The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 5 | Issue 8 | Article ID 2501 | Aug 01, 2007 1 The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: What Drove Japan's Decision to Surrender? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: What Drove Japan’s Decision to Surrender? Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA Almost immediately following the end of World War II, Americans began to question the use of the atomic bomb and the circumstances surrounding the end of the Pacific War. More than half a century later, books and articles on the atomic bomb still provoke storms of debate among readers and the use of atomic weapons remains a sharply contested subject.[1] As the 1995 controversy over the Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum revealed, the issues connected with the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki continue to touch a sensitive nerve in Americans. Among scholars, disagreement remains no less heated. But, on the whole, this debate has been strangely parochial, centering almost exclusively on how the U.S. leadership made the decision to drop the bombs. There are two distinct gaps in this historiography. First, with regard to the atomic bombs, as Asada Sadao in Japan correctly observes, American historians have concentrated on the “motives” behind the use of atomic bombs, but “they have slighted the effects of the bomb.”[2] Second, although historians have been aware of the decisive influence of both the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war, they have largely sidestepped the Soviet factor, relegating it to sideshow status.[3] Two historians, Asada Sadao and Richard Frank, have recently confronted this issue head-on, arguing that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima had a more decisive effect on Japan’s decision to surrender than did Soviet entry into the war.[4] This essay challenges that view. It argues that (1) the atomic bombing of Nagasaki did not have much effect on Japan’s decision; (2) of the two factors—the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Soviet entry into the war—the Soviet invasion had a more important effect on Japan’s decision to surrender; (3) nevertheless, neither the atomic bombs nor Soviet entry into the war served as “a knock-out punch” that had a direct, decisive, and immediate effect on Japan’s decision to surrender; (4) the most important, immediate cause behind Japan’s decision to surrender were the emperor’s “sacred decision” to do so, engineered by a small group of the Japanese ruling elite; and (5) that in the calculations of this group, Soviet entry into the war provided a more powerful motivation than the atomic bombs to seek the termination of the war by accepting the terms specified in the Potsdam Proclamation. Further, by posing counterfactual hypotheses, I argue that Soviet entry into the war against Japan alone, without the atomic bombs, might have led to Japan’s surrender before November 1, but that the atomic bombs alone, without Soviet entry into the war, would not have accomplished this. Finally, I argue that had U.S. President Harry Truman sought Stalin’s signature on the Potsdam Proclamation, and had Truman included the promise of a constitutional monarchy in the Potsdam Proclamation, as Secretary of War Henry Stimson had originally suggested, the war might have ended sooner, possibly without the atomic bombs being
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The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 5 | Issue 8 | Article ID 2501 | Aug 01, 2007
1
The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: What DroveJapan's Decision to Surrender?
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
The Atomic Bombs and the SovietInvasion: What Drove Japan’s Decision toSurrender?
Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA
Almost immediately following the end of WorldWar II, Americans began to question the use ofthe atomic bomb and the circumstancessurrounding the end of the Pacific War. Morethan half a century later, books and articles onthe atomic bomb still provoke storms of debateamong readers and the use of atomic weaponsremains a sharply contested subject.[1] As the1995 controversy over the Enola Gay exhibit atthe Smithsonian’s National Air and SpaceMuseum revealed, the issues connected withthe dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima andNagasaki continue to touch a sensitive nerve inAmericans. Among scholars, disagreementremains no less heated. But, on the whole, thisdebate has been strangely parochial, centeringalmost exclusively on how the U.S. leadershipmade the decision to drop the bombs.
There a re two d i s t inc t gaps in th i shistoriography. First, with regard to the atomicbombs, as Asada Sadao in Japan correctlyobserves, American histor ians haveconcentrated on the “motives” behind the useof atomic bombs, but “they have slighted theeffects of the bomb.”[2] Second, althoughhistorians have been aware of the decisiveinfluence of both the atomic bombs and theSoviet entry into the war, they have largelysidestepped the Soviet factor, relegating it tosideshow status.[3]
Two historians, Asada Sadao and Richard
Frank, have recently confronted this issuehead-on, arguing that the atomic bombing ofHiroshima had a more decisive effect onJapan’s decision to surrender than did Sovietentry into the war.[4] This essay challengesthat view. It argues that (1) the atomicbombing of Nagasaki did not have much effecton Japan’s decision; (2) of the two factors—theatomic bombing of Hiroshima and Soviet entryinto the war—the Soviet invasion had a moreimportant effect on Japan’s decision tosurrender; (3) nevertheless, neither the atomicbombs nor Soviet entry into the war served as“a knock-out punch” that had a direct, decisive,and immediate effect on Japan’s decision tosurrender; (4) the most important, immediatecause behind Japan’s decision to surrenderwere the emperor’s “sacred decision” to do so,engineered by a small group of the Japaneseruling elite; and (5) that in the calculations ofthis group, Soviet entry into the war provided amore powerful motivation than the atomicbombs to seek the termination of the war byaccepting the terms specified in the PotsdamP r o c l a m a t i o n . F u r t h e r , b y p o s i n gcounterfactual hypotheses, I argue that Sovietentry into the war against Japan alone, withoutthe atomic bombs, might have led to Japan’ssurrender before November 1, but that theatomic bombs alone, without Soviet entry intothe war, would not have accomplished this.Finally, I argue that had U.S. President HarryTruman sought Stalin’s signature on thePotsdam Proclamation, and had Trumanincluded the promise of a constitutionalmonarchy in the Potsdam Proclamation, asSecretary of War Henry Stimson had originallysuggested, the war might have ended sooner,possibly without the atomic bombs being
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dropped on Japan.
1: The Influence of the Hiroshima Bomb onJapan’s Decision to Surrender
In order to discuss the influence of the atomicbombs on Japan’s decision to surrender, wemust examine three separate issues: (1) theeffect of the Hiroshima bomb; (2) the effect ofthe Nagasaki bomb; and (3) the effect of thetwo bombs combined.Let us first examine the effect of the Hiroshimabomb. In order to prove that the Hiroshimabomb had a decisive effect on Japan’s decision,Asada and Frank use the following evidence:(1) the August 7 cabinet meeting; (2) thetestimony of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KidoKoichi concerning the emperor’s statement onAugust 7; and (3) the emperor’s statement toForeign Minister Togo Shigenori on August 8.
The atomic bombing of Hiroshima
The Cabinet Meeting on August 7
According to Asada and Frank, the cabinetmeeting on August 7 was a crucial turningpoint. Asada argues that, judging that “theintroduction of a new weapon, which haddrastically altered the whole military situation,offered the military ample grounds for endingthe war,” Foreign Minister Togo Shigenoriproposed that “surrender be considered at onceon the basis of terms presented in the PotsdamDeclaration [Proclamation].”[5] Frank writes:
“Togo extracted from the American statementsabout the ‘new and revolutionary increase indestruct[ive]’ power of the atomic bomb areason to accept the Potsdam Proclamation.”[6]
If these arguments are correct, there wasindeed a fundamental change of policy, at leaston the part of Togo, if not the entire cabinet,and the Hiroshima bomb had a decisive effecton Togo’s thinking, since until then he hadbeen advocating suing for peace throughMoscow’s mediation before considering theacceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation. In hismemoirs, however, Togo does not portray thiscabinet meeting as a decisive turning point.The following is all he says about the cabinetmeeting: “On the afternoon of the 7th, therewas a cabinet meeting. The army minister andthe home minister read their reports. The armyappeared to minimize the effect of the bomb,without admitting that it was the atomic bomb,insisting that further investigation wasnecessary.”[7]
The only source that makes a reference toTogo’s insistence on the acceptance of thePotsdam Proclamation was the testimony givenby Cabinet Minister Sakomizu Hisatsune underpostwar interrogation. Citing Sakomizu’stestimony, Oi Atsushi, who interviewed Togo inpreparation for the Tokyo trial, asked himabout his alleged proposal to accept thePotsdam terms. Togo replied: “I reported thatthe United States was broadcasting that theatomic bomb would impart a revolutionarychange in warfare, and that unless Japanaccepted peace it would drop the bombs onother places. The Army… attempted tominimize its effect, saying that they were notsure if it was the atomic bomb, and that since it[had] dispatched a delegation, it had to wait forits report.”[8] The picture that emerges fromthis testimony is that Togo merely reported theU.S. message. Perhaps he merely conveyed hispreference to consider the PotsdamProclamation by reporting Truman’s message.But when met with stiff opposition from Army
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Minister Anami Korechika, who dismissed theAmerican atomic bomb message as merepropaganda, Togo, without a fight, acceptedAnami’s proposal to wait until the delegationsubmitted its official findings. According toSakomizu’s memoirs, Togo first proposed, andthe cabinet agreed, that Japan should register astrong protest through the International RedCross and the Swiss legation about theAmerican use of the atomic bomb as a seriousviolation of international law prohibitingpoisonous gas. Sakomizu further wrote: “Therewas an argument advocating the quicktermination of war by accepting the PotsdamProclamation,” but in view of the Army’sopposition, the cabinet merely decided to sendthe investigation team to Hiroshima.[9]
In other words, neither the cabinet nor Togohimself believed that any change of policy wasnecessary on the afternoon of August 7, oneday after the atomic bomb was dropped onHiroshima, although the majority of the cabinetmembers had already known that the bomb wasmost likely an atomic bomb, and furthermorethat unless Japan surrendered, many atomicbombs might be dropped on other cities inJapan. In fact, far from entertaining thepossibility of accepting the Potsdam terms, thecabinet was blatantly more combative againstthe United States, deciding to lodge a formalprotest against the use of the atomic bomb.
What Did the Emperor Say on August 7?
The news of the dropping of an atomic bomb onHiroshima had already been brought to theemperor early in the morning on August 7, butKido learned of it only at noon. Kido had anunusually long audience with the emperor thatlasted from 1:30 to 2:05 in the ImperialLibrary. Kido’s diary notes: “The emperorexpressed his august view on how to deal withthe current situation and asked variousquestions.”[10] But Kido’s diary says nothingabout what the emperor’s view was and whatquestions he asked. Later, Kido recalled that
Hirohito had told him: “Now that things havecome to this impasse, we must bow to theinevitable. No matter what happens to mysafety, we should lose no time in ending thewar so as not to have another tragedy likethis.”[11] Citing Kido’s account as the decisiveevidence, Asada concludes: “The Emperorwas… from this time forward Japan’s foremostpeace advocate, increasingly articulate andurgent in expressing his wish for peace.”[12]Frank, however, does not share Asada’sdescription of the emperor as the “foremostpeace advocate,” viewing him as wavering attimes over whether or not Japan should attachmore than one condition to its acceptance ofthe Potsdam Proclamation.[13]
Kido Koichi
Kido’s description of the emperor’s reaction tothe Hiroshima bomb must be taken with a grainof salt. As Hirohito’s closest adviser, Kidoworked assiduously to create the myth that the
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emperor had played a decisive role in endingthe war. Kido’s testimony under interrogationon May 17, 1949, was designed to create theimage of the benevolent emperor saving theJapanese from further devastation. Hirohito’soffer of “self-sacrifice” does not correspond tohis behavior and thinking during those crucialdays. It should be noted that on July 30, threedays after he received a copy of the PotsdamProclamation, Hirohito was concerned above allabout the safety of the “three divine treasures”(sanshu no jingi) that symbolized the imperialhousehold in Ise Shrine in the event of anenemy attack. Meanwhile, more than 10,000Japanese were killed by American incendiarybombings during the eleven days from thePotsdam Proclamation to the Hiroshima bomb.Hirohito’s wish to prevent further sacrifice ofhis “children” (sekishi) at his own risk does notring true.[14] Contrary to Asada’s assertion,Hirohito’s first and foremost preoccupation wasthe preservation of the imperial house. Neitherdoes his subsequent behavior indicate thatHirohito was the most persistent, articulateadvocate of immediate peace. Here, Frank’sskepticism is closer to the truth than Asada’sconclusion.
The Emperor’s Statement to Togo onAugust 8
On the following morning, August 8, ForeignMinister Togo Shigenori went to the imperialpalace for an audience with the emperor.According to Asada, using the American andBritish broadcasts “to buttress his case,” Togourged the emperor to agree to end the war asquickly as possible “on condition, of course,that the emperor system be retained.” Hirohitoconcurred and replied:
Now that such a new weapon hasappeared, it has become less andless possible to continue the war.We must not miss a chance toterminate the war by bargaining
[with the Allied powers, Asadaa d d s ] f o r m o r e f a v o r a b l econditions now. Besides, howevermuch we consult about [surrender,Asada adds] terms we desire, weshall not be able to come to anagreement. So my wish is to makesuch arrangements as will end thewar as soon as possible.[15]
From this statement, Asada concludes that “theemperor expressed his conviction that a speedysurrender was the only feasible way to saveJapan.” Hirohito urged Togo to “do [his] utmostto bring about a prompt termination of war,”and told the foreign minister to convey hisdesire to Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro. “Incompliance with the imperial wish, Togo metSuzuki and proposed that, ‘given the atomicbombing of Hiroshima, the Supreme WarCouncil be convened with all dispatch.’”[16]Frank’s interpretation follows Asada’s basicassumption. According to Frank, “Togo calledfor immediate termination of the war on theb a s i s o f t h e P o t s d a m D e c l a r a t i o n[Proclamation],” but unlike Asada, he assertsthat Hirohito “still balked personally at simpleacceptance of the Potsdam Declaration[Proclamation].”[17]
The crucial question here, however, concernsthe effect of the Hiroshima bomb on theemperor. Both Asada and Frank make theargument that Togo’s meeting with theemperor was a crucial turning point in bothmen’s decision to seek an immediate end to thewar on the terms stipulated by the PotsdamProclamation. This argument, however, is notconvincing.
“We must not miss a chance to terminate thewar by bargaining for more favorableconditions now,” Togo quotes the emperor assaying. Asada adds the words, “with the Alliedpowers” in brackets after “bargaining,” to read:“We must not miss a chance to terminate the
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war by bargaining [with the Allied powers] formore favorable conditions now.” Asada takesthis to mean that the emperor wished to endt h e w a r b y a c c e p t i n g t h e P o t s d a mProclamation.[18] Is it correct, however, tointerpret the implied meaning here as“bargaining with the Allied powers?” As I arguebelow, Togo had dispatched an urgent telegramto Japan’s ambassador to the USSR, SatoNaotake, only the previous day, instructing thelatter to obtain Moscow’s answer to PrinceKonoe Fumimaro’s mission. It is also importantto recall that the Japanese government decidedto suspend judgment on the PotsdamProclamation precisely because it had pinnedits last hope on Moscow’s mediation. Whomwas the Japanese government bargaining withat that moment? Certainly, it was not the Alliedpowers, as Asada has inserted in brackets. Theonly party with whom Japan was “bargaining”at that moment was the Soviet Union, not theAllied powers, and the Japanese governmentpreferred to suspend judgment over thePotsdam terms as long as the possibility ofMoscow’s mediation still seemed available toit.[19] Hirohito’s statement did not change thisposition.
Konoe Fumimaro
Before the Hiroshima bombing, Togo hadalready become convinced that sooner or later,Japan would have to accept the Potsdam terms.It is possible that the Hiroshima bomb furtherreinforced his conviction. But it bears repeatingthat he did not take the initiative to reverse theprevious course, and that he did not proposedirect negotiations with the United States andBritain. As for the emperor, it is possible thatthe Hiroshima bomb contributed to his urgentdesire to terminate the war, but it is erroneousto say that immediately after the Hiroshimabomb, Hirohito decided to accept the Potsdamterms, as Asada asserts.
When Did Suzuki Decide to Terminate theWar?
Another piece of evidence on which Asada’sand Frank’s argument is constructed is PrimeMinister Suzuki’s statement. According toAsada, on the night of August 8, Suzuki toldSakomizu: “Now that we know it was an atomicbomb that was dropped on Hiroshima, I will
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give my views on the termination of the war attomorrow’s Supreme War Council.”[20] Afterthe war, Suzuki made another statement: “Theatomic bomb provided an additional reason forsurrender as well as an extremely favorableopportunity to commence peace talks.” Fromthese statements, Asada concludes: “Thehitherto vacillating and sphinx-like Suzuki hadfinally made up his mind. It is important to notethat Suzuki did so before he was informed ofthe Soviet entry into the war early on thefollowing day.”[21]
Asada’s conclusion is based on the 1973version of Sakomizu’s memoirs, according towhich, Suzuki called Sakomizu late at night andmade the statement quoted by Asada.Sakomizu explains that Suzuki relied on aprepared text written by his secretaries inorder to make an official statement. Threepages later, Sakomizu writes: “On PrimeMinister Suzuki’s order, I had been workinghard to write a text for the prime minister’sstatement for the cabinet meeting on thefollowing day since the evening of August 8”(emphasis added). At around one o’clock in themorning on August 9, Hasegawa Saiji of theDomei News Agency telephoned to inform himof the Soviet Union’s entry into the war.[22]
Sakomizu’s 1973 memoirs contain crucialinconsistencies with respect to timing. In hisearlier memoirs published in 1964, Sakomizusays that after he informed the prime ministerof Dr. Nishina’s report on the Hiroshima atomicbomb, which he had received on the evening ofAugust 8, Suzuki ordered him to call meetingsof the Supreme War Council and the cabinet“tomorrow on August 9 so that we can discussthe termination of the war.” It took Sakomizuuntil 2 A.M. on August 9 to complete thepreparations for the meetings on the followingday. He finally went to bed thinking about thecrucial meeting between Molotov and Sato inMoscow. It was not until three in the morningthat Hasegawa called and told him about theSoviet declaration of war on Japan.[23] The
timeline described in his 1964 memoirs makesmore sense than that in the 1973 memoirs.According to Hasegawa’s testimony, it was notuntil 4:00 A.M. on August 9 that he telephonedSakomizu about the Soviet declaration of war, afact that corresponds to Sakomizu’s account inthe 1964 memoirs, but not to that in the 1973memoirs.[24] Sphinx-like Suzuki, as Asada callshim, had previously confided his views favoringpeace privately on numerous occasions, but fordomestic morale reasons, he had trumpetedbellicose statements, to the constant chagrin ofthe foreign minister. The dropping of theatomic bomb reinforced Suzuki’s determinationto seek an end to the war, as it did theemperor’s. Nevertheless, it is likely that Suzuki,like everybody else, hoped for Moscow’smediation to achieve this, as Sakomizu’s 1964memoirs indicate.[25]
What is important, moreover, is the evidencethat Asada chooses to ignore. According toSuzuki’s biography, the prime minister came tothe clear conclusion after the Hiroshima bombthat there was no other alternative but to endthe war. Nevertheless, it was not until helearned of the Soviet invasion of Manchuriathat he “was finally convinced that the momenthad at last arrived to end the war, since whatwe had been afraid of and tried to avoid at anycost had finally come about [kitarubekimono gakita].” He thought that “now is the time torealize the emperor’s wish,” and “in view of theurgency of the situation, I finally made up mymind to be in charge of the termination of thewar, taking all the responsibility uponmyself.”[26] This biography makes it clear thatSuzuki did not make up his mind aboutterminating the war until the Soviet entry intothe war.[27]
Togo’s Telegram on August 7
That Togo did not change the policy even afterthe atomic bombing of Hiroshima can beascertained from important evidence that bothAsada and Frank ignore. Right after the cabinet
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meeting on August 7, Togo dispatched anurgent telegram, no. 993, to Ambassador Satoin Moscow, saying: “The situation is becomingmore and more pressing. We must know theSoviets’ attitude immediately. Therefore, doyour best once more to obtain their replyimmediately.”[28] In the context of the effect ofthe Hiroshima bomb, this telegram shows thatthe Japanese government as a whole, and Togopersonally, still clung to the hope that thetermination of the war was possible anddesirable through Moscow’s mediation. Thiswas the line that Togo had followed since thePotsdam Proclamation had been issued by theAllies. The Hiroshima bomb did not change thispolicy.[29]
Togo Shigenori
The emperor’s statement to Togo, cited byAsada and Frank, can therefore be interpreted
as the continuation of, not a departure from,the previous policy. If anything, the Japaneserul ing el i te pinned their hopes moredesperately on Moscow’s mediation after theHiroshima bomb. There is no evidence to showthat the emperor’s words “We must end thewar” should be interpreted as “ending the warby accepting the Potsdam Proclamation,” asAsada and Frank argue. When AmbassadorSato cabled to Tokyo that Molotov had finallyagreed to see him at 5 P.M. on August 8, noone, including the usually shrewd and hard-nosed Sato himself, doubted that Molotovwould give Sato an answer to Japan’s long-standing request that Moscow receive PrinceKonoe as the emperor’s special envoy.
There is no evidence to indicate that theHiroshima bomb immediately and directlyinduced either the Japanese government as awhole or individual members, including Togo,Suzuki, Kido, and Hirohito, to terminate thewar by accepting the terms of the PotsdamProclamation. Japan could wait until Moscow’sreaction before it would decide on the Potsdamterms.
Measuring the Shock Value
Asada argues that the atomic bombs provided agreater shock to Japanese policymakers thanthe Soviet entry into the war because (1) thebombing was a direct attack on the Japanesehomeland, compared with the Soviet Union’s“indirect” invasion in Manchuria; and (2) it wasnot anticipated. As for the first argument, thecomparison between atomic bombings of thehomeland and the Soviet invasion in Manchuriais irrelevant. American conventional air attackshad had little effect on Japan’s resolve to fightthe war. What separated the conventionalattacks and the atomic bombs was only themagnitude of the one bomb, and it is knownthat the cumulative effects of the conventionalattacks by American air raids caused moredevastation in terms of the number of deathsand destruction of industries, ports, and
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railroads. But the number of sacrifices was notthe major issue for Japanese policymakers.
The hierarchy of values under which theJapanese ruling elite operated is crucial inunderstanding the psychological factorinvolved in evaluating the effect of the atomicbombs on Japan’s decision to surrender. Thenumber of victims and profound damage thatthe atomic bombs inflicted on the citizens ofHiroshima and Nagasaki, which the Americanpolicymakers had hoped would have a decisiveinfluence on the Japanese government, werenot among the top considerations of theJapanese rul ing e l i te . The Japanesepolicymakers, from the emperor down to themilitary and civilian leaders, including Togohimself, were prepared to sacrifice the lives ofmillions more Japanese to maintain the kokutai(national polity), however they interpreted thisnebulous concept. If the effects of the bombscaused concern for the ruling elite—especiallyto Hirohito, Kido, Konoe, and others closest tothe emperor—it was because the devastationcaused by the bombs might lead to a popularrevolt that could sweep away the emperorsystem.
If the degree of shock can be measured by theaction taken in response to the event, onemight argue that the Hiroshima bomb did nothave a greater effect than Soviet entry into thewar, since no one, including Hirohito, Kido,Suzuki, and Togo, took any concrete actions torespond to the Hiroshima bomb. The SupremeWar Council was not even convened for threefull days after the Hiroshima bomb; not untilafter the USSR entered the war against Japandid it meet. It is true that the emperorinstructed Suzuki to convene the Supreme WarCouncil, and Sakomizu attempted to hold themeeting on Suzuki’s orders. But “because somemilitary leaders had prior commitments,” hecould not arrange the meeting until themorning of August 9. Asada considers thisdelay “criminal,” but this laxity is indicative ofthe way the ruling elite felt regarding the
“shock” of the Hiroshima bomb.
The Supreme War Council that was convenedon the morning of August 9 immediately afterthe Soviet invasion of Manchuria was not thesame meeting that Sakomizu had arranged onthe previous night. The formality of theSupreme War Council meeting required a newsummons in order to convene.[30] Sakomizu’sprevious arrangements made it easier tosummon the new meeting, but the speed withwhich the Supreme War Council was convenedindicates the urgency that the Japanesegovernment fe l t about the s i tuat ionimmediately after the Soviet invasion ofManchuria. Such urgency was absent in itsreaction to the Hiroshima bombing. On August10 and on August 14, Hirohito summoned theimperial conference on his own initiative. Itwas within his power to do so, but no onebelieved this was called for immediately afterthe Hiroshima bombing.
Finally, in his telegram to Sato on August 7,Togo described the situation as “becomingmore and more pressing,” but not completelydesperate. The Hiroshima bomb did not makethe Japanese ruling elite feel as though theirbacks were to the wall. It inflicted a seriousbody blow, but it was hardly a knock-out punch.
2. The Influence of the Nagasaki Bomb andof the Two Atomic Bombs Combined
Chronologically, the Soviet entry into the warwas sandwiched between the Hiroshima bomband the Nagasaki bomb. But here, reversingthe chronological order, I shall discuss theeffect of the Nagasaki bomb first.
The news of the Nagasaki bomb was reportedto Japanese leadership during the middle of aheated discussion at the Supreme War Councilafter the Soviet invasion, but this news had noeffect on the discussion. Asada concedes that“[the] strategic value of a second bomb wasminimal,” but says that “from the standpoint of
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its shock effect, the political impact of [the]Nagasaki bomb cannot be denied.” He explainsthat Suzuki now began to fear that “the UnitedStates, instead of staging the invasion of Japan,will keep on dropping atomic bombs.” Asadatherefore concludes that the Nagasaki bombwas “unnecessary to induce Japan to surrender,but it probably had confirmatory effects.”[31] Itis true that Suzuki said at the cabinet meetingon the afternoon of August 13 that the atomicbombs nullified the traditional form ofhomeland defense. But it appears that themilitary treated the Nagasaki bomb as a part ofthe ordinary incendiary air raids. Even after theNagasaki bomb, and even though Anami madestartling assertions that the United Statesmight possess more than 100 atomic bombs,and that the next target might be Tokyo, themilitary insisted upon the continuation of theKetsu Go strategy. Anami’s revelation did notseem to have any effect on the positions thateach camp had held. The Nagasaki bombsimply did not substantially change thearguments of either side. The official history ofthe Imperial General Headquarters notes:“There is no record in other materials thattreated the effect [of the Nagasaki bomb]seriously.”[32]
Nagasaki following the atomic bombing
Thus, it is fair to conclude that the Nagasakibomb and, for that matter, the two bombscombined, did not have a decisive influence onJapan’s decision to surrender. Remove the
Nagasaki bomb, and Japan’s decision wouldhave been the same.
3. The Influence of the Soviet Entry intothe War
According to Asada, of the atomic bombs andthe Soviet entry into the war, the atomicbombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki gaveJapanese leaders the greater shock. He argues:
From the viewpoint of the shockeffect, then, it may be argued thatthe bomb had a greater impact onJapanese leaders than did theSoviet entry into the war. After all,the Soviet invasion of Manchuriagave them an indirect shock,whereas the use of the atomicbomb on their homeland gave themthe direct threat of the atomicextinction of the Japanese people.
The shock of the bomb was all the greaterbecause it came as a “surprise attack.”[33]
Frank also asserts: “the Soviet intervention wasa significant but not decisive reason for Japan’ssurrender. It was, at best, a reinforcing but notfundamental reason for the intervention by theEmperor.”[34]
The Japanese General Staff’s Assessmentof the Soviet Threat
Asada’s assumption that since the Japanesemilitary had anticipated the Soviet attack, itwas not a shock to them when it reallyhappened is questionable. The Japanesemilitary began reassessing the Soviet threateven before Germany surrendered in May. OnJune 8, the imperial conference adopted thedocument “The Assessment of the WorldSituation,” prepared by the General Staff. Thisassessment judged that after the Germancapitulation, the Soviet Union would plan to
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expand its influence in East Asia, especially inManchuria and China, when an opportunityarose. The USSR had taken a series ofmeasures against Japan, it continued, toprepare to enter into hostile diplomaticrelations, while reinforcing its troops in theeast. Therefore, when Moscow judged that themilitary situation had become extremelydisadvantageous to Japan and that its ownsacrifice would be small, the documentconcluded, there was a great probability thatthe Soviet Union might decide to enter the waragainst Japan. It predicted that in view of theAmerican military plan, the climatic conditionsin Manchuria, and the rate of the militarybuildup in the Soviet Far East, an attack mightcome in the summer or the fall of 1945.[35] TheGeneral Staff further paid close attention to therate of Soviet reinforcement of troops andequipment in the Far East. By the end of June,the USSR had already sent troops, weapons,airplanes, tanks, and other equipment farsurpassing the level that had existed there in1941. The General Staff concluded that if thispace were kept up, the Soviet military wouldreach a preparedness level sufficient to go towar against Japan by August.[36]
In the beginning of July, the General Staffrefined this assessment and came to theconclusion that the USSR might likely launchlarge-scale operations against Japan afterFebruary 1946, while the initial action toprepare for this operation in Manchuria mighttake place in September 1945. This assessmentconcluded: “It is unlikely that the Soviet Unionwill initiate military action against Japan thisyear, but extreme vigilance is required overtheir activities in August and September.”[37]Thus, the General Staff thought that a Sovietattack might be possible, but what dominatedits thinking was the hope that it could beavoided. On the basis of this wishful thinking,the General Staff did not prepare the KwantungArmy for a possible Soviet invasion. In fact,despite the General Staff’s assessment that theS o v i e t a t t a c k m i g h t o c c u r i n
August–September, the military preparednessof the Kwantung Army was such that had anattack occurred in August–September, it wouldnot have had any possibility of defendingitself.[38]
The General Staff was not unanimous in itsassessment of Soviet intentions. The FifthDivision of the Strategy Guidance Departmentof the General Staff was in charge ofintelligence regarding the Soviet Army, and itwas the conclusions of this division thatresulted in the portion of the General Staff’sassessment that predicted the possibility of aSoviet attack in August–September. Theassessment of the Fifth Division met oppositionfrom the Twelfth Division (War GuidanceDivision), headed by Colonel TanemuraSuetaka. Tanemura was one of the staunchadvocates who insisted upon the need to keepthe Soviet Union neutral. At one meeting at theend of July, Tanemura strenuously objected toColonel Shiraki Suenari’s assessment that theSoviet attack might come as early as August10. Tanemura assailed this assessment, stating:“This assessment overexaggerates the danger.Stalin is not so stupid as to attack Japan hastily.He will wait until Japan’s power and militarybecome weakened, and after the Americanlanding on the homeland begins.” Since theTwelfth Division was closely connected with theBureau of Military Affairs, the nerve center ofthe General Staff, Tanemura’s view became theprevailing policy of the General Staff, andhence of the Army as a whole.[39]
On August 8, one day before the Sovietinvasion, the General Staff’s Bureau of MilitaryAffairs produced a study outlining what Japanshould do if the Soviet Union issued anultimatum demanding Japan’s total withdrawalfrom the Asian continent. According to thisplan, the following alternatives weresuggested: (1) reject the Soviet demand andcarry out the war against the Soviet Union inaddition to the United States and Britain; (2)conclude peace with the United States and
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Britain immediately and concentrate on the waragainst the Soviet Union; (3) accept the Sovietdemand and seek Moscow’s neutrality, whilecarrying on the war against the United Statesand Britain; and (4) accept the Soviet demandand involve the Soviet Union in the GreaterEast Asian War. Of these alternatives, the armypreferred to accept the Soviet demand andeither keep the Soviet Union neutral or, ifpossible, involve the Soviet Union in the waragainst the United States and Britain.[40]
The Bureau of Military Affairs also drafted apolicy statement for the Supreme War Councilin the event that the Soviet Union decided toparticipate in the war against Japan. In thatcase, it envisioned the following policy: (1) fightonly in self-defense, without declaring war onthe Soviet Union; (2) continue negotiations withthe Soviet Union to terminate the war, with theminimal conditions of the preservation of thekokutai and the maintenance of nationalindependence; (3) issue an imperial rescriptappealing to the people to maintain the Yamatorace; and (4) establ ish a mart ial lawregime.[41] In a document presented to theSupreme War Council, the army recommendedthat if the Soviet Union entered the war, Japanshould “strive to terminate the war with theSoviet Union as quickly as possible, and tocontinue the war against the United States,Britain, and China, while maintaining Sovietneutrality.”[42] In his postwar testimony,Major-General Hata Hikosaburo, the KwantungArmy’s chief of staff, recalled that theKwantung Army had believed that it couldcount on Soviet neutrality until the spring ofthe following year, although it allowed for theslight chance of a Soviet attack in the fall.[43]
It bears emphasizing that right up to themoment of invasion, the army not only did notexpect an immediate Soviet invasion but also itstill believed that it could either maintainSoviet neutrality or involve the Soviet Union inthe war against the United States and Britain.The thinking that dominated the center of the
army and the Kwantung Army was indeed“wishful thinking,” that a Soviet attack,although possible, would not happen.[44]
Thus, it is misleading to conclude, as Asadadoes, that since the army had assessed that theSoviet attack might take place, the Sovietinvasion into Manchuria was not a shock to theJapanese military. The Bureau of MilitaryAffairs suppressed the prediction that a Sovietattack was imminent and relied instead on itswishful thinking that it could be avoided. Itsstrategy was based on this assessment.Therefore, when Soviet tanks crossed theManchurian border, the news certainly was agreat shock to it, contrary to Asada’s assertion.
Deputy Chief of Staff Kawabe’s Attitude
To support his assertion that the Sovietinvasion had little effect on the Japanesemilitary’s will to fight, Asada cites the followingpassage from Deputy Chief of Staff KawabeTorashiro’s diary entry from the crucial day,August 9, 1945: “To save the honor of theYamato race, there is no way but to keep onfighting. At this critical moment, I don’t evenwant to consider peace or surrender.”[45] Butif we examine Kawabe’s diary more closely, aslightly different picture emerges.
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Kawabe Torashiro
Kawabe was awakened in bed at the GeneralStaff headquarters at around 6:00 A.M., and hereceived the news from his aide that theIntelligence Division had interceptedbroadcasts from Moscow and San Franciscoreporting that the Soviet Union had declaredwar on Japan. Kawabe wrote down his firstimpressions of the news as follows:
The Soviets have finally risen! [Sowa tsuini tachitari!] My judgmenthas proven wrong. But now thatthe situation has come to this, weshould not consider seeking peace.We had half anticipated thismilitary situation and the militaryfortune. There is nothing to thinkabout. To save the honor of theYamato race, there is no other way
but to keep fighting. When wedecided to begin the war, I alwaysbelonged to the soft and prudentfaction, but once the situation hascome to this, I don’t like to thinkabout peace and surrender.Whatever the outcome, we have nochoice but to try.[46]
Asada is correct in pointing out that despite thenews of the Soviet invasion in Manchuria,Kawabe was determined to continue the war.And yet Kawabe’s diary also betrays the shockand confusion he felt at the news. Contrary tohis “judgment,” Kawabe conceded, “the Sovietshave risen!” This exclamation mark speaksvolumes about Kawabe’s shock. In fact, untilthen all Ketsu Go strategy had been built uponthe assumption that the USSR should be keptneutral, and for that reason Kawabe himselfhad campaigned hard for the Foreign Ministryto secure Soviet neutra l i ty throughnegotiations. He admitted that his judgmenthad proved wrong. But this admission wasimmediately followed by a Monday morningquarterback–like reflection that the eventualityof a Soviet attack had been in the back of hismind. This is not necessarily a contradiction. Infact, Kawabe and the Army General Staff hadbeen bothered by the nagging suspicion thatthe Soviets might strike at Japan. Thissuspicion, however, prompted the army todouble its efforts to secure Soviet neutrality.Moreover, the army did not anticipate, first,that the attack was to come so soon, at thebeginning of August, and second, that theSoviet invasion would take place on such alarge scale against the Japanese forces inManchuria and Korea from all directions.
Kawabe’s diary also reveals his confusion. If hisjudgment proved wrong, logically it shouldfollow that the strategy that he had advocatedbased on the erroneous assumption shouldhave been reexamined. Instead of adopting thislogical deduction, Kawabe “did not feel like
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peace and surrender in this situation.” This wasnot rational strategic thinking, but a visceralreluctance to accept surrender. The onlyrationale he could justify for the continuation ofwar was “the honor of the Yamato race.” Hisinsistence on fighting was also a preemptivemove, anticipating, quite correctly, that thepeace party would launch a coordinated moveto end the war. Nevertheless, his argument forthe continuation of war indicated the degree ofthe army’s desperation and confusion.
If the Soviet invasion indeed shocked themilitary, which event, the atomic bombing ofHiroshima or the Soviet attack, provided abigger shock? In order to answer this question,one must compare the August 9 entry with theAugust 7 entry in Kawabe’s diary. In the entryfor August 7, Kawabe wrote: “As soon as I wentto the office, having read various reports on theair raid by the new weapon on Hiroshimayesterday morning of the 6th, I was seriouslydisturbed [shinkokunaru shigeki o uketari,literally, ‘received a serious stimulus’] With thisdevelopment [kakutewa] the military situationhas progressed to such a point that it hasbecome more and more difficult. We must betenacious and fight on.”[47] Kawabe admittedthat he was disturbed by, or more literally,received “a serious stimulus [shigeki]” from thereports of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima.Nevertheless, he avoided using the term“shogeki [shock].” Compared with this passagedescribing the news of the atomic bomb as amatter of fact, the first thing that catches theeye in his entry for August 9 is the firstsentence, “So wa tsuini tachitari!” (“TheSoviets have finally risen!”). As far as Kawabewas concerned, there is no question but thatthe news of the Soviet attack gave him a muchbigger shock than the news of the atomicbomb.
Both diary entries advocated continuing thewar. But there was a subtle change. While theeffects of the atomic bomb were described ashaving worsened the military situation, there
was no change in the overall assumptions. ButKawabe’s insistence on fighting after the Sovietattack is marked by his defensive tone, derivingpartly from the anticipated move for peace andpartly from the disappearance of thefundamental assumptions on which thecontinuation of the war had rested. In thisrespect, too, the shock of the Soviet attack wasmuch greater to the military than the atomicbombing of Hiroshima.Kawabe’s August 9 diary entry goes on todescribe the subsequent events at GeneralStaff headquarters. He recorded his decisionsin an elliptical memorandum that singles outthe continuation of war against the UnitedStates as the major task, and suggests thefollowing measures: (1) proclaim martial law,dismiss the current cabinet, and form a militarydictatorship; (2) abandon Manchuria, defendKorea, and dispatch troops from northernChina to the Manchurian-Korean border; (3)evacuate the Manchurian emperor to Japan;and (4) issue a proclamation in the name of thearmy minister to avoid disturbances (doyo)within the military. Thus, in Kawabe’s mind, thecontinuation of war was associated with theestablishment of a military dictatorship in orderto forestall the movement to end the war thatwould inevitably gather momentum as Soviettanks penetrated deep into Manchuria.
Kawabe’s diary entry for the evening of August9 also indicates his psychological condition.Unable to sleep because of mosquitoes andTokyo’s tropical heat, he mused on the fate ofthe country: “To continue fighting will meandeath, but to make peace with the enemy willmean ruin. But we have no choice but to seeklife in death with the determination to have theentire Japanese people perish with thehomeland as their deathbed pil low bycontinuing to fight, thereby keeping the prideof the Yamato race forever.”[48]
Insisting on the continuation of the war clearlylacked all strategic rationale.Kawabe’s determination to fight, however,
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easily collapsed as soon as the emperor’s“sacred decision” was made at the imperialconference on August 10. After he wasinformed of the result of the imperialconference, he noted in his diary: “Alas,everything is over.” He was critical of theargument advanced by Anami, Umezu, andToyoda, because he did not believe theconditions they had insisted upon would beaccepted by the enemy. For Kawabe, therewere only two options: either acceptunconditional surrender or perish to maintainhonor. The emperor’s decision revealed that hehad completely lost his trust in the military. InKawabe’s view, this was not merely theemperor’s opinion, but the expression of thegeneral view broadly shared by the Japanesepeople as a whole. Kawabe continues:
How is it that not one militaryofficer from the army and the navybefore the emperor could assure[him] that we would be able to winthe war? …How ambiguous theanswer of the two chiefs was:“Although we cannot say that weshall be able to win the wardefinitely, we have no reason tobelieve that we shall definitely losethe war.” No, I am not criticizingtheir answer. Their answer reflectsr e a l i t y . A l t h o u g h I h a v epersistently insisted on thecontinuation of war and haveencouraged myself to continuefighting, I would have no choicebut to give the same answer asgiven by the chiefs if I were to beasked about the probability of ourvictory. I am only driven by thesentiment that “I don’t want tosurrender; I don’t want to saysurrender even if I am killed,” andwish to limit the conditions for thetermination of the war.
Kawabe further noted that the General Staffofficers knew more than anyone else about thedifficulty of continuing the war.[49]
In November 1949, Kawabe gave this testimonyin response to point-blank questions :“[B]etween the atomic bombing and the entryof Soviet Russia into the war, which of the twofactors played a greater part in bringing aboutthe cessation of hostilities?” the U.S. GHQinterrogator, Oi Atsushi, asked. Kawabereplied:
When the atomic bomb wasdropped, I felt: “This is terrible.”Immediately thereafter, it wasreported Soviet Russia entered thewar. This made me feel: “This hasreally become a very difficultsituation.”
Russia’s participation in the warhad long since been expected, butthis does not mean that we hadbeen well prepared for it. It waswith a nervous heart filled withfear that we expected Russia toenter the war. Although it was areaction of a man who was facedwith the actual occurrence of theinevitable, mine was, to speakmore exact, a feeling that “whathas been most [feared] has finallycome into reality.” I felt as thoughI had been given a thoroughbeating in rapid succession, andmy thoughts were, “So not only hasthere been an atomic bombing, butthis has come, too.”
I believe that I was more stronglyimpressed with the atomic bombthan other people. However, event h e n , … b e c a u s e I h a d aconsiderable amount of knowledgeon the subject of atomic bombs, I
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h a d a n i d e a t h a t e v e n t h eAmericans could not produce somany of them. Moreover, sinceTokyo was not directly affected bythe bombing, the full force of theshock was not felt. On top of it, wehad become accustomed tobombings due to frequent raids byB-29s.
Actually, [the] majority in the armydid not realize at first that whathad been dropped was an atomicbomb, and they were not generallyfamiliar with the terrible nature ofthe atomic bomb. It was only in agradual manner that the horriblewreckage which had been made ofHiroshima became known, insteadof in a manner of a shocking effect.
In comparison, the Soviet entryinto the war was a great shockwhen it actually came. Reportsreaching Tokyo described Russianforces as “invading in swarms.” Itgave us all the more severe shockand alarm because we had been inconstant fear of it with a vividimagination that “the vast RedArmy forces in Europe were nowbeing turned against us.” In otherwords, since the atomic bomb andthe Russian declaration of warwere shocks in a quick succession,I cannot give a definite answer asto which of the two factors wasm o r e d e c i s i v e i n e n d i n ghostil it ies.[50]
Kawabe’s testimony repudiates Asada’scontention that since it was anticipated, theSoviet attack did not represent a shock to themilitary. Moreover, up to the last sentence,Kawabe’s argument reinforces the view thatthe Soviet entry into the war had a greater
effect on the military than the atomic bomb.Frank dismisses this statement by arguing thatthe emperor’s decision to surrender was madeeven before the accurate assessment of theManchurian situation reached Tokyo.[51] Thisis hardly a convincing argument. The effect ofthe Soviet entry had little relation to themilitary situation in Manchuria. The very factthat the USSR had entered the war shatteredJapan’s last hope for ending it through Sovietmediation. In other words, the politicalconsequence of the Soviet action, not themilitary situation in Manchuria, was the crucialfactor.
Other Testimonies by Military Leaders
A document in Arisue Kikan News no. 333,which gave the Army Ministry’s answer to theprepared questions of the GHQ, providesinteresting information. To the question ofwhether or not the army knew that sooner orlater the Soviet Union would join the war withthe Allies against Japan, the Army Ministryanswered that it had had no knowledge of this.The army had tried to prevent the Soviet Unionfrom participating in the war, because it hadbelieved that Soviet participation would have agreat political and strategic effect on majoroperations against Japan’s main enemy, theUnited States. Japan was prepared to give upManchuria in order to keep the USSR out of thewar. To the question of whether or not Japanwould have accepted surrender before theSoviet entry into the war, this documentanswers: “The Soviet participation in the warhad the most direct impact on Japan’s decisionto surrender.”[52]
Major-General Amano Masakazu, theoperations department chief at ImperialGeneral Headquarters, replied this way to GHQinterrogation regarding the effect of Sovietentry into the war: “It was estimated that theSoviet Union would most likely enter the war inearly autumn. However, had the Soviet Unionentered the war, the Imperial General
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Headquarters had no definite plan to resist theSoviet Union for a long period while effectivelycarrying out a decisive battle with theAmerican forces on the other. There wasnothing to be done but hope that … the 17thArea Army [of the Kwantung Army], reinforcedby crack units from the China area, would dotheir best and would be able to hold out as longas possible.”[53] Amano confessed that thearmy had possessed no way to counter a Sovietattack, although it thought that this mightcome in early autumn. It is difficult then toargue from Amano’s statement, as Asada does,that simply because it had been anticipated,the Soviet attack was not a great surprise tothe army.
Lieutenant-General Ikeda Sumihisa, director ofthe General Planning Agency, testified that“upon hearing of the Soviet entry into the war,I felt that our chances were gone.” Havingserved in the Kwantung Army, he knew itscondition well. The Kwantung Army was nomore than a hollow shell, largely because it hadbeen transferring its troops, equipment, andmunitions to the home islands since the latterpart of 1944 in anticipation of the homelanddefense. Ikeda often told the commander of theKwantung Army “that if the USSR entered thewar, Japan would never be able to continue thewar.” He firmly believed that “in the event thatthe Soviet [Union] entered the war, Japan’sdefeat would be a foregone conclusion.”[54]
Colonel Hayashi Saburo, Anami’s secretary,was asked by a GHQ interrogator about theinfluence of the atomic bombs and the Sovietentry into the war on Anami’s views regardingthe termination of the war. Hayashi did not sayanything about the effect of the atomic bomb,but he was confident that the Soviet entry intothe war reinforced Anami’s feelings about theneed to hasten the end of the war.[55]
Chief of the Navy General Staff Admiral ToyodaSoemu also gave revealing testimony to theGHQ interrogators. He admitted that the
atomic bomb had been a shock, but he believedthat the United States would not be able tocontinue to drop atomic bombs “at frequentintervals,” partly because of the difficulty ofsecuring radioactive materials, and partlybecause of world public opinion against suchan atrocity. “I believe the atomic bombing wasa cause for the surrender,” Toyoda testified,“but it was not the only cause.” In contrast tothe atomic bombs, the Soviet entry into the warwas a greater shock to the military. “In the faceof this new development,” Toyoda continued,“it became impossible for us to map anyreasonable operation plan. Moreover, the peaceprogram which we had so far relied upon [i.e.,through Moscow’s mediation] came to naught.Therefore, an entirely different program had tobe sought out. At the same time we could notexpect to obtain a good chance for peace bymerely waiting for such a chance. It was timefor us to accept the terms of the PotsdamDeclaration [Proclamation].” Toyoda concluded:“I believe the Russian participation in the waragainst Japan rather than the atomic bombs didmore to hasten the surrender.”[56]
Asada ignores all this overwhelming evidencethat stresses the importance of the Soviet entryinto the war. In the face of this evidence, hiscontention that because the military hadexpected the Soviet invasion, it did not shockthem when it actually happened cannot besustained.
Frank casts doubt on the reliability of Kawabe’sand Toyoda’s testimonies because they weregiven some years after the events. Although hedoes not quote from Ikeda and Hayashi, hewould likely discount them on the samegrounds. Frank’s methodology of separatingcontemporaneous sources from evidence thatcame after the events is commendable. Onecannot apply this method too rigidly, however.In the first place, what benefits did Kawabe,Toyoda, Ikeda, and Hayashi ga in byemphasizing the Soviet factor rather than theatomic bomb years after the events? One may
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even argue that their statements carry moreweight because they were made to Americaninterrogators, who had a vested interest inproving that the atomic bombs were moredecisive than the Soviet entry.After dismissing Kawabe’s and Toyoda’srecollections years after the events, Frankextensively quotes from Suzuki’s testimony inDecember 1945:
The Supreme War Council, up tothe time [that] the atomic bombwas dropped, did not believe thatJapan could be beaten by air attackalone. They also believed that theUnited States would land and notattempt to bomb Japan out of thewar. On the other hand there weremany prominent people who didbelieve that the United Statescould win the war by just bombingalone. However, the Supreme WarCouncil, not believing that, hadproceeded with the one plan offighting a decisive battle at thelanding point and was makingevery possible preparation to meetsuch a landing. They proceededwith that plan until the atomicbomb was dropped, after whichthey believed the United Stateswould no longer attempt to landwhen it had such a superiorweapon … so at that point theydecided that it would be best tosue for peace.[57]
Relying on Suzuki’s statement, Frankconcludes: “Suzuki’s assessment goes to theheart of the matter: Soviet intervention did notinvalidate the Ketsu-Go military and politicalstrategy; the Imperial Army had already writtenoff Manchuria.”[58] But this statement cannotpersuasively prove that Suzuki had alreadydecided to seek the termination of the war
according to the Potsdam terms before theSoviet invasion. It must be kept in mind thatthese testimonies are English translations ofthe original Japanese statements. When Suzukireferred to the “atomic bomb,” he must haveused the term, genbaku or genshi bakudan. Apeculiarity of the Japanese language is that itmakes no distinction between a singular and aplural noun. Therefore, when Suzuki saidgenbaku, he was likely referring to the atomicbombs, meaning the bomb at Hiroshima andthe bomb at Nagasaki. In fact, it is better tointerpret these terms as referring to the pluralform. Taken as such, what Suzuki meant musthave been the effect of the two bombs in ageneral sense. Therefore, it is erroneous toconclude, as Asada and Frank do, that Suzuki’sdecision to end the war predated the Sovietattack on Japan, since Suzuki was comparingthe atomic bombs with conventional air attacks,not with Soviet entry into the war.[59]Furthermore, although Suzuki may havebelieved that the atomic bombs had nullifiedthe basic assumption on which the Ketsu Gostrategy was based, his view was notnecessarily shared by the Army officers. Anamiconsistently argued throughout the criticaldays even after the Hiroshima and Nagasakibombs that the army was confident it couldinflict tremendous damage on the invadingAmerican troops, indicating that Anami and thearmy officers continued to believe that despitethe atomic bombs, the Americans still plannedto launch a homeland invasion. And thisassessment was fundamentally correct, sinceAmerican military planners never substitutedatomic bombing alone for the plan to invadeJapan.
In fact, as the Bureau of Military Affairs reportto the Diet in September 1945 indicated, armyplanners rejected the “counterforce” effects ofatomic weapons in a battleground situation. Itstates: “It is true that the appearance of theatomic bomb brought a great psychologicalthreat, but since its use would be extremelydifficult on the battleground, in view of the
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close proximity of the two forces and scatteredunits, we were convinced that it would notdirectly affect our preparations for homelanddefense.”[60] Toyoda’s testimony, quotedabove, also questioned the American intentionto rely on the atomic bombs. When it camedown to the military plan, it was not Suzuki’sview, but the views of the Army and NavyGeneral Staff that mattered most.
As for Soviet entry into the war, the report ofthe Bureau of Military Affairs states: “Althoughthe Soviet participation in the war wasexpected from the analysis of the general worldsituation, we did not anticipate the situationwhere we would have to fight on the two frontsfrom the point of view of the nation’s totalpower. Throughout we had decided to focus ourmajor strategy on the homeland defense, whilepreparing to sacrifice the operations in thecontinental defense. Therefore, Soviet entryinto the war did not directly affect ourconviction that we would score victory in thedecisive homeland battle.”[61] This is anambiguous and contradictory statement. On theone hand, it states that Soviet participation inthe war was unexpected, forcing Japan to fighton two fronts. On the other, it takes the viewthat the Ketsu Go strategy had already writtenoff Manchuria, which did not substantiallyaffect homeland defense. The latter conclusionseems to support Frank’s argument that sincethe Japanese Army had already written offManchuria, Soviet entry into the war did notsubstantially change the army’s strategy ofputting all its eggs in the one basket of theKetsu Go strategy. The problem with thisargument is that it ignores the assertion thatJapan did not anticipate having to fight on twofronts.To be fair to the arguments advanced by Asadaand Frank, Imperial General Headquartersantic ipated the possibi l i ty of Sovietparticipation in the war and adopted a strategyto cope with this worse-case scenario. Alreadyin September 1944, Imperial GeneralHeadquarters summoned the Kwantung Army’s
operational chief, Colonel Kusachi Sadakichi,and issued Continental Order 1130, by which itordered the Kwantung Army to concentrate onthe defense of a small strip of Manchukuo andKorea against Soviet attack with the stricto rders no t t o p rovoke any mi l i t a ryconfrontations with the Red Army.[62] TheKwantung Army mapped out the f inaloperational plan against the Soviet attack onJuly 5, which basically followed ContinentalOrder 1130.[63] As for Hokkaido, ImperialGeneral Headquarters issued ContinentalOrder 1326 on May 9, 1945, which defined thetask of the Fifth Area Army in Hokkaido as thedefense of Hokkaido itself. For this purpose,the Fifth Area Army was ordered to direct thedefense of southern Sakhalin primarily againstthe possible Soviet attack, while blocking aU.S. and Soviet landing on the Kurils andcrossing the Soya Straits. As for the possibleSoviet invasion of Hokkaido, the Fifth AreaArmy was “to attempt to repulse the enemydepending on circumstances and points ofattack and to secure important areas ofHokkaido.”[64]
Alongside with these military plans, however,Imperial General Headquarters harboredwishful thinking that there was unlikely to be aSoviet attack. The Kwantung Army had littleconfidence in its ability to hold the last defenseline. As for the Fifth Area Army, it expectedthat in the event of the anticipated Americaninvasion of the homeland, Hokkaido would beleft to defend itself against a possible combinedattack by the United States and the SovietUnion. The problem with Hokkaido’s defensewas its size, which was as big as the whole ofTohoku and Niigata prefectures combined. TheFifth Area Army had to disperse 114,000 troopsto three possible points of attack: one divisionin the Shiribetsu-Nemuro area in the east, onedivision at Cape Soya in the north, and onebrigade in the Tomakomai area in the west. Thefortification of the Shibetsu area had not beencompleted, and the defense of the Nemuro areawas considered hopeless because of the flat
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terrain. The defense of the north wasconcentrated at Cape Soya, but nothing wasprepared for Rumoi, where the Soviet forcesintended to land.[65] The inadequacies of theseoperational plans, both in the Kwantung Armyand the Fifth Area Army, were exposed whenthe actual Soviet attack came. The militaryplanners had no confidence in the army’sability to repulse a Soviet invasion of Korea andHokkaido. As Frank writes, “the Soviet Navy’samphibious shipping resources were limitedbut sufficient to transport the three assaultdivisions in several echelon[s]. The Red Armyintended to seize the northern half of Hokkaido.If resistance proved strong, reinforcementswould be deployed to aid the capture the restof Hokkaido. Given the size of Hokkaido, theJapanese would have been hard pressed tomove units for a concerted confrontation of theSoviet invasion. The chances of Soviet successappeared to be very good.”[66] Sovietoccupation of Hokkaido was thus within therealm of possibility.
4. The Soviet Factor in the Emperor’s“Sacred Decision”
Although Soviet entry into the war played amore decisive role in Japan’s decision tosurrender, it did not provide a “knock-outpunch” either. The Supreme War Council andthe cabinet found themselves confronted by astalemate between those who favoredacceptance of the Potsdam terms with onecondition, the preservation of the imperialhouse, and those who insisted in addition thatthere be no Allied occupation and thatdemilitarization and any war crimes trials beconducted by Japan itself. Given the politicalweight of the army and an overwhelmingsentiment among army officers in favor ofcontinuing the war, the war party might haveprevailed had there not been a concerted effortto impose peace on the reluctant army byimperial fiat. Togo, Prince Konoe, andShigemitsu were instrumental in persuadingthe wavering Kido and Hirohito, but more
important were second-echelon players such asSakomizu (Suzuki’s cabinet secretary), DeputyForeign Minister Matsumoto Shun’ichi, ColonelMatsutani Makoto (Suzuki’s secretary andcrucial liaison with the army), MatsudairaYasumasa (Kido’s secretary), and Rear AdmiralTakagi Sokichi (Navy Minister Yonai’s closestconfidant).[67] Throughout this complicatedpolitical process, in which the emperorintervened twice to impose his “sacreddecision” to accept the Potsdam terms, firstwith one condition and the second timeunconditionally, the Soviet factor, more thanthe atomic bombs, played the decisive role.
Political Calculations
Soviet entry into the war was indeed a shock tothe Japanese ruling elite, both civilian andmilitary alike. Politically and diplomatically, itdashed any hope of ending the war throughSoviet mediation. But Soviet entry meant morethan merely precluding the option of Sovietmediation for peace. Here, we must considerthe political calculations and psychologicalfactors apparent in dealing with Japan’s twoenemies. Before the invasion of Manchuria, theSoviet Union had been Japan’s best hope forpeace, while the Japanese ruling elite felt bitterresentment toward the United States, whichhad demanded unconditional surrender. AfterAugust 9, this relationship was reversed. Thesmall opening that the United States hadintentionally left ajar in the Potsdam terms,which Japanese foreign ministry officials hadastutely noticed as soon as the PotsdamProclamation was issued, suddenly lookedinviting, providing the only room in which theJapanese could maneuver. They concluded thatsuing for peace with the United States wouldconfer a better chance of preserving theimperial house, if not the kokutai as it wasenvisaged by ultranationalists. No sooner hadthe marriage of convenience uniting right-wingJapan and the communist Soviet Union brokendown than the Japanese ruling elite’s fear ofcommunism sweeping away the emperor
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system was reawakened. To preserve theimperial house, it would be better to surrenderbefore the USSR was able to dictate terms. OnAugust 13, rejecting Anami’s request that thedecision to accept U.S. Secretary of StateJames Byrnes’s counteroffer (the “Byrnesnote”), which rejected Japan’s conditionalacceptance of the Potsdal terms, be postponed,Suzuki explained: “If we miss today, the SovietUnion would take not only Manchuria, Korea,[and] Karafuto [Sakhalin Island], but alsoHokkaido. This would destroy the foundation ofJapan. We must end the war when we can dealwith the United States.”[68] Furthermore,when Shigemitsu had a crucial meeting withKido on the afternoon of August 9 at PrinceKonoe’s request, which eventually led to Kido’smeeting with Hirohito that persuaded theemperor to accept the “sacred decision”scenario, Shigemitsu stressed the negativeeffect of further Soviet expansion on the fate ofthe imperial household.[69]
What motivated Hirohito was neither a piouswish to bring peace to humanity nor a sinceredesire to save the people and the nation fromdestruction, as his imperial rescript stated andas the myth of the emperor’s “sacred decision”would have us believe. More than anythingelse, it was a sense of personal survival anddeep responsibility to maintain the imperialhouse, which had lasted in unbroken lineagesince the legendary Jinmu emperor. For thatpurpose, Hirohiro was quick to jettison thepseudo-religious concept of the kokutai, andeven the emperor’s prerogatives as embodiedin the Meiji Constitution. What mattered to himwas the preservation of the imperial house, andto that end, he was willing to entrust his fate tothe will of the Japanese people. Hirohito’stransformation from a living god (arahitogami)to a human emperor (ningen tenno), which isseen as having occurred during the Americanoccupation, actually took place during the final“sacred decision” at the imperial conference.With astonishing swiftness, the members of theimperial house closed ranks and defended
Hirohito’s decision. To attain this objective,Hirohito was prepared to part with the militaryand the ultranationalists, who were majorobstacles.
It is difficult to document just how the Sovietfactor influenced the emperor’s decision andthe thinking of his close advisers. It is possibleto conjecture, however, that the emperor andhis advisers wished to avoid any Sovietinfluence in determining the fate of theimperial household and the emperor’s status. Itis not far-fetched to assume that Suzuki’sstatement and Shigemitsu’s thinking quotedabove, which explain the need to accept theByrnes note before the Soviet Union expandedits conquered territories, was widely shared bythe ruling circles in Japan.
There was another factor in the politicalcalculations of the Japanese ruling elite: fear ofpopular unrest. On August 12, Navy MinisterYonai Mitsumasa told Takagi Sokichi: “Theymay not be the appropriate words, but theatomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the warare in a way a godsend, since we don’t have todecide to stop the war because of the domesticsituation. The reason why I have advocated theend of war is not that I was afraid of theenemy’s attack, nor was it because of theatomic bombs or the Soviet entry into the war.It was more than anything else because I wasafraid of domestic conditions. Therefore, wewere fortunate to [be able to] end the warwithout pushing the domestic situation to thefore.”[70] Yonai’s fear was widely shared by theruling elite. Konoe’s advocacy of peace, whichhe had submitted to Hirohito in February 1945,was motivated by his fear of a communistrevolution. Whether or not such a revolutionwas actually likely or even possible, the fearamong the ruling elite of such popular unrestsweeping away the entire emperor system wasquite real. On August 13, 14, and 15, Kido metMachimura Kingo, chief of the MetropolitanPolice, to hear reports of possible political andsocial turmoil at home.[71]
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The Psychological Factor
The complicated political calculations of theJapanese leadership were closely intermingledwith crucial psychological factors. In particular,there were two different psychologicalelements at work. The first was the reversal ofthe degree of hatred attached to two enemies,as described above. The second was a profoundsense of betrayal.
Soviet entry into the war had double-crossedthe Japanese in two distinct senses. In the firstplace, the Kremlin had opted for war just whenJapan was pinning its last hopes of peace onSoviet mediation. Furthermore, the invasionwas a surprise attack. True, Molotov hadhanded a declaration of war to Sato in Moscow.Sato then asked for Molotov’s permission totransmit the declaration of war to Tokyo byciphered telegram, but the ambassador’sdispatch never reached Tokyo. In fact, it neverleft Moscow, most l ikely having beensuppressed by the telegraph office on theorders of the Soviet government. Molotovannounced that the declaration of war was alsoto be handed by Soviet Ambassador IakovMalik to Togo in Tokyo simultaneously. But theJapanese government learned of the Sovietinvasion of Manchuria only from a news agencyreport at around 4:00 A.M. on August 9.[72]
Soviet tanks in Manchuria 1945
Matsumoto Shun’ichi explained Togo’s ragewhen he received the news of the Sovietinvasion of Manchuria. Togo had gulliblybelieved assurances about the Sovietcommitment to the neutrality pact, and he hadpinned his hopes on Soviet mediation toterminate the war. Not only did this turn out tobe a mistake, but the Soviet action alsorevealed that the Japanese government hadbeen consistently and thoroughly deceived.Togo’s determination to end the war byaccepting the Potsdam terms was thusmotivated by his desire to compensate for hisearl ier mistake in seeking Moscow’smediation.[73] Hirohito’s monologue also had atinge of resentment toward the Soviet Union,which he too had mistakenly relied upon tomediate a termination to the war.[74] Togo andhis colleagues were also anxious to deny theSoviet Union any advantage, since it hadperpetrated such a betrayal. After the Sovietentry into the war, the USSR and mattersrelated to the military situation in Manchuriasuddenly disappeared from the discussions ofJapanese policymakers. This does not meanthat the Soviet factor had lost importance. Infact, their silence on the Soviet factor in thesediscussions was proof of both a conscious andunconscious attempt at denial. The greatertheir sense of betrayal, the more determinedJapanese leaders became to deny theimportance of Soviet entry into the war. Theyavoided denouncing Moscow’s perfidy, becausethey did not want to reveal the colossal errorthey themselves had committed in seekingSoviet mediation. And now that the fate of theemperor and the imperial house hung in thebalance, they wished those issues to bedetermined by the United States rather thanthe Soviet Union. These conscious andunconscious manipulations of memory andhistorical records began simultaneously withevents as they unfolded and continuedsubsequently in order to reconstruct thesecrucial events.
Interpreting the Evidence
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To prove the decisiveness of the atomic bomb,Asada cites the testimonies given by Kido andSakomizu. Kido, he says, stated: “I believe thatwith the atomic bomb alone we could havebrought the war to an end. But the Soviet entryinto the war made it that much easier.”[75]Sakomizu’s testimony to Allied interrogatorsstated: “I am sure we could have ended the warin a similar way if the Russian declaration ofwar had not taken place at all.”[76] To borrowFrank’s expression, these testimonies “shouldbe approached with circumspection,” notbecause they were given years after the events,but because their veracity is questionable. Kidowas prominent among those who attempted tocreate the myth that the emperor’s “sacreddecision” had saved the Japanese people andthe Japanese nation from further destruction.On different occasions, both Kido and Sakomizutold a different story.
In an interview with the Diet Library in 1967,Kido stated: “Things went smoothly. The atomicbombs served their purpose, and the Sovietentry served its purpose. They were bothcrucial elements [umaku iku yoso to natta]. Ibelieve that Japan’s recovery as we see it todaywas possible because of the Soviet [entry intothe war] and the atomic bombs.”[77]Sakomizu’s memoirs also convey a differentpicture from that put forward by Asada. WhenSakomizu heard the news of the Soviet invasionof Manchuria from Hasegawa Saiji of theDomei News Service, he writes, he was “reallysurprised” and asked: “Is it really true?” Hesays that he felt “as if the ground on which Istood was collapsing.” While Hasegawa wasdouble-checking the accuracy of the report,Sakomizu “felt the anger as if all the blood inthe body was flowing backward.”[78] Thistestimony was corroborated by Hasegawa, whoremembered: “When I conveyed the news[about the Soviet declaration of war] to Togoand Sakomizu, both were dumbfounded. Togorepeatedly asked me: ‘Are you sure?’ since hewas expecting Moscow’s answer regardingmediation.”[79]
Many in the ruling elite considered the atomicbombs and Soviet entry into the war as god-given gifts (tenyu). Like Kido, in the statementquoted above, Yonai thought both the atomicbomb and the Soviet entry into the war weregifts from heaven.[80] and when Konoe heardthe news of the Soviet invasion, he said “inorder to control the Army, it may be a god-sentgift.”[81] Surveying the discussions at SupremeWar Council meetings and cabinet meetings,there are some references only to the atomicbombs (such as Suzuki’s statement quotedabove), others to Soviet entry into the waralone (such as Konoe’s statement), and stillothers to both (such as Yonai’s remarks) inadvocating peace. Choosing passages thatmerely emphasize the effect of the atomicbombs and ignoring other passages is notsound analytical practice. It should be noted,too, that all these references were made onlyafter the Soviet Union entered the war.
To prove that the atomic bombing onHiroshima had a decisive effect on Hirohito’s“sacred decision,” Asada cites the emperor’sstatement at the imperial conference on August9–10. According to Asada, Hirohito allegedlysaid that it would be impossible to continue thewar, “since the appearance of the atomicbomb.[82] Frank also singles out the emperor’sspeech on August 10 as one of the most crucialpieces of evidence proving the decisiveness ofthe atomic bomb. According to Frank, “theEmperor also explicitly cited two militaryconsiderations: inadequate preparations toresist the invasion and the vast destructivenessof the atomic bomb and the air attacks. He didnot refer to Soviet intervention.”[83] For thisassertion, both Asada and Frank rely on asingle source: Takeshita Masahiko’s Kimitsusakusen nisshi.[84] The emperor’s reference tothe atomic bombs appears only in Kimitsu -sakusen nisshi. Since Takeshita did notparticipate in the imperial conference, hisaccount must have come from Anami, who washis brother-in-law. None of the participantsrecall that Hirohito referred to the atomic
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bombs in his speech. In fact, Togo’s memoirsand Sakomizu’s memoirs, quoted in Shusenshiroku, which Asada cites as the evidence thatthe emperor specifically cited the atomic bombas the major reason for his decision, actuallydoes not contain this reference.[85] Frankconcedes that at this meeting with Japan’s mostsenior military officers on August 14, theemperor cited both Soviet intervention and “theenemy’s scientific power.” This was “the onlycontemporary instance where the Emperor sawSoviet intervention as significant,” Frankwrites, adding, “and even then he coupled itwith the atomic bomb.” In the imperial rescript,Frank says, “the emperor spoke explicitly onone point: the enemy’s employment of a ‘newand most cruel bomb.’”[86]
Silence, however, does not necessarily meanthat the Soviet entry had little effect onHirohito’s decision to surrender. It is true thatthe emperor did not refer to the Soviet entry inhis imperial rescript to the general Japanesepopulation on August 15. But Frank ignoresanother important document: the imperialrescript addressed to the soldiers and sailors,issued on August 17, which states:
Now that the Soviet Union hasentered the war against us, tocontinue … under the presentconditions at home and abroadwould only recklessly incur evenmore damage to ourselves andresult in endangering the veryfoundat ion of the empire’sexistence. Therefore, even thoughenormous fighting spirit still existsin the imperial navy and army, Iam going to make peace with theUnited States, Britain, and theSoviet Union, as well as withChungking, in order to maintainour glorious kokutai.[87]
To the soldiers and sailors, especially die-hardofficers who might still wish to continuefighting, the emperor did not mention theatomic bomb. Rather , i t was Sov ie tparticipation in the war that provided a morepowerful justification to persuade the troops tolay down their arms.[88]
Frank is absolutely right in pointing out that“[t]he end of hostilities required both a decisionby a legitimate authority that Japan must yieldto Allied terms and compliance by Japanesearmed forces with that decision,” and that suchlegitimate authority was the emperor. He isalso right about the inability of the Suzukigovernment to accept unconditional surrenderwithout the emperor’s intervention.[89] It istrue that the emperor’s strong desire toterminate the war played a decisive role in his“sacred decision.” Nevertheless, it seemserroneous to attribute the emperor’s motivationfor this decision to what he said in the imperialrescripts. Now united behind the “sacreddecision,” the cabinet set out to persuade theJapanese people, both civilians and men inuniform, to accept surrender. The cabinettherefore made a few revisions to Sakomizu’sdraft of the imperial rescript.
Two documents issued by the cabinet need tobe examined. The first is a cabinet statementreleased after the imperial rescript wasbroadcast, which refers to both the use of theatomic bomb, which changed the nature of war,and the Soviet entry as two important reasonsfor ending the war.[90] The second is the primeminister’s radio announcement of August 15, inwhich he stated that Soviet entry into the warhad prompted the cabinet to make the finaldecision to end the war, and that the atomicbomb, which “it was evident the enemy willcontinue to use,” would destroy both themilitary power of the empire “and thefoundation of the existence of the nation,endangering the basis of our kokutai.”[91] Bothdocuments cite the atomic bomb and the Sovietentry into the war as the two important reasons
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that had prompted the government to seek thetermination of the war, thus invalidatingFrank’s claim that the atomic bomb had a moredecisive effect on the emperor’s decision to endthe war.
5. Counterfactual Hypotheses
A series of counterfactual hypotheses can helpclarify the question of which factor, the atomicbombs or Soviet entry into the war, had themore decisive effect on Japan’s decision tosurrender. We might ask, in particular, whetherJapan would have surrendered beforeNovember 1, the scheduled date for the start ofOperation Olympic, the U.S. invasion ofKyushu, given (a) neither the atomic bombingsof Hiroshima and Nagasaki nor Soviet entryinto the war; (b) Soviet entry alone, without theatomic bombings; or (c) the atomic bombingsalone, without Soviet entry.[92]
Let us examine the first proposition. TheSummary Report (Pacific War) of the UnitedStates Strategic Bombing Survey, published in1946 concluded that Japan would havesurrendered before November 1 without theatomic bombs and without the Soviet entry intothe war. This conclusion has become thefoundation on which the revisionist historiansconstructed their argument that the atomicbombs were not necessary for Japan’ssurrender.[93] Since Barton Bernstein haspersuasively demonstrated in his devastatingcritique of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Surveythat its conclusion is not supported by its owne v i d e n c e , I n e e d n o t d w e l l o n t h i ssupposition.[94] It suffices to state that,contrary to its conclusion, the evidence theStrategic Bombing Survey re l ied onoverwhelmingly demonstrates the decisiveeffect of the atomic bombs and Soviet entry onJapan’s decision. As Bernstein asserts:“[A]nalysts can no longer trust the Survey’sstatement of counterfactual probabilities aboutwhen the Pacific War would have endedwithout the A-bomb or Soviet entry. On such
matters, the Survey is an unreliable guide.” Iconcur with his conclusion: “[I]t is time for allto stop relying upon the United States StrategicBombing Survey’s pre-November 1945,surrender-counterfactual for authority.”[95]
For the second counterfactual hypothesis, thatis, surrender with the Soviet entry alone, Asadacontends: “[T]here was a possibility that Japanwould not have surrendered before November1.”[96] By making this assertion, Asada ignoresan important conclusion made by Bernstein.Bernstein states: “In view of the great impactof Soviet entry, however, in a situation of heavyconventional bombing and a stranglingblockade, it does seem quite probable—indeed,far more likely than not—that Japan would havesurrendered before November without the useof the A-bomb but after Soviet intervention inthe war. In that sense … there may have been aserious ‘missed opportunity’ in 1945 to avoidthe costly invasion of Kyushu without droppingthe atomic bomb by awaiting Soviet entry.”[97]However, since it was inessential at that pointin his essay, Bernstein does not fully develophis argument.
As I have argued above, Japan relied on Sovietneutrality both militarily and diplomatically.Diplomatically, Japan pinned its last hope onMoscow’s mediation for the termination of thewar. Only by Soviet entry into the war wasJapan forced to make a decision on thePotsdam terms. Militarily as well, Japan’s KetsuGo strategy was predicated on Sovietneutrality. That was why the General Staff’sBureau of Military Affairs constantly overruledthe Fifth Department’s alarming warnings thata Soviet invasion might be imminent.Manchuria was not written off, as Frankasserts; rather, the military was confident thatit could keep the USSR neutral, at least for awhile. When the Soviet invasion of Manchuriaoccurred, the military was taken completely bysurprise. Even Asada admits, “[T]he Sovietentry spelled the strategic bankruptcy ofJapan.”[98] Despite the repeated bravado
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calling for the continuation of the war, it pulledthe rug right out from underneath the Japanesemilitary, puncturing a gaping hole in theirstrategic plan. Their insistence on thecontinuation of the war lost its rationale.Without Japan’s surrender, it is reasonable toassume that the USSR would have completedthe occupation of Manchuria, southernSakhalin, the entire Kurils, and possibly eventhe Korean peninsula, by the beginning ofSeptember. Inevitably, Soviet invasion ofHokkaido would have emerged as a pressingissue to be settled between the United Statesand the Soviet Union. The United States mighthave resisted a Soviet operation againstHokkaido, but given Soviet military strength,and given the enormous casualty figures theAmerican high command had estimated forOlympic, the United States might have agreedto a division of Hokkaido as Stalin envisaged.Even if it succeeded in resisting Stalin’spressure, Soviet military conquests in the restof the Far East might have led the UnitedStates to concede some degree of Sovietparticipation in Japan’s postwar occupation.Whatever the United States might or might nothave done regarding Soviet operations inHokkaido or the postwar occupation of Japan,Japanese leaders were well aware of thedanger of allowing continued Soviet expansionbeyond Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin. Thatwas one of the very powerful reasons why theJapanese ruling elite coalesced at the lastmoment to surrender under the Potsdam terms,why the military’s insistence on continuing thewar collapsed, and why the military relativelyeasily accepted surrender. Japan’s decision tosurrender was above all a political decision, nota military one. It was more likely, therefore,that even without the atomic bombs, the warwould have ended shortly after the Soviet entryinto the war, almost certainly before November1.
Asada does not ask whether Japan would havesurrendered with the atomic bombing ofHiroshima and Nagasaki alone, without the
Soviet entry into the war. It is most likely thatthe two bombs alone would not have promptedJapan to surrender, as long as it still had thehope of attaining a mediated peace throughMoscow. As I have shown, the Hiroshima bombdid not significantly change Japan’s policyexcept for injecting a sense of urgency inseeking an end to the fighting. Without theSoviet entry into the war, I do not see how theNagasaki bomb would have changed thesituation. Japan would most likely still havewaited for Moscow’s answer to the Konoemission even after the Nagasaki bomb. Themost likely scenario would have been that whilewaiting for an answer from Moscow, Japanwould have been surprised by the Sovietinvasion of Manchuria sometime in the middleof August and would have sued for peace onthe Potsdam terms. We would then havedebated endlessly about whether the twoatomic bombs preceding the Soviet invasion orthe Soviet entry had the greater influence onJapan’s decision to surrender. In this case, too,however, Soviet entry would clearly have had amore decisive effect for the reasons statedabove.
Without Soviet participation in the war in themiddle of August, the United States would havefaced the question of whether it should use athird bomb sometime after August 19, and thena fourth bomb early in September, most likelyon Kokura and Niigata. It is hard to say howmany atomic bombs it would have taken tocompel the Japanese ruling elite to abandontheir approach to Moscow. It is possible toargue, although it is impossible to prove, thatthe Japanese military would have still arguedfor the continuation of the war even after thedropping of a third bomb, and even after afourth bomb. Could Japan have withstood theattacks of all seven atomic bombs scheduled tobe produced before November 1?[99] Wouldthe United States have had the resolve to useseven atomic bombs in succession? What wouldhave been the effect of these bombs onJapanese public opinion? Would the continuing
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use of the bombs have solidified the resolve ofthe Japanese to fight or eroded it? Would ithave hopelessly alienated the Japanese fromthe United States, to the point where it wouldhave been difficult to impose the Americanoccupat ion on Japan? Would i t haveencouraged the Japanese to welcome a Sovietoccupation instead? These are the questions Icannot answer with certainty.But what I can state is that the two atomicbombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were notlikely to be decisive in inducing Japan tosurrender. Without the Soviet entry into thewar between the two bombs, Japan would mostlikely have continued the war.
There still remains one important hypothesis toconsider. What if Truman had asked Stalin tojoin the Potsdam Proclamation and retained thepromise to the Japanese to al low thepreservation of a constitutional monarchy, asStimson’s original draft of the proclamationhad suggested? This scenario would not haveassured Japan’s immediate acceptance of thePotsdam terms, since it would surely haveencountered the army’s insistence on threeother conditions. It is not even certain that thearmy would have accepted a constitutionalmonarchy, which was certainly not consistentwith its understanding of the kokutai.Nevertheless, it would have strengthened theresolve of the peace party to seek thetermination of the war, and would have made iteasier for it to accept the terms, knowing that amonarchical system would be preserved andthat Moscow might be harsher and demand theelimination of the emperor system.
But inviting Stalin to join the joint ultimatumand compromising on the unconditionalsurrender terms were not an option thatTruman and Secretary of State James Byrneswould have considered. Although Secretary ofWar Henry Stimson, Admiral William Leahy,General George Marshall, Assistant Secretaryof War John McCloy, Secretary of the NavyJames Forrestal, and Acting Secretary of State
Joseph Grew would all have preferred this, toTruman and Byrnes, it was anathema.Ironically, it was the atomic bomb that made itpossible for Truman to be able to issue thePo t sdam Proc l amat i on demand ingunconditional surrender without Stalin’ssignature. The atomic bomb also changed thevery nature of the Potsdam Proclamation.Instead of being a final warning beforeOlympic, as originally intended, it became thejustification for the use of the atomic bomb. Inthis sense, the revisionist historians’ claim thatthe atomic bomb delayed rather than hastenedJapan’s surrender merits serious consideration.
6. Conclusions
The argument presented by Asada and Frankthat the atomic bombs rather than Soviet entryinto the war had a more decisive effect onJapan’s decision to surrender cannot besupported. The Hiroshima bomb, although itheightened the sense of urgency to seek thetermination of the war, did not prompt theJapanese government to take any immediateaction that repudiated the previous policy ofseeking Moscow’s mediation. Contrary to thecontention advanced by Asada and Frank, thereis no evidence to show that the Hiroshimabomb led either Togo or the emperor to acceptthe Potsdam terms. On the contrary, Togo’surgent telegram to Sato on August 7 indicatesthat, despite the Hiroshima bomb, theycontinued to stay the previous course. Theeffect of the Nagasaki bomb was negligible. Itdid not change the political alignment one wayor the other. Even Anami’s fantastic suggestionthat the United States had more than 100atomic bombs and planned to bomb Tokyo nextdid not change the opinions of either the peaceparty or the war party at all.
Rather, what decisively changed the views ofthe Japanese ruling elite was the Soviet entryinto the war. It catapulted the Japanesegovernment into taking immediate action. Forthe first time, it forced the government
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squarely to confront the issue of whether itshould accept the Potsdam terms. In thetortuous discussions from August 9 throughAugust 14, the peace party, motivated by aprofound sense of betrayal, fear of Sovietinfluence on occupation policy, and above all bya desperate desire to preserve the imperialhouse, finally staged a conspiracy to impose the“emperor’s sacred decision” and accept thePotsdam terms, believing that under thecircumstances surrendering to the UnitedStates would best assure the preservation ofthe imperial house and save the emperor.
This is, of course, not to deny completely theeffect of the atomic bomb on Japan’spolicymakers. It certainly injected a sense ofurgency in finding an acceptable end to thewar. Kido stated that while the peace party andthe war party had previously been equallybalanced in the scale, the atomic bomb helpedto tip the balance in favor of the peaceparty.[100] It would be more accurate to saythat the Soviet entry into the war, adding tothat tipped scale, then completely toppled thescale itself.
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa is professor of modernRussian and Soviet history, University ofCalifornia, Santa Barbara and the author ofRacing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and theS u r r e n d e r o f J a p a n .(http://www.amazon.com/Racing-Enemy-Stalin-T r u m a n -Surrender/dp/0674016939/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/104-1615893-2559918?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1187399684&sr=8-1)This is a slightly revised version of an essaypublished in From The End of the Pacific War,Reappraisals, edited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa ,(c) 2007 by the Board of Trustees of the LelandStanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. Nofurther reproduction or distribution is allowedwithout the prior written permission of thepublisher, www.sup.org. Posted at Japan Focuson August 17, 2007.
Notes
[1] On the American debate about the use ofthe atomic bombs, see Barton J. Bernstein,“The Struggle over History: Defining theHiroshima Narrative, in Judgment at theSmithsonian, ed. Philip Nobile, 127–256 (NewYork: Marlowe, 1995).[2] Sadao Asada, “The Shock of the AtomicBomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender—AReconsideration,” Pacific Historical Review 67,no. 4 (1998): 481.[3] See, e.g., the interesting exchange betweenAlperovi tz /Messer and Bernste in inInternational Security 16 (1991–92). NeitherAlperovitz/Messer nor Bernstein confronts theissue of the Soviet factor in inducing Japan tosurrender. Gar Alperovitz in his The Decision toUse the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture ofan American Myth (New York: Knopf, 1995)devotes more than 600 pages to the U.S.motivation for using the atomic bombs, butdoes not directly address the question ofwhether the atomic bombings or the Sovietentry had the more decisive influence onJapan’s decision to surrender.[4] Asada, “Shock,” 479–83; its Japaneseversion, Asada Sadao, “Genbaku toka noshogeki to kohuku no kettei,” in Hosoya Chihiroet al., Taihei senso no shuketsu (Tokyo:Kashiwa shobo, 1997), 195–222; and Richard B.Frank, Downfall: The End of the ImperialJapanese Empire (New York: Random House,1999), 271.[5] Asada, “Shock,” 486.[6] Frank, Downfall, 271. Frank’s source isAsada’s article. Frank also cites Robert J. C.Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959),152–53, but Butow has nothing to say about theAugust 7 cabinet meeting. Frank explains thatAsada’s source is Togo Shigenori, Jidai noichimen (Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1952; reprint, Harashobo, 1989), but Togo’s memoirs are silentabout the Potsdam Proclamation.[7] Togo, Jidai no ichimen, 355. In his noteswritten in September 1945, Togo referred to
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the cabinet meeting on August 7 without sayingthat he had proposed the acceptance of thePotsdam Proclamation. See “Togo gaiso kijutsuhikki ‘Shusen ni saishite’ September 1945,” inGaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku (Tokyo:Hokuyosha, 1977), 4: 60.[8] Kurihara Ken and Hatano Sumio, eds.,Shusen kosaku no kiroku (Tokyo: Kodansha,1986), 2: 355–56.[9] Sakomizu Hisatsune, Kikanju ka no shushokantei (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1964), 243-44.Sakomizu published another memoir in 1973,Dainihon teikoku saigo no yonkagetsu (Tokyo:Orientosha, 1973), but he makes no referenceto the August 7 cabinet meeting in the laterbook.[10] Kido Nikki Kenkyukai, ed., Kido Koichinikki (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1966),2: 1222.[11] Kido Koichi nikki: Tokyo saibanki (Tokyo:Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1980), 421.[12] Asada, “Shock,” 487.[13] Frank, Downfall, 272.[14] Tanaka Nobunao, Dokyumento showatenno 5, Haisen Vol. 2 (Tokyo: RyokufuShuppan, 1988), 2: 460–61.[15] Quoted in Asada, “Shock,” 488.[16] Ibid.[17] Frank, Downfall, 272.[18] Togo’s statement comes from his memoirs,Jidai no ichimen, 355–56. Asada does notinclude the words in brackets in the Japaneseversion. See Asada, “Genbaku toka,” 199.[19] During an interview with Oi Atsushi for themilitary history project of Military IntelligenceSection of the General Staff of the SupremeCommander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Togosaid that he suggested to the emperor onAugust 8 that Japan should accept the Potsdamterms. Continuing the question, Oi tried toestablish that Togo and the emperor hadalready decided to terminate the war on theterms stipulated in the Potsdam Proclamationbefore the Soviet entry into the war. Togoequivocated, saying that Soviet mediationwould not be limited only to the clarification ofthe Potsdam terms. He was not sure whether
the Kremlin would convey Japan’s wishes to theAllied powers or would take the trouble tomake an arrangement for Japan to hold directnegotiations with the United States and Britain.To this, Oi interjected by saying that whetherthey went through Moscow or by a direct route,the meaning was that the war would beterminated on the basis of the PotsdamProclamation. Togo agreed, but withoutconviction. “Togo Shigenori chinjutsuroku,” inKurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku nokiroku, 2: 357–58.[20] Sakomizu Hisatsune, Dai Nihonteikokusaigo no 4-kagetsu (Tokyo: Oriento shobo,1973), 185.[21] Asada, “Shock,” 489.[22] Sakomizu, Dai Nihon teikoku, 185, 187.[23] Sakomikzu, Kikanju ka no shusho kantei,245–46.[24] Hasegawa Saiji, “Hokai no zenya,” Fujinkoron, August 1947, in Gaimusho, ed., Shusenshiroku, 5: 84.[25] Asada and Frank also cite Suzuki’sstatement made in December 1945, which willbe discussed later.[26] Suzuki Hajime, ed., Suzuki Kantaro jiden(Tokyo: Jijitsushinsha, 1969), 294–95.[27] Sakomizu’s 1964 memoirs also take thisview. Sakomizu, Kikanju ka no shusho kantei,255.[28] Togo to Sato, telegram no. 993, 15: 40Tokyo, Aug. 7, 1945, in Gaimusho, ed., Shusenshiroku, 4: 77.[29] This was also confirmed by Sakomizu, whoallegedly stated that Togo had made astatement at the cabinet meeting on August 7in support of accept ing the PotsdamProclamation. Sakomizu, Kikanju ka no shushokantei, 244–45.[30] Information obtained by Harano Sumio.[31] Asada, “Shock,” 491–92. This term doesnot appear in the Japanese version. “Asada,“Genbaku toka,” 201.[32] Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu, Senshisosho: Daihonei rikugunbu, vol. 10: Showa 20nen 8 ga tsu made (Tokyo : Asagumoshinbunsha, 1975), 443.
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[33] Asada, “Shock,” 504.[34] Frank, Downfall, 348.[35] Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu,Kantogun,Vol. 2, Kantokuen, Shusenji no taisosen (Tokyo: Asagumo shinbunsha, 1974), 326.[36] Ibid..[37] Ibid., 328.[38] Ibid., 330.[39] Ibid., 332; Tanemura Suetaka, Daihoneikimitsu nisshi (Tokyo: Fuyo shobo, 1995), 295.[40] “Soren no tainichi saigo tsucho ni taishitetorubeki sochi no kenkyu,” in Nishihara Masao,Shusen no keii, Vol. 1, 104-08; Kurihara andHatano, eds., Shusen kosaku no kiroku, 2:363–64.[41] Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu,Kantogun, Vol. 2, 318.[42] Ibid., 318.[43] Quoted in Boeicho BoeikenshujoSenshishitsu, Senshi sosho: Daihoneirikugunbu, 10: 427.[44] Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu,Kantogun -, Vol. 2, 330.[45] Asada, “Shock,” 504.[46] Kawabe Torashiro, “Jicho nisshi,” vol. 2,quoted in Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu,Senshi sosho: Daihonei rikugunbu, 10: 430;also Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosakuno kiroku, 2: 364. The handwritten original isKawabe Torashiro Sanbojicho nisshi, Showa 20.7.26–20.9.2, in Boeikenkyujo senshishitsu,chuo, senso shido juyo kokusaku bunsho, 1206.Although Daihonei rikugunbu 10 occasionallyalters the original when it quotes fromKawabe’s diary, this part is accurately quoted.A slightly different version is given in KawabeTorashiro, “Sanbo jicho no nisshi,” in KawabeTorashiro Kaisoroku (Tokyo: Manichishinbunsha, 1979), 253.[47] Quoted in Boeicho BoeikenshujoSenshishitsu, Senshi sosho: Daihoneirikugunbu, 10: 420; Kawabe, “Jicho nisshi,”252.[48] J icho nisshi , quoted in BoeichoBoeikenshujo Senshishitsu, Senshi sosho:Daihonei rikugunbu, 10: 440–41. This part isnot included in Kawabe, “Jicho nissi,” in
Kawabe Kaisoroku, 254.[49] J icho nisshi , quoted in BoeichoBoeikenshujo Senshishitsu, Senshi sosho:Daihonei rikugunbu, 10: 452, “Jicho nisshi” inKawabe Kaisoroku is slightly different.[50] # 52608, Kawabe Torashiro, Nov. 21,1949, 5–6, Historical Manuscript File, Centerfor Military History [hereafter CMH]. I thankRichard Frank for allowing me to use hiscollection from the Center for Military History.[51] Frank, Downfall, 346–67.[52] Arisue kikanho, no. 333, Nov. 16, 1945,R ikugunsho , “Be ikoku sh i re ibu no‘Teikokusakusen oyobi shido kankei shitsumon’ni taisuru kaito, Bunko Yu, 395, BeoeiKenkyujo, Senshishitsu.[53] # 59617, Maj. Gen. Amano Masakazu,Historical Manuscript File; also see AmanoMasakazu Chinjutsusho, GHQ Senshika, vol. 6,Chuo Shusen shori 228, Boei KenkyujoSenshishitsu. The English translation of theHistorical Manuscript File is modified in viewof the original Japanese testimony in the Boeikenkyujo.[54] # 54479, Ikeda Sumihisa, HistoricalManuscript File, 4–5; also see Ikeda SumihisaChinjutsusho, GHQ Senshika, vol. 1, ChuoShusenshori 227, Boei Kenkyujo, Senshishitsu.[55] Hayashi Saburo Chinjutsusho (Dec. 23,1949), vol. 6, GHQ Senshika, Chuo Shusenshori228, Boei Kenkyujo, Senshishitsu.[56] # 61340, Toyoda Soemu (Aug. 29, 1949),7–8, CMH.[57] # 531, Suzuki Kantaro (Dec. 26, 1945),CMH.[58] Frank, Downfall, 347.[59] Frank’s argument is questionable in hismethodology here. If he discounts Kawabe’sand Toyoda’s testimonies as having been givenyears after the events in question, why shouldSuzuki’s testimony, which was given severalmonths after the end of the war, be deemedmore reliable? Frank’s method of lookingcritically at testimonies made after the eventsis admirable, but he is inconsistent in thisapproach.[60] “Gikai toben shiryo,’ Kokubo taiko kankei
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juyoimanaka shorui tsuzuki, RikugunshoGunjika, Rikugun Chusa Shigero shokan, Chuo,Sensoshido sonota 78, BoeikenkyujoSenshishitsu.[61] Ibid.[62] Kantogun,Vol. 2, 280–81.[63] Ibid., 368–70.[64] Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu, Senshisosho: Hokuto homen rikugun sakusen, Vol. 2:Chishima, Karafuto, Hokkaido no boei (Tokyo:Asagumo shinbunsha, 1971), 337.[65] Ibid., 342–45.[66] Frank, Downfall, 323.[67] For this, see Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racingthe Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrenderof Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 2005), chaps. 5 and6.[68] Hando Toshikazu, Nihon no ichiban nagaihi, ed. Oya Soichi (Tokyo: Bungei shunjusha,1973), 36. Hando does not cite his source, butthis popular book, though lacking citations,seems to be based on reliable sources.[69] Shigemitsu Mamoru, Showa no doran(Tokyo: Chukoronsha, 1952), 2: 286.[70] Yonai Mitsumasa, “Takagi oboegaki,”quoted in Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusenkosaku no kiroku, 2: 379.[71] Kido Nikki Kenkyukai, ed., Kido Koichinikki, 2: 1225–27.[72] Ambassador Sato, who was usually veryastute, made a grave error here in assumingthat Molotov’s declaration of war effectivemidnight August 9 meant midnight Moscowtime. Soviet tanks rolled into Manchuria atmidnight Transbaikal time, 6 P.M. Moscowtime, less than an hour after Molotov handedSato the declaration of war, magnifying thesense of betrayal felt by the Japanese. SeeHasegawa, Racing the Enemy, chap. 5.[73] Matsumoto Shun’ichi, “Shusen oboegaki,”in Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 158–59.[74] Showa Tenno dokuhakuroku (Tokyo:Bungei shunju, 1991), 120–21.[75] Asada, “Shock,” 505, citing Kido nikki:Tokyo saibanki, 444. This does not appear inthe Japanese original, Asada, “Genbaku toka,”
207–8.[76] Sakomizu, May 3, 1949, “Interrogations,”quoted in Asada, “Shock,” 505.[77] Quoted in Wada Haruki, “Nisso senso,” inHara Teruyuki and Togawa Tsuguo, eds., KozaSurabu no sekai, vol. 8: Surabu to nihon(Tokyo: Kobundo, 1995), 119.[78] Sakomizu, Kikanju ka no shusho kantei,246.[79] Hasegawa Saiji, “Hokai no zenya,” Fujinkoron, August 1947, quoted in Shusen shiroku,.4: 84.[80] Takagi Sokichi, Takagi kaigun shoshooboegaki (Tokyo: Mainichi shinbunsha, 1979).[81] Hosokawa Morisada, Hosokawa Nikki(1953; reprint, Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1979), 2:415.[82] Asada, “Shock,” 495.[83] Frank, Downfall, 345, based on BoeichoBoeikenshujo Senshishitsu, Senshi sosho:Daihonei rikugunbu, 10: 449. which comesfrom Daihon’ei Rikugunbu Senso Shidohan,Kimitsu senso nisshi, 2: 756. Frank cites theemperor’s statement as recreated by Butow,but Butow’s record says nothing about theemperor’s reference to the atomic bomb. ButFrank inserts in brackets “[At about this point,he also made specific reference to the greatlyincreased destructiveness of the atomicbomb],” supposedly from “the official Japanesemilitary history series.” Frank, Downfall,295–96. Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu,Daihonei rikugunbu, vol. 10, on which Frankrelies, takes this part from Takeshita’s Kimitsusenso nisshi.[84] Asada’s source is Sanbo Honbu, ed.,Haisen no kiroku, 362, and Frank’s source isBoeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu, Daihoneirikugunbu , 10: 449, but the original source ofboth is Takeshita’s Kimitsu sakusen nisshi.[85] Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 139,142. In addition to the excerpts from Togo andSakomizu, Shusen shiroku also containsexcerpts from Toyoda and Hoshina Zenshiro,who attended the imperial conference, andKido and Shimomura, who did not. None ofthem mention anything about the emperor’s
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reference to the atomic bomb.[86] Frank, Downfall, 345–46.[87] “Rikukaigunjin ni taisuru chokugo,” inHattori Takushiro, Daitoa senso zenshi(Harashobo, 1965) 948, translation based onHerbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making ofModern Japan (New York: HarperCollins,2000), 530, with a slight modification.[88] Sakomizu was the author of the imperialrescript on the termination of the war.Sakomizu had been drafting the rescript sincethe first imperial conference on August 9–10.After the second imperial conference was over,he returned to the prime minister’s residenceto revise the draft in view of the emperor’sstatement at the imperial conference. Since hehad to revise the draft to be presented to thecabinet under pressure of time, he asked hissubordinate Kihara Michio to prepare the draftof the imperial rescript for the soldiers andsailors. Hando, Nihon no ichiban nagai hi, 45.Presumably, Sakomizu gave Kihara the basicideas along which the rescript should bewritten. But it is not clear why only the atomicbomb, not Soviet entry into the war, wasmentioned in the imperial rescript for thetermination of the war, why Soviet entry intothe war, but not the atomic bomb, wasmentioned in the later rescript, or whetherKihara consulted any military leaders. It seemslikely, however, that the draft was completedby August 15.[89] Frank, Downfall, 344.[90] “Naikaku kokuyu,” in Matsutani Makoto,Shusen ni kansuru shiryo, Matsutani shiryo,Shusenji shiryo, Chuo, Shusen shori 236, BoeiKenkyujo, Senshishitsu.
[91] “Taisho o haishite,” in Matsutani Makoto,Shusen ni kansuru shiryo, Matsutani shiryo,Shusenji shiryo, Chuo, Shusen shori 236, BoeiKenkyujo, Senshishitsu.[92] This part of the argument is taken partiallyfrom Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 294–98.[93] U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, SummaryReport (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, 1946), 26. SeeAlperovitz, Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 4,321, 368–69, 464, 465.[94] Barton J. Bernstein, “Compelling Japan’sSurrender Without the A-bomb, Soviet Entry, orInvasion: Reconsidering the US BombingSurvey’s Early-Surrender Conclusion,” Journalof Strategic Studies 18, no. 2 (June 1995):101–48.[95] Ibid., 105, 127. Asada also agrees withBernstein’s conclusion on the assessment of theU.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. Asada,“Shock,” 511.[96] Asada, “Shock,” 510–11.[97] Bernstein, “Compell ing Japan’sSurrender,” 129. Asada cites Bernstein’sarticle, but only for the criticism of the U.S.Strategic Bombing Survey. He doe not refer toBernstein’s important assertion that Japanwould likely have surrendered beforeNovember after the Soviet intervention,without the use of the A-bomb, which directlycontradicts Asada’s assertion.[98] Asada, “Shock,” 504.[99] Maj. Gen. John E. Hull and Col. L. E.Seeman, telephone conversation, Aug. 13,1945, 13:25, verifax 2691, George C. MarshallPapers, George C. Marshall Library.[100] Kido Koichi Kenkyukai, ed., Kido Koichinikki: Tokyo saibanki, 444.
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