The Battle of al-Khafji - Marines.mil. Marines in Battle Al... · The Battle of al-Khafji ... a decade long war of attrition, but Kuwait ... are ready to fight when they do; when

The Battle of al-Khafjiby Paul W. Westermeyer

n August 1990, Iraqi mili-tary forces invaded theneighboring nation ofKuwait. The invasion waspart of an expansionist for-

eign policy that President Saddam Hus-sein established a decade earlier when heinvaded post-revolution Iran. The Iraqiinvasion of Iran failed, degenerating intoa decade long war of attrition, but Kuwaitwas an easier target. Kuwait had financedthe Iraq-Iran War for Iraq, but refused toforgive the debt, and Iraq accused Kuwaitof stealing oil from the Rumalia Oil Field.Much smaller than Iran in terms of pop-ulation and geography, Kuwait had fo-cused its foreign and defense policies onnegotiation and compromise rather thanmilitary force; inevitably, the large IraqiArmy quickly overwhelmed the smallKuwaiti armed forces.

Inside Kuwait, Iraqi troops beganwholesale pillaging as security forcesmoved to remove all those loyal to theKuwaiti royal family. Iraq declared thatKuwait was now a province, thus elimi-nating its debt and adding extensive oilfields to its own. Saddam stationed con-script infantry divisions in Kuwait andbegan building extensive defenses alongthe Kuwaiti-Saudi border.

While Saddam calculated the militarybalance between Iraq and Kuwait cor-rectly, he underestimated the willingnessof the world community, especially the

On The Cover: The crew of a Marine LAV-25scans the desert. The LAV-25 was the backboneof the light armored infantry battalions, an un-tried concept prior to the Battle of al-Khafji.The battalions were used in a traditional cav-alry role, providing a screen in front of the mainbody of I Marine Expeditionary Force.

History Division Photo

At Left: A Qatari AMX-30 tank leads twoSaudi V-iSO Commando armored cars, the firstof which is an antitank variant, into al-Khafjithrough the town arches. The arches were thefocal point of each Saudi counterattack into thecity. Used with permission of Jody Harmon

(www.jodyharmon.com)

United States and Great Britain, to inter-vene on Kuwait's behalf. His invasion setthe stage for a military confrontation thatwas larger in scope than any similar cir-cumstance since the Cold War. UnderPresident George H. W. Bush, the UnitedStates assembled a global coalition of con-cerned nations, first to defend Saudi Ara-bia against further Iraqi aggression, andthen to eject the Iraqi military fromKuwait. Early in this "Gulf War" Ameri-can military commanders designated theoperation to protect Saudi Arabia "DesertShield:' and the successive operation tofree Kuwait "Desert Storm:' These mili-tary operations were massive undertak-ings, and they highlighted the paradigmshift from superpowers in precariousequilibrium during the Cold War toAmerican global hegemony in the 1990s.

The Gulf War would be the largest de-ployment of Marines since the VietnamWar. It challenged the entire warfightingestablishment of the Marine Corps—avi-ation, ground, and logistics—forcing ageneration of Marines to put two decadesof planning and training to the test. TheCorps would see many of its tactical andoperational philosophies justified undercombat conditions. The maritime prepo-sitioning ships program, for one, provedits worth, enabling Marines to be the firstcombined arms task force in Saudi Ara-bia. In addition, Marines tested the air-ground task force concept within the jointenvironment.

Marines of the 7th Marine Expedi-tionary Brigade arrived in Saudi Arabiain late August, where they married upwith their equipment from the maritimeprepositioning ships. Under MarineForces Commander, Central Command,and Commander, I Marine ExpeditionaryForce, Lieutenant General Walter E.Boomer, Marines continued to deploy tothe Gulf and solidify the defenses of SaudiArabia. They trained, established defen-sive positions, and watched the diplo-matic efforts attempt to resolve the crisis.

As fall turned to winter, the MarineCorps continued the massive logisticalenterprise, deploying personnel andequipment of I Marine ExpeditionaryForce: 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, 3dMarine Aircraft Wing, and the 1st ForceService Support Group.

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, theUnited States Central Command com-mander, chose the Marines to evict theIraqis from Kuwait proper, fightingalongside Arab members of the Coalition.As Lieutenant General Boomer's I MarineExpeditionary Force and its partners pre-pared to breach the fortifications separat-ing Kuwait from Saudi Arabia, the 4thand 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigadesremained afloat in the Persian Gulf on-board the ships of U.S. Navy amphibiousready groups, providing a seaborne threatwhich would eventually tie up many Iraqiresources along the shoreline.

Despite the threat of a Coalition mili-tary intervention, Iraq refused to with-draw from Kuwait. Saddam wasconvinced that the United States couldneither maintain the Coalition, nor inter-vene militarily in a meaningful way. Amilitary struggle to free Kuwait thus be-came inevitable.

On 17 January 1991, Operation DesertStorm began with massive air strikesthroughout Iraq and Kuwait. Althoughthe operation had an expected groundcomponent, U.S. Air Force strategists,who believed that bombing alone couldcompel Iraq to relinquish Kuwait, drovethe first phases. As a result, the primaryfocus of the campaign was on achievingair superiority (accomplished the firstevening), striking strategic targets insideIraq, then annthilating Iraq's elite Repub-lican Guard centered in southern Iraqi,and finally hitting Iraqi forces in Kuwaitproper.

During the air campaign, Marine avi-ation conducted hundreds of sorties

The Battle of al-Khafji 1

against enemy positions in Kuwait andIraq. Aircrews of the 3d Marine AircraftWing struck Iraqi command and controlcenters, antiaircraft defenses, and strate-gic targets deep inside Iraq, and later per-

formed traditional reconnaissance, bat-tlefield interdiction, and close air supportmissions in Kuwait.

A day after the air campaign began, adistraction was added when Iraq began

Base 881724 (000373) 4-91 Modified by W. Stephen Hilt

firing SS-1 Scud-B Al Hussein surface-to-surface medium range missiles against Is-rael and Saudi Arabia. The political andmilitary consequences of the Scud attacksforced Central Command to immediately

2 The Battle of al-Khafji

instigate the "Great Scud Hunt' Al-though the hunt was unsuccessful, it di-verted large numbers of aircraft andreconnaissance resources away fromKuwait and into the western Iraqi desert.In particular, the hunt required the use ofthe two prototype Northrup GrummanE-8C joint surveillance and target acqui-sition radar system (JSTARS) aircraft.The E-8C aircraft had arrived in SaudiArabia after Christmas and was a new,untested battlefield technology.2 CentralCommand used the planes to track mo-bile Scud launchers in the western desert,although originally designed to tracklarge-scale troop movements, like thosethat would precede a major offensive.3

Despite the Scud distraction and thefocus on strategic rather than operationaltargets, the air campaign had an obviousand significant impact on Iraqi forces in-side Kuwait. It isolated units from the na-tional command authority, degradedtroop morale, and made even simplemovements difficult, often requiring daysof detailed planning.

With its diplomatic options exhausted,and enduring the effects of an air cam-paign much longer than anticipated, Iraqlaunched a large spoiling attack centeredon the Saudi town of al-KhaIji on 29 Jan-uary 1991. Now known as the "Battle ofal-Kha!Ji' it was the first major groundcombat action of the Gulf War.

Saddam Hussein was prepared for aconfrontation with the United Statesprior to the invasion of Kuwait, as evi-denced by his comments to Palestinianleader Yasser Arafat in April 1990:

We are ready for it. We will fightAmerica, and, with God's will, wewill defeat it and kick it out of thewhole region. Because it is notabout the fight itself; we know thatAmerica has a larger air force thanus... has more rockets than us, butI think that when the Arab peoplesee real action of war, when it is realand not only talk, they will fightAmerica everywhere. So we haveto get ready to fight America; weare ready to fight when they do;when they strike, we strike.5

But Iraq's president was convinced the

United States would not fight, in part be-cause of the muted response to the IraqiAérospatiale AM39 Exocet antiship mis-sile attack on the USS Stark (FFG 31) in1987. The massive military buildup inSaudi Arabia throughout the fall of 1990did not change his mind. Moreover, hebelieved that even if the United States de-sired a military confrontation, the SovietUnion would intervene to prevent it.

If an attack did occur, Saddam wasequally convinced that his massive mili-tary could inflict sufficient losses on theAmericans to force them to abandon thestruggle. He considered the Americanwithdrawal from Vietnam indicative ofAmerica's lack of resolve. The UnitedStates suffered 58,000 dead in the Viet-nam War; in comparison Iraq had lost51,000 in a single battle with the Iranianson the al-Faw Peninsula in 1986.6 He be-

Map by W. Stephen Hill

lieved then, as he stated after the war,"America is not in the prime of youth.America is in the last stage of elderlinessand the beginning of the first stage of oldage'7

Iraq had survived the long, 10-yearslaughter of the "Khadisya Saddam' asthe Iraqis termed the Iran-Iraq War, andSaddam believed that the conflict overKuwait, if it came to blows, would followa similar pattern.8 Air power would berelatively ineffective; the main conflictwould be a set piece battle as Americanforces impotently tried to breach the de-fenses built along the Kuwaiti-Saudi bor-der. American losses would be severe, theAmerican people would demand an endto the bloodshed, and the American gov-ernment would then negotiate a peace. Inthe aftermath, Iraq would become theundisputed regional power, while Amer-

The Battle of al-Khafji 3

ican, and Western, influence in the Mid-dle East would suffer a near fatal blow.

Events did not follow Saddam Hus-sein's expectations. The United States wasdetermined not to allow the Iraqi aggres-sion to stand and Iraq's Arab neighborsrecognized the degree to which Iraq's in-vasion of Kuwait would upset the regionalbalance of power. The Soviet Union wasunwilling and unable to support Iraq inan aggressive adventure that offered notangible benefits. The United States wasable to form an international coalitionthat included an impressive variety of na-tions; notable members included GreatBritain, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, andSyria. Despite its variety, the Coalition'sunity was never seriously challenged byIraqi attempts to fracture it.

The United States and its allies beganthe war with the air strikes Saddam andhis generals had predicted, but these at-tacks were far more effective than ex-pected. Later, Iraqis would master the artof proofing their country against aerial at-tack, but in January 1991, the Coalitionair campaign was something the Iraqishad never experienced.

Saddam responded quickly with Scudmissile attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel,and while these strikes were unquestion-ably the most effective military and polit-ical tactic employed by Iraq during theconflict, they did not end the raids, no-ticeably decrease their severity, spur theUnited States into a premature ground as-sault, nor bring Israel into the war andthus splinter the multinational Coalitionwhich Iraq faced.

In addition to the Scud attacks, Iraqtried to provoke Coalition ground opera-tions by setting Kuwaiti oil fields afire andby creating a large oil slick in the PersianGulf that threatened Saudi water desali-nation facilities. But these actions wereno more effective than the Scud attacks.

Saddam expected the air campaign tolast a week, and then be followed by theground war, the "Mother of All Wars:'which would produce the desired massiveAmerican casualties. Instead, the bomb-ing showed no sign of stopping, and wasinflicting serious damage on the Iraqiforces without any corresponding abilityto produce the desired Coalition casual-ties. Something needed to be done inorder to goad the United States into theplanned Kuwaiti "meat-grindet"

An Iraqi War College study, completedlater, highlighted the Iraqi understandingof the situation in late January 1991:

In military practice, there are prin-ciples. One of the important prin-ciples is that the attack is the bestdefense. In the Mother of Wars thisprinciple is particularly important,because the enemy of Iraq and theArab nation has deployed a largenumber of airplanes, rockets andmodern equipment, from which itseems they are prepared for a totalwar. They deployed the most mod-ern equipment for their field forces,which consist of the armies of 28nations totaling half a million men.But for all this great power, theyhesitate to attack the Iraqi fieldforces because they realize how wellthe Iraqi forces can defend against aground attack. And, they know al-ready, the military genius of Iraq'sleader, Saddam Hussein.9

The Iraqis believed they understoodAmerican intentions: "Like we say, theyintend to destroy our forces and the in-frastructure of our country through theair attack, by airplanes and long rangemissiles. And they want to avoid thelosses of a ground war as much as theycan."° Moreover, "George Bush will not

be able to handle the heavy responsibilityof heavy casualties in front of Congressand public opinion:"1 In this case, theIraqis did understand American inten-tions, although they underestimatedAmerican resolve, and gravely overesti-mated the ability of the Iraqi military toinflict losses on the attacking Coalitionforces.

The al-Khafi operation was intendedto spark the ground battle of the "Motherof Wars" which Saddam felt was the pre-requisite for his eventual victory. It wasintended as a provoking raid that woulddraw the Americans into a hasty and mas-sive military response and result in sig-nificant American casualties. Despite hisdeficient military acumen, he correctlyidentified that the center of gravity in theCoalition war effort was the willingnessof the American people to suffer casual-ties, and he designed his operationalplans to strike directly at that willpower.

President Saddam chose al-Kha!i asthe target of the attack for several reasons.The Iraqi War College analysis noted thatit had two harbors: one designed specifi-cally for exporting oil, and the other theIraqis believed was a base for Coalitionforces. An Iraqi force occupying the townwould be able to threaten Coalition navalforces in the Gulf. Al-Kha!ji was alsowithin range of Iraqi supporting artilleryin Kuwait. The attack also would force

4 The Battle of al-Khafji

The arches into the Saudi city of al-Khafji proclaim that "The municipality and residentsof Khafji welcome the honorable visitor." Because the city was within range of Iraqi ar-tillery in Kuwait, it was ordered evacuated on 18 August 1990.

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

the Saudis to respond; he knew they couldnot permit him to hold any part of theirkingdom for long. It seemed likely thatthe attack would force the Coalition intothe bloody ground war Saddam wanted.'2

The operational plan for implementingIraq's strategic goal was relatively straightforward, Five Iraqi infantry divisions de-fended the Saudi-Kuwaiti border from thecoast to the "elbow": from east to west,they were the 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry,29th Infantry, 14th Infantry, and 7th In-

fantry Divisions. These commands wouldnot take part in the offensive, instead theywould continue to defend the fortifica-tions along the border. These border for-tifications, called the "Saddam Line" byU.S. forces, consisted of a belt of mine-fields, antitank obstacles, and triangularbrigade strong points. Iraqi engineers haddesigned and constructed the belt basedon lessons learned in their 10-year warwith Iran.

The attacking forces would be drawnfrom the 3d Armored and 5th MechanizedDivisions of III Corps, under Major Gen-eral Salah Aboud Mahmoud, and the 1stMechanized Division of IV Corps underMajor General Yaiyd Khalel Zaki. MajorGeneral Salah Aboud had over all com-mand of the operation; III Corps, consid-ered one of the better organizations in theIraqi Army, had successfully conductedsimilar operations during the Iran-IraqWar, as well as performing successfullywhile defending the Iraqi city of Basrah.'3

The armored battalions of these divi-sions were equipped with a combinationof T-54/55 and T-62 main battle tankswhile their mechanized infantry battal-ions were equipped with BMP- 1 armoredpersonnel carriers supported by BRDM-2scout vehicles. Their divisional artillerywas lavishly equipped with various mod-els of 152mm and 155mm howitzers.14

The plan called for the 1st MechanizedDivision to pass through the lines of the7th and 14th Infantry Divisions between

the border's "heel" just south of UmmHajul and the "elbow" at al-Manaqish (seemap on page 12). This maneuver was in-tended to protect the flank of BrigadierGeneral Hussan Zedin's 3d Armored Di-vision as it traversed the al-Wafrah oilfields and the lines of the 8th and 29th In-fantry Divisions. The 3d Armored Divi-sion would then take up a blockingposition to the west of al-Khafi. Al-

Khafi itself was the target of the 5thMechanized Division, which was to seizeand fortify the town. Once the 5th Mech-anized Division had secured al-Khafji, the1st Mechanized and 3d Armored Divisionswould withdraw back into Kuwait. Intheory, after the Coalition ground re-sponse was provoked, the 5th MechanizedDivision would retire from al-Khafi andmove safely behind the massive fortifica-tions along the Saudi-Kuwait border.'5The attack was set to be launched at 2000on 29 January 1991, and al-Khafji was tobe occupied by 0100 on 30 January 1991.

General Salah Aboud ordered that theforces be "dug in" and "hidden under-ground" by the morning of 30 January. Heprovided some insightful tactical adviceas well: "I emphasized the use, and theimportance of shoulder fired anti-aircraft

weapons in ambush in the front andflanks of the fortified positions. And Iemphasized how the snipers should beactive and effective against the helicoptersof the enemy" He instructed his men tolight tire fires, as the smoke would con-fuse the infrared sensors of the Coalitionforces. Finally, he ordered his troops "tobe economic with the ammunition whichis in the tanks and the carriers. Becausethe enemy air will be focused on the bat-tle territory, especially the transportation,so movement will be very limited."6Whatever Saddam's understanding of thebattle, at least one of his generals antici-pated the difficulties the Iraqis would facetrying to maneuver against overwhelm-ing Coalition air superiority.

The capture of American personnelwas a high priority. Saddam had deter-

The Battle of al-Khaf)i 5

Iraqi Armored Vehicles

Vehicle Type Armament TopSpeed

T-54/55

100mm main gun

1300m effective range

Coax 7.62mm MG

Bow 7.62mm MG

12.7mm MG

Sokph

T-62

115mm main gun2000m effective rangeCoax 7.62mm MGBow 7.62mm MG12.7mm MG

sokph

0 0 0

BMP-1

73mm smoothborecannon7.62mm MGAT-3 Sagger ATGM8troops

8okph

BRDM-2

14.5mm MG7.62mm MG4 troops lOOkph

mined from the American prisoner ofwar experience during the Vietnam Warand the Iranian hostage crisis that theUnited States was vulnerable to hostagetaking. He held many Westerners hostageearly in the crisis, but released them inDecember 1990 with little obvious ad-vantage. He felt, however, that Americansoldiers would still be excellent bargain-ing chips in the confrontation. An Iraqiprisoner from the battle later told Amer-ican interrogators: "The sole purpose ofthe raid on al-KhaIJi was to capture Coali-tion personnel. The loss of all Iraqi equip-ment and personnel involved in the raidwas of no importance as long as POWswere captured:"7

When giving orders for the attack tohis corps commanders, Saddam summedup Iraqi goals: the "enemy in front of us, ifhe faces this time our willingness to causesevere damage to him, he won't be able tohandle it. He will be destroyed and thenews will be heard. And all the chairs of

the enemy governments will shake."8 ForIraq, the Battle of al-Khai was not in-tended as a skirmish; it was intended towin the war by destroying the Coalition'swill to fight. At the heart of the Coalitionwas the alliance between the United Statesand Saudi Arabia.

The United States began providing theKingdom of Saudi Arabia with militaryassistance in the 1940s, and as the decadespassed the relationship grew. The UnitedStates assisted the kingdom as a bulwarkfirst against communism and secular eth-nic Arab nationalist movements, and lateragainst radical Islamic movements. Inaddition, a strong, stable Saudi Arabiawas seen as the key to preventing a gen-eral war in the Middle East. For theHouse of Saud, the close relationship andmilitary assistance of the United Statesacted as a counter to Saudi Arabia's more

powerful neighbors Iraq and Egypt, aswell as aiding in the suppression of inter-nal rebellious movements. '

As the decades passed, however, andhostility against the United States in-creased in the broader Islamic world,American military assistance becamenearly as much of a liability as it was anasset. This paradox was neatly summa-rized by leading Egyptian journalist, Mo-hamed Heikal: "the first responsibility ofa Saudi monarch is to keep intimate rela-tions with Washington, and the second isto do all he can to hide it"2°

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait produceda near catastrophe in foreign relations forthe Saudis, as it was clear they could notstop any Iraqi encroachment into theirterritory without American aid, yet thataid would have to be very public. The in-timate relationship between the UnitedStates and Saudi Arabia had long been anopen secret, but now it would truly be ex-posed. The presence of a massive "infi-

6 The Battle of al-Khafji

I' 'c& !+

—-I

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Iraqi Training Pamphlet, Battle of al-Khafii (ISGQ-2003-00054592)

Part of the Iraqi plan for the Battle of al-Khafji, as shown in an official Iraqi history of the battle. This sketch indicates that 6th Ar-mored Brigade's attack on Observation Post 4 was not intended as the main Iraqi effort.