


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The answer begins with Israel’s basic premises about the likelihood of warand the necessary preconditions for its outbreak. The conception of Israel’smilitary Intelligence consisted of two assumptions: (1) Egypt will not resumefighting before obtaining aircraft capable of hitting targets in inland Israeland/or ground-to-ground missiles of similar range; (2) although Syria iscapable of bombing in the depth of Israel, it will not go to war alone,without Egypt. These two premises guided AMAN’s appraisals of the pros-pects of war. This mode of thinking took into account quantifiable elementsand technical capabilities, but ignored elements such as motivation,frustration, despair, humiliation, determination etc.

The conception evolved after the ceasefire at the end of the War ofAttrition, and dominated the analysis and estimate of warnings of war untilApril 1973. The Israeli leaders, as well as the general public, believed thatthe Israeli Air Force (IAF) bombings of the Egyptian interior forced Nasserto stop the War of Attrition. Hence, as long as Egypt had no effective answerto the deep bombing raids, it would not start a total war and would not eventry a War of Attrition or any other limited form of hostilities. The IDFregarded an effective answer to the IAF superiority in terms of producing aparallel threat against the Israeli inland. This capacity depended on thepossession of aircraft that could fly below the radar screen, carrying asubstantial load of ammunition to the necessary distance and return backhome. A possible alternative was ground to ground missiles like the SCUDthat also could reach the heart of Israel.

After the war, Zeira maintained that AMAN had estimated the exact forcethe Egyptians needed: five squadrons of long-range fighter-bomber air-craft.23 I have not found this quantitative condition in any pre-wardiscussion or document, and I have found some evidence to the contrary.AMAN’s annual estimate of 1972 said explicitly that even a limited quantityof advanced fighter-bomber aircraft may change Egypt’s perception of itsinferiority in the air.24 Zeira’s insistence on the exact number of squadronsseems odd when presented as a precondition for war.

AMAN’s conception derived from credible knowledge of what theEgyptians thought and said, at least to their Soviet allies. The bulk of thisinformation came from Maruwan and concerned the Egyptian–Sovietnegotiations of arms deals and other bilateral issues. In these parleys,Sadat and his aides presented to their Russian interlocutors Egypt’s requi-rement for long-range jets, fighter bombers and ground-to-ground missiles.Without them, they argued, Egypt could not stand against Israel. Actually,this demand had been raised long before Sadat came to power, and Nasserhad asked the Russians to supply Egypt with an advanced arsenal since thesummer of 1967.

For several years, the Soviets were reluctant to equip the Arab countrieswith advanced weapon systems, and until March 1973 refused the requests.Only in July–August of 1973 did AMAN have full information about the

23Quoted in the Agranat Commission’s report, part III, p.61, IDF Archives, 1892/1994/1572.24Ibid., p.65. The annual intelligence estimate is the commission’s exhibit 210, still classified.


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deal that had been signed in March between the USSR and Egypt to supplyMIG-25 jets, Sukhoy-22 fighter-bombers and SCUD missiles. Some of theseweapon systems had already begun to arrive in Egypt in May.

The reports on and protocols of the Soviet–Egyptian negotiations impliedthat Egypt’s leaders did not dare to resume fighting without these and otherweapon systems. In this respect, Zeira’s assertion that AMAN’s paradigmwas based on the Egyptian way of thinking, and was not just an intellec-tual exercise of AMAN’s analysts, was sound.25 However – and it is asignificant reservation – this was the Egyptians’ way of imparting theirthoughts to the Soviets to justify their requests for modern weapons; it didnot necessarily reflect their intimate views. In October 1972, Sadat made uphis mind to go to war with the means at Egypt’s disposal, and concluded thearms deals with the Soviets several months later.

AMAN’s conception did not tumble in one fell swoop when war brokeout, but earlier and in three phases. First, Israel was unaware of Sadat’sdecision to go to war. This unawareness underscored the weakness of thefirst principle of its defence doctrine: deterrence. One doesn’t know whendeterrence stops and the adversary ceases to be deterred, and this principlehas been based on psychology and wishful thinking rather than on realism.

Second, although in Egyptian eyes the event was routine, the conceptionshould have collapsed in April 1973, when Egypt received from Libya asquadron of Mirages that met the condition of its first assumption. Thistime, Israeli intelligence had the relevant information. The military andpolitical leadership seemingly responded to the new situation by the bookand drew the right conclusions. Nonetheless, AMAN did not come out witha new conceptual framework for analyzing the prospects of war. During thethird phase, from June to October 1973, Israel fluctuated between adherenceto the old, invalid conception, irrelevant analyses of the balance of power interms of the Six Day War and unsystematic responses to new developments.

The Information

In April 1973, the first condition of the conception was fulfilled. Egyptreceived on loan from Libya a squadron of French-made Mirage-3 jets. TheIraqis sent a squadron of British-made Hunter jets. Truly, these aircraft wereobsolete models in 1973, but their technical qualifications enabled them toreach the heart of Israel in an operational flight configuration. Furthermore,unlike purchased aircraft that required a long period of absorption andtraining of air and ground personnel, these aircraft arrived in Egypt withtheir crews and could be operational quickly.

Contrary to the post-war impression that in April–May war might havebeen imminent, the excitement in Israel did not concern the possibility of animpending war, within days or weeks. The IDF chiefs did not comprehend oradmit the collapse of the conception, and no one anticipated an immediate

25Zeira, Milchemet Yom Ha-Kippurim, pp.91–92.


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resumption of hostilities. At the same time, they could not rule it out on thebasis of what the Egyptians themselves said, as AMAN had done hitherto.

On Friday 13 April, the arrival of the aircraft to Egypt surfaced for thefirst time when Dayan summoned a meeting to assess the new situation.Referring to Arie Bar On’s account of the debate, Bar-Joseph wrote thatZeira ‘assessed that the alarming information by itself and the arrival of thejets’ do not testify to Egypt’s intention to start war. Bar On, who servedbefore and during the war as Dayan’s aide-de-camp, did not mention‘alarming information’ or an arrival of aircraft, but ‘information about a bigconcentration of aircraft and operational planning’.26

On the same day Zeira briefed the Knesset committee for defence andforeign affairs. Israel’s new ambassador in Washington DC, Simcha Dinitz,told Henri Kissinger about a concentration of Arab fighter jets in Egypt.27

Two days later, on Sunday 15 April, Zeira reviewed the situation in thecabinet’s weekly meeting and told the ministers:

Apparently Egypt aims today to create an atmosphere of an imminentwar. This is done mainly to influence the [forthcoming] deliberations ofNixon and Brezhnev on the Middle East issues. Egypt wants to play therole of a desperate state on the verge of sparking off hostilities; a statecapable of getting aid from other Arab countries and starting a war.28

Zeira mentioned the arrival of the Libyan Mirages and Iraqi Hunters toEgypt. Without using the word explicitly, he alluded to a possible collapse ofthe ‘conception’:

Objectively, this addition of aircraft to Egypt cannot really change thebalance of power in the air. The Egyptians, however, may regard theincrement of Mirages as something more serious and significant than itseems to us. Especially because in the past they claimed that they hadno aircraft capable of arriving at the heart of Israel and performingwhat they call ‘deep bombing’. Today, when they have the Mirages,they may get the feeling that this is a kind of a solution.(My emphasis)29

The ‘conception’, however, did not relate to the balance of power, but to theavailability of aircraft with certain technical qualities, such as range andcarrying capacity. Owing to the loan of aircraft to Egypt, Zeira continued, thetension appeared this time more genuine than it had been on previous alerts:

Egypt’s self image as strong enough to achieve any gains by a war isdubious. The bulk of the evidence shows that Egypt does not imagine

26Arie Bar On, Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War (Tel Aviv: Idanim 1992), p.19.27Ibid., pp.20–21.28Zeira’s review at the cabinet meeting, April 15, 1973, p.9, PA.29Ibid. pp.8–9.


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itself sufficiently strong. It is unlikely that a state will go to war in orderto fail. Having said all this, it is the first time, at least in the last twoyears, that we have seen actions, not only talk. I mean the transfer ofthe Mirages and the Hunters. It is quite likely that the very transfer ofthese aircraft and the hectic preparations have some inner force thatmay cause deterioration even if there is no intention today todeteriorate the situation. (My emphasis)

And he summed up his survey:

What remains for the intelligence to do at the moment is to check [. . .]and look for additional clues and see whether this is indeed a seriousaim, or as it was several times in the past when such an atmosphere wasobserved without an earnest intention to open war.30

The only concrete evidence was the news of the Libyan Mirages and the IraqiHunters’ arrival in Egypt.

Zeira, Elazar and Dayan’s Appraisals

On Wednesday 18 April, Golda Meir summoned several ministers, as well asthe chiefs of the army and the intelligence community, to a consultation ather home in Tel Aviv. Dayan opened the session, explaining that its purposewas to estimate the situation and consider the prospects of war. The firstspeaker was Zeira, who repeated his observation in the cabinet that, unlikeat the end of 1972, this time there were signs of concrete preparations on theArab side.31 He did not relate explicitly to the arrival of the aircraft, but bythe same token he did not specify any other evidence (dates and SIGINT orother reports about an atmosphere of war). At this meeting as well as inprevious and following discussions in which he referred to it specifically,Zeira probably meant the arrival of the Mirages and Hunters.

The discussion focused on the probability of Egypt renewing the fighting,not imminently, within days or weeks, but as a matter of principle. Zeiradescribed the Egyptians’ three alternative modes of renewed hostilities: (1) alimited war of attrition, mainly shelling of the IDF positions in Sinai; (2) anextended war of attrition, combining artillery fire with small warfare –commando raids and ambushes on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal; or (3)a crossing of the Suez Canal and a total war. In his opinion, the chancesstood in direct relation to scope: he ascribed the highest probability to thefirst alternative, and the lowest to the third one. Zeira also stated thatAMAN could not undertake to provide an early alert on the first and secondalternatives. On the third, however, ‘we shall know a few days in advance’.32

30Ibid., pp.10–11, PA.31Protocol of a consultation at the prime minister’s home, 18 April 1973, p.1, PA.32Ibid., pp.2–3.


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The question of early warning was crucial. During the preparation of theIDF’s annual estimate of the situation in June 1972, arguments broke outabout AMAN’s ability to provide it and how early it could be given. Deputychief of staff Aluf Israel Tal asked Zeira’s predecessor, Aharon Yariv, for awritten estimate of AMAN’s capability of providing an early alert. Yarivundertook to provide 24 hours’ warning of limited Egyptian operations. Fora major operation he promised a warning of 4–6 days in advance, and for anall-out war, including air operations, the warning extended to 6–7 days.AMAN did not undertake to provide an early warning of Syrian moves or ofcoordination between the Arab armies.33

Appearing before the Knesset committee for defence and foreign affairson 18 May 1973, Zeira refused to commit himself with regard to the detailsof an Egyptian war plan. He said that AMAN’s ability to provide the place,timing and method was limited. Zeira insisted that the crossing of the canalcould not be carried out in surprise and for this contingency he promised togive an early warning.34 After the war, Zeira claimed that his commitmentrelated to 48 hours and not ‘a few days’, and it concerned the collection ofevidence but not its interpretation. He had not made these distinctions inhis reports to the general staff, the Knesset and the government in April–May 1973.35

Let’s go back to the consultation on 18 April. Assessing the chances thatEgypt would start a total war, Zeira repeated his commitment to a few days’warning, and added:

The Egyptians fear that on any small action we shall retaliate againstthe interior of Egypt. They are afraid of the consequences of deepbombing raids to their regime [. . .] Possibly, however, their belief thatwe shall respond with a major operation even on a small action on theirpart, may bring them to the logic that if anyhow Israel will hit themhard, why start with small actions? Better launch right away a largescale one. Within the boundaries of their lack of reason – this will be areasonable step, but we shall know about it a few days in advance. (Myemphasis)36

Since the jets came from Libya, some participants regarded Mu’amarGhadafi as the warmonger, and asked if he could also push Syria into aconfrontation. Zeira retorted: ‘Syria has no intention of starting war. TheGolan Heights are not so important to the Syrians, and I also think that Sinai

33Israel Tal’s second testimony to the Agranat Commission, 13 January 1974, IDF Archives,pp.3040–3041. AMAN’s letter of 16 June 1972 is in the commission’s exhibit no. 209 and isstill classified.34Protocol of the Knesset committee for Defence and Foreign Affairs, 18 May 1973, ISA,p.31, PA.35The Agranat Commission report, pp.148–153, IDF Archives 1892/1994/1572.36Protocol of a consultation at the prime minister’s home, 18 April 1973, PA.


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is not so important to the Egyptians’.37 This slip of the tongue was not theresult of any information or analysis, but reflected the psychology,personality and hidden wishes of the Israeli chief of military intelligenceand the person responsible for preparing Israel’s national assessment ofintelligence.

The exchange of ideas, beliefs and appraisals at Golda Meir’s ‘kitchen’uncovered differences among Dayan, Elazar and Zeira’s estimates of theprospects of war. After the war, all three elaborated on their disagreements.At the consultation, however, the differences seemed narrower. Zeirareferred to the warning signs:

We find more signs showing that [Sadat] is not preparing for war thanevidence that he gets himself ready [. . .] Every day and every hour welook for forewarning clues, and at this stage we have not found anyevidence of preparations for a large scale campaign.38

Zeira was right. Nothing along the frontlines suggested an imminent war. Astudy made after the war by a joint team of reserve officers on behalf of theAgranat Commission and AMAN showed it clearly. The team examined allAMAN’s evidence of Egyptian activities on both sides of the frontline alongthe Suez Canal during two periods: April–May and 1–5 October 1973. Theydivided them into groups and sub-groups according to the nature of theactivities (i.e. reinforcing the troops along the front, improving down slopesto the canal, tanks taking positions on the ramps, commanders’ visits offront positions and reconnaissance along the canal, the volume ofcommunications with agents in Sinai etc.). After the war, these activitiesbecame the nucleus of AMAN’s method of examining daily ‘forewarningclues’ to the probability of an impending war.

In all the examined parameters, the volume of activity in April–May wasbetween half and a third of its volume on the eve of the war. Similarly, theEgyptian order of battle in the front grew from April to October by onemechanized division, one armoured brigade, one marine brigade, 54 fieldartillery batteries and 57 AA batteries. Unfortunately, there is no similarwork on incidental random periods in 1972 or 1971 that could showwhether this was (in April–May 1973) the routine volume of activity or if itwas a continuous and lengthy process of intensification that culminated onthe eve of war.39

37Ibid.38Ibid.39The Agranat Commission report, pp.103–104. The team included three retired officers:Colonel Yehoshua Nevo, a lawyer who had been a paratrooper battalion commander in the1950s; Lt. Colonel D. Ambar; and Lt. Colonel Avshalom Shmueli, who in the early 1950sbegan his career as agents’ operator, and later was head of the current activities section inAMAN. After his retirement from the IDF he became a professor of geography at theUniversity of Tel Aviv.


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Hinting to the arrival of the Libyan and Iraqi jets, Elazar maintained thatit was irresponsible to ignore the possibility of war:

Of all the deals that I remember since August 1970 [the end of the Warof Attrition] – this is the most serious and as a point of departure weshould assume that war may break out. I do not dispute AMAN’sanalysis. There are many unreasonable points, and the chances ofsuccess – on their part – are dubious and baseless, but there is internallogic in favor of war [. . .] In my opinion, shaping a conception that warcan get them out of their dire situation is a feasible proposition.40

By that time, AMAN knew the D-Days reported by Mossad’s agents.Nevertheless, they were not discussed at the consultation. Elazar did notmean an imminent war, and explained to Golda Meir:

I think that with time we shall know more. We have several sources,and if they aim to fight we shall have additional confirmation. We stilllack indications. We ought to be prepared for it. It does not mean thatwe have to panic now and mobilize, but we should do staff work andpreliminary preparations. We shall supplement the practical pre-parations with more information that I suppose we shall get in time.41

This statement is reminiscent of and possibly explains Elazar’s position onthe eve of the war. When alarming information about an impending waraccumulated in the early days of October 1973, he declared a state of highalert on 5 October and dispatched regular formations to reinforce Sinai andthe Golan Heights. However, 24 hours before the outbreak of war he repliedto Golda Meir’s question about a possible mobilization of reserves: ‘Forthis, we await additional indications’.42

Dayan articulated a coherent analysis of the case for war. At the beginningof April 1973 he still thought that the test would take place in the end of thedecade.43 A fortnight later, at the consultation at the Prime Minister’s home,he changed his mind, not for the last time. Dayan reviewed the developmentsin the region since the Six Day War, concluding that the regional processesled to another confrontation: Egypt and Syria refused to sign peace treatiesand end the conflict; they had not reduced their military potential and hadnot turned resources from the military to solve their serious economic andsocial problems. Hence, they were heading to a confrontation. Dayan, too,did not have in mind an imminent war. In his view, the fundamental changeof the situation following the arrival of the aircraft in Egypt removed the

40Protocol of a consultation at the prime minister’s home, 18 April 1973, PA.41Ibid.42Protocol of ministers’ consultation, 5 October 1973 at noon, PA.43The Agranat Commission report, p.172. Dayan’s lecture at the annual senior officers’convention, on which the commissioners relied, is the commission’s exhibit 279b, stillclassified.


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option of ruling out war altogether.44 When the cabinet discussed thesituation again on 24 April, Dayan repeated his survey, summing up thatEgypt took a course leading to war and Syria would join the fighting a fewhours later.

In that cabinet meeting, Zeira shared his qualms with the ministers. Heexplained the limits of providing in advance a warning against a war ofattrition, repeated his promise that the chances of an early warning prior tothe canal’s crossing were ‘definitely reasonable’ and described the quandariesof those in charge of estimating the Arabs’ intentions:

When we deal with Arabs, their intentions and aims are always abovetheir competence [. . .] but possibly the Arab works according to hisambitions and takes no notice of his capabilities. He pursues a certainline of action and fails because he follows his intent and disregards hispotential. This is one of the Israeli intelligence’s predicaments inevaluating the intentions of the Arabs rather than their capacity.Sometimes we find out that the aspirations exceed the competence andthe question is by how much? Is it merely a facon de parleur, or will italso lead to a decision.

In response to a query of the minister of police, Shlomo Hillel, Zeira repliedthat with the lapse of time the chances of war diminished:

As long as reason prevails (in the Arabs’ limitations), this is the process:the Arabs do not estimate that they can triumph over Israel, at least inthe next few years. When they speak about opening fire, they do notexpect to occupy Sinai or to defeat Israel, but they anticipate aninternational situation that will force the world to solve the problem bypolitical means.45

Apart from exposing his bias and haughtiness, Zeira’s assessment clearlyshowed that the reason for the excitement in Israel and the unrest among itsleaders was the arrival of the aircraft to Egypt:

Notwithstanding the good sources from which the knowledgeoriginates, and despite the fact that the information concerns theMirages and Hunters and, indeed, some of the Mirages and Huntershave already arrived in Egypt, we estimate that Egypt is still aware ofthe fact that in the present balance of power it has no chances of waginga successful war against Israel [. . .] Hence we assess that at the end ofthe day the probability of restarting the war by Egypt in May is low[. . .] By the way, this time the talking is not public. We see nothing inthe field, except for two things that should not be underestimated: thetransfer of Hunters from Iraq and Mirages from Libya. There is a

44Protocol of a consultation at the prime minister’s home, 18 April 1973, pp.9–10, PA.45Protocol of the government meeting, 24 April 1973, PA.


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difference, therefore, from what happened in November-December1972. For this reason I regard the contingency [of war] as more likely,though in a very low probability. The reality is that there are twophenomena in the field while in November-December 1972 there wasnothing of the kind. (My emphasis)

According to Zeira, the only thing that actually happened in April 1973 wasthe transfer of fighter jets from other Arab states to Egypt. He agreed that‘this reinforcement of the Egyptian air force is evidently a step that triggersthe feeling that the Egyptians are capable of something and, indeed, thecabinet convenes and discusses – I mean the Israeli cabinet’.46

Arguing that low probability is nonetheless a probability, Elazar begged todiffer. In his view, the likelihood of war was indeed low, but higher than ithad been at the end of 1971 and the end of 1972. Therefore, he told theministers, several actions were imperative:

We should be in a certain level of readiness, and we are working on it.At the moment, this readiness does not include calling up reservists ormoving troops. We have many other acts to do before movingformations or mobilizing reserves.47

The ministers were apparently more affected by Zeira’s rhetoric than byElazar or Dayan. Hillel repeated almost literally Zeira’s words when heexplained Sadat’s intentions to the American Charge. Sadat, he said, mayradicalize his threats but would not open war unless he was suicidal.48

Foreign Minister Abba Eban said similar things to the Secretary of State,William Rogers. He estimated the chance that Egypt would initiatehostilities as very low.49

Sharing the Information with the Americans

On 24 April, Dinitz handed over to Henry Kissinger a memorandumsumming up the intelligence at Israel’s disposal and its appraisal. The onlyconcrete evidence that something outstanding was taking place was the newsabout the 18 Libyan Mirages, 16 Iraqi Hunters and information about theexpected arrival of additional aircraft from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Admittedly, Dinitz said, the memorandum was a combination of facts andassessments, to some extent even contradictory. The contradictions, heexplained, resulted from the gap between the information and ‘the visiblephysical situation in the area’. Kissinger remarked: ‘but you could easily

46Ibid. On the discussions and assessments in December 1972, see Uri Bar-Joseph, The Angel(Or Yehuda: Dvir 2010) pp.186–190.47Protocol of the government meeting, 24 April 1973, PA.48Zurhellen’s telegram to the Secretary of State, 9 May 1973, Nixon Library, Box 610, folder 3.49Saunders’ report to Kissinger on Eban’s conversation with Rogers, 11 May 1973, NixonLibrary, Box 610, folder 3.


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handle this?’ and Dinitz replied: ‘Easily. It is not a problem for us in themilitary sense, therefore there is low probability’.

Kissinger promised to protest against the transfer of the Libyan jets toFrance’s president, Pompidou, and to do it on a presidential level. WhenFrance had sold the aircraft to Libya, he said, Pompidou had assured Nixonthat they would not be delivered to a third party. The rest of the conversationconcerned other matters, mainly the exit of Jews from Russia.50

At the beginning of May, Golda Meir met with King Hussein of Jordanand received additional information that probably originated from the Arabchiefs of staff conference in Cairo on 21–24 April. Hussein anticipated thearrival of Algerian and Sudanese land forces to Egypt, while Morocco woulddispatch troops to Syria. Iraqi troops would concentrate on Jordan’s westernborder, ready to come under an Arab unified command. The king related toall these in future tense, except for the Libyan Mirages that were already inEgypt. In Hussein’s words: ‘A major military fiasco in the area is inevitable[. . .] this is the alarming outline of what I see’. Meir ordered Dinitz to briefKissinger and the CIA, and to ask for a corroboration of the new details.51

Hussein interpreted the process as an emerging Arab coalition andforesaw pressures on Jordan by Egypt, Syria and possibly Saudi Arabia andKuwait to join in. Dinitz admitted that the king was a known alarmist, but inthis particular case Israel also had independent information that corrobo-rated that of Hussein.

On Golda Meir’s instruction, the ambassador asked Kissinger threequestions. (1) Did the Americans have such information? Kissinger replied:‘not yet’. (2) Did Hussein pass the intelligence to Washington? Kissingeranswered that he had to check. (3) Was there a contingency that Syrian andIraqi troops would enter into Jordan against the king’s will to threatenIsrael? Kissinger opined that this was implausible before the approachingsummit meeting of Nixon and Brezhnev because of Russia’s great influenceon Syria, and Dinitz concurred.52

Unlike Hussein’s parley with Golda Meir in the end of September 1973, inMay Israel did not conceal the identity of the source from the Americans.The comments of Kissinger and Dinitz may, however, partly explain theIsraelis belittling of his warning in September and their general view of theking as an alarmist and having an axe to grind by delivering the information.

Kissinger asked Scowcroft to find out what information the Americanintelligence community had on preparations to open hostilities in the MiddleEast.53 Two days later, on 5 May, he received a personal message from

50Protocol of Dinitz, accompanied by the Minister Avner Idan, and Kissinger, accompaniedby Peter Rodman of the NSC staff, conversation on 24 April 1973, Nixon Library, Box 135,folder 5.51Hussein’s message to Meir as quoted by Dinitz to Kissinger on 3 May 1973, in PeterRodman to General Scowcroft, Nixon Library, Box 135, folder 5. Meir and Hussein probablymet on 1 May.52Protocol of Kissinger’s meeting with Dinitz on 3 May 1973, in Peter Rodman to GeneralScowcroft, Nixon Library, Box 135, folder 5.


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Hussein. Most of it is still sanitized, but the open part reiterates the king’sapprehension that ‘a fresh large scale military fiasco is to take place at anytime’. In his eyes, Syria was the main culprit. He complained that the Arabstates demanded him to put his army under the supreme command ofEgypt’s minister of defence. Of course, the king had no intention to complywith the demand, but he was afraid that the oil states – Saudi Arabia, Kuwaitand Libya – would stop their contributions to Jordan’s treasury, and heasked Kissinger for American financial support.

On 7 May, the king sent Kissinger another message. This one did notinclude information but asked for political guidance in the labyrinth of overtand covert peace-searching efforts. Kissinger did not treat the king’smessages as a warning of an impending war, and answered:

I greatly appreciate your calling to my personal attention informationconcerning the possible resumption of hostilities in the Middle East andyour own views of the pressures leading toward resumption. You maybe assured that we are watching the situation very carefully.

The rest of the reply, however, concerned other matters, mainly promises tobrief the king in due course about the Americans’ efforts to promotenegotiations of a settlement in the Middle East.54 In hindsight, theAmericans estimated that Hussein’s message came ‘at a time when he feltunder pressure from Egypt and Syria to commit Jordan to military actionagainst Israel if hostilities resumed’.55

In response to Kissinger’s urging, the CIA prepared a paper that summedup the information on Arab military activity in the past several weeks.Egypt’s statements and activities, they wrote, had gradually shifted towardpreparing for war. The most serious indicators, in addition to the loan ofaircraft, were the advancement of SA-6 AA missiles to firing sites 20 mileswest of the Suez Canal; the movement of TU-16 bombers from Aswan toCairo; a declaration of high state of alert in the Egyptian air force on 20April, accompanied by partial mobilization of reserves early in May andrelocation of several squadrons, probably to make room for the Libyan andIraqi jets; and evidence suggesting the movement of several commando unitscloser to the canal area.

One report, reminiscent of those received by AMAN, mentioned that theEgyptian general staff prepared a detailed plan for an attack across the canaland had chosen two full-moon nights as possible D-Days: 19 May and 16June. However, the CIA analysts did not believe that the plan, as describedin the report, matched up with Sadat’s objectives. Another report describedthe Arab chiefs of staff conference in Cairo in the end of April as permeatedwith ‘despair and foreboding’, due to Egypt’s determination to go to war

53Peter Rodman to General Scowcroft, 3 May 1973, Nixon Library, Box 135, folder 5.54King Hussein’s letters to Kissinger, 5 and 7 May 1973, Nixon Library, Box 137, folder 10,and Kissinger’s reply, Nixon Library, Box 137, folder 9.55Saunders’ memo to Kissinger, 3 July 1973, Nixon Library, Box 137, folder 10.


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regardless of the consequences. The paper connected this report withHussein’s warning to Golda Meir (above).

Some steps alleged to have been taken by other Arab states were believedto be in harmony with Sadat’s purpose to increase the tension in the region.These measures included the dispatch of a Moroccan unit to Syria, anAlgerian squadrons of MIG-21 to Libya and MIG-17 to Syria and anundertaking to send Sudanese troops to Syria. Most of this information camefrom Jordan in the wake of the chiefs of staff conference in Cairo.

Individually, the CIA analysts wrote, these actions did not appear to besignificant. Taken collectively, however, they suggested a pattern of actionthat could be interpreted as preparation for hostilities, but also as part of aneffort to arouse international concern and to put psychological pressureon Israel and the USA. All the Egyptians’ actions were steps they could beexpected to take in the early stages of preparing to fight.

Contrary to their Israeli colleagues, the American analysts did not estimatethat Egypt intended to occupy a broad strip of land east of the Canal that wouldstretch as far as the line of the Mitla and Gidi passes. They assessed that Sadat’saim was to take and hold for a few days some territory in western Sinai andthereby provoke outside intervention. Hence, while the ground forces for thisoperation were already deployed between Cairo and the Canal, there should befurther preparations by the Egyptian air force. The Americans were in the darkregarding the method of the Egyptian offensive and its D-Day, but, like theirIsraeli counterparts, they maintained that Sadat had not exhausted his diplo-matic efforts. He was not under domestic pressure to go to war, and was awarethat Egypt’s prospects were poor at best. Fresh disaster, they argued, ‘might wellsweep away Sadat’s regime rather than rescue him from his dilemma’.

Naturally, the Americans were concerned with the Soviets’ role in thesituation, and defined it as ‘ambivalent’. There were signs that the Soviets wereadvising Sadat against precipitate military action. At the same time, MarshalGrechko was quoted saying that the Soviets no longer have a veto over Egypt’sactions. The bottom line of the CIA appraisal was: ‘We do not believe that anoutbreak of hostilities is likely before the next UN debate, and we doubt thatSadat will decide to try a major operation within the next six weeks’.56

The Israeli Response: ‘Blue-White’ State of Alert

On 16 April, following a meeting of the general staff in which the highcommand was briefed about the latest developments, Elazar ordered a longlist of steps to increase the IDF’s readiness for war. These measures receivedthe code name ‘Blue White’.57

56Undated copy of a CIA paper titled ‘Indications of Arab Intentions to Initiate Hostilities’,Nixon Library, Box 137, folder 2.57Bar On held that the origin of ‘Blue White’ was Dayan’s guidelines to Elazar on 20 April,but the protocol of the GS meeting shows convincingly that this is inaccurate and that theinitiative came from Elazar a few days earlier.


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‘Blue White’ was not a state of alert in the sense of mobilizing, reinforcingthe fronts, changing troops’ deployment, assigning missions and other stepsrequired to face a war within hours, days or weeks. It emanated from thepossibility that war would break out in the late summer of 1973 on Egypt’s,or Egypt and Syria’s, initiative.58

The scheme consisted of a long list of measures, whose purpose was either tostop previously-decided processes that might reduce the IDF fitness for war orto accelerate other schemes that increased its preparedness. Among the steps ofthe first category was reversing a previous decision to turn a regular tankbrigade in Sinai into a reserve one. Measures of the second type includedstepping up the building of a new armoured division; rushing the production ofthe cylinders bridge for a storm crossing of the Suez Canal; advancingemergency stores of reserve brigades closer to the Golan Heights; completingthe anti-tank ditch and the minefields along the cease fire line with Syria; andbuilding an amphibious formation and transforming an infantry brigade into amechanized one. Stores of tank and artillery ammunition increased consider-ably, and the pace of tanks and artillery upgrading was accelerated. The full listincluded dozens of actions. None of them would have an effect on a war inMay, and all were bound to last for months and bear fruit in the medium andlong term. The total cost, according to Deputy CoS Tal, was 78 million IP.59

As Elazar said in the cabinet’s meeting on 24 April, ‘Blue White’ did notinvolve the calling-up of reservists.60 In his testimony to the AgranatCommission after the war, Tal, too, insisted that there was no mobilizationin the framework of ‘Blue White’.61 Yet, at the end of April 1973, anarmoured and an artillery brigade were mobilized, as well as a certainnumber of other functionaries. After the war, witnesses and analysts relatedto this draft erroneously as part of ‘Blue White’; reinforcing the troops inSinai in expectation for an impending war. However, the reason for the call-up was different. On 5 May, the 25th Independence Day of Israel, thebiggest ever military parade of the IDF marched in Jerusalem. Twoarmoured brigades, one from Sinai and one from bases in the Negev, tookpart in the procession, as well as one artillery brigade from Sinai.

The reservists were not sent to Sinai as a precaution against an imminentwar but to replace the regulars that marched in the parade. They did notreinforce but kept the order of battle in Sinai at its routine level. Since theearly 1950s, Independence Day parades had been associated with raising thelevel of the IDF readiness. In addition to the tank crews and artillerygunners, other reservists – listeners or electronic warfare technicians – werealso called because of the parade, not for pre-empting a war or deterring it.All those who were called were discharged after the parade, upon the returnof the regular units to their bases.

58The Agranat Commission’s report, p.6.59Tal’s second testimony to the Agranat commission, 13 January 1974, pp.3087–3088, IDFA.The full list is in the commission’s exhibit 212, which is still classified.60Elazar’s testimony to the Agranat Commission, p.3821, and the Commission’s report, p.95.61Tal’s second testimony to the Agranat Commission, p.3074.


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From all we know from Arab sources, Egypt and Syria had no intention oflaunching a war in April–May 1973. Israel’s cabinet, the IDF and the Israeliintelligence community also did not act as if they expected hostilities tobreak out shortly. So, what was the idea behind ‘Blue White’ and the othermeasures that were taken during those two months?

In view of the knowledge that Egypt had at its disposal aircraft capable ofarriving at the heart of Israel in low altitude below the radar screens,attacking targets and returning to their bases west of the Suez Canal, theconception as it had been formulated after the War of Attrition becameinvalid. In April 1973 and thereafter it was out of the question to dismiss thecontingency of renewed fighting along the canal in one of three modes:limited attrition, expanded attrition and total war, in this order oflikelihood.

When the challenge loomed in the spring of 1973, Israel responded by thebook. Although the probability of resuming fire immediately or shortly wasvery low in the eyes of AMAN and – their discords notwithstanding – also inthe eyes of Elazar and Dayan, the IDF embarked on a process of examiningits preparedness for war. In addition to the measures of ‘Blue White’, thisinspection involved refreshing the operational plans, both defensive andoffensive, and a thorough estimate of the situation.

The procedure of inspecting, refreshing and reaffirming the plans was alsoan opportunity to discuss in depth several issues that concerned any futurewar, primarily defining its aims. The process culminated in the presentationof the IDF war plans to Golda Meir on 9 May, and of the air force’s plans toDayan on 22 May. Differences of opinion between Dayan and Elazaremerged during the presentation to the PM, and uncovered some confusionat the top of the IDF at the time. Thus, for example, in the case of anEgyptian attempt to cross the canal, Elazar argued that Israel could affordnot to mobilize in advance because the air force would check the attack.Dayan maintained that the air force would be busy with its first priority:gaining freedom of action through the destruction of the enemy air force andanti-aircraft missiles. The armoured formations would have to destroy theinvaders without air support.62

The Government’s Directive to the Army

After completing the inspection and refreshing the operational planning atthe levels of the general staff, territorial commands and divisions andpresenting the blueprints to Meir and Dayan, the IDF general staff held aseries of debates to estimate the situation. The discussions concerned thecentral questions: when was the threat of war likely to materialize? Whatform it might take? What should be Israel’s response? How long would thewar last? How to define Israel’s war aims?

Opening the first debate with a review of current events, Zeira listed avariety of dates for D-Day that had been mentioned in agents’ reports. Most

62Protocol of the presentation of the IDF plans to PM Golda Meir, 9 May 1973, PA.


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of them were already in the past, and none of the others attracted theparticipants’ attention. One of the main controversies concerned the possibleoccupation of Cairo and Damascus. Israel Tal disputed the militancy ofElazar and most other members of the general staff, and opined that the IDFhad nothing to look for beyond the cease fire lines. Elazar retorted that ifTal’s approach prevailed, nothing would deter the Arabs from opening warbecause they had nothing to lose.63

At the end of the last session on 21 May, Dayan – who was present andlistening to deliberations – took the floor and instructed the army’s highcommand:

(1) Take into account that the war will be renewed in the second half ofthis summer;

(2) The war will start at the initiative of Egypt and Syria;(3) On the Arab side, Egypt and Syria will take direct part in combat but

Jordan will not participate. We all agree that in the territory of Syriaand Egypt other Arab countries like Libya, Iraq and Sudan, will alsoinvolve themselves [by dispatching expeditionary forces];

(4) [The general staff] should also take into account, plan and prepare apre-emptive strike [. . .] in the context of renewing the war by the Arabs;

(5) If fighting breaks out, the IDF should inflict on the Arabs anoverwhelming defeat. They should lose their armies. If the Arabs renewthe war, the IDF must now prepare such a response that will exact fromthe Arabs a heavy toll in missiles, aircraft, tanks and artillery.

(6) Make preparations for crossing the lines on both the Egyptian and theSyrian front.

(7) The war will be short [. . .] Presumably it will last a few days and then aSoviet-American intervention will force its halt [. . .] I am not opposedto preparations and plans to reach the Nile, but I overrule a schemebased on the assumption that the war will continue and we shall waitthere [. . .] Duration is one of the elements [of this war]. On the basis ofthe short time – crossing the lines for destroying [enemy] forces. If [thetroops] arrive at the Nile, the question what to do where is anoperational [not a strategic] one.

(8) The war should reduce our dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf,namely we have to expand the oil fields at our disposal, like Morganfield [opposite Sinai coast] or others [in the Gulf of Suez].

Dayan insisted that this was a directive of the Israeli government to its army:

I am speaking about this summer. I am speaking as the delegate of thegovernment, also on the basis of information. We, the cabinet, tell thegeneral staff: gentlemen, please prepare for war.64

63Protocol of a general staff discussion to estimate the situation, 14 May 1973, PA.64Protocol of a general staff discussion to estimate the situation, 21 May 1973, PA. BothBartov and Bar-Joseph ignored these guidelines and did not mention them.


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Nothing could be more unequivocal. In his memoirs, however, Zeira tookDayan’s directive out of context, deconstructed it, ignored its comprehen-sive nature and portrayed it as ‘a prophecy of war’ that the minister ofdefence himself did not take seriously. He completely disregarded thedebates that preceded Dayan’s directive (though he took a central part inthem). He modified the meaning of three clauses of the directive, the leastsignificant, by taking a few words from each and arguing that they wereDayan’s guidelines, concealing the rest of these clauses and the otherfive.65

A day after the general staff meeting, Dayan spoke in a conference of thecentral territorial command’s officers and told them that the IDF should beready for another round.66 Dayan’s critics refer to reportage in the Timemagazine of 30 July 1973, in which he ‘promised’ the interviewer that nomajor war would take place in the next decade. This is not a quotation but asentence that the journalist put in Dayan’s mouth.67 There is no certaintythat he uttered it (he denied it in his testimony before the AgranatCommission), and in any case it cannot outweigh his directive, in the nameof the government, to the IDF’s general staff.

Dayan’s directive was quite conclusive. Nevertheless, nothing happened inits wake. The appraisal of the situation and the debates of April–May 1973did not lead to any new conceptual framework in lieu of the one thatcollapsed. Dayan’s guidelines or, actually, the cabinet’s, which might haveserved as a basis of a new paradigm, were ignored. As Zeira offensively butjustifiably maintains, Dayan himself did not insist on abiding by hisinstructions precisely when his forecast materialized in September 1973. Inthe meantime, ‘Blue White’ evaporated for all practical purposes and anorder of deputy chief of staff Tal formally ended it on 12 August.

A Ship without a Compass

In the absence of a new anchor, the Israeli analysts and decision-makersacted from day to day, playing by ear. The intelligence and operationalfiasco at the beginning of October 1973 was not the result of aconception, but the outcome of serial mistakes in estimating the evolvingcircumstances without anything behind them except hubris. These errorsemanated from a total loss of sight at the top of the Israeli militaryhierarchy.

The best illustration of this blindness was Elazar’s conclusions in summingup another series of discussions to estimate the situation. The general staffheld these debates following news about Arab purchases of arms in Easternand Western Europe, including SCUD missiles and advanced aircraft (above).Actually, the arms deal had been signed in March 1973 and the SCUDS and

65Zeira, Milchemet Yom Ha-Kippurim, pp.104–105.66The Agranat Commission’s report, p.173.67Time, 30 July 1973, p.13.


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aircraft began to arrive in Egypt in May, but the scope and significance wererevealed only in August.68

In view of the new purchases, the validity of the IDF new five-year plan,Ofek (horizon) A, which was approved by the cabinet in July 1973, becamedoubtful. The estimate of the new situation began on 17 September. Itcoincided with an emergency deployment of the Syrian army, the reper-cussions of an air battle that took place five days earlier and the expectationof a Syrian retaliation.

Zeira opened the discussion with a survey of the arms deals and ananalysis of their significance. In addition, at the opening of each of the nexttwo meetings he briefed the audience on current developments along theborders. In this forum, Zeira repeated the old, now invalid, conception:

The Arabs feel and appreciate that their air power is insufficient for anychance of succeeding in a war. The principal reason is the fact that theArab fighter jets are technically incapable of arriving at the Israeliairfields in low profile and with a substantial load of ammunition.69

After the arrival of the Mirages in April 1973, this was a false presentation,but Zeira did not anticipate war before 1978, provided Israel kept itscapacity to deter the Arabs.

Elazar was more cautious, and on 1 October he concluded the series ofdiscussions: ‘I don’t think that this data critically menaces the balance ofpower, and today we should think whether we shall be able or not to win awar if it will break out in 1975/6’.70 Unfortunately, the war broke out fivedays later.

The intelligence news that accumulated at the beginning of October 1973did not bring about a swift change of Israeli assessment of the situation.Quite the opposite, the estimates delayed the effect of the incoming infor-mation. Presenting the government estimate of the military situation on 1October to Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, Dinitz did not mentionthe developments along the canal and the Syrian border, but dwelt in lengthon the Russian supply of modern weapons to the Arabs, illustrating theprevalent frame of mind of the Israeli political and military leadership.71

The CoS’s conclusion ignored the government’s directive of 21 May. Onthe eve of the war, the IDF general staff shared Elazar’s stance withoutexception or dissidence. A single dispute between Elazar and his deputy,Israel Tal, broke out on 30 September; Tal maintained after the war that thedisagreement concerned their different assessments of the war’s likelihood.

68Tal’s second testimony to the Agranat commission, 13 January 1974, pp.3063–3065, IDFArchives.69Protocol of the general staff discussion on 17 September 1973, PA.70Protocol of the general staff meeting to estimate the situation, 1 October 1973, PA.71State Department to Ambassador Keating in Tel Aviv, 3 October 1973, Nixon Library, Box610, folder 4.


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He regarded the probability as higher, and insisted on mobilizing reservesand reinforcing the Golan Heights, while Elazar dismissed his anxiety.

Actually, neither Elazar nor Tal foresaw a war in the Golan Heights. Theissue had originally been raised a few days earlier by Aluf Itzhak Hofi, thecommanding officer of the northern territorial command. Hofi doubted thatthe order of battle in the Golan Heights could respond effectively to a Syrianreprisal. The Syrians were expected to retaliate for the shooting down of 13 oftheir aircraft in an air battle two weeks earlier. After Elazar dismissed hissuggestion, Tal went to Zeira and urged him to support his plea to reinforcethe Golan Heights. Ultimately, Zeira agreed, Elazar changed his mind andtwo tank battalions and the 7th Armoured Brigade advanced HQ weredispatched to the Golan Heights and arrived there before the war broke out.72

In the case of war, the mission assigned to one of these battalions was totow the cylinders bridge to the Suez Canal and spearhead its crossing. It wasthe only battalion that had trained and prepared for this mission. Contraryto Tal’s version, its dispatch to the Golan Heights clearly showed that noimminent war was anticipated at that time either in the Golan Heights or inSinai, but a local confrontation against the backdrop of the air battle.

At that period, conformity prevailed in the IDF, and Elazar’s biographerwrote about the unanimity of opinion in the general staff:

The blindness was psychological, comprehensive, an indubitableexpression of that thinking-together of the political and defenseleadership. The triumph of the ‘low probability’ estimate of the ‘BlueWhite’ months strengthened their inclination to find proofs of thematerialization of their own prophecies.73

As I have shown, no war was about to break out in May. The lowprobability assessment did not triumph and the context was different. Thedebates at the second half of September and the first days of October 1973give the impression that they were held on the Titanic before it hit theiceberg. In non-impressionistic terms, it can be summed up as follows.

Israel’s national security doctrine stood on three pillars: deterrence, earlywarning and decision. The first collapsed at the end of 1972, when Egyptdecided to go to war. The second collapsed twice. First, when AMAN failedto provide a long-term warning on the loss of deterrence. The damage ofthis failure was not immediate but accumulated with time. Even by April–May 1973, the Arabs’ preparations for war and Sadat’s open declarationsdid not lead AMAN to the conclusion that Israel had lost its deterrence.Zeira was convinced, and persuaded his colleagues that regardless of thesupply of the Mirages to Egypt and the fall of the conception, Israel stilldeterred its enemies. He adhered to this wishful thinking until the actualoutbreak of the war.

72Tal’s third testimony to the Agranat commission, 28 January 1974, pp.3719–3729, IDFArchives.73Hanoch Bartov, Dado (Tel Aviv: Maariv 1978) Vol. 1, p.313.


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The failure to provide a long-term warning on the loss of deterrence ledAMAN directly to its second fiasco: over-confident that Israel still deterredits enemies, it failed to give an early warning on the opening of war. Thealarm was sounded a mere 10 hours before fighting broke out. At the time,the concept of ‘warning of war’ was perceived as a single, unequivocal andundeniable piece of information announcing the outbreak of war in aspecified date and hour. Such an animal has never existed. Even AshrafMaruwan’s report, which finally overcame the Israelis’ mechanism of denialand self-deception, would not have been perceived as such without theprevious background of information on the Arab armies’ moves that hadflowed to AMAN since September 1973, and the evacuation of Russianadvisers’ families from Egypt and Syria on the night of 4–5 October.

The collapse of the first two pillars inevitably led to the breakdown of thethird one. The war opened in surprise and under the circumstances the IDFfailed to accomplish a knockout. Although Israeli troops reached kilometre101 on the road from Suez to Cairo and encircled the Egyptian 3rd Army,the Egyptian 2nd Army remained on the eastern bank and threatened theIsraeli corridor leading to the bridges on the Suez Canal. Whatever theIsraelis might have thought on the final outcome of the war, the Egyptiansdid not feel defeated. They achieved their modest war aim and through themilitary campaign initiated a political process that led to the return of Sinaito Egypt. The IDF, despite its impressive tactical achievements, failed toaccomplish its conceited war aims (like denying the enemy any militaryachievement) and to prevent the Egyptian army from attaining its strategicgoal.

Notes on Contributor

Prof. Yoav Gelber is Professor Emeritus of History in the University of Haifaand the head of the Jewish Peoplehood programme in the Inter-disciplinaryCentre in Herzliya, Israel. In 1961–1975 he served as a career officer in theIDF and was the military and scientific assistant to the Agranat commissionthat investigated the Yom Kippur War. He is the author of 18 books, amongthem: Nation and History (2011); History, Memory and Propaganda (2007,in Hebrew); The Israeli-Jordanian Dialogue (2004); Palestine 1948 (2006);Independence vs. Nakba (in Hebrew, 2004); seven volumes of the History ofIsraeli Intelligence, 1918–1954 (in Hebrew, 1992–2001) and Jewish–Transjordanian Relations, 1921–1948 (1997). His current project is TheYears of Euphoria: Israeli Policy, Society and Military, 1967–1973.


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The Collapse of the Israeli Intelligence's Conception: Apologetics, Memory and History of the Israeli Response to Egypt's Alleged Intention to Open War in May 1973

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