-
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology1985, Vol. 49, No.
5, 1378-1391
Copyright 198S by the American Psychological Association,
Inc.0022-35I4/85A00.75
The "Barnum Effect" Revisited: Cognitive and MotivationalFactors
in the Acceptance of Personality Descriptions
Joel T. Johnson, Lorraine M. Cain, Toni L. Falke, Jon Hayman,and
Edward Perillo
University of California at Davis
Four studies examined factors mediating the so-called "Barnum
effect"—the ac-ceptance of character descriptions composed of high
base-rate personality traits asuniquely applicable to the self.
Departing from previous research, all experimentsexamined the
effect in a context in which subjects were not deceived into
believingthat the descriptions had been based on personal
information supplied by them. InStudy 1 subjects who rated the
applicability of personality characteristics to them-selves viewed
the characteristics as significantly more applicable than subjects
askedto assess their applicability to an acquaintance. In Study 2
subjects estimated thatthey displayed both positive behaviors and
their negatively valenced opposites morefrequently than an
acquaintance displayed them, indicating that the Barnum effectmight
be mediated by the greater availability of evidence to confirm
traits in theself. In Studies 3 and 4 the perceived accuracy of
paragraph-long personality de-scriptions increased with subjects'
familiarity with the applicable individuals. Subjectsrated the
descriptions as most accurate for themselves, next most accurate
for aclose friend, next most accurate for a moderate friend, and
least accurate for acasual acquaintance. In both of the latter
studies, however, the influence of familiarityon perceived accuracy
was largely confined to positively valenced descriptions. Itwas
concluded that, in addition to being influenced by a prior belief
in the credibilityof a source, the Barnum effect may be mediated by
a combination of cognitive andmotivational factors.
Purveyors of anecdotes demonstrating ourgullibility about
ourselves have traditionallyencountered no shortage of supporting
mate-rial. The debunker of astrological horoscopes,for example, may
point to the conviction withwhich a tenacious Gemini maintains that
theGemini birth sign description fits him or herexactly, his or her
confidence in the goodnessof the fit undeterred by the comment that
te-nacity is purportedly more characteristic ofTaurus than of
Gemini. The debunker's fur-ther protestations that Gemini is
supposedlyboth excitable and verbose, whereas present
The seminal idea for this research originated in a grad-uate
seminar in social cognition taught by Shelley E. Taylorat Harvard
University. The research was supported by agrant to Joel T. Johnson
from the Academic Senate of theUniversity of California at Davis.
We express thanks toJerome Drobny and Frank Miller for their
assistance invarious phases of the research and to Lorraine
FindleyIrish for her useful comments on the manuscript.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Joel T.
Johnson,Department of Psychology, University of California,
Davis,California 95616.
company, in contrast, is notably laconic andunflappable, may
also prove of no avail, forpresent company may counter that he or
sheis in fact both excitable and verbose, and fur-ther has the bona
fide memories to prove it.Human credulity—or at least the
prevalenceof our belief in it—is also demonstrated by therecurrent
theme, in literature and folklore, ofthe rewards that accrue the
flatterer for detect-ing our finest hidden qualities. If, according
tothat folklore, our credulity is great, it is perhapsgreatest when
its object is the self.
But are we in fact relatively more gullibleabout ourselves?
Since a classic study by Forer(1949), empirical evidence consistent
with thefolklore has been garnered in a series of in-genious
experiments (e.g., Handelsman &Snyder, 1982; Snyder&
Larson, 1972;Snyder,Larsen, & Bloom, 1976; Snyder, Shenkel,
&Lowery, 1977). These experiments all assess aphenomenon which,
following Meehl (1956),has been termed the "Barnum effect,"
afterthe man who purportedly stated that a goodcircus had a "little
something for everybody."
1378
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THE "BARNUM EFFECT" REVISITED 1379
They have consistently demonstrated that in-dividuals who
erroneously believe that certainhigh base rate personality profiles
were pre-pared specifically for them usually rate themas extremely
accurate descriptions of them-selves. Although given the high base
rate va-lidity of the descriptions, the assessment oftheir
applicability to the self does not in itselfrepresent erroneous
judgment, additional ex-periments have shown that subjects may
ratesome positively valenced descriptions as moreapplicable to
themselves than to "people ingeneral" (Snyder & Shenkel, 1976).
Subjectsare therefore "gullible" in that they believe
thedescriptions are unique to them, failing to re-alize that they
apply equally well to others.
None of the cited experiments, however,have attempted to test
directly the propositionthat, holding constant other relevant
variables,individuals are more accepting of the validityof high
base rate personality descriptions forthemselves than for others.
In all of them, ap-plicability to self has been confounded withthe
belief that the description was based onspecific information
furnished by the recipient.Higher applicability ratings for the
self almostcertainly were influenced by the knowledgethat the
descriptions were generated specifi-cally for the self, and not for
"people in gen-eral."
The above confound relates to an even morefundamental criticism
of all Barnum effectstudies—the suggestion that subject
acceptanceof the descriptions may be due less to
gullibilityconcerning the self than to the demand char-acteristics
(Orne, 1962) inherent in the para-digm. Acceptance of high base
rate general-izations might be due, at least in part, to sub-jects'
beliefs that the researcher expects themto accept the accuracy of
character portraitsostensibly prepared specifically for them.
Theexistence of this particular confound or de-mand characteristic
in no way impugns theexternal validity of the Barnum effect
studies,for the paradigm accurately reflects a fre-quently
occurring real world condition—thereceipt of high base-rate
feedback from an ex-pert, coupled with the belief that the
feedbackwas prepared specifically for the self. However,an
investigation of the relative acceptance(perceived applicability to
self vs. perceivedapplicability to others) of high base-rate
de-scriptions without the erroneous belief that the
descriptions were prepared specifically for theself might, we
surmised, provide importantinsight into the specific cognitive and
moti-vational antecedents of the effect. The four ex-periments
described in this article were de-signed to investigate the Barnum
effect in justsuch a deception-free context.
Potential Mediation by Motivational Factors
Several studies using the false feedback par-adigm have reported
that subjects accept pos-itive descriptions more readily than
negativeones (Collins, Dmitruk, & Ranney, 1977;Snyder &
Shenkel, 1976). Although some ev-idence suggests that this
difference might be atleast partially due to the higher base rates
ofpositive traits in the general population (Snyder& Shenkel,
1976), the results are also consistentwith other studies reporting
a positivity biasin self-evaluation. Chambliss (1964), for
ex-ample, found that subjects rated positive traitsas significantly
more applicable to themselvesthan negative traits, and Wylie (1965)
foundthat subjects consistently rated themselves as"above average"
on certain key dimensions,further noting that subjects'
self-evaluationsexceeded evaluations of them by their
peers.Numerous other studies report a related "self-serving" bias
in attribution (Riess, Rosenfeld,Melburg, & Tedeschi, 1981;
Bradley, 1978;Schlenker & Miller, 1977; Taylor &
Koivu-maki, 1976).
All of these experiments provide evidencethat positively
valenced descriptions might berated as more applicable to the self
than toanother. In parallel fashion, a motivational biaswould cause
subjects to rate negative descrip-tions as less applicable to
themselves. The lat-ter prediction is also consistent with an
expla-nation founded on the Freudian defensemechanism of
projection, for to the extent thatindividuals "project," they
should find negativetraits relatively typical of another while
deny-ing them in themselves.
Potential Mediation by Cognitive Factors
Despite the research indicating a positivitybias, a different
line of reasoning might leadus to speculate that the Barnum effect
mayalso reflect a simple cognitive error in adjust-ment of a
judgment—a failure to make suffi-
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1380 JOHNSON, CAIN, FALKE, HAYMAN, PERILLO
cient allowance for the greater availability ofself knowledge
versus knowledge of others.Simply put, we have a larger memory
storeabout ourselves than about any other person,and are
consequently relatively more likely tofind available behavioral
evidence confirmingany common trait in ourselves. But while useof
the "availability heuristic" (Kahneman &Tversky, 1973) to
assess the presence of traitsin our own behavior may result in
fairly ac-curate judgments, use of this heuristic to assessa trait
in another may commonly lead us tounderestimate its prevalence. The
cause of in-accuracy may lie in our failure to consider thebase
rate of the population of available in-stances from which
confirming evidence is tobe drawn, and subsequently to upgrade
ourestimate of prevalence or applicability to com-pensate for this
relatively scanty data baseconcerning the other. From this
perspective, aself-other difference in perceived applicabilityof
given traits is another example of failure touse population base
rates in deriving judg-ments (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). In
thegeneral sense that it posits an error in the pro-cess of
inference that is independent of moti-vational factors, this
explanation may betermed a cognitive one.
Is there research evidence consistent withthis cognitive
account? Using similar formats,Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and Maracek
(1973)and Goldberg (1981) found that, at least undercertain
circumstances, individuals rate com-mon personality traits as less
descriptive ofthemselves than of others while making sig-nificantly
greater situational attributions forthemselves. Monson, Tanke, and
Lund (1980),in contrast, found that when subjects weresimply asked
to endorse or reject the appli-cability of personality traits (with
no oppor-tunity for situational attributions), they as-cribed a
significantly greater number of traitsto themselves than to
acquaintances. None ofthese experiments, however, directly
investi-gated whether individuals, in estimating therelative
frequency of certain common behav-iors in themselves and others,
adjust suffi-ciently for the differential availability of
con-firming evidence.
An experiment by Funder (1980) providesmore directly relevant
evidence. His subjectstended to rate themselves higher than did
theirpeers on internal dispositional characteristics
(e.g., "is introspective"), whereas their peerstended to rate
them higher on traits especiallyvisible to an external observer
(e.g., "is phys-ically attractive"). These results imply that
in-dividuals in fact may fail to adjust for theirinsufficient
knowledge of others' dispositionaltraits. The further implication
is that individ-uals may rate Barnum style descriptions, whichfocus
largely on internal states, needs, and as-pirations (e.g., Forer,
1949), as less typical ofacquaintances than of themselves.
Study 1 investigates these implications di-rectly by assessing
whether Forer's original listof personality traits is judged as
more descrip-tive of the self than of an acquaintance. Studies2,3,
and 4 assess more precisely the underlyingquestions of whether the
mediation of self-other differences is primarily
motivational,primarily cognitive, or best explained by amodel
including both cognitive and motiva-tional factors, (e.g., Johnson
& Judd, 1983).
Study 1
Method
Subjects. Subjects were 96 undergraduate volunteersfrom an
introductory psychology class at the University ofCalifornia,
Davis.
Design and procedure. Each subject read a list of 13personality
characteristics originally taken by Forer (1949)from a newstand
astrology book, and used in numeroussubsequent experiments (e.g.,
Snyder & Larson, 1972;Snyder et al. 1976). Subject were
randomly assigned to oneof two conditions. Subjects in Condition 1
were asked toassess the applicability of the characteristics to
themselvesunder the following instructions:
How common are certain personality traits in thegeneral
population?
Listed below are a number of different personalitytraits. How
many of these traits are characteristicof you?
First consider how accurately each of the traits de-scribes you.
Then indicate how accurate the descriptionis by circling the
appropriate number on the scale im-mediately below the trait.
Please mark all scales. Evenif you believe you do not have enough
information tomake a choice, use your best guess.
Subjects in Condition 2 were asked to assess the appli-cability
of the same personality traits to an acquaintanceunder the
following instructions:
How common are certain personality traits in thegeneral
population?
Listed below are a number of different personalitytraits. How
many of these traits are characteristic ofsomeone whom you
know?
Please think of an acquaintance of yours. By an ac-quaintance we
mean someone whom you know, some-
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THE "BARNUM EFFECT" REVISITED 1381
times see, and with whom you sometimes speak, but donot know
well enough to consider a close friend. Wewould like you to think
of such a person now. Considerhow accurately each of the traits
describes that person.Then indicate how accurate the description is
by circlingthe appropriate number on the scale immediately belowthe
trait. Please mark all scales. Even if you believe youdo not have
enough information to make a choice, useyour best guess.
The "best guess" instruction explicitly informs subjectsthat
lack of information should not compel a judgmentthat the
description is inaccurate. Under a normativemodel, a subject should
use his or her own personality asa basis for estimating the
prevalence of extremely highbase-rate characteristics in a little
known other, and a "bestguess" strategy should involve the basic
assumption thatthe unknown other possesses the trait to the same
approx-imate degree as the self. We hypothesized, however, thateven
subjects explicitly instructed to use their "best guess"still would
not guess that the relevant personality traitswere fully replicated
in others, and would systematicallyunderestimate the applicability
of the descriptions to theiracquaintances.
Experimental materials. The thirteen personalitycharacteristics
were drawn verbatim (with slight gram-matical modifications) from
Forer (1949), and are the clas-sic Barnum effect statements
utilized in numerous otherpublished studies (i.e., Snyder &
Larson, 1972).
The trait list used in Condition 1 was changed to
thethird-person singular for Condition 2. After assessing
theaccuracy of each of the traits on the list, all subjects
wererequested to "rate the overall accuracy of this list of
char-acteristics as a description of yourself" (Condition 1)
or"your acquaintance" (Condition 2). The dependent mea-sure for
each accuracy assessment was a nine-point scalewith endpoints
marked not at all accurate (1) and extremelyaccurate (9). We
believed that these endpoint labels might,in this particular
context, be less ambiguous to subjectsthan the totally reject to
totally accept labels previouslyused in much of the Barnum effect
research.
Results
To assess the significance of differences inself-other accuracy
ratings, t tests were per-formed on each of the 13 traits on the
list, onthe overall accuracy rating of the list, and onthe mean
accuracy rating averaging across the13 traits. Results of the t
tests, together withthe means for self-accuracy rating conditionand
other-accuracy rating condition, are shownin Table 1. For each of
the 13 traits, meanaccuracy ratings for the self were higher
thanmean accuracy ratings for the acquaintance.For 7 of the traits
the difference was significantat the .05 level or beyond, and for
all but twoof the remaining traits the difference was mar-ginally
significant at the .10 level. The differ-ence between the overall
mean accuracy ratingfor traits in the self-rating condition
versus
traits in the other-rating condition (averagingacross the 13
accuracy ratings of each subject)was highly significant, £(88) =
5.21, p< .001.'In addition, subjects in the self-rating
conditionviewed the list as a whole as significantly moreaccurate
than subjects in the other-rating con-dition, ;(93) = 2.38, p <
.02.
Further analyses investigated the extent towhich the self-other
difference in judged ac-curacy may have been influenced by
motiva-tional factors. A separate group of 23 under-graduate judges
subsequently rated each of the13 personality trait descriptions, as
well as theoverall list, on a 9-point scale with endpoint 1labeled
extremely positive and endpoint 9 la-beled extremely negative.
Although the judgesviewed the overall list as slightly positive (M
=4.87), they rated 8 of the descriptive statements(numbers 2, 3, 5,
6, 7, 9, 10, and 12 in Table1) as at least slightly on the negative
side ofthe neutral point, and only 5 statements(numbers 1, 4, 8,
11, and 13) on the positiveside of the scale. As revealed by Table
1, therewas a significant self-other difference on 4 ofthe 5
positive statements, but on only 3 of the8 negative ones. As also
indicated by Table 1,however, separate ; tests performed on themean
ratings of both positive and negativestatements revealed a
significant self-other dif-ference for each set.
A final 2 X 2 (Person Rated X StatementValence) analysis of
variance (ANOVA), inwhich mean rating of positive-negative
state-ments was a within-subjects repeated measuresvariable,
indicated main effects for both state-ment valence, F( 1, 88) =
51.60, p < .001, andperson rated, F(l, 88) = 28.17, p < .001,
butno interaction between these variables, F(l,88) < 1. Although
positive statements wererated as more accurate descriptions of
bothself and other, both positive and negative state-ments were
seen as more applicable to the self.In sum, although a higher
proportion of in-dividual positive statements indicated
signifi-cant self-other differences, there was strongevidence that
individuals, even when expresslyinstructed to adjust for
insufficient informa-tion by use of their best guess,
systematically
1 Because of missing responses on some dependent mea-sures, data
from 6 subjects were discarded from the analysison mean accuracy
ratings.
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1382 JOHNSON, CAIN, FALKE, HAYMAN, PERILLO
Table 1Mean Accuracy Ratings of Thirteen Personality Traits:
Study 1
Personality trait
1. Need to be liked'2. Tendency toward self-criticism11
3. Unused capacity15
4. Compensation for personalityweakness'
5. Sexual adjustment problems'"6. Disciplined outside, insecure
inside1"7. Serious self-doubts'"8. Preference for change*9. Pride
in independent thinking6
10. Frankness found unwiseb
1 1 . Extraversion and introversion*12. Unrealistic
aspirations'"13. Security as major goal"
Overall accuracy rating of listMean accuracy rating of 1 3
statementsMean accuracy rating of 5 positive
statementsMean accuracy ratings of 8 negative
statements
Self-ratingcondition
5.947.005.78
5.593.584.395.736.716.374.986.884.636.205.655.69
6.30
5.31
Other-ratingcondition
4.984.304.28
4.453.173.554.465.615.614.785.113.705.394.724.53
5.06
4.20
t
2.197.443.47
2.99.88
1.732.772.811.75.46
3.471.821.882.385.21
4.80
4.38
df
94*94***94***
94**939493**93"939291***929393*88***
88***
88***
Note. Higher numbers indicate ratings of greater accuracy.*
Rated as positive by judges.b Rated as negative by judges.*/?
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THE "BARNUM EFFECT" REVISITED 1383
MethodOverview. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of
two rating groups—bipolar or single trait. Bipolar groupsubjects
rated both themselves and an acquaintance on aseries of 9-point
scales. One endpoint represented a pos-itively valenced trait and
the other represented a negativelyvalenced antonym. Single trait
group subjects estimatedthe frequency with which both they and an
acquaintancedisplayed each of the individual traits which appeared
asendpoints on the bipolar scales.
Subjects. Subjects were 69 undergraduate students atthe
University of California at Davis. They received extracredit in an
introductory psychology course for their par-ticipation.
Experimental materials. Traits used in the study wereselected
from an initial group produced by five under-graduate students. The
students had been instructed togenerate trait pairs with positive
and negative antonyms ateach pole and to list only traits with a
high rate of prevalenceamong their peers. Of the original pairs so
generated, 24were subsequently rated by a separate group of
under-graduate judges as markedly differing from one another
invalence.2 These 24 trait pairs were as follows, with the
morepositively rated trait appearing as the first in each
pair:affectionate-reserved; sophisticated-naive;
modest-vain;cautious-impulsive; cheerful-sad;
clear-thinking-confused;brave-fearful; decisive-hesitant;
enthusiastic-apathetic;friendly-disagreeable; generous-selfish;
self-reliant-de-pendent; flexible-stubborn;
good-tempered-irritable; op-timistic-pessimistic; active-passive;
calm-excitable; re-laxed-tense; punctual-tardy;
attentive-distractible; out-going-shy; rugged-delicate;
mature-childish; trusting-suspicious.
Design and procedure. Subjects in both groups wereinformed that
the experimenters were investigating "per-ceptions of the
prevalence of certain personality traits,"and were requested to
rate both themselves and an ac-quaintance on the personality
scales. An acquaintance wasdefined as "someone whom you know, see
occasionally,and speak with occasionally, but do not know well
enoughto consider a friend." All subjects were instructed to
"useyour best guess" if they did not have enough informationto make
a choice.
Bipolar group subjects (n = 34) rated both themselvesand an
acquaintance on each of the trait pairs, with thepositive and
negative antonym in each pair appearing re-spectively as the
positive and negative endpoint on a 9-point scale. Between-subjects
conditions were order of pre-sentation of traits (two different
random orders) and orderof individual rated (self rated first vs.
acquaintance ratedfirst). Subjects were randomly assigned to
condition.
Single trait group subjects (n = 35) estimated the fre-quency
with which both they and an acquaintance displayedeach of the
individual traits. Estimates were made on 9-point scales with
endpoints marked "frequently" and "in-frequently." As in the
bipolar group, between-subjects con-ditions were order of
presentation of trait and order ofindividual rated, with subjects
randomly assigned to con-dition.
Results
Because subjects in the bipolar group andthe single trait group
used different rating
scales, their data were separately analyzed. Aninitial series of
2 X 2 X 2 (Order of Traits XOrder of Person Rated (Self
First/Acquain-tance First) X Person Rated (Self/Acquain-tance)
ANOVAS were performed on each of the24 bipolar scales and on each
of the 48 singletrait rating-scales. Order of traits and order
ofperson rated were between-subjects variables;person rated was a
within-subjects repeatedmeasures variable.
Differences in self-other ratings variedmarkedly according to
group. Bipolar groupsubjects saw a significant difference
betweenthemselves and others on only 2 of the 24 bi-polar scales,
viewing themselves as significantlymore toward the hesitant pole of
the hesitant-decisive scale, F(\, 30) = 4.69, p < .05,
andsignificantly more toward the tense pole of therelaxed-tense
scale, F(l, 30) = 8.07, p < .01.Single trait group subjects, in
contrast, ratedthemselves as displaying 42 of the 48 traitsmore
frequently than their acquaintances. For13 of these
traits—flexible, excitable, affec-tionate, modest, brave,
apathetic, generous,self-reliant, dependent, tense, attentive,
ma-ture, and impulsive—differences were signifi-cant at the .05
level or beyond. Eight of these13 traits had been previously rated
as the pos-itive trait in the pair. Subjects rated their
ac-quaintances as displaying only one trait, tar-diness,
significantly more frequently thanthemselves.
To provide a more meaningful data sum-mary, and in particular to
examine the inter-action of the effect for person rated with
traitvalence, additional ANOVAS were performedthat collapsed across
the ratings of individualtraits. A 2 X 2 X 2 (Order of Traits X
Orderof Person Rated X Person Rated) repeatedmeasures ANOVA on the
mean trait ratings ofBipolar Group subjects indicated that,
al-though both self and acquaintance were ratedcloser to the
positive pole of the scale, self wasnot rated more positively than
acquaintance,F(l, 30) < 1, (M = 3.79 for self vs. M = 3.86for
acquaintance, with lower numbers indi-
2 Nineteen judges separately rated the valence of eachtrait on a
9-point scale ranging from extremely positive (1)to extremely
negative (9). Twenty-two of the 24 pairs dif-fered significantly in
valence at the .05 level or beyond,and the means of the remaining
two trait pairs—rugged-delicate and cautious-impulsive—were in the
predicteddirection.
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1384 JOHNSON, CAIN, FALKE, HAYMAN, PERILLO
eating more positive ratings). A 2 X 2 X 2 X2 (Order of Traits X
Order of Person Rated XPerson Rated X Trait Valence) ANOVA was
alsoperformed on the mean ratings of single traitgroup subjects.
Order of traits and order ofperson rated were between-subjects
variablesin this analysis, while person rated and traitvalence were
within-subject repeated measuresvariables. In a result parallel to
that of Study1, analysis indicated highly significant maineffects
for trait valence, F(l, 31) = 135.55,p < .001, and person rated,
F(l, 31) = 34.75,p < .001, but no significant Trait Valence
XPerson Rated interaction, F(l, 31) < 1. Sub-jects, in other
words, demonstrated an equiv-alent positivity bias in rating both
themselves(M = 6.72 for frequency of positive behaviorsvs. M = 4.31
for frequency of negative behav-iors) and others (M = 6.07 for
frequency ofpositive behaviors vs. M = 3.91 for frequencyof
negative behaviors). Although the rated ab-solute frequency for
both positive and negativebehaviors was higher for the self than
for theother, the mean relative frequency, or ratio ofpositive
behaviors to negative behaviors, wasvirtually identical (1.56 for
self vs. 1.55 forother). Neither the main effect for trait
valencenor the main effect for person rated interactedsignificantly
with either of the between-subjectsvariables related to order of
rating. These re-sults are fully consistent with the analysis ofthe
bipolar group indicating the absence of agreater positivity bias on
self ratings.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 are consistent with apurely cognitive
interpretation of self-otherdifferences in acceptance of the
applicabilityof prevalent traits in that they indicate that
thedifferences may be primarily due to inadequateadjustment for the
lesser availability of knowl-edge concerning the other. Although
the datacoincide with previous research indicating astrong
positivity bias in person evaluation (e.g.,Sears,
1983;Bruner&Taguiri, 1954), they alsoindicate that the bias is
equally strong for eval-uations of self and other. The mean ratios
offrequency of positive behaviors to frequencyof negative behaviors
indicate that subjectsrated both themselves and others as
engagingin positive behaviors approximately 61% of thetime, a
percentage close to the "golden section"identified in previous
research. The results ofAdams-Webber (1979) and Rigdon and
Epting
(1982) indicate that subjects confronted witha dichotomous
choice select the positive roleas descriptive of others
approximately 62% ofthe time, perhaps because it is in this
propor-tion that negative events are maximally strikingas figure
against a general background of pos-itive events. Despite these
equivalent ratios,however, and in accord with the cognitive
ex-planation for the Barnum effect, subjects sys-tematically
underestimated the frequency withwhich their acquaintances,
relative to them-selves, engaged in both positive and
negativebehaviors. Study 3 investigated whether thissymmetry in
relative underestimation of pos-itive and negative behaviors would
extend tothe evaluation of paragraph-long, Baraum-style
descriptions, as opposed to single adjec-tive traits, or whether,
in the context of longerdescriptions, the self-other distinction
wouldinteract with description valence. It also ex-amined certain
additional issues not consid-ered by the initial studies.
Study 3
If a purely cognitive mediation of theBarnum effect implies
similar self-other dif-ferences in the acceptance of positive and
neg-ative descriptions, mediation by motivationalfactors alone
implies opposite self-other effectsfor descriptions of opposing
valence—althoughpositive descriptions would be perceived asmore
applicable to the self, negative descrip-tions would be seen as
less applicable. Put an-other way, predictions based on a
motivationalexplanation dovetail with those based on acognitive
explanation for positive descriptions,but diverge for negative
descriptions. In thelatter case, motivational factors should
compelgreater rejection of negative descriptions asapplicable to
the self, but a cognitive expla-nation based on the differential
availability ofconfirming evidence would predict theirgreater
perceived applicability.
In addition to examining these differingpredictions, Study 3
expanded the number ofpersons rated to self, close friend,
moderatefriend, and casual acquaintance. In this regardthe
experiment tested the prediction, sup-ported by both cognitive and
motivational ex-planations, of a systematic relation betweendegree
of familiarity and perceived accuracy.
Finally, Snyder et al. (1977) noted no gendereffects in previous
Barnum effect research. A
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THE "BARNUM EFFECT" REVISITED 1385
secondary purpose of Study 3 was to examinethe interaction of
the self/other effect with sexof subject under our particular
paradigm.
Method
Overview. In a latin square design (Cochran & Cox,
1957),subjects rated the applicability of various
paragraph-longdescriptions to themselves, a close friend, a
moderate friend,and a casual acquaintance. Each subject rated 8
paragraphsin 4 sets, with a set including a paragraph related to
apositive trait—for example, affectionate—and one relatedto a
negatively valenced antonym—for example, reserved.Each subject
rated the applicability of each of the para-graphs in a set to a
different person—that is, one set wasjudged for accuracy with
regard to the self, one set foraccuracy with regard to a close
friend, and so forth. Pairingof set with person rated was
completely counterbalancedbetween subjects.
Subjects. Subjects were 64 undergraduates at the Uni-versity of
California, Davis. They received extra credit inan introductory
psychology course for their participation.
Experimental materials. Paragraphs were generated
byundergraduate writers to describe prevalent behaviorsamong their
peer group that were characteristic of partic-ular trait
dimensions. The positivity or negativity of thebehaviors described
was moderated to meet the high base-rate restriction. Twenty-three
undergraduate judges sub-sequently rated the applicability of each
of the paragraphdescriptions to the average person on 9-point
scales, withhigher numbers indicating greater accuracy. Analysis
in-dicated no significant systematic main effect for Valenceon the
rated prevalence of the description, (M = 5.30 forpositive
paragraphs vs. M = 5.42 for negative paragraphs),f\\,22)< 1.
In constructing the paragraph descriptions, certainguidelines
were consistently followed: The statements werevague and relatively
short, and the descriptions were fre-quently hedged with
qualifiers, for example, "sometimes"or "occasionally."3 Paragraph
pairs involved the trait di-mensions of affectionate/reserved;
resolute/irresolute;generous/selfish; and careful/rash. To
exemplify the stim-ulus materials, the affectionate/reserved
paragraph pair isshown in its entirety:
(Affectionate paragraph): When this individual is witha person
who can be trusted, warm feelings for that per-son may be
expressed. Best friends may be told howmuch their company is
appreciated. When others sharetheir inner thoughts and emotions
with this individual,he or she may find it easy to do the same.
With friendsit may be quite easy for this person to speak what is
onhis or her mind and to share deep feelings that are notshared
with strangers. In the company of such friendsthe person feels
honest and true to his or her emotions.At such times this person
finds it easy to be open anddemonstrative. People may sometimes
remark on howtalkative and affectionate this individual seems to be
onthese occasions.
(Reserved paragraph): This individual may feel thereis a time
and a place for emotions, and may occasionallyshow embarrassment
about displaying affection in public.Sometimes the person may
prefer to keep some distancefrom others. In particular, there are
certain tasks thatthis person would prefer to do alone. When
friends havehurt this person, he or she may experience difficulty
in
showing them that he or she still cares. People who don'tknow
this person well may be inclined to say he or shesometimes appears
cold and indifferent to strangers. Thisperson may find it difficult
to express genuine feelingsfor acquaintances that he or she does
not know well andmay sometimes be uncomfortable about showing
affec-tion for others.
Design and procedure. Each subject read all four setsof stimulus
paragraphs. Subjects were randomly assignedto two orders of
presentation of paragraphs such that onehalf read the four positive
paragraphs first and one halfread the four negative paragraphs
first. There were 12 malesin each of the order conditions, 19
females in the positiveparagraphs first condition, and 21 females
in the negativeparagraphs first condition. Each subject rated all
four in-dividuals, but only one person (the same individual) oneach
of the two paragraphs in the four paragraph sets. Theperson rated
was completely counterbalanced for eachparagraph set, so that one
quarter of all subjects ratedthemselves on the
affectionate-reserved paragraph set, onequarter rated a close
friend on this set, one quarter a mod-erate friend, and one quarter
a casual acquaintance. Underthis procedure, each subject rated each
of the 4 individualsand each paragraph set, but only one paragraph
set/indi-vidual combination. Order of rating both individuals
andparagraphs was also completely counterbalanced betweensubjects,
with the constraint that either the four negativeor the four
positive paragraphs be rated first. Subjects ratedeach paragraph
immediately after reading it.
Subjects were randomly assigned to condition. They weredebriefed
after completing the task.
Instructions. Subjects were requested to read severalparagraphs
and to decide "how accurately each of theseparagraphs describes
someone whom you know." Beforereading the paragraphs, all subjects
were requested to thinkof a close friend (a person whom "you know
very well"and "see frequently"); a moderate friend (a person
whom"you know and see occasionally and also consider afriend"); and
a casual acquaintance ("someone you knowin passing but not very
well . . . either someone you donot see often or do not spend more
than a few minuteswith when you see him or her"). The instructions
stressedthat subjects should think of the same close friend
wheneverrating the applicability of a paragraph to a close
friend,and the same moderate friend when rating the applicabilityof
a paragraph to a moderate friend, etc.
Dependent measure. The dependent measure for allparagraphs was
the rating on a 9-point scale of how ac-curately the paragraph
described the designated individualwith ranges from not at all
accurately (1) to extremelyaccurately (9). Subjects were again
instructed to "use yourbest guess" in the event of uncertainty.
Results
A 2 X 2 X 4 (Order of Paragraph Presen-tation X Paragraph
Valence X Person Rated)
3 The descriptions were subsequently rated for valenceby
undergraduate judges using 9-point scales. Three of thefour pairs
differed significantly in valence at the .05 levelor beyond and
mean ratings for the remaining pair, care-ful-rash, were in the
predicted direction, F ( l , 18) = 1.39,p < .25.
-
1386 JOHNSON, CAIN, FALKE, HAYMAN, PERILLO
Table 2Mean Accuracy Judgments of Personality Descriptions for
Four Different Individuals: Study 3
Rating
Rating for positive descriptionsRating for negative
descriptions
M
Self
6.974.775.87
Closefriend
6.394.615.50
Moderatefriend
5.094.804.95
Casualacquaintance
4.734.764.75
Note. Higher numbers indicate ratings of greater accuracy.
ANOVA was performed on paragraph accuracyjudgments, collapsing
across individual para-graphs. Order of paragraph presentation wasa
between-subjects variable designatingwhether subjects rated the
four positive para-graphs or the four negative paragraphs
first.Paragraph valence (positive/negative) and per-son rated
(self/close friend/moderate friend/casual acquaintance) were
within-subjectsvariables.
The analysis indicated a highly significantmain effect for
paragraph valence, with sub-jects rating positive paragraphs as
generallymore applicable than negative paragraphs, F( 1,62) =
17.04, p < .001. There was also a highlysignificant main effect
for person rated, F(3,186) = 13.52, p < .001. The precise nature
ofthe latter effect, however, was more meaning-fully investigated
by an a priori contrast testingwhether perceived applicability
varied system-atically with degree of acquaintance. When
thiscomparison (3, 1, — 1, — 3) was performed onthe means shown in
the final row of Table 2,the results were highly significant, F( 1,
186) =39.40, p < .001, with the contrast accountingfor 97% of
the variance among the means.Subjects perceived the character
descriptionsas most applicable to themselves, next mostapplicable
to a close friend, next most appli-cable to a moderate friend, and
least applicableto a casual acquaintance. Separate analyses ofthe
four individual pairs of stimulus para-graphs, although revealing
some variation fromthe general pattern, indicated that
applicabilityratings for self and close friend contrasted
sig-nificantly (at least at the .05 level) with appli-cability
ratings for moderate friend and casualacquaintance (1, 1, — 1, -1
comparison).
There was, however a significant PersonRated X Valence
interaction, P(3, 186) = 5.41,p < .002. As may be noted by an
examinationof the means in Table 2, this pattern was con-
fined to ratings of positive paragraphs. Al-though the contrast
was significant when per-formed on judgments of positive
paragraphsalone, F( 1, 186) = 52.55, p < .001, accountingfor 96%
of the variance among the means, itdid not attain significance on
ratings of neg-ative paragraphs, F(l, 186) < 1. Degree of
ac-quaintance was not systematically related tothe latter
ratings.
Neither the effect for valence nor the effectfor person rated
interacted significantly withorder of paragraph presentation
(positiveparagraphs first/negative paragraphs first),both
interaction Fs < 1, and there was also nomain effect for order,
F < 1. An additionalANOVA adding gender as a
between-subjectsblocking variable also indicated no significantmain
effect or interactions involving sex ofsubject.
Discussion
Study 3 provided strong evidence of a sys-tematic relation
between degree of acquain-tance and judged accuracy of personality
de-scriptions. Results, however, also indicated apronounced
valence-related asymmetry. Al-though positive descriptions
displayed the pre-dicted relation, negative descriptions did
not.Study 4 was undertaken to investigate whetherthis asymmetry
would replicate with differentsubjects and different specific
stimulus mate-rials.
Study 4Method
The design, procedure, instruction set, and dependentmeasures in
Study 4 were all identical to those used inStudy 3. The sets of
stimulus paragraphs used, however,involved the bipolar trait
dimensions of trusting-suspicious,self-reliant-dependent,
stubborn-flexible, and cautious-impulsive. Paragraphs were composed
by undergraduatesunder guidelines and constraints identical to
those of Study
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THE "BARNUM EFFECT" REVISITED 1387
Table 3Mean Accuracy Judgments of Personality Descriptions for
Four Different Individuals: Study 4
Rating
Rating for positive descriptionsRating for negative
descriptions
M
Self
6.354.335.34
Closefriend
5.984.265.12
Moderatefriend
5.394.394.89
Casualacquaintance
5.183.684.43
Note. Higher numbers indicate ratings of greater accuracy.
3 and entailed descriptions of high base rate
characteristicswith either a moderately positive or moderately
negativevalence.4 As in Study 3, the paragraphs were
subsequentlyrated by undergraduate judges on 9-point scales for
theirapplicability to the "average person." Consistent with
theStudy 3 results, analysis revealed no significant systematicmain
effect for valence on perceived prevalence (M forpositive
paragraphs = 4.91 vs. M for negative paragraphs =5.ll,F(\,22)<
1.
Paragraphs averaged two to three sentences longer thanthose used
in Study 3. Subjects in the experiment were 80undergraduates at the
University of California at Davis,who received extra credit in an
introductory psychologycourse for their participation. There were
28 females and12 males in the positive paragraphs first condition,
and 26females and 14 males in the negative paragraphs first
con-dition.
Results
A 2 X 2 X 4 (Order of Paragraph Presen-tation X Paragraph
Valence X Person Rated)ANOVA on paragraph accuracy judgmentsagain
indicated a highly significant main effectfor paragraph valence,
with subjects ratingpositive paragraphs as more applicable, F(l,78)
= 50.10, p < .001. The main effect forperson rated was also
highly significant, F(3,234) = 9.27, p < .001, as was the a
priori con-trast (3, 1, -1, -3), F(l, 234) = 26.76, p <.001,
which accounted for 96% of the varianceamong the means. As
indicated by the meansin the final row of Table 3 (which
collapseacross the valence variable) the pattern of theeffect
directly parallels the pattern of Study 3,although the
applicability ratings are generallyslightly lower. Subjects rated
the descriptionsas most applicable to themselves, next
mostapplicable to a close friend, next most appli-cable to a
moderate friend, and least applicableto a casual acquaintance.
Analysis of individ-ual paragraph sets, although revealing
somevariation from the general pattern, indicatedthat for three of
the four pairs applicabilityratings for self and close friend
contrasted sig-nificantly (at the .05 level for two of the
pairs
and at the .08 level for the third) with appli-cability ratings
for moderate friend and casualacquaintance. The exception to this
generalpattern was the cautious-impulsive paragraphset, in which
accuracy ratings for self and closefriend did not differ
significantly from accuracyratings for moderate friend and casual
ac-quaintance.
In another parallel to Study 3, however, thisrank order of means
occurs for ratings of pos-itive paragraphs alone. The accuracy
ratingsof positive paragraphs show a progressive in-crement with
degree of acquaintance, with thea priori contrast highly
significant, F(l, 234) =17.12, p < .001, accounting for 97% of
thevariance among the means. Although the Per-son Rated X Valence
interaction does not at-tain significance F(3, 234) = 1.14, the
patternof accuracy ratings for negative paragraphs isstrikingly
different. With negative paragraphs,accuracy ratings for self,
close friend, andmoderate friend do not differ significantly
fromone another (all Fs < 1), but accuracy ratingsfor these 3
individuals in the aggregate differsignificantly from accuracy
ratings for casualacquaintance, F(l, 234) = 4.86, p < .05
withthis comparison accounting for 98% of thevariance among the
means. As in Study 3, nei-ther the effect for paragraph valence nor
theeffect for person rated interacted significantlywith order of
paragraph presentation; there was
4 The Study 3 paragraphs in the careful-rash set, whichdid not
differ significantly in valence ratings by the separategroup of
judges, were also the only paragraphs that showedno significant
main effect for positivity on subjects' judg-ments of accuracy. The
cautious-impulsive set in Study 4embodied descriptions on a similar
trait dimension thatwere rated by undergraduate judges as differing
significantlyin valence (at the .01 level). Study 4 investigated
whetherthis significant difference in valence would be
associatedwith a significant effect for positivity on perceived
accuracy.The undergraduate judges also found that the paragraphsin
the other three pairs used in Study 4 also differed sig-nificantly
in valence at the .05 level or beyond.
-
1388 JOHNSON, CAIN, FALKE, HAYMAN, PERILLO
also no significant main effect for order. Anadditional ANOVA
with gender as a between-subjects variable indicated an absence of
a sig-nificant main effect and the absence of anysignificant
interaction between sex of subjectand paragraph valence or person
rated.
Discussion
In sum, the results of Study 4 generally rep-licated those of
Study 3, with the slightly lowerapplicability ratings perhaps
explained by theobservation of Sundberg (1955) that
longerdescriptions are generally perceived as less ac-curate. In
both experiments a highly significanteffect for person rated
assumed the same pat-tern—the more familiar the individual
rated,the more likely was a description to be judgedapplicable to
that person. In both experiments,however, this effect was due
largely to the pat-tern of accuracy ratings for positive
paragraphsalone.
General Discussion
This series of experiments investigatedwhether the Barnum
effect—the acceptance ofhigh base rate descriptions as uniquely
appli-cable to the self—would occur when subjectshad not been
deceived into believing that thedescriptions had been prepared
specifically forthem. All four of the studies showed a
strongself-other distinction under these circum-stances, supporting
the proposition that the ef-fect is not mediated exclusively by the
credi-bility awarded the alleged source—for exam-ple, psychologist,
astrologer, or computer—ofthe description. The results, it would
seem, arealso difficult to explain in terms of
demandcharacteristics. Absent the belief that the per-sonality
summaries were prepared specificallyfor the subject, a strong
motivation to confirmthe expectations of the experimenter by
ac-cepting the descriptions which he or she pre-pared does not
explain the greater perceivedapplicability to the self. Rather, the
studiessupply evidence that self-other differences inperceived
applicability may be mediated byboth cognitive and motivational
factors.
Study 1 examined accuracy ratings of thepersonality descriptions
originally prepared byForer (1949) and subsequently used as
stimulusmaterials in several later Barnum effect studies.Subjects
judging the applicability of these
statements to themselves rated them signifi-cantly higher in
accuracy than subjects judgingtheir applicability to an
acquaintance and thisdifference prevailed for both positive and
neg-ative statements. Study 2 provides evidencesuggesting that the
effect may be mediated bya failure to adjust sufficiently for the
relativelack of confirming evidence of high
base-ratecharacteristics in the other. Subjects rating thefrequency
with which dispositional character-istics were displayed
underestimated the fre-quency with which an acquaintance,
relativeto the self, manifested both positive and neg-ative
traits.
The data of Study 2, although not inconsis-tent with Nisbett et
al. (1973) and Goldberg(1981), also provide some explanation for
thefindings of Monson et al. (1980) that individ-uals asked simply
to accept or reject traits finda greater number applicable to
themselves thanto others. Our results indicate that subjectsrating
themselves readily find more evidenceconfirming the existence of
individual traits.When traits are rated on bipolar scales,
how-ever, relatively strong evidence confirming theexistence of a
trait may be effectively cancelledby relatively strong evidence
confirming theexistence of its polar opposite, with the endresult
that bipolar ratings of the self do notdiffer significantly from
bipolar ratings of anacquaintance.
These data regarding systematic self-otherdifferences in the
estimated prevalence of highbase-rate behaviors indicate that any
adjust-ment subjects make for the differential avail-ability of
confirming evidence is inadequate.One explanation for the
inadequacy is thatsubjects ignore self-other differences in thebase
rates of instances from which confirmingevidence is to be drawn.
Under this account,the relative dearth of available evidence
ofcommon traits in another may have led themto believe that these
traits were in fact moreprevalent in themselves. A different
explana-tion, however, would attribute the self-otherdifference to
subjects' conservatism in com-mitting themselves on the existence
of traitsin another. Although explicitly instructed touse their
"best guess" in the absence of infor-mation sufficient to make a
choice, subjectsmight nevertheless have experienced some
re-luctance to guess, instead estimating that thebehaviors of which
they had little pertinentknowledge were relatively infrequent.
-
THE "BARNUM EFFECT" REVISITED 1389
Note, however, that these two different ex-planations have an
underlying affinity. In cer-tain contexts a judgmental conservatism
maybe well-justified, but not in the context of ourparticular
paradigm. In that paradigm, both afirm belief that high base-rate
behaviors aremore prevalent in the self (Explanation 1) anda
reluctance to ascribe those behaviors to alittle-known other
(Explanation 2) may beviewed as variations of the same basic
failureto draw the normatively appropriate inference,or as two
different versions of the same cog-nitive "error." The appropriate
inference isthat, just as human beings might be thoughtquite likely
to have two eyes, two arms, andtwo legs, they are also reasonably
likely, in theface of little tangible evidence to the contrary,to
manifest traits with an extremely high baserate. Apart from
motivational influence, wewould expect to find little systematic
under-estimation of the physical traits—for exampleheight and
weight—of little-known others, orof certain demographic
characteristics—forexample age or amount of education. The rea-son
for the difference between the two cate-gories of traits may be
that, although there ismuch tangible and objective evidence as to
thedistribution of physical and demographictraits, there is less
evidence of the commonalityof inner states or psychological
variables. Boththe outright denial of the commonality of thelatter
characteristics, as well as the reluctanceto admit their prevalence
without strong sup-porting information, may be products of
afundamental failure to appreciate a generallyhigh degree of
similarity between our ac-quaintances and ourselves.
The findings of Studies 1 and 2, indicatinginsufficient
adjustment for lesser knowledge ofboth positive and negative traits
in others, sug-gested that descriptions of positive and
negativevalence, separately judged, might both be ratedas more
applicable to the self than to others.The results of Studies 3 and
4 did indicatehighly significant main effects for person rated,and
furthermore indicated a systematic rela-tion between degree of
familiarity and per-ceived accuracy of the description. In both
ex-periments, however, this main effect for fa-miliarity was
largely confined to positivedescriptions, indicating the influence
of mo-tivational factors. This particular asymmetryis in fact quite
consistent with Snyder andShenkel (1976), who found that subjects
rated
positive feedback as more applicable to them-selves than to
"people in general," but saw nosignificant difference between the
applicabilityof negative feedback to themselves and a gen-eralized
other.
The observed relation between perceivedaccuracy and degree of
familiarity is reminis-cent of the results of Taylor and
Koivumaki(1976), who found that a positivity bias in at-tribution
increased with degree of acquain-tance. These results might be
taken to implythat the Barnum effect is largely motivationalin
origin—a product of the desire to view selfand friends in a
relatively positive light. Buthow does a motivational explanation
accountfor the asymmetrical nature of the effect? In-dividuals
motivated to rate mildly positive de-scriptions as most applicable
to themselvesought, it would seem, also be motivated to ratemildly
negative descriptions as least applicableto themselves, but none of
the present studiesprovide any indication of the latter
tendency.One reasonable explanation for the asymmetryinvolves the
assumption that, while people aremotivated to be particularly kind
in evaluatingthemselves and their friends, they are not mo-tivated
to be particularly unkind in evaluatinglittle-known others. But
this account, althoughplausible, does not fully explain why, if we
aremotivated to view ourselves and our friends ina positive light,
the negative paragraphs in bothof the latter two studies were rated
at medium-level accuracy (between 4 and 5 on 9-pointscales) as
descriptions of both self and friends.It may be that a
nonmotivational factor—per-sonal knowledge that the descriptions
were infact applicable—inhibited a relatively strongmotivation to
reject the descriptions as accu-rate portraits of the self.
Our results would appear to indicate thatthe Barnum effect may
be influenced both bymotivational factors and by cognitive
factorsrelated to our failure to adjust for the lesseravailability
of confirming evidence regardingthe little-known other. Because
both theamount of available information and the desireto view an
individual positively may increasewith degree of acquaintance,
cognitive andmotivational influences may converge for pos-itive
descriptions, producing a systematic pos-itive relation between
familiarity and judgedaccuracy. With negative descriptions,
however,cognitive and motivational influences mayproduce opposing
tendencies. Both the store
-
1390 JOHNSON, CAIN, FALKE, HAYMAN, PERILLO
of knowledge concerning the prevalence ofnegative
characteristics and the motivation toreject their applicability may
increase with de-gree of acquaintance. These countervailing
in-fluences may in effect nullify one another, re-sulting in
similar medium-level accuracy rat-ings for descriptions of both
self and other.However, increasing the motivation to rejectthe
applicability of negative descriptions to theself (by, for example,
presenting extremelynegative descriptions) might well result in
lessperceived accuracy for the self than for others,confirming the
predictions of a purely moti-vational model.
The results of Studies 3 and 4, which oth-erwise are remarkably
parallel, diverge slightlyin that the Study 4 ratings of the
applicabilityof negative descriptions to a casual acquain-tance are
lower than applicability ratings forthe other 3 persons in the
aggregate; in Study3 the perceived applicability of negative
de-scriptions does not vary significantly with per-son rated. One
plausible explanation for thisdiscrepancy is that both personal
knowledgeof, and inferences concerning, personality traitsin casual
acquaintances may vary with theparticular trait. In instances in
which personalknowledge of a trait is particularly scanty,
anegative description may be rated as less ap-plicable to a casual
acquaintance than to theself or friends, even though perceived
appli-cability to the latter may have been reducedby a motivational
bias. The present experi-ments, which were designed to examine
theBarnum effect with the original Forer stimulusmaterials and
other high base rate descriptionsresembling astrological character
sketches, didnot systematically explore sources of variationrelated
to category of trait. One goal of futureresearch might be to
investigate the influenceof variations along the external-internal
traitdimension proposed by Funder (1980).
A more basic issue involves the question ofwhy the pattern of
self-other rating differenceswas influenced by valence in Studies 3
and 4when neither Study 1 nor Study 2 gave anyclear indication of
such an influence. The mostobvious explanation relates to
fundamentaldifferences in the stimulus materials used. Itmay be
that the motivation to deny the appli-cability of negative traits
to the self becomesa significant factor only when those
negativetraits are presented in the form of a relativelylengthy
description, which carries with it the
implication of being a fairly complete charactersketch. It may
be one thing, for example, toacknowledge frequent stubbornness in
the self,potentially attributable to a particular categoryof
situations, and yet quite another to accedeto the accuracy of the
character sketch of astubborn person, with its concomittant
impli-cation that stubbornness is a central trait at-tributable to
dispositional factors.
Despite the valence-related asymmetry, themain effect for
acquaintance assumed the pre-dicted pattern in both Studies 3 and
4. Giventhe clear real-world analogues to the stimulusmaterials,
the conclusion to be drawn is ap-parent. When personality
descriptions—forexample, the character sketches which fre-quently
appear in books and newspaper col-umns on astrology—consist of a
mix of com-mon positive and negative traits, those de-scriptions
will tend to be regarded assignificantly more accurate when the
persondescribed is well known to the perceiver andwill be seen as
most accurate when the persondescribed is the actual perceiver. The
resultsalso indicate that this effect is not wholly con-tingent on
any prior credibility accorded thesource of the description.
Rather, in accordwith the results of Snyder et al. (1976), it
islikely that the source gains additional credi-bility as a
function of the perceived accuracyof the personality sketch.
It should be emphasized that, although theperception of
applicability of high base ratecharacteristics to the self is not,
in and of itself,inaccurate, the data do provide substantial
ev-idence of one departure from normative ac-curacy—our subjects
failed to adjust their ac-curacy judgments upward to compensate
fortheir relative lack of available data on friendsand
acquaintances. The error, it would appear,lies in our failure to
appreciate that, just as wemay have substantial evidence of
Geminicharacteristics in ourselves (and, for that mat-ter,
substantial evidence of the characteristicsof each of the signs of
the Zodiac), both AuntHarriett and the postman may also have
ampledata bases indicating that they also frequentlybehave as
typical Geminis.
While our failure to adjust for insufficientknowledge, and
concomitant reluctance to as-sume the existence of high base-rate
charac-teristics in everyone, may reflect an inferentialerror, that
error may well have cultural foun-dations. Subjects' estimations
that they per-
-
THE "BARNUM EFFECT" REVISITED 1391
form certain common behaviors more fre-quently than their
acquaintances would appearto reflect the implicit assumption that
our ev-eryday behavior is not fully replicated, evenon the limited
dimension of frequency, in theexperience of little known others.
Althoughthis assumption may be the product of a desirefor
uniqueness (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980), itmay also reflect the
expectations of a Westernculture, which emphasizes the differences
be-tween individuals and minimizes their simi-larities.
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Received February 13, 1984Revision received June 29, 1984