The Authority of International Organizations: The Effects of Scope and Scale Liesbet Hooghe UNC Chapel Hill and VU University Amsterdam. Gary Marks UNC Chapel Hill and VU University Amsterdam ABSTRACT We conceive authority of an international organization as latent in two independent dimensions: delegation by states to international agents and pooling in collective decision making bodies. We theorize that delegation and pooling are empirically as well as conceptually different. Delegation is an effort to deal with the transaction costs of cooperation which are greater in larger, broader, and correspondingly more complex organizations. Pooling reflects the tension between protecting or surrendering the national veto. This paper theorizes that delegation and pooling are constrained by two basic design features: a) the breadth of IO's policy portfolio and b) the scale of its membership. We test these hypotheses with a new cross- sectional dataset that provides detailed and reliable information on IO decision making. Our major finding is that the design of international organizations is framed by stark and intelligible choices, but in surprising ways. Large membership organizations tend to have both more delegation and more pooling. The broader the policy scope of an IO, the more willing are its members to delegate, but the less willing they are to pool authority.
45
Embed
The Authority of International Organizations: The Effects ...gwmarks/assets/doc/hooghe, marks - authority of IOs...The Authority of International Organizations: The Effects of Scope
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
The Authority of International Organizations: The Effects of Scope and Scale
Liesbet Hooghe UNC Chapel Hill and VU University Amsterdam.
Gary Marks
UNC Chapel Hill and VU University Amsterdam
ABSTRACT
We conceive authority of an international organization as latent in two independent dimensions: delegation by states to international agents and pooling in collective decision making bodies. We theorize that delegation and pooling are empirically as well as conceptually different. Delegation is an effort to deal with the transaction costs of cooperation which are greater in larger, broader, and correspondingly more complex organizations. Pooling reflects the tension between protecting or surrendering the national veto. This paper theorizes that delegation and pooling are constrained by two basic design features: a) the breadth of IO's policy portfolio and b) the scale of its membership. We test these hypotheses with a new cross-sectional dataset that provides detailed and reliable information on IO decision making. Our major finding is that the design of international organizations is framed by stark and intelligible choices, but in surprising ways. Large membership organizations tend to have both more delegation and more pooling. The broader the policy scope of an IO, the more willing are its members to delegate, but the less willing they are to pool authority.
Page | 1
To what extent and why do international organizations exert authority independent of their
member states? In this paper we propose that the authority of an international organization is
conditioned by two basic facts of its existence: the scale of its membership and the scope of its
policy portfolio.
International organizations are contracts among formally sovereign actors. This
produces an enormous range of choice in design (Abbott and Snidal 1998, 2000; Keohane
1982). IOs range from small clubs like Mercosur or the Central Commission for the Navigation
of the Rhine with a handful of members, to organizations like the British Commonwealth of
Nations or the African Union with scores of members, to globe-spanning organizations such as
the World Health Organization or the International Monetary Fund. Some IOs are concerned
with a single problem, such as protecting a river or lake, whereas others, like the United
Nations or the Andean Community, tackle a host of social or economic issues.
International organizations are the principal vehicles for producing public goods beyond
the national state and their design is a core area of inquiry in political science. Prior
explanations have focused on the heterogeneity of preferences among member states, the
extent of democratic norms, the relative power of the member states, and the type of
cooperation problem. These are plausible sources of variation, but they take as given two
fundamental features that frame the structure of the organization:
• The scale of the IO's membership. Is the IO designed to encompass a small handful of states,
or does it encompass as many as 200?
Page | 2
• The scope of the IO's policy portfolio. Is the IO designed around a particular task or does it
have a broad policy portfolio?
The puzzle we wish to probe is why and how scale and scope constrain authoritative
design, and we draw on the principal/agent, multilevel governance, and institutional design
literatures to theorize this.
Our approach is innovative in several respects. We conceive authority as two-sided.
States delegate authority when they empower a third party to fill in the details of an
incomplete contract, provide expert information, select or prioritize proposals that are on the
table, and at the authoritative extreme, propose policy initiatives. States pool authority when
they relinquish the national veto in collective decision making. In contrast to prior theory, we
do not assume that these dimensions are associated – in fact we find that they are orthogonal.
The distinction provides the basis for our theory and empirics.
Delegation is an effort to deal with the transaction costs of cooperation which are
greater in larger, broader, and correspondingly more complex organizations. Pooling reflects
the tension between protecting or surrendering the national veto. The national veto is a
blessing and a bane for member states. It is a blessing to the extent it protects governments
from adverse international policies. It is a bane leading to deadlock in a large member
organization.
We disaggregate delegation and pooling into dimensions that can be reliably estimated.
Lack of appropriate data has stymied systematic testing in this field. In this paper we introduce
Page | 3
a new dataset on delegation and pooling in 72 international organizations which allows a
rigorous examination of the effects we theorize.
Our core claims are that the scale of an IO’s membership is a powerful predictor of IO
authority, but that the breadth of its policy portfolio has a contradictory effect: it encourages
delegation but deters pooling.
Our theory has some interesting implications for an understanding of international
organization. We conceive of IOs as contracts among well-informed actors who have the
resources to consider their options and negotiate. However, choice does not imply voluntarism.
The institutional choices that member states make regarding authority appear to be structured
by the basic character of the organization.
We first conceptualize IO authority and set out our expectations concerning scope and
scale. We then explain how we measure the variables of interest before introducing a series of
models that exert statistical controls, match cases, and test for endogeneity. In a final step we
examine outliers to diagnose some limitations of the model. We conclude by summarizing our
findings and considering ways forward in the study of international organization.
CONCEPTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY
Political authority—the capacity to make legitimate and binding decisions for a collectivity—is a
core concern of political science, some would argue the core concern (Eckstein 1973; Lake
2010; Parsons 1963; Weber 1968).
The concept of authority has been deployed chiefly to justify the state, but authority,
abstractly conceived, is not bound to the state. Lake (2010: 587) defines authority as a "social
Page | 4
contract in which a governor provides a political order of value to a community in exchange for
compliance by the governed with the rules necessary to produce that order." This can take
place in the international arena as well as within states. Barnett and Finnemore (2004) conceive
international bureaucracies as exerting authority derived from their impersonal procedures and
rules, their role as delegated agents of states, their claim to represent the international
community, and their expertise. The fact that states do not always comply does not invalidate
the wide application of the concept: speed limits on roads are also broken. What matters then
is a general acceptance of the rules concerning non-compliance (Lake 2010: 592).
Our focus is on legal authority which is distinguished from charismatic and traditional
authority in being a) institutionalized, i.e. codified in a set of formal rules; b) circumscribed, i.e.
specified with respect to who has authority over whom for what; and c) impersonal, i.e. it
applies to roles, not persons.
We specify this abstract concept by distinguishing between delegation and pooling
(Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Lake 1996, 2007; Rittberger and Zangl 2006; Snidal and Vabulas
2013). We conceive delegation as a grant of authority by member states to an independent
body.1 Delegation is designed to overcome issue cycling, sustain credible commitments, provide
information that states might not otherwise share and, in general, reduce the transaction costs
of decision making (Lake 2007: 231; Brown 2010; Hawkins et al 2006; Koremenos 2008; Pollack
2003; Tallberg 2002). The IO secretariat is the body that is tasked with delegation in decision
making, and its competencies are almost always limited to facilitating and perhaps framing the
agenda (Pollack 1997:104).
Page | 5
We define pooling as joint decision making among the principals themselves (Keohane
and Hoffmann 1991: 7; Lake 2007: 220; Moravcsik 1998). It consists of three elements: the rules
under which member states make decisions, the procedure by which those decisions are
ratified, and the extent to which they are binding.
Delegation and pooling are empirically as well as conceptually distinct. Figure 1 maps 72
IOs on pooling and delegation in 2010 using summated rating scales for indicators described
below. These variables are orthogonal (r = 0.02). Interestingly, the most studied IOs are the
exceptional ones—the European Union which has the most delegation and the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (IBRD) which have the most pooling. One advantage of a
larger-N approach is that the selection of cases is divorced from their values on the dependent
variable.
[Figure 1 about here]
Let us take a closer look at three less exceptional IOs to illustrate that pooling and
delegation can vary independently.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has extensive pooling and weak
delegation. It was established in 1958 as a UN special agency for maritime safety and following
the Torrey Canyon disaster of 1967 was tasked also with marine environmental standard
setting (Nordquist and Moore 1999). Its main purpose is to provide a venue for negotiating
conventions and international regulations (Van Leeuwen and Kern 2013). These become
binding once two-thirds of the members have ratified.2 Simple non-weighted majority voting is
the decision rule in its intergovernmental Assembly and Council for regulations and
Page | 6
conventions, the budget, and suspension of nonpaying members. This places the IMO in the top
ten percent of our sample on pooling. However, delegation to independent non-state bodies is
minimal. Aside from co-drafting the budget as a junior partner to the Council, the IMO’s 300
strong staff provides secretarial support for the organization’s technical intergovernmental
committees.
By contrast, the Andean Community has extensive delegation, but little pooling. The
Community was created in 1968 by five Latin American countries (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru) to promote a common market, and has since diversified in related policy
fields, including social policy and the environment (Adkisson 2003). The general secretariat of
the organization is constitutionally designated as its sole executive body (Art. 29, Trujillo
Protocol). It is chiefly responsible for drafting legislation and is entirely responsible for
preparing the annual budget. It handles relations with the Andean Parliament and Andean
Advisory councils for labor, business, local government, and indigenous peoples. Not least, the
General Secretariat can take member states to the Andean Court (Alter and Helfer 2010, 2011).
However, the member states have preserved the national veto in final decision making. The
state-dominated Andean Summit and Coordinating Council operate by consensus with a heavy
emphasis on ratification (Prada and Espinoza 2008). The Andean Community is located in the
top-quartile of our sample on delegation and the bottom quartile on pooling.
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) scores zero on delegation
and pooling. SAARC was founded in 1985 by Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan and four
neighboring countries to promote trust and cooperation in some technical areas, and in 2006
was tasked with trade liberalization (Tavares 2008). All decisions are taken by consensus,
Page | 7
usually by the intergovernmental Council of Ministers or its Standing Committee. Common
projects are not binding and conventions signed by SAARC members bind only those that
subsequently ratify. The SAARC Secretariat has no formal agenda setting role in any of the areas
we monitor. As one commentator observes, the Secretariat “hardly exercises even the modest
role assigned to it by the Charter. It has only occasionally been involved in the preparation of
documentation for important meetings” (Ashan 2006: 146).
These organizations make the point that delegation and pooling cannot be rolled
seamlessly into an overarching concept. Our theory, which we set out in the next section, is
that delegation and pooling are constrained by the scope and scale of an IO, but in contrasting
ways.
SCOPE AND SCALE
Policy scope and scale of membership are fundamental characteristics of an international
organization and have been seen as such (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996; Hasenclever et
al. 1997). However, the connection between the scope of an IO's policy portfolio and its
authority has played second fiddle to hypotheses that link particular kinds of policy to
institutional outcomes. Exceptions are Shanks et al. (1996) who examine whether the policy
scope of an IO affects its survival rate and Haftel (2007) who hypothesizes that the broader the
scope of a regional international organization the less will its member states engage in conflict
with each other.
There are fairly strong expectations about the effects of scale on the incidence of
international organization stemming from cooperation theory, which concludes that large
Page | 8
numbers impede cooperation (Keohane and Ostrom 1995). The notion that "the larger the
group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good"
underpins discussion of the obstacles arising from multilateralism (Olson 1968: 4; Kahler 1992).
However, the effect of scale for IO authority has rarely been theorized. One exception, the
rational design project (2001), hypotheses that a large number of members encourages
centralization and reduces individual control over voting, but this finds little confirmation in the
project's empirical chapters.3
Policy Scope
An international organization can specialize in a single task, such as maritime safety or
regulating navigation in the Rhine, or it can take on a plethora of tasks, such as the Andean
Community, or it may do something in-between, like SAARC. An IO with a broad policy portfolio
is the international approximation to a general purpose government, a government that
handles an unspecified range of policies for a given population (Hooghe and Marks 2003). On
the one hand, this produces complexity because there are likely to be many possible ways to
frame policies and many possible bargains that can be made among the member states. The
complexity of decision making in general purpose government provides a functional rationale
for delegation to independent bodies. But a broad policy portfolio has starkly political
implications as well for it extends the interface between international and domestic politics,
making states more, not less, intent on sustaining the national veto.
There are strong functional reasons for states to delegate in organizations that handle a
swath of policies. The broader the scope, the greater the likelihood that an IO contract does not
Page | 9
specify “the full array of responsibilities and obligations of the contracting parties, as well as
anticipate every possible future contingency” (Cooley and Spruyt 2009: 8). Agenda setting is
particularly complex, and so there is a correspondingly greater benefit for principals in
establishing independent bodies to fill in the details of incomplete contracts, generate expert
policy-relevant information, or monitor compliance (Pollack 2003: 378; see Bradley and Kelley
2008). A general secretariat with the authority to sequence votes can also limit the
opportunities for states to defect from a winning coalition by making a more attractive offer
centered on a different proposal (Tallberg 2010). This, in a nutshell, is the notion that
incomplete contracting induces states to delegate authority to non-state actors to reduce
uncertainty and limit issue-cycling (Hawkins et al. 2006; Mueller 2003; Pollack 2003).
It is one thing for states to facilitate agenda setting by empowering international agents,
but it is quite another to give up individual control over an IO with broad-ranging policy
competences. The concerns that induce states to delegate agenda setting under incomplete
contracting are unlikely to lead them to relinquish the veto in the final decision. The broader
the policy portfolio of an IO, the greater the concern of its member states to maintain the
capacity to block decisions that could hurt them domestically (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Zürn,
Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012).4
Number of member states
Multilateralism after World War II involved as many as 200 states, each of which gained
sovereign status. The problems this generates for collective decision making have a major
impact on the design of IOs (Downs, Barsoom and Rocke 1998; Kahler 1992; Osieke 1984;
Page | 10
Riches 1940; Zamora 1980). The expected direction of the effect is the same for delegation and
pooling—the more members of an IO, the greater delegation and pooling—but the reasons
vary.
The benefits of delegation depend on informational asymmetry between bureaucrats
and principals which is expected to be particularly large in IOs with many members (Hawkins,
Lake, Nielson, and Tierney 2006; Pollack 2003). The number of possible connections in a
network is an exponential function of the number of participants. Delegation of agenda setting
offsets the complexity of gaining full information about the preferences and strategies in a large
member organization.
The effect of numbers on pooling is even sharper. Multilateralism among formally
sovereign states is a recipe for deadlock (Kahler 1992; Martin 1995: 91; Snidal 1995: 57). The
larger the number of veto players, holding their ideological distance constant, the smaller the
size of the winset and the more difficult it is to depart from the status quo (Tsebelis 2002). In
designing an international organization, states have to balance the benefits of scale in the
provision of public goods against decisional blockage that arises in a large-N organization with
sovereign actors. The severity of the trade-off is eased if states are willing to pool authority in
majoritarian decision making (Ostrom 1990: 188-9, 212; Snidal 1995: 57).
Among large-N studies, Blake and Lockwood Payton (2009: 23) find that majority voting
is more likely as membership grows. For a sample of 30 regional IOs, Haftel and Thompson
(2006: 269) find no support for the hypothesis that large-scale IOs are more independent.
However, the history of voting rules in the European Union suggests that increasing the number
Page | 11
of member states produces pressure for majoritarian voting (Schneider 2002). Carrubba and
Volden (2001: 23) note that “as the size of the EU increases, voting rules must be made less
inclusive to sustain vote trades.”
A DATASET FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The political structure of international organizations is perceived to affect the outcomes of
intergovernmental coordination for trade negotiation, environmental regulation, conflict
resolution, and peacekeeping missions. Most empirical studies use sophisticated, usually direct,
measures of the phenomena that are said to be affected by IO design, but rudimentary
measures of IO design itself.
Two challenges confront the researcher who wishes to estimate delegation and pooling
of IO authority. The first is to navigate from the abstract to the particular. Delegation and
pooling cannot be observed directly. We seek to specify these concepts so that their variation
can be reliably evaluated while preserving their meaning. A second, related, challenge is to
“seek a middle ground between a universalizing tendency, which is inattentive to contextual
differences, and a particularizing approach, which is skeptical about the feasibility of
constructing measures that transcend specific contexts” (Adcock and Collier 2001: 530). Each IO
is, in certain respects, unique, yet our purpose is to evaluate them on a common conceptual
frame (Weber 1949; Sartori 1970). Hence, our challenge is to specify institutional possibilities
that have similar connotations across diverse organizations.
Several datasets estimate IO authority (Table 1). Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom
(2004) evaluate the authority exercised by an IO across three categories that tap the degree to
Page | 12
which an IO is institutionalized and its capacity to enforce its will on its member states. Blake
and Lockwood Payton (2009) examine the voting rule in the IO body that they judge to be the
most consequential in setting policy. Haftel and Thompson’s independence measure (2006)
combines voting and decision power in an interstate body with measures on the role of a
permanent secretariat. Goertz and Powers (2012) encompass estimates of the central
interstate body, the general secretariat, dispute settlement, emanations, parliamentary
organization, and whether the IO has international legal personality.
[Table 1 about here]
These data have been used to good effect, but they have fairly basic limitations. A more
refined measure would seek to a) disentangle delegation and pooling; b) distinguish agenda
setting from final decision making; c) differentiate across the decision domains in which
delegation and pooling can be observed; d) distinguish simple majority, supermajority, and
regional IOs as having non-overlapping memberships, multi-functional scope, and as composed primarily
of contiguous states. There are 22 such IOs in our dataset. A less restrictive definition which allows
overlapping membership extends the list to 33 IOs (Marks et al. 2013).
12 This motivates Mitchell’s work (2006) on environmental agreements, Sandler (2004) on global
collective action, and Koremenos (2012) on uncertainty and international agreements.
Page | 29
Table 1: Measures of International Authority
Boehmer, Gartzke, Nordstrom (2004): Institutionalization One trichotomous dimension for international organizations: (1) minimal: plenary meetings, secretariat (2) structured: bodies to implement (3) interventionist: mechanisms to enforce
Blake & Lockwood Payton (2009): Decision making One trichotomous dimension for international organizations: (1) majoritarian voting rule in chief policy making body (2) unanimity voting rule in chief policy making body (3) weighted voting rule in chief policy making body
Haftel & Thompson (2006): Independence Four dichotomous dimensions for regional integration arrangements (RIA): (1) decision-making - voting: majority/ unanimity (2) decision-making – decision power of council (3) supranational bureaucracy -- existence (4) supranational bureaucracy – initiation
Goertz and Powers (2012): Regional governance Six dichotomous dimensions for regional economic institutions (REI): (1) rule & policy system resembling council of ministers (2) dispute settlement mechanism (3) international legal personality
(4) secretariat-headquarters (5) at least one organizational emanation (6) parliamentary organization
Hooghe and Marks (2013): Delegation and Pooling Fifteen dimensions for international organizations: Delegation: nine dichotomous dimensions to evaluate the role of the general secretariat in agenda setting on: (1) membership accession (2) suspension of a member state (3) constitutional revision (4) drafting the budget (5) financial non-compliance (6) policy making (7) monopoly of policy initiation (trichotomous) (8) executive functions (9) monopoly of executive functions
Pooling: six ordinal dimensions to evaluate the extent to which individual member states control the decision on: (1) membership accession (2) suspension of a member state (3) constitutional revision (4) budgetary allocation (5) financial non-compliance (6) policy making Control = 𝑓(voting rule, bindingness, ratification)
Page | 30
Table 2: Delegation and Pooling
Delegation Pooling
Policy scope .077*** (.024)
–.046** (.023)
Members .145*** (.045)
.165*** (.041)
Democracy −.001 (.020)
.016 (.019)
Power asymmetry –.120*** (.045)
–.015 (.041)
Weighted voting .018 (.022)
.037* (.020)
Constant .311 (.020)
.282 (.018)
R2
(Adjusted R2) .235
(.177) .633
(.605)
Note: N=72. OLS regression with two-tailed significance for estimates: *** sign <.01 ** sign <.05 *sign <.10. Standardized coefficients with standard errors in brackets.
Page | 31
Table 3A: The Effect of Policy Scope on Delegation and Pooling after Matching
Note: Each row represents a full OLS model (omitting matched covariate) but reports only the estimates of the variable of interest, Policy scope or Members. We use the CEM stata algorithm developed by Blackwell, Iacus, King, Porro (2009) to obtain a matched data set. This method applies automatic coarsened exact matching. N reports the number of observations retained and matched after treatment. Lambda is a measure of global imbalance, which varies between 0 (perfectly balanced) and 1 (perfectly imbalanced or complete separation).
Page | 32
Table 4: Delegation and Pooling with Covariates at the IO’s Founding
Delegation
Pooling
Policy scope .070*** (.024)
–.075*** (.024)
Members .078** (.034)
.062** (.030)
Democracy –.001 (.004)
–.000 (.004)
Power asymmetry –.007 (.005)
–.226* (.132)
Weighted voting .031 (.053)
.160*** (.054)
Constant .381 (.074)
.359 (.079)
R2
(Adjusted R2) .176
(.113) .515
(.478)
Note: N=72. OLS regression with two-tailed significance for estimates: *** sign <.01 **sign <.05 *sign <.10. Standardized coefficients with standard errors in brackets. Estimates of the covariates take on values in 1950, or in the year of IO creation, whichever is later.
Page | 33
Table 5: Exploring the Regional vs. Global Contrast
Delegation Pooling
Policy scope .102*** (.029)
.072** (.030)
–.056** (.027)
–.046* (.028)
Members .110** (.050)
.1154** (.059)
.180*** (.047)
.166*** (.054)
Democracy .004 (.021)
−.002 (.021)
.013 (.019)
.016 (.019)
Power asymmetry –.116** (.044)
–.125** (.048)
–.017 (.041)
–.016 (.045)
Weighted voting .015 (.021)
.018 (.022)
.018* (.020)
.036 (.020)
Regional IO
–.118 (.078)
.052 (.073)
Regional IO (Goertz-Powers) .021 (.086)
.003 (.079)
Constant .365 (.041)
.304 (.035)
.259 (.038)
.281 (.0321)
R2
(Adjusted R2) .261
(.193) .236
(.165) .636
(.602) .633
(.599)
Note: N=72. OLS regression with two-tailed significance for estimates: *** sign <.01 ** sign <.05 * sign <.10 Standardized coefficients with standard errors in brackets.
Note: N=72. Two-tailed significance: *** sign <.01 ** sign <.05 *sign <.10 OLS regressions with standardized coefficients and standard errors in brackets.
Page | 35
Figure 1: Delegation and Pooling in International Organizations
Note: Some IOs are not visible because they are clustered at a single location (.28 on Delegation and 0 on Pooling). They are ASEAN, Benelux, Central American Integration System (SICA), Commonwealth of States (CIS), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), NATO, Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).
Nordic Council NAFTA
APEC
CABI
CCNR
SAARC
OAPEC
IMO
WMOIwhale
Mercosur
ISA
UPU
SCO
COEITU
WCO
ICAO
OPEC
EFTA
UNIDOWTO
ICC
NATO
WHO
FAO
OSCE
PCA
LAIA
UNWTO
OAS
UNESCO
SA CU
UN
GCC
BIS
Be ne lux
ASEANSICACIS
LOAS
World Bank
IAEA
SELA
OECS
ILO
GEF
OECD
Comesa
CaricomIGAD
PIF
OTIF
INTERPOLIOM
SADCEccas
WIPO
OIC
Andean
CERN
AU
SPC
Cemac
IMF
EEA
Francophonie
ESAEAC
CommonwealthEcowas
EU
0.2
.4.6
.81
.PO
OLIN
G
0 .2 .4 .6 .8.DELEGATION
Page | 36
Figure 2: Scope and Delegation vs. Scope and Pooling
0.2
.4.6
Deleg
ation
0 5 10 15 20 25Policy scope
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
0.1
.2.3
.4Po
oling
0 5 10 15 20 25Policy scope
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
Page | 37
Figure 3: Marginal Effects for Delegation and Pooling
(A) DELEGATION
(B) POOLING
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
-.3
.3
Effec
ts on
Line
ar P
redic
tion
Policy s
cope
Member
s
Democr
acy
Power a
symmetry
Weighte
d votin
g
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs
-.10
.1.2
.3Ef
fects
on Li
near
Pre
dictio
n
Policy s
cope
Member
s
Democr
acy
Power a
symmetry
Weighte
d votin
g
Average marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals
Page | 38
REFERENCES
Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 1998. “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations.” International Organization 42: 3-32.
–––.2000. “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance.” International Organization 54: 421-56.
Acharya, Amitav and Ian Johnston. 2007. “Comparing Regional Institutions: An Introduction.” In Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, ed. Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-31.
Adkisson, Richard V. 2003. “The Andean Group: Institutional Evolution, Intraregional Trade, and Economic Development.” Journal of Economic Issues 37: 371-379.
Alter, Karen and Laurence Hefter. 2010. “Nature or Nurture? Judicial Law Making in the European Court of Justice and Andean Court of Justice.” International Organization 64: 563-92.
Alter, Karen J. and Laurence R. Helfer. 2011. “Legal Integration in the Andes: Law-Making by the Andean Tribunal of Justice.” European Law Journal 17: 701–715.
Ashan, Abul. 2006. “SAARC Secretariat: A Critique.” In SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, ed. Imtiaz Alam. Lahore: South Asian Policy Analysis Network (SAPANA), 142-149.
Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Rules for the World. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Blackwell, Matthew, Stefano Iacus, Gary King, and Giuseppe Porro. 2009. “Cem: Coarsened Exact Matching in Stata.” The Stata Journal 9: 524-46.
Blake, Daniel J. and Autumn Lockwood Payton. 2009. “Decision Making in International Organizations: An Interest Based Approach to Voting Rule Selection.” Manuscript, Ohio State.
Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. “Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?” World Politics 57: 1-38.
Boehmer, Charles and Timothy Nordstrom. 2008. “Intergovernmental Organization Memberships: Examining Political Community and the Attributes of International Organizations.” International Interactions 34: 282–309.
Bradley, Curtis A. and Judith G. Kelley. 2008. “The Concept of International Delegation.” Law and Contemporary Problems 71: 1-36.
Brown, Robert L. 2010. “Measuring Delegation.” Review of International Organization 5: 141–175.
Carrubba, Clifford J. and Craig Volden. 2001. “Explaining Institutional Change in the European Union: What Determines the Voting Rule in the Council of Ministers?” European Union Politics 2: 5-30.
Page | 39
Cooley, Alexander, and Hendrik Spruyt. 2009. Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Davis, Christina. 2004. “International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization." American Political Science Review 98: 153-169.
De Lombaerde, Philippe, and Michael Schulz eds., 2009. The EU and World Regionalism: The Makeability of Regions in the 21st Century. London: Ashgate.
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. “Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism.” International Organization 52: 397-419.
Drezner, Daniel. 2007. All Politics is Global. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Gartzke, Erik [s.d]. The Affinity of Nations: Similarity of State Voting Positions in the UNGA - Data Updated (to 2008). At http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/htmlpages/data.html, accessed Dec 2, 2012.
Goertz, Gary, and Kathy Powers. 2012. “Regional Governance: The Evolution of A New Institutional Form.” Paper presented at a workshop on An International Organization Data Base,” Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, February.
Grieco, Joseph. 1990. Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Haftel, Yoram Z., and Alexander Thompson. 2006. “The Independence of International Organizations: Concept and Applications.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50: 253-75.
Haftel, Yoram Z. 2007. “Designing for Peace: Regional Integration Arrangements, Institutional Variation, and Militarized Interstate Disputes.” International Organization 61: 217–237.
Haftel, Yoram Z. 2012. Regional Economic Institutions and Conflict Mitigation: Design, Implementation, and the Promise of Peace. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Hancock, Kathleen J. 2009. Regional Integration: Choosing Plutocracy. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave/MacMillan.
Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger. 1997. Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: CUP.
Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. 2006. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten. 2012. Penn World Table Version 7.1. Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania. At https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php.
Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2001. Multi-level governance and European integration. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield.
–––. 2003. “Unraveling the Central State, But How? Types of Multi-Level Governance.” American Political Science Review 97: 233-43.
–––. 2009a. “Efficiency and the Territorial Structure of Government.” Annual Review of Political Science 12: 225-41.
–––. 2009b. “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus.” British Journal of Political Science 39: 1-23.
Hooghe, Liesbet, Jeanine Bezuijen, Emanuel Coman, Svet Derderyan. 2013. “Designing Dispute Settlement Bodies in International Organizations.” Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, San Francisco.
Johnson, Tana. 2010. “Rethinking Nonstate Actors: The Role and Impact of International Bureaucrats in Institutional Design.” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago.
Johnson, Tana. 2013. “Institutional Design and Bureaucrats’ Impact on Political Control.” Journal of Politics 75: 183–197.
Kahler, Miles. 1992. “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers.” International Organization 46: 681-708.
–––. 2000. “Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization.” International Organization 54: 661–83.
Keohane, Robert O. 1982. “The Demand for International Regimes.” International Organization 36: 325-55.
Keohane, Robert O. and Elinor Ostrom, eds. 1995. Local Commons and Global Interdependence. New York, N.Y.: Sage Publications.
Keohane, Robert, and Stanley Hoffmann. 1991. “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s.” In The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, eds. Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann. Boulder: Westview Press, 1-40.
Kono, Daniel Y. 2007. “Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions and Trade Cooperation.” Journal of Politics 69: 746-59.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2008. “When, What and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?” Law and Contemporary Problems 71: 151-92.
–––. 2012. “The Continent of International Law.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Available on DOI: 10.1177/0022002712448904
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. “The Rational Design of International Institutions.” International Organization 55: 761-99.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” World Politics 28: 317-47.
–––. 1991. “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier.” World Politics 43: 336–56.
Lake, David A. 1996. “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations.” International Organization 50: 1-33.
–––. 2007. “Delegating Divisible Sovereignty: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield.” Review of International Organization 2: 219–237.
–––. 2009. Hierarchy in international relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Lindberg, Leon, and Stuart Scheingold. 1970. Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Page | 41
Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade.” American Political Science Review 94: 305-1.
Mansfield, Edward D. and Etel Solingen. 2010. “Regionalism.” Annual Review of Political Science 13: 145–63.
Marks, Gary. 2007. “Triangulation and the Square Root Law.” Electoral Studies 26: 1-10.
–––. 2012. “Europe and its Empires: From Rome to the European Union.” Journal of Common Market Studies 50: 1-20.
Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank. 1996. “European Integration and the State: Multi-level vs. State Centric Governance.” Journal of Common Market Studies 34: 341-78.
Marks, Gary, Tobias Lenz, Besir Ceka, and Brian Burgoon. 2013. “Discovering Cooperation: A Contractual Approach to Regional Organization.” Paper presented at the International Studies Association, San Francisco.
Martin, Lisa. 1995. “Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems.” In Local Commons and Global Interdependence, eds. Robert O. Keohane and Elinor Ostrom. New York, N.Y: Sage Publications: 71-92.
–––. 2000. Democratic Commitments. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Mattli, Walter. 1999. The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press.
Mckeown, Timothy. 2009. How U.S. Decision-Makers Assessed their Control of Multilateral Organizations, 1957–1982. Review of International Organizations 4: 269–291.
Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19: 5-49.
Mitchell, Ronald B. 2006. “Problem Structure, Institutional Design, and the Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements.” Global Environmental Politics 6: 72-89.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Mueller, Dennis C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
Nordquist, Myron H. and John Morton Moore, eds. 1999. Current Maritime Issues and the International Maritime Organization. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Olson, Mancur. 1968. The Logic of Collective Action. New York: Schocken.
Osieke, Ebere. 1984. “Majority Voting Systems in the International Labour Organisation and the International Monetary Fund.” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 33: 381-408.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
Page | 42
Pahre, Robert. 2004. “Most favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations.” In The Rational Design of International Institutions, eds. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. New York: Cambridge University Press, 99-130.
Pevehouse, Jon, Timothy Nordstrom, Kevin Warnke n.d. [2004], Intergovernmental Organizations, 1815-2000: A New Correlates of War Data Set. At http://www.correlatesofwar.org/, accessed on Dec 2, 2012.
Pevehouse, Jon. C. 2005. Democracy from Above? Regional Organizations and Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pollack, Mark A. 2003. The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Pollack, Mark A., and Gregory C. Shaffer. 2012. “The Interaction of Formal and Informal Lawmaking.” Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 12-10, University of Minnesota.
Powers, Kathy and Gary Goertz. 2011. “The Economic-Institutional Construction of Regions: Conceptualisation and Operationalisation.” Review of International Studies 37: 2387–416.
Prada, Fernando and Alvaro Espinoza 2008. “Monitoring Regional Integration and Cooperation in the Andean Region.” In Governing Regional Integration for Development, eds. Philippe de Lombaerde, Antoni Estevadeordal and Kati Suominen. London: Ashgate, 11-30.
Qvortrup, Mads, and Robert Hazell. 1998. The British-Irish Council: Nordic Lessons for the Council of the Isles. London: Constitution Unit.
Riches, Cromwell Adam. 1940. Majority Rule in International Organization: A Study of the Trend from Unanimity to Majority Decision. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.
Richards, John E. 2004. “Institutions for Flying: How states built a Market in International Aviation Services.” In The Rational Design of International Institutions, eds. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. New York: Cambridge University Press, 233-258.
Ringe, Nils. 2010. Who Decides, and How? Preferences, Uncertainty, and Policy Choice in the European Parliament. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rittberger, Berthold. 2005. Building Europe's Parliament. Democratic Representation Beyond the Nation State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rittberger, Volker and Bernhard Zangl. 2006. International Organization: Polity, Politics, and Policies. London: Palgrave/MacMillan.
Rosenne, Shabtai. 1999. “The International Maritime Organization Interface with the Law of the Sea Convention.” In Current Maritime Issues and the International Maritime Organization, eds. Myron H. Nordquist and John Morton Moore. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 251-68.
Sandler, Todd. 2004. Global Collective Action. Cambridge: CUP.
Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. “Concept Misformation In Comparative Politics.” American Political Science Review 64: 1033-53.
Schmitter, Philippe C. 1996. “Examining the Present Euro-Polity With the Help of Past Theories.” In Governance in the European Union, eds. Gary Marks, Fritz Scharpf, Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 121-50.
Schneider, Gerald. 2002. “A Never-Ending Success Story? The Dynamics of Widening and Deepening European Integration.” In Widening the European Union: The Politics of Institutional Change and Reform, ed. Bernard Steunenberg. London: Routledge: 183–201.
Shanks, Cheryl, Harold K. Jacobson and Jeffrey H. Kaplan. 1996. “Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992.” International Organization 50: 593-627.
Simmons, Beth and Allison Danner. 2010. “Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court.” International Organization 64: 225-256.
Singer, J. David. 1987. “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985.” International Interactions 14: 115-132.
Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965.” In Peace, War, and Numbers, ed. Bruce Russett. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage: 19-48.
Snidal, Duncan. 1985. “Coordination versus Prisoners Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes.” American Political Science Review 79: 923–43.
–––. 1995. “The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions.” In Local Commons and Global Interdependence, eds. Robert O. Keohane and Elinor Ostrom. New York, N.Y.: Sage Publications: 47-70.
Snidal, Duncan and Felicity Vabulas. 2013. “Soft Pooling through Informal International Organizations (IIGOs).” Unpublished paper.
Solingen, Etel. 2008. “The Genesis, Design and Effects of Regional Institutions: Lessons from East Asia and the Middle East.” International Studies Quarterly 52: 261–294.
Stein, Arthur A. 1983. “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World.” In International Regimes, ed. Stephen Krasner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Stone, Randall. 2010. Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
Tallberg, Jonas. 2002. “Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?” West European Politics 25: 23–46.
Tallberg, Jonas. 2010. “The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership in International Cooperation.” International Studies Quarterly 54: 241–65.
Tavares, Rodrigo. 2008. “Monitoring Regional Cooperation and Integration in South Asia.” In Governing Regional Integration for Development, eds. Philippe de Lombaerde, Antoni Estevadeordal and Kati Suominen. London: Ashgate, 141-160.
Thompson, Alexander. 2010. “Rational Design in Motion: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the Global Climate Regime.” European Journal of International Relations 16: 269–96.
Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press & Russell Foundation.
Page | 44
Urpelainen, Johannes. 2012. “Unilateral Influence on International Bureaucrats: An International Delegation Problem.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56: 704-35.
Van Leeuwen, Judith and Kristine Kern. 2013. “The External Dimension of European Union Marine Governance: Institutional Interplay between the EU and the International Maritime Organization.” Global Environmental Politics 13: 69-87.
Vestergaard, Jakob and Robert H. Wade. 2012. “Establishing a New Global Economic Council: Governance Reform at the G20, the IMF and the World Bank.” Global Policy 3: 257-69.
Viola, Lora Anne. 2008. “Governing the Club of Sovereigns: Inequality and the Politics of Membership in the international System.” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago.
Voeten, Erik. 2013. “Data and Analyses of Voting in the UN General Assembly.” In Routledge Handbook of International Organization, ed. Bob Reinalda. Routledge: London.
Weber, Max. 1949. The Methodology of The Social Sciences. New York, N.Y.: Free Press.
Zamora, Stephen. 1980. “Voting in International Economic Organizations.” American Journal of International Law 74: 566-608.
Zürn, Michael. 1992. Interessen und Institutionen in der Internationalen Politik: Grundlegung und Anwendung des situationsstrukturellen Ansatzes. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
Zürn, Michael, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt. 2012. “International Authority and Its Politicization.” International Theory 4: 69-106.