The biopolitics of the Indian Emergency.

Carlos E. Flores TeránDecember 2014

Indian Emergency and Compulsory Sterilizations:A biopolitical approach

Modern political thought shaped a distinct relationship between

the physical body and the nation-state’s political rationale.

This is, that the notion of a body political no longer embodies the

Sovereign’s duality: an opposition between the King’s physical

corporeality and its imaginary realm of political prerogatives.

Instead, the modern nation-state constructed a distinct type of

body: the body politic of citizens. An entity, whose management,

development and behavior is in the state’s realm of political

interest. Sovereignty, thus, lies not within the ruler body but

within the body politic of its citizens.

This paper undertakes the task of analyzing the

compulsory sterilization policies implemented by Indira

Gandhi’s Emergency government during 1975-1977. Far from

adopting a material approach on the matter, namely the factual

consequences or whether such policies could be assessed as

effective, we are concerned about the implications of such

event. Why in a moment of political turmoil, population became

an objective to the Indian Government?; What calculations drove

such policies?; Does assuming absolute control over state’s

affairs implies as well assuming control over the biological

body of its population? The latter questions pave the

guidelines for this paper. Overall, we will be looking at the

aims of the Indian Government rather than its factual

achievements in terms of population growth.

Although the Emergency’s historiography has largely

focused in the political and economical conditions prior to the

Emergency and how the Indian Government rather pragmatically

addressed its compelling reality, the implications of the

sterilization policies allured scarce attention among

researchers. By 1975, the urge to curve Indian population

growth was a common trait for Indian Governments. Moreover,

policies targeted to curtail such growth were implemented prior

the Emergency and are implemented today. It is striking,

however, the rational efforts, force and magnitude used during

the Emergency to perform sterilizations. 1 In sum, our

argumentation revolves around the idea that the importance of

the political rationale behind the latter policies superseded

its demographical aims, especially because most data suggests

that they proved to be ineffective addressing population

growth.

Considering the particularity—more properly, the anomaly—

of the Indian Emergency we will look at the relationship

between the physical body and the State. Such relationship was

defined by the suspension of a constitution and the civil

rights granted with it; as well as by the threat to the State’s

life and stability conducted into a state of emergency. The

latter conditions suggest a distinct relation, with its own

1 Cfr., Davidson R. Gwatkin, “Political Will and Family Planning: TheImplications of India's Emergency Experience”, Population and Development Review (5) 1979: 29-59. Marika Vicziany, “Coercion in a Soft State: The Family-Planning Program of India: Part I: The Myth of Voluntarism”, Pacific Affairs (55), 1982: 373-402.

interests and aims. Consequently, our primary intention with

this paper is to argue that compulsory sterilization policies

fell within the range of security calculations made by Indian

Emergency government. Facing a perceived threat by political

opposition and by economical conditions, Indira Gandhi declared

an Emergency to secure state’s survival. Asserting State’s

power and presence, however, is not limited to the realm of the

elements laid before. With this regard, state intervention was

extensive and aggressive and it extended to the grounds of

natural life. Thus, the defining fact of our argumentation is

the size of State intervention within the human life, the

disposition of state forces, mechanisms and capabilities to

address a natural variable: the creation of life. Assuming and

exerting power over life were included in the wider range of

efforts made by Indian Leadership to assert its sovereignty and

power.

In the first part of this paper we will present a

schematic background on prior the Emergency. We will try to

assess the threats perceived by Indian Leadership that lead to

the proclamation. In this sense, we will mostly consider those

whom allegedly put at stake Indian state’s survival and its

role in the proclamation. In the following part, we will use

Michel Foucault’s concept of Biopolitics to analyze the state’s

aims and mechanisms that enabled a management of the biological

body. We consider using the concept of Biopolitics for two

reasons: It provides an analytical framework on the

relationship between the physical body and the state’s realm of

administration. Second, it refers such relationship to a

Security question. In the sense that population is not only the

ultimate source of sovereignty, but a significant resource for

state’s interests. Security, thus, implies a kind of rationale

in which the state must manage population; it must exert its

power in order to maximize its potential and foresee potential

dangers. Finally, we will delve into the question of the

significance of exerting power over life in the event of the

Indian Emergency: Using both Foucault’s elaboration on

biopolitics and the factual events that cause the Emergency we

will try answer extensively to questions posed above.

The Emergency

Although it may be tempting to signal the political turmoil of

1975 as the decisive causes to the proclamation of an

Emergency, a closer look will render a far more complex state

of affairs. Failed attempts to build a strong democratic state,

corruption and an inflexible centralized government appeared to

seal the fate of Indira Gandhi and her leadership.2 The burden

of the past and the challenges of the present contributed to an

inordinate crisis.

Sudipta Kaviraj explains that the proclamation of an Emergency

appeared as the only possible culmination for two clashing

dynamics. On the one hand, an inner flaw within Gandhi’s

political economy caused great levels of tensions among low

classes—for it failed to address issues like poverty, hunger

2 Cfr., Henry C. Hart, “Introduction,” in Indira Gandhi’s India: A politicalSystem Reappraised, ed. Henry C. Heart (Boulder: Westview Press,1979), p. 1

and sickness—which allowed for opposing parties to seize a

political opportunity to attack the central government. While

in the other the contingency of a moment in which Indira Gandhi

refused to yield her power to the opposing parties. 3 Both

dynamics add up to the idea that in 1975, Indira Gandhi faced

an extenuating challenge caused equally by systematic flaws

within her government, in addition to its political economy,

and by the consequences of failing at dealing effectively with

an increasing powerful opposition. It is possible, thus, to

aver that what was at stake in 1975 was the stability of

Indira Gandhi’s nation project and the ruling party’s

permanence in power 4:

In the name of democracy it has been sought to negate the very functioning

of democracy. Duly elected governments have been not allowed to function

and in some cases force has been used to compel members to resign […] all

manner of false allegations have been hurled at me. […] The institution of the

prime minister is important and the deliberate political attempt to denigrate

it is not in the interest of democracy or of the nation. 5

An abrupt change in the way the Indian people perceived its

government and its leadership clearly occurred in the first

five years of the 70’s decade. In 1971, Indira Gandhi leading

the Indian National Congress (INC) rose uncontested to power

with the 43% of votes in her favor asserting not only her

popularity but also its overwhelming control over Indian

3 Sudipta Kaviraj, “Indira Gandhi and Indian Politics,” in The Trajectories of the Indian State (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010), p. 194.4 Cfr., Ibid, p. 196. 5 Indira Gandhi, “The Prime Minister ‘s broadcast on June 26”,Statements and Speeches on the Proclamation of Emergency, 107.

politics.6 As opposed to the mid sixties, when it was possible

to explain Indira Gandhi’s popularity due to the legacy of

Jawaharlal Nehru. Additionally, while her political identity

was rather hazy, her positioning within the foundations of the

Congress Party and among people’s mind was timely. 7 In fact,

her ambiguous stance made her a suitable candidate in a moment

of radicalization in Indian Politics. Conversely, in the early

seventies Indira Gandhi’s popularity rested more in the promise

of eroding widespread poverty, rather than in her political

capabilities of implementing effective policies to address

issues like unemployment and hunger that devastated a number of

Indian States; or the creation of enduring coalitions within

the Parliament. 8 When unplanned conditions or events hindered

the promise of development, making the central government

unable to fulfill people’s expectations and needs, critiques

arose. Failure to deliver stability and development to Indian

people questioned the nature and purpose of Indira Gandhi’s

government, for its lack of a clear and distinct ideology was

compensated with policies targeting the masses.

A populist electoral program may serve the immediate purposes

of securing control over Indian politics. However, it did not

give the organization, strength to pursue effectively concrete

6 Michael Henderson, “Setting India's Democratic House in Order:Constitutional Amendments”, Asian Survey (19) 1979: 947. Additionally,the INC secured 352 out of 545 at the Lok Sabha, asserting itsoverwhelming majority in the congress and arguably constituting theuncontested ruling party in India. The opposing parties, claimingcharges of corruption and electoral malpractices, later contested theelection’s results. 7 Sudipta Kaviraj, “Indira Gandhi and Indian Politics”, Economic andPolitical Weekly (21) 1986: 1697. 8 Ibid, p. 1702.

goals to soothe the reality of India.9 Inevitably, perhaps,

populism barricaded comprehensive policies both within the

legislative and executive realm. At a moment of contingency her

position was weakened by the political burden of her promises.

On top of Indira Gandhi’s role as a Prime Minister and her

management of politics, P. N. Dahar points at two conditions

that enervated the state’s strength and capabilities prior

1975. First, a dawning democratic culture among Indian people,

which made civil protest an effective method to achieve social

and economical objectives.10For a country born from an effective

civil opposition to the colonial rule, it was difficult to

forget its past and its achievements. Thus, constant

manifestations and protests were arguably rewarded by a

permissive rule, which often met the people’s demand. Such

tactic, while effective momentarily, displayed the symptoms of

a soft system incapacitated to evolve from a crisis-solving

policy. 11 The example set by a lax government when dealing with

civil discontent conveyed a compelling reality for Indian

Government: The state rarely asserted itself and its authority

in the society. 12 Furthermore, political opposition, lead by

Jayaprakash Narayan, instrumentalized people’s discontent and

the fragmentation within the parliament to increasingly seize

spaces within Indian politics, mingling a wide array of

ideologies and programs around the sole purpose of opposing the

9 Cfr., Idem. 10 Cfr., P. N. Dahar, “The emergency: How I came about it” in Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency” and Indian Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2000) p. 235. 11Idem. 12 Cfr., Ibid, p. 245.

INC and Indira Gandhi’s rule. The opposition’s strength

dwelled in the inadequate stressing of the State’s sovereignty

and power.

To an important extent, India was a strong centralized state.

Aside from controlling the Lok Sabha, Indira Gandhi’s

administration had performed notably when directing its forces

within its own sphere of authority. This, according to P. N.

Dahar, caused the leadership to be overconfident of its own

political capabilities. 13 This perception is due primarily to

an effective Government’s maneuver to nationalize banks in

196914 as well as the fruitful military campaign against

Pakistan in 1971, which rendered in the liberation of

Bangladesh and the positioning of India as the military hegemon

in the subcontinent. Indeed, the State was strong at the

center, but only insofar as the political balances were in its

favor.

The unprecedented economic crisis faced by the Indian

Leadership was certainly aggravated by the conditions outlined

above. They damaged economic stability, the availability of

basic resources and limited the State’s realm of response. In

1972, the Maharashtra drought stroke Indian Government at its

core: it underscored the state’s limitations in security

calculations. Although previous experiences served to address

13 Cfr., Ibid, p. 250. 14 The banking companies (acquisition and transfer of undertakings)ordinance of 1969 established a state-owned and operated bankingindustry. Capital was nationalized; institutions and creditmanagement were directed by the Central Government in order toguarantee a degree of economical stability and to provide thenecessary means to bolster industry and development. Cfr., The BankingCompanies (Acquisition and Transfer of undertakings) Act, 1980 (Mumbai: UniversalLaw Publishing, 1980).

the issue of food scarcity,15 and thus it was possible to avert

a famine, such calculations were limited to the extent of

preventing death, as they did not contemplate the larger

consequences of scarcity. The years that the drought last in

Maharashtra 25 million people were severely affected by the

dramatic decrease of crop production, which irremediably led to

a widespread food scarcity in the region. More than 4 million

people lost their primary source of income, food prices went,

naturally, up and the living conditions of the region

reflected, to an extent, the state’s inability to deal

comprehensively with a crisis.

Finally, the Oil Embargo of 1973 set another milestone of

Indian stability. While Indian economy was not originally

affected by the embargo, it did force a significant expenditure

of monetary reserves: “India's oil import bill was to the tune

of around $414 million, and it was projected to go up to around

$1,350 million in 1974 because of the price hike. This was

around 40 per cent of its potential export earnings, and twice

the amount of its existing foreign exchange reserves.”16 Such

expenditure damaged India’s solvency to pay its foreign debt

and it lead to restructuration of the latter, which caused a

reduction in the financial aid perceived from the International

Development Bank. Social and health programs were,

consequently, curtailed by the lack of sufficient funds. 17

15 Cfr., The Maharashtra Deletion of the Term 'Famine' Act, 1963. 16 Shebonti Ray Dadwal, The Current Oil 'Crisis': Implications for India, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). Retrieved 12/ 29/2014 < http://www.idsa-india.org/an-may011.html>17 Stephen J. Randall, “The 1970s Arab-OPEC Oil Embargo and Latin America”, (Latin American Research Centre, 2006), p. 4. ). Retrieved12/ 29/2014 <https://networks.h-net.org/system/files/contributed-

In sum, both external events and structural flaws enervated

the State and its leadership. In 1975, a political turmoil

left, allegedly, with no other options than the suspension of

law and the norm established by it, in order to protect the

life of the nation itself. While it is possible to understand

the particularities of the latter political crises and the

threat it presented to the Indira Gandhi’s administration, our

analysis points to the state’s weakness as the decisive

condition. A structural weakness hampered the state’s extent of

reaction: Indian leadership was incapable of politically

dealing with the opposition and it lacked the strength to

assert its authority within the society to halt the expressions

of discontent against the government. Moreover, Stephen M. Walt

argues that state’s security calculations and behavior are

often mediated by a self-perception and the dangers that a

threat poses to the state. 18 In other words, it may be possible

to aver that India’s own weakness mediated the way the

political crisis of 1975 was perceived and it shaped to an

important extent the response to address it.

The proclamation of the Emergency It did not come as a surprise when the Supreme Court ruled

Indira Gandhi’s unseating. She was found guilty of electoral

malpractices in 1971. The improprieties ranged from: “using

Yashal Yapoor, officer on special duty in the prime minister’s

secretariat, to ‘further her election prospects’” and of using

files/henergy-s-randall-latin-america-and-1973-oil-crisis.pdf>18 Cfr., Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power”, International Security (9) 1985: 3-43.

Uttar Pradesh’s officials to build stages from which she

addressed the public prior the elections.19 Albeit the charges

represented neither a real advantage nor they could have

possibly modified the election’s outcome, the Supreme Court’s

rule was inexorable. Indira Gandhi was to lose her seat in the

congress. Additionally, every election’s result, prior 1971,

was declared null. Indira Gandhi’s opposition delivered such a

powerful strike, yet it was disguised in a triviality.

Indian Leadership understood this eventuality as a crucial

threat to stability and to its preeminence in politics. First,

Indira Gandhi would be forced to resign as Prime Minister;

causing, undoubtedly, a political crisis and a potential

struggle for power. A deeper fragmentation within the INC may

follow.20 Giving in into the allegations of corruption and poor

management would signify the end of an era. The end of a State

almost embodied by Indira Gandhi. Moreover, Indian Government’s

lack of strength to either deter the crisis, by politically

dealing with the opposition, or to minimize its impact shaped

the nature of its response. Proclaiming the Emergency, thus,

followed a security calculation, in which asserting and

defending the State was the ultimate objective. 21 President

Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed proclaimed a state of Emergency in June

25th 1975 due to the internal disturbances that imperiled the

nation’s stability.

19 Kuldip Nayar, “Towards dictatorship” in The Judgment. Inside story of the Emergency in India(New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1977), p. 5. 20 Sudipta Kaviraj, “Indira Gandhi and Indian Politics”, Economic and Political Weekly (21) 1986: 170221 Cfr., B. C. Das, “Emergency provisions in the Indian Constitution: A comparative analysis”, The Indian Journal of Political Science (38), 1977: 239

Part XVIII of India’s Constitution outlines the legal and

political provisions during an Emergency. 22 It provides three

frames in which an Emergency may be proclaimed, in order to

secure the life of the State: “1) External aggression or war,

internal revolt or disturbance, internal dissensions or

disputes and strife. 2) Breakdown of a constitutional

machinery through political or party deadlocks; and 3) Threat

to the financial stability or credit of India or any part

thereof. “23 To B.C. Das, the Emergency provisions more than

offering a wide space for political maneuvers, it provides

unlimited powers to the head of government in order to

pragmatically address a threat. Moreover, Article 35 lays the

legal foundations for an Emergency: Although the President may

call for an Emergency, the Parliament must define its duration.

As opposed to other countries in which states of exception are

often proclaimed for an indefinite time, Indian Constitution

established a range of one to six months for an Emergency rule.

Even if in legal terms the Parliament is not automatically

dissolved after proclaiming an Emergency, the provisions

granted by Indian Constitution utterly magnify the realm of

prerogatives available to the Executive power. 24 Insofar, the

Executive Power becomes the state itself: it exercises power

directly and unrestrictedly and the boundaries between

government, society and law are dissolved.

In this sense, proclaiming an Emergency due to political

unrest follows both a pragmatic and a security rationale.

22 Idem. 23 Cfr., Ibid, 240. 24 Cfr., Ibid, 243.

First, an Emergency produces a legal and juridical breach in

which most liberties and rights granted by the constitution are

suspended. 25 This is particularly convenient in a moment in

which a State seeks to dominate the political realm or to curb

a certain trend within politics. Second, it produces a certain

dynamic in which the demand to meet a security necessity

justifies all efforts, dispositions and mobilizations. Giorgio

Agamben acutely argues that nature of a state of exception, or

emergency, implies a political anomie, a space in which law and

its mechanisms are suspended; a space in which the executive

power utilizes the force of law—legitimate violence—to impose a

will, to punish and to establish a certain order as a norm;

finally, in which public and private life are rigorously

administrated by the executive power. 26

Biopolitics and the State

Within distinction between the biological and the political

body rests the idea of biopolitics. In this sense, the human

life and body exist beyond a biological reality: a political

significance is attached to them. They partake in the

relationship between a State and its society. Furthermore, both

life and its biological functions are in the realm of interests

of a State. This is, that being born; growing and dying are not

private biological functions. In fact, such functions must be

managed, regulated and supervised by the State. Michel Foucault

25 Cfr. Giorgio Agamben, “The Force of Law” in State of Exception (Chicago:The University of Chicago, 2005), p. 7-28.26 Cfr., Ibid, 33-42.

explains the State’s appropriation of the human body and its

functions as a moment in which life itself became an “object of

a political strategy”. 27

Such strategy is best understood within the notion of a

State’s security calculations. Populations, and its biological

functions, play a pivotal role within the number of variables

that configure a security calculation. 28 Because it is a

collectivity in which power may be directly exercised. As such

exercise of power is more oriented to managing the collectivity

rather than punishing it. Furthermore, both calculating a

potential risk and the instrumental use of population to meet

up a certain interest respond to what Foucault argues is the

state rationale that emerged after the eighteenth century. 29

Biopolitics is closely related to this rationale. In this

sense, life and its functions are manipulated, regulated and

favored by the State. According to Foucault, life, being the

essential condition of every population, is in the domain of

the State, not in the sense of having the power to end it but

to nourish it.30 More than understanding life as a biological

fact, it is understood as the condition of possibility to

calculate death rates, population growth, city planning and

conscription. Life, thus, is simultaneously managed to produce

certain conditions and to avert others. In conclusion, the

notion of biopolitics reflects two-fold State rationale: First,27 Michel Foucault, “11 January 1978” in Security, Territorry and Population (New York: Picador/Palgrave, 2007) p. 1. 28 Ibid, Cfr., 4129 Ibid, Cfr., 10. 30 Cfr., Thomas Lemke, “ The Government of Living Beings: Michel Foucault,” in BioPolitics: An advanced introduction( New York: New York University Press, 2011), p. 33-35.

a way in which power is exerted over the population’s body.

Particularly the power to produce life rather than do deter it,

the State asserts its authority within the body and to its

functions. Second, the security calculations that contemplate

the conditions related to life itself. Thus, biopolitics

operate simultaneously in the State’s political and security

realms.

Biopolitics and Compulsory sterilizations during the Emergency

Only a year after of the Emergency’s proclamation, 8 million

people had been sterilized. India, consequently, reached a peak

in the usage of modern contraceptives to halt population

growth. Dramatically surpassing the annual rates of

sterilizations for previous years in less than 12 months,

Indian Government efforts and mobilizations proved to be

effective when it came to implementing such program at a large

scale. 31 Albeit Indira Gandhi’s official stance on the subject

was rather inconsistent, most accounts point to her son, Sanjay

Gandhi, as the political entrepreneur who often stressed the

importance of curbing population. The steady population growth,

according to Sanjay Gandhi, occluded India’s development. 32

While Family Planning was not a new program for Indian

Government prior 1975 it had never been executed so vigorously

and never before had most governmental branches and officers

31 Cfr., Davidson R. Gwatkin, “Political Will and Family Planning: The Implications of India's Emergency Experience”, Population and Development Review (5) 1979: 34. 32 Ibid, 42.

been involved in the project of compulsory sterilizations. 33

It was clear that even if the Family Planning program may had

not come directly from Indira Gandhi, its implementation was

going to be comprehensive and all forces at the State’s

disposal were going to be mobilized in order to achieve such

goal.

Labeled as another program within a larger campaign

against poverty, the compulsory sterilizations appeared as a

necessary step to produce ideal conditions for development.

Additionally, they created an opportunity for the State to

assert itself within Indian population. If power was going to

be exerted unrestrictedly in other realms, to assert the State

and to secure its position, biological life could not be

excluded. Regulating the power to produce life, curbing

population growth and mobilizing most State mechanisms to

effectively implement such sterilizations may only be explained

within dynamic in which Indian Leadership aimed for authority

strikes.

Mobilization and strength define the nature of compulsory

sterilizations during the Emergency. As noted before, such

programming existed long before 1975 and Indian Governments

continue to carry out some form of control over reproductive

rights. However, few programs are comparable in terms of

numbers, reach and magnitude to the Emergency’s sterilizations.

Indian leadership rigorously designed a comprehensive plan to

achieve the goal of reducing family’s size and to punish those

who resisted. A large scale of mechanisms were implemented or

33 Ibid, 40.

activated in order to either peacefully or coercively drive

population to the end of sterilization: For example, the

government of Andhra Pradesh incentivized its male employees

with a salary’s raise after they have undergone a

sterilization. Conversely, other state governments such as West

Bengal or Bihar implemented far more aggressive methods to curb

the reproductive rights of its own employees.34 The latter

examples provide a relevant insight on how the force that drove

mass sterilizations was not only exerted from the State to its

society, but to the collective body of Indian population. State

efforts were distributed equally, for all government

departments were involved in the regulation of life. 35

Moreover, the methods to implement the State-imposed

sterilization quotas suggest an aggressive interest to meet the

expectations. From the construction of vasectomy camps, in

which men were forcibly intervened; restricting governmental

aid or jobs to those who had not been previously sterilized and

the suspension of salaries to those who failed to perform an

sterilization or that had a family of 3 or more children. For

example, some contractors were required to present his

employee’s proof of sterilization in order to receive a

construction permit from the Public Works Department.

In order to reach out to those spaces where Government

had less presence or where utilizing more aggressive methods

would result counter productive, secondary government’s

employees were instrumental to induce population into being

sterilized. Teachers were crucial to perform this task:34 Cfr., Ibid, 35-38. 35 Cfr., Ibid, 41.

“Families with school-age children would be visited by the

local school teacher. The government, the schoolteacher would

say, attaches great importance to family planning. If the

teacher could get five or six people to accept a sterilization,

he would be certain of getting his salary on schedule the

following month.”36

Increasingly after 1975 every branch related to

Government was involved with the dynamics of family planning.

While the interest of the State may as well been purely a

security calculation in order to prevent further issues related

to overpopulation. This is, the high probability of a famine

due to food scarcity; halting widespread disease or being able

to curb long-term unproductive behaviors were crucial in the

calculations that drove the efforts of sterilization. Such

calculation, ultimately, rendered a compelling reality: in the

years of the Emergency, 10 million Indians were object of the

sterilizations.37 Such efficiency is best understood as the

result of a ruthless pragmatism momentum, in which most state

forces are distrusted from the center to its outskirts.

Furthermore, population and its biological functions became the

objects of the political strategies of Indian leadership. In

this context, they served the purposes for security calculation

and they became a space in which the State asserted its

sovereignty and authority.

36 Ibid, 45. 37 Alaka M. Basu, “Family Planning and the Emergency. An Unanticipated Consequence”, Economic and Political Weekly(20) 1985: 423.

Conclusion

Proclaiming an Emergency in 1975 served a double purpose.

First, it granted unlimited powers for Indira Gandhi to address

its own administration’s shortcomings. Second, it created a

window of opportunity for a transition to occur. During the

Emergency, Indian government shifted its permissive and lax

attitude towards its own population into an assertive one: A

Government centralized both physically and politically in one

person, whose realm of sovereignty and power included equally

government’s departments and population’s reproductive rights.

Our analysis considered the conditions that enervated Indira

Gandhi’s administration, particularly those whom either limited

its capabilities to address in a time of crisis or who

aggravated a crisis. Both the limitations of her political

identity and her populist programming burdened her action in a

moment of crisis. Also, a number of economical fluctuations and

a state that rarely asserted itself in society aggravated the

crisis. To an important extent, the latter conditions conveyed

an image of India as weak, object of a number of attacks

internal and external who had the potential to endanger life

and permanence of the state itself. Only with this regard is

that we consider the Emergency proclamation to be a response

largely mediated by India’s weakness and limitations to address

political and economical crisis. In other words, the impact

caused by a number of economical fluctuations and the Supreme

Court’s ruling endangered Indira Gandhi’s leadership. Thus, the

only possible solution to avert a bigger crisis was the

suspension of law and basic civil guarantees; only such

disposition of would allow sufficient space for Indira Gandhi

to mobilize its political assets and forces to impose the

State’s authority everywhere.

The necessity of a statement of authority and the

unrestricted power held by the Executive operated as conditions

of possibility for a biopolitical maneuver. In this sense, the

compulsory sterilizations served a two-fold objective—both

closely related to the conditions mentioned above. First, they

reassure state’s overwhelming presence in both public and

private spaces. Targeting the right and capabilities to produce

life appeared as crucial to exert a certain degree of power

within population and its basic functions. Second, they proved

to be an efficient technique to assert its security intentions

and principles. This is, curbing population growth served a

security interest: diseases could be easily addressed, taxes

are easily computed, and inducing a work-oriented behavior may

be easier if population is less of an obstacle.

The magnitude, rapidness and ruthlessness in which

sterilizations were performed is the decisive facts to our

argumentation. They provide a clear example of how the State

looked to exert its political will everywhere and how those

forces required to achieve such goal were fetched from every

space. More than assuming control of all human life, Indian

state managed its potential to grow, punished those who broke

the norm and reward those who comply. Ultimately, population

was the goal and the center of such political strategy. The

latter, as mentioned before, served a double purpose:

reassuring the State as the ultimate source of power—stressing

its presence in the most intimate realm of life—and producing

the conditions for development and stability to strive.

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