The Civil War in Mozambique as a Case Study in The jus ad bellum Convention of Just War Theory.

PhD PROPOSALCarlos Manuel Duarte- Santos

A Follow Up To My Thesis BSc (Econ) (Honours)

University of Wales ‘Aberystwyth’ 2004

THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE AS A CASE STUDY IN THE JUS

AD BELLUM CONVENTION OF JUST WAR THEORY

BROTHERS (UP) IN ARMS:

WAS THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIFIED?

CONTENTS

I. A Personal Interest..........................7

II. Just War Theory..............................11

III. Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)

14

IV. The High Jacking of Mozambique...............16

V. The Frelimo Oligarchy Enslaves Mozambique....19

VI. Renamo: A Legitimate Representative of The People

23

VII. Rhodesia and South Africa: The Right Intention25

VIII. Peace Returns to Mozambique and The Region...32

Conclusion..........................................34

Bibliography........................................36

2

3

BROTHERS (UP) IN ARMS:

WAS THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIFIED?

A Personal Interest

The civil war in Mozambique (1976-92) between the

liberation movement Renamo and the Frelimo government,

was one of the bloodiest and longest civil wars in

Africa; with one million dead and three million

displaced people - more than half of which were

refugees in neighbouring countries, - it was a war that

happened because a people were denied the opportunity

to be free after almost five centuries of Portuguese

influence and rule. The war has also to be seen in the

context of the ‘Cold War’ prevailing at the time and

how the struggle for power between East and West that

is between Communism and Democracy was the cause of yet

another innocent bystander in global affairs sinking

into fratricidal violence.

4

My interest in the conflict, and what motivated me

to write and to propose a doctoral thesis on its moral

justification, is a very personal one.

I was born in the country on 13/10/1940 and was as

a student at the Salazar National Lyceum in the 50’s,

one of many young Mozambicans who held very strong

critical views on Portuguese colonialism.

As a result of major problems of a political nature

that I encountered with the Portuguese Education

Authorities, my parents sent me to South Africa in 1957

at the age of 17 to continue my studies and I became a

citizen of that country in the early 1960’s, to avoid

military service in Mozambique, where the Portuguese

were fighting various Mozambican liberation movements.

Many of my childhood and school friends in

Mozambique went on to become leading figures in the

various liberation movements, in particular Frelimo. To

name but a few they are the former President Chissano,

a childhood friend the former minister of information,

5

and chief party ideologue from 1975 to 1991, Dr. Jose

Luis Cabaco and many other officials.

Until 1972, I visited the country on numerous

occasions and kept in touch with most of my friends. My

visits came to an abrupt end in September of that year,

when I was detained and “tactically debriefed” at the

Machava Jail by the then Portuguese security police

PIDE1 on allegations of anti-Portuguese activities

during the 50’s and the 60’s.

Despite the independence of Mozambique in 1975 that

gave rise to great expectations of freedom, equality

and liberty, I never returned until 1989, at the time

of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The reason for my

absence was my knowledge that Frelimo, to whom the

country was handed over by Portugal, had transformed

itself (as I will argue later in this presentation),

from the original pro democracy liberation movement

under Eduardo Mondlane into a Marxist Leninist movement

under Samora Machel a great admirer of Stalin, after

the assassination of Mondlane in Dar- es- Salaam, 1966.

1 Hans Strydom ’22 Days of Terror for SA Man in LM Prison’ ’The Sunday Times Johannesburg,November 1972.

6

During the above mentioned period I kept in touch

with many former Frelimo dissidents, who became to

varying degrees members of Renamo, and in the late 70’s

early 80’s I assisted the South African security

establishment in assessing certain aspects of the civil

war, in particular the interpretation of speeches by

the Frelimo leadership.

My close friendship with many South African

journalists - in particular Al Venter2 - from whose book

I quote extensively also gave me a great insight into

the origins of the conflict.

This dissertation, then, is an enquiry into the

civil war in Mozambique between Renamo (formerly MNR,

Mozambican National Resistance) and Frelimo (Front for

the Liberation of Mozambique) as well as the covert

participation by South Africa in the conflict. The

objective is to ascertain whether there was just cause

for the concerned parties to engage in conflict and

whether Renamo in the first instance and South Africa2Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa, Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers,

Johannesburg, 1977.

7

in the second instance were justified respectively

initiating and engaging in the civil war.

Such an enquiry is important for although The

Mozambican Civil war has been well documented, in this

instance by Cabrita (2000)3, Hall and Young (1997)4,

Vines (1996)5, Newitt (1995)6 , Venter (1977)7 et al,

where one can clearly follow the origins, causes,

conduct and end result of the conflict, no arguments

have ever been advanced nor debated – to my knowledge -

as to the justification for the conflict itself, or the

part played by the main actors as outlined above.

Such debates and assessments are common in the

instance of wars between Nations, as exemplified by the

recent debate on the legality cum justification for the

war on Iraq, but the literature is poor in such3 Joao M. Cabrita ‘Mozambique, the Tortuous Road to Democracy’ Palgrave, Hampshire

2000.4Margaret Hall, Tom Young ‘Confronting the Leviathan, Mozambique Since

Independence’ Hurst &Co. London, 1997.5Alex Vines ‘ RENAMO, From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?’ Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York 1996. 6 Malyn Newitt ‘A History of Mozambique’ C. Hurst &Co. London 1995.

7 Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa, Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers,

Johannesburg, 1977.

8

discourses pertaining to civil wars. This may well be

because just war theory, in its classical formulation,

confers legitimacy to engage in (just) war only to

state-actors, which is a lacuna not often dealt with8.

Thus, albeit more as a byproduct of this proposal than

as a central aim, I will nonetheless demonstrate how

the framework of just war theory – in particular the

precepts of jus ad bellum – can easily and fruitfully be

applied to warring political communities other than

recognized Sovereign States.

In this instance I will assess the character, role

and motivation of Renamo - the main protagonist in

opposing the dictatorial Frelimo regime on behalf of a

large number of Mozambicans - as well as that of South

Africa that, albeit covertly, was a major protagonist

in supporting the rebel movement.

In assessing whether a war is justified, the

traditional yardstick is what has become known as Just

War Theory. That I shall examine in the next section,

8 Although some authors have experimented with applying just war theory to non-state actors. See, for instance, Andrew Valls’ (2000) attempt to apply just war theory to terrorist acts.

9

and I will suggest that under the ante bellum

circumstances prevailing at the time, the civil war in

Mozambique was unavoidable, was conducted by competent

authorities, was a measure of last resort, that there

was just cause, and that it provided the desired end

result.

In addressing a topic as the one of this

dissertation, one should be as objective as one can

possibly be. Thus, a word on methodology is in order.

I am fully aware that because of my intimate

knowledge and occasional involvement in the conflict,

it is not an easy task to avoid the trap of

subjectivity and will thus rely on an approach of

radical empiricism, often used in anthropological

research. ‘Unlike traditional empiricism which draws a definite

boundary between method and object, radical empiricism denies the

validity of such cuts and makes the interplay between these domains the

focus of its interest.9

9 Michael Jackson ‘Paths towards a clearing: radical empiricism and ethnographic enquiry’, 1989, p.3

10

Radical empiricism means the acknowledgement of

the ethnographer’s [Researcher’s] subjective position

rather than the denial of it. Jackson points out that

rather than being a scientific method to accurately

describe a situation, it is probable that ‘objectivity serves

more as a magical token, bolstering our sense of self in disorienting

situations’10. This would certainly seem the case in my

dissertation.

Just War Theory

Western just war theories as we postulate them

today, can be traced as far back in history as Cicero

(106-43 BC), who believed in universal standards,

having the view that there was a ‘society of mankind

[cosmopolitanism] rather than states’11 (a view which, as we

shall see further on, supports our general theoretical

framework).

10 idem, ibid., p.411 David J. Bederman, ‘Reception of the Classical Tradition in International Law: Grotius’ De jus Belli Ac Pacis’, Emory International Law Review, 1996.

11

St. Augustine (354-430 AD)12, in turn, proposed that

there should be duties of just treatment of prisoners

and conquered peoples, saying that mercy should be

shown to the vanquished, particularly if they are no

longer a threat to peace.

Thomas Aquinas, who in the ‘Summa Theologica’ 13

presents the general outline of what becomes the just

war theory, suggested that there should be three tests

for the justification for war, namely: just cause,

competent authority and right intention.

Post St. Augustine thinkers, as exemplified by

Grotius (1583-1645), looked at just war theories from a

secular point of view, and suggested that there are

three basic criteria for a war to be just and

justified: firstly, that the danger faced by a nation

is immediate, secondly that the force used is necessary

to adequately defend the nation’s interests and thirdly

that the use of force is proportionate to the

threatened danger.

12 In ‘Augustine: Political Writings’ Michael W. Tkacz and Douglas Kries, trans, Ernest L. Fortin and Douglas Kries, eds., 1994.13 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ‘Just War Theory’ http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm as downloaded on06/05/02.

12

Michael Walzer, among so many other contemporary

political thinkers who have further refined western

just war theories (that are well articulated in the

‘Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy’14), has suggested that just

war theory can be divided into four main parts, namely:

ante bellum, that concerns the socio economic and

political scenario prevailing at the time; jus ad bellum,

that concerns the justice and justification for going

to war; jus in bello, that refers to the conduct of war; and

jus post bellum, that concerns post war peace agreements

etc.

As indicated in my introduction, I will now

briefly elaborate on the jus ad bellum aspects of western

just war theory. According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of

Philosophy, the rules of jus ad bellum are the responsibility

of nations and their heads of government, and it is in

this norm that there exists a lacuna in western just

war theory that, with particular reference to current

events, and the absence of reference to civil wars, has14 Orend, Brian, "War", The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/war/>.

13

led many contemporary political theorists to suggest

that the theory should be upgraded and modernized to

keep pace with the accelerating changes in the concepts

of war and other bellicose conflicts.

The jus ad bellum convention requires that five basic

principles be met:

1. Just Cause, that basically can mean self defense from

aggression, the protection of innocents or, as Walzer

puts it, ‘simply resistance from aggression’.

2.Proper Authority, meaning that the state has to be

recognized by other states and that a declaration to

engage in war must be made to the enemy as well as to

the citizens of the nation concerned.

3.The Possession of Right Intention, meaning that a war should

only be waged for the cause of justice and not for

self- interest or aggrandizement.

4.Last Resort, meaning that all other means (i.e.

diplomatic efforts or any other reasonable means must

be exhausted.)

5.Probability of Reasonable Success, meaning that whatever the

aimed result is, in order to address the particular

14

just cause, has at the outset to have a reasonable

chance of succeeding.

Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)

Frelimo, as will be discussed in the next

paragraph, was the liberation movement to whom

Portugal, under extreme controversial circumstances,

handed over their colony Mozambique and the origins of

the organization deserves closer scrutiny.

As a norm, the origins of most African liberation

movements are very confusing in that the final

‘product’ is often the sum total of many other

groupings, with many diverse opinions and agendas, that

for one reason or another - in many instances pure

expediency in fighting a common enemy - have

amalgamated into a prominent organization. Frelimo is

no exception.

The literature on Frelimo is abundant and often

confusing. It suffices to say that from the 1920’s some

15

form of protest organizations pleading for better

living conditions for Mozambicans came into being and

that according to Gibson 15 Frelimo was created by a

merger in June 1962 of the three existing Mozambican

African nationalist movements Udenamo, Manu and Unami,

with Eduardo Mondlane as its first president, a new

found unity that was to be very short lived, and

Frelimo continued to be beset by continued fierce

faction fighting, ideological, ethnic and personal

rivalries, assassinations, defections and splits.

Gibson further elaborates that the existence of any

unity was largely due to the active concern of

president Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who had granted

Frelimo major bases in his country from which to launch

its struggle against the Portuguese and the necessity

on the part of Frelimo to justify the extensive

material support that they were receiving from the

African Liberation Committee and the Organization of

African States.

15 Richard Gibson ‘African Liberation Movements’ Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 276-280

16

The assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in Dar-es-Salaam on then 3rd of February1969, precipitated an

hysterical sequence of accusations and counter-

accusations within Frelimo and Tanzanian officials,

such as a possible CIA involvement as well as the

dreaded Portuguese Security police PIDE, but as Cabrita

suggests ‘the full circumstances surrounding Mondlane’s assassination

shall only be known when Tanzania discloses the findings of its

investigations conducted with the help of Scotland Yard and Interpol’.16

For a short period after the assassination, a three

man Presidential Council comprising the vice president

Uria Simango, Marcelino dos Santos and the military

commander Samora Machel led the movement for a short

period that was highlighted by numerous purges within

the organization17. By 1969, Simango and many other high

ranking officials had been expelled from the party, and

Samora Machel with Marcelino dos Santos as his deputy

assumed the party leadership.

Samora Machel was a revolutionary who was not only

dedicated to throwing the Portuguese out of Mozambique16 Cabrita, op cit., pp. 58-917 idem, ibid, pp. 63-68

17

but also radically changing the society and is reported

to have said at the time that’ Of all the things we have done, the

most important-the one that history will record as the principal

contribution of our generation-is that we understand how to turn a armed

struggle into a revolution; that we realized that it was essential to create a

new mentality to build a new society.’18

Following independence in 1975, Machel as the first

president of Mozambique called for Frelimo to organize

itself into a Leninist party, a highly organized single

political party and proceeded to put his revolutionary

principles into practice. As a Marxist, he called for

the nationalization of all private property,

industries, commerce, health services, education and

the abolishment of religion. His systematic

destruction of the traditional fabric of society led

eventually led to a bloody and protracted civil war

that will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

The High Jacking of Mozambique. ‘The ante bellum Scenario’

18 http://www.jlhs.nhusd.Social Science/Mozambique/Samora Machel

18

On the 25th April 1974, the MFA (Armed Forces

Movement) seized power in Portugal, and the new

Portuguese Government burdened with the human and

financial costs of their colonial wars, one of the main

causes for their revolution, decided to relinquish its

colonies.

As aptly recorded by Hall and Young19 the new

regime in Portugal, then headed by general Spinola,

almost immediately started negotiations with the main

Mozambican liberation movement Frelimo, and in May of

1974 a senior member of the junta, general Costa Gomes,

visited Mozambique, appealing to Frelimo for a cease

fire and to enter negotiations to end the war.

The Portuguese proposed that the people of the

colony would choose some kind of arrangement between

the ‘extremes of independence and the status quo at a

planned referendum’. It was the intention of the

Portuguese government to grant a great deal of autonomy

to the colony, while still maintaining ties with the

‘motherland’ within a framework of ‘Lusophonic

19 Margaret Hall, Tom Young ‘Confronting Leviathan, Mozambique Since Independence’ Hurst &Co. London, 1997. pp. 40-43

19

Commonwealth’ comprising all former colonies. This view

was not shared by the left wing senior army officers in

Portugal, led by Major Mello Antunes that had close

ideological ties with Frelimo.

It is further recorded that Frelimo saw no need to

compromise its demand for full independence under its

sole leadership, without any referendum or other

popular consultation on the country’s future, and

refused to concede a ceasefire until their demands were

met,

‘Indeed, increasingly aware of the contradictory

currents within the Portuguese government over

decolonization, Frelimo stepped up the war ,calibrating

the exercise of military pressure with a negotiating

strategy which sought simultaneously to weaken the

Spinola faction and to strengthen the left wing one that

was favorable to their own position’.20

The continuation of the conflict eventually led to

further formal and informal negotiations between the

parties, which in turn led to a cease fire on the 8th

20 Margaret Hall, Tom Young ‘Confronting the Leviathan, Mozambique Since Independence’ Hurst&Co. London, 1997. p 42

20

September 1974, with the Portuguese side still

committed to a referendum and unwilling to concede to

Frelimo’s demands, which comprised their legitimacy as

the sole representative of the peoples of Mozambique,

the recognition of the people’s right to complete

independence and the immediate transfer of power to

Frelimo.

It is important to note that while the

negotiations that led to the cease fire were taking

place, there were a number of secret meetings in Dar es

Salaam between Frelimo and the left wing elements of

the Portuguese regime, this time led by Mario Soares

(at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs and soon to be

Prime Minister) after the demise of General Spinola,

Major Antunes and Almeida Santos a well known left wing

Portuguese lawyer with longstanding connections with

Mozambique and Frelimo, where a secret protocol was

signed recognizing Frelimo as the sole legitimate and

authentic representatives of Mozambique21.

21 Hall and Young, op cit., p.43

21

The events mentioned above laid the foundations

for the final negotiations that took place in Lusaka on

5-7 September 1974, in which Portugal ceded to all

Frelimo’s demands. By the end of September 1974, the

Portuguese government and Frelimo signed the Lusaka

Accord, allowing the transfer of power to Frelimo

without prior elections. On the 25th of June 1975,

Mozambique became an independent one party State, with

Frelimo as the sole legal party led by Samora Moises

Machel.

As I argued in 1978, ‘Mozambique was sold to a militarily

defeated Frelimo by the signing of the Lusaka Agreement, made easy by

the withdrawal of troops from Mozambique which were replaced by

Portuguese communist-orientated battalions’, 22 that aided and

abetted Frelimo’s illegal transition to power, well

documented in Al Venter’s ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and

Frustration’ .23

The Frelimo Oligarchy Enslaves Mozambique.

‘The Just Cause’

22 Carlos Santos ‘West and Marxists in Africa’ Cape Times 19/03/1978.23 Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg 1977, . (Chapter viii, Mozambique: The Marxist Oligarchy). Pp. 142-165.

22

From the outset, the new Mozambican government

showed through its actions that it was totally divorced

from the ethos envisaged by its founder Eduardo

Mondlane, who was assassinated in 1969. Mondlane’s

vision24 as recorded by his widow Jeanette in 1985, was

very much anthropocentric and he would not have agreed

with decisions taken after independence, ‘many of them

allied to the violation of the idea of the right to

individual freedom’, ‘that ideology is not more important than

people’ and that he would have opposed the direction taken

by the new regime.

What happened in Mozambique was that it shifted from

one form of totalitarianism to another and, as Cabrita

suggests, ‘ more specifically from Fascism to Leninism’, although

history has subsequently informed us that it was very

much a Stalinist type of regime.

From day one, Samora Machel who was the head of

state and government, the speaker of the parliament,

24 ? Joao M. Cabrita ‘Mozambique, The Tortuous Road to Democracy’ Palgrave, Hampshire 2000.

23

the chief justice and the head of the armed forces,

indicated that ‘the new Mozambican regime was prepared to go to

great lengths to impose the will of the government by forcing those who

refuse those who accept such an imposition and to repress those who

oppose such a will’25.

With the introduction of a Marxist Leninist form

of government run along the lines of Stalinism, the

people soon found themselves in the grip of fear

through intimidation, the nationalization of homes, the

elimination of private medicine and law practices,

private education that was replaced with government

schools alike, modeled on the Soviet system of

education, and the nationalization of the press under

the government control. Frelimo was the State with the

Nation taking second place.

Freedom of worship was denied to the people of

Mozambique by the banning and closure of all churches

and missions. In line with this purge on religion, any

form of baptism was prohibited , foreign church

missions that for decades had been on the forefront of

25 As quoted by Cabrita 2000, p85 from a speech by Machel reported in ‘voz da revolucao’ [the voice of the revolution], Maputo 1975.

24

providing basic education for the masses came under

particular heavy attack, their bank accounts being

frozen while they were being investigated. It was

suggested at the time26 that the Soviet Union played a

major role in these developments.

‘The Jehovah’s Witnesses were particularly singled

out as they consistently refused to swear allegiance or

indeed to recognize Frelimo as the ruling party’. The

biggest looser was the Roman Catholic Church, despite

the fact that during the war of independence many of

its office bearers were pro Frelimo apologists and were

a powerful force for the elimination of colonial

principles.

‘Other foreign religious missions under pressure

were The Church of the Apostles, an American body, The

Church of the Nazarene, the Swiss Mission particularly

known for their skills in education, The United

Apostolic Church of Zion a powerful Christian

organization with millions of adepts in Southern

Africa, The Assembly of God and many others.

26 Venter, op cit., p. 150

25

More disturbing is what President Samora Machel

has done to an estimated 50000 political prisoners held

in a string of labor camps established in remote areas

of northern Mozambique27 the elimination of opposition

parties such as Rev. Uria T. Simango’s Fumo (Front for

the Unification of Mozambique), ‘ Who broke from

Frelimo in the late 1960’s because it was edging too

close to the Soviet camp [this was after the

assassination in 1969 of Frelimo’s founder Dr. Eduardo

Mondlane when the leadership was taken over by Samora

Machel]’ 28. Joana Simiao, a Sorbonne educated leader of

4 million Makua tribesmen from Central Mozambique, who

had remained implacably opposed to Frelimos’ doctrines

and many other pro democracy parties and movements were

also banned and outlawed.

Of great significance for the majority of the

people of Mozambique was the abolishment of the

traditional tribal system. According to Venter29, Machel

27 Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg 1977, p.16028 idem, ibid, P.155.

29 idem, ibid., p. 145

26

decreed that forthwith there would be no tribes in

Mozambique, but only Mozambicans ‘which is like telling

the Arabs they are no longer Muslims’. Machel further

abolished the offices of chieftainships and many tribal

heads and their followers resisted the change, went

into hiding and became a component of the new

resistance to overthrow the new government by force

very much in the same way that Frelimo fought

Portuguese authority in the decade long guerrilla war

of liberation.

Against the background of political parties and

movements banned and many of their leaders killed or

imprisoned, with civil liberties removed from citizens

and a non existent rule of law to afford protection to

the citizens, any hope of the dreamed of democratic

process was eliminated. The people were in a worst

situation when compared with colonial rule and were

ruthlessly dealt with when attempting to address their

plight, the implementation of all these acts that

removed all the freedom from the people was achieved

through the use of the new security police (SNASP)

created in October 1975, an organization molded along

27

the lines of the KGB in the Soviet Union as I will

expound on when I discuss the role of South Africa in

the civil war.

I would like to suggest that at the above-

mentioned stage of the history of Mozambique; its

peoples were denied ‘equality as equality of fair opportunity, liberal

equality and democratic equality.’30

In a thesis for an MA in politics ‘Civil Wars In Africa,

Causes and Effects’31 Ahmad Mahmoud suggests that Africa’s

civil wars break out due to a set of motives some of

which relate to the political and social structures,

while others are closely linked with outside

intervention in the continent’s internal struggles.

I concur with his assessment, as that was very

much the case of the Mozambican civil war under

discussion. It broke out firstly as a result of the

taking over of power by the undemocratic Frelimo

30 John Rawls ‘A Theory of Justice’ Oxford University Press, Revised Edition 1999, p. 57.31 Ahmad Mahmoud Abdel Atti ‘Civil Wars in Africa, Causes and Effects’ African Perspective, Fourth Issue- Winter 2000-2001. http://www.sis.gov.eg/public/africanmag/issue04/html/enafr13html as downloaded on 22/05/02.

28

regime, followed shortly afterwards by the

establishment of a Marxist Leninist system of

government with the social constraints and loss of

freedom imposed by such regimes, and the outside

influences imposed upon the region by the main cold war

rivals namely the USA and the USSR, alongside with

their respective allies or sympathizing nations.

In recent correspondence with a friend, I was

reminded that ‘A wise professor once commented that governments

should not act like the criminals they’re set to protect us from. Legitimacy,

accordingly, vanishes once a ruling party becomes a criminal regime and

aggresses against the people and property of its jurisdiction’32 and had

no option but to as a last resort engage in civil war

that as mentioned in earlier paragraphs was conducted

by the majority of Mozambicans under the Renamo banner.

Renamo: A Legitimate Representative of the People

‘The Proper Authority’

32 Dr. Alexander Moseley in private correspondence with the author March 22, 2004

29

One of the preoccupations of the theorists of Just

War Theories from Saint Thomas Aquinas who in the

‘Summa Theologica’ 33 presents the general outline of what

becomes the just war theory, through to modern thinkers

such as Michael Walzer, is the competence of Nations to

engage in war. Modern Just War Theory disregards civil

wars and hence there is an obvious lacuna that should

be addressed.

In the case of civil wars in which normally a

section of the population enters into war with the

ruling government as a result of the case in this

conflict ‘A national grievance where the performance of a government

is held to be against the national interest’,34 I looked at ‘The

Libertarian Just War Theory’ to justify the competence of

Renamo, ‘The war must be declared by a competent authority, and

against a proper enemy. The proper authority to exercise a right of self-

defense against an aggressor is the individual whose rights have been

violated or his /her designated agent’. 35

33 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ‘Just War Theory’ http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm as downloaded on06/05/02.34 K.Y.Amoako, UN Under-Secretary- General and Executive Secretary of Economic Commission for Africa ‘The Economic Consequences of Civil Wars and Unrest in Africa’ address to the 70th ordinary session of the council of the Organization of African Unity, Algeria, 8 July 1999. http://www.afbis.com as downloaded on 22/05/02.35‘Libertarian Just War Theory’ http://www.nonaggression/justwar.html as downloaded on 05/07/02.

30

In the fifteen months between the Portuguese

revolution of 25 April 1974, and the controversial

independence of Mozambique on the 25th of September

1975, there were a number of attempts to put together

a viable opposition movement against Frelimo, the most

important one at the time was the 7th of September 1974

revolt when dissatisfied Mozambicans led by

dissatisfied Portuguese whites, attempted to seize

power by taking control of the radio station amid much

pomposity and bravado. As Venter36 aptly puts it: ‘this was

nor totally unexpected and a little more determination and perhaps a few

moments of courage and a few more single minded individuals might have

pulled if off. Especially as Frelimo was strung pretty thin on the ground at

that stage their power structure was very much vulnerable to internal

dissent’.

As I have elaborated on in the previous paragraph

the traumatic events that followed, only reinforced

Mozambicans desire to liberate themselves, resulting in

many Mozambicans of all origins, color, belief,

religion ethnicity and race gathering together in the

36 Venter, op. cit., p.145

31

central Manica and Sofala province of Mozambique, where

the various representatives decided to join efforts in

order to defeat and remove communism from Mozambique

and thus, Renamo (Resistencia National Mocambicana) led

by Andre Matade Matsangaissa, a former Frelimo

commander, was founded in 1976 Upon his violent death

in 1978, Afonso Dhlakama was democratically elected as

the new leader of the liberation movement.

There is a general perception that Renamo was not

a genuine liberation movement representing many

Mozambicans but the creation of the then isolated Jan

Smith’s Rhodesian government and that subsequently

after Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe gained independence

the movement was taken over by South Africa became a

tool of alleged destabilization policies towards the

Frelimo regime. These perceptions fanned by the

writings and observations of, inter alia, (Vines, 1996),

(Hall and Young, 1997) and (Newitt, 1995) are not

entirely a true reflection of the events and I shall

brief deal with the subject in my next chapter.

32

Rhodesia and South Africa:

“The Right Intention”

Despite Rhodesia’s internal settlement and a black

majority government led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 1972

having being democratically elected, Great Britain

insisted on facilitating communist oriented freedom

movements namely Robert Mugabe’s Patriotic Front,

Joshua Nkomo’s Zanu and Sithole’s Zapu, all of whom had

refused to participate in the elections, to eventually

come to power in 1980 after the signing of the

Lancaster House agreement.

In the interim period, Frelimo came to power, and

from 1975, Mugabe had operational bases in Mozambique

that facilitated his movement’s terrorist activities in

Rhodesia. With the denial of Rhodesia’s access to the

port of Beira by the new Mozambican government,

Rhodesia facilitated the re-organization and

continuation of an anti-Frelimo guerrilla movement that

had been created by the former Portuguese security

police PIDE/DGS, comprised mainly of the Mozambican

Diaspora who had fled their country after the Frelimo

33

takeover. These were to become the core of Renamo’s

military after it’s inception in 197637

It is thus reasonable to suggest that Rhodesia’s

actions, and continued support for Renamo until 1980,

can be construed as an act of self- defense against a

foreign country’s aggressive interference in its

territorial integrity, and that the Rhodesian

government was fully justified in getting involved in

the civil war in Mozambique.

Albeit in a covert manner, South Africa also

played a major role in the civil war under discussion,

decisively affecting the outcome of the war by having

covertly assisted Renamo following the Zimbabwean

independence in 1980.

Having previously mentioned that many political

authors and historians have through their accounts of

the war assisted in creating the general impression

that the Mozambique Civil War was South Africa’s war,

and by implication not a justified conflict, I will

37 Hall and Young, op. cit. pp. 117-123

34

briefly elaborate on some of those accounts, that are

either dismissive of South Africa’s foreign policy

prevailing at the time or totally devoid from the

actual facts.

According to Vieira et al.38 ‘the South African regime

knowing that that it was militarily and politically impossible to turn

Mozambique into a Bantustan, tried to make the existence and functioning

of any kind of organized society enviable. It defined its strategy as the

devastation of Mozambique and of its capacity for later recovery’. I

would like to suggest that this assessment is

incorrect, as South Africa was at the time, as will be

discussed later, not particularly concerned about

developments in Mozambique as illustrated in an

assessment by Ellis and Sechaba39 that ‘the idea that South

Africa feared invidious comparison with Mozambique’s successes ( an

important part of Frelimo propaganda, endlessly repeated in the academic

literature) seems bizarre, although this does not mean that Frelimo’s

victory did not have a symbolic value for young South African blacks’.

38 Vieira, Martin & Wallerstein ‘How Fast the Wind? Southern Africa 1975-2000 p.216.39 Ellis and Sechaba ‘Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and The South African Communist Party in Exile’ p75

35

One of the most important factors of the civil war

in the 1980’s was the South Africans; ‘the precise

determinants and objectives of whose foreign policy during this period

remain obscure, although some of the more florid explanations are hardly

worthy of discussion’40. Coming from such distinguished

academics, I find this kind of suggestion intriguing as

South Africa’s foreign policy prevailing at the time

and in particular in its relationship with Africa was

clear-cut and was based on the non-interference in the

internal affairs of their neighboring states and one of

mutual economic co-operation.

South Africa had always had a policy of non-

interference in the internal affairs of other

countries. Despite the abhorrent apartheid laws that as

far as I recollect were not only being opposed by

nationalist movements such as the ANC but also by the

powerful internal and multi racial liberal lobby, the

country had a whites only multi party form of

democracy, was a member of the United Nations, had

diplomatic relations with most nations, fought in both

world wars on the side of the allied forces and was

40 Hall and Young, op cit., p.120

36

thus in international law, competent to engage in

hostilities with other nations whenever if felt

threatened.

It should be noted that Prime Minister John

Vorster had been engaged in detente or constructive

engagement, with a number of independent African

nations in West and East Africa such as Senegal, Ivory

Coast, Zambia etc. the same happened in relations

between S.A. and Mozambique when the latter obtained

independence from Portugal in 1975.

From Independence Day on 25 September 1975 and in

line with South Africa’s foreign policies towards

African nations pertaining at the time, the South

African government went to great lengths to maintain

cordial relations with the new Mozambican government.

Despite Samora Machel’s continued bellicose

rhetoric, preaching revolution and liberation not only

for his country, but for Southern Africa in general and

South Africa in particular – which that led at the time

of Maputo being jokingly referred to as [The Cape

37

Canaveral of revolution in the sub-continent] - the

relationships with South Africa remained good.

As argued by Venter, ‘ much of the goodwill generated

between the two countries, has stemmed from premier Vorster’s détente

policy and from a mutual acceptance by both nations that while they

abhorred each other’s policies, their economic beds had been made for

them by others and that they had better continue to lie in them’41,

indeed Mozambique was receiving direct and indirect aid

from South Africa to the tune of one hundred million US

dollars per annum, albeit on a reduced scale, no

restrictions were placed on Mozambican miners’

continued employment in the gold mines, the port of

Maputo, a major but not only route through which many

South African exports and imports were routed continued

to be used albeit at a reduced capacity due to the

diminishing labour resources available in Mozambique

that came about as a result of a major exodus of

skilled Portuguese management threatened by the new

regime; these and many similar actions are not those of

a government bent on destabilizing a neighboring

country.

41 Venter, op. cit., pp. 162-3

38

Other than the internal conflict with the ANC, PAC

(Pan African Congress) and other similarly communist

oriented militant organizations, that conducted a low

key resistance conflict against the apartheid regime,

South Africa did not consider itself under any

significant threat from its neighboring countries.

When, in 1976, Mozambique adopted a Marxist-

Leninist form of Government, the military threat to

S.A. became alarming due to the deployment of Soviet

intelligence agencies, weapons such as missiles,

fighter aircraft, military advisers and an assorted

number of other offensive weaponry. Furthermore, the

Frelimo government allowed Umkonto I Swize, the armed

wing of the ANC, as well as other liberation movements

to have operational bases inside Mozambique, a fact

vehemently denied by the authorities; it is ironic that

Nelson Mandela, then imprisoned on Roben Island, knew

of such assistance as he later recalls in his

autobiography, ‘Thousands of our young people that left the country to

join our own liberation movement, were trained in our camps in Algeria,

Tanzania and Mozambique. There is nothing more encouraging in prison

39

as learning that the people outside are supporting the cause for which you

are inside’42

Al Venter illustrates the above points by

describing what happened in Mozambique after Machel

signed an agreement in Moscow in 1976. Inter alia, ‘The Soviet

Union would provide military assistance to Mozambique in the form of

weapons, equipment, advisers, liaison staff and instructors. The Soviets

were also to supply (Extra Military Means) in the case of (External

Aggression) [with obvious reference to S.A.]’43

By mid 1976, South Africa, as well as most western

observers were worried about the military developments

in Mozambique as the Indian Ocean was fast becoming a

bridgehead for Soviet expansionism in the area44, with

the Soviet fleet having access to the ports of Maputo,

Quelimane, Beira and Nacala, backed by an intelligence

service in Maputo totally out of proportion to the

normal requirements that are generally accepted within

the realm of diplomatic relations between two nations.

42 Nelson Mandela ‘Long Walk to Freedom’ BCA London 1995 p471.43 Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg 1977, . ( Chapter viii, Mozambique: The Marxist Oligarchy). P.147.44 idem, ibid.

40

Other than the setting up of SNASP, the Mozambican

new security police along the lines of the KGB and the

GRU, the Soviets, under the leadership of Boris

Nikolayvich45 was responsible for the setting up of an

organization to co-ordinate the activities of the

underground South Africa communist party and its ally

the ANC, South Africa was the last domino in Soviet

expansionism in the African sub-continent.

The cold war that was prevailing at the time, led

western nations to resort to rhetoric rather than

action, and S.A. felt isolated and threatened by events

taking place in its neighboring countries: Angola had

been handed over by the Portuguese to the communist

Agostinho Neto’s MPLA movement, in the same fashion as

Mozambique, at the expense of Holden Roberto’s FNLA,

Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA, and FLEC, the freedom movement

of the enclave of Cabinda, with the added problem of a

strong presence of the Cuban army to prop up the

illegal new regime.

45 idem, ibid.

41

South Africa’s involvement in the civil war by

actively, albeit covertly supporting Renamo was an act

of self-defense and gave further legitimate

justification to the conflict. In conclusion, did South

Africa’s intervention have the desired effect? In the

light of above paragraph’s I would like to suggest that

it assisted in restoring democracy in Mozambique, and

struck a blow to the Soviet’s presence in the sub-

continent and facilitated the ‘Demise of Marxist orientated

governments in Southern Africa’46 it set the tone for the

eventual ‘Formation of a confederation of non-Marxist Southern

African Sates soon after South Africa settles with all its population groups,’47

The civil war in Mozambique occurred because a

nation wanted freedom, but the 17-year event was

interconnected with regional and international

developments prevailing at the time. Ten years after

the conflict ended, South Africa has settled

internally, the SADA a powerful regional body dedicated

to the socio-economic development of the region

involving all Southern African nations is functioning

46 Carlos Santos ‘West and Marxists in Africa’ Cape Times 19/03/1978.47 IBID.

42

well for the benefit of all, the South African active

involvement and the positive results that it helped to

bring about are another indication as to the

justification for the civil war.

Peace Returns to Mozambique and the Region:

‘The End Result’

We the demise of the Soviet Union on the horizon,

I overtly returned to Mozambique in August of 1989, on

a visit that - until 1993 - was to be the first of

many, and experienced first hand the human and physical

devastation that had taken place. In my mind there was

often the question: was this civil war, that was not

yet ended, justified? During those four years, I

traveled extensively in the interior, assisting in what

were then the early stages of returning to normality.

In the process I met with my friends, many still in

Government, and with countless innocent bystanders

caught up in the conflict.

43

My observations, at the time shared by many, were

that both Frelimo and Renamo were exhausted by the

fighting, and looming political change in South Africa,

as well as the end of the Cold War, had improved the

international environment for peace.

At the fifth congress of the Frelimo Party held in

Maputo during July of 1989, the Mozambican Government

abandoned its Marxist Leninist system of governance and

replaced it with a 0ne Party Democratic System that

immediately drew opposition from the Renamo leadership

and widespread consternation among the populace.

Frelimo was at all costs trying to hold onto power

without the consent of the people.

The one party democracy rationale was made public

by Jose Luis Cabaco, Frelimo’s External General

Secretary and a childhood friend of mine, who at the

time argued:

‘People say we are a one party state. We are not a one party state, we

are a one party democracy… it is difficult to explain this to Westerners

44

because the West has such short memories of its own history

[democratic history] (…) and are too narrow minded to understand that

a one party state is a product of African culture and history and not a

product of ideology… those foreign interests, and I am talking about

racist colonialist people, are forcing us to have talks with Renamo and

treat them as a valid opposition, understand only too well how this

would threaten our sovereignty and independence… they do not wish to

change the government of Mozambique, they do not even want Renamo

to share power, they just want Renamo to be recognized as an

opposition which can then be mobilized as a destabilizing force…’48.

The above illustrates the Frelimo political

paranoia prevailing at the time. When, as his guest in

August of 1989, he tried to explain to me the political

scenario confronting his government, I cautioned Cabaco

how such views would only prolong the civil war, which

it did until a ceasefire that became known as the

General Peace Agreement (GPA) between Frelimo and

Renamo was signed in Rome on 4 October 1992. The

effective date for the cease-fire was on the 15th of

October 1992 and a UN Peace Keeping Force (ONUMOZ)

oversaw the two-year transition period to democracy,

leaving the country in early 1995.

48 Part of interview with Dr. Cabaco ‘Political Puzzles’ The New Internationalist, No.192 February 1989 pp14/5.

45

Despite many setbacks, which were painstakingly

overcome - such as the protracted part of the peace

negotiations that led Frelimo to introduce

constitutional changes providing for political

pluralism and free speech - Mozambique’s first multi

party elections were held in 1994. They returned

Frelimo and the moderate and reformist president

Chissano to power with 56% of the vote, with Renamo

attaining a credible 41%, and 3% going to a myriad of

minor political parties. In 1998, the country’s first

municipal democratic elections in 33 urban areas took

place with an almost equal share between Frelimo and

Renamo, ensuring that the political opposition will

continue to have an important role in Mozambique’s

maturing democracy.

Conclusion

In the introduction to this dissertation, I

indicated that in order to assess the justification for

the civil war in Mozambique, I looked as a yardstick to

46

the generally accepted conventions of traditional just

war theory, that I have explained in an earlier

paragraph. In particular, I looked at the jus ad bellum

conventions of just war theory.

My rationale is that I see no difference

between a war between states and a war between

peoples within a state, if both can be regarded

as bounded political communities, possessing

legitimate and widely accepted authority, and

following ethical principles in the pursuit of

warfare. Nonetheless, I have yet to come across

a similar perspective applied, in particular, to

civil conflicts such as that of Mozambique.

Authors have dabbled with the application of

just war theory to secessionist movements, and

also to terrorist or guerrilla movements, but to

my knowledge there is no literature attempting

to consider whether or not civil wars were

justly initiated/justified ( jus ad bellum ), nor

whether they were justly conducted ( jus in bello ).

47

In trying to answer whether the Mozambican

conflict, in its tremendous magnitude as a human

tragedy but also as a political shift in the

southern African socio-political arena, was

justified from such a tradition of thought, I

hope to have also given a modest and incipient

contribution to stimulate such a needed analysis

of civil conflicts. I hope that they will not

forever remain outside the pale and purview of

some sort of ethical framework.

As we have seen in the sections above, the

essential criteria of jus ad bellum – just cause,

proper authority, right intention and end result – can

all be applied to the civil war that shook my country

for so long, and its key players. The method is thus

justified – but what of the war itself?

Peace appears to be firmly established, with no

political violence since 1994. There has been a return

to the rule of law, the freedoms of worship, speech and

movement. The rights to private ownership, of free

48

enterprise and of where and how to educate one’s

children have been restored. Despite all the suffering

and grief associated with the 17-year war, there was

always hope that some day the principles of freedom,

equality and liberty would be attained, and they have.

In the light of the aforementioned sequence of events,

I would suggest that under all the circumstances that I

have expounded, and particularly according to the

criteria of jus ad bellum, the civil war in Mozambique

was justified.

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53