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61 The BondholdersDefense Against Stockholder Excesses Aswath Damodaran 61 ¨ More restric9ve covenants on investment, financing and dividend policy have been incorporated into both private lending agreements and into bond issues, to prevent future Nabiscos. ¨ New types of bonds have been created to explicitly protect bondholders against sudden increases in leverage or other ac9ons that increase lender risk substan9ally. Two examples of such bonds ¤ PuFable Bonds, where the bondholder can put the bond back to the firm and get face value, if the firm takes ac9ons that hurt bondholders ¤ Ra9ngs Sensi9ve Notes, where the interest rate on the notes adjusts to that appropriate for the ra9ng of the firm ¨ More hybrid bonds (with an equity component, usually in the form of a conversion op9on or warrant) have been used. This allows bondholders to become equity investors, if they feel it is in their best interests to do so.
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The Bondholders Defense Against Stockholder Excessespeople.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfUGspr16/Session5.pdf · ¨ More restric9ve covenants on investment, financing and dividend

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Page 1: The Bondholders Defense Against Stockholder Excessespeople.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfUGspr16/Session5.pdf · ¨ More restric9ve covenants on investment, financing and dividend

61

TheBondholders’DefenseAgainstStockholderExcesses

AswathDamodaran

61

¨  Morerestric9vecovenantsoninvestment,financinganddividendpolicyhavebeenincorporatedintobothprivatelendingagreementsandintobondissues,topreventfuture“Nabiscos”.

¨  Newtypesofbondshavebeencreatedtoexplicitlyprotectbondholdersagainstsuddenincreasesinleverageorotherac9onsthatincreaselenderrisksubstan9ally.Twoexamplesofsuchbonds¤  PuFableBonds,wherethebondholdercanputthebondbacktothefirm

andgetfacevalue,ifthefirmtakesac9onsthathurtbondholders¤  Ra9ngsSensi9veNotes,wheretheinterestrateonthenotesadjuststo

thatappropriateforthera9ngofthefirm¨  Morehybridbonds(withanequitycomponent,usuallyintheform

ofaconversionop9onorwarrant)havebeenused.Thisallowsbondholderstobecomeequityinvestors,iftheyfeelitisintheirbestintereststodoso.

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62

TheFinancialMarketResponse

AswathDamodaran

62

¨  Whileanalystsaremorelikelys9lltoissuebuyratherthansellrecommenda9ons,thepayofftouncoveringnega9venewsaboutafirmislargeenoughthatsuchnewsiseagerlysoughtandquicklyrevealed(atleasttoalimitedgroupofinvestors).

¨  Asinvestoraccesstoinforma9onimproves,itisbecomingmuchmoredifficultforfirmstocontrolwhenandhowinforma9ongetsouttomarkets.

¨  Asop9ontradinghasbecomemorecommon,ithasbecomemucheasiertotradeonbadnews.Intheprocess,itisrevealedtotherestofthemarket.

¨  Whenfirmsmisleadmarkets,thepunishmentisnotonlyquickbutitissavage.

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63

TheSocietalResponse

AswathDamodaran

63

¨  Iffirmsconsistentlyfloutsocietalnormsandcreatelargesocialcosts,thegovernmentalresponse(especiallyinademocracy)isforlawsandregula9onstobepassedagainstsuchbehavior.

¨  Forfirmscateringtoamoresociallyconsciousclientele,thefailuretomeetsocietalnorms(evenifitislegal)canleadtolossofbusinessandvalue.

¨  Finally,investorsmaychoosenottoinvestinstocksoffirmsthattheyviewassociallyirresponsible.

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64

TheCounterReac9on

AswathDamodaran

64

STOCKHOLDERS

Managers of poorly run firms are puton notice.

1. More activistinvestors2. Hostile takeovers

BONDHOLDERSProtect themselves

1. Covenants2. New Types

FINANCIAL MARKETS

SOCIETYManagers

Firms arepunishedfor misleadingmarkets

Investors andanalysts becomemore skeptical

Corporate Good Citizen Constraints

1. More laws2. Investor/Customer Backlash

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65

Sowhatdoyouthink?

AswathDamodaran

65

¨  Atthispointin9me,thefollowingstatementbestdescribeswhereIstandintermsoftherightobjec9vefunc9onfordecisionmakinginabusinessa.  Maximizestockprice,withnoconstraintsb.  Maximizestockprice,withconstraintsonbeingagoodsocialci9zen.c.  Maximizestockholderwealth,withgoodci9zenconstraints,and

hope/praythatthemarketcatchesupwithyou.d.  Maximizeprofitsorprofitabilitye.  Maximizeearningsgrowthf.  Maximizemarketshareg.  Maximizerevenuesh.  Maximizesocialgoodi.  Noneoftheabove

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66

TheModifiedObjec9veFunc9on

AswathDamodaran

66

¨  Forpubliclytradedfirmsinreasonablyefficientmarkets,wherebondholders(lenders)areprotected:¤  MaximizeStockPrice:Thiswillalsomaximizefirmvalue

¨  Forpubliclytradedfirmsininefficientmarkets,wherebondholdersareprotected:¤  Maximizestockholderwealth:Thiswillalsomaximizefirmvalue,butmightnotmaximizethestockprice

¨  Forpubliclytradedfirmsininefficientmarkets,wherebondholdersarenotfullyprotected¤  Maximizefirmvalue,thoughstockholderwealthandstockpricesmaynotbemaximizedatthesamepoint.

¨  Forprivatefirms,maximizestockholderwealth(iflendersareprotected)orfirmvalue(iftheyarenot)

Page 7: The Bondholders Defense Against Stockholder Excessespeople.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfUGspr16/Session5.pdf · ¨ More restric9ve covenants on investment, financing and dividend

THEINVESTMENTPRINCIPLE:RISKANDRETURNMODELS“YoucannotswinguponaropethatisaFachedonlytoyourownbelt.”

AswathDamodaran 67

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68

FirstPrinciples

AswathDamodaran

68

Page 9: The Bondholders Defense Against Stockholder Excessespeople.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfUGspr16/Session5.pdf · ¨ More restric9ve covenants on investment, financing and dividend

69

Theno9onofabenchmark

AswathDamodaran

69

¨  Sincefinancialresourcesarefinite,thereisahurdlethatprojectshavetocrossbeforebeingdeemedacceptable.Thishurdleshouldbehigherforriskierprojectsthanforsaferprojects.

¨  Asimplerepresenta9onofthehurdlerateisasfollows:Hurdlerate= RisklessRate+RiskPremium

¨  Thetwobasicques9onsthateveryriskandreturnmodelinfinancetriestoanswerare:¤  Howdoyoumeasurerisk?¤  Howdoyoutranslatethisriskmeasureintoariskpremium?

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70

WhatisRisk?

AswathDamodaran

70

¨  Risk,intradi9onalterms,isviewedasa‘nega9ve’.Webster’sdic9onary,forinstance,definesriskas“exposingtodangerorhazard”.TheChinesesymbolsforrisk,reproducedbelow,giveamuchbeFerdescrip9onofrisk

危机¨  Thefirstsymbolisthesymbolfor“danger”,whilethesecond

isthesymbolfor“opportunity”,makingriskamixofdangerandopportunity.Youcannothaveone,withouttheother.

¨  Riskisthereforeneithergoodnorbad.Itisjustafactoflife.Theques9onthatbusinesseshavetoaddressisthereforenotwhethertoavoidriskbuthowbesttoincorporateitintotheirdecisionmaking.

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71

Agoodriskandreturnmodelshould…

AswathDamodaran

71

1.  Itshouldcomeupwithameasureofriskthatappliestoallassetsandnotbeasset-specific.

2.  Itshouldclearlydelineatewhattypesofriskarerewardedandwhatarenot,andprovideara9onaleforthedelinea9on.

3.  Itshouldcomeupwithstandardizedriskmeasures,i.e.,aninvestorpresentedwithariskmeasureforanindividualassetshouldbeabletodrawconclusionsaboutwhethertheassetisabove-averageorbelow-averagerisk.

4.  Itshouldtranslatethemeasureofriskintoarateofreturnthattheinvestorshoulddemandascompensa9onforbearingtherisk.

5.  Itshouldworkwellnotonlyatexplainingpastreturns,butalsoinpredic9ngfutureexpectedreturns.

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72

TheCapitalAssetPricingModel

AswathDamodaran

72

1.  Usesvarianceofactualreturnsaroundanexpectedreturnasameasureofrisk.

2.  Specifiesthatapor9onofvariancecanbediversifiedaway,andthatisonlythenon-diversifiablepor9onthatisrewarded.

3.  Measuresthenon-diversifiableriskwithbeta,whichisstandardizedaroundone.

4.  Translatesbetaintoexpectedreturn-ExpectedReturn=Riskfreerate+Beta*RiskPremium

5.  Worksaswellasthenextbestalterna9veinmostcases.

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73

1.TheMean-VarianceFramework

AswathDamodaran

73

¨  Thevarianceonanyinvestmentmeasuresthedisparitybetweenactualandexpectedreturns.

Expected Return

Low Variance Investment

High Variance Investment

Page 14: The Bondholders Defense Against Stockholder Excessespeople.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfUGspr16/Session5.pdf · ¨ More restric9ve covenants on investment, financing and dividend

74

HowriskyisDisney?Alookatthepast…

AswathDamodaran

74

-25.00%

-20.00%

-15.00%

-10.00%

-5.00%

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

Oct-08

Dec-08

Feb-09

Apr-09

Jun-09

Aug-09

Oct-09

Dec-09

Feb-10

Apr-10

Jun-10

Aug-10

Oct-10

Dec-10

Feb-11

Apr-11

Jun-11

Aug-11

Oct-11

Dec-11

Feb-12

Apr-12

Jun-12

Aug-12

Oct-12

Dec-12

Feb-13

Apr-13

Jun-13

Aug-13

ReturnsonDisney-2008-2013Averagemonthlyreturn=1.65%Averagemonthlystandarddevia9on=7.64%Averageannualreturn=21.70%Averageannualstandarddevia9on=26.47%

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75

Doyouliveinamean-varianceworld?

AswathDamodaran

75

¨  Assumethatyouhadtopickbetweentwoinvestments.Theyhavethesameexpectedreturnof15%andthesamestandarddevia9onof25%;however,investmentAoffersaverysmallpossibilitythatyoucouldquadrupleyourmoney,whileinvestmentB’shighestpossiblepayoffisa60%return.Wouldyoua.  beindifferentbetweenthetwoinvestments,sincetheyhavethe

sameexpectedreturnandstandarddevia9on?b.  preferinvestmentA,becauseofthepossibilityofahighpayoff?b.  preferinvestmentB,becauseitissafer?

¨  Wouldyouranswerchangeifyouwerenottoldthatthereisasmallpossibilitythatyoucouldlose100%ofyourmoneyoninvestmentAbutthatyourworstcasescenariowithinvestmentBis-50%?

Page 16: The Bondholders Defense Against Stockholder Excessespeople.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfUGspr16/Session5.pdf · ¨ More restric9ve covenants on investment, financing and dividend

76

TheImportanceofDiversifica9on:RiskTypes

AswathDamodaran

76

Actions/Risk that affect only one firm

Actions/Risk that affect all investments

Firm-specific Market

Projects maydo better orworse thanexpected

Competitionmay be strongeror weaker thananticipated

Entire Sectormay be affectedby action

Exchange rateand Politicalrisk

Interest rate,Inflation & news about economy

Figure 3.5: A Break Down of Risk

Affects fewfirms

Affects manyfirms

Firm can reduce by

Investing in lots of projects

Acquiring competitors

Diversifying across sectors

Diversifying across countries

Cannot affect

Investors can mitigate by

Diversifying across domestic stocks Diversifying across asset classes

Diversifying globally

Page 17: The Bondholders Defense Against Stockholder Excessespeople.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfUGspr16/Session5.pdf · ¨ More restric9ve covenants on investment, financing and dividend

77

Whydiversifica9onreduces/eliminatesfirmspecificrisk

AswathDamodaran

77

¨  Firm-specificriskcanbereduced,ifnoteliminated,byincreasingthenumberofinvestmentsinyourporpolio(i.e.,bybeingdiversified).Market-wideriskcannot.Thiscanbejus9fiedoneithereconomicorsta9s9calgrounds.

¨  Oneconomicgrounds,diversifyingandholdingalargerporpolioeliminatesfirm-specificriskfortworeasons-a.  Eachinvestmentisamuchsmallerpercentageoftheporpolio,

mu9ngtheeffect(posi9veornega9ve)ontheoverallporpolio.

b.  Firm-specificac9onscanbeeitherposi9veornega9ve.Inalargeporpolio,itisargued,theseeffectswillaverageouttozero.(Foreveryfirm,wheresomethingbadhappens,therewillbesomeotherfirm,wheresomethinggoodhappens.)

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78

TheRoleoftheMarginalInvestor

AswathDamodaran

78

¨  Themarginalinvestorinafirmistheinvestorwhoismostlikelytobethebuyerorselleronthenexttradeandtoinfluencethestockprice.

¨  Generallyspeaking,themarginalinvestorinastockhastoownalotofstockandalsotradethatstockonaregularbasis.

¨  Sincetradingisrequired,thelargestinvestormaynotbethemarginalinvestor,especiallyifheorsheisafounder/managerofthefirm(LarryEllisonatOracle,MarkZuckerbergatFacebook)

¨  Inallriskandreturnmodelsinfinance,weassumethatthemarginalinvestoriswelldiversified.

Page 19: The Bondholders Defense Against Stockholder Excessespeople.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfUGspr16/Session5.pdf · ¨ More restric9ve covenants on investment, financing and dividend

79

Iden9fyingtheMarginalInvestorinyourfirm…

AswathDamodaran

79

Percent of Stock held

by Institutions

Percent of Stock held by

Insiders

Marginal Investor

High Low Institutional Investor

High High Institutional Investor, with insider influence

Low High (held by

founder/manager of firm)

Tough to tell; Could be insiders but only if they

trade. If not, it could be individual investors.

Low High (held by wealthy

individual investor)

Wealthy individual investor, fairly diversified

Low Low Small individual investor with restricted

diversification

Page 20: The Bondholders Defense Against Stockholder Excessespeople.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfUGspr16/Session5.pdf · ¨ More restric9ve covenants on investment, financing and dividend

80

Gaugingthemarginalinvestor:Disneyin2013

Aswath Damodaran

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81

Extendingtheassessmentoftheinvestorbase

¨  Inallfiveofthepubliclytradedcompaniesthatwearelookingat,ins9tu9onsarebigholdersofthecompany’sstock.

Aswath Damodaran

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82

TheLimi9ngCase:TheMarketPorpolio

AswathDamodaran

82

¨  Thebigassump9ons&thefollowup:Assumingdiversifica9oncostsnothing(intermsoftransac9onscosts),andthatallassetscanbetraded,thelimitofdiversifica9onistoholdaporpolioofeverysingleassetintheeconomy(inpropor9ontomarketvalue).Thisporpolioiscalledthemarketporpolio.

¨  Theconsequence:Individualinvestorswilladjustforrisk,byadjus9ngtheiralloca9onstothismarketporpolioandarisklessasset(suchasaT-Bill):Preferredrisklevel Alloca?ondecisionNorisk 100%inT-BillsSomerisk 50%inT-Bills;50%inMarketPorpolio;AliFlemorerisk 25%inT-Bills;75%inMarketPorpolioEvenmorerisk 100%inMarketPorpolioAriskhog.. Borrowmoney;Investinmarketporpolio

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83

TheRiskofanIndividualAsset

AswathDamodaran

83

¨  Theessence:TheriskofanyassetistheriskthatitaddstothemarketporpolioSta9s9cally,thisriskcanbemeasuredbyhowmuchanassetmoveswiththemarket(calledthecovariance)

¨  Themeasure:Betaisastandardizedmeasureofthiscovariance,obtainedbydividingthecovarianceofanyassetwiththemarketbythevarianceofthemarket.Itisameasureofthenon-diversifiableriskforanyassetcanbemeasuredbythecovarianceofitsreturnswithreturnsonamarketindex,whichisdefinedtobetheasset'sbeta.

¨  Theresult:Therequiredreturnonaninvestmentwillbealinearfunc9onofitsbeta:¤  ExpectedReturn=RiskfreeRate+Beta*(ExpectedReturnonthe

MarketPorpolio-RiskfreeRate)

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84

Limita9onsoftheCAPM

AswathDamodaran

84

1.Themodelmakesunrealis9cassump9ons2.Theparametersofthemodelcannotbees9matedprecisely

¤  Themarketindexusedcanbewrong.¤  Thefirmmayhavechangedduringthe'es9ma9on'period'

3.Themodeldoesnotworkwell¤  -Ifthemodelisright,thereshouldbe:

n  Alinearrela9onshipbetweenreturnsandbetasn  Theonlyvariablethatshouldexplainreturnsisbetas

¤  -Therealityisthatn  Therela9onshipbetweenbetasandreturnsisweakn  Othervariables(size,price/bookvalue)seemtoexplaindifferencesinreturnsbeFer.

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85

Alterna9vestotheCAPM

AswathDamodaran

85

The risk in an investment can be measured by the variance in actual returns around an expected return

E(R)

Riskless Investment Low Risk Investment High Risk Investment

E(R) E(R)

Risk that is specific to investment (Firm Specific) Risk that affects all investments (Market Risk)Can be diversified away in a diversified portfolio Cannot be diversified away since most assets1. each investment is a small proportion of portfolio are affected by it.2. risk averages out across investments in portfolioThe marginal investor is assumed to hold a “diversified” portfolio. Thus, only market risk will be rewarded and priced.

The CAPM The APM Multi-Factor Models Proxy ModelsIf there is 1. no private information2. no transactions costthe optimal diversified portfolio includes everytraded asset. Everyonewill hold this market portfolioMarket Risk = Risk added by any investment to the market portfolio:

If there are no arbitrage opportunities then the market risk ofany asset must be captured by betas relative to factors that affect all investments.Market Risk = Risk exposures of any asset to market factors

Beta of asset relative toMarket portfolio (froma regression)

Betas of asset relativeto unspecified marketfactors (from a factoranalysis)

Since market risk affectsmost or all investments,it must come from macro economic factors.Market Risk = Risk exposures of any asset to macro economic factors.

Betas of assets relativeto specified macroeconomic factors (froma regression)

In an efficient market,differences in returnsacross long periods mustbe due to market riskdifferences. Looking forvariables correlated withreturns should then give us proxies for this risk.Market Risk = Captured by the Proxy Variable(s)

Equation relating returns to proxy variables (from aregression)

Step 1: Defining Risk

Step 2: Differentiating between Rewarded and Unrewarded Risk

Step 3: Measuring Market Risk

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86

WhytheCAPMpersists…

AswathDamodaran

86

¨  TheCAPM,notwithstandingitsmanycri9csandlimita9ons,hassurvivedasthedefaultmodelforriskinequityvalua9onandcorporatefinance.Thealterna9vemodelsthathavebeenpresentedasbeFermodels(APM,Mul9factormodel..)havemadeinroadsinperformanceevalua9onbutnotinprospec9veanalysisbecause:¤  Thealterna9vemodels(whicharericher)doamuchbeFerjobthan

theCAPMinexplainingpastreturn,buttheireffec9venessdropsoffwhenitcomestoes9ma9ngexpectedfuturereturns(becausethemodelstendtoshivandchange).

¤  Thealterna9vemodelsaremorecomplicatedandrequiremoreinforma9onthantheCAPM.

¤  Formostcompanies,theexpectedreturnsyougetwiththethealterna9vemodelsisnotdifferentenoughtobeworththeextratroubleofes9ma9ngfouraddi9onalbetas.

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87

Applica9onTest:Whoisthemarginalinvestorinyourfirm?

AswathDamodaran

87

¨  Youcangetinforma9ononinsiderandins9tu9onalholdingsinyourfirmfrom:¤  hFp://finance.yahoo.com/¤  Enteryourcompany’ssymbolandchooseprofile.

¨  Lookingatthebreakdownofstockholdersinyourfirm,considerwhetherthemarginalinvestoris¤  Anins9tu9onalinvestor¤  Anindividualinvestor¤  Aninsider