1. Laying PlansTs`ao Kung, in defning the meaning of the Chinese
for the title of this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations
in the temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as
we should say, in his tent. ee ss. !".1un T#u said$ The art of war
is of %ital importance to the tate. &!'t is a matter of life
and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. (ence it is a
sub)ect of in*uiry whichcan on no account be neglected. &+The
art of war, then, is go%erned by f%e constant factors, to be ta,en
into account in one-s deliberations, when see,ing todetermine the
conditions obtaining in the feld. &.These are$ /10 The 1oral
Law2 /!0 (ea%en2 /+0 3arth2 /.0 The Commander2 /40 1ethod and
discipline. &'t appears from what follows that un T#u means by
51oral Law5 a principle of harmony, not unli,e the Tao of Lao T#u
in its moral aspect. 6ne might be tempted to render it by 5morale,5
were it not considered as an attribute of the ruler in ss.
1+.4,"The 1678L L89 causes the people to be in complete accord with
their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their
li%es, undismayed by any danger. &Tu :u *uotes 9ang T#u as
saying$ 59ithout constant practice, the o;cers will be ner%ous and
undecided when mustering for battle2 without constant practice, the
general will be wa%ering and irresolute when the crisis is at
hand.5 signifes night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
&The commentators, ' thin,, ma,e an unnecessary mystery of two
words here. 1eng hih refers to 5the hard and the soft, wa?ing and
waning5 of (ea%en. 9ang(si, howe%er, may be right in saying that
what is meant is 5the general economyof (ea%en,5 including the f%e
elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and other
phenomena.@387T( comprises distances, great and small2 danger and
security2 open ground and narrow passes2 the chances of life and
death. &AThe C6118>B37 stands for the %irtues of wisdom,
sincerity, bene%olence, courage and strictness. &The f%e
cardinal %irtues of the Chinese are /10 humanity or bene%olence2
/!0 uprightness of mind2 /+0 selfCrespect, selfCcontrol, or 5proper
feeling25 /.0 wisdom2 /40 sincerity or good faith. (ere 5wisdom5
and 5sincerity5 are put before 5humanity or bene%olence,5 and the
two military %irtues of 5courage5 and 5strictness5 substituted for
5uprightness of mind5 and 5selfCrespect, selfCcontrol, or -proper
feeling.-51DEy 13T(6B 8>B B'C'PL'>3 are to be understood the
marshaling of the army in its proper subdi%isions, the graduations
of ran, among the o;cers, the maintenance of roads by which
supplies may reach the army, and the control of military
e?penditure. &11These f%e heads should be familiar to e%ery
general$ he who ,nows them will be %ictorious2 he who ,nows them
not will fail. &1!Therefore, in your deliberations, when
see,ing to determine the military conditions, let them be made the
basis ofa comparison, in this wise$ &1+/10 9hich of the two
so%ereigns is imbued with the 1oral lawF &'.e., 5is in harmony
with his sub)ects.5 Cf. ss. 4./!0 9hich of the two generals has
most abilityF &/+0 9ith whom lie the ad%antages deri%ed from
(ea%en and 3arthF &ee ss. 69 how to con*uer without being able
to B6 it. &4ecurity against defeat implies defensi%e tactics2
ability to defeat the enemy means ta,ing the oHensi%e. &'
retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss. 1C+, in spite of
the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they
gi%e, 5(e who cannot con*uer ta,es the defensi%e,5 is plausible
enough."tanding on the defensi%e indicates insu;cient strength2
attac,ing, a superabundance of strength. &either is it the acme
of e?cellence if you fght and con*uer and the whole 3mpire says,
59ell doneG5 &True e?cellence being, as Tu 1u says$ 5To plan
secretly, to mo%e surreptitiously, to foil the enemy-s intentions
and bal, his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without
shedding a drop of blood.5 un T#u reser%es his approbation for
things that 5the world-s coarse thumb and fnger fail to plumb.51DTo
lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength2 &58utumn5
hair5 is e?plained as the fur of a hare, which is fnest in autumn,
when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a %ery common one in
Chinese writers.to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight2
to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a *uic, ear. &(o hih
gi%es as real instances of strength, sharp sight and *uic, hearing$
9u (uo, who could lift a tripod weighing !4D stone2 Li Chu, who at
a distance of a hundred paces could see ob)ects no bigger than a
mustard seed2 and hih K`uang, a blind musician who could hear the
footsteps of a mos*uito.119hat the ancients called a cle%er fghter
is one who not only wins, but e?cels in winning with ease. &The
last half is literally 5one who, con*uering, e?cels in easy
con*uering.5 1ei :aoCch`en says$ 5(e who only sees the ob%ious,
wins his battles with di;culty2 he who loo,s below the surface of
things, wins with ease.51!(ence his %ictories bring him neither
reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. &Tu 1u e?plains
this %ery well$ 5'nasmuch as his %ictories are gained o%er
circumstances that ha%e not come to light, the world aslarge ,nows
nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom2 inasmuch
asthe hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he
recei%es no credit for courage.51+(e wins his battles by ma,ing no
mista,es. &Ch`en (ao says$ 5(e plans no superSuous marches, he
de%ises no futile attac,s.5 The connection of ideas is thus
e?plained by Chang :u$ 56ne who see,s to con*uer by sheer strength,
cle%er though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable
on occasion to be %an*uished2 whereas he who can loo, into the
future anddiscern conditions that are not yet manifest, will ne%er
ma,e a blunder and therefore in%ariably win.51a,ing no mista,es is
what establishes the certainty of %ictory, for it means con*uering
an enemy that is already defeated. &1.(ence the s,illful fghter
puts himself into a position which ma,es defeat impossible, and
does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. &8 5counsel
of perfection5 as Tu 1u truly obser%es. 5Position5 need not be
confned to the actualground occupied by the troops. 't includes all
the arrangements and preparationswhich a wise general will ma,e to
increase the safety of his army.14Thus it is thatin war the
%ictorious strategist only see,s battle after the %ictory has been
won, whereas he who is destined to defeat frst fghts and afterwards
loo,s for %ictory. &(o hih thus e?pounds the parado?$ 5'n
warfare, frst lay plans which will ensure %ictory, and then lead
your army to battle2 if you will not begin with stratagem but rely
on brute strength alone, %ictory will no longer be assured.51"The
consummate leader culti%ates the moral law, and strictly adheres to
method and discipline2 thus it is in his power to control success.
&1I1E37, thereby ma,ing it nearly synonymous with the second
term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as a
consideration of the enemy-s general position or condition, while
the third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. 6n the
other hand, Tu 1u says$ 5The *uestion of relati%e strength ha%ing
been settled, we can bring the %aried resources of cunning into
play.5 (o hih seconds this interpretation, but wea,ens it. (owe%er,
it points to the third term as being a calculation of numbers.1A8
%ictorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound-s weight
placed in the scale against a single grain. &Literally, 5a
%ictorious army is li,e an ' /!D o#.0 weighed against a (I /1O!.
o#.02 a routed army is a (I weighed against an '.5 The point is
simply the enormous ad%antage which a disciplined force, Sushed
with %ictory, has o%er one demorali#ed by defeat.5 Legge, in his
note on 1encius, '. !. i?. !, ma,es the ' to be !. Chinese ounces,
and corrects Chu (si-s statement that it e*ualed !D o#. only. Eut
Li Ch`uan of the T`ang dynasty here gi%es the same fgure as Chu
(si.!DThe onrush of a con*uering force is li,e the bursting of
pentCup waters intoa chasm a thousand fathoms deep. C ee more at$
http$OOsunt#usaid.comOboo,O.&sthash.Dw%@nh:.dpuf4. 3nergy1un
T#u said$ The control of a large force is the same principle as the
control of a few men$ it is merely a *uestion of di%iding up their
numbers. &That is, cutting up the army into regiments,
companies, etc., with subordinate o;cers in command of each. Tu 1u
reminds us of (an (sin-s famous reply to the frst (an 3mperor, who
once said to him$ 5(ow large an army do you thin, ' could leadF5
5>ot more than 1DD,DDD men, your 1a)esty.5 58nd youF5 as,ed the
3mperor. 56hG5 he answered, 5the more the better.5!Mighting with a
large army under your command is nowise diHerent from fghting with
a small one$ it is merely a *uestion of instituting signs and
signals. &+To ensure that your whole host may withstand the
brunt of the enemy-s attac, and remain unsha,enJthis is eHected by
maneu%ers direct and indirect. &9e now come to one of the most
interesting parts of un T#u-s treatise, the discussion of the
C(3>P and the C(`'.5 8s it is by no means easy to grasp the full
signifcance of these two terms, or to render them consistently by
good 3nglish e*ui%alents2 it may be as well to tabulate some of the
commentators- remar,s on the sub)ect before proceeding further. Li
Ch`uan$ 5Macing the enemy is C(3>P, ma,ing lateral di%ersion is
C(`'. Chia Lin$ 5'n presence of the enemy, your troops should be
arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure %ictory abnormal
maneu%ers must be employed.5 1ei :aoCch`en$ 5C(`' is acti%e,
C(3>P is passi%e2 passi%ity means waiting for an opportunity,
acti%ity beings the %ictory itself.5 (o hih$ 59e must cause the
enemy to regard our straightforward attac, as one that is secretly
designed, and %ice %ersa2 thus C(3>P may also be C(`', and C(`'
may also be C(3>P.5 (e instances the famous e?ploit of (an (sin,
who when marching ostensibly against LinCchin /now ChaoCi in
hensi0, suddenly threw a large force across the :ellow 7i%er in
wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent. KCh`ien (an hu,
ch. +.N (ere, we are told, the march on LinCchin was C(3>P, and
the surprise maneu%er was C(`'.5 Chang :u gi%es the following
summary of opinions on the words$ 51ilitary writers do not agree
with regard to the meaning of C(`' and C(3>P. 9ei Liao T#u K.th
cent. E.C.N says$ -Birect warfare fa%ors frontal attac,s, indirect
warfare attac,s from the rear.- Ts`ao Kung says$ -Poing straight
out to )oin battle is a direct operation2 appearing on the enemy-s
rear is an indirect maneu%er.- Li 9eiC,ung K"th and P as C(3>P,
and C(`' as C(`'2 they do not note that the two are mutually
interchangeable and run into each other li,e the two sides of a
circle Ksee infra, ss. 11N. 8 comment on the T`ang 3mperor T`ai
Tsung goes to theroot of the matter$ -8 C(`' maneu%er may be
C(3>P, if we ma,e the enemy loo, upon it as C(3>P2 then our
real attac, will be C(`', and %ice %ersa. The whole secret lies in
confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.-5 To
put it perhaps a little more clearly$ any attac, or other operation
is C(3>P, on which the enemy has had his attention f?ed2 whereas
that is C(`',5 which ta,es him by surprise or comes from an
une?pected *uarter. 'f the enemy percei%es a mo%ement which is
meant to be C(`',5 it immediately becomes C(3>P.5.That the
impact of your army may be li,e a grindstone dashed against an
eggJthis is eHected by the science of wea, points and strong.
&4'n all fghting, the direct method may be used for )oining
battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure
%ictory. &Chang :u says$ 5teadily de%elop indirect tactics,
either by pounding the enemy-s San,s or falling on his rear.5 8
brilliant e?ample of 5indirect tactics5 which decided the fortunes
of a campaign was Lord 7oberts- night march round the Peiwar Kotal
in the second 8fghan war.K1L5MortyCone :earsin 'ndia,5 chapter
.".N"'ndirect tactics, e;ciently applied, are ine?haustible as
(ea%en and 3arth, unending as the Sow of ri%ers and streams2 li,e
the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew2 li,e the four
seasons, they pass away to return once more. &Tu :u and Chang
:u understand this of the permutations of C(`' and C(3>P.5 Eut
at present un T#u is not spea,ing of C(3>P at all,
unless,indeed, we suppose with Cheng :uChsien that a clause
relating to it has fallen outof the te?t. 6f course, as has already
been pointed out, the two are so ine?tricably interwo%en in all
military operations, that they cannot really be considered apart.
(ere we simply ha%e an e?pression, in fgurati%e language, of the
almost infnite resource of a great leader.one of the commentators
seem to grasp the real point of the simile of energy and the force
stored up in the bent crossbow until released by the fnger on the
trigger.1"8mid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be
seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all2 amid confusion
and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be
proof against defeat. &1ei :aoCch`en says$ 5The subdi%isions of
the army ha%ing been pre%iously f?ed, and the %arious signals
agreed upon, the separating and )oining, the dispersing and
collecting which will ta,e place in the course of a battle, may
gi%e the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible.
:our formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions all
topsyCtur%y, and yet a rout of your forces *uite out of the
*uestion.51ote the following anecdote of un Pin, a descendent of un
9u$ 'n +.1 E.C., the Ch`i tate being at war with 9ei, sent T`ien
Chi and un Pin against the general P`ang Chuan, who happened to be
a deadly personal enemy of the later. un Pin said$ 5The Ch`i tate
has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our ad%ersary
despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account.5
8ccordingly, when the army had crossed the border into 9ei
territory, he ga%e orders to show 1DD,DDD fres on the frst night,
4D,DDD on the ne?t, and the night after only !D,DDD. P`ang Chuan
pursued them hotly, saying to himself$ 5' ,new these men of Ch`i
were cowards$ their numbers ha%e already fallen away by more than
half.5 'n his retreat, un Pin came to a narrow defle, with he
calculated that his pursuers would reach after dar,. (ere he had a
tree stripped of its bar,, and inscribed upon it the words$ 5Inder
this tree shall P`ang Chuan die.5 Then, as night began to fall, he
placed a strong bodyof archers in ambush near by, with orders to
shoot directly they saw a light. Lateron, P`ang Chuan arri%ed at
the spot, and noticing the tree, struc, a light in order to read
what was written on it. (is body was immediately riddled by a
%olley of arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. KThe
abo%e is Tu 1u-s %ersion of the story2 the ('( C(', less
dramatically but probably with more historical truth, ma,es P`ang
Chuan cut his own throat with an e?clamation of despair, after the
rout of his army.N(e sacrifces something, that the enemy may snatch
atit. &!DEy holding out baits, he ,eeps him on the march2 then
with a body of pic,ed men he lies in wait for him. &9ith an
emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, 5(e lies in wait
with the main body of his troops.5!1The cle%er combatant loo,s to
the eHect of combined energy, and does not re*uire too much from
indi%iduals. &Tu 1u says$ 5(e frst of all considers the power
of his army in the bul,2 afterwards he ta,es indi%idual talent into
account, and uses each men according to his capabilities. (e does
not demand perfection from the untalented.5(ence his ability to
pic, out the right men and utili#e combined energy. &!!9hen he
utili#es combined energy, his fghting men become as it were li,e
unto rolling logs or stones. Mor it is the nature of a log or stone
to remain motionless on le%el ground, and to mo%e when on a slope2
if fourCcornered, to come to a standstill, but if roundCshaped, to
go rolling down. &Ts`au Kung calls this 5the use of natural or
inherent power.5!+Thus the energy de%eloped by good fghting men is
as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands
of feet in height. o much on the sub)ect of energy. &The chief
lesson of this chapter, in Tu 1u-s opinion, is the paramount
importance in war of rapid e%olutions and sudden rushes. 5Preat
results,5 he adds, 5can thus be achie%ed with small forces.5 C ee
more at$ http$OOsunt#usaid.comOboo,O4&sthash.VVB"9ocr.dpuf".
9ea, Points and trongChang :u attempts to e?plain the se*uence of
chaptersas follows$ 5Chapter '=, on Tactical Bispositions, treated
of the oHensi%e and the defensi%e2 chapter =, on 3nergy, dealt with
direct and indirect methods. The good general ac*uaints himself
frst with the theory of attac, and defense, and then turns his
attention to direct and indirect methods. (e studies the art of
%arying and combining these two methods before proceeding to the
sub)ect of wea, and strong points. Mor the use of direct or
indirect methods arises out of attac, and defense, and the
perception of wea, and strong points depends againon the abo%e
methods. (ence the present chapter comes immediately after the
chapter on 3nergy.51un T#u said$ 9hoe%er is frst in the feld and
awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fght2 whoe%er
is second in the feld and has to hasten to battle will arri%e
e?hausted. &!Therefore the cle%er combatant imposes his will on
the enemy, but does not allow the enemy-s will to be imposed on
him. &6ne mar, of a great soldier is that he fght on his own
terms or fghts not at all.K1Lee Col. (enderson-s biography of
tonewall Qac,son, 1AD! ed., %ol. '', p. .AD.N+Ey holding out
ad%antages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own
accord2 or, by inSicting damage, he can ma,e it impossible for the
enemy to draw near. &'n the frst case, he will entice him with
a bait2 in the second, he will stri,e at some important point which
the enemy will ha%e to defend..'f the enemy is ta,ing his ease, he
can harass him2 &This passage may be cited as e%idence against
1ei :aoCCh`en-s interpretation of '. ss. !+.if well supplied with
food, he can star%e him out2 if *uietly encamped, he can force him
to mo%e. &48ppear at points which the enemy must hasten to
defend2 march swiftly to places where you are not e?pected.
&"8n army may march great distances without distress, if it
marches through country where the enemy is not. &Ts`ao Kung
sums up %ery well$ 53merge from the %oid K*.d. li,e 5abolt from the
blue5N, stri,e at %ulnerable points, shun places that are defended,
attac, in une?pected *uarters.5 those places that are not li,ely to
be attac,ed25 and Tu 1u adds$ 5(ow much more, then, those that will
be attac,ed.5 Ta,en thus, howe%er, the clause balances less well
with the precedingJalways a consideration in the highly
antithetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang :u,
therefore, seems to come nearer the mar, in saying$ 5(e who is
s,illedin attac, Sashes forth from the topmost heights of hea%en
Ksee '=. ss. T7ICT'6> T6 (' P3>378Lwe read$ 58 defensi%e war
is apt to betray us into too fre*uent detachment. Those generals
who ha%e had but little e?perience attempt to protect e%ery point,
while those who are better ac*uainted with their profession, ha%ing
only the capital ob)ect in %iew, guard against a decisi%e blow, and
ac*uiesce in small misfortunes to a%oid greater.51@>umerical
wea,ness comes from ha%ing to prepare against possible attac,s2
numerical strength, from compelling our ad%ersary to ma,e these
preparations against us. &The highest generalship, in Col.
(enderson-s words, is 5to compel the enemy to disperse his army,
and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction in
turn.51AKnowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may
concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fght. &9hat
un T#u e%idently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances
and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a general to
di%ide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march, and
afterwards to eHect a )unction at precisely the right spot and the
right hour in order to confront the enemy in o%erwhelming strength.
8mong many such successful )unctions which military history
records, one of the most dramatic anddecisi%e was the appearance of
Elucher )ust at the critical moment on the feld of9aterloo.!DEut if
neither time nor place be ,nown, then the left wing will be
impotent to succor the right, the right e*ually impotent to succor
the left, the %an unable to relie%e the rear, or the rear to
support the %an. (ow much more soif the furthest portions of the
army are anything under a hundred L' apart, and e%en the nearest
are separated by se%eral L'G &The Chinese of this last sentence
is a little lac,ing in precision, but the mental picture we are
re*uired to draw is probably that of an army ad%ancing towards a
gi%en rende#%ous in separate columns, each of which has orders to
be there on a f?ed date. 'f the general allows the %arious
detachments to proceed at hapha#ard, without precise instructions
as to the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be able to
annihilate the army in detail. Chang :u-s note may be worth *uoting
here$ 5'f we do not ,now the place where our opponents mean to
concentrate or the day on which they will )oin battle, our unity
will be forfeited through our preparations for defense, and the
positions we hold will be insecure. uddenly happening upon a
powerful foe, we shall be brought to battle in a Surried condition,
and no mutual support will be possible between wings, %anguard or
rear, especially if there is any great distance between the
foremost and hindmost di%isions of the army.5!1Though according to
my estimate the soldiers of :ueh e?ceed our own innumber, that
shall ad%antage them nothing in the matter of %ictory. ' say then
that %ictory can be achie%ed. &8las for these bra%e wordsG The
long feud between the two states ended in .69 how to con*uer
without being able to B6 it,- whereas here we ha%e the statement
that -%ictory- can be achie%ed.- The e?planation is, that in the
former chapter, where the oHensi%e and defensi%e are under
discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one
cannot ma,e certain of beating him. Eut the present passage refers
particularly to the soldiers of :ueh who, according to un T#u-s
calculations, will be ,ept in ignorance of the time and place of
the impending struggle. That is why he says here that %ictory can
be achie%ed.5!!Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may
pre%ent him from fghting. cheme so asto disco%er his plans and the
li,elihood of their success. &8n alternati%e reading oHered by
Chia Lin is$ 5Know beforehand all plans conduci%e to our success
and to the enemy-s failure.5!+7ouse him, and learn the principle of
his acti%ity or inacti%ity. &Chang :u tells us that by noting
the )oy or anger shown by the enemyon being thus disturbed, we
shall be able to conclude whether his policy is to lie low or the
re%erse. (e instances the action of ChoC,u Liang, who sent the
scornful present of a woman-s headCdress to suCma ', in order to
goad him out of his Mabian tactics.Morce him to re%eal himself, so
as to fnd out his %ulnerable spots. &!.Carefully compare the
opposing army with your own, so that you may ,now where strength is
superabundant and where it is defcient. &Cf. '=. ss. ".!4'n
ma,ing tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is
to conceal them2 &The pi*uancy of the parado? e%aporates in
translation. Concealment is perhaps not so much actual in%isibility
/see supra ss. A0 as 5showing no sign5 of what you mean to do, of
the plans that are formed in your brain.conceal your dispositions,
and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from
the machinations of the wisest brains. &Tu 1u e?plains$ 5Though
the enemy may ha%e cle%er and capable o;cers, they will not be able
to lay any plans against us.5!"(ow %ictory may be produced for them
out of the enemy-s own tacticsJthat is what the multitude cannot
comprehend. &!apoleon than a ,nowledge of grammar will teach
him to write li,e Pibbon.5!A1ilitary tactics are li,e unto water2
for water in its natural course runs away from high places and
hastens downwards. &+Do in war, the way is to a%oid what is
strong and to stri,e at what is wea,. &Li,e water, ta,ing the
line of least resistance.+19ater shapes its course according to the
nature of the ground o%er which it Sows2 the soldier wor,s out his
%ictory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. &+!Therefore,
)ust as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are
noconstant conditions. &++(e who can modify his tactics in
relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be
called a hea%enCborn captain. &+.The f%e elements /water, fre,
wood, metal, earth0 are not always e*ually predominant2 &That
is, as 9ang (si says$ 5they predominate alternately.5the
fourseasons ma,e way for each other in turn. &Literally, 5ha%e
no in%ariable seat.5There are short days and long2 the moon has its
periods of waning and wa?ing. &Cf. =. ss. ". The purport of the
passage is simply to illustrate the want of f?ity in war by the
changes constantly ta,ing place in >ature. The comparisonis not
%ery happy, howe%er, because the regularity of the phenomena which
un T#u mentions is by no means paralleled in war. C ee more at$
http$OOsunt#usaid.comOboo,O"&sthash.?Pa)"sMn.dpuforth hill5
before the enemy had got wind of his mo%ements. 8 crushing defeat
followed for the Ch`in forces, who were obliged to raise the siege
of 6Cyu in all haste and retreat across the border.41aneu%ering
with an army is ad%antageous2 with an undisciplined multitude, most
dangerous. &' adopt the reading of the T`I>P T'3>, Cheng
:uChsien and the T`I (I, since they appear to apply the e?act
nuance re*uired in order to ma,e sense. The commentators using the
standard te?t ta,e this line to mean that maneu%ers may be
proftable, or they may be dangerous$ it all depends on the ability
of the general."'f you set a fully e*uipped army in march in order
to snatch an ad%antage, the chances are that you will be too late.
6n theother hand, to detach a Sying column for the purpose in%ol%es
the sacrifce of its baggage and stores. &ome of the Chinese
te?t is unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who paraphrase
the sentence. ' submit my own rendering without much enthusiasm,
being con%inced that there is some deepCseated corruption in the
te?t. 6n the whole, it is clear that un T#u does not appro%e of a
lengthy march being underta,en without supplies. Cf. infra, ss.
11.P T'3> is added$ 5Mrom this we may ,now the di;culty of
maneu%ering.5119e may ta,e it then that an army without its baggage
train is lost2 without pro%isions it is lost2 without bases of
supply it is lost. &' thin, un T#u meant 5stores accumulated in
depots.5 Eut Tu :u says 5fodder and the li,e,5 Chang :u says 5Poods
in general,5 and 9ang (si says 5fuel, salt, foodstuHs, etc.51!9e
cannot enter into alliances until we are ac*uainted with the
designs of our neighbors. &1+9e are not ft to lead an army on
the march unless we are familiar with the face of the countryJits
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and
swamps. &1.9e shall be unable to turn natural ad%antage to
account unless we ma,e use of local guides. &ss. 1!C1. are
repeated in chap. V'. ss. 4!.14'n war, practice dissimulation, and
you will succeed. &'n the tactics of Turenne, deception of the
enemy, especially as to the numerical strength of his troops, too,
a %ery prominent position.K!LMor a number of ma?ims on this head,
see 51arshal Turenne5 /Longmans, 1ADor can ordinary ob)ects be seen
clearly enough$ hence the institution of banners and Sags.
&!.Pongs and drums, banners and Sags, are means whereby the
ears and eyes of the host maybe focused on one particular point.
&Chang :u says$ 5'f sight and hearing con%erge simultaneously
on the same ob)ect, the e%olutions of as many as a million soldiers
will be li,e those of a single man.5G!4The host thus forming a
single united body, is it impossible either for the bra%e to
ad%ance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. &Chuang :u
*uotes a saying$ 53*ually guilty are those who ad%ance against
orders and those who retreat against orders.5 Tu 1u tells a story
in this connection of 9u Ch`i, when he was fghting against the
Ch`in tate. Eefore the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man
of matchless daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads
from the enemy, and returned to camp. 9u Ch`i had the man instantly
e?ecuted, whereupon an o;cer%entured to remonstrate, saying$ 5This
man was a good soldier, and ought not to ha%e been beheaded.5 9u
Ch`i replied$ 5' fully belie%e he was a good soldier, but' had him
beheaded because he acted without orders.5This is the art of
handling large masses of men. &!"'n nightCfghting, then, ma,e
much use of signalCfres and drums, and in fghting by day, of Sags
and banners, as a means of inSuencing the ears and eyes of your
army. &Ch`en (ao alludes to Li KuangCpi-s night ride to (oCyang
at the head of 4DD mounted men2 they made such an imposing display
with torches, that though the rebel leader hih suCming had a large
army, he did not dare to dispute their passage.!, year 1D, ss. 10
of Ts`ao Kuei, a protege of Bu,e Chuang of Lu. The latter tate was
attac,ed by Ch`i, and the du,e was about to )oin battle at
Ch`angCcho, after the frst roll of the enemy-s drums, whenTs`ao
said$ 5>ot )ust yet.5 6nly after their drums had beaten for the
third time, did he gi%e the word for attac,. Then they fought, and
the men of Ch`i were utterly defeated. Tuestioned afterwards by the
Bu,e as to the meaning of his delay, Ts`ao Kuei replied$ 5'n
battle, a courageous spirit is e%erything. >ow the frst roll of
the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is
already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. '
attac,ed when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height.
(ence our %ictory.5 9u T#u /chap. .0 puts 5spirit5 frst among the
5four important inSuences5 in war, and continues$ 5The %alue of a
whole armyJa mighty host of a million menJis dependent on one man
alone$ such is the inSuence of spiritG5a commanderCinCchief may be
robbed of his presence of mind. &Chang :u says$ 5Presence of
mind is the general-s mostimportant asset. 't is the *uality which
enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage into the
panic stric,en.5 The great general Li Ching /8.B. 4ine =ariations
out to be, but it has been suggested that they are connected with
the >ine ituations5 of chapt. V'. This is the %iew adopted by
Chang :u. The only other alternati%e is to suppose that something
has been lostJa supposition to which the unusual shortness of the
chapter lends some weight.1un T#u said$ 'n war, the general
recei%es his commands from the so%ereign, collects his army and
concentrates his forces. &7epeated from =''. ss. 1, where it is
certainly more in place. 't may ha%e been interpolated here merely
in order to supply a beginning to the chapter.!9hen in di;cult
country, do not encamp. 'n country where high roads intersect, )oin
hands with your allies. Bo not linger in dangerously isolated
positions. &The last situation is not one of the >ine
ituations as gi%en in the beginning of chap. V', but occurs later
on /ibid. ss..+. *.%.0. Chang :u defnes this situation as being
situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch`uan says
it is 5country in which there are no springs or wells, Soc,s or
herds, %egetables or frewood25 Chia Lin, 5one of gorges, chasms and
precipices, without a road by which to ad%ance.5'n hemmedCin
situations, you must resort to stratagem. 'n desperate position,
you must fght. &+There areroads which must not be followed,
&53specially those leading through narrow defles,5 says Li
Ch`uan, 5where an ambush is to be feared.5armies which must be not
attac,ed, &1ore correctly, perhaps, 5there are times when an
army must not be attac,ed.5 Ch`en (ao says$ 59hen you see your way
to obtain a ri%al ad%antage, but are powerless to inSict a real
defeat, refrain from attac,ing, for fear of o%erta?ing your men-s
strength.5towns which must not be besieged, &Cf. '''. ss. .
Ts`ao Kung gi%es an interesting illustration from his own
e?perience. 9hen in%ading the territory of (suCchou, he ignored the
city of (uaCpi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into
the heart of the country. This e?cellent strategy was rewarded by
the subse*uent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district
cities. Chang :u says$ 5>o town should be attac,ed which, if
ta,en, cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any
trouble.5 (sun :ing, when urged to attac, PiCyang, replied$ 5The
city is small and wellCfortifed2 e%en if' succeed inta,ing it, it
will be no great feat of arms2 whereas if ' fail, ' shall
ma,emyself a laughingCstoc,.5 'n the se%enteenth century, sieges
still formed a large proportion of war. 't was Turenne who directed
attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and
maneu%ers. (e said$ 5't is a great mista,e to waste men in ta,ing a
town when the same e?penditure of soldiers will gain a
pro%ince.5K1L51arshal Turenne,5 p. 4D.Npositions which must not be
contested, commands of the so%ereign which must not be obeyed.
&This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their re%erence
for authority, and 9ei Liao T#u /*uoted by Tu 1u0 is mo%ed to
e?claim$ 59eapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic
to %irtue, a military commander is the negation of ci%il orderG5
The unpalatable fact remains, howe%er, that e%en 'mperial wishes
must be subordinated to military necessity..The general who
thoroughly understands the ad%antages that accompany %ariation of
tactics ,nows how to handle his troops. &4The general who does
not understand these, may be well ac*uainted with the confguration
of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his ,nowledge to
practical account. &Literally, 5get the ad%antage of the
ground,5 which means not only securing good positions, but a%ailing
oneself of natural ad%antages in e%ery possible way. Chang :u says$
53%ery ,ind of ground is characteri#ed by certain natural features,
and also gi%es scope for a certain %ariability of plan. (ow it is
possible to turn these natural features to account unless
topographical ,nowledge is supplemented by %ersatility of mindF5"o,
the student of war who is un%ersed in the art of war of %arying his
plans, e%en though he be ac*uainted with the Mi%e 8d%antages, will
fail to ma,e the best use of his men. &Chia Lin tells us that
these imply f%e ob%ious and generally ad%antageous lines of action,
namely$ 5if a certain road is short, it must be followed2 if an
army is isolated, it must be attac,ed2 if a town is in a parlous
condition, it must be besieged2 if a position can be stormed, it
must be attempted2 and if consistent with military operations, the
ruler-s commands must be obeyed.5 Eut there are circumstances which
sometimes forbid a general to use these ad%antages. Mor instance,
5a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if he ,nows
that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an
ambush on it, he will not follow that road. 8 hostile force may be
open to attac,, but if he ,nows that it is hardCpressed and li,ely
to fght with desperation, he will refrain from stri,ing,5 and so
on.ot on high hills, but on ,nolls or hilloc,s ele%ated abo%e the
surrounding country.facing the sun. &Tu 1u ta,es this to mean
5facing south,5 and Ch`en (ao 5facing east.5 Cf. infra, . 11, 1+.Bo
not climb heights in order to fght. o much for mountain warfare.
&+8fter crossing a ri%er, you should get far away from it.
&5'n order to tempt the enemy to cross after you,5 according to
Ts`ao Kung, and also, says Chang :u, 5in order not to be impeded in
your e%olutions.5 The T`I>P T'3> reads, 5'f T(3 3>31:
crosses a ri%er,5 etc. Eut in %iew of the ne?t sentence, this is
almost certainly an interpolation..9hen an in%ading force crosses a
ri%er in its onward march, do notad%ance to meet it in midCstream.
't will be best to let half the army get across, and then deli%er
your attac,. &Li Ch`uan alludes to the great %ictory won by
(an(sin o%er Lung Chu at the 9ei 7i%er. Turning to the C(`'3>
(8> (I, ch. +., fol. " %erso, we fnd the battle described as
follows$ 5The two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the
ri%er. 'n the night, (an (sin ordered his men to ta,e some ten
thousand sac,s flled with sand and construct a dam higher up. Then,
leading half his army across, he attac,ed Lung Chu2 but after a
time, pretending to ha%e failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew
to the other ban,. Lung Chu was much elated by this unloo,edCfor
success, and e?claiming$ 5' felt sure that (an (sin was really a
cowardG5 he pursued him and began crossing the ri%er in his turn.
(an (sin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing
a great %olume of water, which swept down and pre%ented the greater
portion of Lung Chu-s army from getting across. (e then turned upon
the force which had been cut oH, and annihilated it, Lung Chu
himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the
further ban,, also scattered and Sed in all directions.4'f you are
an?ious to fght, you should not go to meet the in%ader near a ri%er
which he has to cross. &Mor fear of pre%enting his
crossing."1oor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the
sun. &ee supra, ss. !. The repetition of these words in
connection with water is %ery aw,ward. Chang :u has the note$5aid
either of troops marshaled on the ri%erCban,, or of boats anchored
in the stream itself2 in either case it is essential to be higher
than the enemy and facingthe sun.5 The other commentators are not
at all e?plicit.Bo not mo%e upCstream to meet the enemy. &Tu 1u
says$ 58s water Sows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on the
lower reaches of a ri%er, for fear the enemy should open the
sluices and sweep us away in a Sood. ChuC,o 9uChou has remar,ed
that -in ri%er warfare we must not ad%ance against the stream,-
which is as much as to say that our Seet must not be anchored below
that of the enemy, for then they wouldbe able to ta,e ad%antage of
the current and ma,e short wor, of us.5 There is also the danger,
noted by other commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the
water to be carried down to us.o much for ri%er warfare.
&etCli,ecountry, %enturing into which you become entangled.5/+0
tempori#ing ground2 &Pround which allows you to 5sta%e oH5 or
5delay.5/.0 narrow passes2 /40 precipitous heights2 /"0 positions
at a great distance from the enemy. &'t is hardly necessary to
point out the faultiness of this classifcation. 8 strange lac, of
logical perception is shown in the Chinaman-s un*uestioning
acceptance of glaring cross di%isions such as the abo%e.!Pround
which can be freely tra%ersed by both sides is called 8CC3'EL3.
&+9ith regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in
occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line
of supplies. &The general meaning of the last phrase is
doubtlessly, as Tu :u says, 5not to allow the enemy to cut your
communications.5 'n %iew of >apoleon-s dictum, 5the secret of
war lies in the communications,5K1Lee 5Pensees de >apoleon 1er,5
no. .P. &4Mrom a position of this sort, if the enemy is
unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. Eut if the enemy is
prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return
being impossible, disaster will ensue. &"9hen the position is
such that neither side willgain by ma,ing the frst mo%e, it is
called T31P67'U'>P ground. &Tu 1u says$ 53ach side fnds it
incon%enient to mo%e, and the situation remains at a
deadloc,.5IE67B'>8T'6>. &Tu 1u cites the unhappy case of
T`ien Pu K('> T`8>P (I, ch. 1.@N, who was sent to 9ei in @!1
8.B. with orders to lead an army against 9ang T`ingCts`ou. Eut the
whole time he was in command, his soldiers treated him with the
utmost contempt, and openly Souted his authority by riding about
the camp on don,eys,se%eral thousands at a time. T`ien Pu was
powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some
months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his
troops turned tail and dispersed in e%ery direction. 8fter that,
the unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.9hen
the o;cers are too strong and the common soldiers too wea,, the
result is C6LL8P3. &Ts`ao Kung says$ 5The o;cers are energetic
and want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly
collapse.51either o;cers nor men ha%e any regular routine.5and the
ran,s are formed in a slo%enly hapha#ard manner, the result is
utter B'67P8>'U8T'6>. &1A9hen a general, unable to
estimate the enemy-s strength, allows an inferior force to engage a
larger one, or hurls a wea, detachment against a powerful one, and
neglects to place pic,ed soldiers in the front ran,, the result
must be 76IT. &Chang :u paraphrases the latter part of the
sentence and continues$ 59hene%er there is fghting to be done, the
,eenest spirits should be appointed to ser%e in the front ran,s,
both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to
demorali#e the enemy.5 Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar /5Be Eello
Pallico,5 =. !@, .., et al.0.!DThese are si? waysof courting
defeat, which must be carefully noted by the general who has
attained a responsible post. &ee supra, ss. 1+.!1The natural
formation of the country is the soldier-s best ally2 &Ch`en (ao
says$ 5The ad%antages of weather and season are not e*ual to those
connected with ground.5but a power of estimating the ad%ersary, of
controlling the forces of %ictory, and of shrewdly calculating
di;culties, dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great
general. &!!(e who ,nows these things, and in fghting puts his
,nowledge into practice, will win his battles. (e who ,nows them
not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated. &!+'f fghting
is sure to result in %ictory, then you must fght,e%en though the
ruler forbid it2 if fghting will not result in %ictory, then you
must not fght e%en at the ruler-s bidding. &Cf. ='''. ss. + fn.
(uang hihC,ung of the Ch`in dynasty, who is said to ha%e been the
patron of Chang Liang and to ha%e written the 8> LI3(, has these
words attributed to him$ 5The responsibility of setting an army in
motion must de%ol%e on the general alone2 if ad%ance and retreat
are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will hardly be
achie%ed. (ence the godCli,e ruler and the enlightened monarch are
content to play a humble part in furthering their country-s cause
Klit., ,neel down to push the chariot wheelN.5 This means that 5in
matters lying outside the #enana, the decision of the military
commander must be absolute.5 Chang :u also *uote the saying$
5Becrees from the on of (ea%en do not penetrate the walls of a
camp.5!.The general who ad%ances without co%eting fame and retreats
without fearing disgrace, &'t was 9ellington, ' thin,, who said
that the hardest thing of all for a soldier is to retreat.whose
only thought is to protect his country and do good ser%ice for his
so%ereign, is the )ewel of the ,ingdom. &8 noble presentiment,
in few words, of the Chinese 5happy warrior.5 uch a man, says
(ohih, 5e%en if he had to suHer punishment, would not regret his
conduct.5!47egard your soldiers as your children, and they will
follow you into the deepest %alleys2 loo, upon them as your own
belo%ed sons, and they will stand by you e%en unto death. &Cf.
'. ss. ". 'n this connection, Tu 1u draws for usan engaging picture
of the famous general 9u Ch`i, from whose treatise on war 'ha%e
fre*uently had occasion to *uote$ 5(e wore the same clothes and ate
the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to ha%e
either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own
surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared e%ery hardship with
his men. 6ne of his soldiers was suHering from an abscess, and 9u
Ch`i himself suc,ed out the %irus. The soldier-s mother, hearing
this, began wailing and lamenting. omebody as,ed her, saying$ -9hy
do you cryF :our son is only a common soldier, and yet the
commanderCinCchief himself has suc,ed the poison from his sore.-
The woman replied, -1any years ago, Lord 9u performed a similar
ser%ice for my husband, who ne%er left him afterwards, and fnally
met his death at the hands of the enemy. 8nd now that he has done
the same for my son, he too will fall fghting ' ,now not where.-5
Li Ch`uan mentions the =iscount of Ch`u, who in%aded the small
state of (siao during the winter. The Bu,e of hen said to him$
51any of the soldiers are suHering se%erelyfrom the cold.5 o he
made a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men2
and straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined
with Soss sil,.!"'f, howe%er, you are indulgent, but unable to ma,e
your authority felt2 ,indChearted, but unable to enforce your
commands2 and incapable, moreo%er, of *uelling disorder$ then your
soldiers must be li,enedto spoilt children2 they are useless for
any practical purpose. &Li Ching once said that if you could
ma,e your soldiers afraid of you, they would not be afraid of
theenemy. Tu 1u recalls an instance of stern military discipline
which occurred in !1A 8.B., when Lu 1eng was occupying the town of
ChiangCling. (e had gi%en stringent orders to his army not to
molest the inhabitants nor ta,e anything fromthem by force.
>e%ertheless, a certain o;cer ser%ing under his banner, who
happened to be a fellowCtownsman, %entured to appropriate a bamboo
hat belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it o%er his
regulation helmet as aprotection against the rain. Lu 1eng
considered that the fact of his being also a nati%e of QuCnan
should not be allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline,
andaccordingly he ordered his summary e?ecution, the tears rolling
down his face, howe%er, as he did so. This act of se%erity flled
the army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth e%en articles
dropped in the highway were not pic,ed up.! (I, ch. 1, f. +.N 'n
"!1 8.B., Li Ching was sent from K`ueiCchou in suCch`uan to reduce
the successful rebel (siao (sien, who had set up as 3mperor at the
modern ChingCchou Mu in (upeh. 't was autumn, and the :angts#e
being then in Sood, (siao (sien ne%er dreamt that his ad%ersary
would %enture to come down through the gorges, and conse*uently
made no preparations. Eut Li Ching embar,ed his army without loss
of time, and was )ust about to start when the other generals
implored him to postpone his departure until the ri%er was in a
less dangerous state for na%igation. Li Ching replied$ 5To the
soldier, o%erwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and he must
ne%ermiss opportunities. >ow is the time to stri,e, before (siao
(sien e%en ,nows thatwe ha%e got an army together. 'f we sei#e the
present moment when the ri%er is in Sood, we shall appear before
his capital with startling suddenness, li,e the thunder which is
heard before you ha%e time to stop your ears against it. Kee =''.
ss. 1A, note.N This is the great principle in war. 3%en if he gets
to ,now of our approach, he will ha%e to le%y his soldiers in such
a hurry that they will not be ft to oppose us. Thus the full fruits
of %ictory will be ours.5 8ll came about as he predicted, and (siao
(sien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people
should be spared and he alone suHer the penalty of death.ta,e
ad%antageof the enemy-s unreadiness, ma,e your way by une?pected
routes, and attac, unguarded spots. &!DThe following are the
principles to be obser%ed by an in%ading force$ The further you
penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of
your troops, and thus the defenders will not pre%ail against you.
&!11a,e forays in fertile country in order to supply your army
with food. &Cf. supra, ss. 1+. Li Ch`uan does not %enture on a
note here.!!Carefully study the wellCbeing of your men, &Mor
5wellCbeing5, 9ang (si means, 5Pet them, humor them, gi%e them
plenty of food and drin,, and loo, after them generally.5and do not
o%erta? them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength.
&Ch`en recalls the line of action adopted in !!. E.C. by the
famous general 9ang Chien, whose military genius largely
contributed to the success of the Mirst 3mperor. (e had in%aded the
Ch`u tate, where a uni%ersal le%y was made to oppose him. Eut,
being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all
in%itations to fghtand remained strictly on the defensi%e. 'n %ain
did the Ch`u general try to force abattle$ day after day 9ang Chien
,ept inside his walls and would not come out, but de%oted his whole
time and energy to winning the aHection and confdence of his men.
(e too, care that they should be well fed, sharing his own meals
withthem, pro%ided facilities for bathing, and employed e%ery
method of )udicious indulgence to weld them into a loyal and
homogenous body. 8fter some time hadelapsed, he told oH certain
persons to fnd out how the men were amusing themsel%es. The answer
was, that they were contending with one another in putting the
weight and longC)umping. 9hen 9ang Chien heard that they were
engaged in these athletic pursuits, he ,new that their spirits had
been strung up to the re*uired pitch and that they were now ready
for fghting. Ey this time the Ch`u army, after repeating their
challenge again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust.
The Ch`in general immediately bro,e up his camp and followed them,
and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great
slaughter. hortly afterwards, the whole of Ch`u was con*uered by
Ch`in, and the ,ing MuCch`u led into capti%ity.Keep your army
continually on the mo%e, &'n order that the enemy may ne%er
,now e?actly where you are. 't has struc, me, howe%er, that the
true reading might be 5lin, your army together.5and de%ise
unfathomable plans. &!+Throw your soldiers into positions
whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to Sight. 'f
they will face death, there is nothing they may not achie%e.
&Chang :u *uotes his fa%orite 9ei Liao T#u /ch. +0$ 5'f one man
were to run amo, with a sword in the mar,etCplace, and e%erybody
else tried to get our of his way, ' should not allow that this man
alone had courage and that all the rest were contemptible cowards.
The truth is, that a desperado and a man who sets some %alue on his
life do not meet on e%en terms.56;cers and men ali,e will put forth
their uttermost strength. &Chang :u says$ 5'f they are in an
aw,ward place together, they will surely e?ert their unitedstrength
to get out of it.5!.oldiers when in desperate straits lose the
sense of fear. 'f there is no place of refuge, they will stand frm.
'f they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. 'f
there is no help for it, they will fght hard. &!4Thus, without
waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be constantly on the *ui
%i%e2 without waiting to be as,ed, they will do your will2
&Literally, 5without as,ing, you will get.5without
restrictions, they will be faithful2 without gi%ing orders, they
can be trusted. &!"Prohibit the ta,ing of omens, and do
awaywith superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no
calamity need be feared. &The superstitious, 5bound in to saucy
doubts and fears,5 degenerate into cowards and 5die many times
before their deaths.5 Tu 1u *uotes (uang hihC,ung$ 5-pells and
incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no o;cer allowed to
in*uire by di%ination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the
soldiers-minds should be seriously perturbed.- The meaning is,5 he
continues, 5that if all doubts and scruples are discarded, your men
will ne%er falter in their resolution until they die.5!. >ow the
(I8'CQ8> is a sna,e that is found in the Ch`ang mountains.
&5huaiC)an5 means 5suddenly5 or 5rapidly,5 and the sna,e in
*uestion was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its
mo%ements. Through this passage, the term in the Chinese has now
come to be used in the sense of 5military maneu%ers.5tri,e at its
head, and you will be attac,ed by its tail2 stri,e at its tail, and
you will be attac,ed by its head2 stri,e at its middle, andyou will
be attac,ed by head and tail both. &+D8s,ed if an army can be
made to imitate the (I8'CQ8>, &That is, as 1ei :aoCch`en
says, 5's it possible to ma,e the front and rear of an army each
swiftly responsi%e to attac, on the other, )ust as though they were
part of a single li%ing bodyF5' should answer, :es. Mor the men of
9u and the men of :ueh are enemies2 &Cf. ='. ss. !1.yet if they
are crossing a ri%er in the same boat and are caught by a storm,
they will come to each other-s assistance )ust as the left hand
helps the right. &The meaning is$ 'f two enemies will help each
other in a time of common peril, how much more should two parts of
the same army, bound together as they are by e%ery tie of interest
and fellowCfeeling. :et it is notorious that many a campaign has
been ruined through lac, of cooperation, especially in the case of
allied armies.+1(ence it is not enough to put one-s trust in the
tethering of horses, andthe burying of chariot wheels in the ground
&These *uaint de%ices to pre%ent one-s army from running away
recall the 8thenian hero ophanes, who carried the anchor with him
at the battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself
frmly to one spot. Kee (erodotus, 'V. .+!The principle on which to
manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must
reach. &Literally, 5le%el the courage Kof allN as though Kit
were that ofN one.5 'f the ideal army is to form a single organic
whole, then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its
component parts must be of the same *uality, or at any rate must
not fall below a certain standard. 9ellington-s seemingly
ungrateful description of his army at 9aterloo as 5the worst he had
e%er commanded5 meant no more than that it was defcient in this
important particularJunity of spirit and courage. (ad he not
foreseen the Eelgian defections and carefully ,ept those troops in
the bac,ground, he would almost certainly ha%e lost the day.++(ow
to ma,e the best of both strong and wea,Jthat is a *uestion
in%ol%ing the proper use of ground. &1ei :aoCch`en-s paraphrase
is$ 5The way to eliminate the diHerences of strong and wea, and to
ma,e both ser%iceable is to utili#e accidental features of the
ground.5 Less reliable troops, if posted in strong positions, will
hold out as long as better troops on more e?posed terrain. The
ad%antage of position neutrali#es the inferiority in stamina and
courage. Col. (enderson says$ 59ith all respect to the te?t boo,s,
and to the ordinary tactical teaching, ' am inclined to thin, that
the study of ground is often o%erloo,ed, and that by no means
su;cient importance is attached to the selection of positions...
and to the immense ad%antages that are to be deri%ed, whether you
are defending or attac,ing, from the proper utili#ationof natural
features.5K!L5The cience of 9ar,5 p. +++.N+.Thus the s,illful
general conducts his army )ust as though he were leading a single
man, willyCnilly, by thehand. &Tu 1u says$ 5The simile has
reference to the ease with which he does it.5+4't is the business
of a general to be *uiet and thus ensure secrecy2 upright and )ust,
and thus maintain order. &+"(e must be able to mystify his
o;cers andmen by false reports and appearances, &Literally, 5to
decei%e their eyes and ears.5and thus ,eep them in total ignorance.
&Ts`ao Kung gi%es us one of his e?cellent apophthegms$ 5The
troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning2
they may only re)oice with you o%er their happy outcome.5 5To
mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy,5 is one of the frst
principles in war, ashad been fre*uently pointed out. Eut how about
the other processJthe mystifcation of one-s own menF Those who may
thin, that un T#u is o%erCemphatic on this point would do well to
read Col. (enderson-s remar,s on tonewall Qac,son-s =alley
campaign$ 5The infnite pains,5 he says, 5with which Qac,son sought
to conceal, e%en from his most trusted staH o;cers, his mo%ements,
his intentions, and his thoughts, a commander less thorough would
ha%e pronounced useless5Jetc. etc.K+L5tonewall Qac,son,5 %ol. ', p.
.!1.N 'n theyear @@ 8.B., as we read in ch. .< of the (6I (8>
(I, 5Pan Ch`ao too, the feldwith !4,DDD men from Khotan and other
Central 8sian states with the ob)ect of crushing :ar,and. The King
of Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief commanderto succor the
place with an army drawn from the ,ingdoms of 9enCsu, KuCmo, and
9eiCt`ou, totaling 4D,DDD men. Pan Ch`ao summoned his o;cers and
also the King of Khotan to a council of war, and said$ -6ur forces
are now outnumbered and unable to ma,e head against the enemy. The
best plan, then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a
diHerent direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the
easterly route, and ' will then return myself towards the west. Let
us wait until the e%ening drum has sounded and then start.- Pan
Ch`ao now secretly released the prisoners whom he had ta,en ali%e,
and the King of Kutcha was thus informed of his plans. 1uch elated
by the news, the latter set oH at once at the head of 1D,DDD
horsemen to bar Pan Ch`ao-s retreat in the west, while the King of
9enCsu rode eastward with @DDD horse in order to intercept the King
of Khotan. 8s soon as Pan Ch`ao ,new that the two chieftains had
gone, he called his di%isions together, got them well in hand, and
at coc,Ccrow hurled them against the army of :ar,and, as it lay
encamped. The barbarians, panicCstric,en, Sed in confusion, and
were closely pursued by Pan Ch`ao. 6%er 4DDD heads were brought
bac, as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and
cattle and %aluables of e%ery description. :ar,and then
capitulating, Kutcha and the other ,ingdoms drew oH their
respecti%e forces. Mrom that time forward, Pan Ch`ao-s prestige
completely o%erawed the countries of the west.5 'n this case, we
see that the Chinese general not only ,ept his own o;cers in
ignorance of his real plans, but actually too, the bold step of
di%iding his army in order to decei%e the enemy.+ote how he returns
again and again to this point. 8mong the warring states of ancient
China, desertion was no doubt a much more present fear and serious
e%il than it is in the armies of today..1The diHerent measures
suited to the nine %arieties of ground2 &Chang :u says$ 56ne
must not be hideCbound in interpreting the rules for the nine
%arieties of ground.the e?pediency of aggressi%e or defensi%e
tactics2 and the fundamental laws of human nature$ these are things
that must most certainly be studied. &.!9hen in%ading hostile
territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings
cohesion2 penetrating but a short way means dispersion. &Cf.
supra, ss. !D..+9hen you lea%e your own country behind, and ta,e
your army across neighborhood territory, you fnd yourself on
critical ground. &This 5ground5 is curiously mentioned in ='''.
ss. !, but it does not fgure among the >ine ituations or the i?
Calamities in chap. V. 6ne-s frst impulse would be to translate it
distant ground,5 but this, if we can trust the commentators, is
precisely what is not meant here. 1ei :aoCch`en says it is 5a
position not far enough ad%anced to be called -facile,- and not
near enough to home to be -dispersi%e,- but something between the
two.5 9ang (si says$ 5't is ground separated from home by an
inter)acent state, whose territory we ha%e had to cross in order to
reach it. (ence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business there
*uic,ly.5 (e adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which
is the reason why it is not included among the >ine
ituations.9hen there are means of communication on all four sides,
the ground is one of intersecting highways. &..9hen you
penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. 9hen you
penetrate but a little way, itis facile ground. &.49hen you
ha%e the enemy-s strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in
front, it is hemmedCin ground. 9hen there is no place of refuge at
all, it is desperate ground. &."Therefore, on dispersi%e
ground, ' would inspiremy men with unity of purpose. &This end,
according to Tu 1u, is best attained byremaining on the defensi%e,
and a%oiding battle. Cf. supra, ss. 11.6n facile ground, ' would
see that there is close connection between all parts of my army.
&8s Tu 1u says, the ob)ect is to guard against two possible
contingencies$ 5/10 the desertion of our own troops2 /!0 a sudden
attac, on the part of the enemy.5 Cf. =''. ss. 1ine Prounds. e%eral
of these are defned twice o%er, besides which there are two
distinct lists of the corresponding %ariations. /.0 The length of
the chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other
e?cept 'V. ' do not propose to draw any inferences from these
facts, beyond the general conclusion that un T#u-s wor, cannot ha%e
come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands$ chap. ='''
is ob%iously defecti%e and probably out of place, while V' seems to
contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought
to appear elsewhere.41Mor it is the soldier-s disposition to oHer
an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fght hard when he
cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into
danger. &Chang :u alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch`ao-s de%oted
followers in (I, ch. .orthern barbarians, and that conse*uently he
is in a state of indecision, not ,nowing withwhich side to throw in
his lot. That surely is the reason. The truly wise man, we are
told, can percei%e things before they ha%e come to pass2 how much
more, then, those that are already manifestG- Thereupon he called
one of the nati%es who had been assigned to his ser%ice, and set a
trap for him, saying$ -9here are those en%oys from the (siungCnu
who arri%ed some day agoF- The man was so ta,en abac, that between
surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan
Ch`ao, ,eeping his informant carefully under loc, and ,ey, then
summoned a general gathering of his o;cers, thirtyCsi? in all, and
began drin,ingwith them. 9hen the wine had mounted into their heads
a little, he tried to rousetheir spirit still further by addressing
them thus$ -Pentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated
region, an?ious to achie%e riches and honor by some great e?ploit.
>ow it happens that an ambassador from the (siungCno arri%ed in
this ,ingdom only a few days ago, and the result is that the
respectful courtesy e?tended towards us by our royal host has
disappeared. hould this en%oy pre%ail upon him to sei#e our party
and hand us o%er to the (siungCno, our boneswill become food for
the wol%es of the desert. 9hat are we to doF- 9ith one accord, the
o;cers replied$ -tanding as we do in peril of our li%es, we will
follow our commander through life and death.- Mor the se*uel of
this ad%enture, see chap. V''. ss. 1, note.4!9e cannot enter into
alliance with neighboring princes until we are ac*uainted with
their designs. 9e are not ft to lead an army on the march unless we
are familiar with the face of the countryJits mountains and
forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. 9e
shall be unable toturn natural ad%antages to account unless we ma,e
use of local guides. &These three sentences are repeated from
=''. . 1!C1.Jin order to emphasi#e their importance, the
commentators seem to thin,. ' prefer to regard them as interpolated
here in order to form an antecedent to the following words. 9ith
regard to local guides, un T#u might ha%e added that there is
always the ris, of going wrong, either through their treachery or
some misunderstanding such as Li%y records /VV''. 1+0$ (annibal, we
are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighborhood of
Casinum, where there was an important pass to be occupied2 but his
Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin names,
caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of Casinum, and
turning from his proper route, he too, the army in that direction,
the mista,e not being disco%ered until they had almost arri%ed.4+To
be ignored of any one of the following four or f%e principles does
not beft a warli,e prince. &4.9hen a warli,e prince attac,s a
powerful state, his generalship shows itself in pre%entingthe
concentration of the enemy-s forces. (e o%erawes his opponents, and
their allies are pre%ented from )oining against him. &1ei
TaoCch`en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so
much aHected by the Chinese$ 5'n attac,ing apowerful state, if you
can di%ide her forces, you will ha%e a superiority in strength2 if
you ha%e a superiority in strength, you will o%erawe the enemy2 if
youo%erawe the enemy, the neighboring states will be frightened2
and if the neighboring states are frightened, the enemy-s allies
will be pre%ented from )oining her.5 The following gi%es a stronger
meaning$ 5'f the great state has once been defeated /before she has
had time to summon her allies0, then the lesser states will hold
aloof and refrain from massing their forces.5 Ch`en (ao and Chang
:u ta,e the sentence in *uite another way. The former says$
5Powerful though a prince may be, if he attac,s a large state, he
will be unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some e?tent
on e?ternal aid2 if he dispenses with this, and with o%erweening
confdence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the
enemy, he will surely be defeated.5 Chang :u puts his %iew thus$
5'f we rec,lessly attac, a large state, our own people will be
discontented and hang bac,. Eut if /as will then be the case0 our
display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy,
the other chieftains will ta,e fright and refuse to )oin
us.544(ence he does not stri%e to ally himself with all and sundry,
nor does he foster the power of other states. (e carries out his
own secret designs, ,eeping his antagonists in awe. &The train
of thought, as said by Li Ch`uan, appears to be this$ ecure against
a combination of his enemies, 5he can aHord to re)ect entangling
alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige
enable him to dispense with e?ternal friendships.5Thus he is able
to capture their cities and o%erthrow their ,ingdoms. &This
paragraph, though written many years before the Ch`in tate became a
serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the
famous i? Chancellors gradually pa%ed the way for her fnal triumph
under hih (uang Ti. Chang :u, following up his pre%ious note,
thin,s that un T#u is condemning this attitude of coldCblooded
selfshness and haughty isolation.4"Eestow rewards without regard to
rule, &9u T#u /ch. +0 less wisely says$ 5Let ad%ance be richly
rewarded and retreat be hea%ily punished.5issue orders
&Literally, 5hang5 or post up.5without regard to pre%ious
arrangements2 &5'n order to pre%ent treachery,5 says 9ang (si.
The general meaning is made clear by Ts`ao Kung-s *uotation from
the IC18 M8$ 5Pi%e instructions only on sighting the enemy2 gi%e
rewards when you see deser%ing deeds.5 Ts`ao Kung-s paraphrase$
5The fnal instructions you gi%e to your army should not correspond
with those that ha%e been pre%iously posted up.5 Chang :u simplifes
this into 5your arrangements should not be di%ulged beforehand.5
8nd Chia Lin says$ 5there should be no f?ity in your rules and
arrangements.5 >ot only is there danger in letting your plans be
,nown, but war often necessitates the entire re%ersal of them at
the last moment.and you will beable to handle a whole army as
though you had to do with but a single man. &Cf.supra, ss.
+..4i, lea%ing drums and banner on the feld, Sed to the di%ision on
the ri%er ban,, where another ferce battle was raging. The enemy
rushed out to pursue them and to secure the trophies, thus denuding
their ramparts of men2but the two generals succeeded in )oining the
other army, which was fghting with the utmost desperation. The time
had now come for the !DDD horsemen to play their part. 8s soon as
they saw the men of Chao following up their ad%antage, they
galloped behind the deserted walls, tore up the enemy-s Sags and
replaced them by those of (an. 9hen the Chao army loo,ed bac, from
the pursuit, the sight of these red Sags struc, them with terror.
Con%inced that the (ans had got in and o%erpowered their ,ing, they
bro,e up in wild disorder, e%ery eHort of their leader to stay the
panic being in %ain. Then the (an army fellon them from both sides
and completed the rout, ,illing a number and capturing the rest,
amongst whom was King :a himself.... 8fter the battle, some of (an
(sin-s o;cers came to him and said$ 5'n the 87T 6M 987 we are told
to ha%e a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a ri%er or marsh
on the left front. KThis appears to be a blend of un T#u and T`ai
Kung. ee 'V ss. A, and note.N :ou, on the contrary, ordered us to
draw up our troops with the ri%er at our bac,. Inder these
conditions, how did you manage to gain the %ictoryF5 The general
replied$ 5' fear you gentlemen ha%e not studied the 8rt of 9ar with
su;cient care. 's it not written there$ -Plunge your army into
desperate straits and it will come oH in safety2 place it in deadly
peril and it will sur%i%e-F (ad ' ta,en the usual course, ' should
ne%er ha%e been able to bring my colleague round. 9hat says the
1ilitaryClassicJ-woop down on the mar,etCplace and dri%e the men oH
to fght.- KThis passage does not occur in the present te?t of un
T#u.N 'f ' had not placed my troops in a position where they were
obliged to fght for their li%es, but had allowed each man to follow
his own discretion, there would ha%e been a general debandade, and
it would ha%e been impossible to do anything with them.5 The o;cers
admitted the force of his argument, and said$ 5These are higher
tactics than we should ha%e been capable of.5 Kee C(`'3> (8>
(I, ch. +., H. ., 4.N4AMor it is precisely when a force has fallen
into harm-s way that is capable of stri,ing a blow for %ictory.
&Banger has a bracing eHect."Duccess in warfare is gained by
carefully accommodating oursel%es to the enemy-s purpose.
&Ts`ao Kung says$ 5Meign stupidity5Jby an appearance of
yielding and falling in with theenemy-s wishes. Chang :u-s note
ma,es the meaning clear$ 5'f the enemy shows an inclination to
ad%ance, lure him on to do so2 if he is an?ious to retreat, delay
on purpose that he may carry out his intention.5 The ob)ect is to
ma,e him remiss and contemptuous before we deli%er our attac,."1Ey
persistently hangingon the enemy-s San,, &' understand the frst
four words to mean 5accompanyingthe enemy in one direction.5 Ts`ao
Kung says$ 5unite the soldiers and ma,e for the enemy.5 Eut such a
%iolent displacement of characters is *uite indefensible.we shall
succeed in the long run &Literally, 5after a thousand L'.5in
,illing the commanderCinCchief. &8lways a great point with the
Chinese."!This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer
cunning. &"+6n the day that you ta,e up your command, bloc, the
frontier passes, destroy the o;cial tallies, &These were
tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as a permit
or passport by the o;cial in charge of a gate. Cf. the
5borderCwarden5 of LI> :I '''. !., who may ha%e had similar
duties. 9hen this half was returned to him, within a f?ed period,
he was authori#ed to open the gate and let the tra%eler through.and
stop the passage of all emissaries. &3ither to or from the
enemy-s country.".Ee stern in the councilCchamber, &how no
wea,ness, and insist on your plans being ratifed by the
so%ereign.so that you may control the situation. &1ei :aoCch`en
understands the whole sentence to mean$ Ta,e the strictest
precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations."4'f the enemy
lea%es a door open, you must rush in. &""Morestall your
opponent by sei#ing what he holds dear, &Cf. supra, ss. [email protected]
subtly contri%e to time his arri%al on the ground. &Ch`en (ao`s
e?planation$ 5'f ' manage to sei#e a fa%orable position, but the
enemy does not appear on the scene, the ad%antage thus obtained
cannot be turned to any practical account. (e who intends
therefore, tooccupy a position of importance to the enemy, must
begin by ma,ing an artful appointment, so to spea,, with his
antagonist, and ca)ole him into going there as well.5 1ei :aoCch`en
e?plains that this 5artful appointment5 is to be made through the
medium of the enemy-s own spies, who will carry bac, )ust the
amount of information that we choose to gi%e them. Then, ha%ing
cunningly disclosed our intentions, 5we must manage, though
starting after the enemy, to arri%e before him /=''. ss. .0. 9e
must start after him in order to ensure his marching thither2 we
must arri%e before him in order to capture the place
withouttrouble. Ta,en thus, the present passage lends some support
to 1ei :aoCch`en-s interpretation of ss. .e%er %enture, ne%er
winGK1L5Inless you enter the tiger-s lair, you cannot get hold of
the tiger-s cubs.5N The only course open to us now is to ma,e an
assault by fre on the barbarians under co%er of night, when they
will not be able to discern our numbers. Profting by their panic,
we shall e?terminate them completely2 this will cool the King-s
courage and co%er us with glory, besides ensuring the success of
our mission.- the o;cers all replied that it would be necessary to
discuss the matter frst with the 'ntendant. Pan Ch`ao then fell
into a passion$ -'t is today,- he cried, -that our fortunes must be
decidedG The 'ntendant is only a humdrum ci%ilian, who on hearing
of our pro)ect will certainly be afraid, and e%erything will be
brought to light. 8n inglorious death is no worthy fate for %aliant
warriors.- 8ll then agreed to do as he wished. 8ccordingly, as soon
as night came on, he and his little band *uic,ly made their way to
the barbarian camp. 8 strong gale was blowing at the time. Pan
Ch`ao ordered ten ofthe party to ta,e drums and hide behind the
enemy-s barrac,s, it being arrangedthat when they saw Sames shoot
up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might.
The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in
ambuscade at the gate of the camp. (e then set fre to the place
from the windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums and
shouting arose onthe front and rear of the (siungCnu, who rushed
out pellCmell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch`ao slew three of them
with his own hand, while his companions cut oH the heads of the
en%oy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred
in all, perished in the Sames. 6n the following day, Pan Ch`ao,
di%ining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand$ -8lthough you did
not go with us last night, ' should not thin,, ir, of ta,ing sole
credit for our e?ploit.- This satisfed Kuo (sun, and Pan Ch`ao,
ha%ing sent for Kuang, King of hanCshan, showed him the head of the
barbarian en%oy. The whole ,ingdom was sei#ed with fear and
trembling, which Pan Ch`ao too, steps to allay by issuing a public
proclamation. Then, ta,ing the ,ing-s sons as hostage, he returned
to ma,e his report to Tou Ku.5 (6I (8> (I, ch. .$ 5To drop fre
into the enemy-s camp. The method by which this may be done is to
set the tips of arrows alight by dipping them into a bra#ier, and
then shoot them from powerful crossbows into the enemy-s lines.5!'n
order to carry out an attac,, we must ha%e means a%ailable.
&T`sao Kung thin,s that 5traitors in the enemy-s camp5 are
referred to. Eut Ch`en (ao is more li,ely to be right in saying$
59e must ha%e fa%orable circumstances in general, not merely
traitors to help us.5 Chia Lin says$ 59e must a%ail oursel%es of
wind and dry weather.5the material forraising fre should always be
,ept in readiness. &Tu 1u suggests as material for ma,ing fre$
5dry %egetable matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc.5
(ere we ha%e the material cause. Chang :u says$ 5%essels for
hoarding fre, stuH for lighting fres.5+There is a proper season for
ma,ing attac,s with fre, and special days for starting a
conSagration. &.The proper season is when the weather is %ery
dry2 the special days are those when the moon is in the
constellations of the ie%e, the 9all, the 9ing or the CrossCbar2
&These are, respecti%ely, the LI3(, ch. !$ 5The warli,e prince
controls his soldiers by his authority, ,its them together by good
faith, and by rewards ma,esthem ser%iceable. 'f faith decays, there
will be disruption2 if rewards are defcient, commands will not be
respected.51one should be more liberally rewarded. 'n no other
business should greater secrecy be preser%ed. &Tu 1u gi%es a
graphic touch$ all communication with spies should be carried
5mouthCtoCear.5 The following remar,s on spies may be *uoted from
Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any pre%ious
commander$ 5pies are attached to those who gi%e themmost, he who
pays them ill is ne%er ser%ed. They should ne%er be ,nown to
anybody2 nor should they ,now one another. 9hen they propose
anything %ery material, secure their persons, or ha%e in your
possession their wi%es and children as hostages for their fdelity.
>e%er communicate anything to them but what is absolutely
necessary that they should ,now.K!L51arshal Turenne,5 p.
+11.N14pies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuiti%e
sagacity. &1ei :aoCch`en says$ 5'n order to use them, one must
,now fact from falsehood, and be able to discriminate between
honesty and doubleCdealing.5 9ang (si in a diHerent interpretation
thin,s more along the lines of 5intuiti%e perception5 and
5practical intelligence.5 Tu 1u strangely refers these attributes
to the spies themsel%es$ 5Eefore using spies we must assure
oursel%es as to their integrity of character and the e?tent of
their e?perience and s,ill.5 Eut he continues$ 58 bra#en face and a
crafty disposition are more dangerous than mountains or ri%ers2 it
ta,es a man of genius to penetrate such.5 o that we are left in
some doubt as to his real opinion on the passage.51"They cannot be
properly managedwithout bene%olence and straightforwardness.
&Chang :u says$ 59hen you ha%e attracted them by substantial
oHers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity2 then they will
wor, for you with all their might.51