The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict - Africa Portal

South African Instit

ute of Inte

rnat

iona

l Affa

irs

African perspectives. Global insights.

China in Africa Project

O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 6 7

The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict

S e p t e m b e r 2 0 1 0

G a a f a r K a r r a r A h m e d

A b o u t S A I I A

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record

as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent,

non-government think-tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into

public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs

with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research

excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA’s occasional papers

present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in

Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good

governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace;

and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the

environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about

SAIIA’s work.

A b o u t t h e C h I N A I N A F R I C A P R o J e C t

SAIIA’s ‘China in Africa’ research project investigates the emerging relationship between

China and Africa; analyses China’s trade and foreign policy towards the continent; and

studies the implications of this strategic co-operation in the political, military, economic and

diplomatic fields.

The project seeks to develop an understanding of the motives, rationale and institutional

structures guiding China’s Africa policy, and to study China’s growing power and influence

so that they will help rather than hinder development in Africa. It further aims to assist African

policymakers to recognise the opportunities presented by the Chinese commitment to the

continent, and presents a platform for broad discussion about how to facilitate closer

co-operation. The key objective is to produce policy-relevant research that will allow Africa

to reap the benefits of interaction with China, so that a collective and integrated African

response to future challenges can be devised that provides for constructive engagement

with Chinese partners.

A ‘China–Africa Toolkit’ has been developed to serve African policymakers as an

information database, a source of capacity building and a guide to policy formulation

SAIIA gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the main funders of the project:

The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfID) and the Swedish

International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).

Project leader and series editor: Dr Chris Alden, email: [email protected]

© SAIIA September 2010

All rights are reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised in any form by any

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Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.

A b S t R A C t

China’s role in Sudan is one of the most closely watched and, in many circles, controversial

relationships on the continent. This paper provides a Sudanese perspective and argues

that, far from profiting from its close ties with Khartoum, the Chinese government has

experienced considerable difficulties. As a result of complexities arising from the ongoing

conflict in Darfur, China has gradually changed its foreign policy approach towards Sudan.

A b o u t t h e A u t h o R

Gaafar Karrar Ahmed has a master’s degree from the University of Khartoum and a

doctorate in History from Nanjing University, and has done post-doctoral research at

the University of Beijing. He has lectured at the Universities of Beijing and Shanghai and

has worked for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Sudan and Qatar. He has published

extensively on China’s policy towards and relations with the Middle East and North Africa,

and its dealings with the oil, gas and petrochemical industries in these regions.

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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 6 7

C H I N A I N A F R I C A P R O J E C T

A b b R e v I A t I o N S A N d A C R o N y m S

ARM armedresistancemovement

AU AfricanUnion

CSO civilsocietyorganisation

EU EuropeanUnion

GNU GovernmentofNationalUnity

ICC InternationalCriminalCourt

JEM JusticeandEqualityMovement

MFA MinistryofForeignAffairs

NCP NationalCongressParty

SLA SudanLiberationArmy

SPLM SudanPeople’sLiberationMovement

UK UnitedKingdom

UN UnitedNations

UNAMID AU/UNHybridOperationinDarfur

US UnitedStates

T H E C H I N E S E S T A N C E O N T H E d A R F U R C O N F L I C T

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I N t R o d u C t I o N

TheriseofChinaanditsroleinmanagingthecomplexissuesofpeaceandsecurity

have been the subject of considerable interest in recent years. As a permanent

memberoftheUNSecurityCouncilandamajordevelopingcountry,China’sstanceon

theDarfurquestionisparticularlyimportant.Moreover,withsignificanteconomicand

diplomatictiestoSudan,Chinahascomeunderclosescrutinyandcriticismbybothlocal

Sudaneseandinternationalactorswhohaveaccuseditofprovidingunconditionalsupport

totheSudanesegovernment.Insodoing,accordingtothesecritics,Chinaisobstructing

keyinternationalresolutionsaimedatencouragingtheSudanesegovernmenttofinda

peacefulsolutiontotheDarfurconflictandputastoptothewidespreadactsofviolence

takingplaceintheregion.

However,farfromprofitingfromitsinvolvementinSudan,assomewouldassert,

thispaperarguesthatinrealityChinahaspaidaconsiderablepriceforitsassociation

withthatcountry.Thebelief thatChina’soil interestsdetermine itspolicies towards

Khartoumandthatthesepoliciesareessentiallysupportiveofthepracticesandstancesof

theSudanesegovernmentiswidespreadamonginfluentialmembersoftheinternational

communityandinternationalorganisations.Ifnotforthisreason,thenatleastfromtheir

perspectivetheChineseseemnottocaremuchabouttheongoinghumandisasterinthe

region,whichhasledtothekillinganddisplacementofhundredsofthousandsofpeople.

Moreover,theinternationalcampaignonDarfur–inwhichpopular,local,regionaland

internationalorganisationshaveparticipatedforthefirsttime,alongwithanumberof

Westerngovernments–hasgreatlytroubledChinesediplomats,whohavefeltthatthey

wereexertingconsiderableeffortandexpendingprecioustimedefendingthestanceof

theircountrytotrytoimproveitsimageinworldopinion.Bythesametoken,inthewake

ofsuchexposureandcriticism,someSudaneseorganisationsandactorshaveforthefirst

timeindecadesbeguntoviewChinawithdoubtanddistrust.

HowhasChinadealtwiththeseinternationaltensionsandwhathasbeenitsactual

stancevis-à-vis theDarfurcrisis?HasChinareallyofferedunconditional support to

theSudanesegovernmentandhasthisledtomoresufferinginDarfur?Thispaperwill

attempttoanswerthesequestionsbyinvestigatingandassessingtheChineseroleinthe

conflictintheDarfurregionfromitsoutbreakin2003toFebruary2009.1

t h e C h I N e S e S t A N C e o N t h e d A R F u R C o N F l I C t , F e b R u A R y 2 0 0 3 – F e b R u A R y 2 0 0 9

ChinahasneverreallybeenawayfromthecentreoftheDarfurconflictsinceitsearliest

years. Indeed, the country found itself drawn directly into the conflict when some

membersoftheSudanLiberationArmy(SLA),whichwasledbyAbdelWahidal-Nur,

kidnappedtwoChineseworkers(LiAijunandJiaHuipeng)whowereworkingona

well-drillingprojectforthelocalinhabitantson14March2004.Theincidentoccurred

about50kilometresfromtheBuramareainwesternSudan.2TheinabilityoftheSudanese

governmentanditsofficialapparatusestoorganisethereleaseoftheabductedChinese

workersmeantthatitwaslefttothe‘friendsofChina’todoso.Itisworthmentioningthat

thegeneralsecretaryoftheSLAatthetime,MinniArcuaMinnawi,playedanimportant

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roleinthisprocess.3Moreover,itisprobablethatthisabductionoftwoChineseworkers

attractedtheattentionoftheChineseleadership,especiallyPresidentHuJintaoandthe

ministerofforeignaffairsatthattime,LiZhaoxing.Despitetheissuesthatthisraised,

theseChineseofficialsandtheSudaneseleadershipinKhartoumdidnotbelievethat

thingswouldgetoutofcontrolatthisstage.Meanwhile,theSudaneseleadership,which

visitedBeijingrepeatedlyinthatperiod,continuedtoconveyfalseinformationaboutthe

situationinDarfur,sayingthatthearmedrebelliontherewouldbebroughtundercontrol

inashorttime.TheyrequestedthatChinaassistinconfrontingtheemergingWestern

campaignonDarfur.

ItseemedthattheChineseofficialshadacceptedthisofficialSudaneseversionof

eventsinDarfur;inanycase,theywereinclined,atleastintheearlystagesoftheconflict,

tobelievethattheSudanesegovernmenthadbeenabletocontaintheproblemandwould

thereforeachieveapeacefulsolution.Theyalsobelievedthatwhatwashappeningin

SudanwasaninternalaffairthatcouldbelefttotheSudanesecentralgovernmentto

handle.Thus,ChinacontinuedtodefendthestanceoftheSudanesegovernment,even

adoptingthelanguagewithwhichKhartoumexplainedthesituationinDarfur.Thiswas

theviewofmostobserversandawidesectoroftheSudanesepoliticaloppositionin

boththenorthandwestofthecountryatthattime.TheyeventhoughtthattheChinese

governmentwasinvolvedinobstructingseveralUNSecurityCouncilresolutionsaimed

atexertingpressureontheSudanesegovernmenttostoptheviolenceandimprovethe

humanitariansituationofthepopulation.4Therewasindeedcloseco-ordinationbetween

the twocountriesduring thatperiod.Forexample,when theSudanesegovernment

rejectedproposalsforthereplacementoftheAfricanUnion(AU)peacekeepingforce

byUNpeacekeepers,therejectionwasbasedonthenotionthatatthatstageAfrican

peacekeepersneededonlyfinancialsupport.SoBeijingrequestedtheUNtoprovidesuch

financialsupportfortheAUpeacekeepingoperation.5

However, bymid-2004Chinabegan to shift itspositionon theDarfur issue,no

longerofferingunconditionalsupporttotheSudanesegovernment.Thiswasaresult

of a combinationof internationalpressure calling forChina to adopt a ‘responsible

stakeholder’roleininternationalaffairsand,concurrently,trendswithinChineseforeign

policycirclesthatcalledforareviewofChineseforeignpolicyandthestrengtheningof

effortstoco-operatewiththeothermajor(i.e.Western)powers.Theproponentsofbetter

co-ordinationwiththeWestinsideChina’sinstitutionsandresearchcentresexpressed

anxietyovertheoutcomeofChinesepoliciestowardsIran,SudanandNorthKorea.They

describedthepoliciesofthesecountriesasbeingambiguousandhard-line,burdening

ChinesediplomacywhilesendingthewrongsignaltoitsfriendsinTehran,Khartoum

andPyongyangthattheycouldcontinuetoignoretheircountries’respectiveinternal

problems. Inkeepingwiththisapproach, theseChinese institutions/researchcentres

alsocalledforadegreeofco-ordinationonDarfurandacknowledgementoftheneedto

separatetradeandinvestmentinSudan,ontheonehand,andpolitics,ontheother.6

Thereafter,ChinabeganadiplomaticcampaignaimedatpersuadingtheSudanese

governmenttochangeitspolicythroughvisitsofspecialenvoyssuchasLuGuozeng,

whometwithSudanesePresidentOmaral-Bashirtwice,inAugust2004andFebruary

2005.7Insimilarfashion,theassistantministerofforeignaffairs,ZhaiJun,undertookfour

visitstoSudanandmetwiththepresidentandseniorofficialsoftheMinistryofForeign

Affairs(MFA).TheseenvoysurgedtheSudanesegovernmenttoimprovethehumanitarian


7


situationintheDarfurregion,stopthekillingandmakearealefforttosolvethecrisis,and

nottoconfronttheinternationalcommunitythroughahard-lineapproachorpublicity

only.8Chineseofficialsalso tooktheopportunity toexpress theirconcernabout the

situationinthetroubledregiontoseniorSudaneseofficialsvisitingChina.Forinstance,

duringhisvisitinDecember2004,ChineseofficialsaskedtheSudaneseministerofenergy

andminingtoconsidertheimportanceofsolvingtheproblemsofSudaninaserious

mannerandprovidingeconomic,securityandsocialassistancetothepeopleofDarfuras

quicklyaspossible.9Atthesametime,theformerChineseministerofforeignaffairs,Li

Zhaoxing,andhissuccessor,YangJiechi,expressedtheirconcernaboutthedeterioration

ofthehumanitariansituationinDarfur.SomeSudanesediplomatsandChineseofficials

confirmedthatduringthisperiodtheChinesewereaddressingSudaneseofficialsbehind

closeddoorsinamorebluntmanner.10Infact,theChineseapproachtowardstheDarfur

crisiscontinuedtoemphasisetheabsenceofdevelopmentintheregion.FromtheChinese

perspective,alastingsolutionwouldnotbefoundwithoutengagingwiththedevelopment

factor.ChineseAmbassadorLiuGuijindeclaredthat‘Chinawillcontinuetosupportthe

developmentprojectsintheregion;suchascleanwatersupplyandbuildingagricultural

technicalcenters,onthebasisthattheabsenceofsocio-economicdevelopmentisapart

ofthecauseoftheconflict’.11Duringthisperiod,Chinabegantoprovidesupportfor

theprovisionofwater,electricityandhealthservicestotheinhabitantsofthedistressed

region,withassistanceamountingto$11.65millionbyJune2008.12

Khartoumignoredthesepressuresandcontinuedtopursueaggressivepolicies in

Darfur,includingmaintainingsupportfortheJanjaweed,convincedthatBeijingwould

backsuchanapproachaslongasChinesecompaniesweregivenpreferentialtreatment

andthetwocountriesremainedtiedthroughoilinterests.TheresultwasthatChina,

frustratedbythislackofresponse,allowedtheWesttoexertpressureontheSudanese

government.FollowingdirecttalkswiththeUSgovernment,Chinaabstainedinthevote

forUNSecurityCouncilResolution1556on30July2004.DespiteattemptsbySudan’s

ambassadorinBeijingandappealsbytheSudanesegovernmenttoChinanottoallowthe

resolutiontobepassed,theresolutionimplicatedtheSudanesegovernmentintheconflict

asaperpetratorofhumanrightsviolationsandcalledfortherapiddisarmamentofthe

Janjaweedandthesummoningofindividualstoaninternationalcriminalcourt.13

Following thepassingof theresolution,Chinacontinued toadvise theSudanese

governmenttostoptheviolenceanddisarmtheJanjaweed.Khartoumrespondedtothese

callswithincreasinginflexibility,leadingtoafurtherdeteriorationinthesecuritysituation

inDarfur.14InviewoftheindifferenceoftheSudanesegovernmenttoResolution1556,

ChinapavedthewayforfurtheractivismintheSecurityCouncil.ProposedbytheUS,

Resolution1564threatenedSudanwithoilsanctionsifitcontinuedtodismissResolution

1556andthecallfortheexpansionoftheAUmonitoringpresenceinDarfurandfailed

toendtheatrocitiesbeingcommittedintheregion.DespitetheurgingoftheSudanese

government,ChinaonceagaindidnotuseitsvetoandabstainedinthevoteforResolution

1564on14September2004.15TheChineseambassadortotheUN,WangGuangya,said

that‘Chinahadabstainedfromconstrainingtheadoptionoftheproposedresolution,for

thesakeoftheenhancementoftheAfricanUnion,toexpandthespreadofitsforces,and

toprotectthesupervisorsofthecease-fireinDarfur’.16MutrifSiddiq,theunder-secretary

oftheSudaneseMFA,describedthepassingoftheresolutionas‘disappointingtothe

aspirationsoftheSudanesepeopleandtheirgovernment…itwithdrawspowersfromthe

8



AfricanUnion,despitethebrightwordsthatwereused,forthesupportandstrengthening

ofthemissionoftheAfricanUnioninSudan’.17SudanesePresidentAl-Bashirdescribed

thestatesthatabstainedfromvotingas ‘therealfriendsoftheSudan’.18Despitethis

blatantoppositionbyKhartoum,Chinaprovidedkeysupportinallowingthepassingof

SecurityCouncilResolution1593on31March2005,whichcalledforthereferralofthose

suspectedofcommittingatrocitiesinDarfurtotheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC).19

ThiswasfollowedbyChina’sabstentioninthevoteforResolution1706on31August

2006,whichexpandedthemandateoftheUNMissioninSudansothatitsoperations

includedtheDarfurregion.20

This resolution had effectively transformed the African presence in Darfur to a

comprehensiveinternationalpresence.However,thiswasmetwithangerbySudanese

officials,whohadrequestedChinanottoallowtheresolutiontopass,describingitasa

threattothenationalsovereigntyofthecountry.NafiAliNafi,assistantandadviserto

thepresidentanddeputypresidentforpoliticalaffairsoftherulingNationalCongress

Party(NCP),openlycriticisedChinawhenheasked,‘whyisChinawaitingtousethe

rightofvetointhefaceofunfairresolutionsthattargetitsfriends?’21Notlongafterwards

KhartoumbeganitsowndiplomaticcampaigntopressureBeijingtoreturntoitsprior

stanceinsupportofSudan.22Indeed,thereisevidencethattheChinesegovernment,

reacting topressure fromChineseoil firms thathadclose ties to the rulingelite in

Khartoum,soughttosoftenChina’sactivistrole.HencethedecisionbyChinatomake

thedeploymentofUNpeacekeepersinDarfursubjecttoKhartoum’sapproval.Asthe

officialspokespersonfortheChineseMFAstated:‘Chinasupportsthepresenceofan

internationalpeacekeepingforcetoreplacetheAfricanforces,butwithSudan’sapproval.’

Itwasalsostatedthat,atthesametime,Chinawas‘tryingtoconvinceSudantoassume

aflexiblestance’.23AllthisoccurredatatimewhenSudanstronglyrejectedtheideaof

replacingtheAUforces,whichitsgovernmenthaddescribedas‘anattemptbytheWest

toreoccupytheSudan’.24

WhileKhartoumwasmaintaining itspressureonBeijingbyplayingtheChinese

oilinterestcard,aharderlinetowardsSudanwasbeingformedintheChineseMFA.

Moreover,intheChineseCommunistPartyandstateinstitutionsconcernedwiththe

issue,thereweregrowingcallsforshiftingsupportawayfromtheSudanesegovernment

andopeningacommonfrontwiththeWestandtheinternationalcommunitytocontinue

toapplypressureonKhartoum.Thus,anewphaseofdirectChinesepressurestarted,

afterChinabecameconvincedthattheapproachofreconciliationandquietdiplomacy

waslimitedwhendealingwiththegovernmentofSudan.Infact,itwastheChinese

presidentwhoinitiatedthisdirectionon2November2006whenhemettheSudanese

presidentduringtheChina–AfricaSummitinBeijing.HuJintaodirectlyexpressedthe

anxietyof theChinesegovernment aboutwhatwashappening inDarfur anddrew

attentiontothefactthatChinawasalsofacingstrongWesternpressure,concludingby

askingtheSudanesepresidenttoco-operatefullywiththeinternationalcommunity.25

Similarly, the Chinese government sent veteran diplomat Zhai Jun to meet the

Sudanese leadership as a special envoy of the Chinese president. After visiting the

refugeecampsinwesternSudan,JunconfrontedtheSudanesepresidentatameetingon

8April2007andaskedifAl-Bashircouldamelioratethesituation,becauseChinawas

undertremendouspressure.JunrequestedthatthegovernmentoftheSudanacceptUN


9


Secretary-GeneralKofiAnnan’splan–knownasthethreesupportpackagesplan–but

thiswasimmediatelyrejectedbyKhartoum.26DuringHuJintao’svisittoKhartoumon

2February2007,theChinesepresidentaskedhisSudanesecounterparttoacceptthe

UNpeacekeepingforcesandtoco-operatewiththeinternationalcommunityandthe

SecurityCouncil.Importantly,thissignalledthefactthatChinawasunabletotakeastand

againsttheWesternpositionattheUNSecurityCouncil.27Speakinglater,LiuGuijin,

specialenvoyforAfricanaffairs,declaredthatHuJintaohadapplieddirectpressureonthe

SudanesepresidenttomakehimaccepttheUNpeacekeepingforces.Guijinstated:‘the

talksbetweentheChinesepresidentandtheSudanesepresident,inFebruary2007,had

helpedtheSudantoacceptthespreadoftheinternationalforcesintheDarfurregion’.28

TheresponseoftheSudanesepresidentwasoneofastonishment:‘Wewereconvinced

thatChinawasnot,anddidnotexpect,tobeaninstrumentfortheAmericanpressure

againstSudan’.29TheSudaneseconcernwasclearlydemonstratedinanotherstatement

bytheofficialspokespersonoftheSudaneseMFA,Alial-Sadig,whoexpressedhisanxiety

overthevisitofthespecialAmericanenvoy,AndrewNatsios,toChinainJanuary2007.

Al-Sadigstated:‘ChinaisastrategicallyoftheSudan.ItshouldworkwiththeSudan,

throughthesystematicdiplomaticdialoguebetweenus,andanyAmericanmovetowards

Beijing is fruitless.’30 Such statementshighlight thatSudaneseofficialshad failed to

interpretChina’semergingforeignpolicyactivismmoregenerallyasBeijingbeganto

expressitsintentionstoco-operatewiththeinternationalcommunityoveravarietyof

issuesrangingfromDarfurtoNorthKoreaandnuclearnon-proliferation.

t h e A P P o I N t m e N t o F t h e S P e C I A l e N v o y

ThenewChinesepolicytowardsDarfurreacheditsclimaxwiththeannouncementon11

May2007oftheappointmentofaChinesespecialenvoyforAfricanaffairs,LiuGuijin

(theformerambassadortoZimbabweandSouthAfrica),31whowouldberesponsiblefor

Darfur.Chinaalsoannouncedthatitwassending275militaryengineerstotakepartinthe

UNpeacekeepingoperationinDarfur.32ByJune2008,143engineershadalreadyarrived

attheirpostsandChinadeclaredthattheremainingmembersofitsengineeringmission

wouldarriveinSudanbymid-July.Moreover,Chinahadalsoconsentedtothetransferof

someoftheChineseengineerswhowereparticipatinginpeacekeepingtasksinSouthern

SudantoDarfurtoassisttheChineseengineeringunitsintheconstructionofcampsand

thelevellingofroads,thuspreparingforthedeploymentofmoreUN-sponsoredforces.33

YongYu,theChineseMFAspokesperson,referredto‘thereadinessofChinatoco-operate

withtheinternationalcommunitytostoptheviolenceinDarfurandreturnstabilityto

theregion’,indicatingthat,‘Chinaispreparedtoco-operatewiththeUSinthismatter’.

Importantly,sheaddedthattheUShadplayed‘apositiveroletowardsthesolutionofthe

Darfurproblem…andthatChinaandtheUSsharebetweenthemajointvisionabout

Darfur,andbothareworkingtoresolvetheproblemthroughdiplomaticmeans’.34

Behindthispublicshift inChina’sstancewereanumberoffactors, includingthe

factthatsomeleadersoftheEuropeanUnion(EU)raisedthepossibilityofboycotting

theBeijingOlympicsscheduledforthesummerof2008andthemessagesentby108

membersoftheUSCongresstotheChinesepresidentcallingonhimtopressSudanto

10



takesomeseriousstepstostoptheviolenceinDarfur.35However,thispublicdisplayof

achangeinChina’sapproachtoSudanwas,asnotedearlier,alreadyafeatureofbilateral

relationsbetweenthetwocountriesbehindthescenes.

WiththeannouncementoftheappointmentofaspecialChineseenvoy,theSudanese

governmentinformedBeijingthatfromitsperspectivetheUNforcewasapreludetothe

oustingoftherulingregimeandtheimpositionofWesterncontroloverSudan’sinternal

affairs. It indicatedthat, if it lostpoweroverDarfurbyacceptingthedeploymentof

UNpeacekeepersthis,thismightaffectChina’soilinterestsinSudan.36TheSudanese

president triedoncemore togetChinesesupport toblock theproposedUSandUK

sanctions,butHuJintaoreportedlytoldAl-Bashirthatfirsthewouldhavetoacceptthe

UNpeacekeepingforcesandfacilitatetheirtask,afterwhichChinawouldnegotiatewith

WashingtonandLondontoabandonthepunitivemeasuresthattheyintendedtobring

beforetheUNSecurityCouncil.37

AgainstabackdropofdeepeningviolenceinDarfur,ChinajoinedtheWestinpublicly

pressuringSudanon31July2007whenitvotedinfavourofSecurityCouncilResolution

1769,whichauthorisedtheUNtosenda26 000-strongpeacekeepingforcetoDarfur.38

ThereactionoftheSudanesegovernmentwashostileanditoncemorethreatenedtofight

theseforces.However,facedwithjointpressurefromChinaandtheWest,coupledwiththe

threatofadditionalnewpenalties,Khartoumacceptedthedeploymentofthepeacekeepers.

Butitwasnotlongbeforeitbegantoadoptnewtacticstoobstructtheexecutionofthe

resolution.Thisincludedraisingmanytechnicalproblemsandobjectingtotheparticipation

ofsomestatesintheoperation,aswellasinsistingthattheAfricancontinentprovidethe

peacekeepingforces,thusdelayingthewholemissionforseveralmonths.39Furthermore,

accusationsthattheSudanesegovernmentwasplanningtosponsoraninvasionofChad

inordertodisruptplannedEUtroopdeploymentsthere–whichconcurrentlyexposedthe

roleofChineseweaponrysuppliedtoChadianoppositionmilitias–broughtadditional

complexity to the situation.China, alongwith theotherSecurityCouncilmembers,

supportedaresolutionauthorisingdeploymentoftheEUforces,40despiteeffortsbythe

SudanesegovernmenttoconvinceChinatoblocktheresolution.41

As a result of these developments and the persistent delays by the Sudanese

government in fulfilling its obligations over Darfur, the Chinese envoy, Liu Guijin,

confrontedtheSudaneseministerofforeignaffairs,DengAlor,attheAfricanSummitin

AddisAbabaon31January2008andinformedhimofChina’sanxietyoverthesituation

inDarfur,asserting that, ‘thepatienceof the internationalcommunityhasstarted to

runoutaboutwhatishappeninginDarfur’.42Furthermore,asGuijinindicatedinarare

publicstatementonthesubjecton10January2008, ‘theco-operationofChinawith

statessuchasSudandoesnotnecessarilymeanitsapprovalofoffencesagainsthuman

rightsthere…theChineseGovernmentdoesnotsupportanymassacrecommittedbythe

Sudanesegovernmentagainstitspeople’.43Thesestatementsindicatethatthepatience

oftheChinesegovernmenthadactuallyranout,justasthepatienceoftheinternational

communityhad runout some timebefore.Followinghis attendance at theAfrican

Summit,theChinesespecialenvoyvisitedKhartoum.Reportsindicatethatheinformed

alltheofficialswhomhemetthatthedegreeoffrustrationoftheinternationalcommunity

wassuchthatitcouldleadtoeconomicboycottsandawide-rangingmilitaryembargo

againstSudan.Moreover,thatChinawouldnotbeabletoopposethesemeasuresdueto

Khartoum’slackofco-operationwiththeinternationalcommunity.44


11


Despitethis,NafiAliNafireiteratedtheSudanesegovernment’srefusaltoacceptthe

deploymentofnon-Africantroopsintheregion.45Moreover,theSudanesegovernment

escalated itsmilitaryactionsandbombarded the JebelMoonarea inwesternSudan.

Theresultwasmorekillinganddisplacementofpeople.46TheSudanesegovernment’s

continueddismissalofthecallsfromitsfriendsinBeijingledtheChineseleadersto

integrateChinafurtherwiththeeffortsoftheWesternstates,andon8March2008Liu

Guijincalledontheinternationalcommunityto ‘speakinonevoice’toinfluencethe

Sudanesegovernmenttobringanendtothecrisis.Notably,hedescribedthesituation

inDarfurasa‘humanitariandisaster’–thefirsttimethatChinahadusedthislanguage

publiclysincetheoutbreakofthecrisisin2003.47

PublicconcernandcriticismmarkedtheChineseapproach,forexampleHuJintao’s

useofdirectlanguagetoAliOthmanMohamedTaha,thevice-presidentofSudan,during

the latter’svisit toChina in June2008.48Moreover,according to informedSudanese

sources,ChinadidnotrespondenthusiasticallytoarequestbySudaneseofficialstoassist

themingettingaSecurityCouncilresolutionpassedcondemningtheattackonKhartoum

bytheJusticeandEqualityMovement(JEM)andnamingitaterroristgroup.Atthesame

timetheChinesegovernmentshowedconcernoverthedelaysinimplementingtheAbuja

PeaceAgreement,whichwassignedinMay2006,callingforareturntonegotiations

andtheresumptionofthedialoguebetweentheSudanesegovernmentandthearmed

resistancemovements(ARMs)inDarfur.49DuringthevisittoKhartoumbyChineseVice-

PresidentXiJinping,hedirectlylinkedtherepercussionsofthecrisisinDarfurtoChina’s

interestsinSudan,pointingoutthat‘findingapeacefulsolutioninDarfurislinkedto

peaceandstabilityinSudanandthecommoninterestofthetwocountries’andwarning

hisSudanesehostthatthedeploymentofinternationalforceswasproceedingtooslowly.50

At the same time, the Chinese used international forums to press the ARMs in

Darfurtoreturntothenegotiatingtable.FromtheChineseperspective,theWestwas

inabetterpositiontosecurethislatteraim.LiuGuijinusedhisvisittoLondoninJune

2008tounderscorethispoint:‘WithoutthereturnoftheDarfurianArmedGroupsto

thenegotiationstable,Darfurwillnotwitnessanystability.’Moreover,hestatedthat

‘pressureononepartyalone[thegovernmentofSudan]isnotthesuitablewaytoreach

acomprehensivepoliticalsettlement’.51ReinforcingthisChineseapproachwasGeneral

MartinLutherAgwai,commanderoftheAU/UNHybridOperationinDarfur(UNAMID)

peacekeepingforces,whoannouncedinMay2008thathewas‘notreadytoriskthelives

ofhissoldiersamidstthepeopleofDarfur,whohavedecidedtofighteachother;andthat

militaryinterventioninthisconflictisnotoneofthetasksofthepeacekeepingforces,as

therewasnopeacetheretobekept’.Hecalledontheinternationalcommunitytoexert

pressureontheARMsandtheSudanesegovernmenttodemonstrateseriousintentby

returningtothepathofpeace.52

ChinaactivelyparticipatedintheParisconferenceonDarfurinJune2007,despite

theboycottbytheSudanesegovernmentandChina’sowndoubtsastotheintentions

ofthevariousparticipants,andalsoattendedtheSurtconferenceinOctober2007.53Its

unwillingnesstospeakforKhartouminthesesettingscausedAliIsmailal-Atabani,a

Sudanesejournalistwhoisknowntobeveryclosetotheleadersoftherulingpartyin

Sudan,tosaythat‘[t]heGovernmenthadnoallyinthatrealm’,presumablyreferringto

China.54ChinadidnothesitatetosupporttheinitiativeoftheSudanPeople’sLiberation

Movement(SPLM)headedbyPresidentSalvaKiirMayarditofSouthernSudanregarding

12



theunificationoftheARMsinDarfurtoproduceaunifiedprogrammeandvisionto

presenttotheSudanesegovernmentandtheinternationalcommunity.55China,inits

desiretodemonstrateitssupportforapeacefulsolutioninDarfur,wasthefirstcountryto

respondtotheUN’scallforthesupportofpeacefulmediationefforts,providingfinancial

supportamountingto$500,000forthispurpose.

Continuingtoassertthatapoliticalsolutionwastheonlywayofendingviolenceinthe

region,ChinacondemnedtheJEMattackonKhartoumon11May2008becauseithadled

tothelossofcivilianlives.Chinathen‘calleduponthisMovementtoreturntothepeace

process’andstartwithnegotiationsthatwouldachievepeace,stabilityanddevelopment

inDarfur.56AnimportantstepwasthentakenwhenChinaexpresseditsreadinesstoplay

amediatingrolebetweentheARMsandtheKhartoumgovernmentintheDarfurconflict.

FollowinghisvisittoSudaninMarch2008,LiuGuijindescribedthesituationinDarfur

asdisastrousandstatedthatChinais‘readytooperateasadiplomaticbridgeamongthe

partiestotheconflicttoassistinendingthecrisisandstoppingthebloodshed’.57

Thecontentionofthispaperisthatperhapsthemostsignificanteventrepresenting

thetransformationinChina’sstancevis-à-vistheconflictinDarfuroccurredwhenSpecial

EnvoyLiuGuijinhadameetingwithAliKhalifaAskouri,theSudaneseoppositionleader

ofthedisplacedpeopleofNorthernSudan,attheUKparliamentinLondon.Askouri

urgedtheChineseenvoythat‘itisnecessarythat[China]adoptsanewpolicyindealing

with theSudaneseproblems’,which should include theparticipationof thevarious

politicalforcesandcivilsocietyorganisations(CSOs)inresolvingtheDarfurconflict.58

Followingthismeeting,Guijindeclaredthathiscountry‘endeavourstoengageallthe

SudanesepoliticalforcestoachieveaconsensusamongtheSudanese’tobringabouta

peacefulsolutiontothecrisisinDarfur.59IthasbeenstatedthatcertainSudaneseactivists

thereforeconsideredthemeetingbetweenGuijinandAskouritorepresentanimportant

changeinBeijing’spolicy,andtheyalsoexpectedChinatotakegreaterstepstoworkwith

CSOsinSudan.60

t h e C A l l F o R A l- b A S h I R ’ S A R R e S t b y t h e I N t e R N A t I o N A l C R I m I N A l C o u R t

ThecrisisinDarfurenteredanewanddangerousphasewhenon14July2008thegeneral

attorneyoftheICC,LuisMoreno-Ocampo,calledfortheissueofawarrantofarrestfor

SudanesePresidentOmaral-Bashirforcrimesagainsthumanityandwarcrimescommitted

inDarfur.61Oncemore,Chinesediplomacyfounditselfconfrontedbyanewchallenge

asaresultoftheDarfurcrisisastheICCcallwasissuedlessthanamonthbeforethe

openingoftheBeijingOlympics.China,withoneeyeontheupcomingsummergames,

expressedgraveconcernover theICC’sdecision.AnMFAspokespersonstated: ‘The

activityoftheInternationalCriminalCourtmustbeofbenefittothestabilityoftheDarfur

regionandtheaccomplishmentofthesettlementofthecase,andnottheopposite.’Guijin

refrainedfromissuinganystatementaboutwhetherChinawouldsupportsuchadecision,

indicatingthatChinawouldcontinuetoconsultwithSecurityCouncilmembersand

otherstoreachanunderstandingregardingtheSudanesequestionandtheICCdecision.62

Meanwhile, on 17 July 2008 the People’s Daily (the official organ of the Central

CommitteeoftheChineseCommunistParty)arguedthattheICCdecision‘pouredoilon


13


thefireandobstructstheeffortsofthepeacefulsettlementandnegotiationsbetweenthe

ArmedMovementsinDarfurandtheSudanesegovernment’.Itwentontodescribethe

situationinDarfurascriticalandwhatwasrequiredatthattimewastheenhancementof

peaceandtheencouragingofdialogueamongallthepartiesandnotthethreateningof

certainpartiestotheconflictwithpenaltiesandarrestwarrants.63

Having issuedthesepublicstatementsaimedatplacating theDarfuractivistsand

influentialinternationalorganisations,Chinesediplomatsimmediatelybeganconducting

negotiations in Washington, a number of European capitals and Beijing to contain

theimpactoftheICC’sdecision.64InformedChineseandSudanesesourcesclaimthat

telephonecallsweremadebetweenseniorSudaneseandChineseofficialsexchanging

opinions as towhat the ICCwoulddonext and their respective countries’ possible

reactions.Accordingtothesesamesources,SudanaskedChinatouseitsinfluencein

theSecurityCounciltopreventanyfurtherdevelopments.65Meanwhile,theSudanese

representativeattheUNdeclaredthathewasholdingdiscussionswithhisChineseand

RussiancounterpartsinsearchofaformulathatwouldeffectivelyfreezetheICCdecision.66

AsChinawasfocusedontheupcomingBeijingOlympicsinJuly2008,theChinese

MFA(especiallythedepartmentsdealingwiththeDarfurcrisis)workedfranticallytofind

asatisfactorysolutiontotheDarfurissue.Itconductedintensiveconsultationswiththe

ArabLeagueofStatesandtheAU.Similarly,theSudaneseministeroffinance,AwadAhmed

al-Jaz,conductedimportanttalksinBeijingatthetimeoftheSecurityCouncil’sdiscussions

concerningtheextensionoftheUNAMIDpeacekeepingoperation.67Co-ordinationamong

theAU,theArabLeagueandChinaledtothepassingofSecurityCouncilResolution

1828,whichextendedtheUNAMIDmandate to31July2009.However, theAUand

China insistedon the inclusionof aparagraph in the resolutionexpressingconcern

as to ‘potentialdevelopmentssubsequent to theapplicationby theprosecutorof the

InternationalCriminalCourtof14July2008andtakingnoteoftheirintentiontoconsider

thesemattersfurther’.68TheUShadrefrainedfromsupportingtheresolution‘becausethe

languagewhichwasaddedwillsendawrongmessagetoSudanandobstructtheeffortsof

achievingjustice’,69whileKhartoumwelcomedtheresolutionasbalanced.70

Duringthedebateontheresolution,theChineserepresentativeattheUN,Ambassador

WangGuangya,tooktheopportunitytocallontheSecurityCounciltouseitsauthorities

tofreezetheproceduresoftheICC’sindictmentoftheSudanesepresident.Hedrewthe

council’sattentiontothefactthat,inChina’sopinion,noprogresscouldbeexpected

intheDarfurpeaceprocesswithoutthefullco-operationoftheSudanesegovernment

anddescribedthedecisionoftheICCas‘inappropriate’andpoorlytimed,andthatit

wouldseverelyunderminethemutualpoliticalconfidenceandco-operationbetweenthe

UNandtheSudanesegovernment.Headdedthatthisindictmenthadbeenmetwith

criticismsfrominternationalorganisationssuchastheAU,theArabLeagueofStates,the

OrganisationoftheIslamicConferenceandtheNon-AlignedMovement.71

However,theChinesestancecameunderattackfromIslamistswithinSudanfornot

goingfarenough,declaringittobeaweakpositionforthatofamajorglobalpower.In

thewordsofonewriter:72

WhydidChinauseitsvetorightsonlyoncetostopthesuccessivepenaltiesintheSecurity

CouncilagainsttheSudan;whileBeijingusedthisrightwithouthesitationtostopadecision

topunishPresidentRobertMugabeonthepretextthatsuchadecisionrepresentsanoutright

14



interferenceof the sovereigntyof the stateandanoffenceagainst the immunityof its

president.So,whyMugabeandnotAl-Bashir?

While Sudan’s official media were celebrating the passing of the Security Council

resolutionasavictoryfortheSudanesegovernment,ChinarecognisedthattheICCmatter

continuedtoposeadanger.InformedsourcesstresstheimportanceofSpecialEnvoyZhai

Jun’svisittoKhartouminearlySeptember,inwhichhedeliveredapersonalmessage

fromHuJintaotoAl-Bashir.Heexpressedhiscountry’sconcernoverthegovernment-led

attackagainsttheKalimarefugeecamp,whichledtowideinternationalcondemnation.

Junwarnedagainstanyirresponsiblebehaviourthatmightobstructapeacesettlement.73

TheChineseenvoyalsostressedthatcriminalcasesexistedthatshouldbeaddressed.74

Moreover,heurgedKhartoumtotakeintoconsiderationthemotivesofthestatesthat

supportedtheindictmentoftheSudanesepresidentbytheICC.75Amongthesuggestions

madebytheChinesegovernmentwastourgetheSudanesegovernmenttofindawayto

dealwiththeICC,76thesamepositionarticulatedbyZhouYongkang,amemberofthe

PoliticalBureauoftheChineseCommunistParty,whenhemetNafiAliNafiinBeijingon

16September2008.Khartoumdidnotrespondtothisproposal.

Inthisnegativeatmosphere,QatarlaunchedanArab–Africaninitiative.Itwasevident

fromthebeginningthatthisinitiativehadthetacitsupportofimportantinternational

actors and even some parties to the conflict within Sudan. France, the US and the

Sudanesegovernmentallwelcomedit,whiletheARMsinDarfurdidnottakeanegative

approachtoit,withJEMdeclaringitsappreciationoftheinitiativesandotherfactions

adoptinga‘waitandsee’attitude.77

China,ontheotherhand,sawtheArab–Africaninitiativeasanimportantopportunity

tobreakthedeadlockinthecrisis.Beijingwasveryenthusiasticaboutitandcalledfor

co-ordinationbetweenChinaandQatar.IndiscussionswithQatarianofficials,theChinese

suggestedurgingtheSudanesesidestodemonstrategreaterflexibilityinco-operatingwith

theinitiative.TheyalsopleadedwithWesterngovernmentstopresstheARMsinDarfur

toholddirectdiscussionswiththeSudanesegovernment.78

ThroughassessinginformationgatheredfrommeetingsheldbetweenChineseofficials

andtheirSudanese,WesternandArabcounterpartsupuntilFebruary2009,China’sstance

vis-à-vistheICCcrisisandtheSudanesegovernmentcanbesummarisedbythefivekey

pointsstressedbyitsofficials.Firstly,theICCindictmentcomplicatedthepeaceeffortsin

suchawaythatcouldleadtocivilwarandthedismantlingoftheSudanesestate.Assuch,

ChineseofficialscalledupontheICCtofreezetheindictmentforayear.Secondly,they

believedthatitwasimportantthattheSudanesegovernmentengageindialoguewiththe

ICC,evenifthroughathirdparty.Thirdly,thereshouldbeafairpaymentofcompensation

tothevictimsoftheconflictinDarfur.Fourthly,whatcoulddelayasolutiontothecrisis

wasthecontinuationofdifferencesbetweenhardlinersandmoderateswithintheruling

NCPoverthewaytodealwiththeICC.Finally,ChineseofficialsurgedtheSudanese

government tobring thoseresponsible forcriminaloffences inDarfur toa fair trial,

includingtheministerofstateforhumanitarianaffairs,AhmedHaroun,andtheleader

ofthePopularArmyfortheRestorationofDemocracy,AliKushayb.Inaddition,they

advisedthegovernmenttodismisstheformerfromhiscurrentpost.

Inlightofthesecircumstances,thispapercontendsthatatthisstageofthecrisisthe

ChinesestancewasinfactclosertothatoftheWestthanthatoftheSudanesegovernment.


15


This ishighlightedby theapparent similaritybetweenChina’sapproachand thatof

France.FrenchdiplomatsalsodeclaredtheneedtobeginproceduresagainstAhmed

HarounandAliKushaybfortheirallegedrolesincommittingcrimesagainstciviliansin

Darfur,advocatedtheco-operationoftheSudanesegovernmentwiththeICC,encouraged

dialoguewiththeARMsanddemandedthenon-interventionofSudanintheinternal

affairsofneighbouringChad.79

Infact,sinceChina’sabstentioninthevoteforSecurityCouncilResolution1593

inMarch2005,whichdirectedtheICCtoinvestigateallegedcrimesagainsthumanity

in Darfur, China had been well aware of its limited potential influence over such

developmentswithintheSecurityCouncil.Inthecaseofanyproposedresolutionfrom

itssideforfreezingtheproceduresoftheICC,theUS(andperhapsalsoFranceandthe

UK)wouldusethevetorighttoabortsucharesolution.ForChinatogetanyproposed

decisionpassedintheSecurityCouncil, itwouldneedthesupportofninemembers

inthecouncilandnovetofromanypermanentmember.Thus,theChineseviewwas

thatthiscaseneededtobesettledwithintheSecurityCouncilandinco-operationwith

theWesternpowers,butthatthiswouldbeextremelydifficultwithouttheSudanese

governmentbecomingmoreflexiblevis-à-vistheICC.

AccordingtomanyresponsibleChineseofficials,Chinafacedsignificantchallengesin

dealingwiththeICCduetothedifferencesofopinionwithintherulingpartyinSudan

betweenthosewhostressedtheimportanceofdealingwiththeICCandthosewhorefused

anyco-operation. Sucha lackof coherencewas exacerbatedbydifferencesbetween

officialsinKhartoumandthoseinJuba,indicatingthattheGovernmentofNationalUnity

(GNU)wasunabletoagreeonaunifiednationalstancetowardsthecrisis.Itseemsthat

China’sadvicetotheKhartoumgovernment,whichZhaiJunstressedinhisSeptember

2008visittoSudan,abouttheimportanceofdealingwiththeICCdidnotbearfruit,asthe

Sudanesegovernmentcontinuedtorejectanykindofcontactoranyattemptatbuilding

relationswiththeICC.

t h e R e A C t I o N o F t h e A R m e d R e S I S t A N C e m o v e m e N t S I N d A R F u R t o t h e C h I N e S e S t A N C e o N t h e C o N F l I C t

Fromtheresearchfindingsofthepresentauthor,whoconductednumerousinterviews

withSudanese intellectualsandopinionleaders fromoutsidethemembershipof the

rulingNCPinSudan,mostofthemseetheChinesestancevis-à-vistheconflictinDarfur

asbeinginlinewiththestanceoftheNCP.Fromtheirperspective,Chinacouldnotbean

effectiveforceforbringingaboutaresolutiontotheconflict.80

Infact,oppositionforcesoutsidethegovernmentdonotstandaloneinthisregard,

asofficialswithin thepartnerpartyof theGNU, theSPLM,also share thisopinion.

AtthetimethattheNCPgovernmentrejectedthepresenceofinternationalforcesin

Sudan,thegeneralsecretaryoftheSPLM,FaganAmom,appealedtothegovernmentto

acceptResolution1706,statingthat‘therejectionbytheNationalCongressPartyofthe

internationalresolutionworsensthesituationinDarfur’.81Likewise,MinniMinnawi,the

seniorpresidentialassistantoftheSudanesepresident(whoisalsotheleaderoftheSLA

andasignatoryoftheMay2006AbujaPeaceAgreement)declaredthattherulingNCP

doesnotwishtoimplementtheAbujaAgreementandisplacingmajorobstaclesinthe

16



wayofitsimplementation.82Someofhisadherentshaveconsistentlycomplainedthat

Chinaignoresthem,andoneofthemconveyedtotheauthorthatthey‘donotknow

thereasonwhyChinadisregardstheirleadership,eventhoughtheybecameapartof

thecentralgovernment’.83Inaddition,theadvisertotheSudanesepresident,Abdalla

Masar,whoisknowntobeanardentdefenderofthegovernment’spolicyinDarfur,called

uponChinatopressuretheSudanesegovernmenttoreviewitsstancetowardsthevarious

internationalresolutions.84

Ingeneral,thecriticismvoicedbysomeGNUofficials,CSOsandARMswascalmas

theywaitedforBeijingtolistentotheirsuggestions.However,amajortransformation

occurredwhentheChinesepresidentvisitedSudaninFebruary2007.TheKhartoum

Monitor,whichisacloseaffiliateoftheSPLM,tookadvantageofHuJintao’svisit to

criticisethestanceoftheChinesegovernmenttowardstheconflictinSudanandcalled

onChinatoreviewitsapproachandpressurisetheNCPleadershiptoaddresstheconflict

inaseriousmanner.85TheDarfurARMsalsotookthisopportunitytolaunchaviolent

informationcampaignagainsttheChinesestandvis-à-visthecrisisintheregion.

OnepublicstatementbytheNationalSalvationFront(oneofthefactionsfighting

in Darfur) claimed during President Jintao’s visit that ‘China’s record in the Darfur

casewasshamefulanddepressing’andalsoaddedthatChina‘supportstheKhartoum

regimewithoutcaringaboutthewarcrimescommittedbyitinDarfur,andthat[China]

continuestoprovidetheinternationalpoliticalcoverforSudantocontinueitsmassacres’.

ThestatementthencalledonJintaoto‘reviewthestanceofhisGovernmenttowardsthe

SudanandDarfur’.86Meanwhile,aseniorsourcewithintheSLAaccusedtheChinese

governmentofprovidingtheKhartoumregimewithweaponryandaircraftusedinDarfur

sothatChinacouldcontrolthewealthoftheregion.87Throughthissource,theSLAasked

theChinesepresidenttoengagewithallthepeopleoftheSudanandnotonlywiththe

governmentinordertocorrectwhatitconsideredtobeChina’snegativeimageinSudan.88

Moreover,theSLApleadedwithChinatoapplypressureontheKhartoumgovernmentto

swiftlyimplementResolution1706.89

However, voices critical of China’s policy towards the crisis in Darfur were not

onlyheardwithinKhartoum.AliKhalifaAskouri,theleaderofthedisplacedpeopleof

NorthernSudan(whoisalsoaknownpoliticalactivist),surprisedobserversbyholdinga

pressconferenceinBeijingafterparticipatinginaninternationalseminaraboutChinese

investmentsinAfricaheldinShanghai.AtthisconferencehecriticisedChinesepolicy

towardstheDarfurcrisis,indicatingthat‘haditnotbeenforthesupportofChina,the

killing,displacementandburningofvillagesbytheKhartoumgovernmentwouldnot

haveoccurred’.AskourialsocalledonChinatopressurisetheKhartoumgovernmentto

accepttheinternationalforcessoastoprotecttherefugeecamps.Furthermore,heasked

theinternationalcommunitytoencourageChinatoenditsunconditionalsupportforthe

Sudanesegovernment.90

InadditiontoSudanesepoliticalforces,China’sstancetowardsthecrisisinDarfur

wasalsoperceivedtobeproblematicamongseniorofficials,journalistsandpublicfigures

inEasternandSouthernAfrica,suchasArchbishopDesmondTutu,whoexpressedtheir

concernaboutthefailureoftheSecurityCouncil toexertpressureontheKhartoum

governmentto improvethesituationinDarfur.Theywarnedagainst theJanjaweed’s

attempttoannihilateAfricantribes.91Moreover,ChineseembassiesinanumberofWestern

capitalswitnessedprotestsbySudanesewhowerejoinedbymanyEuropeancitizens,


17


writersandNobelPrizewinnersagainstChina’sstancevis-à-vistheconflictinDarfur.

ThedemonstratorsdeliveredmemorandumstotheChineseambassadorsinLondon,Paris

andWashington,DC,demandingthattheChinesegovernmentapplypressureonthe

SudanesegovernmenttoaccepttheUNresolutionsandco-operatewiththeinternational

community.92ThisoccurredatatimewhentheDarfurBarAssociationhadsentlettersto

theresponsibleChineseofficials,includingSpecialEnvoyLiuGuijinduringhisvisitto

Sudan,inwhichtheyaskedtheChinesetopresstheSudanesegovernmenttostopcreating

obstaclespreventingtheimplementationofthevariousUNresolutions.93

However,itwasthecriticismbytheCSOsandARMswithinSudanthatquicklyturned

fromcondemnationandthedenouncingofChina’spoliciestothethreatofattacking

ChineseeconomicinterestsinSudanatanumberofsiteswhereChina’soilcompanies

wereoperating.InOctober2007JEM,ledbyKhalilIbrahim,attackedtheDefraoilfield

intheKordofanarea,asitemanagedbytheGreaterNilePetroleumOperatingCompany,

withwhichtheChineseNationalPetroleumCorporationisaffiliated.Thegroupabducted

twoforeignoilworkersandreleasedastatementclaimingthat‘theattackontheDefra

fieldisamessagetoChinawhicharmstheKhartoumGovernment’.Moreover,Ahmed

Togo,theseniorJEMnegotiator,indicatedinastatementtoReutersthat‘thearmswhich

wecapturedfromthegovernmentsoldiersduringtheattackwereChinesemade’.

Inapreviousstatement,JEMhadgiventheforeignoilcompaniesaweektoleave

Sudan.94AlthoughChinarespondedtothisthreaton25October2007byaskingthe

Sudanese government to take urgent measures ‘to guarantee the safety of Chinese

employeesintheoilfieldsandothersitesofwork’,JEMsucceededinmakinganadditional

attackontheRahwafieldintheKordofanregioninDecember2007.95TheJEMfield

commander,AbdelAzizNur,toldAgenceFrance-Presseaftertheattackthathis‘forces

hadattackedtheRahwafieldinitstargetingoftheChineseoilcompaniesoperatingin

theregion’.96ThisoccurredatatimewhenmanyoftheARMsinDarfurhaddeclared

ChineseforceswithinUNAMIDtobeunwelcome,astheywerenotperceivedtobeneutral

intheconflict,whileIsamal-Haj,theofficialspokespersonoftheSLA,accusedChinaof

obstructingtheeffortsat‘mitigatingthehumanitariancrisiswhichafflictedthepeopleof

Darfur’.97

It is important to note that the address of the Darfur ARMs attending the Surt

conferenceinLibyaon27October2007,whichaimedatbridgingthegapbetweenthese

groupsandtheSudanesegovernment,disregardedtheroleofChinainreachingasolution

tothecrisis.Forexample,theaddressonbehalfoftheARMsdeliveredbyTajel-Deen

Bashir,theJEMseniornegotiator,thankedthedelegatesoftheAU,theUN,theEU,the

US,Canada,theUKandNorway,butdidnotacknowledgeChina’seffortstoresolvethe

conflict,despitethepresenceoftheChineseSpecialEnvoyGuijin,atthisconferenceand

theconsiderablehumanitarianassistancethatChinahadprovidedtotheunstableregion.98

Inreality,alltheoppositionforcestotherulingNCPcontendedthatChinacouldplaya

positiveandassertiveroleintheresolutionofthedispute.Tothiseffect,Saddiqal-Mahdi,

leaderoftheNationalUmmaParty,statedthat‘thereisanecessityfortheinterventionof

RussiaandChinaintheinternationaleffortsaimingattheresolutionofthecrisis,soas

tocreateamuchneededbalanceindealingwiththeforeignforcesconcernedwiththis

conflict’.Moreover,Al-Mahdiassertedthat‘ChinaandRussiahavelongrelationswith

theSudan,andsotheymustbeinvolvedinthesolutionsothatthemattershallnotbe

confinedonlytotheeffortsoftheUSandtheEuropeanUnion’.99Itispossiblethatthis

18



callforChina’sfullparticipationintheinternationaleffortstoresolvethecrisisisalsoa

resultofAl-Mahdi’sconcernsabouttheintentionsoftheUSanditsEuropeanalliesin

Sudan.

t h e o F F I C I A l R e A C t I o N S o F t h e W e S t t o C h I N e S e P o l I C y I N d A R F u R

Asiswellknown,thecriticismofChina’sinitialroleinthecrisisputforwardbytheARMs

bothwithinSudanandabroadoccurredwithinthecontextofwiderinternationalpressure

onChina.Moreover,manyoftheoppositiongroupswithinSudangainedinternational

support,forexample,fromtheAmericanfilmdirectorStevenSpielberg,whowithdrew

fromhispostasaconsultantfortheBeijingOlympics.100Inaddition,Chinawasexposed

tosignificantpressurefromEUministersofforeignaffairsduringthe8thAsia–Europe

MeetinginGermanyinMay2007.101Atthesametime,morethanahundredmembers

oftheUKparliamentsentamessagetotheChinesepresident,HuJintao,on29October

2007appealingtoChinatoreviewitspolicytowardsSudanandtotrytoconvincethe

Sudanesegovernmenttostopattacksagainstcivilians,disarmitsmilitias,co-operatewith

theICCandfacilitatereliefoperations.102Meanwhile,someEuropeanrepresentatives

encouragedtheEUtomaintainthearmsbanthathadbeenimposedonChinasince

1989untilitsuspendsitsexportsofarmstoSudan.Similarly,USJewishorganisations

calleduponJewstoboycotttheOlympicGamesinBeijingduetoChina’ssupportfor

theSudanesegovernment,which,theyclaimed,oppressedthepeopleofDarfur.103Inthe

past,theseJewishorganisationshadfollowedIsraelipolicy,whichavoideddirectingany

criticismagainstChina.

China’smoreactivepolicyregardingtheDarfurcrisiswaswellreceivedwithinWestern

officialcircles.TheUSpresidentatthetime,GeorgeW.Bush,commentedonChina’s

positiveroleinthecrisiswhenhemettheChinesepresidentattheWhiteHouseinApril

2006and,moreover,attheG8summitinJune2007,hedescribedChinaasaprincipal

stakeholderthatsharedseveralstrategicinterestswiththeUS.104Inaddition,severalaides

oftheUSpresidentcommendedtheChineseeffortsatsolvingthecrisisinDarfur,such

asUSSecretaryofStateCondoleezzaRice,whoaffirmedthat‘theUShighlyappreciates

thepositiverolewhichChinaplaysinDarfur’.105TheUSspecialenvoytoSudan,Andrew

Natsios,reassertedthispositioninstatingthatitwas‘becauseoftheinfluenceofChina

thatKhartoumacceptedtheSecurityCouncilResolution[for]thedeploymentoftheUN–

AUHybridMissioninJuly2007’.Moreover,headdedthat‘theChinesearemakingmany

positiveinitiatives,evenwhenwedidnotaskthemto’.106

China’s new foreign policy activism, with the shift on Darfur being its clearest

expression,hascontributedtotherecognitionbyWesterncountriesofChina’simportance

todevelopmentandpeaceintheworld.PresidentNicolasSarkozyofFranceunderscored

thispointwhenhedeclared that ‘[m]ajorworldproblemscannotbesolvedwithout

theco-operationandcontributionofChina’whenreferringtoanumberinternational

crisessuchasthecasesofnuclearproliferationbyNorthKoreaandIran,aswellasthe

humanitariansituationinDarfur.107Attheregionallevel,theArabLeaguepraisedChina’s

contributionstointernationalstabilityandpeace,especiallyitsroleintheDarfurquestion

anditsongoingeffortstofindacomprehensivesolutiontothecrisis.108


19


C o N C l u S I o N

AfterassessingChina’sroleintheDarfurconflictsinceitsoutbreakin2003,itisevident

thatthecountryhadinitiallyacceptedtheofficialSudanesepositionandtoagreatextent

supportedtheSudanesegovernmentintheUNSecurityCouncil.Asapermanentmember

ofthecouncil,China’sSudanpolicyattheearlystagesoftheconflictservedtoobstruct

manyUNresolutionsaimedatimprovingconditionsintheregionfortheprotectionof

thelocalpopulationandforcingtheSudanesegovernmenttosuspenditssupportforthe

violentactstakingplaceinDarfur.ItisapparentthattheChinesedeclarationsofsupport

fortheSudanesegovernmenthadbeenbasedonKhartoum’sassurancestoChinathatit

(i.e.theSudanesegovernment)wasdealingwiththesituationinDarfur.

However,Chinabegantoreassessitsrolevis-à-visthecrisisafteritrealisedthatthere

wasagapbetweenofficialgovernmentrhetoricandtherealityonthegroundinthe

region.FromDecember2004,notablypriortothelaunchingofthe‘GenocideOlympics’

campaign,Chinabegantoexpressitsconcernoverthedeteriorationofthesituationin

theregionbyadvisingtheSudanesegovernmenttoactivelyaddresstheDarfurcrisis.

Moreover,on30July2004ChinaeffectivelyopenedthedoorforWesternpowerstoexert

pressureonKhartoumbyabstaininginthevoteforSecurityCouncilResolution1556,

whichdemandedthatthegovernmentofSudanfulfil itscommitmentstodisarmthe

Janjaweedmilitiasandbringitsleaderswhohadcarriedouthumanrightsviolationsin

Darfurtojustice.

ThisstudyhasalsorevealedafurthershiftinChina’sstancesinceNovember2006

whenChinabegantoapplydirectpressureontheSudanesegovernmenttoco-operate

withtheinternationalcommunityandnottoputobstaclesinthewayofthedeployment

ofaninternationalpeacekeepingforceintheDarfurregion.ItisevidentthatChina’s

interventionintheSudanatthisstageledtotheNCPgovernment’sacceptanceofthe

deploymentofUNAMID,assetoutinResolution1769,andthustoKhartoum’sincreased

flexibilityinitsdealingswiththeinternationalcommunity.Furthermore,thisresearch

hasexposed thedisconnectionbetween theSudaneseandChineseofficialpositions

towardstheconflictfrom2007,asChinavotedinsupportofeachoftheSecurityCouncil

resolutionsthataimedtoexertfurtherpressureontheKhartoumgovernment.InJune

2008,ChinasupportedtheSecurityCouncilpresident’sstatementreiteratingthatthe

governmentof Sudan should co-operatewith the ICC in its investigationof crimes

committedbythepartiestotheconflict.TheSudanesegovernment,ontheotherhand,

consideredthisstatementasoutrightinterferenceinSudan’sinternalaffairs.Moreover,

Chinaparticipatedinseveralinternationalforumsandconferences,suchastheParis

conferenceinJune2008,thatattemptedtoseekwaystoendtheviolenceinDarfur,despite

theirrejectionbytheKhartoumgovernmentasadistractionfromcurrentpeaceefforts.

Throughout this period, China continued to apply pressure on the Sudanese

governmentbyassuringitsofficialsthatonlyapeacefulsolutiontotheconflictwould

bringanendtothecrisis.Chinesediplomatsengagedwiththeircounterpartsinboththe

WestandKhartouminthesearchnotonlyforapoliticalsettlementoftheICCissue,but

alsoforacomprehensivesolutiontotheconflictintheDarfurregion.However,Chinaalso

begantoemphasisethatonlybyexertingpressureonallpartiestotheconflicttonegotiate

couldapoliticalsettlementbeachieved.Assuch,Chinesediplomatscalledupontheir

counterpartsintheWesttoinfluencetheARMsinDarfurtoengageindialogueandtook

20



animportantstepindeclaringChina’sintentiontomediatebetweentheARMsandthe

Khartoumgovernmentintheconflict.

However,Beijingultimatelydidnotsucceedinthismediationroledespiterepeated

callstotheARMstositdownatthenegotiatingtable.WhileChinacertainlyappearedto

provideunconditionalsupportfortheKhartoumgovernmentintheinitialstagesofthe

conflict,theARMsfailedtorecognisetheshiftintheChinesestancetowardstheconflict

andsocontinuedtheircriticismofChina’srelationshipwiththegovernmentandthe

targetingofChina’seconomicinterestsinSudan.Assuch,theywereunabletoutilisethis

changeinChina’spolicy,whichhadwidenedthespacefordialogueandgivenARMsthe

opportunitytoengagewithsuchaninfluentialmemberoftheUNSecurityCouncil.By

thesametoken,itisevidentthatChinadidnotmakeaconcertedefforttoreassurethe

ARMSofitsintentiontobringaboutapeacefulsolutiontotheconflictandthusbuild

strongerrelationswiththem.ThispaperthereforecontendsthattheimpactofChinaasa

mediatorintheconflictwillremainlimitedunlessitisabletoestablishbalancedrelations

withallthekeypoliticalforcesintheSudanratherthandealingonlywiththeKhartoum

government.

ThecriticalstanceofCSOsandactivistsintheWestduringthelatterstagesofthe

crisiswassimilartothatoftheARMsinSudan,astheytoodidnotgrasptheshiftin

China’sapproachto theconflict inDarfur.Theircall toboycott theOlympicGames

in2008occurredatatimewhenWesterngovernmentshadbeguntoacknowledgethe

transformationinBeijing’spolicy,asboththeUSandFrancecommendedChinaforthe

keyroleitplayedinpersuadingtheSudanesegovernmenttoacceptthedeploymentof

UNAMIDin2007.Asthispaperhasrevealed,Chinahadfounditspolicyof‘unconditional’

supportforthegovernmenttobeunderstrainasearlyas2004,andthepressurethat

itbegantoexertonSudan inresponse to therealityontheground inDarfur led to

Khartoum’sacceptanceofanumberofcrucialdecisionspertainingtotheconflictprior

tothedeploymentofUNAMID.However,despitethisshiftinChina’sapproach,Western

governmentsandthemediacontinuedtocriticiseChinaoveritsperceivedunconditional

tieswiththegovernmentinKhartoumduringthisperiod.

Asarisingpower,Chinaisrelativelynewtothechallengeofmanagingthecomplex

issuesofpeaceandsecurityabroad.ButinthecaseofDarfur,Chinesediplomatssoon

becameawarethattheirpolicyofunconditionalsupportfortheKhartoumgovernment

and‘non-interference’intheinternalaffairsoftheSudanesestatewouldconflictwith

China’swiderinterestofreassuringtheWestofitsroleasaresponsiblestakeholderin

theinternationalcommunity.Thus,inthiscontext,amoreeffectiveapproachonthe

partoftheinternationalcommunitytowardsChinawouldhavebeentoabstainfrom

criticismandtoacknowledgeandencouragethelatter’sgradualshifttowardsthisnew

policyactivismatanearlierstageofthecrisis.

In turn,however, thepaper contends that there is anurgentneed forChina, as

anemergingmajorplayerintheinternationalarena,toestablishresearchcentresand

institutessuchas those in theWest toprovidedecisionmakerswith timelyanalysis

andpolicyrecommendationsregardingconflicts,suchasDarfur,inwhichChinacould

playapivotalroleinthefuture.Moreover,anewdevelopmenthasoccurredwiththe

internationalisationoftheDarfurconflict,whichhasimplicationsforthewiderperception

ofChina’sexpandingpresenceontheAfricancontinent.Thegatheringofhundredsof

SudaneseprotestersandtheirsupportersfromanumberofAfricancountriesatChinese


21


embassiesabroadsignalled that theDarfurcrisismayhavedistorted thehistorically

positiveimageofChina’sroleonthecontinentinthemindsofSudaneseandAfricans

moregenerally.Consequentially,ChinawillneedtoengagewithAfricancivilsocietyin

ordertoimproveitsimagevis-à-vispublicopinioninthefuture.

e N d N o t e S

1 ItshouldbestressedattheoutsetthatthisstudyisconcernedwiththeChinesepositionon

theconflictinDarfur.Itdoesnotdiscussthehistorical,economic,environmental,socialor

politicalconditionsthatleduptothisconflict,northeapproachesneededtodealwithit.For

anyoneinterestedinthesedimensionsofthecrisis,manystudiesdealingwithitsrootsare

availablefrombothinsideandoutsideSudan.

2 China View,‘AntigovernmentmilitantsabductworkersinSudan,rescued’,27March2004,

http://www.chinaview.cn;seealsoPeople’s Daily Online,18&23March2004,http://www.

peoplesdaily-online.com/.

3 Anonymousinformedsource.Minnawilaterbrokeawayandformedhisownfactionofthe

SLA.

4 XinhuaNewsAgency,1September2006;seealsoPeople’s Daily Online,30January2006;

24October2006,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/;International Herald Tribune,2&3

September2006;statementbyLiuJianqiao,officialspokespersonoftheChineseMinistryof

ForeignAffairs(MFA),pressconference,2November2006.

5 NoticethattheofficialspokespersonoftheChineseMFA,YuJiang,quicklyannouncedina

pressconferencethat‘Chinahopes’thattheSecurityCouncilwouldpassaresolutionoffering

financialsupporttotheAfricanpeacekeepingforcesinSudanattheearliestpossibletime;

People’s Daily Online,30January2006,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/.

6 AhmedGK,‘MajorchangesinChineseforeignpolicy’,Strategic Studies Journal,4,11,Spring

2008,pp.71–108.

7 AhmedGK, ‘WhyChinadidnotuse itsveto toabort international resolutionno.1593’,

Al-Sahafa,14April2005(inArabic).SeealsoSudanese Online,16April2005;16January

2007;23February2007,http://www.sudaneseonline.com/;XinhuaNewsAgency,‘Chinaenvoy

visitstheSudanonties’,19February2005;seealso People’s Daily Online,17August2004,

http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/.InanattempttoexplaintheChinesepositionregarding

theDarfurcrisis,ZhaiJun,thendirectoroftheWestAsiaandNorthAfricaDepartmentatthe

ChineseMFA,metwithArabambassadorsinBeijingon23August2004andinformedthem

oftheresultsofthevisitofLuGuozeng,assistantministerofforeignaffairs,toSudan.Jun

indicatedthatGuozenghaddeliveredahandwrittenmessagefromPresidentJintaotoPresident

Al-BashirconcerningChina’sstandontheconflictinDarfur.HeaddedthatChinaalsocalled

ontheSudanesegovernmenttoimplementitsobligationsandtodealwiththeSecurityCouncil

resolutions,statingthatpenaltiesdonotsolvetheproblem.Inthismeeting,theSudanese

ambassadordeclared that Sudanwouldnot accept thepresenceof foreignpeacekeeping

forcesonitsterritories.InhismeetingswiththeresponsibleofficialsinKhartoum,Guozeng

reaffirmed the importanceof co-ordination inorder toavoid internationalpenalties; see

MFA(MinistryofForeignAffairs),‘MinutesofthemeetingsofZhaiJunwiththeArabStates

ambassadorsattheMFAinBeijing,23August2004’.Beijing:MFA,2004.

8 Ibid.

22



9 Ibid.;seealsoXinhuaNewsAgency,14December2004.

10 Anonymoussource;personalcommunicationwithaseniorSudaneseofficial.

11 China Daily,18June2007.

12 XinhuaNewsAgency,27June2008.

13 PersonalcommunicationwithaseniorSudaneseofficial.

14 AhmedGK,2008,op. cit.

15 XinhuaNewsAgency,18&19September2004;seealsoPeople’s Daily Online,15,16&18

September2004,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/.

16 XinhuaNewsAgency,19September2004.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 ForthecompletetextofSecurityCouncilResolution1593(2005),whichwaspassedbythe

SecurityCouncilinitsmeetingno.5158of31March2005,seehttp://www.un.org/News/Press/

docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm.

20 XinhuaNewsAgency,1September2006;seeUNSecurityCouncil,5519thmeeting,31August

2006,forthefulltextoftheresolution,http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8821.doc.

htm.

21 Al-Rai Al-Am,6April2005(inArabic).

22 PrivatecommunicationwithaseniorSudaneseofficial.

23 People’s Daily Online,24October2006,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/.

24 People’s Daily Online,27October2006,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/.

25 Private communication with a senior Sudanese official; see also Xinhua News Agency,

November2006;Al-Sudani, Al-Rai Al-Am andAl-Shafaduring theperiod3–4November

2006(allinArabic);seealsoChina Daily,3–4November2006.Sudancontinuedtorefuse

toacceptSecurityCouncilResolution1706uptoNovember2006.Duringhismeetingwith

PresidentHuJintao,PresidentAl-BashirconfirmedSudan’srejectionoftheresolutionandits

non-approvaloftheexpansionofthetasksoftheUNMissioninSudanwithadditionaltasks

tocoverDarfur.Heindicatedthatifthisweredone,itwouldunderminethesovereigntyand

independenceofSudan,thereforeSudanrejectedtheassignmentofthepeacekeepingtaskin

DarfurtoanyentityexcepttheAU.Inthatmeeting,Al-BashiraskedChinatosupporttheAU

bothmateriallyandlogisticallysoastoallowittocompleteitstaskinDarfur,accordingto

ananonymoussource;seeSudaneseMFA,AsianAffairsDepartment,‘TheAfrican–Chinese

CooperationForum,Beijing,November2006’.Khartoum:MFA,2006.

26 XinhuaNewsAgency,April2007;seealsoPeople’s Daily Online,8April2007,http://www.

peoplesdaily-online.com/.

27 International Herald Tribune,3–4February2007;seealsoChina Daily,3February2007.

28 South China Morning Post,11January2008.

29 Ibid.

30 Al-Sudani,14January2007(inArabic).

31 Infact,andasanindicatorofitsdesiretosettletheDarfurconflict,Chinaappointedother

envoystodealwiththematter,specificallyAmbassadorLuGuosingandZhaiJun,theassistant

ministerofforeignaffairs,whoworkedcloselytogether.

32 People’s Daily Online,11May2007,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/;China Daily,11May

2007.

33 XinhuaNewsAgency,26June2008.

34 China Daily,11May2007.


23


35 International Herald Tribune,12–14May2007.


37 PrivatecommunicationwithaseniorSudaneseofficial;seealsoChina Daily,20April2007.

38 ForthetextofResolution1769,seehttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9089.doc.htm.

39 Sudanile Online, 12 January 2008, http://www.sudanile.com/; Al-Sudani, 18 April 2008

(inArabic);Al-Intibaha,24February2008(inArabic);Al-Rai Al-Am,15December2007

(inArabic).

40 Al-Sudani,3February2008(inArabic).

41 Al-Sudani,27September2007(inArabic).

42 Sudanile Online,31December2007,http://www.sundanile.com/;seealsoAl-Sudani,1January

2008(inArabic).

43 South China Morning Post,11January2008.


45 Sudanese Online,25February2008,http://www.sudaneseonline.com/;Al-Intibaha,24February

2008(inArabic).

46 South China Morning Post,26February2008.

47 China Daily,8March2008.

48 People’s Daily Online,1June2008,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/;seealsoSudanile

Online, ‘TheChinesepresidentcallsuponSudantodomoreaboutDarfur’,13June2008,

http://www.sundanile.com/.

49 PrivatecommunicationwithaseniorSudaneseofficial;seealsoPeople’s Daily Online,12June

2008,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/.ItseemsthatBeijing’sdecisionnottosupport

Sudan’sattemptstohaveJEMplacedonthelistofterroristorganisationswasawiseone,

eventhoughKhartoumwasaskingChina,aswellasitsregionalandinternationalfriends,to

supportthismove.ChinathuskeptsendingitsofficialstointernationalconferencesintheUS

abouttheDarfurproblemthatwereattendedbyJEMleaders.Atthesametime,theSudanese

firstvice-president,SalvaKiirMayardit,calledfortheactivationofdialoguewiththeARMs

(includingJEM,whichhisgovernmentwasendeavouringtoaddtothelistofinternational

terroristorganisations).


51 China Daily,25January2008.

52 Al Ayam,‘WhatistheroutemapfortheDarfurcrisis?’,editorial,1June2008;seealsoPeople’s

Daily Online,26January2007,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/.

53 People’s Daily Online, ‘Chinesevice-foreignministertoattendParisconferenceonDarfur’,

21June2007,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/.

54 Al-AtabaniAI,‘Themovementisforeignmadeandthegovernmenthasnoally’,Al-Rai Al-Am,

29October2007.

55 Sudanile Online,18July2007,http://www.sundanile.com/.TheARMsinDarfuramountedto

20factions.ByJune2008theywerecollectedintofivemaingroupings:(1)SudanLiberation

Movement-Unity,ledbyAbdallaYahya;(2)UnitedResistanceFront,ledbyBahrAbuGarda;

(3)SudanLiberationArmyfactionledbyAbdelWahidal-Nur;(4)JEM,ledbyKhalilIbrahim;

and(5)SudanLiberationArmyfactionledbyMinniArcuaMinnawi.

56 People’s Daily Online,12May2008,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/.

57 Sudanese Online,7March2007,http://www.sudaneseonline.com/.

58 Al-Sudani,24February2008(inArabic).

59 Ibid.

24



60 Ibid.

61 See the ICC indictment, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/

situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/icc02050109?lan=en-GB.

62 PressconferenceofthespokespersonoftheChineseMFA,LiuJianqiao,15July2008.

63 People’s Daily Online,17July2008,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/.

64 Ibid.


66 Yahoo News,‘Sudan’sBashircouldescapewarcrimesindictment’,16July2008.

67 XinhuaNewsAgency,31July2008.

68 UNSecurityCouncilResolution1828(2008),S/Res/1828(2008),31July2008,http://www.

un.org/documents/scres.htm;seealsoXinhuaNewsAgency,‘ChinaurgesSecurityCouncilto

suspendICCindictmentofSudanleader’,31July2008;Al-Sudani,2August2008(inArabic.

69 Ibid.

70 Al-Sudani,2August2008(inArabic).

71 XinhuaNewsAgency,31July2008.

72 Al-HindiID,‘MytestimonyforGod’ssake’,Akhir Lahza,5August2008(inArabic).Al-Hindi

isconsideredtobeamemberoftheIslamicMovementwhoenjoyswidepressinfluenceandis

anardentdefenderofgovernmentpolicies.Chinavotedon12July2008againstaUSandEU

callfortheimpositionofpenaltiessuchasbanningPresidentRobertMugabefromtravelling,

freezinghispropertiesandsomeotherpenalties.Thatwasbecauseoftheelectionfraudand

widespreadintimidationofoppositionsupportersbysupportersofMugabe’sparty,ZANU-PF,

inZimbabweinthe2008presidentialelections.Chinacalledforthenegotiationsinvolvingthe

AUandSouthAfricatobegivenachance,ontheassumptionthatdialogueisthewaytoresolve

thecrisisintheZimbabwe.BothSouthAfricaandChinadrewattentiontothepossibilitythat

penaltieswouldincreasethecomplexityofthesituation.Informedsourcesconfirmedthat

SouthAfricahadpresentedstrongprooftoChinaaboutthepossibilityofreachingapolitical

solutiontothecrisisthroughnegotiations.ChinaalsoreceivedassurancesfromMugabe’s

governmentconfirmingthatitwasreadytosignanagreementwiththeoppositioninthe

country.ItaskedChinatodelaytheWesternschemeintheSecurityCouncilonthebasisthat

signingthisagreementwasonlyamatteroftime;seeXinhuaNewsAgency,24July2008.

73 Al-Sudani,31August2008(inArabic).TheattackbytheSudaneseforcesonKalimarefugee

anddisplacedpeople’scampinDarfurledtoanewcrisiswithintheGNU,totheeffectthat

SPLMministerswithdrewfromthethreestatesofDarfurasaprotestagainstwhathappened

inthecamp.Theministerswhowithdrewsaidinawidelydistributedstatementthattheyhad

decidedtofreezetheiractivitiesintheGNUsoasnottobecomepartytothecrimesthatwere

committedinthenameoftheGNU;seeAl-Sudani,1September2008(inArabic).

74 Al-Rai Al-Am,1September2008(inArabic).

75 Ibid.


77 Sudanile Online,1December2008;6December2008,http://www.sundanile.com/;seealso

Al-Rai Al-Am,29November2008(inArabic).

78 Author’sinterviewwithChineseofficialandQataridiplomat.

79 Sudan Tribute,‘SudanrejectsFrenchproposaltoextraditeDarfursuspects’,8August2008.

80 Author’s interviewswith leading journalists,opinionleaders,membersofCSOs,political

parties,academicsandmembersoftheDarfurARMs.

81 Al-Sudani,2December2006(inArabic).


25


82 ArmanA,‘PressdialoguewiththeseniorassistanttothepresidentoftheRepublic,Minni

Minnawi’,Sudanile Online,12March2008,http://www.sundanile.com/.

83 Author’sinterviewwithoneofMinnawi’sassistants.

84 Sudanese Online,17July2007,http://www.sudaneseonline.com/.

85 Khartoum Monitor,2February2007.

86 NationalSalvationFront,‘AstatementontheoccasionofthevisitoftheChinesepresidentto

Sudan’,Sudanile Online,3February2007,http://www.sundanile.com/.

87 Sudanese Online,2February2007,http://www.sudaneseonline.com/.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 TheMovementoftheDisplacedPeopleheldapressconferenceinBeijing;seeSudanese Online,

18May2007,http://www.sudaneseonline.com/.

91 BBCNews,‘TutuurgessanctionsoverDarfur’,14September2006;Financial Gazette(Harare),

12March2008,http://www.financialgazette.co.zw.

92 Sudanese Online, ‘Sudaneseprotestors,foreignsupportersinfrontofChineseembassiesin

London,Washington,ParisandotherWesterncapitals’,19November2007,http://www.

sudaneseonline.com/;Sudanese Online,14February2008,http://www.sudaneseonline.com/;

seealsoAlsharg Alawsut (London),22June2007.

93 LetterfromDarfurBarAssociationtoAmbassadorGuijin;fulltextavailableinSudanese Online,

7April2008,http://www.sudaneseonline.com/.

94 Darfur rebels said that they had abducted two foreign oil workers; see Sudanile Online,

24October2007,http://www.sundanile.com/.

95 Sudanese Online,‘ChinacallsuponSudantotightensecurityafterthespreadofthenewsofthe

attack’,25October2007,http://www.sudaneseonline.com/.

96 Al-Sudani,12December2007(inArabic).

97 TheleaderofafactionoftheSLA,AbdelWahidal-Nur,refusedthedeploymentofChinese

forcesaspartoftheinternationalforcesinDarfur;seeSudanese Online,18December2007,

http://www.sudaneseonline.com/; seealsoSudanile Online, ’SudanLiberationArmyreject

thedeploymentofEgyptian,ChineseorPakistani forces inDarfur’, 28December2007,

http://www.sundanile.com/. In fact, the targetingof theoilfieldsby theDarfurianARMs

startedinSeptember2004,whenanarmedgroupattackedChariffieldinsouthernDarfurand

burnedinfrastructure.Tengovernmentsoldiersandfivecivilianswerekilledintheattack,

ofwhomtwowereworkingintheoilfield;Sudanese Online,25December2004,http://www.

sudaneseonline.com/.

98 AhardcopyofthefulltextoftheaddressbytheDarfurianARMsattheopeningsessionofthe

Surtconference,Libya,27October2007wassuppliedtotheauthor;seealsoSudanese Online,

29October2007,http://www.sudaneseonline.com/.

99 StatementsbySaddiqal-Mahdi,presidentof theUmraNationalParty and formerprime

minister, inhispress conference inDohaon27 January2008; see alsoSudanile Online,

23January2008,http://www.sundanile.com/.

100 Wall Street Journal(Asia),1–2May2008;seealsoWall Street Journal (Asia),31May2007;

Sudanile Online,20May2007,http://www.sudanile.com/;Sudanese Online,14February2006,

http://www.sudaneseonline.com/.

101 South China Morning Post,28–31May2007.

102 InternationalHeraldTribune,‘Chinasays“BritishlawmakersletteronSudanisirresponsible”’,

20October2007;seealsoSudanese Online,31October2007,http://www.sudaneseonline.com/.

26



103 Wall Street Journal(Asia),1–2May2008.

104 China Daily,27October2006;9–10June2007.

105 South China Morning Post,28May2007.

106 South China Morning Post,21September2007.

107 South China Morning Post,28May2007.

108 People’s Daily Online,22June2007,http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/.

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