The Barcelona System Re-Inverting the Pyramid

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The Barcelona System: Re-Inverting the Pyramid vs. Getafe

By: Euler | 16 April 2012 | 40 Comments »

At the individual level, football contains within it dazzling variety. Nothing repeats-every match is unique in its own patterned ways. At the team level, however, systems are

more constrained. While there are many different interpretations and implementations of 

tactical systems, there are only so many different baseline ways to set up a side. As such,in any particular time, many of the most radical ways of making the game new can

emerge by drawing directly or indirectly on football’s rich history. Innovation can

emerge by repeating a pattern long forgotten or relegated to a dark crevice of memory.

2-6 at the Bernabeu. The 2009 Champions League final. 5-0 Villareal. There are certainmatches this Barcelona project play that establish tactical benchmarks for the system and

Guardiola’s thinking. They are matches – often subtle and ostensibly un-noteworthy at

face value, which will go on to act as touchstones for Guardiola’s Barcelona. The homematch against Getafe was one of these.

Pep and Tito: Tactics

In defeating Getafe 4-0, Pep Guardiola utilized a tactical approach that incorporated

certain elements of play not regularly seen in the game for almost a century. What was

so noteworthy and at times, breathtaking (even lovely), about how Barcelona played inthis match was how old and antiquated it was in so many ways and how at the same time

it was completely pragmatic and devoid of nostalgia. The past returned due to necessity

and circumstance. If history is indeed a dustbin, this match was a kind of polished gemmade from the weight, from the pressure that can be applied now to the carbon ash of the

 past.

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Inverting the Pyramid Football in the 19th century was a game that would be difficult

for us to recognize now in comparison to the modern sport we are accustomed to. At thetime, football was still in the process of formalizing itself. There were few set it’s rules.

There was a stringent debate over whether it should be legal to intentionally kick an

opposing player in the shins. Professionalism was still something not part of the sport.Outside of these issues of standardization and business, the approach adopted by teams

was radically different. The standard formation had 7-8 players on the front line acting as

forwards. All out attack was the focal point of competition. The primary thrust of how

the game was played was largely oriented through dribbling in direct lines to theopponents goals. In fact it was only in the 1860’s that it became legal to pass the ball

forward. Prior, according to one existing rule, Law Six, it was illegal for any player to be

 positioned ahead of the ball. The very notion of passing was considered an inferior wayof playing. (1)

All of this would change however. This history is brilliantly recounted in Jonathan

Wilson’s seminal study of tactics and their evolution, Inverting the Pyramid. But thetransition to a more interlinked way of playing was slow. As Wilson describes, when the

Law Six was altered making the forward pass legal the game initially changed little.

Teams didn’t take advantage of passing even after it was legalized. Innovation came

from outside of England, which was then both the home and dominant center of thegame. Passing was first leveraged as a means of playing in Scotland.

In order to pass the ball better a new kind of formation was developed. One of the seven

forwards was drawn back and the 2-2-6 was developed.

Soon however it became clear that the 2-2-6 wasn’t the optimal way to set up a side thatwas oriented around the pass. Another forward was drawn back and the forerunner of the

modern center half was born in the 2-3-5 formation.

The 2-3-5 would go on to be the predominant system played in much of the world until

the 1925 when further changes in the offside rule were made. This in turn led to theemergence of the “W-M” formation (3-2-2-3).

Wilson deftly summarizes the history of the game after the dominance of the 2-3-5 as a

 process of he describes “Inverting the Pyramid.” Managers became progressively more

and more concerned about creating defensive solidity over the course of the 20thcentury. As such, they continued to drop forwards from the 2-3-5 back deeper to create

additional defensive positions.

In the mid-1980’s Carlos Bilardo, manager of Argentina, developed the 3-5-2 as a system

to play in the 1986 World Cup. Part of the purpose of Bilardo’s 3-5-2 was to provide a

defensive platform for Maradona to play in front of, a structure that would allow hisgenius to shine and not burden him with the need to defend. The 3-5-2 would quickly go

on to become one of the most favored systems in the world. Part of it’s widespreadadoption was related to its flexibility – how it was implemented could vary widely.

While the 3-5-2 can seem like a highly attack oriented system latent within it is an

extremely defensive variant. Play the defensive block deep and focus the wing backs onsolidity and the 3-5-2 quickly turns into a 5-3-2. And this is what many sides did in the

1980’s and 1990’s. The original pyramid formed in the 19th century – the 2-3-5 oriented

around attack – had undergone complete inversion turning into a 5-3-2 oriented around

defending.

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Re-Inverting the Pyramid

Line Up:

Coming into the Getafe match, Guardiola’s options for how to set up his side wereseverely constrained due to injuries, particularly at the back. Pique, Alves, and Abidal

were all unavailable leaving only three first team defenders available. Further 

complicating this issue was that one of these three defenders was Adriano, who generally

 plays as an attacking full back and whose usual style of play isn’t ideally suited to act as alateral center half in a three man backline.

Heading into the match it was widely thought that Guardiola would thus play a four man

 backline of Adriano, Mascherano, Puyol and youngster Martin Montoya at RB. Thishowever did not prove to be the case. Despite the absence of a true left center half,

Guardiola chose to utilize Puyol, Mascherano, and Adriano as his nominal backline. I

say nominal here because in fact these three players didn’t truly function as a backline inthe usual sense (more on this later).

The other issue of note in the line up was the number and variety of attacking players.

With Cesc Fabregas unavailable due to suspension, Guardiola chose to utilize both Pedroand Cuenca in addition to line up stalwarts Messi, Sanchez, Xavi, and Iniesta along withBusquets at holding midfield.

This season Guardiola has often opted to play Iniesta at LW and Fabregas in midfield.

With the line up against Getafe, Barça was functionally playing with an additional wide

forward rather than midfielder as even on the LW Iniesta often pinches into midfield.

Formation:

While the line up was set, how Barça would play was very unclear given the range of 

different formations the team has utilized this season. To immediately open the match,Barcelona came out in a 3-4-3. Puyol, Mascherano, and Adriano formed a back threewith Sanchez at the 9 and Pedro and Cuenca on the wings. Messi played behind Sanchez

as he has in a few matches this season (most notably at the Bernabeu). Xavi and Iniesta

opened in midfield.

However, Barça quickly morphed out of this opening 3-4-3 alignment. This is wellillustrated by the average positioning of the players:

Barcelona: Average Positions (via whoscored.com)

Positional diagrams can be very difficult to interpret for Barça because the system

involves so much movement and position switching. However, there are few points that

are well illustrated by the visual above.

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What sticks out most perhaps is how relatively deep Mascherano stationed himself 

compared to other players. Functionally, he acted as a sweeper in a last line of defense.That said, what the diagram doesn’t accurately portray is that while Mascherano

consistently stayed deep to defend he really didn’t act as a one man backline (more on

this later).

The second interesting point from average positioning is how high Puyol played. Puyoldidn’t truly play as a backline “defender” for much of this match. Instead he almost

functioned as a right sided holding midfielder. To this point-Puyol actually played higher this match than not only Adriano did at LB but also Busquets.

 Notice how leftwards Busquets played. He shaded that way because it was often Adriano

who would rotate to a deeper position to defend alongside Mascherano. Busquets would

then fill in that left flank space in defense. In a sense there was an overlap in role and

 positioning between what Busquets was doing on the center left of the pitch and whatPuyol was doing on the right.

One of the key tactical features the positional diagrams demonstrates is the significant

gap in space between inner four Barcelona players (Xavi, Iniesta, Sanchez and Messi)

and the outer two (Pedro and Cuenca). The wingers clearly provided tactical width thatalmost created a kind of wide boundary for the inner four to play within.

Finally, Sanchez and Messi’s positioning are worth noting. In the initial Barça formation,

Sanchez was ostensibly acting as the striker playing in front of Messi. However, thoseterms are relative. And over the course of the match it was Messi who in fact wound up

 playing higher up the pitch on average than Sanchez. Again, this isn’t a rigid positioning

 – as I’ll show later with still images – Sanchez was generally slightly advanced of Messi.

But Sanchez would drop behind Messi to play the ball. And perhaps even moreimportantly, Sanchez would often occupy the CBs freeing Messi to make darting runs

towards goal from a slightly deeper starting position.

In a sense, it’s very difficult to state who the “10” was and who the “9” was. And

 perhaps what is most important is that both Sanchez and Messi played very advanced,almost as if Barça were playing with two strikers or two mobile false 9s. While they

would move back on occasions for the ball they didn’t frequently drop deep into midfield

to collect the ball. Instead they stayed pressed closer to goal.

How did Getafe respond to this complexity? Below is the average positional diagram for 

their side

Getafe: Average Positions (via whoscored.Com)

This positional diagram also has to be interpreted in context as Getafe players moved

quite a bit in to close down Barça and looked to attack largely on long counters. In

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general Getafe played in a 4-5-1/5-4-1 defensive block which doesn’t come across clearly

in the diagram (will be evident in the still shots presented later).

A few things to note above. First, as is often done vs. Barça, Getafe tried to stay

extremely narrow through midfield.

Second, significant gaps in space existed between the Getafe CBs and their full backs.

Even with playing five at the back Getafe developed gaps in the channels of their block.

In essence, while Getafe played very narrow across midfield, they did not stay as narrowacross the backline. This was one of the primary impacts of the tactical width Pedro and

Cuenca created. This tactical width was critical in two of Barcelona’s four goals.

To make up for this problem they had Rios act as a hybrid CB/holding midfielder and

dropped both wingers into midfield. This essentially isolated Miku as the lone striker inspace, as seen in the diagram (note the positioning of the winger Rios #16 is somewhat

misleading by average position as he was the one who would often try to make long runs

to support Miku when Getafe had a chance to counter).

Getafe’s defensive system was predicated on having nine outfield players behind the ball. Guardiola anticipated this and in response took the bold step of playing 9 players in

the opposition half (or more accurately 8 ½ as will be explained later).

Structure and Dynamics

Every system has to balance structure and function. Too much structure and systems become suffocating and rigid. Orient a system too much towards dynamics and

organization deteriorates and a kind of chaos can emerge. Vibrant systems in nature such

as a colony of leaf-cutter ants or a coral reef maintain the balance between the two forcesof structure and dynamics.

Football is much the same from a systems perspective. Traditionally, for attacking sides

such as Barcelona, developing an appropriate level of structure is a recurring challenge.

The tendency is to often go too far in the way of dynamics. One of the great examples of this was the brilliant Brazil 1982 World Cup squad.

Barça itself is constantly challenged with this balance and at times the club falls into too

heavily into dynamics with too little structure. For example, Barça can often at times

lose width by fielding too many players who seek to move dynamically through midfield.

In this match Guardiola balanced these competing demands by distributing the pitch with

 players who fell into three kinds of roles:

Provide structure: Three players in the Barça system provided clear structural roles:

• Mascherano: formed the system base

• Pedro: outer wide boundary left

• Cuenca: outer wide boundary right

Provide dynamic force: Three players played free to relatively free roles in the system.

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• Messi: free role

• Iniesta: shifting from frontal attack to space between the lines

• Xavi: moving across midfield band to orchestrate as needed

Provide a mixture structure and dynamics (semi-structured role): Four players could be

considered in this category.

• Sanchez: point of reference while also dropping back to play ball

• Busquets: holding midfield to circulate ball while also staying positioned to moveto backline cover as needed

• Puyol: outlet for ball on right while assisting defensive base.

• Adriano: defensive base deep while also making surging runs forward if space

As with all categorizations there are areas of overlap. It would be reasonable for exampleto shift Sanchez to the Dynamics category or Xavi to the Mixed. This schematic is

intended to be illustrative rather than definitive.

This framework provides a model for understanding both how Barça plays overall but

how they played differently vs. Getafe than they usually do.

Against Getafe Barcelona had much more defined wide structure than they usually do.Fielding two player who acted in the roles of true wingers, Barça had well defined outer 

 boundaries that stretched the pitch horizontally and vertically. They had increased

structure on the right side of the pitch as they had two players stationed in advanced torelatively advanced positions there – Cuenca and Puyol – rather than one in Dani Alves

as they often do. Additional structure was provided by Sanchez playing in the middle as

a point of reference.

Structural differences also developed not only from the roles the players assumed but alsohow they played with respect to each other. Barcelona played three in midfield for much

of the match but they did so in a very different shape than they usually do – the three players in midfield often played along the same line rather than in a triangle (more on thislater).

The main source of different dynamics primarily rested in Adriano and Puyol’s roles.

Mascherano was the base of the defense. But Adriano consistently dropped back to

make sure that Barça always had two markers versus the Getafe lone striker.

At the same time, when Barça was controlling possession and space opened on the left,Adriano would surge forward, especially with the ball. One the opposite side, Puyol

 played an analogous role, one that was contingent on reading Adriano’s play. When

Adriano went forward Puyol would track back to form a back two with Mascherano.Busquets would also key off of Adriano’s positioning and drop back for cover – however 

this is the kind of role he usually plays within the Barça system.

System Structure: Because the system structure was different in this match for Barça

let’s focus on those elements. Below is a partial diagram of key structural elements. Thisdiagram is intentionally filled in only in partial for the sake of simplification and

highlighting key features.

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 Partial System Structure Diagram

While by average position it seemed that Barcelona played only one at the back they

nearly always had two defenders deep. Mascherano played deepest. However, he was

neither alone nor was his role to mark the striker. Instead, for most of the match, therewas a second defender there whose job it was to mark the striker.

In the diagram above rather than a name I’ve marked it with and X. The reason for this is

that more than a specific player functioning alongside Mascherano, it was really a tactical

role that paired with him. This tactical role was shared by the team. While it was mostoften Adriano who filled that role, Puyol, Busquets and even Xavi and Iniesta filled it at

others.

It was very clear that Guardiola not only wanted two defenders deep but wanted them to

 play different roles – one to “cover” and one to “pressure.” Mascherano was to cover deep while the second defender was to mark more closely to pressure him when he got

the ball. These two different roles are important for the Barça system.

The problem with playing defenders deep for Barça is that the team can lose its compact

shape. Part of the role of the second defender was to ensure this doesn’t happen byasserting pressure. In this regard, while Guardiola fielded two at the back he did so in a

very different fashion than teams often do against a lone striker. Miku wasn’t truly

double marked by having two defenders in equal proximity to him at all times.

At the same time, because Getafe was defending deep and looked to get nine outfield

 players behind the ball, Guardiola didn’t want to create a two man defensive set that was

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overly structured. Instead, he gave Adriano license to go forward and move as the game

unfolded. However, when Adriano did this another player generally moved back to cover in his place. In a sense Barça almost played 1 ½ defenders at the back in order to balance

structure and dynamics.

Because Mascherano was playing deep and the Getafe striker was marked, Mascherano

was also nearly always open as a deep point of reference and outlet to retain possession.

The other structural elements shown in the diagram relates to the wingers. Both stayedvery wide and up the pitch. The main purpose here was to create tactical width in order 

to stretch the two full backs as wide as possible.

As is suggested by the diagram – Barcelona utilized a structure which would make the pitch as big as possible given that the match unfolded in only one half and limited space

was present behind a 4-5 man defensive line sitting deep.

Formation

While it’s always difficult to exactly describe Barça’s formation because of how dynamic

and fluid the team plays, patterns do emerge. Those patterns speak to the structure thatGuardiola looks to create as a foundation for the team’s movement, position switching

and other dynamics.

In this regard, while there are several different numerical designations one can use todescribe the Barça system there are certain themes that anchored how Guardiola set up

his side for this match.

As described above, Barça played with two at the back to ensure that there would be a

spare man at the back against Getafe’s lone striker.

Two players roughly played in the same line across midfield-Busquets and Puyol.

Xavi shuttled in a free orchestration role but was often playing along the same region/line

as Busquets and Puyol in midfield.

Two wingers pressed wide and up the pitch against the Getafe backline.

Three attackers played free or semi-structured roles: Messi, Iniesta and Sanchez. These

 players generally pressed agains the Getafe backline or dropped into the space betweenthe lines while also moving into midfield as needed dynamically.

At the same time, because Getafe was defending deep and extremely compact, these threeattackers in free/semi-structured roles generally played very high up the pitch.

Pulling these themes together the best way to describe the Barcelona formation is as a 2-3-5. In essence, Guardiola “re-inverted the pyramid” Wilson described.

Again at times in the match Barça could be thought of as playing a 3-4-3 or a 2-2-2-4 or 

even a 1-2-2-5. But overall, balancing accuracy with parsimony, a 2-3-5 is likely the

single best summarization.

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If the dominant tactical trend of the 20th century was the inversion of the 2-3-5 pyramid

towards a 5-3-2, in this match, Guardiola was almost reverting that pyramid back in time.Back to two at the back, three in midfield and five in attack. Or more accurately, driven

 by necessity and his philosophy of football, Guardiola reinterpreted the past to enact a

system that was both very old and entirely new at the same time.

The 2-3-5

The image below summarizes the general positioning of the Barcelona system, particularly when the team was building out of the back. Because the Barça system was

so well spaced it was actually somewhat challenging to find a shots where all ten outfield players were present. I bring this up because Barça so dominated possession and retained

so much possession in the Getafe half play in the middle region of the pitch wasn’t

necessarily indicative of much of the match. Nonetheless the image shows the basic

formation well:

Barcelona Base 2 3 5 Formation

At the base of Barcelona’s “re-inverted pyramid,” Mascherno is deep along with Adriano

who is slightly advanced in the back two as he bring the ball out.

 Notice how Puyol is both wide right and relatively advanced already. He is playing onnearly the same line as Xavi and Busquets.

Cuenca and Pedro are both very wide and high up the pitch. Sanchez is in the center 

occupying the CB. Both Iniesta and Messi are in advanced positions between the lines

 but very close to the front line.

In essence, one could describe this formation as a 2-3-2-3. But as we’ll see in subsequentimages for much of the match this kind of formation was more a variant on a base 2-3-5.

On this point, one thing to note in this image is how many triangles Messi and Iniesta

create in the formation by dropping even slightly into the space between the lines. This

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kind of positioning to create triangles is particularly important during buildup play which

is why both players are between the lines on opposite sides of the pitch. This is another good example of how Guardiola enacts structure within the “carousel” of Barcelona’s

 passing game.

Another point to note on this image is the problem that tactical width creates for the

defense. Pedro and Cuenca are both equally wide on opposite flanks. However, look athow radically different Getafe’s defense reacts to that width. This image summarizes

much of what happened in the match.

The L FB of Getafe is forced to pull in centrally in order to mark Messi. Sanchez, in his point of reference role up top, is already occupying the L CB. In general teams look to

double mark Messi. At minimal they must have at least one marker on him at all times.

As such the L FB narrows.

This means that Cuenca winds up alone in space completely unmarked. Amplifying thiseffect on the that flank is the positioning of the LW. Because Messi is preferably double

marked the LW also narrows and is dropping back to support the L FB. This is why

attackers positioning themselves between the lines can create such problems. There’s

often no direct defender to account for them.

Critical to this flank in addition is Puyol’s intelligent positioning. Notice how Puyol

reads the position of the LW. The Barça captain moves wide right – nearly as wide as

Cuenca but intentionally stays deep also to maximize his space.

Barça have two players on the right flank who are essentially unmarked. This happenedover and over in this match. Additionally, Puyol consistently read the match to position

himself free from the defense. He was the player who had the most time and space on the

 ball throughout.

This defensive problem caused by tactical width would create the context for howBarcelona scored its first and third goals (more later).

On the opposite flank notice how differently Getafe is defending Pedro. The full back is

closely marking him along the touchline. Unlike Cuenca he is not free in space.

However, this creates an entirely different problem for Getafe. Their backline along theright is unable to stay narrow. Because the R FB is marking Pedro wide a significant gap

in the channel between the R FB and R CB has developed. The R CB doesn’t want to

adjust his position because he is looking to support defense through the middle on

Sanchez and Messi. Leaving these kinds of gaps in the channel against Barcelona is

disastrous.

This defensive response to width would help lead to Barcelona’s second goal.

The primary adjustment Getafe made to these problems as the match went on was to drop

another player to the back line to act as a fifth defender. This allowed them to better mark Pedro and Cuenca wide while lessening the risk of gaps in the channels. However,

this in turn meant that they lost a player in midfield which made it even more difficult for 

them retain any possession and attack. Guardiola functionally turned tactical width intoattack into another form of defense.

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Finally, notice how Iniesta between the lines, like Messi, if is being double marked. This

creates open space for Adriano to run into with the ball. This happened throughout thematch and was part of why playing a fixed back two rather than Mascherano and a player 

rotating into the other back two spot would have been highly inefficient on Guardiola’s

 part.

Here is a different view of that basic 2-3-5 structure from a different angle:

Barcelona's 2-3-5 Formation

The Base: Two at the Back In the prior images we saw the arrangement at the back 

Barça played most often – Mascherano deep as a sweeper and Adriano partnered with

him. However, that second defensive role varied as different player occupied it atdifferent times depending on match dynamics.

Puyol Drops Deep to Form 2 Man Backline with Mascherano

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In the image above Adriano is positioned towards the left and advanced when Getafe

recover the ball. In this transition situation, because Adriano isn’t in position to doublemark the Getafe striker with Mascherano Puyol drops back.

This was a general tactical principle Guardiola implemented in this match. He always

looked to have a spare man at the back.

Puyol and Adriano Up Pitch: Iniesta Drops Deep to Form Back Two with Mascherano

Above Puyol Adriano is along the flank pressuring the ball. Busquets is supporting him.At the same time Puyol who had prior made a run forward isn’t in position to defend at

the back.

Given that the two lateral center of the “backline three” halves are out of central, deep position one would expect Mascherano to be in a 1 vs 1 situation with Miku. However,

he’s not. Instead, Iniesta has read the situation and dropped to deep to assume that open

defensive role alongside Mascherno. In addition notice their positioning. Iniesta is most

immediately marking the striker while Mascherano is deeper for cover. The structure andrelationship of that back two base doesn’t change – even when it’s an attacking central

midfielder filling one of roles. This is a great example of who Barça defends as a unit.

Again, while Barça generally played two at the back the general tactical approach

Guardiola looked to implement was to have a spare man at the back. This is exemplified

in the image below where Getafe gets 4 attackers forward on goal kick.

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Barcelona Look to Retain a Spare Man at the Back 4 vs 3

Getafe has sent central striker and two wingers forward. Barcelona’s response is to dropBusquets back while Adriano and Puyol also move deep. The full back has also gone up

field but Pedro has tracked his run. Getage have sent four players upfield – but Barça still

retains a spare man at the back.

Part of the idea of having a spare man at the back is that this player’s primary role should be cover rather than marking. As such, in the two man defensive formation Guardiola

instructed one player to pressure the lone striker while Mascherano swept behind.

Adriano Pressures Getafe's Striker Across Pitch as Mascherano Stays Deep to Cover 

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 Notice how Adriano isn’t simply marking Miku in the center of the pitch or when the

striker is on the left. Adriano has tracked him to pressure all the way to the oppositeflank. Also, notice how Barça aren’t immediately double marking Miku. Adriano is

marking and pressuring him 1 vs 1. Mascherano stays deeper to provide cover.

Midfield Three and Attacking Five

In this match Guardiola, by playing most of the match with a back two, took one player 

and turned him into an additional wide forward compared to how Barcelona usually play. The other defender taken out of the backline was turned into an additional

midfielder of sorts. This was essentially the position and role Puyol occupied.

Puyol Moves in Same Midfield Line as Xavi and Busquets; Five Attackers on Frontline

The image above typifies how Barcelona played in midfield for much of the match.

 Notice how high up Puyol is playing. He, Busquets and Xavi are effectively playing on

the same line (as was evidenced on the average positional diagram as well).

The basic structure of three attackers is also visible with Pedro and Cuenca keepingtactical width close to the touchlines with Sanchez in the middle. Iniesta and Messi are

technically between the lines but they are so far upfield and Getafe was so compact that

they are close to playing on the same line as Pedro, Sanchez and Cuenca. All match long

Messi and Iniesta would station themselves in very advanced position and fall off that

line front line to support possession. In the image above Iniesta is running back towardsXavi to make himself available.

In addition to Puyol joining midfield, the other thing which was different about howBarça organized this region was it’s shape and orientation. Barça usually play a three

man midfield with Xavi, Iniesta and Busquets. Those three are arranged in a triangle.

Against Getafe, the midfield orientation was very different. It was much more linear and

flat. It almost had a geometry similar to the midfield of a 4-4-2.

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In this match triangles were created dynamically through the movement of Messi, Iniesta

and Sanchez dropping back off the front line while Pedro and Cuenca stayed wide.Those five players operated as a synchronized five man unit balancing the need to attack 

in numbers while still supporting midfield to retain possession. This can be seen in the

image above as Iniesta is dropping back off a five man front line to support midfield play. If Iniesta continues his run above into space multiple triangles are formed: Iniesta,

Xavi, Busquets; Iniesta, Xavi, Pedro. Iniesta, Busquets, Sanchez; Iniesta Sanchez, Messi.

Barcelona used this strategy to strong effect throughout the match. Arrange both thefront five and midfield in relatively linear arrangement. Move players back off that frontfive to create triangles dynamically. This allowed them to create geometry on the pitch in

response to Getafe trying to control space through shape.

The reason for this unusual, linear midfield three was that even in this region Guardiola

was looking to create width. Puyol generally stayed wide in open space.

Puyol Free in Space Despite Getafe Defending with 9 Oufield Players Behind the Ball

 Notice how upfield and wide Puyol is playing with the ball. He is advanced of Busquets

and Xavi. This was due to the fact that Getafe prioritized defending very narrow – 

especially in midfield around the Barça right flank. The reason why they did so was dueto concerns about having multiple defenders around Messi at all times.

In the image above notice who Getafe are now playing five at the back. This allows themto extend their L FB laterally to mark Cuenca. However, there is now no natural

defender to mark Puyol. As such he was open as an outlet all match long – as long as hestayed wide. If Puyol were to pinch into the middle of the pitch it would have been far 

easier for Getafe’s narrow midfield line to mark him while still marking Messi.

Five Man Attack While certain players would drop off the front line into midfield to

support possession and combination play, Barça consistently attacked with five players pushed high against the Getafe backline throughout the match.

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Barcelona's Five Man Attacking Frontline

In the image above, Barça have five attackers in a line pushed against Getafe defense. By

flooding forward deep into the box, Barça have caused the defense to lose shape(compare this image to prior images where Getafe were arranged in two clear banks). To

further augment the confusion, Iniesta and Cuenca have switched positions.

Even with the apparent chaos created through all of this movement, notice Barcelona’sutilization of structure here. Pedro remains wide left. Iniesta has switched positions with

Cuenca but even so he remains wide of the most lateral Getafe defender on the Barça

right flank (this points out how width has important relative dimensions). Sanchez,

almost back to goal, watches the play and acts as a point of reference.

In midfield this same discipline is retained. Puyol remains wide of the most lateral

defender and Busquets stays deep acting as a pivot. They are both unmarked and Puyol

forms a direct outlet for Xavi to swing play to the other flank through.

 Notice that by staying even a few steps deep of the line Xavi and Puyol are playing on,Busquets forms a triangle in midfield. This is necessary because Barça are relatively

linear along that front line. Geometry can’t come from Iniesta, Messi or Sanchez as they

are moving aggressively towards goal as a unit.

Creating Opportunities: The Balance of Structure and Dynamics in Barça’s 2-3-5

Two of the primary purposes of defending deep is that it facilitates defending in numbers

and controlling space in front of goal. Guardiola’s priority in this match was to diminish

the numerical advantage Getafe would normally enjoy by defending in this way.

To accomplish this Guardiola was willing to send players forward by utilizing only asweeper and support defender at the back. By doing this, Guardiola always had at least

eight outfield players in the Getafe half to combat the nine defenders they utilized. In

addition, because the support defender next to Mascherano was a flexible role players

would rotate in and out of, Guardiola in fact often had nine outfield players involved in

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the attack within the Getafe half. Despite looking to defend deep, Getafe didn’t

necessarily enjoy numerical superiority even close to their eighteen yard box.

This however only minimized the issue of Getafe having numerical superiority deep.

Getafe could also maintain shape to control space. To address this problem, Guardiola

 balanced structural elements in the Barça system with dynamics to great effect. We’ve

covered a number of those points in this review already. Now we’ll take a more detailedlook at how this combination of numbers forward coupled with structure and dynamics

led to opportunities.

Blocks of Both Teams Shifted to Toucline

In the image above play has shifted close to the touchline on Barça’s left flank. BecauseMascherano has shifted and stepped up to close down the ball Puyol has dropped deep

into the sweeper position. Even though the blocks of both teams have shifted leftwards

Cuenca remains wide right of the most lateral full back.

Pedro controls Mascherano’s header sending the ball to Iniesta who passes the ball toMessi. Messi deftly chest passes the ball to Sanchez. The action is all taking place on

the left side of the pitch. However, the key movement is occurring on the right.

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Gap in Space Develops Between CB and L FB Due to Cuenca's Run and Tactical Width

In the image above Sanchez has received the ball from Messi and both are not attackingaggressively. What’s critical however is to look at what Cuenca is doing. Specifically,

compare Cuenca’s positioning in the last two images.

What is Cuenca’s reaction to Barcelona controlling possession at the extreme left flank?

He makes a run wide right. In other words, rather than running to the ball or closer to the play, Cuenca runs away from it. This is the embodiment of tactical width.

And in the second image where Sanchez has the ball we see the impact that Cuenca’s

intelligent movement has. Notice how he’s dragged the Getage L FB out of position.

This is very evident by the large gap in space between the L FB and the Getafe CB. TheCB is holding position to close down the ball. The L FB is caught in between because

he’s tracked Cuenca’s run away from the ball. This creates a large channel (This space

is similar to the one we saw earlier in this review that was created when the full back edged towards Pedro.)

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Sanchez Scores from Gap in Space Developed by Cuenca's Tactical Width

In the image above, Sanchez is about to uncurl the shot that would score Barça’s first

goal. Notice how he’s dribbled into the exact gap in space between the CB and FB thatwas created by Cuenca’s run away from the ball. The L FB is late to cover due to the

room he had to make up. Interestingly, in the image you can see that even at this late

moment the L FB is still concerned about Cuenca – he’s still trying to hedge his bets thatSanchez may pass the ball to Cuenca (he isn’t directly facing Sanchez -he’s trying to

maintain visual contact with Cuenca while moving over to support defense on Sanchez).

It is only a moment later – when the shot is off – that the FB fully commits to Sanchez.By then it is too late.

Sanchez Moves Wide and Iniesta Fills in Space to Create Opportunity for Messi to Score

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Above Barcelona are again attacking as a five man front line. Here Sanchez has come

wide to receive a throw in. When he does Pedro loops inwards. Sanchez plays the ballto Iniesta who dribbles to the middle and sends the ball to Messi. With both Iniesta and

Pedro towards the middle Sanchez reads the play and assumes the role of tactical width.

However, this movement has unsettled Getafe and caused them to lose shape. As usual,

defenses react to Messi receiving the ball by immediately allocating multiple defenders tostop him. Two midfielder look to fence him off. The L CB has shifted over behind the

midfield to create a second line of defense. Because Sanchez has vacated central space,the other CB looks to drop deeper to cover.

 Notice how Pedro also stays relatively wide rather than running into the center. Pedro is

also providing a form of tactical width here as he’s making sure that the FB doesn’t have

the chance to pull into the middle and that the other CB has to keep an eye on a player on

his left side.

As seen in the prior image, Iniesta reads all of this and runs into the exact space vacated

 by Sanchez and kept open by Pedro. With the nominal central striker pulled wide, Iniesta

moves to fill that space. He now acts as a point of reference for the attack. Messi slides

an intelligent ball to Iniesta who executes a brilliant back heel return to Messi to set upBarcelona’s second goal.

Getafe Overplay Middle in Defense Cuenca Free in Space Wide

Above Getafe are defending narrow. Messi receives the ball in midfield and the L FB

 pulls in further to the middle to help defend. Cuenca however continues providingtactical width out right. Even when Messi is pressured by multiple defenders he knows

he has an outlet open on that flank. He passes the ball to Cuenca who is now completely

open in space. There isn’t a defender remotely close to him. Cuenca drives the ballforward and delivers a fantastic cross to Sanchez who heads home Barça’s third score.

Delivering accurate crosses isn’t an easy piece of skill. Cuenca’s job was made much

easier because he is so free in space.

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How Does Guardiola Make This Work?

What I’ve tried to do in this review is both provide an analysis of how Barcelona playedvs. Getafe while also placing some of the innovations Guardiola implemented in some

historical context. Barça functioned dynamically out of a 2-3-5 formation, a system that

was last regularly played prior to the 1920’s. This is not to say in any way that Barça is

reproducing those older systems. Formations are neutral. How they are implemented arewhat largely matters. And the 2-3-5 Barça played likely has limited similarities to the 2-

3-5 formation that once formed the norm for football.

But there are touchpoints. Guardiola utilized this formation to minimize the numericaladvantage Getafe could create around goal by defending deep. He did this by taking

 positions off the backline and shifting them forward. Guardiola then added elements of 

structure and dynamics into that base 2-3-5 to increase Barcelona’s ability to break 

Getafe’s shape. I’ve tried to demonstrate some of this through images of key momentsthroughout the match. To see how some of these dynamics unfolded from a different

 perspective, see this excellent video from Allas on Barça’s formation.

The 2-3-5 was a formation that grew out of a period of time when the game was

structured around attack. As the game modernized, this intent became less and less pragmatic. How is it possible for Guardiola to utilize key features from such an

antiquated way of playing? Ultimately, what makes this feasible now, what likely makes

the Barça 2-3-5 very different from it’s ancestor formation, is the way Barcelona defendsas a complete team unit and the multi-dimensional skill sets of the players on the team.

Guardiola shifted players off the backline to implement a two man unit. But he never 

reduced the number of defenders. The team still defended with ten outfield players.

Guardiola just shifted where they were positioned on average. This involved real risk asthe last line of defense was only two men. But Guardiola was willing to absorb those

risks in order to gain other advantages.

How can Barça play this way? The sequence below summarizes for me how they can do

so.

Barcelona in Defence: Balanced in Zones Without the Ball-All Getafe Players Marked

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Barça lose the ball. But look at how well organized they immediately become out of 

 possession. They are arranged in three clear banks and arranged in zones that cover the pitch. Every Getafe player is marked. Busquets pressures the ball. Another midfielder 

makes a run to provide a passing option but Xavi is tracking him.

Another important feature to this image is Sanchez and Messi’s positioning. They can

see that even though Busquets is pressuring alone, Getafe are having difficulty advancingthe ball. Rather than retreating to hunt for the ball both stay on their players and wait.

Take note of where Sanchez is positioned in particular.

Messi Joins Busquets to Pressure Ball; Sanchez Adjusts Position to Anticipate Back Passto Keeper 

When Busquets hounds the man with the ball deep enough Messi springs to press the ball

as well. Since every outlet is marked the midfielder is forced into a back pass to the CB

that Messi had been marking. Once he does that Messi then attacks in defense to try todispossess the ball.

Consider what has just happened. While Barcelona haven’t recovered the ball they’ve

not only forced it backwards but even more importantly taken it away from a midfielder 

and forced it to a CB, a player who is likely mush less skilled on the ball. The defensiveattack then starts on the CB. In essence, Barça have systematically decreased Getafe’s

ability to retain possession despite playing a very conservative back pass.

 Notice how the rest of the defense, sensing Getafe is in danger, stay on their marks.

Barça usually defend by hunting in packs. In this instance it’s not necessary.

Finally, notice how Sanchez has changed his positioning on his marker. Reading the play

develop Sanchez gets behind his marker slightly and at an angle towards goal. In

essence, Sanchez can already see what’s going to happen next before it does.

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Under Pressure Getafe CB Turns to Make Safe Back Pass but Sanchez Already Making

Run to Intercept Pass

Uncomfortable on the ball with Messi pressing him, the Getafe CB turns back towards

goal. But Sanchez, having already read the probability of a back pass to the keeper is

already started a dead sprint aimed at the passing lane. This is the kind of intelligent,insight into the game that Barça possesses throughout its squad and it’s critical to how

they can defend so efficiently through anticipation and reading the game.

Sanchez Nearly Intercepts Pass via Anticipation; Coordinated Team Pressure Forces

Getafe in a Turnover 

The ball is played back to the keeper but due to Sanchez’s read of the back pass before it

happened the keeper is under great duress. Sanchez uses his pace to close space and justmisses the ball. Getafe’s L CB – the player Sanchez had been marking – is now open for 

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a pass. But the keeper is under so much pressure that he doesn’t have time to find the

open man. In addition, Barça have systematically forced players with poorer ball skills toretain possession for Getafe. The keeper’s only interest now is to boot the ball away so

Sanchez doesn’t strip him of the ball so close to goal. Ultimately this leads to a turnover.

Barça get the regain possession.

Barça may have been utilizing a 2-3-5 formation. But doesn’t mean they are playing withonly two defenders. So many players can be sent into attack in the context of the modern

game and the way it’s played because all of those attackers also read the game and defendvigorously the second possession is lost.

The End

High performance systems integrate their structure and dynamics cohesively so that their 

components add up to be more than the “sum of their parts.” Structure and dynamics feed

into the other. This is central to the Barcelona system as well. How Guardiolaimplements these features varies from match to match depending on requirements.

Against Getafe he expanded his level of innovation by drawing on something very old:

“reverting the pyramid” back to a 2-3-5 formation that hasn’t been played in decades.

But rather than simply mimicking the past he reinterpreted it and made it new andrelevant to the modern game.

We often believe that tradition and innovation are in opposition. But often they aren’t.

Or at least they don’t need to be. Many of the same needs and goals that drove the pastecho today. We can re-appropriate those yearning to make things new. That’s what

imagination can do when it’s coupled with deep understanding.

Experimentation isn’t an aside for Barcelona. It’s at the core of how they function. The

system is set up on principles but how those principles are implemented can vary widely.Guardiola learns and improves the team through an evolutionary series of trial and error.

 Not all experiments work – but they form lessons. Getafe was one of those experiments,one that was successful in particularly interesting ways.

It’s interesting to see this level of experimentation happen at this time of year. Certainlyit was in part driven by need (injury and suspensions). But Guardiola often looks to push

creativity when Barça is going to face it’s most difficult challenges. Often he does this

with the Clásico in mind.

The last time he undertook this level of experimentation was probably the match vs. RayoVallecano in the first half of the season where Barça moved through three different

formations without making any substitutes. That match formed the template for how the

team would play against Real Madrid at the Bernabeu shortly after. We may very wellsee Guardiola implement elements he experimented with in the Getafe match against

Chelsea and the next Clásico.