The Army of the 21st Century T - Support for the Soldier · sustained fights associated more with conventional forces. Hezbollah’s methods and tactics were a mix of the conven-tional

October 2009 n ARMY 25

The perils and challenges of the 21st century areincreasingly apparent. The United States’ senseof domestic invulnerability to external threatswas destroyed on 9/11. Since then, we havebeen at war—a long-term ideological struggle

with a global extremist network. More than one millionhave served in the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq,and more than 5,100 of our soldiers, sailors, marines,airmen and civilians have sacrificed their lives.

These opening engagements of the21st century are harbingers of theemerging security environment. Inthe years ahead, the United Stateswill confront complex, dynamic andunanticipated challenges to our na-tional security and to the collectivesecurity of our friends and allies.These challenges will occur in manyforms and will be waged across thespectrum of conflict—ranging frompeaceful competition to general warand at all points in between—and inall domains—land, sea, air, space andcyberspace.

The Army of the 21st Century

By GEN George W. Casey Jr.Army Chief of Staff

To succeed in this new environment, our Secretary ofDefense has reinforced the principle of balance in our de-fense strategy: balance in our response to the current con-flict vice preparing for future conflicts; balance in prepar-ing for irregular warfare vice conventional warfare; andbalance between the cultural advantages that have givenus security vice the cultural changes needed to preserve it.

Given the emerging security environment, the evolvingcharacter of conflict, and the Secretary of Defense’s visionof balance in our defense strategy, we see four roles forland forces in the 21st century: prevail in protracted coun-terinsurgency campaigns; engage to help other nationsbuild capacity and to assure friends and allies; support civilauthorities at home and abroad; deter and defeat hybridthreats and hostile state actors.

To fulfill these four roles, we need an Army that is a ver-satile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, oper-ating on a rotational cycle to provide a sustained flow oftrained and ready forces for full spectrum operations andto hedge against unexpected contingencies—all at a tempothat is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteerforce. To achieve this, we must continuously adapt ourforce and the institutions that support and generate it.

An Era of Persistent ConflictAfter more than seven years at war, we are facing a fu-

ture in which several global trends will shape the emerg-ing security environment and exacerbate the ideologicalstruggle we are engaged in. Although such trends poseboth dilemmas and opportunities, their comprehensiveimpact will increase security challenges and frame the

conflicts confronting our nation.Globalization can spread prosperity by accelerating the

transfer of trade, technology and ideas, but it can alsopropagate destabilizing influences. While globalization hasbrought prosperity to people around the world, its benefitsare unequally distributed, creating “have” and “have not”conditions that can spawn conflict. In addition, the interde-pendence of the global economy amplifies the local impactof distant crises, as demonstrated by the food, energy andfinancial disruptions of the last year.

Technology is another double-edged sword. Inexpensiveaccess to information enables entrepreneurs and innova-tors to collaborate in developing new technologies and im-proving existing ones. Yet our adversaries can exploit thesesame technologies to export terror around the globe.

Population growth in the developing world expandsmarkets, but the accompanying “youth bulge” can also in-crease the potential for instability and extremism. Studiespredict that the populations in some developing countrieswill double in the next few decades, and some estimateshold that by 2030, 60 percent of the world’s population willlive in cities. This speaks volumes about the densely popu-lated urban areas in which our land forces will operate inthe future. Conversely, in some portions of the developedworld, population growth is negative; depopulation un-dermines established economies and cultures, inviting po-tentially destabilizing immigration.

Increased resource demand is a consequence of growingglobal prosperity and populations. While this demand mayencourage more efficient use of natural resources and thedevelopment of alternatives, burgeoning middle classes incountries like China and India will exacerbate demands onalready scarce resources. These rising demands for energy,water and food may enhance the potential for conflict.

Climate change and natural disasters have energizedstates and international institutions to work closer togetherto alleviate suffering. They can also compound already dif-

26 ARMY n October 2009

GEN George W. Casey Jr. became the36th Chief of Staff of the Army in April2007. His previous assignment was com-mander, Multi-National Force-Iraq. Hehas served in operational assignments inGermany, Italy, Egypt, Southwest Asiaand the United States and has commandedat every level from platoon to division.GEN Casey served as a congressional pro-

gram coordinator for the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaisonand as the special assistant to the Army Chief of Staff. He re-turned to the field as chief of staff for the 1st Cavalry Divisionbefore commanding the division’s 3rd Brigade. He became the as-sistant chief of staff, G-3 (Operations), and later the chief of stafffor V Corps. He then became assistant division commander (Ma-neuver) and then assistant division commander (Support) forthe 1st Armored Division. He returned to Washington to serveas the deputy director for Politico-Military Affairs, J-5, for TheJoint Staff, before commanding the 1st Armored Division in Ger-many. He later commanded the Joint Warfighting Center andserved as the director for Joint Training, J-7, U.S. Joint ForcesCommand, the director of Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, andthe director of The Joint Staff. He also served as the 30th ViceChief of Staff of the Army. GEN Casey has a master’s degree ininternational relations from the University of Denver.

ficult conditions in developing countries, causing humani-tarian crises, driving destabilizing population migrationsand raising the potential for epidemic diseases.

The two trends of greatest concern are proliferation andfailing states. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMDs) increases the potential for catastrophic attacks thatmay be globally destabilizing. Al Qaeda and affiliated terror-ist groups already seek WMDs and, given the opportunity,will use them against Western interests. Meanwhile, failed orfailing states that lack the capacity or will to maintain territo-rial control can provide safe havens forterrorist groups to plan and export op-erations. The merging of these twotrends is particularly worrisome: failingstates that offer safe haven to terroristsseeking weapons of mass destruction.

The combined impact of these trendsmakes it likely that the next decadeswill be ones of persistent conflict—pro-tracted confrontation among state,nonstate and individual actors that areincreasingly willing to use violence toachieve their political and ideologicalends. In the years ahead, as interestscollide across the globe, protractedcompetition and friction will manifestthemselves in many forms. As a result,our commitments in the future will bemore frequent and continuous; con-flicts will arise unpredictably, vary inintensity and scope, and will be lesssusceptible to the traditional mecha-nisms of conflict resolution.

The Character of Conflict EvolvesNations and other actors will act to serve their own in-

terests, so conflict is a “normal” aspect of our environment.Although the fundamental nature of conflict is timeless, itscharacter reflects the particular conditions of each epoch.The global trends that shape this era of persistent conflictwill also significantly shape the character of conflict in the21st century.

Conflicts will be waged between and among diverse ac-tors, both state and nonstate, with the former frequentlyacting covertly and the latter sometimes acting throughstate sponsorship or as a proxy for a state. The SecondLebanon War in 2006 pitted the state of Israel against anonstate actor, Hezbollah, supported by Iran and Syria, in-side the territory of Lebanon. Such situations pose specialchallenges to an international system that has been focusedon conflict between and among nation-states. Conflict mo-tives, objectives and even the identities of protagonists willbe difficult to discern and will shift over time. The pres-ence and power of nonstate actors, in particular their abil-ity to challenge nation-states, is a significant shift in thecharacter of conflict. States no longer hold a monopoly onthe instruments of war.

Ideological competition for sovereignty and influenceover populations also characterizes current conflict. Gain-ing the support of indigenous populations, always instru-mental to the outcome of conflict, is now so important thatconflict cannot be waged around the people—it is unavoid-ably waged among the people. Many of the safe havens weencounter today are “safe” not because of their geographiclocation, but because of the popular support our adver-saries find in those locations. Adversaries will seek to miti-gate our advantages, operating anonymously among in-

digenous populations to avoid detection and counteraction.Hezbollah, for example, made extensive use of civilian ar-eas to deter Israeli counterstrikes.

Future conflicts will be unpredictable and may arisesuddenly, expand rapidly into unanticipated locations, andlast for unexpected durations. Adversaries will pursue dy-namic combinations of means, shifting their employmentin rapid succession and exploiting the element of surprise.Conflicts may also expand to areas historically immune toconflict, such as space and cyberspace. Previous trendsmay be reversed suddenly: Hezbollah inflicted more Is-raeli casualties per Arab fighter in 2006 than did any oppo-nent of Israel in 1956, 1967, 1973 or 1982.

Local conflicts and their social, economic and politicalconsequences offer increasing potential for spillover, creat-ing regional and globally destabilizing effects. Moreover,the interconnectedness of a globalized world can causecrises to spread quickly while the conditions necessary toresolve crises, such as governance or effective rule of law,usually evolve slowly; this poses increased challenges forgovernments.

Conflicts will continue to take place under the unblink-ing scrutiny of the 24-hour media cycle and the WorldWide Web. A global media presence and increasingly uni-

October 2009 n ARMY 27

versal access to information will ensure that details of aconflict are rapidly available through social and cyber net-works. Adversaries will have many forums in which todisseminate their messages worldwide.

Future conflicts will also present a new array of threatsthat defy simple categorization. Formerly, we could differ-entiate and categorize threats as conventional or unconven-tional; regular or irregular; high intensity or low intensity;traditional, terrorist or criminal. Such categorization wasuseful because each categorized threat had an associatedcounter. It is no longer enough to discern the “correct” con-flict category and then pursue a singular solution; we aremore likely to face hybrid threats—dynamic combinationsof conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilitiesemployed asymmetrically to counter our advantages.

The Israeli-Hezbollah conflict also illustrates the poten-tial impact of hybrid threats. Hezbollah employed moderncivil technology (secure cell phones, computers and videotelecommunications systems) combined with militarymeans (antitank, surface-to-air and antiship missiles, rock-ets, mortars and unmanned aerial vehicles) and impro-vised explosive devices in an innovative array of unantici-pated patterns. In addition, Hezbollah placed an emphasison holding ground, concentrated its forces and engaged insustained fights associated more with conventional forces.Hezbollah’s methods and tactics were a mix of the conven-tional and unconventional.

Clearly, today’s nonstate actors are not limited to irregu-lar, guerrilla methods. The future is not simply irregularwarfare by nonstate actors—adversaries can be expected to

use a full spectrum of options, includ-ing every political, economic, informa-tional and military measure at theirdisposal. When combined with cul-tural and demographic factors, thesemeasures will present U.S. militaryleaders with complex challenges thatwill require increasingly complex solu-tions. Hybrid threats necessitate hybridsolutions, and such solutions increas-ingly require military forces that areadaptive and versatile enough to func-tion in a variety of situations againstmyriad threats with a diverse set of na-tional, allied and indigenous partners.

Given the strategic environmentand the projected character of 21st-century conflict, we believe that, forthe next several decades, we shouldprepare our land forces, as part of ajoint and interagency team, to:

n Prevail in protracted counterinsur-gency campaigns. It is imperative thatwe prevail in our current missions inIraq and Afghanistan. Successful coun-


terinsurgency (COIN) operations are inherently protracted,and we must be prepared to sustain the required level ofcommitment to prevail in these and future COIN operations.

n Engage to help other nations build capacity and to assurefriends and allies. The Army can help in preventing futureconflicts by increasing the capacity of other nations’ securityforces—both military and police—to uphold the rule of law,ensure domestic order and deny their territory to terrorists.

n Support civil authorities at home and abroad. We work pri-marily through the National Guard to provide support tocivil authorities in the United States, augmenting them withactive forces as necessary. Abroad, we will provide supportto various agencies of governments, as we are doing in Iraqand Afghanistan today, helping them plan, integrate and ex-ecute the political, economic and information elements ofnational strategy. This should be seen as a national asset.

n Deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors.While we do not anticipate a “near-peer competitor” chal-lenging us in the foreseeable future, we can never losesight of the requirement to train and prepare for this state-on-state conflict. There are nations in the world todaytraining their forces with our Army as their primary threat.

A Balanced Army for the 21st CenturyFulfilling these four roles for land forces will require a

fundamentally different Army from the one we had before9/11. While the Army has been progressively adapting sincethe end of the Cold War, we must take advantage of whatwe continue to learn in our current operations, use emerg-ing technology and continuously adapt to build a balancedArmy to meet the demands of 21st-century conflict.

We need to continuously adapt to a versatile mix of tai-lorable and networked organizations, operating on a rota-tional cycle, to provide a sustained flow of trained andready forces for full spectrum operations and to hedgeagainst unexpected contingencies—ata tempo that is predictable and sustain-able for our all-volunteer force.

One truism about predicting the fu-ture is that we will never get it exactlyright; indeed, we can only aspire not tobe too wrong. Thus we need to buildversatility into our force. We will de-velop a versatile mix of forces that al-lows us to address the broadest rangeof future requirements, providing us a base from which to adapt to reality as it unfolds. The advent of modularbrigades is a great first step in buildingthis versatile mix of organizations, butit is not the only step. A versatile armymust provide operational commandersa balanced mix of force types—heavy,Stryker, light, special operations forces(SOF) and enablers—so that they candevise effective combinations for anytactical situation. It is our strategic esti-

mate, supported by our experience over the last decade, thatwe need a multiweight force: Infantry brigade combat teams(BCTs) augmented with protected vehicles, Stryker BCTs,and armored BCTs, all integrated with SOF and enablers, toprovide the nation with versatile land-force options for thewide variety of security challenges we will face. All of theseformations have some utility at any point on the spectrum ofconflict, while each BCT type possesses relative advantagesthat compensate for the disadvantages of the other types.

The Army’s modular design efforts of the past five yearshave immeasurably enhanced the inherent versatility ofArmy units. Modular units were designed to be tailorable.We have distributed critical enablers previously held at divi-sion level and higher to BCTs, improving their ability to betailored for a broad range of missions. These key enablers in-clude intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; civil af-fairs; psychological operations; public affairs capabilities; andexpanded logistics support, providing them the versatility toeffectively perform a variety of missions and to operate inde-pendently. The Army can also task organize these modularunits with force packages of additional enablers to enhancetheir ability to meet expanded mission requirements, increas-ing the land options available to combatant commanders.

We can extend this versatility by rethinking the composi-tion of our Army prepositioned stocks, ensuring that theycontain full spectrum capabilities, including those that in-crease the survivability of Infantry BCTs within an impro-vised explosive device environment. In this way, we can en-sure that our forces are fully prepared for the broadestrange of challenges.

Moreover, these units will be networked, providing robustdigital connectivity down to the soldier level. The networkwill enable our soldiers to access information at the rightplace and time to achieve a decisive advantage over any en-emy they face. The network will enhance their situational


awareness, enabling them to know where they are, wherefriendly forces are and where the enemy is, and affordingthem the ability to engage the enemy with precision fires. Itwill give commanders the ability to fuse data more effi-ciently, enabling a more accurate understanding of the battle-field and better collaboration to enhance decision making. Infuture operational environments, where the tactical environ-ment and strategic environment will often be seamless, it isthe network that will provide the ability to gain and main-tain the operational advantage over our adversaries.

To provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forcesat a tempo sustainable for our all-volunteer force, we haveinstituted a rotational readiness model called Army forcegeneration (ARFORGEN). ARFORGEN is a transformationin how the Army builds readiness, and it includes both ac-tive and reserve component forces.

The ARFORGEN model consists of three force pools: reset,train-ready and available. Each of the three force pools con-tains a versatile force package to provide a sustained flow offorces for current commitments and to hedge against unex-pected contingencies. The force pools are available at varyingtime intervals based on their readiness levels to provide op-erational and strategic depth. The ARFORGEN model pro-vides a versatile mix of ready forces capable of full spectrumoperations at a boots-on-the-ground (BOG)-to-dwell ratio ofone to two for active component (AC) forces and one to fourfor reserve component (RC) forces. The optimal ARFORGENallows for a BOG-to-dwell ratio of one to three and one tofive for active and reserve components, respectively. (BOGrefers to time spent deployed, and dwell refers to time spentnot deployed, so that a one to two BOG to dwell could meanone year deployed and two years at home.) In emergencies,the model permits “surging” forces from the train-ready poolto meet unexpected demands.

We are organizing our force structure on the ARFORGENmodel to continuously supply an operational headquarters;

five tactical headquarters; 20 Infantry,Stryker and armored BCTs; and en-abling forces organized, trained andequipped for full spectrum operationsat a sustainable rate of one to two ACand one to four RC. This versatile mixof land forces could sustain operationsin Iraq and Afghanistan and, at lowerdemand levels, provide ready globalreaction forces and regionally orientedforces for engagement in support ofcombatant commander theater securitycooperation programs. Further, thismodel allows us to surge portions ofanother five-division corps and en-abling forces from the train-ready poolto respond to unexpected contingenciesacross the spectrum of conflict, and itallows us to have two more corps avail-able at longer commitment times toprovide strategic depth.

The enablers generated as part of each force package arean essential component of the ability of the Army to sus-tain land campaigns and to provide support to the jointforce. These enablers provide a versatile mix of operationalcapabilities. They consist of tailorable packages of aviation,artillery, engineers, intelligence, sustainment and other ca-pabilities that enable commanders to organize their opera-tional areas to achieve their campaign objectives. Enablersalso provide the versatility to conduct full spectrum opera-tions by permitting tailoring of force packages with thetype and amount of capabilities required for a specific en-vironment or mission. Our modular enablers are designedto “plug-in” to allow for rapid adjustment within a forcewhen the environment or enemy changes.

We are building an integrated Total Force in which ourRC forces are also on a rotational cycle, but at a deploy-ment rate of about half that of their AC counterparts. Thiscyclical readiness model will increase predictability for sol-diers, families, employers and communities, and enableour RC to remain an integral element of the operationalforce while providing the nation with a strategic reserve(that is, those nondeployed RC units that are two to threeyears from commitment).

The increased demands of our combatant commanders,coupled with the size of our AC force, require that we rou-tinely employ RC forces as part of our operational force.Continued and routine access to our RC forces is essentialto sustaining current operations, as is improving the over-all operational experience and quality of our RC forces. Inaddition, adequate Army National Guard forces will beready and immediately available to their state and territor-ial authorities to respond to domestic crises.

We have begun the implementation of ARFORGEN andare already using the model to meet the requirements forArmy forces around the world, but we are doing so mostlywith institutions and processes that were originally de-


2 x RC ForcePools

RESET TRAIN – READY AVAILABLE

ACTIVITYRecovery

From Deployment

Full SpectrumTraining/Preparefor Deployment

Deployed orAvailable for Deployment/Engagement

READINESSLEVEL

Not Ready

Manned andEquipped at C2 Levels to

C1 Levels

Manned andEquipped at

C1 Level

AVAILABILITY > 180 Days 90–180 Days Available

FORCE PACKAGE

1 Corps HQRemainder

of RC Forces*

1 Corps HQ4 Div HQs20 BCTs

~92K Enablers


~92K Enablers


~92K Enablers

Army Capabilities (FY11 Goal)1:2 (AC) and 1:4 (RC)

*The remainder of our 18 divisions, 73 BCTs and enablers would rotate through the force pools at a 1:4 ratio.

signed for an Army of a different era. Our generating force,the force that recruits, equips, trains and sustains our Army,is critically important to building the Army of the 21st cen-tury. Without our generating force, we would not have beenable to sustain the last eight years of continuous mobiliza-tion and combat operations across two separate theaters. Noother nation in the world has the quality or capacity in itsgenerating force that America has. While the generatingforce has been constantly adapting to meet the requirementsof the operating force over the last eight years, we must nowlook for fundamental change in the generating force to sup-port an Army operating on a rotational cycle. The generat-ing force must be as versatile as the operating force it sup-ports. This will require making fundamental changes to theprocesses and policies we use to manage the Army. Once themission is defined, our institutions must seamlessly andcontinuously adapt—tailoring force packages and quicklyreadjusting training, staffing and equipping—to ensureunits have all of the tools necessary to succeed. Adaptingour institutions and generating-force processes to supportan Army operating on a rotational cycle is an essential ele-ment of our transformation.

Land Force QualitiesA balanced Army adapted to the requirements of 21st-cen-

tury conflict will be fundamentally different in every dimen-sion of doctrine, organization, training, staffing, equipping,stationing and support from the Army we had on 9/11. Abalanced Army must be organized to be versatile; deployableenough to be expeditionary; responsive enough to be agile;precise enough to be lethal; robust and protected enough tobe sustainable; and flexible enough to be interoperable with awide range of partners. These qualities—being versatile, ex-peditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable and interoperable—arethe defining qualities of a balanced Army. They describe not

only the operating force, but also the generating force, andwill form the basis of our overall modernization strategy andfor the ground combat vehicle.

Versatile. Versatility is the central organizing principle of abalanced Army. It is this quality that will enable our forcesand institutions to effectively execute operations across thespectrum of conflict. Versatility implies that: Precision is im-possible when predicting force requirements in this volatileand uncertain strategic environment, and that our Armymust be able to react to the future as it actually presents itself.A versatile force must possess a balanced mix of multipur-pose capabilities and sufficient capacity to execute our doc-trine of full spectrum operations across the range of militaryoperations, from peacetime engagement to major combat.

Versatility begins with how the Army thinks—a solidfoundation of coherent, relevant and adaptive concepts anddoctrine. The revision of Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operationsestablished full spectrum operations as our capstone opera-tional concept: Army forces combine offensive, defensive and sta-bility or civil-support operations simultaneously as part of an in-terdependent joint force to seize, retain and exploit the initiative,accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive re-

sults. The concepts supporting fullspectrum operations are further refinedin updates to subordinate doctrinalmanuals such FM 3-24 Counterinsur-gency and FM 3-07 Stability Operations.

Most importantly, the Army is onlyas versatile as its soldiers, leaders andcivilians. Every soldier is a warrior, andeach must be trained and ready to ef-fectively operate in any environment.Versatile leaders are competent in theircore proficiencies, yet broad enough tooperate across the spectrum of conflict.Army civilians must be adaptable, pro-viding broad expertise and stabilityacross myriad tasks and functions. De-veloping versatile soldiers, leaders andcivilians will enable us to lead the ver-satile Army we need to overcome 21st-century challenges.

Expeditionary. The dynamic and glob-al character of conflict will require theArmy, as part of a joint force, to de-

ploy to the site of problems in austere and unfamiliar loca-tions around the world, to sustain operations for extendedperiods of time, and to engage with the security forces ofother nations. To do this, we must be expeditionary. TheArmy must be organized, trained and equipped to provideforces capable of operating in austere environments, com-fortable in diverse cultural environments, able to conductjoint forcible entry operations and able to fight, if neces-sary, upon arrival.

The ARFORGEN model and the Army’s global force pos-ture define the available start points for expeditionary re-sponse. We have recently shifted to a more continental U.S.-


based posture, adjusting our forward stationing. There is anatural tension between the flexibility of a continental U.S.-based response posture and the immediacy of forwardpresence. Forward-stationed forces are an indicator of ourregional commitment and a source of assurance to ourfriends and allies. They also provide a mechanism to in-crease our cultural awareness and sensitivity. This shift to acontinental U.S.-based posture puts added significance onmaintaining a robust joint forcible entry capability.

An expeditionary Army must also retain an expeditionarymind-set—the confidence and competence to quickly adaptand function effectively in any physical or cultural environ-ment. Such a mind-set requires soldiers, leaders and civil-ians to be mentally prepared to deploy anywhere in theworld on short notice. Soldiers possessing an expeditionarymind-set have the critical-thinking skills necessary to adaptquickly to unexpected situations in unfamiliar physical sur-roundings and are prepared to succeed in austere and com-plex conditions.

An expeditionary mind-set also hasa cultural component. In an era char-acterized by conflicts in which inter-action between soldiers and indige-nous populations could mean thedifference between victory and defeat,soldiers, leaders and civilians mustfeel confident interacting with peopleof different cultural backgrounds andperspectives. Developing this confi-dence demands that soldiers, leadersand civilians become culturally astuteand able to use this awareness to op-erate innovatively.

Agile. While versatility is the abilityto do different tasks, agility is the abil-ity to rapidly shift from one task to an-other. An agile Army must have forces

that can quickly adapt to exploit oppor-tunities in complex environments. Todo this, we require not only agile unitsbut also agile minds and institutions.

To build and maintain our agility, wemust remain a learning organization,quickly absorbing lessons learned,sharing them and applying them tocurrent and future problems. One keyto institutionalizing our learning isadaptive doctrine. Doctrine must growand adapt based on the hard-earnedlessons being learned daily in the field.Our institutions must be able to quicklycollect, analyze, learn and disseminatebest practices from units in contact andadapt Army doctrine.

Soldiers must possess the mentalagility to react quickly and appropri-ately to changing situations and com-

plex environments. We must prepare soldiers and leadersto function effectively in these complex operational envi-ronments through a variety of institutional, operationaland self-development educational and training opportuni-ties. Army training and education programs must be dy-namic and adaptive, instilling full spectrum capabilities inthe operating force while keeping pace with constantlyevolving doctrine and operational requirements. We willcontinue to incorporate hard-learned battlefield tactics,techniques and procedures into individual and collectivetraining so that soldiers and leaders possess the requisiteand relevant skills for full spectrum operations. Diverse,realistic training and education will develop the agile sol-diers and leaders that make up agile units.

To direct agile soldiers, the Army must continue to de-velop agile leaders able to handle the challenges of full spec-trum operations. Agile leaders are adaptive thinkers who usetheir individual initiative and understanding of the environ-


ment to quickly and boldly seize and exploit opportunitiesas they present themselves. While our junior officers andnoncommissioned officers have had ample opportunities todevelop their mental agility on the battlefield, we must de-velop and empower agile, adaptive leaders at all levels, fromthe tactical to the strategic.

Agile soldiers deserve agile institutions. While focused onbuilding versatile, agile units capable of adapting to chang-ing environments, the institutional Army has continued toutilize processes and procedures designed to support a staticArmy. To support an agile operating force, the Army musthave an agile generating force. This requires fundamentallytransforming generating-force and supporting processes tomore effectively and efficiently prepare trained and readyforces for combatant commanders. Institutional agility al-lows us to adapt to the realities of the future as they presentthemselves.

Lethal. Only the armed forces possess the core compe-tency of applying lethal force. This competency requiresthe capability to overmatch any enemy across the spec-trum of conflict while mitigating collateral damage. TheArmy achieves such competency by operating as part of ajoint team with air, naval and special operations forces.

Conflicts among populations require the use of propor-tional lethal force with precision. To do so, soldiers andleaders must be able to quickly and accurately identify tar-gets; discriminate between hostile, friendly and neutral ac-tors; and apply precise lethal effects on identified targets.

Lethal precision requires superior intelligence capabili-ties, precise delivery systems and broad situational aware-ness. As the Army provides “capability packages” to BCTscurrently fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, these systemswill provide precision fires and advanced intelligence, sur-veillance and reconnaissance capabilities, exponentially in-creasing soldiers’ ability to positively identify and applyprecision lethality to legitimate threats. Concurrently, thesesystems enable operational-level commanders to gainbroader situational awareness and shift resources appro-priately to gain an advantage over the threat, while miti-gating collateral damage to the surrounding populace.

Finally, the requirement for precision also extends tohow we apply nonlethal effects. In a population-centric op-erating environment, we must be precise in the executionof information operations to ensure that we are sendingthe most effective message to the right audience in a timelymanner. Mastery of the information environment is a criti-cal component of full spectrum operations.

Sustainable. The anticipated expeditionary nature ofArmy operations in the 21st century—abroad for extendedperiods of time in austere and unfamiliar locations—re-quires a fundamentally different view of sustainability. Asustainable Army must integrate national and global re-sources to ensure that forces are physically available, prop-erly equipped, at the right place at the right time, with theright tools to support the combatant commanders. Flexibil-ity and agility must be the hallmarks of expeditionary sus-tainability. In addition, our sustainment footprint must


take into account the social and political realities of thecountries to which we may deploy.

The modularity of the Army sustainment force structurehas kept pace with the remainder of the Army. Today oursustainability is achieved through a mix of soldiers, civil-ians and contractors. We must continually assess that mixto ensure that it will be adequate across the entire spec-trum of potential operations to provide the most expedi-tionary sustainment capability for the operational force.

The Army has developed an affordable equipping strat-egy that supports ARFORGEN and an Army on a rotationalreadiness cycle. Army acquisition must use technologiesthat make us lighter and more mobile while maintaining orimproving our survivability and lethality. We must con-tinue to push research and development to produce smallerand lighter energy sources, fuel-efficient engines, andlighter and stronger protection materials.

Our view of the future security environment includes theproliferation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) acrossthe battlefield. This puts added emphasis on developingtechnologies and tactics, techniques and procedures that en-hance the protection of the force, creating urgency in devel-oping the next breakthrough in lighter protection technolo-gies. In addition, a smaller logistics footprint will be enabledby advances in energy efficiency and reduction in logisticsdemand by developing more reliable equipment. Whencoupled with a network-enabled common logistics operat-ing picture, our forces will be more sustainable in austereenvironments and able to decrease the frequency of drivingdown IED-strewn lines of communication.

Interoperable. Well beyond the capability to operate on thesame radio frequencies and utilize the same caliber ammuni-tion, an interoperable army must be able to build unity of ef-fort with other government agencies, indigenous forces and

international partners. The Army canlead the development of interoperabil-ity with other agencies, allies and in-digenous forces by sharing our plan-ning and organizational skills. TheArmy can also facilitate unity of effortthrough the development of both an in-teroperable mind-set and interoperabletechnologies.

To enhance the Army’s interoper-ability and ensure a common view ofhow the Army, the joint force and civilgovernment agencies should workcollaboratively, we must actively con-tribute to the development of intera-gency doctrine. Such doctrine wouldprovide the intellectual and institu-tional basis for success in full spec-trum operations and would ensurethat we are integrating all joint, intera-gency, intergovernmental and multi-national efforts to achieve our com-mon strategic objectives.

Furthermore, we must expand educational and experi-ential opportunities for leaders and soldiers beyond theDepartment of Defense, including graduate school andtraining with industry, other government agencies, andwith allies and partners. The Army’s asymmetric advan-tage is its people; therefore, we must commit the resourcesnecessary to maximize their intellectual abilities to effec-tively employ all elements of national power.

Leading ChangeThe 21st-century security environment and the continu-

ous adaptation of the Army in order to remain ahead ofrapidly evolving threats will put a premium on leaders ofcharacter and competence, leaders grounded in Army Val-ues and the Warrior Ethos. This will require a commitmentby the institution, leaders and individuals to lifelong learn-ing and development as well as a balanced approach totraining, education and experience as the foundation ofany leader-development plan. Furthermore, our leader-de-velopment policies and programs must support ARFOR-GEN and the rotational readiness model in order to pro-vide balance and predictability for our all-volunteer Army.

The Army of the 21st century described here will requirecontinuous change. Our strategic environment has evolveddramatically, and so has the Army. The challenges of insti-tutional change in large organizations like the Army aresubstantial, especially as we are adapting an organizationthat is already the best in the world at what it does. Ourtest must not be, “Have we changed?” It must be, “Have wechanged enough?” Everything is on the table except our corevalues. We are building an agile, disciplined warrior teamthat is dominant across the spectrum of 21st-century con-flict. It will be, inherently, a balanced Army for a balancedstrategy. M


The Army of the 21st Century T - Support for the Soldier · sustained fights associated more with conventional forces. Hezbollah’s methods and tactics were a mix of the conven-tional

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