VOLUME 71 2014 THE AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO CIVILIAN-MILITARY/INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM CAPACITY BUILDING LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN KEANE AND MAJOR KENNETH A. ARTZ EXAMINING BLASPHEMY: INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY REGARDING FREE SPEECH LIEUTENANT COLONEL ERIC M. JOHNSON CYBER NEUTRALITY: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF TRADITIONAL JUS IN BELLO NEUTRALITY RULES THROUGH A PURPOSE-BASED LENS MAJOR ZACHARY P. AUGUSTINE WHEN THERE ARE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM THE MISAPPLICATION OF NEPA MAJOR DANIEL J. WHITE NON-GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES’ PERSONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN PUBLIC ACQUISITION: A CASE FOR GREATER HARMONIZATION MAJOR GARRETT JONATHAN BRUENING BEYOND SKYNET: RECONCILING INCREASED AUTONOMY IN COMPUTER-BASED WEAPONS SYSTEMS WITH THE LAWS OF WAR CAPTAIN CHRISTOPHER M. KOVACH ARTICLES T H E J U D G E A D V O C A T E G E N E R A L ’ S C O R P S U N I T E D S T A T E S A I R F O R C E
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Volume 71 2014
THE AIR FORCELAW REVIEW
An IntegrAted ApproAch to cIvIlIAn-MIlItAry/InterAgency counterterrorIsM cApAcIty BuIldIng
Lieutenant CoLoneL Stephen Keane and Major Kenneth a. artz
exAMInIng BlAspheMy: InternAtIonAl lAw, nAtIonAl securIty And the u.s. ForeIgn polIcy regArdIng Free speech
Lieutenant CoLoneL eriC M. johnSon
cyBer neutrAlIty: A textuAl AnAlysIs oF trAdItIonAl Jus In Bello neutrAlIty rules through A purpose-BAsed lens
Major zaChary p. auguStine
when there Are no Adverse eFFects: protectIng the envIronMent FroM the MIsApplIcAtIon oF nepA
Major danieL j. White
non-governMentAl eMployees’ personAl conFlIcts oF Interest In puBlIc AcquIsItIon: A cAse For greAter hArMonIzAtIon
Major garrett jonathan Bruening
Beyond SKynet: reconcIlIng IncreAsed AutonoMy In coMputer-BAsed weApons systeMs wIth the lAws oF wAr
Captain ChriStopher M. KovaCh
ARTICleS
THE
JUDG
E ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS
UN ITED STATES AIR FORCE
THE AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW
AFPAM 51-106
The Air Force Law Review is a publication of The Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force. It is published semiannually by The Judge Advocate General’s School as a professional legal forum for articles of interest to military and civilian lawyers. The Law Review encourages frank discussion of relevant legislative, administrative, and judicial developments.
The Air Force Law Review does not promulgate Department of the Air Force policy. The opinions and conclusions expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of The Judge Advocate General, The Judge Advocate General’s Corps, or any other department or agency of the U.S. Government.
The Law Review solicits contributions from its readers. Information for contributors is provided on the inside back cover of this issue.
Readers who desire reprint permission or further information should contact the Editor, The Air Force Law Review, The Judge Advocate General’s School, 150 Chennault Circle, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 36112-6418. Official governmental requests for free copies, not under the depository program, should also be sent to the above address.
Cite this Law Review as 71 A.F. l. rev. (page number) (2014).
The Air Force Law Review is available online at http://www.afjag.af.mil/library.
i
An IntegrAted ApproAch to cIvIlIAn-MIlItAry/InterAgency counterterrorIsM cApAcIty BuIldIng ................................................................... 1
Lieutenant CoLoneL Stephen Keane and Major Kenneth a. artz
exAMInIng BlAspheMy: InternAtIonAl lAw, nAtIonAl securIty And the u.s. ForeIgn polIcy regArdIng Free speech ........................................ 25
Lieutenant CoLoneL eriC M. johnSon
cyBer neutrAlIty: A textuAl AnAlysIs oF trAdItIonAl Jus In Bello neutrAlIty rules through A purpose-BAsed lens ............................................ 69
Major zaChary p. auguStine
when there Are no Adverse eFFects: protectIng the envIronMent FroM the MIsApplIcAtIon oF nepA ..................................................................... 107
Major danieL j. White
non-governMentAl eMployees’ personAl conFlIcts oF Interest In puBlIc AcquIsItIon: A cAse For greAter hArMonIzAtIon ............................. 163
Major garrett jonathan Bruening
Beyond SKynet: reconcIlIng IncreAsed AutonoMy In coMputer-BAsed weApons systeMs wIth the lAws oF wAr ......................................................... 231
Captain ChriStopher M. KovaCh
THE AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW
VOL. 71 2014
ii
iii
THE AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW
lIeutenAnt generAl chrIstopher F. Burne, usAFThe Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
colonel KIrK l. dAvIes, usAFCommandant, The Judge Advocate General’s School
lIeutenAnt colonel MArK B. McKIernAn, usAFMAJor Andrew r. BArKer, usAF
MAJor trAcy A. pArK, usAFMAJor lAurA c. desIo, usAF
Ms. thoMAsA t. pAul
Editors, The Air Force Law Review
EDITORIAL BOARD
colonel MAry e. hArney, usAFcolonel MIchAel J. MccorMIcK, usAFr
lIeutenAnt colonel roBert s. huMe, usAFlIeutenAnt colonel AAron e. woodwArd, usAF
MAJor lAurA lee MArtIn, usAFMAJor dAvId e. FeIth, usAF
cAptAIn JArrod h. stuArd, usAFcAptAIn seth w. dIlworth, usAFcAptAIn MeghAn t. sMorol, usAFcAptAIn MAIte s. KollMAn, usAF
cAptAIn FrederIc l. puglIese, usAFcAptAIn JAred c. BruFF, usAF
Mr. roBert A. wIllIAMs
Mr. peter J. cAMp
Ms. cArA M. Johnson
Mr. wIllIAM h. hIll, IIIMr. thoMAs g. BecKer
Authority to publish automatically expires unless otherwise authorized by the approving authority. Distribution: members of The Judge Advocate General’s Corps, USAF; judge advocates of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; law schools; and professional bar association libraries.
iv
An Integrated Approach to Civilian-Military/Interagency 1
I. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................... 2 II. SITUATION................................................................................................ 3 III. CURRENTUSGEFFORTSATFOREIGNCAPACITYBUILDING....... 5 IV. IMPROVINGUNITYOFEFFORTINTHEUSG.................................. 10 V. THEIMPORTANCEOFTHERULEOFLAWINFOREIGNCT
CAPACITYBUILDING........................................................................... 16 VI. LEGALOPTIONSFORCIVIL-MILITARYCTDETENTION
ANDPROSECUTION.............................................................................. 17 VII. RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................... 22
A.General................................................................................................. 22B.Specific................................................................................................ 22
VIII. CONCLUSION........................................................................................ 23
ANINTEGRATEDAPPROACHTOCIVILIAN-MILITARY/INTERAGENCYCOUNTERTERRORISMCAPACITYBUILDING
Lieutenant CoLoneL Stephen Keane* and Major Kenneth a. artz**
* LieutenantColonelStephenKeane,U.S.MarineCorps,B.A.UniversityofArizona(1994);J.D.WilliamandMarySchoolofLaw(2002);LL.M.TheJudgeAdvocateGeneralLegalCenterandSchool(2006);currentlyCommandingOfficerMarineCorpsSecurityForceBattalionBangor,Washington.PriortothisassignmenthewasaMarineCorpsFellowtotheDepartmentofJustice,NationalSecurityDivision.** MajorKennethA.Artz,U.S.AirForce,B.A.UniversityofMichigan(1988);J.D.,ChicagoKentCollegeofLaw(1996);currentlyChiefofMediaandCommunications,HQAF/JA.PriortothisassignmenthewasanAirForceStrategicPolicyFellowattheDepartmentofJustice,NationalSecurityDivision.HeisamemberoftheStateBarofMichigan.
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I.INTRODUCTION
ForeignCounterTerrorism(CT)capacitybuildingisvitallyimportanttotheNationalSecurityoftheUnitedStates.Currently,avastarrayofU.S.Government(USG)organizations,militaryandcivilian,areinvolvedwithUSGCTcapacitybuildingefforts.ItiscrucialforthenationalsecurityoftheUnitedStatesfortheUSGtovastlyimproveandsynchronizeitseffortsintheareaofCTcapacitybuild-ing.Currently,andforavarietyofreasons,manyofUSGCTcapacitybuildingorganizationsoperateinacompartmentalizedor“stovepiped”fashion.AclearvisionfromacentralUSGauthoritydetailinghowsuchoperationsshouldbeplannedforandcarriedoutwouldenhancetheoveralleffectivenessofCTcapacitybuildingoperations.Correspondingly,establishingformalizedprocessesforinteragencycoordinationacrossUSGCTcapacitybuildingentitieswillensuretheUSG’soverallpolicyobjectivesinthisareaareexecutedconsistentlyandclearly.
TherearemanyUSGorganizationsworkingtowardsthesamegoalofhelpingothercountriesfightterrorismbutunityofeffortislackingamongthesedisparateandoftencompetingorganizations.Clearassignmentofroles,missions,andacentralizedfundingsourcefromaUSGcentralauthoritywouldgreatlyreduceunnecessaryredundancyandensurethattheUSGresourcesaremostefficientlyemployed.Establishingformalizedprocessesforinter-agencycoordinationacrossUSGCTcapacitybuildingentitieswillensurethattheUSG’soverallpolicyobjec-tivesinthisareaareexecutedconsistentlyandclearly.Ultimately,theUSGshouldestablishaCTcapacitybuildingframeworkthatutilizesmorecentralizedplanningtoenablebetterinformedandresourceddecentralizedexecution.EnhancedUSGunityofeffort,andlessstovepipingofeffort,willtranslateintomorecrediblyconveyingthecivil-militaryunityofeffortapproachtotheentitiestheUSGsupportsthroughCTcapacitybuildingoperations.
PresidentObamarecentlyrecognizedtheneedforincreasedunityofeffortwhenhereleasedPresidentialPolicyDirective-23(PPD-23).1ThepublicfactsheettotheApril2013documentstatesthata“collaborativeapproach,bothwithintheUnitedStatesGovernmentandamongallies,partners,andmultilateralorganizations”2iskeytoSecuritySectorAssistance(SSA),anareathatencompassesforeignCTcapacitybuilding.PPD-23furtheremphasizesthepolicythatunityofeffortacrosstheUnitedStatesGovernmentisessential,bothinresponsetoemergentopportunitiesandinsupportoflong-termpartnerships.3
First,thisarticlewillgenerallydiscussthethreatofterrorismtotheUnitedStates(U.S.)anditsallies.Next,thisarticlewilladdresstheUSG’scurrenteffortsat
1the whIte house, FAct sheet: u.s. securIty sector AssIstAnce polIcy (Apr.5,2013),http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy.2 Id.3 See id.
An Integrated Approach to Civilian-Military/Interagency 3
foreignCTcapacitybuilding.ThethirdsectionwilldiscusswaystoimproveunityofeffortintheUSGinordertoimprovetheUSG’sCTcapacitybuildingefforts.ThefourthsectionwillhighlighttheimportanceofestablishingtheruleoflawinCTcapacitybuilding.Finally,thearticlewillexploretheimportanceofdevelopingacommonsenselegalframeworktodealwithdetaineesseizedduringCToperations,asignificantproblemthatcanpreventsuccessfulCTcapacitybuildingoperations.
II.SITUATION
ThepurposeofCTcapacitybuildingistopreventterroristsfromharmingtheU.S.homelandorourallies.TheterroristorganizationsthattheUSGanditsalliesarecounteringmaybegroupedbroadlyintotwogeneralcategories.Politicalterroristsuseterrorisminanattempttoachieveapoliticalgoalsuchastheoverthrowofagovernment.Ideologicalterroristsemployterrorismdrivenbyextremedogmaandmaybecharacterizedbyadesiretodestroycertainformsofsocietalstructure.Bothtypesofterroristorganizationsuseviolenceasaweapontoachievetheirgoals.Theuseofterroristicviolenceisalsoemployed,onincreasingoccasion,bystatesagainsttheirowncitizens,insurgentgroupsandcriminalgangs.4
Terroristorganizationstypicallyseektooperateinareaswheretheyhaveacertaindegreeofimpunitysuchasremoteborderareas,ungovernedspaces,andperhapsevenonthehighseasandincyberspace.Becausetheyincreasinglyoperateinareasthatlacksecurecontrolbyastatelawenforcementapparatus,takingactiontodisrupt,dismantle,anddefeatterroristorganizationspresentsacomplexarrayofchallenges.Terroristorganizationsmayutilizeorganizedcriminalactivitiesorevenotherwiselegitimatebusinessactivitiestofinanceterroroperations.Terroristgroupshavealsobeenknowntopartnerwithorganizedcriminalorganizationsforfinancingandsupport.5
Additionally,modernterroristorganizationsaretypicallynon-stateactorsthatoperateoutsideoftraditionalmilitaryorganizations,anddonotrespectthecustomarylawofarmedconflict,theGenevaConventionsorbasichumanrights.Terroristorganizationsmayexercisecontroloverterritory,aswellaselementsofthepoliceand/orgovernmentinstitutions.Terrorismposesriskstoastate,andacapabilityforlethalityanddestruction,thatmayexceedtherisksposedbymoreconventionalcriminalenterprisesmotivatedprimarilybyfinancialgain.Manymodernterroristorganizationspossessalevelofsophistication,training,andfire-powercommensuratewithamilitaryorganization.Terroristorganizationcapabilities
4 PaulShemalla,Introduction,inFIghtIng BAcK: whAt governMents cAn do ABout terrorIsM1-2(PaulShemallaed.,2011)(referringtoThomasR.Mockaitis,Terrorism, Insurgency, and Organized Crime,inid.at11).5 Id.
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oftenexceedthecapabilityoftraditionallawenforcementorganizationstoaddressindependently.6
Post-conflictenvironmentsinparticularlendthemselvestoexploitationbylawlessgroupsandterrorists.IntestimonytotheSenateArmedServicesCommittee,AssistantSecretaryofDefenseMichaelSheehandescribedhow:
Despitetheuniquevariablesofeachcasetherewereconstants,infactalltoofamiliarconstantsthatfaceduseverytime:
• Lawandorderhadcompletelybrokendown;therewerenoviablestateinstitutions• Localpolicehadstoppedtofunctionandwereovertakenbymilitaryandparamilitaryforces• Therewasnofunctioningjudicialorpenalsystem• Therewasminimalornofunctioningcivilsociety,suchasapressorcivicorganizations• Thecountrywasbankruptwithnoresourcestohireandretainpublicworkersincludingpolice
Threeconsistentcomplaintswereheardconcerningtheresponsetothischallenge,mostoftencomingfromthemilitaryforcesthatwereforcedtomoveintothesecurityvacuumcreatedbybrokenpoliceforces.
• Thetrainingofthenewforcestartedtoolateandproceededtooslowly,emboldeningtrouble-makinggroups• Therewerenotenoughresourcestotrain,equiporpaythepolice• Therewasashortageofexpertiseindevelopingleadersandspecialists• Therewasnojudicialsystemtohandlecriminalsandothertroublemakersifapprehendedbymilitaryorpoliceunits7
Clearly,thethreatposedbyterrorismissignificant.Terrorismhasbeenreferredtoasaproblemthatiscomplexandglobalized,andmoreoftenthannotrelatedtoothertransnationalthreats.8TheUSGhasbeenincreasinglyleveragingitsvastresourcesforCTcapacitybuildinginanefforttoaddressthiscomplexproblem.
6 Id.at1-6.7 Building Police Forces in a Post-Conflict Environment: Testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;Apr.21,2004(statementofMichaelA.Sheehan;DeputyComm’rforCounterTerrorism,NewYorkCityPoliceDep’t;currentAss.Sec.ofDef.forSpecialOperations&LowIntensityConflicts),available athttp://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/sheehan_post_conflict_police.pdf(lastvisitedApr.30,2014).8 NaureenChowdhuryFink,Meeting the Challenge: A Guide to United Nations Counterterrorism
An Integrated Approach to Civilian-Military/Interagency 5
III.CURRENTUSGEFFORTSATFOREIGNCAPACITYBUILDING
OnSeptember11,2001,theworldawoketothestarkrealityandthreatofterrorism.AlthoughtheattackhappenedintheUnitedStates,theplanningandtheperpetratorsallemanatedfromoverseas.Inresponsetothe9/11attack,theUSGhasincreasinglymovedtowardpreventingterrorismabroadbeforetheenemycanconductterroristoperationsintheUnitedStates.9
ThereisasubstantialamountofforeignCTcapacitybuildingbeingcon-ductedthroughoutthecivilianandmilitarycomponentsoftheUSG.TheUnitedStates’military,intelligence,andlawenforcementagencieseachhavebeenintenselyinvolvedinforeignCTcapacitybuildingefforts.Themilitary’seffortsaremostevidentinthehigherprofileconflictsofIraqandAfghanistan.Forexample, inAfghanistan,aswasdoneinIraq,theU.S.militaryisworkingsidebysidewithmembersofnumerousUSGexecutiveagencies,suchastheDepartmentofState(DoS)andtheDepartmentofJustice(DOJ),tohelpestablishanewlegalsystemandruleoflawregimethatwillstabilizeandprotectthesupportedcountry.10
Inaddition,theDepartmentofDefense(DoD)runstheDefenseInstituteofInternationalLegalStudies(DIILS),ajointmilitaryprogramwhichsupportstheCTcapacitybuildingmissionbyprovidingruleoflawandcounter-terrorismtrainingandeducationtoforeignmilitaryofficers,legaladvisors,andcivilians.11InFY2011,DIILSconductedone-hundredthirtyseminarsallovertheworldwithpartnernationsseekingruleoflawtraining.Foreignmilitaryofficers,legaladvisorsandpertinentciviliansreceivethisimportanttrainingtohelpsetuporimprovetheirmilitaryandcivilianjusticesystems.Thetraining,mostimportantly,buildsaccountabilityandtransparencyacrosstheirlegalsystems.12
AnotherDoDorganization,theDefenseSecurityCooperationAgency(DSCA),directsandmanagessecuritycooperationprogramsandresourcestopromoteU.S.interestsandbuildalliedandpartnercapacities.TheDSCAfocusesonpromotingandsupportingself-defenseandcoalitionoperationsintheglobalwaronterrorism,andpromotingpeace-timeandcontingencyaccessforU.S.forces.13
Activities 3(June2012),http://www.ipinst.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/363-meeting-the-challenge-a-guide-to-united-nations-counterterrorism-activities.html.9the whIte house, the nAtIonAl securIty strAtegy(2006),available athttp://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/print/index.html.10 See e.g., u.s. dep’t oF stAte, rule oF lAw progrAMs In AFghAnIstAn, May4, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/189320.htm;Dep’tofState,Strengthening Iraq,May19,2011,http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163826.htm; UniversityofSouthCarolina,Rule Of Law Collaborative, http://www.rolc.sc.edu(lastvisitedApr.30,2014).11AboutDefenseInstituteofInternationalLegalStudies,https://www.diils.org/node/1455541/about(lastvisitedApr.30,2014).12 Id.13 See WhatisDSCA?,http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/HRbrochure5.pdf(lastvisitedApr.30,2014).
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NavalPostGraduateSchoolinMonterrey,California,runstheCenterforCivil-MilitaryOperations(CCMR).CCMRhasthemissionofbuildingpartnercapacityandimprovinginteragencyandinternationalcoordinationandcooperationbyaddressingcivil-militarychallenges.Thesechallengesinclude:enhancingcivil-militaryrelations,supportingdefensereformandinstitutionbuilding,improvingpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingoperations,andcombatingterrorism.Theyhaveconductedprogramsforoverone-hundredandfiftycountries.14
TheDoDhasclearlyshoulderedthebulkofthemissioninAfghanistanbecauseofthedangeroussecuritysituation.ThroughtheCombatantCommand,CENTCOM,variousdepartmentswithintheDoDhavecombatedterrorisminAfghanistan.Approximately20percentofSOCOM’s60,000membersaredeployedtonotonlyAfghanistan,butalso78othercountriesaroundtheworldworkingwithhostnationmilitariesandothercapacitybuildingefforts.15Still,alackofinteragencyunityofeffortcontinuestoplagueoperations.16
TheU.S.MarineCorps,alreadyaleaderincapacitybuildingoperationsbyusingMarineExpeditionaryUnitsandMarineSpecialOperationsCommand’s(MARSOC)ForeignMilitaryTrainingUnitstoengagewithforeignpartners,islean-ingforwardinthedrivetoenhanceinteragencyeffortsonseveralfronts.TheMarineCorpshasestablishedtheSecurityCooperationGrouptoexecuteandenablesecuritycooperationprograms,training,planning,andactivitiesinordertoensureunityofeffort.TheMarineshavealsoassignedseveralFieldGradeOfficersthroughouttheinteragencyviabothfellowshipsandpermanentassignments.MostnotablytheMarineshaverecentlypublishedtheMarineCorpsInteragencyIntegrationStrategywhichdetailshowtheMarinesintendtoworkeffectivelywithintheinteragencyframework.17
CivilianagenciestookmoretimetobegintheirforeignCTworkthantheDoD.However,inthepastfewyears,progresshasbeenmadeasamultitudeofothergovernmentagencieshavebeenengagedinCTcapacitybuildingaswell.
14 See CenterForCivilMilitaryRelations,http://www.ccmr.org/capabilities/(lastvisitedApr.30,2014).15 Jr.Wilson,SOCOM: The Year in Review,Mar.22,2012,http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/socom-the-year-in-review/.16 RandyGeorge&DanteParadiso,The Case for a Wartime Chief Executive Officer Fixing the Interagency Quagmire in Afghanistan, ForeIgn AFF,June21,2011,http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/roundtables/does-the-afghan-war-need-a-ceo.17 usMc InterAgency IntegrAtIon strAtegy (MArIne corps servIce cAMpAIgn plAn) 2012-2020 Annex v(2013), available at http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/142496/usmc-interagency-integration-strategy-marine-corps-service-campaign-plan-2012-2.aspx.
An Integrated Approach to Civilian-Military/Interagency 7
On4January2012,theDoStransformedthe30-plusyear-oldOfficeoftheCoordinatorofCounterterrorismintotheBureauofCounterterrorismtostrengthentheDepartment’sabilitytocarryoutcounterterrorismmissionsaroundtheworld.18ThemissionoftheBureauistoleadtheDepartment’seffortstobuildforeigncounterterrorismcapacityabroadintheciviliansectorandcontributeeffortsinthemilitaryanddefensesectors.19TheBureauofCounterterrorismisalsoworkingwiththenewlyestablishedStrategicCounterterrorismCommunicationsInitiative,whichwasestablishedbyapresidentialExecutiveOrderon9September2011,toreinforce,integrate,andcoordinateUSGcommunicationsinvestmentstocombatterrorismandextremismaroundtheworldinanefforttocountertheactionsandideologyofal-Qaidaanditsaffiliates.20
In2011, theDoSspearheadedcreatingtheGlobalCounterTerrorismForum(GCTF).TheGCTFhas29foundingmemberstatesandtheEuropeanUnion.ThepurposeoftheGCTFistobuildaninternationalframeworkfordeal-ingwith21stCenturyterroristthreats.21TheGCTFhasamassed$175milliontostrengthen“counterterrorism-relatedruleoflawinstitutions,andhasdevelopedbestpracticedocumentsinruleoflaw,combatingkidnappingforransomandprisonde-radicalizationanddisengagement.”TheGCTFisalsointheprocessofdevelopingtwointernationaltrainingcentersintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricaregionthatwillprovidetrainingincounteringviolentextremismandbetteringruleoflawinstitutions.22TheGCTF’sglaringweaknessisinitsneglectofthewholeofgovernmentunifiedapproachtoCTcapacitybuilding.
TheGCTFisalsoresponsiblefordraftingandadoptingtheRabatMemo-randumonGoodPracticesforEffectiveCounterTerrorismPracticeintheCriminalJusticeSector(“TheRabatMemorandum”).23TheRabatMemorandumisanexampleofa“goodpractice”documentthatprovideswidelyacceptedinvestigativeandprosecutorialgoodpractices(e.g.,developmentanduseofcooperatingwitnesses,ortheuseofaformofpleabargaining)thatarenowbeingimplementedworld-wideaskeycomponentsofacomprehensiveCTlegalregime.Unfortunately,theRabatMemorandumissilentonthebenefitofincorporatingacivil-militaryinteragencyapproachthatincorporatesmilitaryassetsandcapabilitiesintoCT.Duetothissignificantomission,thememorandumfallsshortofaframeworkforbasingCTcapacitybuildingefforts.
18AmbassadorDanielBenjamin,Establishment of the Bureau of Counterterrorism,Jan.4,2012,http:www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/180148.htm.19 U.S.dep’t oF stAte,ten thIngs you should Know ABout the stAte depArtMent’s BureAu oF counterterrorIsM,http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/fs/fs/206185.htm(lastvisitedApr.30,2014).20 Id.,seeExec.OrderNo.13584,76Fed.Reg.56945(Sept.11,2011).21 Exec.OrderNo.13584.22 Id.23 gloBAl counterterrorIsM tAsK Force, the rABAt MeMorAnduM on good prActIces For eFFectIve counter terrorIsM prActIce In the crIMInAl JustIce sector 1,http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/38299/Rabat+Memorandum-English(lastvisitedApr.30,2014).
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AccordingtothecoordinatoroftheDoS’sBureauofCounterterrorism,Mr.DanielBenjamin,themaingoalofcounterterrorismassistancetoforeigncountriesistohelpthemmoveawayfromrepressiveapproachestowarddevelopingtrueruleoflawframeworks.24Mr.Benjaminstated:
[T]hebetterourpartnersareatusingtheircriminaljusticeagenciestoprosecute,adjudicateandincarcerateterrorists,thelesstheywillresorttoextralegalmethodstocrackdownonadomesticthreat.Moreover,oursecuritybenefitswhencountriesdealwiththreatswithintheirownborders—sothatthosethreatsdon’tballoonanddemandthatweact,andsowedon’tneedtotakethekindofdra-maticstepsthatinevitablycauseabacklashandradicalization.Thatiswhywe’reworkingcloselywithourinteragencypartners—theDepartmentsofJustice,HomelandSecurity,andDefense—tohelpforeignpartnersdeveloptheirlawenforcementandjusticesectorinstitutionsandtosecuretheirborders.25
TheDoSalsorunstheAnti-TerrorismAssistance(ATA)Program,whichistheUSG’sforeignCTprogramforcriminaljusticeagenciesofpartnernations.TheATAprovidesbombdetectionassistance,crimesceneinvestigationhelp,border,aviationandcybersecuritytoourallies.Inthepastfiscalyear,ATAtrainedmorethan9,800participantsfrommorethan50partnernations.26Increasedcoordinationwithmilitarypartnerswouldundoubtedlystrengthenthisprogram.
AsMr.Benjaminmentionedabove,theDOJandDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)arealsoplayinganimportantroleinCToperations.TheDOJdeploysResidentLegalAdvisors(RLAs)toU.S.embassiesaroundtheworldtodevelophostcountrygovernmentandlawenforcementsectorcapacitytodealwithterrorism.27RLAsaregenerallypostedforaminimumof12monthsandallowfordevelopmentofstrongpartnerrelationshipswithhostcountryagenciesandofficialstogetherwithadeeperunderstandingoflocalconditions,laws,andchallengesaswellastheestablishmentoftherequiredtrustneededtoaccomplishthemission.
TheDOJcreatedtheofficeofOverseasProsecutorialDevelopment,Assis-tanceandTraining(OPDAT)in1991.OPDATassistsprosecutorsandjudicialpersonnelinothercountriesdevelop,amongotherthings,asolidlegalresponsetocounterterrorism.28ThroughOPDAT,theDOJhasstrategicallypositionedResidentLegalAdvisorsaroundtheglobetoassistinCTcapacitybuildingefforts.
24 U.S.dep’t oF stAte, gloBAl counterterrorIsM: A progress report,Dec.18,2012,http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/202179.htm.25 Id.26 Id. 27 Id.28 oFFIce oF overseAs prosecutorIAl developMent, AssIstAnce & trAInIng, u.s. dep’t oF JustIce,
An Integrated Approach to Civilian-Military/Interagency 9
Additionally,theDOJrunstheInternationalCriminalAssistanceInvestiga-tiveTrainingAssistanceProgram(ICITAP)whichworkswithforeigngovernmentstodevelopprofessionalandtransparentlawenforcementinstitutionsthatprotecthumanrights,combatcorruption,andreducethethreatoftransnationalcrimeandterrorism.AlthoughICITAPisaDOJprogram,theDoS,DoD,andU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),amongotherfederalagencies,fundICITAP’sprograms.OPDATandICITAPwoulddowelltocoordinatetheireffortswithDIILSandCCMR.
TheDHSrecognizesthelinkbetweeninternationalsecurityandthesecurityoftheUnitedStates.TheDHShaspersonnellocatedin75countriesworkingwiththehostnationsto,amongotherareas,mentorforeignborderagents,screenU.Sboundmaritimecontainers,andhelpidentifyknownorsuspectedterroristandotherhighrisktravelers.29
TheUnitedNations(U.N.)hasalsorampedupitsCTcapacitybuildingefforts.Forexample,in2006,theU.N.adoptedaGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategywhichurgesthestatesto:(1)addressconditionsconducivetoterrorism;(2)preventandcombatterrorism;(3)buildstatescapacitiestopreventandcombatterrorism;and(4)promoteandprotecthumanrightsasafundamentalbasisforCTefforts.30Further,thetransnationalnatureofcontemporaryterrorismpromptedtheU.N.todevelopaninstitutionalarchitectureencompassingtheSecurityCouncilandthethirty-oneentitiesoftheCounter-TerrorismImplementationTaskForce(CTITF).Moreover,theU.N.SecurityCounciladoptedResolution1373thatcanbeconsideredthekeystonetotheU.N.’sresponsetoglobalterrorism.31Resolution1373requiredallU.N.memberstatestopasslegislationtohelpinthefightagainstterror.Forexample,itforcesstatesto“criminalizethefinancingofterrorismandfreezeassetsofknownterroristsandsupporters,torefrainfromprovidingactiveandpassivesupporttoentitiesorpersonsinvolvedinterroristacts,topreventthemovementandtravelofknownterrorists,andtointensifyanacceleratelaw-enforcementcooperationtocounterterrorism.”32
Interagencycapacitybuildingeffortshaveincreasedsignificantlyinthepastdecade.TheamountofUSGCTcapacitybuildingpersonnelworkingoverseas,butnotemployedwithDoD,hasalsoincreasedsubstantially.AsidefromtheU.N.,therearenumerousNon-GovernmentOrganizations(NGOs)thatarecontractedbytheUnitedStatesandforeigngovernmentstoperformCTcapacitybuildingoperations.
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/(lastvisitedApr.30,2014).29 u.s. dep’t oF hoMelAnd sec.,FAct sheet: dhs’s InternAtIonAl FootprInt (UpdatedDec.12,2011),http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/12/02/fact-sheet-dhss-international-footprint.30 Fink,supranote9at4.31 S.C.Res.1373,¶X,U.N.Doc.S/RES/1373(Sept.28,2011),http://www.un.org/docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm.32 Id.
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TheneedforunityofefforttofullyleveragethepotentialoftheUSGtodisruptanddefeatterroristorganizationsthroughCTcapacitybuildinghasneverbeengreater.Yet,duetothesheernumberofdisparateagenciesandalackofcentral-izedplanningorcontrol,unityofefforthasbecomeincreasinglydifficulttoachieve.
IV.IMPROVINGUNITYOFEFFORTINTHEUSG
WiththeexplosionofresourcesandentitiesperformingforeignCTmis-sions,thestruggletoputalloftheseagenciesonthesamepagehasbecomemoredifficult.EachorganizationhasitsownagendaandideasastohowtoaccomplishforeignCTcapacitybuilding.UnityofeffortisgreatlylackingbetweenthecivilianagenciesthemselvesaswellasbetweentheDoDandthesesamecivilianagencies.
FormerDoDUnderSecretaryofDefenseforPolicy,MichelleFlournoy,whileattheCenterForAmericanProgress(CNAS),pointedouttheimportanceofunityofeffort:
Attheendoftheday,unityofeffortacrosstheU.S.Governmentisnotjustaboutbeingmoreefficientorevenmoreeffectiveinoperations.ItcandeterminewhethertheUnitedStatessucceedsorfailsinagivenintervention.Unityofeffortisnotjustsomethingthatisnicetohave;itisimperative.33
Ms.FlournoycitedtovariouseffortsthattheUSGhasattemptedtoachieveunityofeffort,suchasPresidentialPolicyDirectivesbyPresidentsBillClintonandGeorgeW.Bush,“pol-milplans”andCombatantCommandersformingJointInteragencyCoordinationGroupstobringinteragencyperspectivesintotheirplan-ningandoperations.However,accordingtoMs.Flournoy,theseeffortshavemerelybeenpiecemealapproachesandhavenotsolvedthelargerintegrationproblem.34
PPD-23isanotherattempttoimproveunityofeffort.ThePresident’sPolicyemphasizesthatunityofeffortacrosstheUSGisessential,bothinresponsetoemergentopportunitiesandinsupportoflong-termpartnerships.AkeytenantofthePolicyisthata“collaborativeapproach,bothwithintheUSGandamongallies,partners,andmultilateralorganizations”isnecessaryforsuccessfulSecuritySectorAssistance(SSA)operations,anareathatincludesCTcapacitybuilding.
PPD-23attemptstounveilanewapproachtoCTcapacitybuildingorSSAstrengtheningitsowncapacitytoplan,synchronizeandimplementSSAthrough
33 Achieving Unity of Effort in Interagency Operations: Hearing on Prospects For Effective Collaboration on National Security Before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 3, 110th Cong.(2008)(statementofMichelleA.Flournoy,formerDep’tofDef.UnderSecretaryofDef.forPol’y),available at http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNASTestimony_FlournoyHASCJan2908.pdf.34 Id.
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U.S.wholeofgovernmentcollaborationbetweenstatesecurityandlawenforcementproviders,governmentalsecurityandjusticemanagementandoversightbodies,civilsociety,institutionsresponsibleforbordermanagement,customsandcivilemergencies,andnon-statejusticeandsecurityproviders.35ThePresident’sPolicyisanewandmuchneededattemptatanimprovedcoordinationamongUSGagencies.
However, theentireCTcapacitybuildingeffortwillnotbesuccessfulunlessthereissignificantimprovementinintegratingmilitaryoperationsintoCTcapacitybuildingefforts.Manycountriesrequirearobustmilitaryresponse,orevenacombinedmilitary/civilianresponsetoterroristgroupsthatcontrolsubstantialterritory,suchasinYemen,Mali,Pakistan,andNigeria.However,thecurrentUSGCTcapacitybuildingeffortsoftenfailtoaddresshowthosecountriesshouldmeldmilitaryoperationswiththecriminaljusticeprocessinrespondingtoterroristthreatsandoperations.ThisfailurebytheUSGtoarticulateanoverallCTcapacitybuildingframeworkleadstocompartmentedanddisjointedCTcapacitybuildingeffortthatfailstoaddresstherealityofthedangerposedbyterrorists.
Specifically,withrespecttointegratingmilitaryforceswithcivilianagen-ciesinagivenoperation,Ms.Flournoyhighlightedthefailurescausedbyalackofunityofeffort:
Inthelasttwodecades,theUnitedStateshasexperiencedsometrulystellarmilitaryvictories:rollingbackSaddamHussein’saggres-sionagainstKuwaitinthe1991PersianGulfWar,establishingasecureenvironmentfortheimplementationofpeaceaccordsintheBalkans,drivingtheTalibanfrompowerinAfghanistaninthewakeoftheSeptember11,2001terroristattacks,andtopplingSaddamHussein’sbrutalregimeinamatterofweeks.
Duringthesameperiod,however,theUnitedStateshasalsoexperi-encedsomeprofoundoperationalfailures:fromthesuccessfulefforttostabilizeandrebuildwar-tornSomaliatothefailuretoquelltheinsurgencyandjump-startreconstructionearlyoninpost-conflictIraq.Insuchcases,theUnitedStates,andtheinternationalcom-munitymorebroadly,hashadgreatdifficultytranslatingmilitarysuccessesintotheachievementofbroaderstrategicobjectives.Win-ningthepeacehasproventobemuchmoredifficultthanwinningwars.Whilesomeoftheseoperationalfailuresmayhavestemmedfrommisguidedpolicyormistakenjudgment,othershaveresultedfrompoorpolicyexecution.Innumerousoperations,theUnitedStateshasbeenunabletobringtobearallofitsinstrumentsofnationalpower...inacoherentandeffectivecampaign.Insomecases,inadequateverticalintegrationmeantthatpolicydecisions
35 Id.
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madeinWashingtondidnottranslateintointendedactionsontheground.Inothers,poorhorizontalintegrationmeantthatthevariousagenciesinvolvedinexecutionoperatedindependentlyofoneanotherratherthanasateam,yieldinganuncoordinatedandineffectivecampaign.36
Ms.FlournoyalsopointedoutthesourceoftheinteragencyfailureliesprimarilyinthefactthattheUSGinteragency,unliketheU.S.military,lackssuf-ficientcapacityanddoctrinetoproperlyplanforoperationsastheinteragency.37
ThefailuresdescribedbyMs.FlournoycanbesharplycontrastedagainstCTsuccessesthatemployedastrongcivil-military/interagencyapproachtoCT.Forinstance,afteryearsoffailurerelyingonunilateralcivilianormilitaryapproachestoCT,bothColombia38andNorthernIreland39achievedsuccessthroughcarefullyplannedandcoordinatedcivil-military/interagencyCToperations.
Theconceptofimprovingunityofeffortshouldbeconsideredinthree
relatedcontextsrelativetoCTcapacitybuilding.First, itshouldberecognizedthattheUSGhasmadegreatstridesinourownsuccessfuluseofcivil-military/interagencycooperationinCToperations.Second,akeycomponentofCTcapacitybuildingisstressingcivil-military/interagencycooperation.Finally,thebestpracticeforstressingcivil-military/interagencycooperationisdesigningcomprehensive,multi-disciplinaryCTcapacitybuildingpackages,asacombinedcivil-military/interagencyteam,tailoredtoeachcountry’sneeds.
Unityofcommandisadoctrineofmilitaryoperationsthatensuresrespon-sibilityislocatedinoneplace.U.S.ArmyFieldManual3-0OperationsdefinesitasoneofninePrinciplesofWar:“Foreveryobjective,ensureunityofcommandunderoneresponsiblecommander.”40Unityofcommandensuresthatonepersonretainsresponsibilityfortheobjectivesandpeoplethatunderhisorheroffice,andatthesametime,makescleartoeveryoneinvolvedwhoisultimatelyresponsible.
Unityofeffort,though,mayormaynotbeperfectlycompatiblewiththeresponsibilitythatgoesalongwithunityofcommand.Unity
36 Id.at1.37 Id. at1-2.38 Seee.g.,JuanManuelSantos,Afghanistan’s challenges - Lessons from the Colombian Experience,2007NATORev.3;http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/Military_civilian_divide/Afghanistan_colombian_Challenge/EN/index.htm.39 See e.g.,ThomasR.Mockaitis,The Irish Republican Army, in FIghtIng BAcK: whAt governMents cAn do ABout terrorIsM 332-49(PaulShemellaed.,2011);ThomasR.Mockaitis,Low Intensity-Conflict: The British Experience,13/1conFlIct quArterly7,8-9(1993),available at http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewFile/15092/16161.40 u.s. dep’t oF ArMy,FIeld MAnuAl3-0,operAtIons,App.A,para.A-12,page3(27Feb.2008),available at http://downloads.army.mil/fm3-0/FM3-0.pdf.
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ofeffortimpliesalackofresponsibilitybecauseonepersonisnotultimatelyincharge;rather,unityofeffortrequirescoordination.EitherbetweenthevariousU.S.governmentagenciesthemselvesorbetweenU.S.andinternationalandlocalpartnersthatarefundamen-tallynecessaryandimportanttoachievingthecivil-militarygoalsassociatedwithcomplexoperations,coordinationisasimportantascommand.Asmostpractitionersandanalystsofcomplexoperationswouldattest,unityofeffortisextremelychallengingbecausethereisnosingle,ultimate“responsiblecommander.”41
Withoutunityofcommand,ifaparticularagencydoesnotwanttocarryoutatask,theyusuallycanfigureoutawaynottodoit.FieldManual3-0states:
Cooperationmayproducecoordination,butgivingasinglecom-mandertherequiredauthorityunifiesaction.Thejoint,multina-tional,andinteragencynatureofunifiedactioncreatessituationswherethemilitarycommanderdoesnotdirectlycontrolallelementsintheAO[areaofoperations].Intheabsenceofcommandauthority,commanderscooperate,negotiate,andbuildconsensustoachieveunityofeffort.42
WhilehavingaunifiedcommanderoverallaspectsofUSGCTcapacitybuildingeffortswouldbefavorablefromaplanningandaccountabilityperspective,thenumberoforganizationsacrosstheinteragencyinvolvedinCTcapacitybuilding,alongwiththeirseparatechainsofauthority,maketheprospectofunifiedcommandunlikely.Instead,anentitysuchastheNationalSecurityCouncil(NSC)should,throughdirectedtopdownplanning,movetowardestablishinggreatlyimprovedunityofeffort.NSCeffortinthisarenawouldpotentiallybedauntingbecausethereareseveralsystemicobstaclesthatgenerallyinhibitachievementofunityofeffort:
Interagencycoordinationandcooperationcontinuetobeahottopicamonganalystsofgovernmental-securityprocesses,particularlywhendealingwithissuessurroundingterrorism.Inmanywaystheplethoraofstudygroups,thinktanksandcommissionsthatdealwithimprovinginteragencyprocesseshavebecomevirtualcottageindustries,producingacontinuousspateofanalysesthatidentifyspecificandgeneralproblems....
Anumberoffactorscomplicateorpotentiallyblockeffectiveinter-agencycooperationwithinanycountry’sgovernment...Internal
41 JoshJones,Unity of Command and Unity of Effort in Complex Operations: Implications for Leadership,July20,2010,http://inssblog.wordpress.com/2010/07/20/unity-of-command-and-unity-of-effort-in-complex-operations-implications-for-leadership/.42 Id.; FIeld MAnuAl 3-0,supranote41,atparas.A-12,A-13.
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dynamicsinvolvetheinterestsandcharacteristicsofbothgovern-mentagenciesandtheirindividualmembers.Itisfairtosurmisenotonlythatindividualswillbedrawnintodifferentkindsofagenciesaccordingtotheirpersonalitytraits,butalsothatthepathtosuccesswithinagivenagencytypicallycanreinforceparticularbehaviors...thisapproachcanresultindisparate,self-reinforcingorganiza-tionalculturesevenwithinalargerdepartmentorministry.
Onamorepracticalbureaucraticlevel,agenciesalmostinherentlyhavecompetingintereststhatcanposerealobstaclestocoordinationandcooperation.Thistranslatesintocompetitionforfunding.Givenfinitegovernmentalresources,eachagencyhasavestedinterestinmaximizingitsinfluenceandvisibilitywithinthegovernmentbecausedoingsotypicallyleadstoincreasedfunding....
Tocomplicatemattersfurther,theUnitedStatesandsomeothercountrieshavepoliciesinplacethatdeliberatelyprecludecloseinteragencycooperationinsomecases.These“firewalls”tendtobeparticularlystrongbetweenmilitaryandcivilianagenciesandbetweenforeignanddomesticintelligenceoperations,althoughsince2001theyhavebeenreducedsignificantlywithintheU.S.government.43
OneofthemainpolicyguidelinesofthePPD-23istostrengthentheUnitedStates’ownSSAcapacitythroughadeliberatewhole-of-governmentprocess.PastpracticerevealstheUSG’sweaknessesingettingpastpersonalandinstitutionalbiasesandimpediments,whicharecrucialnotonlyintheUSG,butalsoinconveyingeffectiveCTcapacitybuildingapproachestoforeignpartners.OneexamplewouldbetheagenciesofTunisia.Itsmilitaryiscomprisedlargelyofapoliticalprofes-sionalswhohavedemonstratedadherencetotheruleoflawandhaveablyfilledgapsinciviliangovernancefollowingthe“ArabSpring.”Thesegapswerecreatedbyoverlypoliticized,andarguablycorruptandsectarian,civilianlawenforcementinstitutions.44Therefore, itwouldbefoolhardynottoincludeTunisia’smilitaryinallCTefforts, includingCTcapacitybuilding.SuchanomissionwouldbenearlycomparabletomarginalizingallformerBaathPartymembersduringtheIraq
43 LawrenceE.Cline,Interagency Decision Making,162,162-165inFIghtIng BAcK: whAt governMents cAn do ABout terrorIsM1-2(PaulShemallaed.,2011).44 See e.g.,severalarticlesontheTunisiastruggle,atStevenA.Cook,The Calculations of Tunisia’s Military,ForeIgn polIcy,Jan.20,2011,http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/20/the_calculations_of_tunisias_military;BadraGaaloul,Back to the Barracks: The Tunisian Army Post-Revolution,sAdA,Nov.3,2011,http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/03/back-to-barracks-tunisian-army-post-revolution/6lxg;Islamist Chaos has Tunisia Facing Threat of Military Coup,world trIBune,Oct.24,2012,http://www.worldtribune.com/2012/10/24/islamist-chaos-has-tunisia-facing-threat-of-a-military-coup/;Tunisia’s Military Court Sentences Ben Ali to 20 Years for ‘Incitement of Murder,’Al ArABIA news,June13,2012,http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/06/13/220377.html.
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reconstruction.TheTunisianmilitaryisthemoststable,competent,andprofessionalcomponentofthestateapparatusandshouldbeleveragedassuch.
Therehavebeenotherinteragencysuccessesinsecuritycooperation.Mostofthosesuccesses,however,havebeenatthetacticalandoperationallevels,andaresultofad hoccollaborationoftenbasedlargelyonpersonalrelationships.Despitethesesuccesses,therehasnotbeenacoherentstrategicvisionorplanforCTcapac-itybuilding,withclearlydefinedrolesandresponsibilities.Oneproposalcallsforinstitutionalizingthesuccessfuloperationalapproachatthestrategiclevel.ThiswouldbepursuedbyproducingacommandstructureontheDoDsideofthecivil-militaryrelationship.Suchacommandwouldbetaskedsolelywithconductingsecuritycooperationmissions:
Overthepastdecade,theUnitedStateshasconductedcounterin-surgency(COIN)operationsintwomajortheatersandparticipatedinsecuritycooperation(SC)operationsworldwidetobuildpartnercapacityanddefeatinsurgentsandterroristnetworks.SuccessfulCOINandSCoperationshingeontheabilitytofullyintegratejointmilitaryandinteragencycapabilitiestoachievestrategicobjectives.RecentoperationsinIraq,Afghanistan,thePhilippines,andelse-whereshowthatwhenSCoperationsaresynchronizedwithmilitaryandinteragencyelementsofnationalpower,theycanhaveapositiveimpactonsecurityandstability.ThecurrentemphasisonSCatthestrategicandoperationallevelsreflectsitssignificance;however,thereisnoDepartmentofDefense(DoD)commandresponsibleforintegratedSCjointdoctrine,training,interagencycoordination,andworldwideforceemployment.ConsideringtheimportanceofintegratedSCoperationsandtheirrelevancetothecurrentglobalsecurityenvironment,anewSCfunctionalcombatantcommandshouldbecreatedthatsynchronizesjoint,interagencyresourcesandincorporateslessonslearnedduringthepastdecadeofSCandcapacitybuildingoperations.45
HavingacommandstructureatDoDmakessensebecauseDoDhasthemostdevelopedjointplanningdoctrineamongsttheinteragency.UtilizingDoD’splanningexpertisewouldgoalongwaytowardsachievingenhancedunityofeffort.Moreover,theciviliancomponentofUSGCTcapacitybuildingoperationsshouldtakestepstoimproveitsplanningprocess.AcentralUSGauthority,perhapsattheNationalSecurityStaff,shouldoverseetheplanningeffortsofboththemilitaryandtheciviliancomponentstoensurethatoperationsarecarriedoutinaccord
45 RandalM.Walsh,Security Cooperation: A New Functional Command Security Cooperation: A New Functional Command,64JoInt Force quArterly52,53(2012),available athttp://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-64.pdf.
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withanationalstrategy.Thisoversightshouldbedesignedtoensurecollaboration,synchronizationandefficientutilizationofresources.
V.THEIMPORTANCEOFTHERULEOFLAWINFOREIGNCTCAPACITYBUILDING
OneofthemostimportantaspectsofasuccessfulforeignCTcapacitybuildingisdevelopingaruleoflawframework.TheimportanceofthisframeworkistoenablethecountriestoaddresstheirownterroristproblemsbeforeitbecomesaproblemoftheU.S.
AsstatedintheAfghanistanRuleofLawandLawEnforcementmagazinepublishedbytheAirForceJudgeAdvocateGeneral’sSchool, theU.S.militaryhaslongknowntheimportanceofestablishingaruleoflawinitsinternationaloperations:
Whatarenowcommonlyreferredtoas“RuleofLawOperations”havebeenapartofAmericanforeignpolicysincemilitarypersonnelservinginthePhilippinesaftertheSpanish-AmericanWarbegantointroducedomesticlegalconceptsontheforeignislandsinanefforttostabilizethegrowingsociety.SimilareffortswereundertakeninbothGermanyandJapanpost-WWII,andinVietnamthroughoutthe1960sand1970s.Inthemodernera,RuleofLaw(ROL)pro-gramshavebecomeincreasinglymoreimportant,andvastlymorecommon.TheNationalSecurityStrategysaysthat“America’scommitmenttodemocracy,humanrights,andtheruleoflawareessentialsourcesofourstrengthandinfluenceintheworld.”ThisguidingprincipleinsuresthattheUnitedStateswillcontinuetoassistinternationalpartnersinestablishingopensocietieswherenoindividualorinstitutionisabovethelaw,asdoingsopromotesglobalsecurityandstability.46
Further, thegoaloftheDoS’sCTassistanceistodevelopruleoflawframeworksincountriesthatalloworbreedterrorists.InPPD-23,thepresidentacknowledgedtheimportanceoftheruleoflawwhenhestatedthedirectivewasaimedat“strengtheningtheabilityoftheUnitedStatestohelpalliesandpartnernationsbuildtheirownsecuritycapacity,consistentwiththeprinciplesofgoodgovernmentandruleoflaw.”47
Thebestorganizationtohelpimplementtheruleofthelawisthroughtheuseofacombinedcivil-militaryinteragencyteamcomprisedoflegalandlaw
46 U.S.AIr Force Judge AdvocAte generAl’s school,Introduction, inAFghAnIstAn rule oF lAw And lAw enForceMent,2012.47 PPD-23,supranote2.
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enforcementexpertsfromacrossthespectrumofgovernment.Astheterroristtargetvariesdependingonfactorssuchastheterroristorganization’sgeographiclocation,size,trainingandequipment,itmakessensetoleverageUSGandforeignexpertisetailoredtocounterthespecifictarget.
Terroristsarethemainimpedimenttoestablishingaruleoflawinmanycountries,astheyoftentargetthefoundationofaruleoflawregimebyattackinglawenforcementofficials,prosecutorsandjudges,asseeninIraqandAfghanistan.ThisiswhyitiscrucialtoestablishworkingrelationshipsbetweenthemilitaryandthesetypesofcivilianagenciespriortobeginningforeignCT.
VI.LEGALOPTIONSFORCIVIL-MILITARYCTDETENTIONANDPROSECUTION
TheissueofwhattodowithsuspectedterroristswhoarecapturedduringCToperationscanposechallengingconcernsfortheUSGandourpartnersworkingtobuildCTcapacity.Toestablishtheruleoflaw,thisissuemustberesolved.Thisissuerequiresclosecivil-militarycoordination.
Asmentionedabove,manycountriesrequirearobustmilitaryresponsetoterroristgroupswhocontrolsubstantialterritory.Thisisthecasecurrentlyintheon-goingmilitaryoperationsinMali.TheFrenchmilitary,supportedbyseveralAfricannationsaswellastheMalianmilitary,havehadtousecombatoperationstoremoveIslamicterroristsfromsomemajorcitiesinNorthernMali.48TheFrenchmilitaryandtheMalianforcesresultantlyfacedtheissueofwhattodowithterroristscapturedduringcombatoperations.Similarly,theUnitedStatesfacedsignificantissuesonhowtohandlecapturedterroristsinIraqandAfghanistan.Thisturnedouttobeasignificantissuethatimpededsuccess.ThedetaineesthatarestillbeingheldinGuantanamoBayareatestamenttotheimportanceofsettingupalegalframeworktodetaineesinCToperations.
Mostterroristactsmaybeprosecutedascrimesunderstatutesfoundinexistingstatepenalcodes,whetherterroristoffensesarecommittedinpeacetimeorduringmilitaryoperations.Duringinternationally-recognizedwarorhostilitiesshortofwar,terroristsmaybeprosecutedinaccordancewiththelocalpenalcodeorundermilitaryjurisdictionbyeitheracourt-martialormilitarycommission.49Preventativedetentionisalsopermissibleundercertaincircumstances.50Analysis
48 See e.g.,collectionofarticlesontheMaliConflict,at:the new yorK tIMes,http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/mali/index.html(lastvisitedApr.30,2014).49 u.s. ArMy Judge AdvocAte generAl’s school,lAw oF wAr hAndBooK414(2008).50 See e.g., DavidCole,Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War,97cAl. l. rev.693,695(2009).
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ofthedetentionandprosecutionoptionsavailabletostatesintheirCTeffortsmustbeakeycomponentofeveryCTcapacitybuildingprogram.
ArecentU.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofColumbiadecision,U.S. v. Hamdan,providesaninformativediscussionofthepotentialprosecutorialanddetentionoptionsforgovernmentsdealingwithcapturedterrorists.In2001,Mr.HamdanwascapturedinAfghanistananddeterminedtobeamemberofthealQaedaterroristorganization.HewaslatertransferredtotheU.S.NavalBaseatGuantanamoBay,Cuba.HamdanwasdetainedatGuantanamoasanenemycombatant,andalsoaccusedofbeinganunlawfulenemycombatant.TheDCCircuit,whilerulingonaseparateissuerelatedtotheformofthecharges,describedindictaapanoplyofoptions:
OurjudgmentwouldnotprecludedetentionofHamdanuntiltheendofU.S.hostilitiesagainstalQaeda.NordoesourjudgmentprecludeanyfuturemilitarycommissionchargesagainstHamdan—eitherforconductprohibitedbythe“lawofwar”under10U.S.C.§821orforanyconductsince2006thathasviolatedtheMilitaryCom-missionsAct.Nordoesourjudgmentprecludeappropriatecriminalchargesinciviliancourt.Moreover,ourdecisionconcernsonlythecommission’slegalauthority.Wedonothaveoccasiontoquestionthat,asamatteroffact,Hamdanengagedintheconductforwhichhewasconvicted.51
Itisimportantforastatetohaveoptionsfordetainingterroristcombatants.Forexample,theSupremeCourtinJohnson v. Eisentragerstated,
[t]healienenemyisboundbyanallegiancewhichcommitshimtolosenoopportunitytoforwardthecauseofourenemy;hencetheUnitedStates,assuminghimtobefaithfultohisallegiance,regardshimaspartoftheenemyresources.Itthereforetakesmeasurestodisablehimfromcommissionofhostileactsimputedashisintentionbecausetheyareadutytohissovereign.52
Arguably,aterroristwhoisideologicallycommittedtoattackingastatecontinuestoposeathreatifreleasedduringaperiodofongoinghostilityandconflict.Hence,thestatesmayhaveaneedfordetentionchoicesthatexceedthedetentionoptionsnormallyusedforconventionalcriminalcases.
InternationalHumanitarianLaw(IHL),alsoknownastheLawofWarandtheLawofArmedConflict,providesfordetentionofacombatantwhenastateofarmedconflictexistsandamemberoftheenemyforceiscapturedandidentifiedas
51 Hamdanv.UnitedStates,696F.3d1238,1241-42,FN1(D.C.Cir.2012).52 Johnsonv.Eisentrager,339U.S.763,772-73(1950).
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anenemycombatant.53ThedetentionpowerofastateisenhancedduringperiodsofarmedconflictbecauseIHLrecognizestheuniquethreatstostatesecurityposedbyarmedconflict.Prisonersofwar(lawfulcombatants)maybedetainedforthedurationofhostilitiesbut,unlesstheyhavecommittedwarcrimes,areimmunefromcriminalprocessfortheiractsofcombat.54Unprivilegedbelligerents(unlawfulcombatants)mayalsobedetainedforthedurationofhostilitiesbutmayalsofacetrialfortheircriminalacts.55Theauthoritytodetainthecombatantsendsuponthecessationofhostilities;however,criminalincarcerationmaycontinueifadetaineehasbeenprosecutedandconvictedofacrimeandremainsservingasentence.56
LawenforcementapproachestodetentionandprosecutionposechallengestoeffectiveCTbecausetheyaregenerallyretrospectiveinnatureandoftenfailtoaccountfortheuniqueevidentiarychallengespresentincomplexCToperations.Still,lawenforcementcounter-terroristoperationsthatemployanefficientcriminaljusticeprocessthatrespectstheprinciplesofruleoflawandhumanrights,canofferalegitimateresponsetoterrorismintheappropriatesituation.Whenemployedeffectively,acriminaljusticeresponsetoterrorismmayservetodeescalateviolence.LawenforcementapproachestoCTpotentiallyreinforceasociety’scommitmenttotheruleoflawandhumanrights,evenwhenunderterroristthreats.57
TheU.N.OfficeofDrugsandCrimerecognizestheuniquechallengesofemployingalawenforcementbasedapproachtoterrorism:
Aneffectiveruleoflaw-basedcriminaljusticeresponsetoterrorisminvolvesmorethanthemereratificationandimplementationoftheuniversalinstrumentsagainstterrorism.Inadditiontotheappro-priatelaws,policiesandpractices,criminaljusticepractitionersneedongoingcapacity-buildingandspecializedtrainingtoenablethemtorespondeffectivelytotheincreasinglycomplexnatureofterroristcrimes.58
ThetraditionalcriminalCTmodel,becauseofthesubstantiveandproceduralrequirements,maybethemostlegitimateinstitutionforlong-termdetention.The
53 TheThirdGenevaConventionappliesinaninternationalarmedconflict.GenevaConventionRelativetotheTreatmentofPrisonersofWar,art.4(A)(2),Aug.12,1949,6U.S.T.3316,75U.N.T.S.135[hereinafterThirdGenevaConvention].CommonArticle3applieseveninanon-internationalarmedconflict.SeeAdamKlein&BenjaminWittes,Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice,2hArv. nAt’l sec.J.85,191(2011).54 ThirdGenevaConvention,supranote52,arts.21,118.55 ThirdGenevaConvention,supranote52,art.5.56 ThirdGenevaConvention,supranote52,arts.118,119.57 U.N.oFFIce oF drug & crIMe,hAndBooK on crIMInAl JustIce responses to terrorIsM 5(2009),available athttps://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Handbook_on_Criminal_Justice_Responses_to_Terrorism_en.pdf.58 Id.at33.
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lawenforcementCTmodelarguablymaynot,however,becauseofproceduralandsubstantiverequirements,comportwellwiththeconceptofpreventivedetention.59
Nationalsecuritylawscholarshavearguedthemilitaryandciviliandeten-tionregimeshaveconverged:
Duringthepastfiveyears,themilitarydetentionsystemhasinsti-tutednewrightsandproceduresdesignedtopreventerroneousdetentions,andsomecourtshaveurgeddetentioncriteriamoreorientedtowardindividualconductthanwastraditionallythecase.Atthesametime,thecriminaljusticesystemhasdiminishedsometraditionalproceduralsafeguardsinterrorismtrialsandhasquietlyestablishedthecapacityforconvictingterroristsbasedoncriteriathatcomeclosetoassociationalstatus.Eachdetentionmodel,inshort,hasbecomemoreliketheother.Despiteconvergence,neithermodelascurrentlyconfiguredpresentsafinalanswertotheproblemofterroristdetention.60
Itisbecomingmoreacceptedthatevenunderthecriminaljusticeapproach,administrativepreventivedetentioniseffectivebecause“suchdetentionmaybebestsuitedtopreventcontinuedfighting,andbecausestatesengagedinsuchconflictsarenotexpectedtodevotetheirlawenforcementandothersecurityresourcesprimarilytotheprocessofcriminalprosecutionandconviction.”61“Humanrightslawpermitsstatestodetainpersonsposingserioussecuritythreatsjustasitpermitsstatestodetainpersonswhoareawaitingdeportationorwhoendangerpublicsafetyduetomentalillness-notonlythroughthecriminalprocess,butalsothroughsystemsofadministrativedetention.”62
RecentUSGsuccessesincivil-militarycooperationprovideamodelforCTcapacitybuildingefforts.Forexample,theApril2011captureofSomaliterror-istAhmedAbdulkadirWarsame(“Warsame”)mayserveasatemplateforfuturemilitarycapture,detention,andtransfertocivilianjurisdictionforprosecutioninU.S.federalcourt.63
59 SeeRobertChesney&JackGoldsmith,Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models,60Stan.L.Rev.1079,1081(2008);see alsoMonicaHakimi,The Way Forward: International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide,33YaleJ.INT’LL.369,386(2008).60 Chesney&Goldsmith,supranote59,at1081.61 Hakimi,supra note58,at382.62 Id.at388.63 PeterFinn,Somali’s Case a Template for U.S. as it Seeks to Prosecute Terrorism Suspects in Federal Court,wAshIngton post, Mar.30,2013,available athttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/somalis-case-a-template-for-us-as-it-seeks-to-prosecute-terrorism-suspects-in-federal-court/2013/03/30/53b38fd0-988a-11e2-814b-063623d80a60_story.html.
An Integrated Approach to Civilian-Military/Interagency 21
AccordingtoPeterFinn’sMarch2013Washington Post article,U.S.specialoperatorscapturedWarsameinaraidoffthecoastofYemen.Warsamewasfirstheldunderthelawsofwar,pursuanttotheAuthorizationforUseofMilitaryForce.64Fortwomonths,hewasinmilitarydetentionandinterrogatedbytheU.S.intelligencecommunityonthenavalvesselUSSBoxerintheIndianOcean.Then,PresidentObama’snationalsecurityadvisorsdecidedtotransferWarsamefrommilitarydetentiontociviliandetention.InJune2011,ateamofFBIagentsflewtotheUSSBoxerandgaveWarsameaMirandawarning,advisinghimofhisrighttoremainsilentandhisrighttoalawyer.Warsameagreedtowaivehisrightsandcontinuedtoanswerquestions.65
The“cleanbreak”offeredbytheFBIagentstoWarsameallowedforalladmissionsandevidenceobtainedthroughhissubsequentstatementstobeavailableforuseinhisfederalprosecution.RobertChesney,bloggerattheLawfareblogrunbytheBrookingsInstitute,describestheWarsamecaseasasmart,hybridapproachbecauseitcombinedmilitaryassetstocapture,detain,andinterrogatetheterrorsuspect,withthemaximumsustainabilitysolutionforlong-termdetentionofferedbytheU.S.FederalCourts.66ProfessorChesneyalsobelievesthiscaseisaperfectcasethat“oneneednottakeaone-size-fits-allapproachinwhichyoumusteitherembraceamilitaryoralawenforcementmodelfromstarttofinish;theseelementscanandshouldworkincombinationinatleastsomeinstances....”Chesneygoesontosay,
Thelessonhereislikelytobethatwhatmakesthemostsense,fromaCTpolicyperspective,istoensurethattheexecutivebranchhastherightarrayofoptionsonhand,andthatwhenfreetousethoseoptionsthegovernmentcanbringthemtobearincoordinatedfashionthatgivesdueaccountbothtotheimperativeofacquiringintelligenceandthegoalofensuringthatadangerouspersoncanbeincapacitatedforthelongtermintheend.67
HowtheWarsamematterwascoordinatediskeytofutureCToperations.Thistypeofworkingrelationshipbetweenalltheexecutivebranchesisneededforsimilarfuturesuccesses.
64AuthorizationforUseofMilitaryForce,Pub.L.No.107-40,§2,115Stat.224(2001).65 Id.66 RobertChesney,Why No Period of Detention and Interrogation for Abu Ghaith, ala the Warsame Model?,lAwFAre,Mar.7,2013,http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/detention-interrogation-abu-ghaith-warsam/.67 RobertChesney,Breaking News: Overseas Military Capture Extended Interrogation and Civilian Prosecution in New York City: U.S. v Warsame as the Model Case?,lAwFAre,July5,2011,http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/07/breaking-news-overseas-military-capture-extended-interrogation-and-civilian-criminal-prosecution-in-new-york-city-us-v-warsame-as-the-model-case/(lastvisitedApr.30,2014).
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VII.RECOMMENDATIONS
A.General
Thereareseveraloptionsfordetentionandprosecutionunderexistinglegalframeworks.Accordingly,CToperatorsneedtobeversedinavailablelegalmechanisms,someofwhichmaybeoutsidethetraditionaloptionsoftheirrespectiveagencies.Inparticular,militaryforcesmustbetrainedtoconductCToperationswiththeinsightthattheireffortsmayinfactleadtocivilianormilitarystylecriminalprosecutions.CivilianlawenforcementexpertsbringarangeofcapabilitiestotheCTfightthatoftenexceedwhatthemilitarycanprovide.Thesecapabilitiesincludeexperienceandexpertisewithfinancialandorganizedcrime,seizureofassetsthroughjudicialsystems,forensics,evidencesecurityandevidencehandlingexpertiseandcivilianprosecutorialexperienceandexpertise.Additionally,withtheprospectofcriminaltrialsinCT,militaryforcesmustbeversedinevidencecollectionandpreservation.Moreover,theywouldideallyhavetheassistanceoflawenforcementexpertsattheirdisposalifnotco-locatedwiththemduringoperations.
LawenforcementCTprofessionalsneedtrainingwiththeinsightthatmili-taryforcesareakeycomponentofeffectiveCToperations.Beyondsheerfirepowerfordirectaction,themilitarymayprovideimprovedintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance,advancedplanningcapacity,trainingexpertise,personnel,equip-ment,andamoreflexiblelegalmethodologyforthedetentionandprosecutionofterrorists.
Incontrast,failuretointegratecivil-military/interagencyassetscanleadtofailedoperationsandIHLandHumanRightsviolations.Elementsofthemilitaryandcivilianforcemaybebecomefrustratedwithlackofprogress,confusedrolesandalackofunderstandingofdetention,prosecutorialoptions,anddistrustofwhetherthelegalsystemwillproperlysecurecaptureddetainees.Thiscanleadtoabuseofdetaineesandevenextrajudicialkillingsandprisonerabuse.
B.Specific
ThefollowingspecificrecommendationswouldenhanceCTcapacitybuild-ingoperations.TheserecommendationsaredesignedtobetterorganizeaCTcapacitybuildingapparatus,improveplanning,andfostersynchronousUSGresources.
(1) DevelopandimplementaUSGplanforcivil-military/inter-agencyCTcapacitybuilding.TheNSS,asrequiredunderPPD-23,mustuseitsauthoritytoinitiateandoverseedevelopmentofacomprehensiveplan.Includeintheplanthenationalstrat-egyforCTcapacitybuilding,eachagency’sspecificrolesandresponsibilities,andaframeworkforinteragencycooperationandcollaboration.Oncetheplanisissued,thesamecentral
An Integrated Approach to Civilian-Military/Interagency 23
USGauthorityshouldoverseetheplan’simplementationtoensuretheplanisimplementedinaccordancewithitsstrategicintent.Fundingoversightshouldbecentralizedatahighleveltofurtherpromotecompliancewiththestrategicintent.
(2) IncluderepresentativesfromallthemajorCTcapacitybuild-ingagenciesatDoD,DoS,DOJ,DHS,andothersintotheforegoingplanning.EachdepartmentlevelorganizationshouldensurecoordinationwiththeirrespectivesubordinateunitsthatengageinCTcapacitybuildingsothatrealisticappreciationofthediverseequitieslocatedattheimplementationlevelareconsideredduringplanning.
(3) Establisharapidlydeployablecivil-military/interagencycadrethatcandeployquicklyforcontingencyoperationsandserveandthego-toorganizationforcrisisactionplanning.ToomuchoftheUSG’sCTcapacitybuildingcivil-military/interagencycoordinationisdoneadhocandbyhappenstance.Develop-ingacoregroupofcivil-militaryCTexpertswithestablishedrelationshipsandafirmgrasponthenationalstrategywillgreatlyimproveCTcapacitybuildingprograms,particularlywhenrespondingtoacrisisorpost-conflictsituation.
(4) ImplementUSGinteragencyliaisonprograms.Liaisonsper-formdetailsatofficesoutsidetheirhomeagency.Performingsuchworkshouldbedeemedascareerenhancingsoas toencourageparticipationbytoptierprofessionals.Residentliaisonswillgreatlyfacilitateinteragencycoordinationandcooperation.
VIII.CONCLUSION
Thecombinedcivil-military/interagencyapproachtoCThasproventobethemosteffectiveinthemodernfightagainstterrorism.IntheworldofCT,thesoldier,thepoliceofficer,theprosecutor,theinvestigatingjudge,andtheprisonguardeachhasarole;but,eachalsohasaneedtounderstandtheroleoftheotherCTprofessionalsandwhentoengagethem.TheUSGanditspartnersbuildingCTcapacityneedtounderstandtheresourcesavailablewithinthewholegovernmentandconsequentlybringtheentirerangeofthoseresourcestobearagainstterroristadversaries.ThemosteffectivewaytoadvocatethewholeofgovernmentapproachduringCTcapacitybuildingoperationsistoestablishacentralizedplanningframe-workforconductingthesemissions.ImprovedunityofeffortamongsttheUSGwillultimatelyleadtogreaterresultsinCTcapacitybuildingoperations.
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Examining Blasphemy 25
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................... 26 II. BLASPHEMYANDTHEINSTABILITYITCREATES........................ 27
A.WhatisBlasphemy?............................................................................ 28B.TheMiddleEastandNorthAfricanStatesStrategic
ImportancetotheU.S.andtheU.S.InterestinStability.................... 29C.InstabilityCausedbyAllegedBlasphemy........................................... 31D.U.S.ForeignPolicyontheFreedomofExpression............................ 34E.DefamationofReligionResolutions................................................... 34
III. FREEDOMOFEXPRESSIONININTERNATIONALLAW................. 37A.TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights...................................... 38B.TheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights................... 43C.HateSpeech......................................................................................... 46
IV. BLASPHEMYANDFREEDOMOFEXPRESSIONINDIFFERENTCOUNTRIES................................................................. 48A.UnitedStatesofAmerica..................................................................... 49B.Tunisia................................................................................................. 50C.Egypt.................................................................................................... 53D.Pakistan................................................................................................ 54
V. DOESTHEUNITEDSTATES’APPROACHTOFREEEXPRESSIONPROMOTIONADVANCEITSFOREIGNPOLICYINTERESTS?.......................................................... 56A.U.S.PolicyontheAnti-DefamationProposals................................... 57B.DoestheU.S.PolicyMakeSense?...................................................... 59C.ShouldTherebeLimitsonWhatCanbePostedinOne
CountrybutBroadcastInternationally?............................................... 61D.WouldaDifferentApproachtoFreeExpressionBetterServe
U.S.NationalSecurity?....................................................................... 63 VI. CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 65
EXAMININGBLASPHEMY:INTERNATIONALLAW,NATIONALSECURITYANDTHEU.S.FOREIGNPOLICYREGARDING
FREESPEECH
Lieutenant CoLoneL eriC M. johnSon*
* LtColEricM.Johnson,JudgeAdvocate,UnitedStatesAirForce(LL.M.,TheJudgeAdvocateGeneral’sLegalCenterandSchool,Charlottesville,VA(2013);J.D.,NewEnglandSchoolofLaw(2001);B.A.,VirginiaPolytechnicInstituteandStateUniversity(1998))istheChief,ProfessionalOutreachDivision,TheJudgeAdvocateGeneral’sSchool,MaxwellAirForceBase,Alabama.PreviousassignmentsincludeDeputyChiefofMilitaryJustice,ChiefofAviationLawandDeputyChiefofOperationsLaw,HeadquartersAirCombatCommand,JointBaseLangley-Eustis,Virginia,2010-2012;DeputyStaffJudgeAdvocate,11thWing,BollingAirForceBase,Washington,D.C.,2008-2010;ChiefofGeneralLaw,ChiefofMilitaryJustice,52dFighterWing,SpangdahlemAirBase,Germany,2005-2008;AssistantOfficer-in-Charge,MagistrateCell,JointTaskForce134,CampCropper,Iraq,2007;ClaimsOfficer,DeputyChiefofMilitaryJustice,andChiefofCivilLawandLegalAssistance,325thFighterWing,TyndallAirForceBase,Florida,2002-2005.MemberofthebaroftheCommonwealthofMassachusetts,theCourtofAppealsfortheArmedForces,andtheAirForceCourtofCriminalAppeals.ThisarticlewassubmittedinpartialcompletionoftheMasterofLawsrequirementsofthe61stJudgeAdvocateOfficerGraduateCourse.
26The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
I.INTRODUCTION
InJune2012,afourteenminutetrailertoamovietitled“InnocenceofMuslims”waspostedtoYouTube.1Thoughitreceivedvirtuallynonoticewheninitiallymadepublic,lessthantwomonths2lateritwasattheepicenterofaglobalcontroversy,acauseforterroristgroupsseekingtotargetWesterninstitutions,andthecenterpieceofthedebateoverblasphemousspeechanditslegalprotection.Themovie,madeintheUnitedStateswithobviouslowproductionvalues,makesnumerousoutlandishclaimstheProphetMohammedis(amongotherthings)ahomosexual,achildmolester,andbloodthirsty.3Thissetoffaseriesofanti-AmericanriotsthroughouttheIslamicworld.4
ShortlyafterthedemonstrationsandriotsintheIslamicworldbeganoverthe“InnocenceofMuslims”movie,aFrenchsatiricalmagazinepublishedseveralcartoonsdepictingwhatisconsideredtobetheProphetMohammednaked.5Thedirectorofthemagazinepushedbackagainstclaimshewasaddingtotheunrest,sayingthemagazineis“notreallyfuelingthefire”butinstead“comment[ing][on]thenewsinasatiricalway.”6
Bothoftheseeventsbringtoaheadtheconflictbetweenafundamentalhumanright,thefreedomofexpression,andblasphemy.UnitedStateslawmain-tainsaliberalprotectionoftherighttofreedomofexpressionprotectedintheU.S.Constitution’sBillofRights.7Internationallaw,asdelineatedbytheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR),allowsmorerestrictionstobeplacedonthisright.8Whenshould,ifever,therighttoexpressopinionsbecurtailedinordertopreventblasphemyorthedefamationofareligion?
1 The “Innocence of Muslims” Riots, the n. y. tIMes,Nov.26,2012,http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/i/innocence_of_muslims_riots/index.html.2 Id.3 Id.ThetrailercanbeviewedonYouTubeathttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmodVun16Q4(lastvisitedMar.13,2013).Subsequently,thefullmovie(overanhourinlength)wasalsopostedonYouTube.Itwasviewedathttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X6s8eFkt90Q(lastvisitedMar.13,2013)butsubsequentlyremovedduetocopyrightclaim.4 See id.;see alsoRebeccaKeegan,JohnHorn&DawnC.Chmielewski,Anti-Islam Film Contains Controversial Scenes by Mystery Director,los Angeles tIMes,Sept.12,2012,http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/12/entertainment/la-et-mn-antiislam-film-sparks-violence-20120912.5 SharonaSchwartz,Naked Mohammed Cartoon Prompts French Embassy, School Closures across Middle East,BlAze,September19,2012,http://www.theblaze.com/stories/french-satire-magazine-publishes-naked-mohammed-cartoons-and-now-officials-are-worried.6 JimBittermann,PierreMeilhan&HollyYan,Free Speech or Incitement? French Magazine Runs Cartoons of Mohammed,cnn.coM,September19,2012,http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/19/world/europe/france-mohammed-cartoon/index.html.7 u.s. const.amend.I.8 InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,art.19-20,Dec.16,1966,S.TreatyDoc.No.
Examining Blasphemy 27
ManyfollowersoftheIslamicfaithtakeblasphemy,orthedefamationoftheirreligion,seriouslyandpersonally,andreactviolentlywhenthewest,intheirmind,defamesIslam.Thisblasphemousspeech,orspeechwhichdefamesreligions,particularlyIslam,isasourceofglobalinstabilitythatcannegativelyaffecttheforeignpolicyinterestsand/ornationalsecurityoftheUnitedStates.Inspiteofthisrisk,theUnitedStatesshouldcontinuetoadvocateforitsliberalinterpretationofthefreedomofexpression.TherehavebeenmultipleincidentsintherecentpastwherepeoplehavedonethingsconsideredtobeblasphemousintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.Asaresult,violentriotshaveoccurredacrossthisstrategicallyimportantregion.Eventhoughananti-defamationofreligionresolutionmayincreasestabilityinthisvolatileregion,theUnitedStatesshouldnotalteritscurrentforeignpolicy.Internationallawonthefreedomofexpressiondoesnotallowforrestrictionsonexpressionforthispurpose,andthesmallbenefittheUnitedStateswouldseeisnotenoughtojustifyrestrictingthefreedomofexpression.
PartIIofthisarticlewillattempttodefineblasphemyanddiscussblasphemyanddefamationofreligionasasourceofinstability,discussingexamplesofriotsthathaveoccurredafterincidencesofblasphemyacrosstheworld.ItwillalsodiscussthecurrentU.S.foreignpolicyonthefreedomofexpression,andattemptstolimitthatrightbyprohibitingspeechthatdefamesreligions.PartIIIwilldiscussthefreedomofexpressionininternationallaw,specificallydiscussingtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandtheICCPR.PartIVwillcompareandcontrastthefreedomofexpressionandblasphemylawsintheUnitedStates,Tunisia,Egypt,andPakistan.PartVwilldiscusstheU.S.approachtofreeexpressionandwhetherthatapproachadvancesourforeignpolicyinterests.PartVIwillconcludethisarticle.
II.BLASPHEMYANDTHEINSTABILITYITCREATES
Blasphemyandinstabilityareinextricablylinkedtogether.Whetheritisthroughpurposefulactionoraccidental,whenanactionofsomeonefromthewesterndemocraciesisconsideredtobeblasphemoustoIslam,theQuran,ortheProphetMohammed,violencehasresulted.9
95-20,6I.L.M.368(1967),999U.N.T.S.171[hereinafterICCPR].Article19,§3states:
Theexerciseoftherightsprovidedforinparagraph2ofthisarticlecarrieswithitspecialdutiesandresponsibilities.Itmaythereforebesubjecttocertainrestric-tions,buttheseshallonlybesuchasareprovidedbylawandarenecessary:(a)Forrespectoftherightsorreputationsofothers;(b)Fortheprotectionofnationalsecurityorofpublicorder(ordrepublic),orofpublichealthormorals.Id.
Article20,§2states,“Anyadvocacyofnational,racialorreligioushatredthatconstitutesincitementtodiscrimination,hostilityorviolenceshallbeprohibitedbylaw.”Id.9 See infraPartII.C.
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A.WhatisBlasphemy?
Thisisasimplequestionwithoutasimpleanswer.Blasphemyisdefinedindictionariesas“theactofinsultingorshowingcontemptorlackofreverenceforGod,”10orthe“impiousutteranceoractionconcerningGodorsacredthings.”11Butthedefinitioninthelegalcontextismuchmoredifficult.Thereisnoclear,overarchinglegaldefinitionofblasphemy.12Blasphemymeanssomethingdifferentineverylegalsystemintheworld.13Infact,thereisnocommonpracticeregardingblasphemycrimesintheIslamicstates.14Thecrimeofblasphemyhasdevelopedindividuallyineachstatebasedonvaryingpracticesthatareusuallyunwrittenandsubjective.15Blasphemouswordsoractshavebeenthestartofseveralriotsinthepast;asmanyMuslimsfeelanemotionalattachmenttotheProphetMohammedandfeeltheneedtoprotecthim.16
Eachreligionmayhaveadifferentinterpretationofwhatisblasphemous.ThequestionofwhatisblasphemyinIslamisnotaneasyonetoanswer.ThisisbecausetheQurandoesnotdefineblasphemy.17OneformofallegedblasphemyisanydepictionoftheProphetMohammed.18Somescholarshaveusedthe“hadiths,”whicharecollectionsofsayingsattributedtoMohammed,tocreateadefinitionofblasphemy;buteveninthehadithsthedefinitiondependsonaperson’sinterpre-tation.19Thesameholdstrueforthepunishmentofblasphemy.NeithertheQuran
10 Blasphemy,MerrIAM-weBster dIctIonAry,http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/blasphemy(lastvisitedMar.13,2013).11 Blasphemy,dIctIonAry.coM,http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/blasphemy?s=t(lastvisitedMar.13,2013).12 See JeremyPatrick,The Curious Persistence of Blasphemy,23FlA. J. Int’l l. 187,206(2011).13 See id.14 See pAul MArshAll & nInA sheA,sIlenced: how ApostAsy And BlAspheMy codes Are choKIng FreedoM worldwIde5(2011).15 See id. 16 See infraPartII.C,andDianaKraft,In Wake of Anti-Muslim Video, U.S. Religious Leaders Condemn Violence, Affirm Free Speech,hAAretz.coM,September14,2012,http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/in-wake-of-anti-muslim-video-u-s-religious-leaders-condemn-violence-affirm-free-speech-1.464931.17 ChristaCaseBryant,Anti-Muslim Video: What Muslim Teachings Say About Retribution for Blasphemy,chrIstIAn scI. MonItor,September18,2012,http://www.csmonitior.com/world/middle-east/2012/0918/anti-muslim-video-what-muslim-teachings-say-about-retribution-for-blasphemy.18 See Kraft,supranote16.19 Id.;see alsoPrimozManfreda,ABout.coM MIddle eAst Issues,What is Blasphemy in Islam,http://middleeast.about.com/od/religionsectarianism/a/What-Is-Blasphemy-In-Islam.htm(lastvisitedMar.13,2013).Whilethisistrue,thereobviouslydoesexistthatwhichMuslimsbelievetobeblasphemy.OnelistIfoundincludes:denyingtheexistenceofAllah,drinkingalcoholorstealing,throwingtheQuraninthetrash,writingtextfromtheQuraninurine.See Lesson 13: The Types of Blasphemy and Blasphemers,Ass’n oF IslAMIc chArItABle proJects, http://www.aicp.ca/
Examining Blasphemy 29
northehadithsdirectlydiscussthepunishmentforblasphemy.20TheproponentsofthestrictShariareligiouslawwillarguethatthepunishmentforblasphemyshouldbedeath.21However,atleastoneIslamicscholarhasarguedtheQuranshowsthatnocorporalpunishmentshouldbehandedoutforblasphemyandcurrentMuslimsgoagainsttheteachingsoftheQuran.22
Theconceptofblasphemyhascurrentlytakenonthelabelof“defama-tionofreligion”whentherehavebeenattemptstolimitfreedomofexpressionintheinternationalarena.23Thiscouldbeconsideredapotentiallylargerconceptas“defamationofreligion”isnotnecessarilyastiedtotheinsultofGodorasacredobject/personasblasphemy.
B.TheMiddleEastandNorthAfricanStatesStrategicImportancetotheU.S.andtheU.S.InterestinStability
Tothisday,theIslamicstates,particularlytheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,remainofvitalstrategicimportancetotheUnitedStates.Assuch,theUnitedStatesforeignpolicyfocusforatleastthelastdecadehasbeenonthatregionastheUnitedStatesstrivesforstability,andrecentlydemocracy,intheregion.TheUnitedStatesfocushasmainlybeenduetotheneedforoil,tosecurebothaccessandalowprice.24TheUnitedStateshaslonghadanoiladdiction,andthatneedhasbeensatiatedmainlybyforeignoil.Nearlysixtypercentoftheworld’soilcanbefoundintheMiddleEastregion.25Thisisaregionthathasbeen,andremains,unstableandoftendangerous.26
AmericannationalsecurityinterestswerelinkedtotheMiddleEastin1980byPresidentCarter,withtheannouncementofwhathasbecomeknownastheCarter
Islamic-lesson/English/youth/the-islamic-education-series-book-5/chapter-of-belief/lesson-13-the-types-of-blasphemy-and-blasphemers/(lastvisitedMar.13,2013).ThelessoncitestoversesfromtheQuranassupport.Id.20 SeeBryant, supra note17.21 See Manfreda,supranote19.22MaulanaWahiduddinKhan,Blasphemy in Islam: The Quran Does Not Prescribe Punishment for Abusing the Prophet,tIMes oF IndIA,October2,2012,http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Blasphemy-in-Islam-The-Quran-does-not-prescribe-punishment-for-abusing-the-Prophet/articleshow/16631496.cms.23 See, e.g.,JeremyPatrick,The Curious Persistence of Blasphemy,23FlA. J. Int’l l.187(2011).24 See BruceW.Jentleson,AndrewM.Exum,MelissaG.Dalton&J.DanaStuster,Strategic Adaptation: Toward a New U.S. Strategy in the Middle East,ctr. For A new AM. securIty(June2012).25 NasserMomayezi,Oil, the Middle East and U.S. National Security,1Int’l J. huMAn. & soc. scI. 1 (Aug.2011).26 Id.
30The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
Doctrine.27ThroughtheCarterDoctrine,whichhasbeenenforcedbyeverypresidentsince,theUnitedStatescommitteditselftousinganymeans,includingmilitaryforce,topreventoutsideforcesfromgainingcontroloftheMiddleEastregion.28TheCarterDoctrineprovidedtherationalefortheuseofmilitaryforceonnumerousoccasionsinordertoprotecttheseinterests.Theseinclude:UnitedStatesassistancetoAfghanistanduringtheirwarwiththeSovietUnion(1979–1989),PersianGulfWar(1990–1991),Somaliaintervention(1992–1993),OperationIraqiFreedom(2003–2010),andOperationEnduringFreedom(2001–present).29Thisdoctrinehascontinuallylinkedourinterests,includingforeignaid,diplomaticenergy,andtreasure,bothintheformofmoneyandlives,tothisregionforoverthirtyyears.30
OilisnottheonlyAmericaninterestintheregion,ortheonlyreasonthattheregionisstrategicallyimportant.TheregionisalsohometomostoftheimportantthreatsthattheUnitedStatesisfacingtoday.31ManyexpertsinthisregionhavestatedthatthethreatIranposesisthebiggestsecurityriskcurrentlyfacingtheUnitedStates.32OtherstatesintheregionareofgreatstrategicimportancetotheUnitedStatesaswell.PakistanplaysanextremelyimportantstrategicroleintheregionfortheUnitedStates.Pakistanhasaroleincounter-terrorism,accesstooilandregionalpoliticalstability.33EgypthaslongbeenthebellwetherfortheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,withamoderateEgyptthekeytopeaceandstabilityintheregion.34Tunisia’simportancestemsfromtheirpositionasthe“cradleof[the]Arab
27 See ThanassisCambanis,The Carter Doctrine: A Middle East strategy past its prime,Boston gloBe,October14,2012,http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/10/13/the-carter-doctrine-middle-east-strategy-past-its-prime-the-carter-doctrine-middle-east-strategy-past-its-prime/xkDcRIPaE68mFbpnsUoARI/story.html.28 See id.;see also Cato Handbook for Policymakers,cAto Inst. (7thed.2009),available athttp://www.object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-52.pdf.29AndrewJ.Bacevich,The Carter Doctrine at 30,world AFF.,Apr.1,2010,http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/andrew-j-bacevich/carter-doctrine-30.30 Cambanis,supranote27.31 JeffreyM.Jones,In U.S. 6 in 10 View Iran as Critical Threat to U.S. Interests,gAllup,February16,2010,http://www.gallup.com/poll/125996/View-Iran-Critical-Threat-Interests.aspx(statingaGalluppollfoundthat61percentofAmericansbelievedthatIran’smilitaryisathreattovitalU.S.interestsoverthenextdecade).32 See Iran, Hezbollah, and the Threat to the Homeland: Hearing before the H. Comm. On Homeland Sec.,112thCong.(2012)(statementofDr.ColinH.Kahl),andJamesJoyner,America’s Number One Geostrategic Threat?,AtlAntIc councIl,March28,2012,http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/americas-number-one-geostrategic-threat.33 See TheNationalStrategyForum,20 nAt’l strAtegy F. rev. 1(2011),available athttp://www.nationalstrategy.com/Portals/0/documents/Spring%202011%20NSFR/The%20US-Pak%20Relationship.pdf.34 See Strengthening the U.S.-Egyptian Relationship,councIl on ForeIgn relAtIons,May2002,http://www.cfr.org/egypt/strengthening-us-egyptian-relationship-cfr-paper/p8666.
Examining Blasphemy 31
Spring,”andimportantastohowtheArabSpringrevolutioncontinuestodevelopinthatnation.35
Thisregionisalsothehomeofmanyofthemostviolentextremists,orter-rorists,intheworld.36Astudycompletedin1980concludedtwooutof64terroristgroupswerecategorizedasreligiouslymotivated.37Arepeatofthatstudyin1995concluded26of56werereligiouslymotivated,withthemajorityofthosebeingmotivatedbyIslam.38“TheinfluenceofreligioncannotbeunderestimatedwhendiscussingforcescontributingtoIslamicextremism.BinLadenandhisfollowersseethecurrentstrugglewiththeWestasalong,defensive,historicalstruggleblessedbyAllah.”39TheriseoftheseIslamicextremist terroristorganizations,withtheirbaseintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,hasresultedintheUnitedStatesfocusingmuchofitsglobaldefenseeffortsoncounteringtheterroristthreat,andthatremainsatopprioritytoday.40AlongwithIran,theothertopthreattotheUnitedStatesremainsalQaeda.41OnemajoraspectofPresidentObama’scurrentdefensestrategyinvolvesthe“targeted,surgical”strikestoeliminatethealQaedaleadership.42AllthesefactorsaddtogethertomakethisregionvitallyimportanttotheUnitedStates,bothintermsofoureconomicneeds(intermsofenergy),andintermsofstoppingglobalterrorism.
C.InstabilityCausedbyAllegedBlasphemy
WhiletherehavebeenpeacefuldemonstrationsintheIslamicworldafteranallegedblasphemousacthastakenplace,unfortunatelyviolenceandinstability,intheformofriotsorotherbreachesofthepeace,havealsofrequentlyoccurred.
In1988,SalmanRushdiewroteanovel,“TheSatanicVerses,”promptingoutrageamongtheMuslimworldforitsallegedlyblasphemouscontent.43Thebook
35 JillReilly&AlexWard,Cradle of Arab Spring Goes Up in Flames as Protesters Fire-omb Egyptian Presidential Palace and Youths Torch Cars at Funeral of Tunisian Leader,MAIl onlIne,Feb.8,2013,http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2275677/Cradle-Arab-Spring-goes-flames-protesters-bomb-Egyptian-presidential-palace-youths-torch-cars-funeral-Tunisian-leader.html.36 PresidentBarackObama,Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,Jan.3,2012.37 JohnMoore,The Evolution of Islamic Terrorism: An Overview,FrontlIne,http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/modern.html.38 Id.39 SteveA.Young,A Basis for Middle East Islamic Extremism,2proF. Issues In crIM. Just. 9, 16 (2007).40 See id.41 KeithJohnson,Al Qaeda Remains Top Threat to U.S.,wAll st. J.,June30,2011,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303763404576416191709848746.html.42 Id.43 Perceived Insults to Islam Trigger Muslim Anger,n. y. dAIly news, September12,2012,
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triggereddeadlyriotsinIslamabad,PakistanandMumbai,India.44Iran’sAyatollahRuhollahKhomeiniissuedafatwa(religiousedict)callingforthedeathofMr.Rushdiein1989.45Thatedictstillstands,andtherewardforhismurderhasbeenraisedto$3.3milliondollars.46
OnMay9,2005,newsweeKmagazineranastoryallegingAmericaninter-rogatorsatGuantanamoBay,CubaflushedcopiesoftheQurandownatoiletinthedetentioncenter.47ThisstoryledtoprotestsandriotsacrosstheMuslimworldandresultedinatleast15deaths.48OneweeklaternewsweeKretractedthestory,whichthePentagoncalled“demonstrablyfalse.”49
In2005and2006aDanishnewspaperpublishedtwelvecartoonsdepictingunflatteringimagesoftheProphetMohammed.50ThesecartoonsgeneratedviolentprotestsacrosstheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.51Over200peopledied,withmanymoreinjured,intheseriots.52Eachtimethecartoonsarereprintedorreferenced,violencebreaksoutagain.AfteronereprintalQaedaclaimedresponsibilityforbombingtheDanishembassyinPakistanin2010.53
In2010,PastorTerryJones,theheadofasixty-personcongregationnearGainesville,Florida,threatenedtohosta“BurnaQuranDay”tomarktheanniver-saryoftheSeptember11,2001attacks.54Thisannouncementledtolargedemonstra-tionsinAfghanistanwith“DeathtoAmerica”chants,butnoviolence.55PastorJoneslaterdecidednottoburntheQurans.56Almostayearlater,PastorJonesdidburn
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-09-12/news/33794945_1_muslim-backlash-danish-embassy-muslim-anger.44 Id.45 Id.46 Iran Increases Price on ‘Satanic Verses’ Author Salman Rushdie’s Head by $500K,nBcnews.coM,September17,2012,http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/17/13908002-iran-increases-price-on-satanic-verses-author-salman-rushdies-head-by-500k?lite.47WhitneyEulich,Blasphemy Riots: 6 Examples Around the World,chrIstIAn scI. MonItor—csMonItor.coM,http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-Issues/2012/0912/Blasphemy-riots-6-examples-around-the-world(lastvisitedApr.18,2014).48 See id.49 Id.50 SeeJytte KlAusen, the cArtoons thAt shooK the world(2009).51 See Eulich,supranote47.52 Id.53 Id.54 Id.,see also DamienCave&AnnieBarnard,Minister Wavers on Plans to Burn Koran,n. y. tIMes,September9,2010,http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/us/10obama.html.55 See Eulich,supranote47.56 Id.
Examining Blasphemy 33
aQuranafter“puttingthebookontrial.”57WhenvideooftheburningwaspostedonlineitledtoviolenceinAfghanistanwithatleastninepeopledead.58
InFebruary2012,itwasdiscoveredU.S.troopshadburnedcopiesoftheQuraninatrashdumponabaseinAfghanistan.59LocalAfghanemployeesonthebaseevidentlywitnessedcharredremainsoftheQuransandpassedinformationontheincidentoutsidethebase.60ThisledtoviolentprotestsinvolvingthousandsofpeopleacrossAfghanistan,leadingtoatleasttwelvedeaths.61Whileitwasdeterminednoservicememberhadmaliciousintent,thatfacthadnoeffectontheriots.62
AsdiscussedinPartI,theproductionofthe“InnocenceofMuslims”gener-atedviolenceacrosstheMiddleEast.63Egypt,Tunisia,Libya,SudanandYemenallexperiencedviolenceafterthetrailerwasdiscoveredonYouTubeinSeptember2012.64SecretaryofStateClintonattemptedtomakeitcleartotheworldthatthegovernmentoftheUnitedStateshadnopartintheproductionordisseminationofthevideo,statingherpersonalopinionthevideois“disgustingandreprehensible.”65Inspiteofthesestatements,violencebrokeoutacrosstheregion,withsomeoftheworstviolenceinYemen,whereatleastfiveYemeniswerekilled.66ThetrailercausedangrymobstogatherattheU.S.EmbassyinEgypt,wherethemobbreachedthefortifiedwallsoftheembassy.67MoreangrydemonstratorsstormedtheU.S.EmbassyinTunisia,leavingtwopeopledead.68
57 Id.58 KevinSieff,Florida Pastor Terry Jones’s Koran Burning Has Far-reaching Effect,wAsh. post,April2,2011,http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/florida-pastor-terry-joness-koran-burning-has-far-reaching-effect/2011/04/02/AFpiFoQC_story.html.59 Eulich,supranote47.60 Id.61 Id.; see also Six Dead in Afghanistan Koran Burning Protests,BBc news,February22,2012,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17123464.62 Eulich,supranote47; see also SangarRahimi&AlissaJ.Rubin,Koran Burning in NATO Error Incites Afghans,n.y. tIMes,February21,2012,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/world/asia/nato-commander-apologizes-for-koran-disposal-in-afghanistan.html.63 See supraPartI.64 Widespread Protests Against U.S. Over Anti-Muslim Film,cBs news.coM,http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57512841/widespread-protests-against-u.s-over-anti-muslim-film(lastvisitedNov.25,2012).65 NasserArrabyee,AlanCowell&RickGladstone,Turmoil Over Contentious Video Spreads,n.y. tIMes,September13,2012,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/world/middleeast/Mideast-turmoil-spreads-to-us-embassy-in-yemen.html.66 Id.67 The “Innocence of Muslims” Riots,supranote1.68 Id.
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D.U.S.ForeignPolicyontheFreedomofExpression
TheUnitedStates,aspartofitsforeignpolicy,advocatesforexpandedhumanrightsaroundtheworld,includingthefreedomofexpression.TheU.S.foreignpolicyonthefreedomofexpressionistoadvocateforanexpansivefreedomsimilartoU.S.nationallaw.Thisexpansivefreedomofexpressionwouldcontainminimalrestrictions.69TheU.S.positionwasstatedbyDeputySecretaryDanielBaeroftheDepartmentofStatewhenhesaid,“weareconsistentinadvocatingforauniversalstandardthathasonlytheverynarrowestoflimitationsonfreedomofexpression,”and“weprotectpeople’srighttosayprettymuchallmannerofspeech.Therearesomelimitations.Theyarevery,very,verylimitedlimitations.”70ThisalsohappenstobetheU.S.nationallawisonthesubject;anexpansivefreedomwithveryfewrestrictions,andthenonlyinlimitedcircumstances.71Infact,inthesameinterviewMr.BaerspecificallyreferredtotheU.S.standardonincitementtoviolenceastheonlytimespeechshouldberestricted.72
TheU.S.positiononblasphemousspeechis,notsurprisingly,nodifferent.TheUnitedStatestreatsblasphemousspeechasanyotherformofspeech.TheU.S.positionisblasphemyshouldnotbesuppressed,andanysuppressionofblasphemywouldbeathreattoboththefreedomofexpressionandthefreedomofreligion.73
E.DefamationofReligionResolutions
Pakistan,actingonbehalfoftheOrganizationofIslamicCooperation(OIC),74firstproposedaresolutionentitled“DefamationofIslam”totheUnitedNationsCommissiononHumanRightsin1999.75OneofthestatedgoalsoftheOICistosecurearestrictiononblasphemyintheformofinternationallaworresolutionsfromtheUnitedNations.76TheOICproposedtextoftheresolutionwassolelyfocusedon
69 LiveAtStateInterviewwithDanielBaer,DeputyAssistantSec’y,BureauofDemocracy,Hum.Rts.,andLabor,Dep’tofState,viainteractivevideoplatform(Sept.27,2012),available athttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/ime/198332.htm.70 Id.71 SeeinfraPartIV.A.72 Baer,supranote69.73 Id.74 TheOICisaninter-governmentalorganizationmadeupoffifty-sevenstateswithagoaltoprotecttheinterestsoftheMuslimworldwhichwasfoundedin1969.About OIC,http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en(lastvisitedDec.1,2012).75 Comm’nonHum.Rts.,PakistanDraftRes.,Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and all Forms of Discrimination,U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/1999/L.40(Apr.20,1999).76 RobertC.Blitt,Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated,62cAse w. res. l. rev.347,353(2011).
Examining Blasphemy 35
defamationofIslam.77TheOICdraftresolutionwasnotpassedduetoconcernbytheothermembersofthecommissiononthedraft’ssolefocusonIslam.78However,aresolutionentitled“DefamationofReligions”wasadoptedbytheCommission.79Whilethetitledidchange,theresolutioncontinuedtosingleoutIslambyonlymentioningthatreligioninthetextoftheresolution.80TheU.N.CommissiononHumanRightscontinuedtoadoptresolutionsonthedefamationofreligionseveryyearthrough2005.81OncetheCommissiononHumanRightsceasedtoexist,therequestfortheresolutionwenttotheGeneralAssemblyforconsideration.82TheGeneralAssemblyadoptedthedefamationofreligionsresolutionsfortheyears2005–2010.83WhiletheUnitedStateshasconsistentlyopposedtheseresolutions,theresolutionspassedtheGeneralAssemblyortheCommissiononHumanRightsbylargemarginsintheearlyyears.84In2008,theresolutiononlypassedbyaplurality.85Recently,stateshavebecomemoreeducatedaboutwhatthedefamationofreligionsresolutionsmean;specifically,theirrelationshipanddangertowardtheinfringementofhumanrights,especiallythefreedomofreligionandthefreedomofexpression.86ThisledtotheUnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncil(UNHRC)(thesuccessoroftheCommissiononHumanRights)adoptingaresolutionin2011thatdoesnotincludetheconceptofdefamationofreligion.87Thisresolution,UNHRC
77 L.BennettGraham,Defamation of Religions: The End of Pluralism?,23eMory Int’l l. rev. 69, 70(2009).78 Id.79 C.H.R.Res.1999/82,U.N.ESCOR,55thSess.,Supp.No.3,U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/1999/167,at280(Apr.30,1999).80 See Graham,supranote77;see alsoJaimeContreras&RosaMariaMartinezDeCodes,Cultural and Legal Issues Concerning Defamation of Religions,inFIdes et lIBertAs2008-200931,38(2008-2009).Whilewrittenbroadlyenoughtoapplytoanyreligion,theonlyreligionmentionedintheresolutionsisIslam.Id.81 C.H.R.Res.2005/3,U.N.ESCOR,61stSess.,Supp.No.3,U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2005/135,at21(Apr.12,2005);C.H.R.Res.2004/6,U.N.ESCOR,60thSess.,Supp.No.3,U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2004/127,at28(Apr.13,2004);C.H.R.Res.2003/4,U.N.ESCOR,59thSess.,Supp.No.3,U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2003/135,at34(Apr.14,2003);C.H.R.Res.2002/9,U.N.ESCOR,58thSess.,Supp.No.3,U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2002/200,at56(Apr.15,2002);C.H.R.Res.2001/4,U.N.ESCOR,57thSess.,Supp.No.3,U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2001/167,at47(Apr.18,2001);C.H.R.Res.2000/84,U.N.ESCOR,56thSess.,Supp.No.3,U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2000/167,at336(Apr.26,2000)[hereinafterDefamationResolutions].Theresolutionsremainedwrittenbroadlyenoughtocaptureanyreligion,butwiththeonlyreligionmentionedbynamebeingIslam.82 See Graham,supra note77,at71.83 See id.andG.A.Res.61/164,U.N.Doc.A/RES/61/164(Dec.19,2006);G.A.Res.62/154,U.N.Doc.A/RES/62/154(Dec.18,2007);G.A.Res.63/171,U.N.Doc.A/RES/63/171(Dec.18,2008).84 See Graham,supranote77,at71-72.85 Id.86 See id.87 HumanRightsCouncilRes.16/18,Combatingintolerance,negativestereotypingandstigmatizationof,anddiscrimination,incitementtoviolenceandviolenceagainst,personsbasedonreligionorbelief,16thSess.April12,2011,A/HRC/RES/16/18(April12,2011).
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Resolution16/18,focusesonthecombatingofintoleranceandnegativestereotyp-ingofreligionsinsteadoffocusingonthedefamationofanyreligions,makingtheresolutionmoreinlinewiththefreedomofexpression.88Concernhasstillbeenexpressedbysomecritics,evenwiththismoremoderateresolution,thatResolution16/18doesnotrepudiatetheconceptofdefamationofreligion.89
Intheinternationalarena,theconceptdefamationofreligionhaseludeddefinitiondespitemanyresolutionspassedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyanditscommitteesandsubcommitteesonthesubject.ThisisoneoftheproblemswiththeDefamationResolutions.Nomeaningisgiventotheterm“defamationofreligions,”andtheresolutionsareallwritteninvague,broadterms.90Clearly,thiscreatesproblemsforenforcement.Whatarestatestoprohibit?Whatshouldstatesstrivetoeradicate?Whatreligionsareincluded?TheonlyreligionmentionedinmanyoftheresolutionswasIslam,91butwouldthisalsoincludenon-mainstreamreligions?TheU.S.CommissiononInternationalReligiousFreedom(USCIRF),anindependentbipartisanfederalgovernmententity,statedintheir2010annualreporttoCongress:
AsidefromIslam,theresolutionsdonotspecifywhichreligionsaredeservingofprotection,orexplainhoworbywhomthiswouldbedetermined.Theresolutionsalsodonotdefinewhatwouldmakeastatementdefamatorytoreligionsorexplainwhodecidesthisquestion.Foritspart,theOICappearstoconsideranyspeechthattheorganization,orevenasingleclericorindividual,deemscriti-caloforoffensivetoIslamorMuslimstoautomaticallyconstitutereligiousdefamatoryspeech.92
Perhapsthatwasneverthepointoftheresolutions,sincetheseresolutionsarenon-bindingthereisnomandatoryactionstatesarerequiredtotake.Thevaguenessofthe
88 See id.;see also PressRelease,U.S.Comm’nonInt.ReligiousFreedom,USCIRFWelcomesMoveAwayfrom“DefamationofReligions”Concept(March24,2011),available athttp://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/3570.html(lastvisitedMar.13,2013).89 See Blitt,supra note76,at371-78.“Byfailingtodecisivelyinvalidatethechimeraofdefamationofreligion,theUNhasallowedtheOICtoadvocateitscontinuedlegality,includingbyopenlyassertingthatimplementationofResolution16/18isonepossible‘alternativeapproach’toachievingtheendgoalofshieldingreligiousbeliefsfromcriticismandinsult.”Id.at377.90 See DefamationResolutions,supra note81;see also Contreras&DeCodes,supra note 80
InsuchUNResolutionsthereareanumberofprovisionsthatcondemndefama-tion,underliningtheintensificationofthecampaignofdefamationofreligions;theystresstheconnectionbetweendefamationofreligionsandincitementtoreligioushatred;theymentionthatdefamationofreligionscouldleadtosocialdisharmonyandviolationsofhumanrights—butthereisnotonesingledefinitionof‘defamationofreligions.’Id.
91 See id.92 u.s. coMM’n on Int. relIgIous FreedoM, 2010 AnnuAl report, 336(2010).
Examining Blasphemy 37
resolutionsdoesgiveroomfortheOICstatestoargueanythingcouldbedefamingIslam,andshouldberestricted.Perhapsthepointwastobegintheprohibitionofdefamationofreligionsonitswaydownthepathtocustomaryinternationallaw,whichwouldthenbecomebindingonallstates.93
Theuseofdefamationofreligionsisalsoproblematicbecausethetradi-tionalconceptofdefamationismeanttoprotectindividualsfromfalsehoods,butnotorganizations.94Inordertodefendoneselfinadefamationsuit,ifoneisabletoprovethatthestatementmadeistrue,thenthattruthservesasanabsolutedefense.95Thismakestheapplicationofthisconcepttoreligionsimpossible,becausebyitsverynaturereligionsarenotprovabletoanobjectivestandard.
Further,thegenesisofresolutionsprohibitingdefamationofreligionargu-ablyintroducesotherwaystoinfringeuponhumanrights,mostnotablythefreedomofexpression.Theselimitationswouldnotbeinaccordancewithcurrentinterna-tionallawasitstandsregardingthefreedomofexpression.96
III.FREEDOMOFEXPRESSIONININTERNATIONALLAW
Thenotionofahumanrighttothefreedomofexpression,orthefreedomofspeech,isnotarecentinvention.OneofthefirstpeoplestoacceptafreedomofspeechwastheancientGreekcity-stateofAthensinapproximatelytheyear500B.C.97Thefreedomofspeech,whilenotwrittenintotheAthenianconstitution,waswidelyacceptedamongallAthenians.98Inatragicirony,Athens,thefirstdemocracyandcreatorofthefreedomofspeech,putthephilosopherSocratesontrialforwhatamountedtohisuseofhisfreedomofspeech.99
ThefreedomofexpressioncontinuedtoslowlydevelopoverthecenturieswithsupporterssuchasJohnStuartMill,JohnMilton,andThomasJefferson.100However,itwasnotuntiltheyear1789thatthefreedomofspeechwascodified
93 See Patrick,supranote23,at192(citingLiaquatAliKhan,Combating Defamation of Religions,AM. MuslIM,Jan1,2007,available athttp://www.theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/combating_defamation_of_religions(lastvisitedMar.13,2013);see also Blitt, supranote76.94 See Graham,supranote77,at75.95 Id. at76.96 JeroenTemperman,Freedom of Expression and Religious Sensitivities in Pluralist Societies: Facing the Challenge of Extreme Speech,2011Byu l. rev.729(2011);see also ICCPR, supranote8.97 roBert hArgreAves,the FIrst FreedoM: A hIstory oF Free speech1(2002)98 See id.at1-21.99 Id.at15.Socrateswaschargedwithcorruptingtheyoungandimpiety.Hewasfoundguiltyandsentencedtodeath,whichwasaccomplishedbyhisconsumptionofpoisonhemlock.Id.at14-21.100 See generally id. (givinganoverviewofthedevelopmentofthefreedomofspeechthroughhistory).
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intoacountry’sconstitution,intheformofFrance’sDeclarationoftheRightsofMan.101TheDeclarationproclaimed,“Thefreecommunicationofideasandopinionsisoneofthemostpreciousoftherightsofman.Everycitizenmay,accordingly,speak,write,andprintwithfreedom,butshallberesponsibleforsuchabusesofthisfreedomasshallbedefinedbylaw.”102Thatwassoonfollowedin1791bytheFirstAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitutionwhichstated“Congressshallmakenolaw...abridgingthefreedomofspeech,orofthepress....”103Afterthispointinhistory,thefreedomofspeechbegantogainmoretraction,andisnowconsideredabasichumanrightfoundincountriesallovertheworld.104
AfterthedevastationofWorldWarII,theinternationalcommunitycametogetherforthefirsttimetobegindraftinginternationalagreementsthatlistedandprotectedbasichumanrights.105Manyofthesedocumentsreceivedinspirationfroma1941speechbyPresidentFranklinD.Roosevelt.Inthatspeechhespokeofhumanrightscontainingthefreedomofexpression,freedomoffaith,freedomfromwant,andfreedomfromfear.106Thetwomostimportantinternationalagreementsonhumanrights,theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,willbediscussedindetailbelow.107
A.TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights
ThehorrorscommittedduringWorldWarIIareofsuchnaturethatitisdifficulttocomprehendhowandwhytheycouldhappen.Asonecommentatorsaid,“[a]fterWorldWarII,differentpeoplesoftheworldwereperhapsmoreunitedthanatanytimebeforeorsinceontheneedforapracticalenforceableinternationalmoralitytoavoidarecurrenceofwaranditsaccompanyingmassatrocities.”108
101WilliamMagnuson,The Responsibility to Protect and the Decline of Sovereignty: Free Speech Protection Under International Law,43vAnd. J. trAnsnAt’l l.255,277(2010).102 declArAtIon oF the rIghts oF MAn And the cItIzenpara.11(France1789).103 U.S. const.amend.I.104 See Magnuson,supra note101.105 See id.106the unIversAl declArAtIon oF huMAn rIghts: A coMMentAry 10 (AsbjornEide,GudmundurAlfredsson,GoranMelander,LarsAdamRehof,AllanRosas&TheresaSwineharteds.1992).107Whilenotdiscussedinthisarticle,regionalhumanrightstreatiesoftenalsoprotectthefreedomofexpression.SomeofthemoreimportantregionaltreatiesincludetheEuropeanConvention,AmericanConventiononHumanRights,andtheAfricanCharteronHumanRights.ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,Nov.4,1950,213U.N.T.S.22[EuropeanConvention],OrganizationofAmericanStates,AmericanConventiononHumanRights,Nov.22,1969,O.A.S.T.S.No.36,1114U.N.T.S.123,andAfricanCharteronHumanandPeoples’Rights,June27,1981,21I.L.M.58,OAUDoc.CAB/LEG/67/3rev.5,entered into forceOct21,1986,21I.L.M.58.108 roger norMAnd & sArAh zAIdI,huMAn rIghts At the un: the polItIcAl hIstory oF unIversAl JustIce196(2008).
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TheWorldWarIIatrocitieslaidthegroundworkforthepost-warworldwheretheinternationalcommunitywouldfocusonprotectinghumanrights.
In1946,theU.N.HumanRightsCommissionwasformed,withtheirfirsttasktodraftabillofhumanrights.109TheCommission,madeupofrepresentativesof18memberstates,unanimouslyelectedEleanorRoosevelt, thelatePresidentFranklinD.Roosevelt’swife,aschairmanofthecommission.110TheappointmentofEleanorRooseveltbroughtgreatprestigetothecommission,bothbecauseofthestatureofherlatehusbandandherowneffectivenessinadvocatinghumanitar-iancauses.111Mrs.Roosevelthasbeenstatedtobe“oneofthechiefassetsoftheHumanRightsCommissionintheearlyyears.”112Peng-chunChang,fromChina,wasappointedasthevicechairmanofthecommission,withCharlesMalik,fromLebanon,appointedastherapporteur(secretary).113
TheCommissionfirstmetinJanuary1947,withtheprocessfordraft-ingaUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR)proceedingrapidly.TheCommissionwentthroughseveraldraftsbeforeafinaldraftwasreadytopresenttotheGeneralAssemblyforavoteinDecember1948.114TheGeneralAssemblyfirsttookeacharticleintheproposedUDHRindividually,votingoneachone.115Amazingly,twenty-threeofthethirtyarticleswereapprovedwithoutanynayvotesorabstentions,withtheremainingoverwhelminglysupported.116WhentheentireUDHRwasputtotheGeneralAssemblyforavoteitwasapprovedunanimously,withonly9abstentions.117
109 MAry Ann glendon,A world MAde new31(2001).110 Id.at32-33.111 Id.at33.112 Id. 113 Id.114 See Normand&Zaidi,supranote108.Foracompletehistoryofthedraftingprocess(includingcopiesofthevariousdraftdeclarations),withafocusonEleanorRoosevelt’sparticipationandinfluence,see Glendon,supra note109.115 See Glendon, supra note109,at170.116 Id.Article19,thefreedomofexpressionarticle,receivedsevennayvotes.Id.at169.117 h. lAuterpAcht,InternAtIonAl lAw And huMAn rIghts402(1950).ThenineabstentionsweretheSovietUnion,Belorussia,Czechoslovakia,Honduras,Poland,Ukraine,Yugoslavia,SaudiArabia,andSouthAfrica.Id.SouthAfricaabstainedbecausetheDeclarationstoodapartfromtheirapartheidregime.SaudiArabia’sreasonsincludedthefailuretoincludeareferencetoGodintheDeclarationandthefailuretocompletelyaddresscolonialismandself-determination,andfinallythattheDeclarationwasbasedtoomuchonWesternidealsandculture.TheremainingcommuniststatesbasedtheirabstentionsonthefailureoftheDeclarationtorecognizetheinterdependenceoftheindividualandthestate,thefailuretoaddresstheeconomicandsocialconditionsinstates,anddidnothingtopreventfascism.See Normand&Zaidi,supra note108,at193-94.
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ThemajordownsidetothepassingoftheUDHRisthedeclarationhasnolegaleffectandnomeansofenforcement.118NearlyallmembersoftheCommission“gloriedintheprofoundsignificance”ofthedocumentthattheywerecreating,yetstilldeclinedtogivethedeclarationanylegaleffect.119ThiswasalsothepositionoftheUnitedStates,withMrs.Rooseveltarticulatingthedeclarationwasnotalegislativedocument,andwastoonlyhavemoralpersuasiveauthority.120“[I]tisnotatreaty;itisnotaninternationalagreement.Itisnotanddoesnotpurporttobeastatementoflaworoflegalobligation.Itis...toserveasacommonstandardofachievementforallpeoplesofallnations.”121TheDeclarationwasevendismissedbytheAmericanambassadortotheUnitedNationsasa“lettertoSantaClaus.”122TherepresentativesforFranceandBelgiumwerealoneinassertingsomesortoflegalauthorityforthedeclaration,buteventhatsupportwasinconsistent.123
WhiletheUDHRismerelyapersuasiveauthority,notbyitstermslegally
bindingonanynation,ithashadalargeimpactonstatesaroundtheworld.Atthispoint,many(ifnotall)ofthehumanrightsproposedbytheUDHRcanbeconsideredtobecustomaryinternationallaw,whichisbindingonallnations.124OnecommentatorexpressedthetrulyuniversalacceptanceoftheUDHRbystatingthatithas“becomeapartofthecommonlawoftheworldcommunity;and,togetherwiththeCharteroftheUnitedNations,ithasachievedthecharacteroftheworldlawsuperiortoallotherinternationalinstrumentsandtodomesticlaws.”125
Becauseofthisuniversalacceptance,theUDHRisthesinglemostimportantdocumentproducedinsupportofhumanrights.TheUDHRhasbeenhailedbymanycommentatorsasoneofthegreatestachievementsoftheUnitedNations.126ThePresidentoftheGeneralAssemblystatedatthetime,
Itwasthefirstoccasiononwhichtheorganizedcommunityofnationshasmadeadeclarationofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms.ThatdocumentwasbackedbytheauthorityofthebodyofopinionoftheUnitedNationsasawhole,andmillionsofpeople,
118 See Lauterpacht,supranote117,at397.119 Id.120 Id. at399.121 Id.at398-99.122 Hargreaves,supranote97,at271.123 See id.at402.124 SeeHurstHannum,The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law,25gA. J. Int’l & coMp. l. 287 (1996).125 LouisB.Sohn,The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8 J. Int’l coMM’n JurIsts17,26(1967).126 See Lauterpacht, supranote117,at394.
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men,women,andchildrenallovertheworld,manymilesfromParisandNewYork,wouldturntoitforhelp,guidanceandinspiration.127
WhilesomeofthecommentsatthetimeofthepassingoftheUDHRwereveryeffusiveandclearlyfullofhyperbole,128theGeneralAssemblyPresident’scom-menthasstoodthetestoftimeandseemstobesupportedbyhistory.TheUDHRhasbecomethe“primaryinspiration”forallhumanrightsdocuments,a“referencepoint”forallhumanrightsdiscussions,andawiderangingmoralandpersuasiveauthorityagainstallwhomdecidetoviolatehumanrights.129
ManycountrieshaveincorporatedprovisionsoftheUDHRintotheirconsti-tutionsortheirownbillofrights.130EvenwhereprovisionsoftheUDHRwerenotdirectlyincorporatedintoastate’sconstitutionorbillofrights,theUDHRservedasthebasisandinspirationforthesedocuments.IthasevenhadinfluenceintheU.S.legalsystem.131Ithasbeenestimatedoverninetystates’constitutionshavebeeninspiredbytheUDHRorservedasthemodelforthem.132Clearlytheimpactthisdocumenthadonhumanrightscannotbeoverestimated.
AnimportantquestionregardingtheUDHRiswhethertheDeclarationonlycontainswhatcanbecalled“western”valuesandculturalrecognition,orifitismoremulti-cultural.Ifthehumanrightyouareespousingisconsideredonly“western,”forinstance,willithaveacceptanceintheeast?133Thisphilosophicaldiscussion
127 Id.at395.128 Forexample,therepresentativefromParaguaysaid,“itwouldshedalightonthewaymanhadtotreadtoreachhappiness,”withtherepresentativefromHaiticallingitthe“greatesteffortyet...togivesociety...moralfoundations,”andtherepresentativefromSyriasayingthatthepeople’s“aimhadbeenreachedbytheUnitedNations.”Id.at395-396.129 Glendon,supranote109,atxvi.130Magnusson,supra note101,at279.131 See Tai-HengCheng,The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Sixty: Is it Still Right for the United States?,41cornell Int’l l.J. 251, 254 (2008).132 Glendon,supranote109,at228.133 TwoofthemaincampsinthisdebatearetheRelativistsandtheUniversalists.Arelativistbelievesthat“culturesmanifestsowideanddiversearangeofpreferences,morality,motivations,andevaluationsthatnohumanrightsprinciplescanbesaidtobeself-evidentandrecognizedatalltimesandallplaces.”Therefore,ifacertainrightdidnotcomefromaparticularculture,thenthevalidityandapplicabilitywillbeindoubt.MichaelGoodhart,Origins and Universality in the Human Rights Debate: Cultural Essentialism and the Challenge of Globalization,25huM. rts. q. 935,939(2003).
Incontrast,aUniversalistbelievesthat“somemoraljudgmentsareuniversallyvalid,”mostbelievingthattherightsembracedintheUDHRandotherinternationaltreatiesarethosethatareuniversallyvalid.Theclaimsderivefromargumentsthatsomerightstranscendcultureandarevalidargumentsregardlessofwhereitfirstappearsbasedonthingslikenaturallaw,justice,equalityandrespect.Id.at940.
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playsadirectroleinthediscussionofthefreedomofexpressionandblasphemyandcouldaffecttheacceptancethattheDeclarationreceivesinotherpartsoftheworld.ItalsodrivesstraighttothepointofwhethertheDeclarationistruly“universal,”asitpurportstobe.WhentheUDHRwaspassedbytheGeneralAssembly,theU.N.comprisedlessthanone-thirdofitscurrentmemberstates.134DuringthedraftingprocesstheUnitedStatesexerciseddominantinfluenceonmuchofthediscussionanddraftingonmostofthekeydecisionsonthetext.135Thedrafterswereawareofthispotentialfromthebeginning,andU.N.EconomicandSocialCommitteephilosopherswereconsulted.Theiropinionwasthat“[w]herebasichumanvaluesareconcerned,culturaldiversityhasbeenexaggerated.”136TheopponentsoftheuniversalityoftheUDHRoftenoverlookthefacttheChineserepresentativewasthevicechairmanofthecommission.Also,manydevelopingnationsdidplayaroleincreatingtheDeclarationwithmembershiponthecommission.137
FreedomofexpressionandfreedomtoinformationondifferentsidesofthesamecoinandhavebeenconsideredtobevitallyimportantsincethefoundingoftheUnitedNations.IntheU.N.GeneralAssembly’sfirstsession,theassemblypassedaresolutioncallingthe“[f]reedomofinformationafundamentalhumanrightandthetouchstoneofallthefreedomstowhichtheUnitedNationsisconsecrated....”138ThisfreedomwasincludedwithintheUDHRinArticle19,whichstates,“[e]veryonehastherighttofreedomofopinionandexpression;thisrightincludesfreedomtoholdopinionswithoutinterferenceandtoseek,receiveandimpartinformationandideasthroughanymediaandregardlessoffrontiers.”139ThegoaloftheUDHRisaworldwhereindividualscanexpressthemselveshowtheyseefitandhaveanunobstructedflowofinformationacross.140Article19seemstodothatwell,espousingaliberalfreedomwithoutanylimitations.Infact,onlyoneofthedraftsoftheUDHRforfreedomofspeechcontainedanylimitationswithinthearticle.141Whileitmayappeartobeabsolute,theUDHRprovidesforlimitationstoallrightscontainedintheDeclarationwithinArticle29.Article29purportstolimitthoserightsbystating,“everyoneshallbesubjectonlytosuchlimitationsasaredeterminedbylawsolelyforthepurposeofsecuringduerecognitionandrespectfortherightsandfreedomsofothersandofmeetingthejustrequirements
134 Normand&Zaidi,supranote108,at194.135 Id.at195.136 Glendon,supranote109,at222.137 Id.at225.138 CallingofanInternationalConferenceonFreedomofInformation,G.A.Res.59(I),U.N.GAOR,1stSess.(Dec.14,1946).139 UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,G.A.Res.217A,U.N.GAOR,3dSess.,1stplen.mtg.,U.N.Doc.A/810(Dec12,1948).140 Eide,etal.,supra note106,at278.141 Glendon,supra note109,at271-314.Thatwaswhatisknownasthe“Cassindraft”(theseconddraft).Id.Therestrictionwasonlytoprohibitdefamation.Id.
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ofmorality,publicorderandthegeneralwelfareinademocraticsociety.”142WhatArticle29leavesoutisanyguidanceonwhatmeetstherequirementsofthearticleversuswhatwouldbetoostringentalimitation.BythetermsofArticle29,astatecouldhavealawrestrictingspeechoranyrightintheUDHR,aslongasthegoalwastorespectothers’freedomsandpublicorder,suchasblasphemyrestrictions.
B.TheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights
AftercompletionoftheUDHR,theHumanRightsCommissionbegantopressforabindingcovenantonstatestoenforcetheaspirationalrightsfoundintheUDHR.143TheresultwastheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR).144Currently,thereare167statespartiestotheICCPR,withtheUnitedStatessigningthetreatyon5Oct1977,andratifyingthetreatyon8June1992.145
WhiletheUnitedStatesfinallyratifedthetreaty15yearsaftersigning,theUnitedStatessubmittedreservations,understandings,anddeclarations(RUDs)tothetermsofthetreaty,asmanyotherstateshavedone.146TheonlyU.S.reservationregardingthefreedomofexpressionisregardingArticle20.Thereservationstates,“[t]hatarticle20doesnotauthorizeorrequirelegislationorotheractionbytheUnitedStatesthatwouldrestricttherightoffreespeechandassociationprotectedbytheConstitutionandlawsoftheUnitedStates.”147Inotherwords,theUnitedStateswillfollowtheU.S.Constitutionandlaws,insteadofthetreatyregarding
142 Id.art.29.143Magnuson,supranote101,at279.144 ICCPR,supranote8.145 InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsStatus,available athttp://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en(lastvisitedJan.13,2013)[hereinafterICCPRStatus].146 Id.;see alsoJackGoldsmith,The Unexceptional U.S. Human Rights RUDs,3u. st. thoMAs l.J.311(2005)(arguingthatwhiletheU.S.hastakencriticismoversubmittingRUDstotreaties,statessubmittingRUDsisnotunusual,anddoesnotaffectthetreatyortheU.S.’scommitmenttointernationalhumanrights.ThearticlealsodemonstratesthatliberaldemocraciestendtotakeRUDsonhumanrightstreaties,whilestatesthatrespecthumanrightslesstendnottotakeanyRUDs).147 Id.TherehasbeensomecontroversyintheideaofstatestakingRUDstotreaties,andinrecenttimesnewchallengestotheRUDregimehaveemerged,especiallyregardinghumanrightstreaties.See KonstantinKorkelia,New Challenges to the Regime of Reservations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,13 eur. J. Int’l l. 437 (2002).ThisarticlepresentsagooddiscussionofthetwoviewpointsregardingRUDs.Oneviewholdsthepositionthatsinceconsentisthegoverningprinciple,stateshavethepowertodeterminethevalidityofpartsofthetreatyandmaytakewhateverRUDthestatedeemsappropriate.Theotherviewisthathumanrightstreatiesaredifferent,andthatthereshouldbea“treatysupervisoryorgan”thatrulesontheadmissibilityofanyRUDtakenonthetreaty.Id.at438.TheHumanRightsCommittee,createdbytheICCPR,hastakenthepositioninitsGeneralCommentNo.24thatithastheauthoritytomakethedeterminationastotheadmissibilityofRUDs,andtoseverinadmissiblereservations.Id.Thisgetstotheheartofapotentialproblemininternationallaw,inthatifRUDswerenotabletobetaken,howmanystateswouldratifythetreaty?
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howthefreedomofexpressionisabletoberestricted.IftheConstitutionwouldprohibitrestrictionsonthefreedomofexpressionandtheICCPRwouldrequirethem,theU.S.willallowthespeech.TheUnitedStateshasamoreliberalviewofthefreedomofexpressionthanmostothercountriesandtheICCPR,andtookthisreservationasanattempttosafeguarditscurrentandhistoricalinterpretationoftheFirstAmendmenttotheConstitution.148
ThedraftersofthenewICCPRincludedprotectionsforthefreedomofexpressioninArticle19.Article19states:
1.Everyoneshallhavetherighttoholdopinionswithoutinterfer-ence.2.Everyoneshallhavetherighttofreedomofexpression;thisrightshallincludefreedomtoseek,receiveandimpartinformationandideasofallkinds,regardlessoffrontiers,eitherorally,inwritingorinprint,intheformofart,orthroughanyothermediaofhischoice.3.Theexerciseoftherightsprovidedforinparagraph2ofthisarticlecarrieswithitspecialdutiesandresponsibilities.Itmaythereforebesubjecttocertainrestrictions,buttheseshallonlybesuchasareprovidedbylawandarenecessary:(a)Forrespectoftherightsorreputationsofothers;(b)Fortheprotectionofnationalsecurityorofpublicorder(ordrepublic),orofpublichealthormorals.149
IthasbeensaidthetextofArticle19“secures[the]keycomponentofindividualliberty,therighttoformhisorherownopinionsfreefromoutsideinflu-enceandtodefendthemwithoutfearofexternalrepression.”150Article19allowspersonstomakeandholdopinionswithoutanyformofrestrictions.Thisrightisabsolute;however,therighttoseekorimpartinformationmayberestrictedbythestate.151Article19statestherighttofreedomofexpressioncarrieswithit“specialdutiesandresponsibilities”thatallowstatestorestrictaperson’sfreedomincertaincases.152Inclusionofthisprovisionwascontroversial.153Thestatesthatsupportedinclusionarguedspeechholdsspecialpowersinpublicopinion,whichjustifiestheinclusion.154Thosestatesagainsttheprovision,includingtheUnitedStates,argued
148 See infra PartIV.A.149 ICCPR,supranote8,atart.19.150 scott n. cArlson & gregory grIsvold,prActIcAl guIde to the InternAtIonAl covenAnt on cIvIl And polItIcAl rIghts119(2003).151 ICCPR,supranote8,art.19.152 Id.153Magnuson,supranote101,at280(citingMarcJ.Bossuyt,guIde to the “trAvAux prepArAtoIres” oF the InternAtIonAl covenAnt on cIvIl And polItIcAl rIghts379(1987)).154 Id.
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allrightsalsocomewithduties,andtherewasnoreasontospecificallyincludetheresponsibilityofaspeaker.155
SpeechintheICCPRdidnotstopatArticle19;Article20alsodiscussesexpression,exceptonlyinanegativecontext.Article20statesthat,“1.Anypro-pagandaforwarshallbeprohibitedbylaw.2.Anyadvocacyofnational,racialorreligioushatredthatconstitutesincitementtodiscrimination,hostilityorviolenceshallbeprohibitedbylaw.”156Article20makesparagraph3ofArticle19evenclearer.Whileitspecificallyprohibitswarpropagandawithoutrestriction,speechthatcouldbeclassifiedas“advocacyofnational,racialorreligioushatred”mustbeanincitementtoviolenceordiscrimination,withoutdefininganyofthoseterms.157
TheHumanRightsCommitteeisthebodyofindependentexpertsestab-lishedbytheICCPRtomonitorcompliancewiththeICCPRtreaty.158Further,statespartiestotheICCPRarerequiredbythetreatytosubmitreportseveryfouryearsonhowthestateisproceedingwithprotectingtherightscontainedwithinthetreaty.159Inadditiontomonitoringcompliance,theCommitteeperiodicallypublishesamemorandumwithitsinterpretationofaparticularprovisionofthetreaty.Theseareknownas“GeneralComments,”andtheCommitteehaspublished34ofthemsince1981.160Relatingtothefreedomofexpression,theCommitteehaspublishedGeneralComments10,11,and34.161
GeneralComment(GC)10istheCommittee’sfirstinterpretationofArticle19.ThiscommentisverybriefanddoesnotaddmuchtotheunderstandingofArticle19.162GC11istheCommittee’sinterpretationofArticle20.ThisGCisalsoverybriefanddoesnotaddtothediscussionofwhattypeofspeechArticle20prohibits.163However,in2011theCommitteeissuedGC34whichexpresslyreplacedGC10.164
155 Id.156 ICCPR,supra note8,art.20.157 Id.158 Human Rights Committee,oFFIce oF the unIted nAtIons hIgh coMMIssIoner For huMAn rIghts(lastvisitedJan16,2013,),http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm.159 Id.160 Id.161 HumanRightsCommittee,InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,GeneralCommentNo.10,19thSess.,CCPR/C/GC/10(June29,1983),HumanRightsCommittee,InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,GeneralCommentNo.11,19thSess.,CCPR/C/GC/11(Jul.29,1983),HumanRightsCommittee,InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,GeneralCommentNo.34,102ndSess.,CCPR/C/GC/34(Sept.12,2011).162 HumanRightsCommittee,InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,GeneralCommentNo.10,19thSess.,CCPR/C/GC/10(June29,1983).163 HumanRightsCommittee,InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,GeneralCommentNo.11,19thSess.,CCPR/C/GC/11(July29,1983).164 HumanRightsCommittee,InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,General
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InGC34theCommitteegoesthroughindetailtheiropinionofwhatArticle19meanswithintheICCPR.GC34makesitclearArticle19andArticle20worktogetherandcomplementeachother,andspeechlimitedinaccordancewithArticle20mustalsocomplywithArticle19.165TheGClaysoutthatthefreedomofexpres-sionisessentialforanyfreepersonandspeechisthe“foundationstoneforeveryfreeanddemocraticsociety.”166TheCommitteebelievesallformsofspeech,whetherart,newspapers,verbalornon-verbal,areprotectedbyArticle19.Whilethecommentspecificallyincludesspeechthatis“deeplyoffensive”asprotected,itimmediatelyturnsaroundandholdsthat“deeplyoffensive”speechmaybeprohibitedinaccor-dancewiththeprovisionsofArticle19(3).167ThelimitationintherestrictionsavailableinArticle19(3)isthattherestrictionsmaynot“putinjeopardytherightitself,andthatanyrestrictionsmustnotbeoverbroad,thattherestrictionsmustbeproportionaltoachievetheaimofrestrictingtheprohibitedspeechwithoutcurtailinganyotherspeechwhichwouldbepermissible.”168Thisappearstobeinsupportofaprinciplethattheexceptions(restrictionsonfreeexpression)mustnotovercometherule(freeexpression).TheGCmakesitclearthattheCommitteedoesnotbelievetheICCPRallowsrestrictionsofthefreedomofexpressionthatstemfromtradition,religion,orothercustom.Thisincludesexpressionsthatconveyalackofrespectforcertainreligions,exceptasallowedbyArticle20.169However,thestatemustbecarefulnottosupportonereligioninfavorofanother,asthatwouldnotbepermissibleundertheICCPR.170
C.HateSpeech
Oneofthetheoriespostulatedbytheproponentsofrestrictingblasphemousspeech,orinsupportofrestrictingspeechthatdefamesreligion,isanattempttoequateittohatespeech.171Thetheorygoesthatifyoucanrestricthatespeech,thenyoucanrestrictblasphemousspeech.Butwhatishatespeech?Article20oftheICCPRprohibitsspeechthatisconsideredtobe“advocacyofnational,racialorreligioushatredthatconstitutesincitementtodiscrimination,hostilityorviolence.”172Butthatisaninadequatedefinition.Itdoeslittletotellthestatespartieswhatspeechtheycanandcannotrestrict.Unfortunately,thereisnobetterdefinitioncontainedinanylegal
CommentNo.34,102ndSess.,CCPR/C/GC/34atpara.1(Sept.12,2011)[hereinafterGC34].165 Id. para.50.166 Id.para.2.167 Id.paras.11-12.168 Id.para.21.169 Id.paras.24and48.170 Id.para.48.171 See, e.g.,OsamaSiddique&ZahraHayat,Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan—Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications,17MInn. J. Int’l l.303(2008).172 ICCPR,supranote8,art.20.
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internationallawdocument.173Thenon-governmentalorganization(NGO)Article19,agroupwhosestatedmissionistodefendfreedomofexpression,174createdwhattheycall“TheCamdenPrinciplesonFreedomofExpressionandEquality”in2009,whichcontainsadefinitionofhatespeech.175Itdefineshatespeechas“anyadvocacyofnational,racialorreligioushatredthatconstitutesincitementtodiscrimination,hostilityorviolence(hatespeech).”176This,however,isnodifferentfromtheICCPR.TheCamdenPrinciplesaddinPrinciple12.1(i)that“‘hatred’and‘hostility’refertointenseandirrationalemotionsofopprobrium,enmityanddetestationtowardsthetargetgroup.”177Italsodefinestheterms“advocacy”and“incitement,”byanystate-mentthatmaycreatean“imminentriskofdiscrimination.”178SowhileTheCamdenPrinciplesdohelptoclarifywhatmaybehatespeech,itisstillabroaddefinition,whichcouldbewhateverastatewantsittobe.Infact,thedefinitionofhatespeechchangesovertime.Oneexpertrelates:
Traditionallyitincludedanyformofexpressiondeemedoffensivetoanyracial,religious,ethnic,ornationalgroup.Inthe1980ssomecampusspeechcodesbroadenedittoincludegender,age,sexualpreference,maritalstatus,physicalcapacity,andothercategories.HumanRightsWatchdefineshatespeechas‘anyformofexpres-sionregardedasoffensivetoracial,ethnicandreligiousgroupsandotherdiscreteminorities,andtowomen.’RodneySmolladefinesitasa‘generictermthathascometoembracetheuseofspeechattacksbasedonrace,ethnicity,religionandsexualorientationorpreference.’Historically,hatespeechhasbeenreferredtobyseveralterms.Inthelate1920sandearly1930sitwasknownas‘racehate.’Beginninginthe1940sitwasgenerallycalled‘grouplibel,’reflectingthespecificlegalquestionwhetherthelawoflibelshouldbeexpandedtocovergroupsaswellasindividuals.Inthe1980s‘hatespeech’and‘racistspeech’becamethemostcommonterms.179
173 See id., UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,supranote139,andInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination,660U.N.T.S.195art.4,entered into forceJan.4,1969(requiringgovernmentstooutlaw“alldisseminationofideasbasedonracialsuperiorityorhatred’aswellas‘organizations...whichpromoteandinciteracialdiscrimination”).174Article19Mission,http://www.article19.org/pages/en/mission.html(lastvisitedMar.13,2013).175 The Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality,ArtIcle 19,(2009) available at http://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/1214/Camden-Principles-ENGLISH-web.pdf.176 Id.principle12.177 Id.178 Id.179 ClaudiaE.Haupt,Regulating Hate Speech—Damned if you Do and Damned if you Don’t: Lessons Learned from Comparing the German and U.S. Approaches,23 B.u. Int’l l. J. 299, 304 (2005) (citing sAMuel wAlKer, hAte speech: the hIstory oF An AMerIcAn controversy8(1994)).
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Anydefinitionofhatespeechnecessarilyisimpactedbythetimeweareviewingthequestionedspeechandwhereweareviewingit.Thedifficultyindefiningthetermmakesanyregulationofitmoredifficult,butmanystatesaroundtheworldcurrentlydorestricthatespeech.180
Whileitmaybedebatablewhatexactlyconstituteshatespeech,internationallawpermitsitsrestriction.ItisclearinthedraftinghistoryoftheICCPRthatthedelegateswereconcernedaboutadvocacyofdiscriminationandracialhatred,andsoughttolimitit inthedraft treaty.181Thisthoughtcontinuedthroughthedevelopmentofthetreatyandafterthetreatywasputintoeffect.In1988,theU.N.CommissiononHumanRightsappointedtwoSpecialRapporteursonFreedomofExpressiontostudytherightoffreedomofexpression.182TheRapporteursfoundthatrestrictinghatespeechiscompletelycompatiblewiththeArticle19righttofreeexpression,sinceArticle19carrieswithit“specialdutiesandresponsibilities.”183
Therefore,whileinternationallawclearlyprovidesforlimitationstotherightoffreedomofexpressioninordertoprohibithatespeech,couldblasphemousspeechmeetthevaguedefinitionofhatespeechandbepermissiblyrestricted?TheHumanRightsCommitteedoesnottakethisview.Asdiscussedabove,GC34indicatesthatblasphemycannotberestricted,exceptinlimitedcircumstances.184EvenusingthedefinitionsinTheCamdenPrincipleswouldnotappeartoincludeblasphemyashatespeech.
IV.BLASPHEMYANDFREEDOMOFEXPRESSIONINDIFFERENTCOUNTRIES
AnydiscussionofblasphemyasastrategicinterestoftheUnitedStatesrequiresaprecursoranalysisofhowU.S.lawsaredifferentfromMuslimstates’lawsinthisregard.Thedifferencesaregreat.TheMuslimstatesgenerallyputaprimacyontheirreligionanditsprotectionovertherightoftheindividual.ThisstemsfromthemainbeliefsofIslamthatthereisonlyoneGod,theProphetMohammadisHis
180 See, e.g.,ThomasJ.Webb,Verbal Poison—Criminalizing Hate Speech: A Comparative Analysis and a Proposal for the American System,50 wAshBurn l. J. 445,446(2011)(statingthatmostnationsregulatehatespeechinordertoprotecthumandignityandminorities).181 See StephanieFarrior,Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate Speech,14 BerKeley J. Int’l. l. 1, 21(1996).182 Id.at88.TheSpecialRapporteurs’reportsareavailable at:SpecialRapporteurontheFreedomofExpression,The Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression: Final Report,U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/9(14July1992)(byMr.DaniloTurk&Mr.LouisJoinet),SpecialRapporteurontheFreedomofExpression,Final Report, Conclusions and Recommendations,U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/9/Add.1(14July1992)(byDaniloTurk&LouisJoinet).183 Farrior,supranote181,at91.184 See GC34,supranote164,para.48.
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finalmessenger,andtheQuranisthewordofGod,andisabsoluteandirrevocable.185ThesestatesareoftenrecognizedasIslamicstates,wherethereligionandstateareinseparable.186BelowarebriefdiscussionsoftheblasphemyandfreedomofexpressionlawsfromtheUnitedStates,Tunisia,Egypt,andPakistan.ImportanttonoteisthatTunisiaandEgypthaverecentlyundergone,andarestillundergoing,transformationthroughwhatisknownasthe“ArabSpring.”187
A.UnitedStatesofAmerica
TheUnitedStateshasaveryexpansiveguaranteeofthefreedomofexpres-sion.ThisrightisprotectedintheFirstAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitution.188TheSupremeCourthasupheldfewrestrictionsonthefreedomofexpression,andgener-allyonlyupholdsthoserestrictionsthatarecontentneutral.189Thisistrueregardlesshowoffensivesomepeoplemayfindthespeech.TheU.S.systemprotectsalmostallspeech,supportingtheprinciplethattheonlyremedyforbadspeechismorespeech.190“Theoffensivenatureofthespeech,farfromjustifyingitsprohibition,ispreciselywhyitisentitledtoconstitutionalprotection.”191However,therighttofreeexpressionisnotabsolute.
TwoexamplesofthisstemfromSupremeCourtcases.TheSupremeCourt,inBrandenburgv.Ohio,statedforspeechtoberegulatedasanincitementitmustprovokeimminentlawlessactionandthatthelawlessactionislikelytooccur.192Also,theSupremeCourtlaidoutanotherexceptiontotheFirstAmendmentinChaplinsky
185 RebeccaJ.Dobras,Is the United Nations Endorsing Human Rights Violations? An Analysis of the United Nations’ Combating Defamation of Religions Resolutions and Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws,37gA. J. Int’l & coMp. l. 339, 346(2009).186 Id.187 The Arab Spring: A Year of Revolution,NPRNews,Dec.17,2011,http://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution[hereinafterTheArabSpring].ThepeoplefrombothTunisiaandEgypthaveoverthrowntheirgovernmentsandareintheprocessofinstitutingnewones,includingdraftingandapprovingnewconstitutions.Id.ThiswillbediscussedinmoredetailinPartIII.BandIII.C.188 u.s. const. amend.I.189 Haupt,supranote179,at317.190 RobertA.Sedler,An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States versus the Rest of the World,2006 MIch. st. l. rev. 377,383-84(2006).191 Id.at383;see alsoronAld J. KrotoszynsKI, Jr., the FIrst AMendMent In cross-culturAl perspectIve: A coMpArAtIve legAl AnAlysIs oF the FreedoM oF speech12-25(2006)(discussingthedifferenttheoriesbehindFirstAmendmentjurisprudenceincludingJusticeHolmes’“marketplaceofideas”(theideathatallspeechisgoodandthatthetruthwillwinoutintheend)orthe“public-good-basedapproach”(theideathatfreespeechexiststomainlyfacilitatedemocracyandthat“everythingworthsayinggetssaid”)thathavecompetedinthecaselaw).192 Brandenburgv.Ohio,395U.S.444(1969).
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v.NewHampshire.193InChaplinskytheCourtestablishedanarrowexceptionforspeechthatcanbeconsideredas“fightingwords,”wordswhichbytheirverynature“inflictinjuryortendtoinciteanimmediatebreachofthepeace.”194Thus,whiletherearerestrictionsonexpressionintheUnitedStates,theUnitedStateshasveryexpansiveprotectionsforthefreedomofspeech.
TheUnitedStatesdoesnotbanspeechthatisconsideredblasphemous,unlessitmeetsoneoftheotherexceptionstotheFirstAmendment.WhilesomeU.S.statesdostillhaveblasphemylawsonthebooks,theyarenolongerenforceable.195TheSupremeCourt,inthecaseJosephBurstyn,Incv.Wilson,heldblasphemylawswereunenforceablerestraintsofthefreedomofspeechcontainedintheFirstAmendment.196TheCourtheld“[i]tisnotthebusinessofgovernmentinournationtosuppressrealorimaginedattacksuponaparticularreligiousdoctrine,whethertheyappearinpublications,speeches,ormotionpictures.”197Therefore,itisclearnolawsbanningblasphemousspeechwillbeenforceableintheUnitedStates.
TheU.S.nationallawonthefreedomofexpressionismoreexpansivethaninternationallaw;apersonintheUnitedStateshastheabilitytosay,withoutworryofsanction,morethanwhattheICCPRwouldallow.TheICCPRstatesspeechshouldberestrictedtostopreligiousorracialhatred,protectnationalsecurity,orprotectpublicmorals.198TheU.S.domesticlawdoesnotpermitthesetypesofrestrictions,exceptinverylimitedcircumstances.TheU.S.lawviolatestheICCPR,inthisregard,asitistoopermissiveandallowstoomuchspeech.199However,asdiscussedinPartIII.B,theUnitedStatessubmittedRUDswhenitratifiedtheICCPR,anddidnotratifytherestrictionsonfreespeechintheICCPR.200
B.Tunisia
InDecember2010,atwenty-sixyearoldTunisianman,anownerofafruitstand,setofftheArabSpringwhenhesethimselfonfireinfrontofagovernmentbuildingasanactofprotest.201Thisactofdesperationsetoffachainofeventsnotonlyinhiscountry,butinmanyotherstatesaroundNorthAfricaandtheMiddle
193 Chaplinskyv.NewHampshire,315U.S.568(1942).194 Id.at571-72.195MichaelMcGough,Americans Have Cracked Down on Blasphemy Too,l.A. tIMes,Sept.25,2012,http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/25/news/la-ol-obama-blasphemy-islam-20120925.MassachusettsandPennsylvaniastillhaveblasphemylawsintheircode.Id.196 JosephBurstyn,Inc.v.Wilson,343U.S.495(1952).197 Id.at505.198 ICCPR,supranote8,arts.19-20.199 Id.200 ICCPRStatus,supranote145.201 SeeTheArabSpring,supranote187.
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East,withtheeffectsstillbeingfelttoday.TheproteststhatfollowedinTunisialedtothepeacefulousterofPresidentZineelAbidineBenAliandhisgovernment.202
TheTunisianpeoplehadtheirfirstfreeelectionsinOctober2011whentheyelectedmembersfortheNationalConstituentAssembly(NCA).TheNCAwastaskedwithdraftinganewconstitutionbecausethelastconstitution(draftedin1959)wassuspendedinMarch2011.203TheNCAreleasedthefirstdraftofthenewconstitutioninAugust2012.204Thisdraftwasmetwithstiffcriticismfromhumanrightsgroups.BothHumanRightsWatchandArticle19bothexpressedconcerntheconstitutiondidnotdoenoughtoprotectfreeexpressionandnotedthedraftcriminalizedblasphemy.205Aseconddraft,releasedinJanuary2013,removedthecriminalizationofblasphemyarticle,butvagueandambiguousphrasingonfreeexpressionremains.206Thenewdraftconstitutionisstillundergoingreview,andthereishopetheprotectionsforthefreedomofexpressionwillcontinuetoimprove.
AftertheoverthrowofPresidentBenAli, thenewlyelectedauthoritiespromisedtoupholdthefreedomofexpressionbothintheconstitutionandinthelaws.207Inpractice,however,therepressionoffreespeechcontinued.WhiletheTunisianPenalCodecurrentlydoesnotcontainananti-blasphemyprovision,therulingEnnahdhaMovementhaspromisedto“protectthesacred,”andtodosohasproposedananti-blasphemylaw.208ThisproposedlawwouldbeArticle165bintheTunisiaPenalCode.209Theproposedlawwouldcriminalizeany“insult,mockery,disdainorphysicalormoraldesecration”ofthe“sacredvalues”orsymbols.210Whilethisproposalhasnotbeenmadelawyet,blasphemyisstillbeingprosecutedinTunisia.ThegovernmenthasusedArticle121(3)oftheTunisiaPenalCodeto
202 Id.203AMnesty Int’l, one step ForwArd, two steps BAcK? one yeAr sInce tunIsIA’s lAndMArK electIons1(Oct22,2012)[hereinafterAmnestyInternational],available athttp://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/one-step-forward-two-steps-back-one-year-since-tunisia-s-landmark-elections.204 SarahLeahWhitson,Letter to Members of the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly,huM. rts. wAtch,Sept.13,2012,http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/13/letter-members-tunisian-national-constituent-assembly.205 Id.;see also Tunisian Draft Constitution Needs More Work to Protect Freedom of Expression, ArtIcle 19, (Nov.9,2012)http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3512/en/tunisa-draft-constitution-needs-more-work-to-protect-freedom-ofexpression.206 Amnesty Voices Concern Over Tunisia Draft Constitution,Agence FrAnce-presse,Jan.12,2013,http://reliefweb.int/report/tunisia/amnesty-voices-concern-over-tunisia-draft-constitution.207 Id.208AfefAbrougui,Free Speech in Tunisia: New Year, Same Fears,uncut,Jan.4,2013,http://uncut.indexoncensorship.org/2013/01/tunisia-free-speech/.209 Id.210 Tunisia: Draft Law Amending and Completing Specific Provisions of the Penal Code on the Criminalisation of Offences against Sacred Values,ArtIcle 19, Aug.2012,available athttp://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/3411/12-08-16-LA-tunisia.pdf.
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criminalizeallegedblasphemy.211Thelawprohibitspublicationsthatare“liabletocauseharmtothepublicorderorpublicmorals.”212Thisbroaddefinitionhasbeeninterpretedbygovernmentofficialstoincludeallegedblasphemy.
InApril2012,twoyoungTunisianmenweresentencedtosevenyearsinprisonforpostingcartoonsoftheProphetMuhammadnakedonFacebook.213AspokesmanfortheJusticeMinistrywasquotedassayingthatthesentencewasfora“violationofmorality,anddisturbingpublicorder.”214InMay2012,atelevisionstationowner,NabilKaroui,wasfoundguiltyandfined2,400dinar(approximately$1,500)forairingthecriticallyacclaimedfilm“Persepolis,”whichcontainedanimageofAllah.215InSeptember2012,AyoubMassoudiwassentencedtoasuspendedfour-monthtermfor“underminingthereputationofthearmy”and“defamingacivilservant”forcriticizingtheextraditionoftheformerLibyanPrimeMinisterfromTunisiabacktoLibya.216
WhiletheArabSpringbroughtthepromiseofdemocraticreformsandnewfreedomsfortheTunisianpeople,therealityhasbeenfartherfromthat.Theunfortunaterealityispeopleareprosecutedfortheirspeech,especiallyregardingspeechconsideredtobeblasphemous.PartofthisstemsfromsomeconservativeMuslimswhowantmorefaithintheirpubliclife,versussecularistswhowanttominimizetheroleofreligionintheirpubliclife.217UnliketheU.S.Constitutionwhichclearlyprotectstherighttofreeexpression,thedraftTunisianconstitutionisvagueandambiguousabouttheprotectionsfreeexpressionwillreceiveinthepost-ArabSpringTunisia.
CurrentTunisiandomesticlawisnotincompliancewithinternationallaw.TunisiaratifiedtheICCPRin1969,andisthusboundtomeetitsrequirements.218InordertomeettheirobligationsundertheICCPR,Tunisiamustclearlydefineandprotecttherightoffreedomofexpressionintheirnewconstitution.TheuseofArticle121(3)andtheproposedArticle165bbothimpermissiblycurtailtheright
211 Id.212 Id.213 Reuters,Tunisia Jails 2 for Posting Cartoons on Facebook,n. y. tIMes, Apr.5,2012,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/world/africa/tunisia-jails-2-for-facebook-cartoons-of-prophet.html?_r=0.214 Id.215 Tunisian Court Levies Fine on Persepolis Cinema Owner,the telegrAph,May3,2012,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/tunisia/9242927/Tunisian-court-levies-fine-on-Persepolis-cinema-owner.html.216 See AmnestyInt’l,supranote203,at27.217 Reuters,supranote213.218 ICCPRStatus,supranote145.
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tofreespeechasguaranteedbytheICCPR.219TherestrictionsonspeechinTunisiadonotmeettheexceptionslaidoutbyArticle19or20oftheICCPR.
C.Egypt
LikeTunisia,theEgyptianpeopleweresweptupinthetideoftheArabSpringandoverthrewtheirgovernment,ledbyPresidentHosniMubarak,inFeb-ruary2011.220Oncethegovernmentwasoverthrown,themilitarysuspendedtheconstitution.221ElectionswereheldinNovember2011,andanewpresidentwaselected,MuhammadMorsi.222
Whiletheconstitutionhadprovisionsthatprotectedtherightoffreedomofexpression,PresidentMubarak’sregimesuppressedmostrights,withthecon-stitution’stermsmeaninglittle.223OnDecember26,2012,PresidentMorsisignedadecreethatputintoeffecttherecentlyvoter-approvednewconstitution.224Thisnewconstitutionhasalreadybeenheavilycriticizedforitsapparentlackofprotec-tionforfundamentalhumanrights.225Freedomofexpression,whileprotectedintheconstitution,islimitedinseveralways.Thenewconstitutionbansblasphemyandformsof“insult,”aswellasonlypermittingthe“divine”or“monotheistic”religions.226HumanRightsWatchtakesthepositionthattheconstitutionfailstosufficientlyprotectthefreedomofexpressionbyvaguelydefiningwhatthelimita-tionsaretospeechandwhenthestateisallowedtolimitit.227SomemembersoftheEgyptianmediaarguethisnewconstitutionhasworseprotectionsforthemediathanithadduringMubarak’sregime.Theyargueifanindividualreportermakesamistake,thenthegovernmentcanshutdowntheentirepublication.228Inadditiontotheconstitution,therearelimitsonfreedomofexpressionfoundinthepenallaw.
219 See also Tunisia:DraftLawAmendingandCompletingSpecificProvisionsofthePenalCodeontheCriminalisationofOffencesagainstSacredValues,supranote210.220 TheArabSpring:A Year of Revolution,supranote187.221 Egypt: Protecting Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information in the New Constitution, ArtIcle 19, 9(2012),available at http://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/3092/12-05-09-LA-egypt.pdf.222 SalmaAbdelaziz,Morsy Signs Egypt’s Constitution into Law,cnn.coM,Dec.26,2012,http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/25/world/africa/egypt-constitution/index.html.223 Egypt: Protecting Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information in the New Constitution, supranote221.224Abdelaziz,supranote222.225 IsobelColeman,The Explosive Debate over Egypt’s new Constitution,the AtlAntIc,Dec.5,2012,http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/12/the-explosive-debate-over-egypts-new-constitution/265931.226 Id.227 Egypt: New Constitution Mixed on Support of Rights, huM. rts. wAtch,Nov.30,2012,http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/29/egypt-new-constitution-mixed-support-rights.228Mosireen,Egypt’s Draft Constitution in Focus: Freedom of Expression,JAdAlIyyA, Dec.20,2012,
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TheEgyptianPenalCode,whilenothavingalawthatspecificallyprohibitsblasphemy,doescontainArticle98(f)whichprohibitsusingreligionto“promoteoradvocateextremistideologies,ignitestrife,degradeanyoftheheavenlyreligions,orharmnationalunityorsocialpeace.”229TheEgyptianlawalsocontainsthe“doctrineofhisbawhichentitlesanyMuslimtotakelegalactionagainstanyoneheconsidersharmfultoIslam.”230ThisdoctrinehasgivensomeIslamicextremiststheabilitytoharassscholarsandothersseenasinsultingIslam,includingmembersofothersectsofIslam,Judaism,orChristianity.231
DuringtheshortpresidencyofMr.Morsi,theprosecutionsforinsultingthepresidentorthejudiciaryhaveincreased.232BassemYoussef,atelevisioncomedian,isbeinginvestigatedforinsultingPresidentMorsiandotherconservativeIslamists,withthecomplainantsstatinghisskitsamountedtoa“sharpattackonthepersonofthepresident,”or“sarcasmagainstthepresident.”233AnEgyptiancourtrecentlysentencedtodeathsevenCopticEgyptianslivingabroadaftertrialinabsentiafortheirconnectiontothefilm“InnocenceofMuslims.”234
ThenewEgyptianconstitutionandcurrentcriminalinvestigationsandprosecutionsputgreatlimitsonthefreedomofexpression.Theconstitutiongivestoomuchpowertothestate,almosttothepointwherefreeexpressionexistsinnameonly.ThenewEgyptianconstitution,filledwithlimitationsonfreeexpression,ishardlyprotectiveoffreeexpression.ThisconstitutionarguablyviolatesEgypt’srequirementsundertheICCPR,whichEgyptratifiedin1982,byimposingrestric-tionsthatfalloutsideofthelimitationsallowedinArticles19and20oftheICCPR.235
D.Pakistan
Pakistan’sblasphemylawshaveoftenmadefortragicinternationalheadlinesafteranotherincidentofoppressionofminoritygroups.236WhilePakistanhaslaws
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9139/egypts-draft-constitution-in-focus_freedom-of-expr.229Marshall&Shea,supranote14,at67.230 Id.at62(emphasisinoriginal).231 Id.232 Egypt: New Constitution Mixed on Support of Rights,supranote227.233MayyElSheikh,Egypt: Prosecutor Opens Criminal Investigation Against Comedian Accused of Insulting the President,n. y. tIMes,Jan.1,2013,http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/02/world/middleeast/comedian-accused-of-insulting-egyption-president-to-be-investigated.html?ref=middleeast&_r=0.234MohamedFadelFahmy,Egyptian Court Orders Death Sentences over Anti-Islam Film,cnn.coM,Nov.29,2012,http://cnn.com/2012/11/28/world/meast/Egypt-anti-islam-film/index.html?hpt=wo_c2.235 ICCPRStatus,supranote145.236 See Siddique&Hayat,supranote171;seeRebeccaJ.Dobras,Is the United Nations Endorsing Human Rights Violations? An Analysis of the United Nations’ Combating Defamation of Religions
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prohibitingblasphemousspeech,theirconstitutionpurportstoprotecttherighttofreeexpression.237However,aquickreviewofArticle19oftheconstitutionrevealsthereareseveralprovisionsthatallowthestatetolimittherighttofreespeech.Speechcanbelimitedby“reasonablerestrictionsimposedbylawintheinterestofthegloryofIslam”orinnationaldefense,oraspartof“friendlyrelations”withforeignpowers,orforpublicorder.238ThisisinstarkcontrasttotheU.S.Constitutionwhichcontainsnolimitationsontherighttofreespeech.
ThePakistanicourtstendtoviewfreespeechonacase-by-caseapproachinordertobestgaugethe“reasonableness”ofthestate’srestrictionsandtobestbalancethestate’sinterests.239Thecourtshavecaselawthathassupportedfreedomofspeechasitconcernsthepress,andstruckdownattemptedregulationofthepress.240Incontrasttothislimitedcaselawthatmaybeanattempttosupportthefreedomofexpression,Pakistanhasconsistentlybeennamedoneoftheworld’sdeadliestplacesforreporters,withreportersthreateneduntiltheyleavecities,andwebsitestonewsorganizationsroutinelyblocked.241
ThePakistanPenalCodecontainsstrictblasphemyprovisionsinordertopunishpeoplefordefamingIslam.242TheseblasphemylawsprotectIslamandtheProphetMuhammadfromcriticismoranytypeofdefilingofhisnameorIslam’sholybooks.243Thepunishmentforblasphemycanbeuptoamaximumoflifeinprisonordeath.244Thesestatuteshaveroutinelybeenarbitrarilyenforcedtorepressminorities,suchastheAhmadis,aminorityreligioussect.245AseniorresearcheratHumanRightsWatchnotesthat“Pakistanhassetthestandardforintolerancewhenitcomestomisusingblasphemylaws....”246
Resolutions and Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws,37gA. J. Int’l & coMp. l. 339(2009).237 pAKIstAn const.art.19(1973)(“Everycitizenshallhavetherighttofreedomofspeechandexpression,andthereshallbefreedomofthepress,subjecttoanyreasonablerestrictionsimposedbylawintheinterestofthegloryofIslamortheintegrity,securityordefenceofPakistanoranypartthereof,friendlyrelationswithforeignStates,publicorder,decencyormorality,orinrelationtocontemptofCourt,commissionoforincitementtoanoffence”).238 Id.239 Siddique&Hayat,supranote171,at370-71.240 Id.241MalikSirajAkbar,Pakistan’s Eroding Space for Free Expression,huFFIngton post,Aug.9,2012,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-siraj-akbar/pakistan-press-freedom_b_1735806.html.242pAK. penAl code§§295-98(1860),available athttp://www.refworld.org/docid/485231942.html.243 Id.244 Id.245 Dobras,supra note236,at343.246 Pakistan: Drop Blasphemy Charges Against 17-Year-Old, huM. rts. wAtch, Feb.2,2011,http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/02/pakistan-drop-blasphemy-charges-against-17-year-old(discussingacasewhereaseventeen-year-oldwasarrestedforblasphemyforallegedlyincludingderogatoryremarksabouttheProphetMuhammadonanexam.Thepolicestatedthattheycannotdiscloseany
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Theevidenceusedtodetermineifsomeonecommittedablasphemousactisuptothesubjectivebiasesandopinionsofthestateofficial.247Nofurtherevidenceofblasphemyisrequired;thegovernmentwillusuallyacceptanycomplaintofblasphemyandnotconductaninvestigation.Thecomplaintisoftensufficienttoconvictsomeoneofblasphemy,withoutanyconsiderationofthecomplainant’smotivations.248Therehavebeenoccasionsof“religiousvigilantism”occurringinPakistan,wheregroupsofextremistshaveattackedandkilledallegedblasphemers.249However,thosepeopleconvictedofblasphemyattrialoftenhavetheirconvictionsoverturnedbytheappellatecourts.250Andwhilethedeathpenaltyisanauthorizedpunishment,andseveralpeopleareondeathrowforblasphemy,noonehaseverbeenexecutedinPakistanforblasphemy.251
Pakistan’sviewoffreespeechismuchdifferentfromthatoftheUnitedStates.Withthenumerousexceptionstotheirconstitutionalprotectionsoffreespeech,clearlyapersoninPakistanhaslessfreedomofspeechthanintheUnitedStates.Pakistan’slawsonfreedomofspeechalsodonotholdupagainstinternationallaw.PakistansignedandratifiedtheICCPR,andassuchmustmeetthoseterms,whichprovidefarmoreprotectionsforthefreedomofexpressionthanPakistanilawallows.252Pakistan’sblasphemylawsdonotmeettherequirementsforallowablerestrictionsonspeechfoundinArticles19and20oftheICCPR.
V.DOESTHEUNITEDSTATES’APPROACHTOFREEEXPRESSIONPROMOTIONADVANCEITSFOREIGNPOLICYINTERESTS?
TheUnitedStates’approachtofreespeechismorethanjustaninterpreta-tionofU.S.andinternationallaw.TheUnitedStatesadvocacyofthefreedomofexpressionhaseffectsnotjustoninternationallaw,butinnon-legalareas,suchasglobalstabilityandsecurity.Thisisespeciallyfocusedintheareaofblasphemyandthedefamationofreligions,asthesetopicsimplicatebothinternationallawandthepoliticaldecisionsthataremadeastheUnitedStatesstrivesforglobalsecurityandstability.
detailsoftheincidentbecausetodosowouldbeblasphemy).247 Dobras,supranote236,at357(citing Persecuted Minorities and Writers in Pakistan huM. rts. wAtch(1993),available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/pakistan/).248 Id.249 Dobras,supranote236,at344.250 Siddique&Hayat,supra note171,at374.251 See id.;Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws Still Claim Many Victims,cAtholIcculture.org, Nov.21,2012,http://www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/index.cfm?storyid=16326.252 ICCPRStatus,supranote145.Pakistantookreservationstomostprovisionsofthetreaty,towhichmanynationsaroundtheworldobjectedtoasincompatiblewiththetreaty.Id.See alsosupraPartIII.B.
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A.U.S.PolicyontheAnti-DefamationProposals
AsdiscussedinPartII.D,theOrganizationofIslamicCooperation(OIC)haspushedforU.N.resolutionsthatcalledforlimitsonspeechthatwasblasphemousordefamedreligions.TheseresolutionswerepassedbytheHumanRightsCommitteeandGeneralAssemblyforyears.However,in2011,thelanguagesoftenedandonlyspokeofcombatingintoleranceordiscriminationbecauseofreligionorbelief.ThisresolutionwasadoptedbytheHumanRightsCommitteein2011,andthenextyearbytheGeneralAssembly.253
TheUnitedStateshasbeenagainsteverydefamationofreligionresolutionproposedbystatesonbehalfoftheOIC.TheUnitedStateshasheldthispositionsincethefirstdefamationofreligionresolutionwasdraftedbyPakistanin1999,andbeensupportedinarguingagainsttheseresolutionsbymostwesterncountries.254TheUnitedStatesandmanyWesternstatesarguetheseresolutionsillegallyandimproperlyrestrictthefreedomofexpressioninawayinconsistentwithinternationallaw.255SecretaryofStateHillaryRodhamClintoneloquentlystatedtheU.S.positionduringaspeechshegavein2009:
Now,someclaimthattheUnitedNationscanbestprotectthefree-domofreligionbyadoptingwhatiscalled“anti-defamation”policythatwouldrestrictthefreedomofexpressionandthefreedomofreligion.Iobviously,stronglydisagree.Anindividual’sabilitytopracticetheirreligionshouldhavenobearingonothers[sic]individuals’freedomofspeech.Theprotectionofspeechaboutreligionisparticularlyimportantsincepersonsofdifferentfaithswillinevitablyholddivergentviewsonreligiousquestions.Andthesedifferencesshouldbemetwithtolerance,notsuppressionofdiscourse.AndtheUnitedStateswillstandagainsttheideaofdefamationofreligionintheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyandtheHumanRightsCouncil.256
Whiletheearlyanti-defamationofreligionresolutionspassedbylandslidemargins,eachtimethereafterthe“no”votesgainedtraction,thoughtheresolutionsstillpassedbyamajorityvote.257InMarch2010,aftertheHumanRightsCouncilpassedwhatendedupbeingthelast(fornow)resolutionondefamationofreligion,theU.S.ambassadortotheCouncil,EileenDonahoe,summarizedtheU.S.position
253 G.A.Res.66/167,U.N.Doc.A/RES/66/167(Mar.27,2012).254 See id.255 See id.256 SecretaryofStateHillaryRodhamClinton,RemarksUponReceiptoftheRooseveltInstitute’sFourFreedomsAwardattheRooseveltInstitute’sFourFreedomsMedalsGalaDinner(Sept.11,2009),available athttp://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/09/129164.htm.257 See Blitt,supranote76,at350.
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ontheresolutionwhenshesaid,“[W]ecannotagreethatprohibitingspeechisthewaytopromotetolerance,becausewecontinuetoseethe‘defamationofreligions’conceptusedtojustifycensorship,criminalization,andinsomecasesviolentassaultsanddeathsofpolitical,racial,andreligiousminoritiesaroundtheworld.”258
WhiletheUnitedStatesmayhavebeenagainstresolutionscontaininglanguageprohibitingthedefamationofreligion,theUnitedStatessupportedU.N.HumanRightsCouncilResolution16/18oncombatingintolerance.259Theoppo-nentsofthedefamationofreligionresolutionswereabletodeleteanymentionofdefamationintheresolution,andassuch,manystatessupportedResolution16/18thathadbeenagainstthepriorresolutions.
Resolution16/18didnotendthedebateaboutdefamationofreligionthough.Resolution16/18enabledtheUnitedStatestosupportitandallowedtheUnitedStatestoclaimthatthetimeofputtingreligioussensitivitiesofsomepeopleoverfreedomofexpressionforallwasover.260TheUnitedStatesalsobelievedthatResolution16/18movedthedebateintherightdirectiontowardaglobaldiscus-siononintolerance,discrimination,andviolenceagainstpersonsbasedonreligionorbelief.261However,thelanguageusedintheresolutionalsoallowedtheOICtoclaimthattheresolutionwasnothingmorethanthe“exploring[ofan]alternativeapproach.”262Thesedifferingviewpointsonthemeaningandfinalityofthe“death”ofthedefamationresolutionssignalthefightagainstlimitingfreeexpressionisnotover.TheOICCharterstillliststhefightagainstthedefamationofIslamasoneoftheorganizationsbasicobjectives.263TheSecretary-GeneraloftheOICwasquotedafterthepassingofResolution16/18assayingthatthe“perceptionthatsupporting[defamationofreligion]wouldthrottleone’srighttofreedom[of]expressionisonlyamyth.”264
258 UNHRC Votes by Narrower Margin to Condemn “Defamation of Religion,”relIgIon & l. consortIuM, Mar.2010,available athttp://www.religlaw.org/index.php?blurb_id=805&page_id=25.259 Blitt,supranote76,at350.260 See id.261 PressRelease,U.S.DepartmentofState,AdoptionofResolutionatHumanRightsCouncilCombatingDiscriminationandViolence(Mar.24,2011),available athttp://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/03/159095.htm.262 Blitt,supranote76,at350.263 OIC Charter ¶ 12,org. oF IslAMIc cooperAtIon, http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=53(lastvisitedJan.24,2013).Paragraph12oftheOICCharterstates,“ToprotectanddefendthetrueimageofIslam,tocombatdefamationofIslamandencouragedialogueamongcivilisations[sic]andreligions.”Id.264 Blitt,supranote76,at362.
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Withtherecentallegedblasphemousactsoccurringworld-wide,265theOICstateshavebegunpushingfornewresolutionswiththelanguagerevertingbacktotheoldwaytoattempttoprohibitlanguagethatdefamesreligion,especiallyIslam.ThesecallshavecomefrombothEgyptandYemenattheU.N.,withbothcountries’presidentsdemandinglimitationsonspeechthatinsultsreligion.266Whatremainstobeseenishowtheinternationalcommunitywillrespond;whethertheconsensusthatbuiltuparoundResolution16/18willstand,orwhethertherenewedcallsforlimitationonspeechwillattractenoughsupport.
B.DoestheU.S.PolicyMakeSense?
TheUnitedStates’stridentoppositiontoanyresolutioncondemningorprohibitingblasphemyorthedefamationofreligionmakessense.Beingsupportiveofexpandedhumanrightswillhelpleadtofreedomandjusticearoundtheworld.Furtherrestrictionsonspeechwillnotmaketheworldabetterplace.
Limitingfreedomofexpressionwithrestrictionsagainstblasphemyanddefamationofreligiondoesnotmeetthestandardsofinternationallaw.TheICCPRlimitsspeechinArticle19(3)onlywhentheyare“providedbylawandareneces-sary:(a)Forrespectoftherightsorreputationsofothers;(b)Fortheprotectionofnationalsecurityorofpublicorder(ordrepublic),orofpublichealthormorals.”267GC34specificallyaddressestheissueofblasphemy.ItholdsthatnorestrictiononspeechforpurelyreligiousreasonscanstandinaccordancewiththetermsofArticle19,stating,“[p]rohibitionsofdisplaysoflackofrespectforareligionorotherbeliefsystem,includingblasphemylaws,areincompatiblewiththeCovenant....”268
TheotheravenueforrestrictingspeechgivenbytheICCPRisArticle20,whichprohibitsspeechthatisadvocating“religioushatredthatconstitutesincitementtodiscrimination,hostilityorviolence....”269Unfortunately,GC11onArticle20,doesnothelpinterpretthisrestrictiononspeech.Aplainreadingoftheprovisionappearstoprohibitarestrictiononexpressionforthepurposeofpreventingblas-phemyorthedefamationofareligionasitisnotnecessarilyadvocatinganyreligioushatred.Ofcourse,thischangesifthespeakerisdirectlyincitinghisaudiencetoviolence,hostilityordiscrimination.ButthistypeofspeechismorethanthesimpleblasphemytheOICisattemptingtoprohibitintheU.N.resolutions.ThisdirectadvocacytoviolencewouldevenbeprohibitedunderU.S.law.270Theproponents
265 See supra PartII.C.266 See NeilMacFarquhar,At U.N., Egypt and Yemen Urge Curbs on Free Speech,n. y. tIMes,Sept.26,2012,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/world/united-nation-general-assembly.html.267 See ICCPR,supranote8,art.19.268 See GC34,supra note161,para.48.269 See ICCPR,supranote8,art.20.270 See,supraPartIV.A.
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oftheanti-defamationofreligionresolutionsandstateblasphemylaws(namelytheOIC),generallyuseArticle20astheirmeansofjustifyingtheirlawsandtheresolution.271However,itisgenerallyagreedthiswouldbearedefinitionofthelawascurrentlyunderstoodinternationally.272In2001,thefreedomofexpressionspecialrapporteursfortheU.N.,theOrganizationofAmericanStates,andOrganizationforSecurityandCooperationinEuropejointlyissuedastatementwhichargued“nooneshouldbepenalizedforthedisseminationof‘hatespeech’unlessithasbeenshowntheydidsowiththeintentionofincitingdiscrimination,hostility,orviolence.”273
Democracyisfundamentallyaboutfreedom.Humanrights,bothinterna-tionallyandnationally,shouldbeaboutprotectingandexpandinghumanfreedoms.Blasphemylawsaremeanttocurtailfreedomandopposingideas.Thelawsarenotusedforsomehigherpurpose,butoftenforthemaintenanceofthestatusquo,tokeepasideinpowerbysuppressinganyotherviewpointandpreventingadiscussiononotherideasfrombeginning.274Thelawsthatarecurrentlyinexistence,suchastheoneinPakistan,areextremelypronetoabuse,oftenusedtosuppressminoritieswithinthecountry.275
Proponentsofrestrictionsofspeechforblasphemysometimesarguereligiondeservesthesameprotectionsracereceives.276However,thereisaproblemwiththatcomparison.Religionisinherentlypersonal.Itisnotthesameasaperson’srace.“Aperson’sraceisimmutable,whilereligionisabeliefthatindividualsarefreetochooseorchange....”277Attemptstoequatethetwomissthepointandarewrong.Whilecriticizingaraceinferscriticismofapersonofthatrace,criticismofabeliefdoesnot.278Religionsorbeliefsdonotdeservethesameprotectionsthatracereceives.279
TheU.S.policydecisiontofightthedefamationofreligionsresolutionsiscorrectalsobecauseofthevaguenessandone-sidednessoftheresolutions.Theresolutionsarewrittensovaguelyitisimpossibletoknowpreciselywhatisbeing
271 See LeonardA.Leo,FeliceD.Gaer&ElizabethK.Cassidy,Protecting Religions from “Defamation”: A Threat to Universal Human Rights Standards,34hArv. J.l. & puB. pol’y 769, 775 (2011).272 See id.273 See id.274 See id.275 Seesupra PartIV.D.276 See CourtneyC.Radsch,Why a Global Blasphemy Law is the Wrong Response to Islamaphobia,huFFIngton post,Oct.10,2012,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/Courtney-c-radsch/global-blasphemy-law-wrong-response-to-islamaphobia_b_1920109.html.277 Id. 278 See id.279 See id.
Examining Blasphemy 61
limited.Proponentsusethephrase“defamationofreligion,”withoutanydiscussionofwhatthatphrasemeans.280RoyW.BrownoftheInternationalHumanistandEthicalUnionstateditwellwhenhesaidthefollowinginalettertotheHumanRightsCouncil:
Andhowarewetodefinedefamation?Arewenolongertobepermittedtocondemnmisogyny,homophobia,orcallstokill—iftheyaremadeinthenameofreligion?Areweobligedtorespectreligiouspracticesthatwefindoffensive?Islackofrespectforsuchpracticestobeconsideredacrime?Areideas,arereligionsnowtobeaccordedhumanrights?Surely,whenreligioninvadesthepublicdomainitbecomesanideologylikeanyother,andmustbeopentocriticismassuch.Todenytheclaimsofreligionisneitherdefamationnorblasphemy.281
IftheUnitedStatessupportedthesemeasuresandsupportedthembecom-inginternationallaw,wouldtheU.S.thenberequiredtooutlawatheists?CouldapersonintheUnitedStatesbeallowedtostandupandshout“ThereisnoGod,”towhoeverwilllisten?ArguablythatsimplestatementisblasphemyanddefamingallreligionsthatbelieveinGodandtheUnitedStateswouldberequiredtosilencetheatheist.Thishypotheticalmaybesaidtobeludicrousfromsomesupportersofanti-blasphemyresolutions,butitistakingtheideabehindtheresolutionstoitslogicalextreme.Anythoughtsbesidewhatyou(thesupporter)haveareblasphemyandtherebydefamingyourreligion,andneedstobeoutlawed.
C.ShouldTherebeLimitsonWhatCanbePostedinOneCountrybutBroadcastInternationally?
Astraditionsagainstblasphemyareusuallyculturalanddistincttospecificstates,onepotentialsolutionwouldbetoregulatethespeechthatemanatesfromastate.ThiswouldhavetheeffectofallowingstatesliketheUnitedStates,withitsliberalallowancesforfreedomofexpression,tomaintaintheirfreedoms,andallowstateslikePakistan,withstrictblasphemylaws,tonothavetheirlawsviolatedbywhatisproducedintheUnitedStates.Thissolutionthough,isnotworkableinourmoderntechnologicalworld.TheInternetcannotbelimitedinthatmannerwithoutdraconianrestrictions.
TheInternetisanamazinginstrumentforcommunication,research,andstudyallacrosstheworld.Ithasalsobecome,unfortunately,anamazingvehicletodistributemessagesofhate.282Hatespeechandcyberbullyinghaveaffectedlives
280 SeeResolutions,supranote83,andsupraPartII.E.281 StatementofRoyW.BrowntoHumanRightsCouncil,Int’l huMAnIst & ethIcAl unIon(Mar.29,2007),available at http://iheu.org/how-islamic-states-dominate-un-human-rights-council/.282 See LaShelShaw,Hate Speech in Cyberspace: Bitterness without Boundaries,25 notre dAMe
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allacrosstheworld.283TheU.N.SecretaryGeneralhascalledtheuseoftheInternettospreadhateanimportantchallengearisenfrommoderntechnology.284
Inordertolimitspeechtothestateofthespeaker,youwouldhavetolimittheInternetinwaysthatithasneverbeenlimitedbefore.Today,ifsomeoneintheUnitedStatespostedablasphemousvideoontoYouTube,thatvideoisviewablebypeopleallacrosstheworld,whethertheposterintendedittobeviewedbypeopleinPakistanornot.285HowisthevideopostertoknowitviolatessomelawinPakistan,ontheothersideoftheworld?Shouldhebeliableforthat,eventhoughheonlyintendedhisfamilytoviewthevideoinanearbyU.S.state?
Blasphemousspeech,asdiscussedinPartII.A,variesbyreligion.Thethings/people/itemsthatonereligionholdssacredcanbeverydifferent,andperhapsunexpectedlyso,tosomeonenotofthatreligion.Ifagroupweretocallblasphemyhatespeech,thenwhatishatespeech?Socialandhistoricalcontextisextremelyimportantindeterminingwhathatespeechis.286Hatefulspeechcanbedifferentthingstodifferentpeople.“Andifyouaskwhatwordsarelikelytobeprovocative...whatarelikelytobetheirfightingwords,theanswerisanythingandeverything...everyideaisanincitementtosomebody....”287ItisdifficulttoputregulationsontheInternetonspeechthatspeakersdonot,orcannot,knowishateful.
TheInternetistransnationalbyitsverynature.Informationonlineexistsinsomeways“everywhere,nowhereinparticular,andonlyontheNet,”andyetcanaffectpeopleeverywhere.288Inordertomakeworkablealimitationonspeechtokeepwhatisspokeninyourstateinyourstate,theverynatureoftheInternetwouldhavetochange.Contentmonitors(censors)wouldbeneededineverystateoneveryISPtoreviewcontentbeforeitwaspostedforwidedissemination.Thescaleofthisprojectwouldbeimmense.Considerthatcurrentlyover48hoursofvideoisuploadedtoYouTubeeveryminutefromhundredsofmillionsofusersaroundtheworld.289Andthisisonlyonewebsite.Thesolutionisjustnotworkable
J.l. ethIcs & puB. pol’y 279(2011).283 See id.at281.284 TheSecretary-General,Preliminary Report of the Secretary-General on Globalization and its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of all Human Rights,26-28,U.N.DocA/55/342(Aug.31,2000).285 Shaw,supranote282.286AlexanderTsesis,Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy,44WAKe Forest l. rev.497(2009).287 stAnley FIsh,there’s no such thIng As Free speech: And It’s A good thIng too106(1994).288 DavisR.Johnson&DavidPost,Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,48stAn. l. rev. 1367,1375(1996).289AboutYouTube,youtuBe.coM,http://www.youtube.com/t/faq(lastvisitedMar.13,2013).
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withtheInternetandmoderntelecommunicationtechnologyifthereisanydesiretokeeptheInternetanopenmarketplaceofideas.290
D.WouldaDifferentApproachtoFreeExpressionBetterServeU.S.NationalSecurity?
TheUnitedStatesshouldnotchangeitsapproachtoadvocatingforinterna-tionalfreedomofexpression.BlasphemousspeechdoescreateinstabilityanddoespresentasecurityriskfortheUnitedStates.291Afterthe“InnocenceofMuslims”wentviralandtheriotsbegan,U.S.agencieswarned“[t]heriskofviolencecouldincreasebothathomeandabroadasthefilmcontinuestogainattention,”puttingatriskU.S.interestsbothathomeandabroad.292TheminimalgaininsecuritytheUnitedStateswouldseeasaresultofchangingitslawandpolicyonfreedomofexpressionwouldnotbeenoughtojustifythedramaticchanges.TheUnitedStateswouldneedtooverrideitsentirejurisprudentialhistoryontheFirstAmendment,aswellasbothitsandtheinternationalcommunity’sunderstandingofinternationallaw,inordertopreventblasphemy.293Onemustimaginethisradicalshift,probablyrequiringaConstitutionalamendment,wouldthrowAmericansocietyintoupheav-als.IftheUnitedStatesdoesnotwanttogothatfar,asimplechangeofforeignpolicywillnotwork.IftheUnitedStateschangestoadvocatingforreducedfreedomofexpressionabroad,butdoesnotcurtailthefreedomathome,theblasphemousspeechwillstillemanatefromtheUnitedStates,andstillcauseinstabilityandangerdirectedattheUnitedStates.
ItisquestionablewhethereliminatingspeechconsideredblasphemousordefamingIslamemanatingfromtheUnitedStateswouldhaveanyeffectonIslamicterrorists.TheIslamicterrorists’hatredofthewest,andtheUnitedStates,comesfrommuchmorethanwhatwesternerssayaboutIslam.Thishatredgoesbackover100yearstothecolonialoppressionbythewesternnationsoftheMiddleEasternnations.294Fromtheearly1900swhentheEuropeanpowerscreatedthenationsoftheMiddleEastfortheirownprofit,totheColdWarwhentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion“foughtovertheMiddleEastnationslikechildrenovertoys,”MiddleEastresentmenthasgrown.295DuringtheColdWar,theUnitedStatessupported
290 But seeInternet Censorship in China,n. y. tIMes,Dec.28,2012,http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/international/countriesandterritories/china/internet_censorship/index.html(statingthatChinesegovernmentcomputersscreenallincomingdataandcompareittobannedkeywordlistsandwebsites,andthenblockthem).291 See U.S. Warns of Rising Threat of Violence Amid Outrage Over Anti-Islam Video,cnn.coM,Sept14.2012,http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/13/world/meast/embassy-attacks-main/index.html.292 Id.293 See supraPartIV.A.294WilliamO.Beeman,Why Middle Eastern Terrorists Hate the United States(2001),available athttps://www.brown.edu/Administration/News_Bureau/2001-02/01-025.html.295 Id.
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manydespotic,tyrannicalrulersintheMiddleEast;eachofwhomoppressedtheirpeople.ThishasbeencitedasaprimarycauseofIslamicterrorists’desirestotargettheUnitedStates.296Withareductionintheimportanceofblasphemy,theneedtoadjusttheU.S.securitypolicybasedonitisreduced.
Islamicpoliticalradicals’mainfearwasidentifiedina2006GallupsurveyasAmericanoccupation/domination,andthethreattherebytoIslam.297ThisinturnsleadsdirectlyintowhathasbeencalledthebiggestgeopoliticalforcecausingIslamicextremismandterrorism,theU.S.militarypresenceintheregionandthePalestinian/Israeliconflict.298Thethreatmodernityandglobalizationpose,atleastinthemindsoftheIslamicextremist,isanotherdrivingfactorinthehatredofthewest.ThisculturaldilemmafacingtheMiddleEastcausestensionsthatresultinterrorism.ExtremistsrefertotheWest’smilitarypresenceasmoderndaycrusadersattemptingtostampoutIslamandtheircultureinordertomaintainpower.299
TherootcausesoftheIslamicterrorists’hatredtowardstheUnitedStatesandtheweststemfrommorethanthewest’sdepictionsofIslam.However,fromthereactionintheMiddleEast,itisclearthese“blasphemous”actionsdothrowfuelonthefire.Buthowmuch?JessicaStern,amemberoftheHooverInstitutionTaskForceonNationalSecurityandLaw,disputessomeofthecommonlyheldmyths,assheputsit,regardingterrorists.300Oneofthesemythsisterroristsgroupsaremadeupofreligiouszealots.EvidencetheSaudiInteriorMinistrygainedfromthousandsofinterviewsofterroristsincustodyuncoveredthatthemajorityhadonlyalimitedunderstandingofIslam,andone-quarterhadcriminalhistories.301Anotherstatedmythisterroristsarestronglymotivatedbytheircause.Researchindicatestheopposite.Infact,thereasonspeoplejointerroristorganizationsareextremelyvaried.Thisleadstoshortlivedterroristsgroups,withonesthatsurvivehavingamoreflexibleideologytosupportthevariedideologyoftheirrecruits.AnexceptionisalQaeda,whichisadisciplinedgroup,butonewhosegoalsshiftconstantly.302
Terrorgroupsmaygainnewmembersthroughangertowardsblasphemybythewest,andtherecouldfollowariseinterroristactivitiesdirectedtowardsU.S.interests.However,studieshavedemonstratedthereisnoonepathorrecruitment
296Young,supranote39,at11.297 Id.at10.298 Id.at14.TheauthorspecificallycitestotheIraqconflictandinsurgencyasthecause.ThiscanlogicallybeextendedtotheU.S.militarypresenceintheregion,toincludetheconflictinAfghanistanagainsttheTaliban.299 Id.at17.300 JessicaStern,5 Myths About Who Becomes a Terrorist,wAsh. post,Jan.10,2010,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/08/AR2010010803585.html.301 Id.302 Id.
Examining Blasphemy 65
pitchthatissuccessfultopersuadingpeopletojointhesegroups.303WhileU.S.agenciesdofeartheseactscouldbeusedtoexploitangerandobtainnewmembers,itdoesnotappearblasphemywillbeadrivingforceinrecruitment.304ThereasonsterroristgroupstargettheUnitedStatesaresufficientlydistinctfromtheU.S.freespeechpolicythatthereislittleevidencetosupportanyassertionthatmodificationofthatpolicywouldaffectthesecurityoftheUnitedStates.
VI.CONCLUSION
BlasphemybythewesttowardsIslamhascontributedtoglobalunrestandinstabilityoverthelastseveralyears,andwillcontinuetointhefuture.Theseactsbyindividuals,oftenintheUnitedStatesexercisingtheirconstitutionallyprotectedrighttofreespeech,haveresultedinnationalsecuritythreatstotheUnitedStatesanditsinterestsaroundtheworld.However,theinstabilitycreatedintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,whilecausingnationalsecurityconcernsfortheUnitedStates,isnotalwaysbad.TheArabSpringisagoodexampleofthis.Whileitwasbroughtonbydecadesofoppression,itwasspurredonandorganizedbyInternetsocialmediasiteslikeTwitterandFacebook.305ThepoweroftheInternetandthefreespeechthatitisabletoprovidecanbeapowerfulforceforgoodacrosstheworld.
Evenwithinternationallawbeingclearonthematter,thishasnotstopped,norwillitstop,theOICfromadvocatingforlimitingexpressioninthismanner.EvenwithResolution16/18306steppingawayfromtheanti-defamationlanguage,theOICstateshavealreadyindicatedtheywillbepursuingananti-defamationresolutionagain.PresidentMohamedMorsiofEgypt, inaspeechtotheU.N.GeneralAssembly,stated:
[w]eexpectfromothers,astheyexpectfromus,thattheyrespectourculturalspecificsandreligiousreferences,andnotseektoimposeconceptsorculturesthatareunacceptabletous...InsultsagainsttheprophetofIslam,Muhammad,arenotacceptable.Wewillnotallowanyonetodothisbywordorbydeed.307
ThesewordsunmistakablyindicatetheintentofEgypttopressforrestrictionsonspeechsimilartothepastanti-defamationresolutions.
303 SaraDaly&ScottGerwehr,Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment, rAnd corp.(2006),available athttp://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1214.html.304 Id.305 SeeCarolHuang,Facebook and Twitter Key to Arab Spring Uprisings: Report,the nAt’l,June6,2011,http://openlab.citytech.cuny.edu/designprocess/files/2012/08/TheNational_FacebookandTwitterKeytoArabSpringUprising.pdf.306 Resolution16/18,supranote87.307MacFarquhar,supranote266.
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Evenwiththeclearmandatebyinternationallaw,blasphemyisstillbannedinmanyIslamiccountries,asshowninPartIV.ThisisdespitethesenationsbeingsignatoriestotheICCPR.308Blasphemyrestrictionsarealiveandwell,andtheydonotappeartobegoinganywhereinthenearfuture.Thesecountries’actionsandwordsindicatetheywillcontinuetoadvocateforalimitationtothebasichumanrightoffreedomofexpressionfortherestoftheworld.Nationsoftheworldneedtobevigilant,andcontinuetosupporttheexpansionofthefreedomofexpression.
TheU.S.foreignpolicyonfreedomofspeechistoadvocateforspeechwithveryfewlimitations,justlikeU.S.domesticlawprovides.309PresidentObamaeloquentlydefendedtheU.S.viewoffreespeechinfrontoftheU.N.GeneralAssembly,andmadeitclearevenifastatedoesnothavequitetheexpansiveviewtheUnitedStateshas,thereis“nospeechthatjustifiesmindlessviolence.”310This
308 See BlasphemyLawsinDifferentCountries,supraPartIV.309 See supraPartII.D.310 Obama’s Speech to the United Nations General Assembly—Text,n. y. tIMes,Sept.25,2012,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/world/obamas-speech-to-the-united-nations-general-assembly-text.html?r=0.PresidentObamastatedtheU.S.positiononfreespeechas:
Iknowtherearesomewhoaskwhywedon’tjustbansuchavideo.Andtheanswerisenshrinedinourlaws:OurConstitutionprotectstherighttopracticefreespeech.
HereintheUnitedStates,countlesspublicationsprovokeoffense.Likeme,themajorityofAmericansareChristian,andyetwedonotbanblasphemyagainstourmostsacredbeliefs.AsPresidentofourcountryandCommander-in-Chiefofourmilitary,Iacceptthatpeoplearegoingtocallmeawfulthingseveryday—(laughter)—andIwillalwaysdefendtheirrighttodoso.
Americanshavefoughtanddiedaroundtheglobetoprotecttherightofallpeopletoexpresstheirviews,evenviewsthatweprofoundlydisagreewith.Wedonotdosobecausewesupporthatefulspeech,butbecauseourfoundersunderstoodthatwithoutsuchprotections,thecapacityofeachindividualtoexpresstheirownviewsandpracticetheirownfaithmaybethreatened.Wedosobecauseinadiversesociety,effortstorestrictspeechcanquicklybecomeatooltosilencecriticsandoppressminorities.
Wedosobecausegiventhepoweroffaithinourlives,andthepassionthatreligiousdifferencescaninflame,thestrongestweaponagainsthatefulspeechisnotrepression;itismorespeech—thevoicesoftolerancethatrallyagainstbigotryandblasphemy,andliftupthevaluesofunderstandingandmutualrespect.
Now,Iknowthatnotallcountriesinthisbodysharethisparticularunderstandingoftheprotectionoffreespeech.Werecognizethat.Butin2012,atatimewhenanyonewithacellphonecanspreadoffensiveviewsaroundtheworldwiththeclickofabutton,thenotionthatwecancontroltheflowofinformationisobsolete.Thequestion,then,ishowdowerespond?Andonthiswemustagree:Thereisnospeechthatjustifiesmindlessviolence.Therearenowordsthatexcusethekillingofinnocents.There’snovideothatjustifiesanattackonanembassy.There’snoslanderthatprovidesanexcuseforpeopletoburnarestaurantinLebanon,ordestroyaschoolinTunis,orcausedeathanddestructioninPakistan.Inthismodern
Examining Blasphemy 67
liberalpolicypositioncouldcreatenewterroristswhenpeoplehearspeechcomingfromtheUnitedStatestheyfindblasphemous.ThisisarisktheUnitedStatesmusttake.HatredfortheUnitedStatesexistsintheMiddleEast.Itisnotnew,norisadrivingfactorinthathatredblasphemy.311TheIslamicfundamentalists/extremistswillharborhatredfortheUnitedStatesregardlessofwhattheU.S.positionisonfreespeech.EveniftheUnitedStatesmoderatesitsforeignpolicypositiononfreedomofexpression,theattacksontheUnitedStatesanditsinterestswillcontinue.AchangeintheU.S.foreignpolicywouldonlygenerateaminorimprovement(atbest)insomeIslamicterrorists’viewsoftheUnitedStates,butnotenoughtoeradicateIslamicterrorism,ortherebytojustifyachangeinU.S.policy.EveniftheUnitedStatesweretochangeitsforeignpolicy,thatchangewillnotstopthespeechthatemanatesfromtheUnitedStates.AsPresidentObamasaid,onepersonwithasmartphoneiscapableofsendingamessageofhate,orlove,aroundtheworldinstantly.312Thatmessagecouldhavepositiveornegativeeffects;theinternetoftenbringsunpredictableresults.313Theinternetisheretostay,andtheabilitytocompletelycontrolinformationisgonewithit.Freespeechcan,anddoes,dogood.Therearebenefitstomankind,withtheArabSpringonlyarecentexampleofthepowerofspeech.TheU.S.positiononthefreedomofexpressionshouldstandasabeaconofhope,freedom,andexpansivehumanrightsaroundtheworld.Thatbeaconshouldneverbediminished.
worldwithmoderntechnologies,forustorespondinthatwaytohatefulspeechempowersanyindividualwhoengagesinsuchspeechtocreatechaosaroundtheworld.Weempowertheworstofusifthat’showwerespond.
Id.311 See Beeman,supranote294,andYoung,supranote296.312 See Obama’s Speech to the United Nations General Assembly—Text,supranote310.313 See, e.g.,What’s in a Meme? YouTube Causes Upset on 125th Street,the econoMIst,Mar.9,2013,http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21573168-youtube-causes-upset-125th-street-whats-meme(discussingtheunexpectedpopularityoftheHarlemShakevideosaroundtheworld).
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Cyber Neutrality 69
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................... 71 II. NEUTRALITY......................................................................................... 72
A.NeutralityRules—HagueConventionsof1899and1907.................. 72 1.HagueV:RespectingtheRightsandDutiesofNeutral
PowersandPersonsinCaseofWaronLand.................................. 73 2.HagueXIII:RespectingtheRightsandDutiesofNeutral
PowersinNavalWar....................................................................... 75B.WhendoNeutralityRulesApplyinGeneral?..................................... 75
1.InternationalArmedConflictvs.Non-internationalArmedConflict.............................................................................. 75
2.TheUnitedNationsCharterandCollectiveSecurityLimitationsonNeutrality............................................................... 77(a)United Nations Charter............................................................ 77(b)Other Collective Security Agreements..................................... 79
C.ApplyingNeutralityRulesinCyberspace........................................... 80 III. ATTRIBUTION:LEGALTHEORYANDPRACTICE........................... 86
A.LegalTheoriesofStateResponsibility................................................ 86B.TechnicalandHumanAttribution........................................................ 89C.AttributingConductforNeutralityPurposes...................................... 92
IV. CASESTUDIES....................................................................................... 92A.Estonia................................................................................................. 93
1.Background.................................................................................... 93 2.NeutralityAnalysis........................................................................ 93
CYBERNEUTRALITY:ATEXTUALANALYSISOFTRADITIONALJUSINBELLONEUTRALITYRULESTHROUGHAPURPOSE-
BASEDLENS
Major Zachary P. Augustine*
* MajZacharyP.Augustine,JudgeAdvocate,UnitedStatesAirForce(LL.M.,Space,CyberandTelecommunicationsLaw,UniversityofNebraska-Lincoln(2013);J.D.,summa cum laude,NorthernIllinoisUniversitySchoolofLaw(2008);B.S.,Distinguished Graduate,UnitedStatesAirForceAcademy(2002))iscurrentlydeployedtotheCombinedAirOperationsCenter,AlUdeidAB,QatarandpermanentlyassignedastheChiefofCyberOperationsLaw,24thAirForce/AirForceCyberCommand,JointBaseSanAntonio-Lackland,Texas.PreviousassignmentsincludeAcquisitionsOfficer,LosAngelesAirForceBase,CA;ChiefofMilitaryJusticeandChiefofLegalAssistance,28thBombWing,EllsworthAFB,SD;ChiefofCivilLawandChiefofOperationsLaw,18thWing,KadenaAB,Okinawa,Japan.ThisarticlewassubmittedinpartialsatisfactionoftherequirementsforthedegreeofMasterofLawsinSpace,Cyber,andTelecommunicationsLawattheUniversityofNebraskaSchoolofLaw.TheauthorwishestothankthefacultyandstaffattheUniversityofNebraskafortheirkeeninsightintothecyberdomainandexcellentfeedbackindraftingthisarticle.TheviewsexpressedinthisarticlearesolelythoseoftheauthoranddonotreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheUnitedStatesAirForce,DepartmentofDefense,orU.S.Government.
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B.Georgia................................................................................................ 95 1.Background.................................................................................... 95 2.NeutralityAnalysis......................................................................... 97
(a)Turkish Neutrality..................................................................... 97(b)United States’ Neutrality ......................................................... 99
C.Stuxnet............................................................................................... 100 1.Background.................................................................................. 100 2.NeutralityAnalysis....................................................................... 102
V. CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 105
Cyber Neutrality 71
I.INTRODUCTION
Allwarfareisbasedondeception.Hence,whenabletoattack,wemustseemunable;whenusingourforces,wemustseeminactive;whenwearenear,wemustmaketheenemybelievewearefaraway;whenfaraway,wemustmakehimbelievewearenear—SunTzu,The Art of War
WhetheritwasusinginflatabletankstoconfuseNazisforcesastothelocationoftheD-DayinvasioninWorldWarII1orallowingthemediatoincor-rectlyconcludeandbroadcastreportsofanimminentamphibiousassaultonIraqiforcesinKuwaitduringthePersianGulfWar,2deceptionhaspersistentlyremainedafundamentalaspectofwarfare.However,themajortechnologicaldevelopmentsofthelate20thandearly21stcenturiesnowallowfordeceptiononawholenewscale.TheabilitytoanonymouslymisleadanadversaryorcreateharmfuleffectsonanadversaryfromanoceanawaythroughafewcomputerkeystrokeswouldprobablyputagrinonSunTzu’sface.Today’sdigitallynetworkedworldofferstrulyamazingbenefitsonaglobalscalebutalsocreatesnewfoundvulnerabilities.Thishasledtowhatsomehavereferredtoasacyberarmsrace,3wherestatesareincreasinglylookingtoexploitcybervulnerabilitiesasaprimaryinstrumentofnationalpower.Iranhasbeenheavilyinvestingincybercapabilities.4RussiaandChinaarewidelyknownasmajoractorsincyberspace.5ApparentleaksfromhighlyplacedUnitedStatesgovernmentofficialssuggestedthatUnitedStatesandIsraelicyberexpertsco-developedamalwareprogram,nicknamedStuxnet,todisruptoperationsatIran’sNatanzuraniumenrichmentfacility.6Withafairlysubstantiallistofbenefits,includ-ingtheinherentdeniabilityoftheInternet,itiseasytoseewhycyberoperationsaregaininginternationalpopularity,atrendthatislikelytocontinue.7
1 u.s. ArMy center oF MIlItAry hIstory, puBl’n no. 72-18, norMAndy, p. 15,(available athttp://www.history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-18/CMH_Pub_72-18.pdf).2 JohnS.Brown,The Maturation of Operational Art: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,inhIstorIcAl perspectIves oF the operAtIonAl Art439,460(U.S.ArmyCenterofMilitaryHistory,2005)(available athttp://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-89-1/cmhPub_70-89.pdf).3 Code Wars,wAsh. post,June4,2012(available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-03/opinions/35462276_1_cyber-security-computer-worm-nuclear-enrichment).4 ShaunWaterman,U.S. Seen as Iran ‘Cyberarmy’ Target,wAsh. tIMes,Apr.25,2012(available athttp://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/25/us-seen-as-iran-cyberarmy-target/?page=all).5 EllenNakashima,U.S. Said to be Target of Massive Cyber-Espionage Campaign,wAsh. post,Feb.11,2013,(available athttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-said-to-be-target-of-massive-cyber-espionage-campaign/2013/02/10/7b4687d8-6fc1-11e2-aa58-243de81040ba_print.html).6 EllenNakashima,JobyWarrick,Stuxnet was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts, Officials Say,wAsh. post,June1,2012,(available athttp://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-01/world/35459494_1_nuclear-program-stuxnet-senior-iranian-officials).7 See, e.g.,Pentagon to Boost Cybersecurity Force,wAsh. post,Jan.19,2013,(available athttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagon-to-boost-cybersecurity-
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Alongwithitsbenefits,militaryusesofcyberspacepresentanumberoflegalchallenges,bothinternationallyanddomestically.Onekeychallengeisthedifficultyofgaininginternationalconsensusonwhethertraditionallawsofarmedconflictapplytocyberoperations.Thisarticlewillanalyzeoneofthetraditionalinternationalrulesofarmedconflictthatmightlimitaprimarybenefitofcyberoperations:theabilitytodeceiveanadversary.Thelawofneutralitylimitscertaindeceptivebehaviorintraditionalarmedconflict.Maneuveringmilitaryforcesandweaponryalongunexpectedroutestosurpriseanenemyhasbeenastapleofwarfarethroughouthistoryandisalegitimateformofdeceptionsolongastheroutedoesnotpassthroughaneutralstate.Doesthislimitationalsopreventmaneuveringcyber“forces”or“weaponry”throughaneutralstate?
PartIIofthisarticlewillhighlightthekeyneutralityrulesthatarepoten-tiallyrelevanttoactivitiesincyberspaceandthenanalyzetheapplicabilityoftheserulestoabelligerent’scyberoperations.PartIIIwilldiscussinternationalstandardsofattributionandwherethosestandardsmightpresentpracticalproblemsinapplyingneutralityrulestocyberactivities.PartIVwillanalyzethepotentialneutralityimplicationsofseveralrecentlyreportedmaliciouscyberactivities.PartVconcludesthatneutralityrulesdoplacelimitsondeceptivecyberpracticesinanarmedconflict.But,whileindividualbelligerentsgenerallyhavetheabilitytoapplyneutralityrulestotheirownconductinthecyberdomain,neutralstateswillhavedifficultyestablishingneutralityviolationsbybelligerentsandwilllikelyhavetorelyonnotificationsfromthebelligerentsthemselves.
II.NEUTRALITY
ModernneutralityrulesflowfromtheHagueConventionsof1899and1907andderivefromageneraldesiretolocalizeconflictandpreventitsspread.Stateswhowishtoremainneutralinanygivenconflictareobligatedtotakecertainprecautionssoastoavoidimproperlyassistingapartytotheconflict.Inexchangefortakingtheseprecautions,belligerentstatespromisetorespecttheterritoryandcitizensofneutralstates.Onpaper,itisafairlysimpleconcept.However,inpractice,thedesireforbelligerentstogaintactical,operational,andstrategicadvantagesmaytestrespectforneutrality,especiallywhereviolationsaredifficulttodetect.8
A.NeutralityRules—HagueConventionsof1899and1907
The1899and1907Hagueconferencesincludedanumberofconventionsrelatedtoresolvinginternationaldisputesandproperbehaviorduringinternationalconflicts.Twooftheseconventions,HagueVandHagueXIII,werespecifically
force/2013/01/19/d87d9dc2-5fec-11e2-b05a-605528f6b712_story_1.html);Waterman,supranote4.8 Forexample,NorthVietnamesetroopsusedthedenseterraininCambodiaduringtheVietnamWarforsanctuary,movementofreinforcements,andcommunicationpurposes.roderIcK ogley, the theory And prActIce oF neutrAlIty In the twentIeth century199(1970).
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directedatarticulatingtherightsandobligationsofneutralstatesaswellastherightsandobligationsofbelligerentstowardsneutralstates.HagueVdealtwiththeconceptsofneutralityforlandwarfarewhileHagueXIIIdealtwithneutralityrulesatsea.Thesetwoconventionsarestillgoodlawtoday9andformtheanalyticalframeworkforapplyingneutralityconceptstoconflictsincyberspace.
1.HagueV:RespectingtheRightsandDutiesofNeutralPowersandPersonsinCaseofWaronLand
Article1oftheHagueVarticulatesthekeybenefitforneutralstates:“theterritoryofneutralPowersisinviolable.”10Theprincipleofterritorialsovereigntyisahallmarkofmoderninternationalrelationsbutitcanbedifficulttoapplywhencybercapabilitiesstartcomplementingtraditionaltoolsofwar.Launchinganairattackthroughaneutralstate’ssovereignairspaceonthewaytoatargetisaclearviolationofArticle111butitismuchlessclearwhenitcomestoroutingamaliciouscyberactivitythroughaneutralstate’sinfrastructureonthewaytothesametarget.12
Article2forbidsthemovementof“troopsorconvoysofeithermunitionsofwarorsuppliesacrosstheterritoryofaneutralPower.”13Here,theterm“convoyofmunitions”couldarguablyincludecyberweaponsbutthedraftersofthisarticleenvisionedthemovementofphysicalweaponsoveraneutralstate’sterritory.14
Article3prohibitsbelligerentsfromerectingonthe“territoryofaneutralPowerawirelesstelegraphystationorapparatusforthepurposeofcommunicatingwithbelligerentforcesonlandorsea”orusing“anyinstallationofthiskindestab-lishedbythembeforethewarontheterritoryofaneutralPowerforpurelymilitarypurposes,andwhichhasnotbeenopenedfortheserviceofpublicmessages.”15Inthecybercontext,thisraisesinterestingquestionsaboutwhetheravirtual“wirelesstelegraphystation”wouldbeprohibitedifitcouldessentiallyperformthesamefunctionasaphysicaltelegraphystation.
9 U.S.Dep’tofState,TreatiesinForce:AListofTreatiesandOtherInternationalAgreementsoftheUnitedStatesinForceonJanuary1,2013,at479-480(2013)(available athttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/218912.pdf).10 ConventionRespectingtheRightsandDutiesofNeutralPowersandPersonsInCaseofWaronLand,art.1,Oct18,1907,36Stat.2310[hereinafterHagueV].11 Int’l & operAtIonAl lAw dep’t, the Judge AdvocAte gen.’s legAl ctr. & sch., u.s. ArMy, JA 422, operAtIonAl lAw hAndBooK, ch. 2, para.XIII.A.1,at35(2012)[hereinafterArMy operAtIonAl lAw hAndBooK].12 SeeHagueV,supranote10,art.8(creatinganeutralityexceptionwhenusingpubliclyavailablecommunicationnetworks).13 HagueV,supranote10,art.2.14 See JamesBrownScott,TheReportstotheHagueConferencesof1899and1907,at539(1917)[hereinafterHagueReports].15 HagueV,supranote10,art.3.
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Article4preventsbelligerentsfromforminga“corpsofcombatants…ontheterritoryofaneutralPowertoassistthebelligerents.”16Wouldthispreventabelligerentfromformingabotnet17ontheterritoryofaneutralthatcouldlaunchadistributeddenialofservice(DDoS)attackonenemycommandandcontrolnetworks?
Article5highlightsthekeydutyofaneutralpower,namelytopreventbelligerentsfromperforminganyoftheactionsprohibitedinArticles2through4.18Neutralstatesmayevenberequiredtoapplyforcetocomplywiththeseduties.19Practicallyspeaking,howcouldaneutralstatepreventbelligerentsfromusingitsinfrastructureifbelligerentcyberactivitiesamountedtoaviolationofArticle2,3,or4?
Article8laysoutanimportantexceptionwhenitcomestotheapplicabilityofHagueVtocyberoperations.Article8says“[a]neutralPowerisnotcalledupontoforbidorrestricttheuseonbehalfofthebelligerentsoftelegraphortelephonecablesorofwirelesstelegraphyapparatusbelongingtoitortocompaniesorprivateindividuals.”20Whileaneutralstatedoesnothavetopreventtheuseoftelegraphortelephonelinesbybelligerents,thereisstillanobligationtoallowequalusebybelligerents.Article9says“[e]verymeasureofrestrictionorprohibitiontakenbyaneutralPowerinregardtothemattersreferredtoinArticles7and8mustbeimpartiallyappliedbyittobothbelligerents.”21Additionally,thisimpartialityrequirementflowstoprivatecompanieswhomayownoroperatecommunicationinfrastructure.Article9goesontosay“[a]neutralPowermustseetothesameobligationbeingobservedbycompaniesorprivateindividualsowningtelegraphortelephonecablesorwirelesstelegraphyapparatus.”22Oneapproachwouldbetocitethisexceptionasblanketauthorityforabelligerenttouseaneutralstate’sinfrastructuretotransportmaliciouscybercode.However,readingthisexceptiontoobroadlywouldtendtocontravenethepurposesoftheneutralityrulesandotherarticlesarguablysupportamuchmorenarrowreadingofArticle8.Additionally,muchoftherationalebehindArticle8seemstostemfromthepracticalproblemsassociatedwithpreventingbelligerentsfromusingpubliclyavailablecommunica-
16 Id.,supranote10,art.4.17 “[A]botnetisalargenumberofcompromisedcomputersthatareusedtogeneratespam,relayvirusesorfloodanetworkorWebserverwithexcessiverequeststocauseittofail...ThecomputeriscompromisedviaaTrojanthatoftenworksbyopeninganInternetRelayChat(IRC)channelthatwaitsforcommandsfromthepersonincontrolofthebotnet.Thereisathrivingbotnetbusinesssellinglistsofcompromisedcomputerstohackersandspammers.”PCMagazineOnlineDictionary,available athttp://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=botnet&i=38866,00.asp.18 HagueV,supranote10,art.5.19 Id.atart.10.20 Id. atart.8.21 Id. atart.9.22 Id.atart.9.
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tionlines.23Theofficialreportofthe1907Hagueconferencestatesthatrequiringneutralstopreventbelligerentsfromusingtheselineswouldencounter“objectionsofapracticalkind...arisingoutoftheconsiderabledifficultiesinexercisingcontrol,nottomentiontheconfidentialcharacteroftelegraphiccorrespondenceandtherapiditynecessarytothisservice.”24Ifmoderntechnologycandiminishsomeofthoseenforcementconcerns,itwouldseemtomakelesssensetointerpretArticle8assanctioningoffensivecyberoperations.
2.HagueXIII:RespectingtheRightsandDutiesofNeutralPowersinNavalWar
WhileHagueXIIIoffersmuchlessinthewayofrulesthatarerelevanttothecyberdomain,certainprovisionsdohelpguideinterpretationsofHagueV.ThemainfocusofHagueXIIIistoregulatethemannerinwhichbelligerentwarshipsmayreplenishattheportsofneutralstatesortransittheirterritorialwaters.Meretransitthroughterritorialwatersisallowed,25whilethearmingofavesselattheportofaneutralstateisprohibited.26Article5restatesasimilarprohibitionfromHagueV,prohibitingbelligerentsfromusing“neutralportsandwatersasabaseofnavaloperationsagainsttheiradversaries”or“erect[ing]wirelesstelegraphystationsoranyapparatusforthepurposeofcommunicatingwiththebelligerentforcesonlandorsea.”27Again,itseemstobethecontrol and operationofacommunicationsystemontheterritory(orintheterritorialwaters)ofaneutralstateversusthemere useofapublicutilitythatisprohibited.
B.WhendoNeutralityRulesApplyinGeneral?
Beforeanalyzingtheapplicabilityofneutralityrulestocyberoperations,itishelpfultodefinethegeneralapplicabilityofneutralityrulesintraditionalarmedconflict.Evenifneutralityrulesapplytoactivitiesincyberspace,thetraditionallimitationsonneutralityruleswillapplyaswell.
1.InternationalArmedConflictvs.Non-internationalArmedConflict
Strictlyspeaking,theprovisionsofHagueVandHagueXIIIonlyapplytointernationalarmedconflicts(IAC)betweensignatorynations.28Whileinitiallylimitedtostateparties,29theprovisionsofHagueVandHagueXIIIarealsonow
23 SeeHagueReports,supra note14,at543.24 Id.25 ConventionConcerningtheRightsandDutiesofNeutralPowersinNavalWarart.10,Oct.18,1907,36Stat.2415[hereinafterHagueXIII].26 HagueXIII,supra note25,art8.27 HagueXIII,supra note25,art5.28 SeeHagueV,supranote10,art.20;HagueXIII,supra note25,art.28.29 Id.
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bindingonallstatesascustomaryinternationallaw.30Formalneutralityrightsandobligationsonlyarisewhenthereisarecognizedstateofbelligerency.31Belligerencyisdefinedasastateofwarbetweentwosovereignstates.32However,neutralityrightsandobligationswillalsoariseinacivilwarwhenforeignstatesrecognizeaninsurgentforceasabelligerent,essentiallyputtingtheinsurgentforceonequalfootingwiththeestablishedgovernment.33
Acivilwarisbydefinition,anon-internationalarmedconflict(NIAC).34However,justbecauseneutralityrightsandobligationsariseduringacivilwardoesnotmeantheyapplyinalltypesofNIACs.WhilesomeauthorshavearguedthatneutralityappliesinallNIACs,35thebetterviewisthatrecognizedcivilwarsaretheonlytypeofNIACwhereformalneutralityrulesapply.36However,theinap-plicabilityofformalneutralityrulestoaNIACdoesnotmeanthat“neutral”stateshavenoobligationswithrespecttotheconflictparticipants.Apartfromneutralityobligations,statesoweeachotherageneraldutytopreventtheirterritoryfrombeingusedinawaythatcausesharmtoanotherstate.Initsfirstcase,theInternationalCourtofJusticeheldthatallstateshavean“obligationnottoallowknowinglyitsterritorytobeusedforactscontrarytotherightsofotherStates.”37ThisobligationappliesatalltimesandthereforeequallytoIACsandNIACs.Thisobligationisonlyowedtootherstates,nottoinsurgencies,essentiallycreatingsomethinganalogoustoverybasicneutralityobligationswithrespecttothelegitimategovernmentbutnotwithrespecttotheinsurgency.38
30WolffHeintschelvonHeinegg,Neutrality in Cyberspace,in4thConferenceonCyberWarfareProceedings35,38(C.Czosseck,R.Ottis,K.Ziolkowskieds.,2012);TessBridgeman,Note,The Law of Neutrality and the Conflict with Al Qaeda,85Vol5n.y.u. l. rev. 1186,1198(2010).31 l. oppenheIM, InternAtIonAl lAw: A treAtIse. voluMe II: dIsputes, wAr And neutrAlIty §§ 307, 311a, 312 (7thed.,H.Lauterpacted.,1952)(“recognitionofbelligerencyalonebringsabouttheoperationofrulesofneutrality”)(“Neutralityendswiththecessationofwar”).32 BlAcK’s lAw dIctIonAry175(9thed.2009)(Belligerencyisdefinedas“[t]hestatusassumedbyanationthatwageswaragainstanothernation”and“theactorstateofwagingwar.”).33 oppenheIM, InternAtIonAl lAw,supra note31,§ 308(“AscivilwarbecomesrealwarthroughrecognitionoftheinsurgentsasabelligerentPower,neutralityduringacivilwarbeginsforeveryforeignStatefromthemomentrecognitionisgranted.”).34MichaelN.Schmitt,YoramDinstein&CharlesH.B.Garraway,The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict: With Commentary,InternAtIonAl InstItute oF huMAnItArIAn lAwat2(2006),available at http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/The%20Manual%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20NIAC.pdf.35 Brideman,supra note30,at1211-1212.36 KevinJ.Heller,The Law of Neutrality Does not Apply to the Conflict with Al-Qaeda, and it’s a Good Thing, Too: A Response to Chang,47tex. Int’l. l.J.115,120-21(2011).37 CorfuChannel(U.K.v.Alb.),1949I.C.J.4,22(Apr.9)[hereinafterCorfuChannelCase].38 See Heller,supra note36,at119-20;see e.g.,DetlevF.Vagts,The Traditional Concept of Neutrality in a Changing Environment,14AM. u. Intl’l l. rev.83,90-91(1998);but seeKarlS.Chang,Enemy Status and Military Detention in the War Against Al-Qaeda,47tex Int’l l.J.1,40(2011)(arguingthattheneutralitydoctrineisappliedtoinsurgencieslikealQaeda).
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Inthecontextofcyberoperations,theneutralityanalysisinpartdependsonwhetherthecyberactivityitselfamountstoanarmedconflictoristakingplacewithinthecontextofaconventionalarmedconflict.ItalsodependsontheconflictclassificationaseitheranIACorNIAC,mademorecomplicatedbythedifferentarmedconflictthresholdsbetweenthetwo.TheInternationalCommitteefortheRedCrossCommentarytoArticle2oftheGenevaConventionsof1949says:
AnydifferencearisingbetweentwoStatesandleadingtotheinter-ventionofmembersofthearmedforcesisanarmedconflictwithinthemeaningofArticle2,evenifoneofthePartiesdeniestheexis-tenceofastateofwar.Itmakesnodifferencehowlongtheconflictlasts,howmuchslaughtertakesplace,orhownumerousaretheparticipatingforces.39
However,foraNIAC,thearmedconflictthresholdismuchhigher.AdditionalProtocolIIoftheGenevaConventionsof1949describes“internaldisturbancesandtensions,suchasriots,isolatedandsporadicactsofviolenceandotheractsofasimilarnature,asnotbeingarmedconflicts.”40
2.TheUnitedNationsCharterandCollectiveSecurityLimitationsonNeutrality
Inadditiontoproperlyclassifyingthenatureofaconflict, thepracticalapplicabilityofneutralityrightsandobligationsmaybelimitedbycommitmentsundertheUnitedNations(UN)Charterandanyotherapplicablecollectivesecurityagreements.
(a)United Nations Charter
Thepost-WorldWarIIerabroughtaboutsignificantchangestothepracti-calapplicabilityofneutralityrightsandobligations,evencausingspeculationthatneutralitywouldcompletelydisappear.41MuchofthisspeculationwasbasedupontheUNCharter’soutlawingofwar,42whichisapre-requisiteforneutrality,andontheformalcommitmentto“givetheUnitedNationseveryassistanceinanyactionittakes”and“refrainfromgivingassistancetoanystateagainstwhichtheUnitedNationsistakingpreventiveorenforcementaction.”43Withnearlyallsovereign
39 Int’l coMM. oF the red cross, coMMentAry to the thIrd genevA conventIon relAtIve to the treAtMent oF prIsoners oF wAr23(JeanPicteted.,1960);but seeMilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(Nicar.v.U.S.),1986I.C.J.14,103(June27)[hereinafterICJNicaraguaCase](establishingadifferencebetweenanarmedattackanda“merefrontierincident”).40 ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andrelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofNon-InternationalArmedConflicts,art.1(2),8June1977,1125UNTS609[hereinafterAdditionalProtocolII].41Vagts,supranote38,at88-89.42 U.N.Charterart.2,para.3,4;Vagts,supranote38,at89.43 Id. atart.2,para.5.
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statesbeingmembersoftheUnitedNations,44Article2(5)wouldseemtoleavelittleopportunityforstatestoremainneutraloncetheUnitedNationshasacted.UnderChapter7oftheUNCharter,theSecurityCouncilhastheauthoritytorequire45allmemberstatestoengageinnon-forcefulactionsagainstanoffendingstateunderArticle41orforcefulactionsunderArticle42.46However,theUNCharter’spredictedimpactineliminatingneutralityhasnotplayedoutinpractice.47WhiletheSecurityCouncildoeshavesignificantenforcementauthority,thevetorights48heldbyChina,France,Russia,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates49oftenpreventfulluseofthatauthority.Between1946and2012,apermanentmemberoftheUNSecurityCouncilusedaveto269times,thoughmostwerecastduringthecoldwar.50BecauseSecurityCouncilresolutionsrequirenineoffifteenaffirmativevotes,51includingaffirmativeorabstentionvotesfromallfivepermanentmemberstates,politicshaveseeminglypreventedthekindofactionsthatwouldeffectivelynullifyneutralityopportunities.Instead,SecurityCouncilenforcementactionstendtouselanguagelike“requests,”“invites,”“encourages,”“authorizes,”“endorses,”or“urges,”52hardlythekindofforcefullanguagethatmightrequireastatetoabandonaneutralitystance.Eventhestronger“callsupon”languagesometimesusedinSecurityCouncilresolutionsdoesnotusuallyequatetoamandatewhenreadincontext.53ScholarsinthisareatendtoagreethatwhiletheSecurityCouncilhasthepotentialtodrasticallylimit,oreveneliminate,astate’sabilitytoactasaneutralwithrespecttoaparticulararmedconflict,historysuggeststhatpoliticalrealitiesstillleaveroomforneutrality.54
44 SeeUnitedNationsmembershiplistavailable athttp://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml.45 U.N.Charterart25(“TheMembersoftheUnitedNationsagreetoacceptandcarryoutthedecisionsoftheSecurityCouncilinaccordancewiththepresentCharter”).46 Id. at art.41,42.47 See generally, Vagts,supranote38at89.48 U.N.Charterart.27,para.3.49 Id.atart.23,para.1.50 SeeGlobalPolicyForum,ChangingPatternsintheUseoftheVetointheSecurityCouncil,available athttp://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Changing_Patterns_in_the_Use_of_the_Veto_as_of_August_2012.pdf.51 U.N.Charterart.27,para.2.52 See,e.g.,S.C.Res665,U.N.Doc.S/RES/665(Aug.25,1990)(inviting memberstatestoparticipateandrequesting theyprovideassistancetoKuwait);S.C.Res1199,U.N.Doc.S/RES/1199(Sept.23,1998)(endorsinginternationalmonitoringeffortsinKosovoandurgingstatestomakepersonnelavailabletocontinuouslymonitorthesituation);S.C.Res1378,U.N.Doc.S/RES/1378(Nov.14,2001)(encouragingmemberstatestosupportAfghansecurity);S.C.Res.1973,U.N.Doc.S/RES/1973(Mar.17,2011)(authorizingmemberstatestotakeallnecessarymeasurestoenforceno-flyzoneinLibya).53 See, e.g.,S.C.Res665,U.N.Doc.S/RES/665(Aug.25,1990)(callingon“those statescooperating with the government of Kuwait”(emphasisadded));S.C.Res1386,U.N.Doc.S/RES/1386(Dec.20,2001)(callingonmemberstates“participating in the International Security Assistance Force”(emphasisadded)).54 See, e.g.,EricT.Jensen,Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyber Conflict,35FordhAM Int’l l.J.815,820(2012);Bridgeman,supra note30,at1208-09;GeorgeK.Walker,Information Warfare
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(b)Other Collective Security Agreements
However,eveniftheUNSecurityCouncilfailstotakeaction,ortakesactionthatallowsforoptionalparticipation,regionalsecurityagreementsmaystillpreventaneutralstance.Forexample,allmembers55oftheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)haveagreedthat“anarmedattackagainstoneormoreoftheminEuropeorNorthAmericashallbeconsideredanattackagainstthemall.”56ThislanguageissomewhatsoftenedbyArticle5though,arguablyleavingatleastsomeroomforstatestomakeindividualdecisionsconcerningparticipationinhostilities.Article5saysthateachmemberstate“willassistthePartyorPartiessoattackedbytaking…such action as it deems necessary,includingtheuseofarmedforce,torestoreandmaintainthesecurityoftheNorthAtlanticarea.”57Byallowingeachstatetotakesuchactionasitdeemsnecessary,theremaybesomewiggleroomforindividualNATOstatestostayoutofaparticularconflictwithoutbreachingtheirNATOobligations.
InadditiontoNATO,therearemanyothercollectivesecurityagreementsthatmaylimitastate’sneutralityoptions.Forexample,theUnitedStateshascom-mittedtothecollectivedefenseofnearlythirtycountriesoutsideofNATO.TheUnitedStates,Australia,andNewZealandhaveacollectivesecurityagreementthatcoversarmedattacksinthePacificArea.58TheUnitedStateshasbilateralsecurityagreementswithJapan,59SouthKorea,60andthePhilippines61thatalladdressarmedattacksinthePacificagainsteitherparty.TheSoutheastAsiaTreatybetweentheUnitedStates,UnitedKingdom,France,Australia,NewZealand,Philippines,andThailand,saysallstateswillcollectivelyrespondtoarmedattacksinthetreatyareaasdeterminedbytheirown“constitutionalprocesses.”62TheInter-AmericanTreatyofReciprocalAssistance(RioTreaty)between22North,Central,andSouthAmericanstatessaysthateachsignatorynationwill“undertaketoassist”inmeeting
and Neutrality,33vAnd. J. trAnsnAt’l l.1079,1111(2000).55Albania,Belgium,Bulgaria,Canada,Croatia,CzechRepublic,Denmark,Estonia,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Iceland,Italy,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Netherlands,Norway,Poland,Portugal,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia,Spain,Turkey,UnitedKingdom,UnitedStates.SeecurrentNATOmemberlistavailable athttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm.56 NorthAtlanticTreatyart.5,Apr.4,1949,63Stat.2241,34U.N.T.S.243.57 Id.(emphasisadded).58 TheAustralia,NewZealandandUnitedStatesSecurityTreaty,Sept.1,1951,3U.S.T.3420,131U.N.T.S.83.59 TreatyofMutualCooperationandSecurityBetweenJapanandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica,Jan.19,1960,11U.S.T.1632.60MutualDefenseTreatyBetweentheUnitedStatesandtheRepublicofKorea,Oct.11953,5U.S.T.2368,238U.N.T.S.199.61MutualDefenseTreatyBetweentheUnitedStatesandtheRepublicofthePhilippines,Aug.30,1951,U.S.-Phil.,3U.S.T.3947,177U.N.T.S.133.62 SoutheastAsiaCollectiveDefenseTreaty,Sept.8,1954,art.9,6U.S.T.81,209U.N.T.S.28.
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anarmedattackagainstanothersignatorynation.63Additionally,whilenotofficiallyrecognizingTaiwanasanindependentstate, theUnitedStateshascontinuallyexpresseditscommitmenttodefendTaiwan.64
WhiletheUnitedStateshascollectivesecurityagreementsthatspantheglobeandappearsdestinedforbelligerencyinjustaboutanyfutureIAC,notallstateshavesuchwidespreadcommitments.Additionally,asidefromtheUnitedNations,mostcollectivesecurityagreementsarebasedongeographicregions,typicallyonlyrequiringstatestogiveupaneutralityposturewhentheconflictcreepsintotheirneighborhood.Afterall,withtraditionalmethodsofwarfarewoulditreallymatterwhetherCostaRicaiswillingtoallowconvoysoftroopsormunitionstocrossitsterritoryinsupportofanarmedconflictinEurope?Withtheinterconnectednatureofglobalnetworksandthedevelopmentofoffensivecybertools,allofasuddenCostaRica’sstanceonadistantEuropeanorAsianconflictcouldbecomerelevant.Ifneutralityrightsandobligationsextendtoactivitiesincyberspace,regionalsecurityagreementswilldoverylittletoeliminateneutralityissuesbecausewithglobalinformationnetworks,everystateisinthesameneighborhood.WhiletheUNSecurityCouncilcouldtheoreticallyrequireallstatestogiveupaneutralityposturewithrespecttoaparticularconflict,practicallimitationsmakeitunlikely.So,ifallfuturearmedconflictsaregoingtohaveatleastsomeneutrals,andallfutureconflictswillinvolvecyberoperations,65how,ifatall,doneutralityrulesaffectactivitiesincyberspace?
C.ApplyingNeutralityRulesinCyberspace
EventhoughtheHagueVandXIIIrulesareoverahundredyearsold,todaytheyprovidethebasicframeworkforapplyingneutralityconceptstoactivi-tiesincyberspace.Theremaynotbeuniversalinternationalagreementinapply-ingfundamentalprinciplesofinternationallawtoactivitiesincyberspacebuttheUnitedStates’positionisthatexistinginternationallawdoesapplyincyberspace.66Additionally,theInternationalCourtofJusticehassuggestedthatneutralityrulesapplytoallweaponsystems.67
63 Inter-AmericanTreatyofReciprocalAssistanceart.3,Sept.2,1947,62Stat.1681,21U.N.T.S.77.64 See TheTaiwanRelationsAct,22U.S.C.§3301(1979).65 SeeJimGaramone,Lynn: Cyberwarfare Extends Scope of Conflict,AmericanForcesPressService,available athttp://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=61107(FormerDeputySecretaryofDefenseWilliamLynn’ssuggestionthat“[a]nymajorfutureconflictwillalmostcertainlyincludeelementsofcyberwarfare.”).66 HaroldHonhguKoh,LegalAdvisoroftheDep’tofState,AddresstotheUSCYBERCOMInter-AgencyLegalConference(Sept.18,2012),available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm[hereinafterKohComments](“Somehavealsosaidthatexistinginternationallawisnotuptothetask,andthatweneedentirelynewtreatiestoimposeauniquesetofrulesoncyberspace.ButtheUnitedStateshasmadeclearourviewthatestablishedprinciplesofinternationallawdoapplyincyberspace.”)(emphasisadded).67 LegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons,AdvisoryOpinion,1996I.C.J.226,para.
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Whilethe1907neutralityrulesarenotaperfectfitformostcyberactivities,theyleadtorationalconclusionswhenappliedthroughapurpose-basedlens.ThepreambleoftheHagueVdoesnotdefinethepurpose,merelystatingthedesiretodefine“moreclearlytherightsanddutiesofneutralPowersincaseofwaronland.”68ThepreambleofHagueXIIIissimilarlyvoidofaclearpurposestatement.69Generically,thepurposeofneutralityistopreservestate’spoliticalandterritorialsovereignty.Morespecificallyhowever,thepurposeofneutralityistopreserveastate’sabilitytochooseifandwhentoenteranarmedconflictandtominimizethespreadofconflictanditsharmfuleffects.70ThisultimatepurposeisreflectedinthepolicyofUnitedStates.TheUnitedStatesNavyhandbookforthelawofnavaloperationssays“[t]helawofneutralityservestolocalizewar,tolimittheconductofwaronbothlandandsea,andtolessentheimpactofwaroninternationalcommerce.”71Whenapplyingtheneutralityrulestoactivitiesincyberspacetheymustbeviewedthroughthispurpose-basedlensoflimitingthespreadofconflict.
WhileafullanalysisofhowtheuseofforceandarmedattackthresholdsundertheUnitedNationsCharterapplyincyberspaceisbeyondthescopeofthisarticle,apurpose-basedanalysisoftheneutralityrulesreliesonthepremisethatnationscanlegitimatelyexerciseself-defenserightsinthefaceofcertainmali-ciouscyberactivities.First,mostscholarsagreethatactivitiesincyberspacecanconstituteauseofforceoranarmedattack.72ProfessorMichaelSchmitt,aretiredAirForceLieutenantColonel,isaleadingscholarinthisareaandhasadvocatedaconsequence-basedapproach.Hearguesthatifamaliciouscyberactivityhassimilardestructiveconsequencesofaconventionalattackthenitismainlyamatterofseverityindecidingwhethertheuseofforcethresholdorarmedattackthresholdhasbeencrossed.73TheUnitedStateshasapparentlyadoptedasimilarview.InSeptember2012,HaroldKoh,legaladvisortotheStateDepartment,stated“[c]yberactivitiesthatproximatelyresultindeath,injury,orsignificantdestructionwould
88(July8)(“TheCourtfindsthatasinthecaseoftheprinciplesofhumanitarianlawapplicableinarmedconflict,internationallawleavesnodoubtthattheprincipleofneutrality,whateveritscontent,whichisofafundamentalcharactersimilartothatofthehumanitarianprinciplesandrules,isapplicable(subjecttotherelevantprovisionsoftheUnitedNationsCharter),toallinternationalarmedconflict,whatevertypeofweaponsmightbeused.”).68 SeeHagueV,supranote10,Preamble.69 See HagueXIII,supra note25,Preamble.70 GeorgiosC.Petrochilos,The Relevance of Concepts of War and Armed Conflict to the Law of Neutrality,31vAnd. J. trAnsnAt’l l.575,580(1998)(“neutralitylogicallypresupposesindependence—thatis,thelegalcapacitytodetermineastate’sownpositionwithregardtoquestionsofpeaceandwar.”).71the coMMAnder’s hAndBooK on the lAw oF nAvAl operAtIons,para7-1,Dep’toftheNavy,NavalWarPub.No.1-14M(2007);see also,WolffHeintschelvonHeinegg,supra note30,at39.72 CharlesJ.DunlapJr.,Maj.Gen.(Ret.),USAF,Perspectives for Cyber Strategists on Law for Cyberwar,5strAtegIc studIes quArterly,at81,85(Spring2011).73MichaelN.Schmitt,Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited,56vIll. l. rev.569,575-76(2011).
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likelybeviewedasauseofforce.”74Kohwentontosay“[a]State’snationalrightofself-defense,recognizedinArticle51oftheUNCharter,maybetriggeredbycomputernetworkactivitiesthatamounttoanarmedattackorimminentthreatthereof.”75Whileitisuncleartowhatextenttheinternationalcommunityembracestheabilitytoassertself-defenserightsinresponsetoamaliciouscyberactivity,76withtheUnitedStatestakinganunequivocalpositionandNATOsuggestingasimilarstance,77othersmayfollow.
Itisastate’sabilitytoassertself-defenserightsunderArticle51oftheUNCharterthatissoimportanttotheneutralityanalysis.Ifthewholepurposeofneutralityistopreventthespreadofwarandbelligerentscanlegitimatelyassertself-defenserightsinresponsetomaliciouscyberactivity,thenwhenabelligerentroutesmaliciouscybercodethroughaneutralstate’sinfrastructureonthewaytotheenemyitthreatensthestabilitythattheneutralityrulesseektouphold.Unfettereduseofaneutralstate’sinfrastructureformaliciouscyberoperationsraisesasignificantriskthattheneutralstatewillbedraggedintotheconflictasthevictimstateseekstodefenditself.Inordertoachieveitspurpose,theneutralityrulesneedtoapplytoallmilitaryactionsthatarelikelytotriggerdefensivemeasures.
Italsomakessenseforneutralityrulestoapplytothissituationwhenviewedfromanincentivesperspective.Intheabsenceofgoverningneutralityrules,abelligerentcouldfindgreatstrategicvalueinbringinganeutralpartyintoaconflict.Onewaytogetastatetoabandonneutralitymightbetoroutedestructivecybercodethroughthatneutralcountry,therebypressuringanopposingbelliger-enttotakeactionagainsttheneutral’sinfrastructure.Whenportionsoftheneutralstate’sinfrastructuresuddenlyshutdownorothermilitaryoperationsstartaffectingday-to-daylifeinthatneutralstate,politicalwilltojointheconflictcouldincrease.Alternatively,ifthedefenderchoosesnottoengagetheneutralstate’sinfrastructure,theattackermaygainanoperationalsafehaven.Fortheattackingbelligerent,thisisawin-winsituationthatusesaneutral’sterritorytogainastrategicadvantage.
Inlightoftheseincentives,theneutralityrulesshouldbeinterpretedasgrantingrightsandimposingdutiesincyberspaceifthetextallowsforsuchaninterpretation.However,oneclearlimitationinthetextconcernsterritorialborders.Eveniftherulescanbeinterpretedtoapplytocyberactivity,theterritoriallimitations
74 KohComments,supra note66.75 Id.76 See generally LtCol.PatrickW.Franzese,Sovereignty in Cyberspace,64A.F. l. rev.1,5-6(2009).77 SeeDefendingtheNetworks:TheNATOPolicyonCyberDefence,N.Atl.TreatyOrg.(2011),available athttp://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110914-policy-cyberdefence.pdf(stating“...NATOwilldefenditsterritoryandpopulationsagainstallthreats,includingemergingsecuritychallengessuchascyberdefence”and“NATOwillmaintainstrategicambiguityaswellasflexibilityonhowtorespondtodifferenttypesofcrisesthatincludeacybercomponent.”).
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stressedinHagueVwillstillserveasdistinctboundariesintheanalysis.ThedraftersofHagueVspecificallyconsideredandrejectedtheideaofextendinganeutralstate’sdutiestoareaswhereitexercisesjurisdictionoutsideofitssovereignterritory.78Inthecybercontext,underseacommunicationcablesorcommunicationsatelliteswouldthereforealwaysfalloutsidethescopeofanyneutralityanalysis.However,withinaneutral’sterritory,theHagueVrulesallowforreasonableinterpretationsconcerningtheirapplicabilitytomaliciouscyberactivities.Articles2–4offerthestrongestargumentsforapplyingneutralityrulesincyberspacewhileArticle8standsasthemaincounterargument.
ThekeylanguageinArticle2is“convoy”of“munitions.”79TheOxforddictionarydefinesaconvoyas“agroupofshipsorvehiclestravellingtogether,typi-callyoneaccompaniedbyarmedtroops,warships,orothervehiclesforprotection.”80TheofficialreportofHagueVarguablyelaboratesonwhatismeantbytheterm“convoy”bydistinguishingtheprohibitioninArticle2withthepermissibleactivityinArticle7.Article7says“[a]neutralStateisnotcalledupontopreventtheexportortransport,onbehalfofoneorotherofthebelligerents,ofarms,munitionsofwar,or,ingeneral,ofanythingwhichcanbeofusetoanarmyorafleet.”81ThekeydistinctionbetweenArticle2andArticle7istheidentityofthetransporter.Ifthetransporterisabelligerent,thenArticle2actsasacompletebar.Ifthetransporterisanyoneelse,Article7applies.82ThethrustoftheArticle7rationaleistolimittheharmfuleconomiceffectsofwaronaneutralstateanditspopulation.83Inthecybercontext,thekeythenisdeterminingtheidentityofthetransporter.Isitthebelligerenttypingcommandsthatcausethemaliciouscodetotakecertainpathsthroughtheinfrastructureofaneutralstateorisitthetelecommunicationsserviceproviderwhosephysicalcablesortowerstransmitbitsofinformationfromnodetonode?Here,theneutralstate’snetworkinfrastructureisanalogoustoitsroads.IfabelligerentdrivesaconvoyofmunitionsovertheroadsofaneutralstatethereisaclearviolationofArticle2,eventhoughtheneutralstatebuilttheroads,decidedwhichdirectionstheywillrun,howtomanagetrafficcongestion,andwhetherorhowmuchtochargeintolls.Aphysicalcommunicationnetworklooksverymuchthesame.Theserviceproviderlaidthecableorbuiltthetowers,createdparticularroutes,establishedvarioustrafficcontrolmechanisms,andmaychargeatollforpassingtrafficoveritsnetwork.ThisinterpretationisinlinewiththeeconomicmotivebehindArticle7.Anyeconomicgaintoaserviceproviderinallowingabelligerentto“hireitstransportservices”ismorecloselyanalogoustopayingaroadtollthanhiringtruckdriversorshippingcompaniestotransportcratesofmunitions.BecausethegoalofArticle7istopreventharmfuleconomicimpactstoneutral
78 HagueReports,supra note14,at541.79 HagueV,supranote10,art.2.80 oxFord dIctIonAryavailable at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/convoy.81 HagueV,supranote10,art.7.82 HagueReports,supra note14,at539.83 Id. at542.
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states,itshouldnotencompasscybertransportactivity,whichatmostbringsonlynegligibleeconomicgain.
TheprohibitioninArticle3alsotendstosupporttheapplicationofneutralityrulestocyberoperations,althoughthefocusshiftsfrommunitionstocommunica-tions.ThemainthrustofArticle3istoprohibitbelligerentsfromerectingonaneutral’sterritory“awirelesstelegraphystationoranyotherapparatusforthepur-poseofcommunicatingwith[the]belligerentforces.”84TheofficialreportfromtheHagueconferencesexplainsthatArticle3isfocusedon“installationbybelligerentpartiesofstationsorapparatusontheterritoryoftheneutralState.”85Clearly,thislanguageenvisionstheestablishmentofphysicalinfrastructureonaneutral’sterri-tory.However,itwouldbeoddforthefunctionalequivalentofawirelesstelegraphystationtobeexcluded.Arguably,oneofthemainreasonsforthisprovisionisthatmilitarycommunicationlinesarelegitimate,andoftenveryimportant,militarytargets.86Ifbelligerentswereallowedtoshieldcommandandcontroltargetsbyvirtuallyplacingthemwithinaneutral’sterritory,anenemywouldbeforcedtoeitherviolatethatneutral’sterritoryorsufferpotentiallydecisivedisadvantages.ModerntechnologyallowsforvirtualcommunicationstationsthatcouldphysicallyresideonanycomputerconnectedtotheInternet.Virtualcommunicationstationswouldbeequallyvalidfortargetingpurposesasabrickandmortarstation,althoughtheproportionalityanalysismaybemoredifficultifitisadualusetarget.87IfArticle3onlyprohibitstheestablishmentofphysicalcommunicationstations,abelligerentisforcedtochoosebetweenviolatingneutralityandsufferingtacticalandstrategicdisadvantages.Fromthisperspective,Article3shouldbeinterpretedasprohibitingtheestablishmentofvirtualcommunicationstationswithinaneutral’sterritoryinthesamewayitprohibitsphysicalcommunicationstations.
Article4’sprohibitiononforming“corpsofcombatants”88inaneutralstateshouldalsoextendtothecyberdomain.Therationaleagaincomesbacktothepurposeoftheneutralityrulesandtherightofabelligerenttoattacklegitimatemilitarytargets.Theofficialreportclarifiesthatitisthe“formationofacorpsofcombatantstoassistabelligerent”thatisprohibited.Article4appearstofocusonthecreationofamilitia-likeforceinaneutralterritory.89Theterm“combatant”makesitmoredifficulttoapplyArticle4inthecybercontextthanArticles2or3.Articles2and3arefocusedonobjects,suchasconvoysandcommunicationcenters,whichareeasiertotranslateintothecyberdomain.Article4isdirectedaspecificgroupofpeoplewhoqualifyascombatants.Thereisnofunctionalequivalentof
84 HagueV,supranote10,art.3.85 HagueReports,supra note14,at540.86ArMy operAtIonAl lAw hAndBooK,supranote11,Ch.2para.IX.A.2.a.(1),at22.87 Id.atCh.8para.II.C.3.b.(5),at135.88 HagueV,supranote10,art.4.89Aneutralstateisnotobligatedtoprohibititsnationalsfromcrossingtheborderandofferingassistancetoabelligerent.HagueV,supranote10,art.6.
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anindividualpersonincyberspace.However,intheaggregate,abotnetarmymayhavefaircomparisonstoa“corpsofcombatants”incertainsituations.Bothareorganized,haveachainofcommand,executetheordersofsuperiors,andcancauseappreciableharmtoanenemyincarryingoutthoseorders.Ifbothabotnetarmyandacorpsofcombatantscanaccomplishsimilarmilitaryobjectives,Article4shouldapplyequallytobothgroups.Anenemybelligerentneedstohavethesameabilitytofendoffattacksfromdigitalarmiesasitdoeshumanarmies,atleasttotheextentthatdigitalarmiescaninflictcomparableharm.Ifthegoalistopreventthespreadofconflictbylocalizingwar,neitherhumannordigitalarmiescanhavealegalsafehaveninneutralstates.
WhileArticles2–4allowforreasonableargumentsconcerningtheirappli-cabilitytocyberoperations,Article8offersthestrongestsupportforthecounterargument.Article8doesnotrequireneutralstatestoforbidbelligerentstouse“tele-graphortelephonecables”orany“wirelesstelegraphyapparatus.”90Importantly,thetextofArticle8isentirelyfocusedontheneutralstateanddoesnotgrantanyrightstobelligerents.Intheory,aneutralstatecertainlycouldprohibittheuseofitscommunicationnetworksbyabelligerentwithoutimplicatingArticle8.However,thepracticaldifficultiesofenforcingsuchaprohibitionwouldbedifficultatbest.TheHaguereportexplainsthatthefocusofArticle8is“thetransmissionofnews,”comparingittoapublicservice.91Atthetime,communicationnetworkshadverylimitedcapability.Communicatinginformationwasalltheseearlynetworkscoulddo.Today’snetworkcapabilitiesfarexceedthescopeofwhatthedraftersofArticle8likelymeantby“thetransmissionofnews”in1907.Whiletechnicallyspeaking,today’snetworksarestilltransmittinginformationintheformofbitsandbytes,informing(ormisinforming)ahumanmindontheotherendisnolongerthesolepurpose.Thereachoftoday’sautomatednetworks,andautomatedsystemsattachedtonetworks,drasticallyincreasestherangeofachievableeffectsbymerelytransmit-tinginformationfrompointAtopointB.Whenthetransmissionofinformationhastheabilitytodirectlycausephysicaldamageintherealworld,Article8isnolongermerelyshieldingtheflowofinformationthatmaybeusedinplanninganattackontheenemy,itisshieldingtheattackitself.
Fromapracticalstandpoint,becauseArticle8doesnotconveyanyrightstobelligerents,abelligerent’sabilitytoinvokeArticle51rightsagainstaneutralstatefromwhichmaliciouscyberoperationsareemanatingmayenticeneutralstatestoprohibitbelligerentsfromusingtheirnetworksatall.However,duetotheattributionproblemsincyberspace,neutralstatesmayhavesignificantenforcementdifficultiesinapplyinganadhocapproach.Interpretingtherulestoplacethedutyonallbelligerentsfromtheoutsethastheadvantagesofuniformityandpredictability,evenifattributionandenforcementproblemsremain.
90 HagueV,supranote10,art.8.91 HagueReports,supra note14,at543.
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Inordertoachievethepurposeoftheneutralityrules,belligerentsshouldnotbeabletoexploitthenetworkinfrastructureofneutralstates.SincethekeylanguageofHagueVinArticles2,3,4,7,and8,allowforreasonableapplicationtocyberoperations,theyshouldbeinterpretedbroadlywheredoingsoisnecessarytolimitthespreadofconflict.
III.ATTRIBUTION:LEGALTHEORYANDPRACTICE
Meaningfulapplicationofneutralityrulesrequiresanenforcementmecha-nism,especiallywhengrayareasinthelawallowforreasonablemindstodiffer.Thispartwilldiscusstheinternationalstandardsofstateattributionandbrieflyanalyzesomeofthepracticalproblemstheycreateforenforcementofneutralityrulesincyberspace.Inlayingoutthestandardsofstateresponsibility,thispartwillfirstaddressseverallegaltheoriesofattributionarticulatedintheDraftArticlesofStateResponsibilityforInternationallyWrongfulActsanddiscusstwokeyInternationalCourtofJustice(ICJ)opinionsthatdealwiththefactualapplicationofattributiontheories.Next,thispartwillbrieflydiscusssomeofthetechnologicalfeaturesofmodernnetworksthatcreatehurdlesinapplyingthesestandardstocyberactivities.
A.LegalTheoriesofStateResponsibility
ThepurposeoftheDraftArticlesistocodify“thebasicrulesofinterna-tionallawconcerningtheresponsibilityofstatesfortheirinternationallywrongfulacts.”92Attributinganacttoastatehastwokeycomponents:avalidlegaltheoryofattributionandidentificationoftheactor.Articles4through11oftheDraftArticlescontaindifferentlegaltheoriesofattribution,allofwhichcouldbeappliedinthecybercontext.However,thissectionwillfocusonArticles4,5,7,and8.
Article4oftheDraftArticlesisthemostdirectlegaltheoryofattribution.Itholdsastateresponsiblefortheactionsof“anyStateorgan,”whichincludes“anypersonorentity.”93
Article5extendsresponsibilitytothestatewhenthestatehasempoweredanon-stateorganbylawto“exerciseelementsofgovernmentalauthority.”94Enti-tiesempoweredbyastatewouldincludepubliclyorstateownedcompanies.95Ifthosepubliccompaniesareempoweredbylawtoexerciseelementsofgovern-mentalauthority,thentheiractionsareattributabletothestate.Bordercontrolisatypicalstatefunction.Ifagovernmentownedinformationserviceproviderhas
92 U.N.Int’lLawComm’n,Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries,p.31,inRep.oftheInt’lLawComm’n,53rdSess.,April23-June1,July2-Aug.10,2001,U.N.Doc.A/56/10;U.N.GAOR,56thSess.,Supp.No.10(2001)[hereinafterDraftArticlesonStateResponsibility].93 Id. atart.4.94 Id. atart.5.95 Id. atart.5commentary,para.2.
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beenempoweredbylawtoconductdigitalborderinspections,anyinternationallywrongfulactionsittakeswhileperformingthatbordercontrolfunctionarearguablyattributabletothestate.
Theseactionsareattributabletothestateeveniftheentityexceedsitsauthorityordirectlycontravenesstatelaw,asarticulatedinArticle7.96Article7’sextensionofstateresponsibilitytounauthorizedactsappliestobothastateorganandtoanentityempoweredbystatelaw.Itpreventsastatefromtaking“refugebehindthenotionthat,accordingtotheprovisionsofitsinternallawortoinstruc-tionswhichmayhavebeengiventoitsorgansoragents,theiractionsoromissionsoughtnottohaveoccurredoroughttohavetakenadifferentform.”97
Article8oftheDraftArticlesstatesanimportanttheoryofattributionforcyberoperationsbutpresentsdifficultpracticalproblems.Article8saysthe “conductofapersonorgroupofpersonsshallbeconsideredanactofaStateunderinterna-tionallawifthepersonorgroupofpersonsisinfactactingontheinstructionsof,orunderthedirectionorcontrolof,thatStateincarryingouttheconduct.”98AkeydistinctionbetweenArticle8andArticle5isthatArticle8requiresastatelawthatconfersauthoritywhileArticle5appliestolessformaltiesbetweenthestateandtheactor.99Article8applieswhere“individualsorgroupsofprivateindividualswho,thoughnotspecificallycommissionedbytheStateandnotformingpartofitspoliceorarmedforces,areemployedasauxiliariesoraresentas‘volunteers’toneighboringcountries,orwhoareinstructedtocarryoutparticularmissionsabroad.”100Article8encompassesthedirectionorcontrolstandardreflectedintheICJ’sholdingintheMilitary and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case.Inthatcase,NicaraguaattemptedtoholdtheUnitedStatesresponsibleforvarioushumanitar-ianviolationscommittedbyanorganizedanti-governmentgroup.101WhiletheICJfoundthattheUnitedStateshadtrained,equipped,supplied,andfinancedtheseanti-governmentgroups,therewasnoevidencethattheUnitedStatesdirectedorcontrolledtheparticularhumanitarianviolationsalleged.102ThecourtstatedthatfortheUnitedStatestobeheldliablefortheparticularhumanitarianviolations“itwouldinprinciplehavetobeprovedthatthatStatehadeffectivecontrolofthemilitaryorparamilitaryoperationsinthecourseofwhichtheallegedviolationswerecommitted.”103However,thecourtdidholdthat“theUnitedStatesofAmerica,bytraining,arming,equipping,financingandsupplyingthecontraforcesorotherwiseencouraging,supportingandaidingmilitaryandparamilitaryactivities…hasacted…
96 Id. atart.7.97 Id. atart.7commentary,para.2.98 Id. at art.8.99 Id. atart.5commentary,para.7.100 Id. atart.8commentary,para.2.101 SeeICJNicaraguaCase,supra 39,at6.102 Id. at315.103 Id. at115.
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inbreachofitsobligationundercustomaryinternationallawnottointerveneintheaffairsofanotherState.”104
ThecommentarytoArticle8suggeststhatastatewillbeliablewheniteitheractuallyparticipatesintheoperationorgivesspecificdirectionsconcerningtheoperation.105Inapplyingthisstandardtooperationsincyberspace,thegeneralfunding,training,orsupplyingofnon-stateentitieswhoareengagedinmaliciouscyberactivitymightconstituteaviolationofthenon-interventionprinciplebutwouldnotamounttodirectingorcontrollingspecificoperations.Directingspecifictypesofmaliciouscyberactivitiesagainstspecifictargets,wouldlikelymeetthedirectionorcontrolthresholdwithrespecttotheendresult,butitmightnotmeetthedirectionorcontrolthresholdforthemannerofdelivery.Thiscouldleadtoasituationwhereastatedirectedorcontrolledaspecificactbecauseofitsinvolvementinthespecificmalicioussoftwareandthechoosingoftargets,butdidnotdirectorcontrolitsdeliverythroughaneutralstate.
AnothertheoryofattributionwithparticularrelevancetocyberoperationsisbasedontheICJ’srationaleintheCorfuChannelcase.ThistheorywouldbeincludedunderArticle4oftheDraftArticlesas“conduct”ofastateorgan.IntheCorfuChannelcase,theICJheldAlbanialiableforfailingtowarnBritishshipsofthepresenceofminesinitsterritorialwaters.106ThecourtreasonedthatAlbania’sknowledgeofthepresenceofthemines,regardlessofwhoputthemthere,establishedliability.107Importantly,therewasnodirectevidenceofAlbania’sknowledge.Thecourtwaswillingtoinferknowledge,providedtheinferencesleft“noroomforreasonabledoubt.”108Thecourtwascarefultostatethat“itcannotbeconcludedfromthemerefactofthecontrolexercisedbyaStateoveritsterritoryandwatersthatthatStatenecessarilyknew,oroughttohaveknown,ofanyunlawfulactperpetratedtherein.”109ThecourtreliedonstrongevidencethatAlbaniacontinuouslykeptaclosewatchoveritsterritorialwatersintheCorfuChannelandthelayingofminesinthosewaterswouldhavelikelybeendiscoveredbyAlbanianauthorities.110Thistheoryisparticularlyenticinginthecybercontext,especiallywhenagovernmentexercisestightcontroloveritsinformationnetworks,andisfrequentlycitedbyauthorsasapotentialpartialsolutiontotheattributionproblem.111
104 ICJNicaraguaCase,at146.105 DraftArticlesonStateResponsibility,supra note92,art.8commentary,para.3-4.106 CorfuChannelCase,supra note37.107 Id.at18.108 Id. at18.109 Id. at18.110 Id. at18-20.111 See, e.g.,ScottJ.ShacklefordandRichardB.Andres,State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing Problem,42geo J. Int’l l.971,989(2011);OonaA.Hathaway,RebeccaCrootof,PhilipLevitz,HaleyNix,AileenNowlan,WilliamPerdue,JuliaSpiegel,The Law of Cyber Attack,100cAl. l. rev.817,855(2012).
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B.TechnicalandHumanAttribution
Attributionismostappropriatelydividedintotwosubcategories:technicalattributionandhumanattribution.Technicalattributionistracingthephysicalpathofthecodetothecomputeratitssource.Humanattributionisidentifyingthepersonoperatingthecomputer.Inreality,onlythehumanattributionaspectisnecessarytoapplyalegaltheoryofattributionbutbecauseoftheabilitytomaskidentityontheInternet,itmaybeimpossibletoconclusivelyestablishhumanattributionwithoutcombiningthetechnicalcomponent.Additionally,strongevidenceoftechnicalattributionmayallowforaninferenceofknowledgebasedonCorfuChannel’srationale,especiallywhereastateorganexercisessignificantcontroloverInternettrafficandinfrastructure.
Technicalattributionisasignificantchallengeinapplyinganylegalstandardtocyberoperations.TheInternet’sdesignencompassesafundamentaltradeoff,choosingthefreeflowofinformationoversecurity.Attimes,U.S.governmentofficialshavecalledforthedesignofanewversionoftheInternetforcriticalinfrastructurethatprimarilyfocusesonsecurity.112AmoresecureInternetwouldlikelymaketechnicalattributioneasierbutuntiloneisdeveloped,sophisticatedcyberoperatorswillcontinuetoexploittheanonymityofferedbythecurrentversion.
Theabilitytotechnicallyattributeanactionincyberspacemaysignificantlydependonthetypeofactivity.WheninformationflowsacrosstheInternetit isbrokendownintoseveralsmallerpackets.113EachpacketcontainsadestinationInternetProtocol(IP)address,asourceIPaddress,andaportionofthemessage.114Eachpacketissentfromthesourcecomputertoaninitialrouter.Theinitialrouterreadsthedestinationaddressandforwardsthepackettoanotherrouteruntilthepacketeventuallyreachesthedestinationaddress.115
Oneoftheconcernswithtechnicalattributionrelatestothesourceaddress,whichmaybefakedor“spoofed.”116Whilethisislegitimateissue,itdoesnotapplytoallmaliciouscyberactivities.Ifthesenderwantstoreceiveanyinformationbackfromthedestinationaddress,thenthesourceaddresscontainedinthepacketmustleadbacktothesender,evenifnotdirectly.117Whilemanymaliciouscyberactivitieswillseekaresponse,aDDoSattackcanbecarriedoutwithoutseeking
112 SeeJ.NicholasHoover,Cyber Command Director: U.S. Needs to Secure Critical Infrastructure,InformationWeek.com,available athttp://www.informationweek.com/government/security/cyber-command-director-us-needs-to-secur/227500515.113 DavidD.ClarkandSusanLandau,Essay,Untangling Attribution,2hArv. nAt’l sec. J.531,534(2011).114 Id. 115 Id. 116 Id. at534-35.117 Id.
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aresponse.118Whenthesender’sIPaddressisspoofed,tracingthesourcemaynotevenbepossible.119
WhenthesourceIPaddressisnotspoofed,technicalattributionremainsachallenge,evenifitmaybetechnicallypossible.Acommontechniquetofrustrateattributionistheuseofproxies.120Proxiesareintermediariesthatperformvarioustechnicalfunctionsforacustomerbeforeamessageissenttoadestination.121Prox-iesfrustrateattributionbecausetheyreplacethesourceIPaddressofallpacketswiththeirownIPaddress.122Someproxiesaredesignedsolelyforthepurposeofpreservinganonymity123anddependingonthegeographiclocationoftheproxyserver,gainingcooperationfromitsowner/operator,atleastthroughjudicialmeans,maynotbepossible.
OnionroutingisanothertechniquethatcomplicatesattributionevenwhenthesourceIPaddressisnotspoofed.Onionroutingisbasicallyaprocesswhereamessagegoesthroughseveralintermediariesbeforeitreachesitsrecipient.124However,whatmakesonionroutinguniqueisthateachlayerofthetransmissionisfullyencrypted,includingthesourceaddress,destinationaddress,andcontentsofthemessage.125Eachrouterisonlyabletodecrypttheaddressofthenextrouterandisthereforeunawareofthesource,contents,orultimatedestination.126Torisapubliclyavailableonionroutingservice127andiscommonlyusedbymilitaries,intelligenceagencies,andlawenforcementpersonnel,amongothers.128Furthercomplicatingmatters,various“anonymizing”techniquescanbecombinedandeachtechniquecanhavemultiplesteps.129
Despitetheavailabilityofthesesophisticatedtechniques,securityfirmscontinuetoclaimsuccessintracingtheoriginsofvariousmaliciouscyberactivi-ties.InFebruary2013,Mandiant,aU.S.computersecurityfirm,releasedareporttracingsystematichackingeffortsdatingbackto2006tohundredsofIPaddresses
118 Id. at537-38.119 Id.at537.120W.EarlBoebert,ASurveyofChallengesinAttribution,incoMM. on deterrIng cyBerAttAcKs, nAt’l reseArch councIl, proceedIngs oF A worKshop on deterrIng cyBerAttAcKs: InForMIng strAtegIes And developIng optIons For u.s. polIcy, At45(2010),available athttp://www.nap.edu/catalog/12997.html.121 Id. 122 Id.123 Id.124 Id. at46.125 Id.126 Id.127 Id.128 Clark,supra note113,at546.129 Id.at542-43.
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registeredinChina.130Accordingtothereport,Chinesehackersfrequentlyhijackedthirdpartycomputers,usingtoolssuchasRemoteDesktop,beforehackingthetargetcomputers.131However,Mandiantclaimstohavetracedthelinkbetweenthehackerandthehijackedcomputerin1,905instancesfromJanuary2011toJanuary2013.132Theconnectionwastracedto832IPaddresses,817ofwhichwereregisteredinChinaandmainlybelongedtooneoffourlargeblocksofIPaddressesthatserviceShanghai.133Chineseauthoritieshaveboisterouslydeniedresponsibility,callingMandiant’sreport“irresponsibleandunprofessional.”134Technicalaspectsaloneshouldprobablynotconclusivelyestablishanoriginationpoint.Asdiscussedearlier,varioustechniquesallowhackerstomasktheirtruelocation.Coulditbe,asChineseauthoritiesseemtosuggest,135thathackersoutsideofChinaaremaskingtheirattacksasoriginatingfromChina?TheMandiantreportdidnotsolelyrelyontechnicalanalysis.Infact,itcombinedsignificanthumanattributiontechniquesandothernon-technicaldatatopaintacomprehensivepicture.Forexample,twoofthefourlargeblocksofIPaddressesidentifiedbyMandiantservicedthesameareawhereChineseMilitaryUnit61398isheadquartered.136Accordingtothereport,independentinformationsuggestedthatUnit61398istaskedwithcomputernetworkoperationsthatspecificallytargetEnglishspeakingcountries.137TheremotedesktopintrusionsweredrivenbyaChinesevirtualkeyboardlayoutsettingin97%oftheidentifiedintrusions.138Thereportevenidentifiesseveralhackersbynamethroughvarioustechniques,suchaswhenhackersloggedintotheirpersonnelFacebookaccountsthroughthesamecommandandcontrolinfrastructuretheyusedtoinfil-trateintermediarysystems.139Inthiscase,itisthesheervolumeofevidence,bothtechnicalandhuman,thatseemtoreliablyattributethesource.
However,evenwithoutthehumanattributionevidence,anattributionargu-mentbasedonCorfuChannel’srationaleinthiscaseispersuasive.TheChinesegovernmentexercisessignificantcontroloveritscommunicationnetworks,includingcellphones,e-mail,andInternetaccess.140Additionally,becausethetelecommunica-
130 SeeMandiant,APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,atpg.2-6,available at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf[hereinafterMandiantReport].131 Id. at39-40.132 Id. at40.133 Id. 134 DavidE.Sanger,DavidBarbozaandNicolePerlroth,Chinese Army Unit Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S.,n.y. tIMes,Feb.19,2013,atA1,available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html.135 Id.136MandiantReport,supra note130,p.40.137 Id. at9.138MandiantReport,supra note130,p.4.139 Id. at51-58.140 SharonLaFraniere&DavidBarboza,China Tightens Censorship of Electronic Communications, n.y. tIMes,Mar.22,2011,atA4,available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/asia/22china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
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tionsindustryinChinaisstate-owned,141itwouldbedifficulttoargueitdidnotatleasthaveknowledgeoftheintrusions.142UnderCorfuChannel,knowledgecoupledwiththefailuretowarnortakeotheradequatemeasurestopreventharm,isinitselfaninternationallywrongfulact,regardlessofwhoactuallycontrolsthecomputer.143
C.AttributingConductforNeutralityPurposes
EvenifattributionispossibleforsustainedandsystematichackingbyaChinesemilitaryunit,itmaybeverydifficulttoattributeisolatedincidentsthatcouldimplicateneutralityconcerns.However,theutilityofanisolatedincidentmightbequestionable.Theeffectivedeploymentofmalicioussoftwarethatcouldhavemilitarilysignificantresultswouldlikelyrequireextensiveintelligencegathering.Theintelligencegatheringphaseofacyberoperationtypicallyrequiresthesameorsimilaraccessasthedeploymentstage.Additionally,becauseofroutinesoftwareupdatesorpatches,withoutcontinuousmonitoringofthetargetsystem,theoperationhasahighriskoffailure.
AnotherpracticalattributionissueisthataneutralcountrymaynothavethesameincentivetoduplicateMandiant’srigorousinvestigativeefforts.Whilebelligerentswillbehighlymotivatedtodiscoverthesourceofmaliciouscyberactiv-ity,manyneutralstatesmaydeterminethateffectivemonitoringcostssignificantlyoutweighthebenefits,atleastuntilbelligerentsthreatentoexpandthebattlefieldintoitsterritory.
IV.CASESTUDIES
Whiletherehasnotyetbeenanarmedconflictbetweenthecountrieswiththemostadvancedcyberforces,cybercapabilitiescontinuetodevelopandareincreasinglyincorporatedbymilitaryplanners.Thispartwillanalyzetheneutralityimplicationsofdifferenttypesofcyberoperationsbylookingatseveralrecentlyreportedusesofmaliciouscybercapabilities.Whilesomeoftheseexamplesdidactuallyraiseneutralityissues,thispartwillhypotheticallybuildontheseexamplesinordertobetterexplorevariouslegalboundaries.
141 KeithBradsher,China’s Grip onEconomyWillTestNewLeaders,n.y. tIMes,Nov.9,2012,available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/world/asia/state-enterprises-pose-test-for-chinas-new-leaders.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.142 CadieThompson,Chinese Hacking Defense ‘Hard to Believe’: Security Expert,CNBC,available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/100470478.143 CorfuChannelCase,supra note37,at18.
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A.Estonia
1.Background
The2007networkintrusionsinEstoniademonstratedhowdisruptiveacoordinatedcybercampaigncanbeonasocietythatisheavilydependentonmoderntechnology.By2007,Estoniahadbecomeoneofthemosttechnologicallydependentcountriesintheworld.Electronicbankingaccountedfor95%ofallbankingopera-tions,98%ofitsterritoryhadInternetaccess,andmanygovernmentservicesandfunctionswereprimarilyconductedonline.144InAprilof2007,politicaltensionsrosebetweenEstoniaandRussiaafterEstonianofficialsdecidedtoremoveaSoviet-eraWWIImemorial.145ThedecisionresultedinlocalriotsinTallinn,Estonia’scapital,mainlyamongethnicRussians.146BetweenApril27thandMay18th,Estoniawasthevictimofnumerousmaliciousanddisruptivecyberactivities,mainlyconsist-ingofwebsitedefacementanddenialofservice(DoS)attacks.147Thesedisruptivecyberactivitieshadsignificanteconomicandsocietaleffects.148WhilesomeoftheintrusionsweretracedtoIPaddressesregisteredinMoscow,includinggovernmentinstitutions,theRussiangovernmentdeniedanyinvolvementandmanyoftheintrusionsinvolvedcomputersfrom178differentcountries.149
2.NeutralityAnalysis
BecausetheseintrusionsintoEstonia’snetworksdidnotoccurduringthecourseofanarmedconflict,anddidnottriggeranarmedconflict,theydidnotraiseanyformalneutralityissues.However,atleastoneauthorhasarguedthattheseintrusionscollectivelycouldhaveamountedtoanillegaluseofforce.150WhileEstoniadidnotinvokeNATO’scollectivedefensemeasures,itisnotdifficulttoimagineasimilarcyberoperationescalatingintoanarmedconflictortakingplaceaspartofanongoingconventionalarmedconflictwhereformalneutralityrightsandobligationswouldapply.
IfthecyberactivityinEstoniahadescalatedtoanarmedconflictitwouldhaveraisedsignificantneutralityissues.Ofthe178countrieswhoseinfrastructurewasreportedlyinvolvedintheintrusions,151itislikelythatatleastsomeofthemwouldwanttotakeaneutralstance.
144 EnekenTikk,KadriKaska,LiisVihul,International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations17-18(2010).145 Tikk,Kaska,Vihul,supra note144,at15.146 Id. at15.147 Id. at18-21.148 Id. at24-25.149 Id. at23.150 Schmitt,supranote73,at577.151 Tikk,Kaska,Vihul,supra note144,at23.
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MostofthemaliciouscyberactivityagainstEstoniawasaimedatdenyingaccess,eitherintheformofDoSattacksorvariousattacksonDomainNameServers(DNS).152Thistypeofmaliciouscyberactivityisnotlikelytocausepermanentdamagetoanetworkorsystemsonanetworkandmainlyhastheeffectofhinderinginformationflow.Inthecontextofanarmedconflict,belligerentsmightusethistypeofcapabilitytohelpprotectconventionalforcesduringanattackbylimitinganenemy’sabilitytoeffectivelycommunicate.DoSattackscouldthereforearguablyprovidecapabilitiescomparabletoelectronicjammingsystems.
Forexample,theUnitedStatesNavyusestheEA-6Basanairbornejammingsystemtosuppressenemyairdefenses.153TheEA-6Bismainlyusedasasupportelementoftacticalstrikepackagesbydisruptingtheenemy’selectronicsignalsandallowingstrikeaircraftorgroundtroopstohitdesignatedtargetswithminimalresistance.154AnotherexampleistheU.S.Army’suseofcellphonejammersinAfghanistan.TheArmyusesmobilejammingsystemsthatemitpowerfulradiosignalsthatdrownoutallothersignalsoveraparticulararea.155WhilepreventingremoteImprovisedExplosiveDevice(IED)detonationsisoneoftheprimaryusesofthesecellphonejammingsystems,156theycanalsobeusedtosupportoffensiveoperationsbyblackingoutcellsignalsinaparticularareaduringanattack.
ThereisnodoubtthatpositioninganEA-6Boramobilecellphonejammingsysteminaneutralcountrywouldviolatethatneutralcountry’srights.157Whataboutacomparablecybercapability?ThedifferencewiththecybercapabilityisthataDoSattacksimultaneouslycomesfromsomanydifferentplaces,asillustratedintheEstoniasituation.Thethreeoptionswouldbetosaythatneutralityrulesdonotgovernthistypeofactivityatall,theygoverneveryaspectoftheactivity,ortheygoverncertainpartsoftheactivity.
Becausethepurposeofneutralityrulesistopreventthespreadofconflict,158exemptingallDoSattacksfromneutralityrulesisanunsatisfyingoption.Itwouldputbelligerentsinthedelicatepositionofchoosingbetweengrantingsafehavensortakingdefensivemeasuresthatcouldconvinceneutralcountriestoallythemselveswithopposingforces.However,becauseofthewayDoSattackswork,oftenenslav-ingcomputersallovertheworld,fullyapplyingneutralityrulestotheactivityof
152 Tikk,Kaska,Vihul,supra note144,at21.153 EA-6B Prowler Mission, Description, and Specifications,NavalAirSystemsCommandWebsite,available athttp://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.display&key=C8B54023-C006-4699-BD20-9A45FBA02B9A(lastvisitedApr13,2013)[hereinafter,EA-6BDetails].154 Id. 155 DavidAxe,Secret Army Bomb Jammers Stolen in Afghanistan,wIred, Mar.1,2012,available at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/03/bomb-jammers-stolen/.156 Id.157 HagueV,supranote10,art.2.158 See supra notes70-71andaccompanyingtext.
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everycomputerparticipatinginaDoSattackwouldbenearlyimpossibletoenforce.Additionally,notallcomputersparticipatinginaDoSattackcarrythesameriskofspreadingaconflict.AbelligerentsufferingadebilitatingDoSattackinconjunc-tionwithaphysicalattackismuchmorelikelytoattackthecomputersthatarecontrollingabotnet,thecommandandcontrolnode,thantheenslavedcomputersthataremerelyfollowingorders.Identifyingthecommandandcontrolnodemaybetechnicallydifficultbutbelligerentsareunlikelytoexpendlimiteddefensiveresourcesunlesstheyarelikelytohavethedesiredmilitaryeffect.Forexample,usingamilitaryoptiontodisableoneofthe10,000enslavedcomputerswillnotdomuchtostopaDoSattack,butfocusingamilitaryoptionagainstacommandandcontrolnodecouldstoptheattackaltogether.
ByapplyingtheneutralityrulesonlytotheactivityofthecommandandcontrolnodesinsteadofallcomputersparticipatingintheDoSattack,thepurposeoftheneutralityrulescanbeharmonizedwithsomeofthepracticalrealitiesofcybercapabilities.Underthisapproach,belligerentswouldbeprohibitedfromusingcommandandcontrolnodesthataregeographicallylocatedinaneutralcountry,butnotnecessarilyprohibitedfromenlistingindividualcomputersinaneutralcountrytoparticipateinaDoSattack.IfamilitaryoptioncouldrealisticallydisableallcomputersparticipatingintheDoSattack,consistentwithotherLOACprinciples,thentheneutralityrulesshouldapplytotheuseofthoseindividualcomputersaswell.Assoonaspersonsorobjectswithinaneutralstatebecomelegitimatemilitarytargets,theneutralityrulesbecomeavitaltooltohelplimitthespreadofconflict.
InEstonia,theDoSattacksapparentlybeganmoreorlessasanunorganizedcyberprotestbutevolvedintoanorganizedandsophisticatedattackthatsuggested“centralcommandandcontrol.”159IfthisDoSattackhadoccurredduringanarmedconflict,itisthelocationofthecommandandcontrolnodesthatwouldbemostimportantinconductingtheneutralityanalysisbuttheremaybesituationswherethelocationoftheindividualcomputersisimportantaswell.Forexample,ifmanyoftheindividualcomputersparticipatinginaDoSattackwereco-located,militaryoptionsspecificallytargetingthoseindividualcomputersmightbecomemorerealistic.
B.Georgia
1.Background
WhiletheEstoniasituationraisedmanyinterestinghypotheticalsitua-tionsconcerningtheapplicabilityofneutralityrulestoactivitiesincyberspace,theGeorgiasituationin2008actuallyraisedneutralityissues.ThekeydistinctioninGeorgiawasthatthecyberactivityoccurredinconjunctionwithaconventionalarmedconflictbetweenRussiaandGeorgia.160OnAugust8,2008,Russianmilitary
159 Tikk,Kaska,Vihul,supra note144,at23.160 Id. at67.
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forcesenteredGeorgianterritory,claiminganeedtoprotectRussiancitizensabroadfromhostileactionbytheGeorgianmilitary.161InresponsetoRussianaggression,Georgiamobilizedmilitaryforcesanddeclaredastateofwar.162VariousmaliciouscyberactivitiesagainstGeorgiangovernmentalwebsitesalsobeganonAugust8,163althoughtheRussiangovernmentdeniedallinvolvementinthecyberactivities.164WhileGeorgiansocietywasmuchlessdependentontheInternetthanEstoniansociety,variousgovernmentalorganizationsheavilyreliedonwebsitestodis-seminateinformation.165ThemaliciouscyberactivitycloselyparalleledtheactivityagainstEstoniaayearearlier,mainlyconsistingofDoSattacksanddefacementofpublicwebsites.166ThesitesspecificallytargetedincludedtheGeorgianPresident’swebsite,thecentralgovernment’swebsite,theMinistryofForeignAffairs’website,andtheMinistryofDefense’swebsite.167AsinEstonia,themaliciouscyberactiv-ityoriginatedfromallovertheworld,andwaslikelycarriedoutbyoneormorebotnets.168However,atleastonecommandandcontrolserverwastracedtoanIPaddressinTurkey.169
AnotherimportantaspectoftheGeorgiasituationconcernstheassistanceGeorgiareceivedfromthirdparties.TulipSystems,aprivatewebhostingcom-panybasedinAtlanta,Georgia,apparentlyreachedouttoGeorgiangovernmentofficialsafter theDoSattacksstartedandofferedtohostvariousgovernmentwebsites.170TulipSystemstooktheseactionswithoutanyapparentauthorizationfromtheUnitedStatesGovernment.171Thecompanyofferedassistanceinorderto“‘protect’thenationofGeorgia’sInternetsitesfrommalicioustraffic.”172AfterhostingseveralkeyGeorgianwebsites,TulipsSystemswassubsequentlythetargetofseveralDoSattacks.173
161 Id. at67.162 Id. at68.163 Id. 164 Id. at75.165 Id. at70.166 Id. at71.167 Tikk,Kaska,Vihul,supra note144,at70.168 Id. at71.169 Id. at70.170 StephenW.Korns,JoshuaE.Kasteberg,Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook,pArAMeters 61, 66-67(2009).171 Id. at67.172 Id. 173 Id.
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2.NeutralityAnalysis
ThisconflictbetweenRussiaandGeorgiaraisedtwosignificantcyberneutralityissues.ThefirstconcernstheneutralityrightsofTurkeywhilethesecondconcernstheneutralityrightsoftheUnitedStates.
(a)Turkish Neutrality
WhileTurkeydidnotformallydeclareitselftobeaneutralintheRussian-Georgianarmedconflict,whichtechnicallyonlylastedfivedays,174officialTurkishstatementssuggestedadesiretoremainneutral.Shortlyaftertheconflictended,theTurkishPrimeministerstated:
ItwouldnotberightforTurkeytobepushedtowardanyside.CertaincircleswanttopushTurkeyintoacornereitherwiththeUnitedStatesorRussiaaftertheGeorgianincident.Oneofthesidesisourclosestally,theUnitedStates.TheothersideisRussia,withwhichwehaveanimportanttradevolume.WewouldactinthelinewithwhatTurkey’snationalinterestsrequire.175
ThesestatementsbytheTurkishPrimeMinistersuggestthatTurkeydidnotwanttotakesidesandmayhaveofficiallydeclaredneutralityhadtheconflictlastedlonger.However,withatleastonebotnet’scommandandcontrolserverapparentlyresidinginTurkey,176Turkishsovereignterritorymayhaveplayedasignificantroleinthecyberportionoftheconflict.AssumingGeorgia,oranyofitsallies,couldidentifythecommandandcontrolserverinTurkeyduringtheDoSattack,whatwereGeorgia’soptions?WhatiftheDoSattackwashinderingGeorgianforcesabilitytocommunicateandmountaneffectivedefenseagainstinvadingRussianforces?Georgianforceswouldhavebeeninadifficultposition,potentiallyhavingtochoosebetweentakingmilitaryactionagainstserversresidinginaneutralstateorsimplyacceptingthedegradedcommunicationsenvironment.Thisispreciselythetypeofconundrumtheneutralityrulesseektoavoid.Bytreatingthecommandandcontrolserverasaneutralityviolation,Turkeyhasanobligationtotakeneces-saryactiontoshutitdownifitwantstoremainneutral.177FromTurkey’spointofview,treatingthisasaneutralityviolationprobablyalsohelpswiththecomplicatedpoliticalbalancingact.Turkeycanshutdownthecommandandcontrolserverinthenameofneutralityandavoidtheperceptionthatitistakingsidesintheconflict.Iftheneutralityrulesdonotapply,anydecisionTurkeymakesmaybeperceivedastakingasideintheconflict.Ifitshutsdowntheserver,RussiamayperceiveTurkey
174 Tikk,Kaska,Vihul,supra note144,at68.175 IgorTorbakov,The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkey Relations,the JAMestown FoundAtIon,at20(2008),available athttp://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/GeorgiaCrisisTorbakov.pdf.176 Tikk,Kaska,Vihul,supra note144,at70.177 HagueV,supra note10,art.5.
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astakingGeorgia’sside,whileifitleavestheserverupandrunning,GeorgiamayperceiveTurkeyastakingRussia’sside.
Whataboutattribution?HowcanGeorgia,TurkeyoranyotherinterestedpartyknowwhetherRussianforcesareoperatingthecommandandcontrolserver?Therealitymaybethattheycannotknowwithmuchcertainty,atleastnotinrealtime.Butdoesitreallymatter?Georgia’srighttotakedefensiveactionagainsttheserverdoesnotdependonpositivelyidentifyingtheoperator,althoughthemannerinwhichitexercisesthatrightprobablydoes.Whileitistruethatciviliansandcivilianobjectsareprotectedbythelawofarmedconflict,civiliansmaybetargetedwhentheydirectlyparticipateinhostilities178andcivilianobjectsbecomemilitaryobjectswhenusedtoeffectivelycontributetomilitaryaction.179FromGeorgia’sperspective,DoSattacksthatbeginjustasRussiainvadesandinhibitvitalcommunicationsarearguablymakinganeffectivecontributiontomilitaryaction.Georgiamaynotbeabletotargetspecificpersonnelwithoutadditionalattributionfacts,butitlikelycouldtargettheobjectperformingacommandandcontrolfunctionforadebilitatingDoSattack.AnyGeorgianresponsewouldonlybesubjecttoaproperproportionalityanalysis.DependingonhowGeorgiaconductsitsproportionalityanalysis,itmightchoosetodisablethecommandandcontrolserverwithcybertoolsorconventionalweapons,buteitheroptioncouldtheoreticallybejustifiedunderthelawofarmedconflict.Whenthelawofarmedconflictwouldallowforabelligerenttotakemilitaryactionagainstpersonsorobjectsinaneutralcountry,theneutralityruleshavetoapplyiftheconceptofneutralityistosurvivemodernwarfare.
Furthermore,HagueVtextuallysupportsinterpretingthesecommandandcontrolserversasconstitutingneutralityviolations.BothArticle2180andArticle3181couldarguablyapplytocommandandcontrolserversbutArticle3isabetterfit.Acommandandcontrolserveriscloselyanalogoustoa“wirelesstelegraphystation.”Thecommandandcontrolserverisusedtosendandreceivemessagesinmuchthesamewayasatelegraphystationwouldsendandreceivemessages.Additionally,commandandcontrolserversclearlycommunicatewithbelligerent“forces.”Article2isspecificallydirectedatconvoysoftroopsormunitionsbutArticle3usesthebroaderterm“forces.”EvenifreasonablemindscoulddifferonwhethertheindividualcomputersperformingtheDoSattackare“forces”withinthe
178 See ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andRelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofInternationalArmedConflicts(ProtocolI)art51,June8,1977,1125UNTS3[hereinafterAdditionalProtocolI].179 Id.atart.52.180 HagueV,supra note10,art.2(“BelligerentsareforbiddentomovetroopsorconvoysofeithermunitionsofwarorsuppliesacrosstheterritoryofaneutralPower.”).181 HagueV,supra note10,art.3(statingthat“[b]elligerentsarelikewiseforbidden:(a)ToerectontheterritoryofaneutralPowerawirelesstelegraphystationorapparatusforthepurposeofcommunicatingwithbelligerentforcesonlandorsea;(b)TouseanyinstallationofthiskindestablishedbythembeforethewarontheterritoryofaneutralPowerforpurelymilitarypurposes,andwhichhasnotbeenopenedfortheserviceofpublicmessages.”).
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meaningofHagueV,thecommandandcontrolserverisalsocommunicatingwiththepersonorpersonsultimatelycontrollingthebotnet.Thecommandandcontrolserverhastoreceiveinstructionsontargets,timing,anddurationoftheattackthatitthensendsouttoalloftheindividualcomputersthatmakeupthebotnet.Thepersonorpersonsultimatelycontrollingthebotnetwouldlikelyqualifyasabelligerentforce,evenifonlyasanunprivilegedbelligerentforcenotformallyassociatedwithamilitary.182ThecommunicationbetweenthisbelligerentforceandthecommandandcontrolserverwouldthenbringtheactivitywithinthepurviewofArticle3.
(b)United States’ Neutrality
ThesecondmaincyberneutralityissueraisedbytheRussian-Georgianconflictconcernstheabilityforwell-intentionedthirdpartiestothreatentheirowngovernment’sneutrality.WhenTulipSystemshostedkeyGeorgianwebsitesintheUnitedStatesitlikelyjeopardizedtheUnitedStates’abilitytoremainneutral.183Byhostingkeygovernmentalwebsitesusedfordisseminatinginformation,TulipSystemsmayhaveallowedabelligerenttoerect“awirelesstelegraphystationorapparatusforthepurposeofcommunicatingwithbelligerentforces”184ontheterritoryofapotentiallyneutralstate.Bynottakingactiontopreventthehostingofthewebsites,theUnitedStatesgovernmentmayhaveforfeiteditsrighttoremainneutral.185
SomemightarguethatwithRussiadenyingresponsibilityfortheDoSattackscombinedwiththeinherentattributionproblemsofsuchattacks,theUnitedStates’assistancetoGeorgiainthissituationdoesnotputtheUnitedStates’neutralityatrisk.186Whilethiskindofargumentmightbeenticingfromadefensiveperspec-tiveforacountrywishingtomaintainneutrality,itcouldsignificantlyundermineacountry’soffensiveoptionswithrespecttounlawfulcombatantsorunprivilegedcombatantsinthecyberdomaininotherconflicts.Thelawofarmedconflictrec-ognizestheabilitytolawfullytargetanyonewhotakespartinhostilities.187IntheofficialcommentarytoAdditionalProtocolI,theICRCdefineshostilitiesas“actswhichbytheirnatureandpurposeareintendedtocauseactualharmtothepersonnelandequipmentofthearmedforces.”188Itgoesontosaythatcivilianswhotake“part
182 Forexample,theU.S.lawdefinesanunprivilegedenemybelligerentasanyonewho“hasengagedinhostilitiesagainsttheUnitedStatesoritscoalitionpartners”or“haspurposefullyandmateriallysupportedhostilitiesagainsttheUnitedStatesoritscoalitionpartners.”See 10U.S.C.§948a(7)(2009).Anyonecontrollingabotnetthatappearstoactinconjunctionwithinvadingconventionalforceswouldalmostcertainlyqualifyasonewho“haspurposelyandmateriallysupportedhostilities.”183 Korns,Kasteberg,supra note170,at68.184 HagueV,supra note10,art.3.185 Id. atart.5.186 SeeRainOttis,Georgia 2008 and Cyber Neutrality,available athttp://conflictsincyberspace.blogspot.com/2010/03/georgia-2008-and-cyber-neutrality.html.187 SeeAdditionalProtocolI,supra note178,art.51.188 ClaudePilloudet al., clAude pIlloud et Al., coMMentAry on the AddItIonAl protocols oF 8
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inarmedcombat,eitherindividuallyorasapartofagroup”become“alegitimatetarget.”189Evenifthebotnetitselfisnotintendedtocauseactualharmitisarguablyfacilitatingtheharmthatwillbecausedbytheinvadingconventionalforcesandthereforecouldamounttodirectparticipationinhostilities.190ItwouldbeproblematicforastatetoargueontheonehandthereisnowaytoknowwhoisbehindtheseDoSattacksandthereforeitcanrenderassistancewithoutsacrificingneutrality,andthenontheotherhandarguethisbehaviorconstitutesdirectparticipationinhostilitiesfortargetingpurposesinalaterconflict.ThebetterviewisthatwhenmaliciouscyberactivityaugmentsorenablesconventionalattacksinanIAC,thecybercomponentshouldbetreatedasbelligerentactivity.Itmaybeimportanttosortoutwhetherthemaliciouscyberactivityisprivilegedbelligerentactivityorunprivilegedbelligerentactivityinmanysituations,butitdoesnotmatterintheneutralityanalysis.
C.Stuxnet
Thepreviousexamplesmainlycenteredonsomeoftheneutralityimplica-tionsofDoSattacksbutthemilitaryapplicationofcybercapabilitiesextendsbeyondmerelypreventingaccesstoinformation.TheStuxnetwormisanexampleofacybercapabilitythatcanhaveeffectsthatarecomparabletoadamage-inflictingconven-tionalweapon,versuseffectsthatarecomparabletoadamage-enablingconventionalcapability.Cybercapabilitiesthatcouldconceivablysubstituteforconventionaldamage-inflictingweaponsincreasetheneedforapplicableneutralityrules.
1.Background
OnJune17,2010,anemployeeatVirusBlokAda,asmallcomputersecurityfirminBelarus,readareportfromaclientinIranshowingthattheclient’scomputerwascontinuouslyrebooting.191TherebootingproblemindicatedapotentialvirusandemployeesatVirusBlokAdasoonbegananalyzingthesystemformalicioussoftware.192Theydiscoveredazero-dayexploitinMicrosoft’swebbrowser,InternetExplorer.193Zero-dayexploitsaresoftwarevulnerabilitiesthatareunknowntoitsdesignersandtheyarequiterare.194SoftwareanalysislaterdiscoveredthatStuxnettookadvantageofseveraladditionalWindowsvulnerabilities,includingadditional
June 1977 to the genevA conventIons oF 12 August 1949, 618(YvesSandozetal.eds.,1987).189 Id.190 See MichaelN.Schmitt,The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis,1hArv. nAt’l sec. J.5,26-27(2010).191 KimZetter,How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History,wIred,(July11,2011,7),available athttp://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet-the-most-menacing-malware-in-history/.192 Id. 193 Id. 194 Id.
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zero-dayexploits.195Afewweekslater,VirusBlokAdaemployeesreportedthezero-dayexploitandthemalicioussoftwaretoMicrosoft,whichlaternicknamedthemaliciouscodeStuxnet.196
AssoftwareengineersworldwidebegandissectingStuxnet’scode,theydiscoveredthatitwasdesignedtotargetspecificindustrialcontrolsoftwaredesignedbySiemens,theverysamesoftwareusedbyIran’sNatanzuraniumenrichmentfacility.197Otheraspectsofthecode,suchasonlytargetingconfigurationscontain-ing164devicesandreferencestoaspecificfrequency,1064Hz,seemedtoconfirmNatanzasthecode’starget.198OnceStuxnetfounditstarget,itwasdesignedtodotwothings:1)periodicallyspeedupandslowdowncertainmotorsconnectedtoafrequencyconverter,and2)trickmonitoringsystemsbyreplacingstatusreportsandshuttingoffsystemalarms.199ThisallowedStuxnettoalterthenormaloperationoftheindustrialcontrolsystemwithoutraisingoperatorawareness.200
Iraniancentrifuges,usedforenrichinguranium,arebasedoffofaPakistanidesignandhaveareputationforbeingextremelytemperamental,“subjecttoperi-odic,randomexplosion.”201InDavidSanger’s2012book,Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power,hesaysStuxnetwasajointoperationnamed“OlympicGames”betweentheUnitedStateandIsrael.202SangersaysOlympicGamesdatedbackto2006whenPresidentGeorgeW.Bushdemandeda“thirdoption”besideslettingIrandevelopanuclearweaponorstart-ingawarwithIran.203Stuxnetbecamethatthirdoption.AccordingtoSanger,thegoalwastocapitalizeonIran’svolatilecentrifugedesignbyinitiatingaseriesofapparentlyrandomcentrifugefailures,withthehopethatIranianauthoritieswouldlosefaithinthedesign,theparts,and/ortheirengineers.204
OneofStuxnet’smostintriguingaspectswasitsdelivery.NatanzisasecurefacilitythatisnotconnectedtotheInternetsoitsdesignershadtofigureoutawaytobridgethe“airgap.”205AccordingtoSymantec,Stuxnetwasdesignedtospread
195 NicolasFalliereet al., W32.StuxnetDossier,Version1.4,SymantecSecurityResponse2(Feb.2011),available athttp://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf[hereinafter,StuxnetDossier].196 Zetter,supra note191(combiningthefilenames.stubandMrxNet.sysfromthesoftwarecode).197 Id. 198 Id. 199 Id. 200 Id. 201 dAvId e. sAnger, conFront And conceAl: oBAMA’s secret wArs And surprIsIng use oF AMerIcAn power 188-89 (2012). 202 Id. at188-91.203 sAnger, supra201,at188-191.204 Id. at188.205 Id. at195-96.
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inseveraldifferentways,includingthroughavulnerabilityinremovabledriveswith“auto-execution”software(thumbdrives)andthroughlocalareanetworks(LANs)viaaWindowsPrintSpoolervulnerability.206StuxnetwasdesignedtoinfectthecomputersystemsofpeoplewithaccesstoNatanz,whothenmightplugalaptoporathumbdriveintoNatanz’sclosednetwork.207Additionally,eachtimeStuxnetinfectedacomputeritwouldgathersomebasicinformationaboutthesystem,suchasthemachine’sinternalandexternalIPaddresses,itsname,detailsabouttheoperatingsystem,andwhetheritcontainedSiemensindustrialcontrolsoftware.208Stuxnetwouldthenreportthisinformationtoacentralcommandandcontrolserverattachedtooneormoredomainnames.209Symantecidentifiedtwoofthesecommandandcontrolservers,oneinDenmarkandoneinMalaysia.210ThecommandandcontrolserverscoulddirectlyinstallupdatedversionsofStuxnetorotherfilesoninfectedmachines.211Additionally,infectedcomputerscontinuouslysearchedLANsorconnecteddevicesforupdatedversionsofthecode.212ThismeantthatsolongasNatanzinsiderskeptconnectingthumbdrivesandlaptopstobothopenandclosednetworks,updatedversionsofStuxnetwouldeventuallyinfectalltargetedsystems.
WhileStuxneteventuallyspreadto155differentcountries213(asaresultofanunintendedprogrammingmistake214),Symantecsaysitwasinitiallytargetedatfivedifferentorganizations,allwitha“presenceinIran”.215Interestingly,theshortesttimebetweenthesoftwarecompiletimeandinitialinfectiontimewas12hours.216Suchashorttimebetweenwhenthecodewascompletedtowhenitinfectedamachinewithan“Iranianpresence”suggeststhatthecodewasinitiallydeliveredviatheInternetasopposedtobeingcovertlyinstalledbyhand.
2.NeutralityAnalysis
WhileStuxnetdidnotoccurduringanarmedconflictandthereforedidnotdirectlyraiseanyneutralityissues,itdidproveaneffectiveoperationalconceptthatwilllikelybeusedinfutureconflicts.AsevidencedbytheEstoniaandGeorgia
206 StuxnetDossier,supra 195,at2.Interestingly,theUnitedStatesDepartmentofDefensebannedtheuseofthumbdrivesaroundthissametime.See NoahShachtman,Under Worm Assault, Military Bans Disks, USB Drives,WIRED(Nov.19,20083:12PM),available athttp://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/11/army-bans-usb-d/.207 sAnger, supra201,at196.208 Zetter,supra note191.209 Id. 210 StuxnetDossier,supra 195,at21.211 Zetter,supra note191.212 StuxnetDossier,supra 195,at34.213 Id. at6.214 sAnger, supra201,at204-205.215 StuxnetDossier,supra 195,at7.216 Id.
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examples,militaryleadersareseeminglylearningthevalueofeffectivecyberopera-tionsandwilllikelyincorporatethemintofuturewarplans.WithStuxnet’scodenowavailableforanyonetotinkerwithormodify,itisreasonabletoassumethatthenextmajorinternationalconflictwillincludemalwaresimilarto,ormodeledafter,Stuxnet.Forexample,industrialcontrolsystems,similartotheoneusedatNatanz,arefoundinpetroleumrefinementplants,chemicalproductionplants,andelectricalpowergenerationandtransmissionplants.217Itisfairlyeasytoimagineanyoftheseplantsasconstitutingalegitimatemilitarytargetduringafuturearmedconflict.
UsingmalwarelikeStuxnetinanarmedconflictwouldraiseatleasttwosignificantneutralityconcerns:(1)thelocationofcommandandcontrolserversand(2)deliveryroutes.TheanalysisofthecommandandcontrolserverissueissimilarforaStuxnet-typeoperationasitwouldbeforaDoSattackbuttheargumentsarestronger.Stuxnetusedatleasttwodifferentcommandandcontrolservers,oneinMalaysiaandoneinDenmark,butcouldhavebeenupdatedthroughouttheopera-tiontocommunicatewithdifferentcommandandcontrolservers.218IfStuxnethadoccurredduringthecourseofanarmedconflict,MalaysiaandDenmarkwouldhavebeeninadifficultposition.IfStuxnetwasdevelopedasawaytoachieveeffectscomparabletoattackingNatanzwithconventionalweapons,219itessentiallysubstitutedforconventionalweapons.Whenmilitaryplannerscanusecertaincybercapabilitiesandconventionalweaponsinterchangeably,itdefieslogictoapplytheneutralityrulestooneandnottheother.
WithrespecttoHagueV,theanalysisremainsthesameforthecommandandcontrolsserversintheStuxnetcontextasitdoesintheDoSattackcontext.Thecommandandcontrolserversinthisscenariowouldbeactingasvirtual“wirelesstelegraphystations”forthepurposeof“communicatingwithbelligerentforces”inviolationofArticle3.220TheStuxnetcommandandcontrolserverscompileddatareceivedfromeachinfectedcomputer221andpresumablysentthatdatatoStuxnet’screators.Additionally,Stuxnet’screatorslikelyusedthecommandandcontrolserv-erstopushupdatedversionsofthecodeouttoinfectedcomputers.222Inanarmedconflictscenario,itwouldbedifficulttoarguethatthesecommandandcontrolserversarenotcommunicatingwithbelligerentforces.Furthermore,ifmalwarehastheabilitytoshutdownapowergridorcrippleanoilrefinery,abelligerentmaybemorelikelytorespondmilitarilyonceitdiscoversthethreat.Sucharesponsemightincludedamagingordisablinganyknowncommandandcontrolserversorother
217 systeMs And networK AnAlysIs center, nAtIonAl securIty Agency, A FrAMeworK For AssessIng And IMprovIng the securIty posture oF IndustrIAl control systeMs (Version1.1,Aug.20,2010),available athttp://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/ics/ics_fact_sheet.pdf.218 StuxnetDossier,supra note195,at21.219 sAnger, supranote201,at188-191.220 HagueV,supra note10,art.3.221 StuxnetDossier,supra note195,at21.222 Zetter,supra note191.
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vitalnetworkelementsresidinginthatneutralstate.Asthelikelihoodofamilitaryresponseagainstaneutralstate’snetworkcomponentsincreases,sodoestheneedtoapplythelawofneutralityinordertopreventthespreadofconflict.
TheotheraspectofStuxnetthatraisespotentialneutralityissuesconcernsthespecificdeliverypathorpathsthemaliciouscodetravels.Doesthelawofneutralityprohibitmaliciouspacketsofinformationfromtravelingoverthenetworkinfrastructureofaneutralstateonthewaytoabelligerenttarget?Applyingthelawofneutralitytothisparticularscenarioisproblematicfortworeasons.First,individualpacketsmightnotalltakethesamerouteandusersmaynotbeabletocontroltheroute.223Second,applicableneutralityrulesarenotlikelyneededinthissituationtopreventthespreadofconflict.Putanotherway,thefactthatsomepacketstraveloveraneutral’snetworkonthewaytoabelligerentisnotlikelytotriggeranymilitaryactionagainsttheneutral’snetwork.TheInternet’sredundantdesignmeansthatanymilitaryactiontoshutdownoneparticularroutewouldnothavemuch,orany,practicaleffect;thepacketswilljusttakeadifferentroute.224Whilenotaperfectfit,thisnarrowsituationshouldstillfallunderthescopeofHagueV’stelegraphexception.225Thetelegraphexceptionwaslargelybasedonpracticallimitations226thatareespeciallyapplicabletocontrollingormonitoringthedeliveryroutesofindividualpackets.Furthermore,usingtheroadsanalogydiscussedearlier, it ismoreappropriatetoviewthetelecommunicationsserviceproviderastransportingthecodeinthisscenariosinceitistheserviceproviderwhoisdirectingthepath,notthebelligerent.
Whileitmaynotbeappropriatetoapplytheneutralityrulestothedeliveryroutesofindividualpacketsinmostcases,itisimportanttodistinguishthesituationwhereabelligerentusesaproxyinaneutralstate.Whilebelligerentsmaynotbeabletocontrolthespecificroutespacketstake,abelligerentensuresthepacketsgothroughaneutralstatebyusingaproxyinthatneutralstate.AbelligerentmayuseaproxyinaneutralstateinordertomakeitappearasiftheneutralstateissupportingitseffortorsimplybecausetheenemymaynotscrutinizeInternettrafficemanatingfromthatneutralcountryinthesamewayitscrutinizesotherInternettraffic.Eitherway,thedeliberateuseofproxyinaneutralstateislikelyanattempttoderivesomeformofmilitaryadvantagefromaneutral’sterritorialinfrastructureandisprohibited.227Thisessentiallycollapsestheneutralityanalysisforthedeliveryofpacketsintoanintent-basedanalysis,anapproachoftenadvocated.228Addition-
223 SeeBoebert,supra note120,at41-42.224 Seeid. at42.225 HagueV,supranote10,art.8.226 SeeHagueReports,supra note14,at543.227 SeeHagueV,supranote10,art.1(“TheterritoryofneutralStatesisinviolable.”).228 See,e.g.,DavisBrown,A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict,47hArv. Int’l l.J.179,210-11(2006);JeffreyT.G.Kelsey,Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and
Cyber Neutrality 105
ally,whiletheremaynotbemuchpracticalvalueintakingmilitaryactionagainstaneutral’snetworkthatisonlycarryingpackets,“bricking”229aproxymaybeaneffectivecountermeasure.Neutralstatesshouldnotbecomecyberbattlegroundsforbelligerents,wheretheburdenofcollateraldamagewouldrestentirelyontheneutralstate.
AsintheGeorgiaexample,attributionlimitationswillnotbarmilitaryaction.Attributionlimitationsarecertainlyrelevant,especiallyinconductingaproportionalityanalysis,butthefactremainsthatobjectswhicharebeingusedto“makeaneffectivecontributiontomilitaryaction”aremilitaryobjectsandmaybeattacked.230Everyproxycomputerinthechainwouldlikelymeetthisdefinitionandwouldthereforebesubjecttoattack.Forthatmatter,thecablesthatmerelycarrypacketscouldalsoqualifyasmilitary,ordual-use,objectsbutthenegligiblemilitaryadvantagetobegainedbyattackingthemmightbedifficulttojustifyunderaproportionalityanalysis.231AswiththeDoSattackscenario,itistechnicalattributiontoaparticularnode/computerthattriggersabelligerent’sabilitytotakemilitaryactionagainstthatparticularnode/computer,regardlessofwhetherthebelligerentcanfurtherattributetheconducttoaperson,organization,orgovernment.232
V.CONCLUSION
Theneutralityrulesareoverahundredyearsoldanddidnotenvisionmoderncybercapabilitiesbuttechnologicalinnovationinweaponryisnothingnew.Whencybercapabilitiescanviablysubstituteforconventionalcapabilities,whethertheyaredamage-causingordamage-enablingcapabilities,theneutralityrulesmustequallyapplyinordertopreservestatesovereignty.Withoutapplicableneutralityrules,belligerentswillderivestrategicadvantagesbypurposelyexploitingcomponentsofaneutralstate’sinfrastructure.Allowingthecybercomponentofthebattlefieldtoexpandtoneutralstateserodesaneutralstate’sabilitytostayoutofaconflict.Belligerentsdonotseeksymmetricresponses.Theyconstantlyseekopportunitiestooverwhelmtheenemyintheplaceandmannerwheretheyperceiveanadvantage.Thereisnoguaranteethatthecybercomponentofthebattlefieldcouldspreadtoneutralstateswithouttheconventionalbattlefieldexpandingthereaswell.
Attributionremainsachallenge,especiallywhenitcomestopunishingbel-ligerentswhomightchoosetoviolateaneutralstate’srights.Notonlyistechnicalattributiondifficultbutholdingastateresponsiblealsorequireshumanattribution.
Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare,106MIch. l. rev.1427,1448-49(2008).229 Theterm“bricking”referstosoftwareorfirmwarechangesthatcompletely,andoftenpermanently,disableacomputer.See JohnHaubenreich,The iPhone and the DMCA: Locking the Hands of Customers,61vAnd. l. rev. 1507,1538,n.201(2008).230AdditionalProtocolI,supra note178,art.52.231 Id. atart.51.232 See supranotes178-179andaccompanyingtext.
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Theseattributionchallengesmaylimitthedeterrentvalueofapplyingtheneutralityrulestocyberoperations.However,asevidencedbytheMandiantreport, large,prolongedcyberoperationsmaybedifficulttoconcealindefinitely.Additionally,belligerentswithsophisticatedcybercapabilitiesmayalsorigorouslymonitorandcontroltheirownnetworks,strengtheningattributionargumentsbasedonCorfuChannel’srationale.Finally,whileattributioncertainlyposesaprobleminholdingbelligerentsresponsibleforneutralityviolations,itislessimportantwhentheneu-tralityrulesareusedtoimposeadutyonneutralstates.Neutralstatesmaynothavetheincentivetodedicatetheresourcesnecessarytomonitortheirownnetworks,butbelligerentsdo.Whenabelligerenttracesmaliciouscyberactivitytocomponentsofaneutralstate’sinfrastructure,itshouldbeabletorequiretheneutralstatetotakeappropriateactionifthatstatewantstoremainneutral.
Aswithmostareasofthelaw,technologicaladvancescreatechallenges.
Sometimesthelawisamendedtoexplicitlydealwithnewtechnologiesandsome-timestheoldlawisinterpretedtocover(ornotcover)newtechnologies.Whenitcomestocybercapabilitiesandthelawofneutrality,gaininginternationalconsensustoamendthelawmaynotbepossibleandinterpretingthelawtonotcovercyberoperationsthreatenstheentireinstitutionofneutrality.Byinterpretingtheneutral-ityruleswithafocusontheirpurpose,statescanusherrespectforneutralityintotwenty-firstcenturywarfareandcontinuetodecideforthemselvesifandwhentoenteraconflict.
When There are No Adverse Effects 107
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 108 II. BACKGROUNDANDOVERVIEWOFNEPAREQUIREMENTS......112 III. ANEISSHOULDNOTBEREQUIREDFORBENEFICIAL
IMPACTS.................................................................................................116A.TheOriginoftheBeneficialEISandtheCircuitSplit.......................117
1.TheSeemingOriginoftheBeneficialImpactEISRequirement..118 2.TheFifthCircuit........................................................................... 121 3.TheEleventhCircuit.................................................................... 124 4.TheSixthCircuit.......................................................................... 128 5.OtherCases.................................................................................. 130
B.StatutoryConstruction....................................................................... 130C.LegislativeHistory............................................................................ 134D.CEQRegulations............................................................................... 140
1.DefiningSignificantEffectsontheEnvironment........................ 141 2.PurposeoftheRegulationsandCEQ’sInterpretation................. 144 3.RequirementforPublicParticipation........................................... 147
E.FunctionalEquivalence..................................................................... 151F. TheCorrectResolutionoftheCircuitSplit....................................... 156
IV. ASUGGESTEDAGENCYAPPROACH............................................... 157 V. CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 161
WHENTHEREARENOADVERSEEFFECTS:PROTECTINGTHEENVIRONMENTFROMTHEMISAPPLICATIONOFNEPA
Major danieL j. White*
TABLE
TABLE1............................................................................................................ 135
*MajDanielJ.White,JudgeAdvocate,UnitedStatesAirForce(LL.M.,withhighesthonors,EnvironmentalLaw,TheGeorgeWashingtonUniversityLawSchool(2013);J.D.,WestVirginiaUniversityCollegeofLaw(2000);B.A.,MarshallUniversity(1997))istheEnvironmentalLiaisonOfficerforAirForceMaterielCommand,Wright-PattersonAirForceBase,Ohio.ThispaperwassubmittedinpartialsatisfactionoftherequirementsforthedegreeofMasterofLawsinEnvironmentalLawatTheGeorgeWashingtonUniversityLawSchool.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperaresolelythoseoftheauthoranddonotreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheUnitedStatesAirForce,DepartmentofDefenseorU.S.Government.
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I.INTRODUCTION
In2012,theU.S.Armyundertookaprojecttopreserveandrestoreover8,600acresoflong-leafpineforestatFortBenning,Georgia.1Thisprojectofhabitatconservationandenvironmentalimprovementdemonstratesaremarkabletransformationfromwhatwasoccurringinthefederalgovernmentforty-threeyearsearlier.Atthattime,citingtheexamplesoftheSantaBarbaraoilwellblowoutandcontroversiesoveranassuredsupplyofcleanwater,Congressexpressedconcernthatmanyagenciessimplydidnot,orevencouldnotunderexistinglaw,considertheeffectstotheenvironmentbeforetakingaparticularaction.2ThisresultedinPresidentRichardNixonsigningtheNationalEnvironmentalPolicyActof1969(NEPA)intolaw,onJanuary1,1970,ashisfirstofficialactofthedecade.3NEPArequiresallfederalagenciestotakea“hardlook”attheenvironmentalimpactsofanyproposedfederalactionthathasasignificantimpactontheenvironment.Now,however,projectssuchasthepineforestrestorationatFortBenning,whichrepresentthefulfillmentofthepolicyvisionestablishedbyNEPA,areendangeredbyanoverbroadinterpretationofthatAct.
AtleastonecourthasheldthatNEPArequiresanEnvironmentalImpactStatement(EIS)forprojectswithonlybeneficial significantimpacts.4RequiringanEISfortheseprojectsmaywellsoundthe“deathknell”foragencyactionsthathaveonlybeneficialsignificantimpacts.5Manyactionsbythegovernmentresultinsomekindofadverseeffect6ontheenvironment.Yetincreasingly,thegovernmentisdoingabetterjobofundertakingprojectsthatembracethenationalenvironmentalpolicyto“createandmaintainconditionsunderwhichmanandnaturecanexistinproductiveharmony....”7Actionsthatbenefittheenvironmentwhilecausingnosignificantadverseimpacts,poseararelyconsideredquestion:DoesaprojectwithonlybeneficialsignificantenvironmentalimpactsrequireanagencytoprepareanEIS?
1OFFIceoF theSec’yoF DeF.,Dep’toFDeF.ReAdIness And EnvIronMentAl ProtectIonIntegrAtIonProgrAM,REPI in the News—2012,available at http://www.repi.mil/InTheNews/2012.aspx(lastvisitedAugust5,2013)[hereinafterREPI2012].2 S.Rep.No.91-296,at8-9(1969).3AlBert Ferlo et Al.,TheNEPALItIgAtIonGuIde1(2ded.2012).4 SeeNat’lWildlifeFed’nv.Marsh,721F.2d767,782-83(11thCir.1983)(emphasisadded);see alsoinfraPartII.A.5 “Thereisalsosomefeelingamongagencies,projectapplicants,andevencourts,thatanEISisthedeathknellofaproject”SeeFerloetAl.,supra note3,at44(citingCroninv.UnitedStatesDep’tofAgric.,919F.2d439,443(7thCir.1990)).6 CEQdefinitionsindicatethateffectandimpactareusedsynonymouslythroughouttheNEPAimplementingregulations.Inthisarticle,thetwotermsarealsosynonymous.See40C.F.R.§1508.8(2012).7 42U.S.C.§4331(2013).
When There are No Adverse Effects 109
MostrecentcaseshavefailedtoanswerthequestionofwhethersignificantpositiveimpactsontheenvironmenttriggertheneedforanEIS.8However,lookingbacktothe1980sand1990s,theFifthandEleventhCircuitsappeartohaveansweredthisquestionintheaffirmative,whiletheSixthCircuithasconcludednoEISisrequiredforimpactsthataresolelybeneficial.9TheFifthCircuithasarguablybackedawayfromthisassertion,butwasneverthelessrelieduponbytheEleventhCircuit.10Thesethreecasesareallmorethanseventeenyearsold.WhileitisnotsurprisingthatveryfewNEPAlawsuitsarebroughtbyindividualsseekingtopreventbenefitstotheenvironment,theargumentisstillraisedregularly.Twodistrictcourtshaveaddressedtheargumentinthetwoyearsprecedingthisarticle;theNinthCircuithasdiscussedtheissueinthelastthreeyears.11Asagenciescontinuetotakeevenmoreenvironmentallyconsciousactions,theargumentmaybecomeincreasinglyrelevant.
SinceNEPA’senactment,therehavebeenmoreandmoregovernmentalprogramsthataredesignedtofindwaystoenhancetheenvironmentwhilestillallowingthegovernmenttocompleteitsfunctions;forexample,thelongleafpinerestorationatFortBenning.IfNEPArequiresthatagenciesprepareanEISforprojectswithonlybeneficialsignificantimpacts,agenciesmustcomplywiththatrequirement.However,becauseofthecostanddelayassociatedwithcompletinganEIS,agencieswillbeabletoundertakefewerprojectsthatdo benefittheenvironmentandmaybedeterredfromundertakingsuchbeneficialprojectsatall.
ThecostofpreparinganEIS,inbothtimeandmoney,isasubstantialburden.A2003reportfromtheNEPATaskForcetotheCouncilonEnvironmentalQuality(CEQ)indicatedanEISatthattime,tookanaverageofonetosixyearstocomplete,andcostanaverageof$250,000to$2,000,000.12In2013thosecostsarelikelytobefarhigher,andagencieshavesubstantiallydiminishedresourcesasaresultofthebudgetcutsundersequestration.13Accordingly,itisinanagency’s
8 See, e.g.,HumaneSocietyv.Locke,626F.3d1040,1056(9thCir.2010)(notingcourthasnotdecidedquestionofwhetheranEISisrequiredforbeneficialsignificantimpacts);ColiseumSquareAss’nv.Jackson,465F.3d215,239(5thCir.2006)(courthasnotarrivedatanansweronwhetheranEISisrequiredforsignificantpositiveimpacts).9 See generally,FriendsofFieryGizzardv.FarmersHomeAdmin.,61F.3d501(6thCir.1995).Marsh,721F.2dat782-83.10 SeeColiseum Square Ass’n,465F.3dat239;Marsh,721F.2dat782-83.11 SeeOceana,Inc.v.Bryson,No.C-11-6257EMC,2013WL1563675,at*24-25(N.D.Cal.Apr.13,2013);S.FourWheelDriveAss’nv.UnitedStatesForestService,No.2:10CV15,2012WL4106427,at*12-15(W.D.N.C.Sept.19,2012);Locke,626F.3dat1040.12 NAtIonAlEnvIronMentAlPolIcyAct(“NEPA”)TAsKForce,CouncIlonEnvIronMentAlQuAlIty(“CEQ”),TheNEPATAsKForce Report to theCouncIlonEnvIronMentAl QuAlIty:ModernIzIngNEPAIMpleMentAtIon 66(2003),available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/ntf/report/finalreport.pdf[hereinafterTaskForceReport].13 LetterfromJeffreyZients,DeputyDirectorforManagementoftheOfficeofManagementandBudget,toJohnA.Boehner,SpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives(Mar.1,2013)(onfilewithauthor),available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/fy13ombjcsequestrationreport.pdf.
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bestinteresttoavoidanEISwheneverpossible.CourtshaverecognizedthatanEIS“isverycostlyandtime-consumingtoprepareandhasbeenthekissofdeathtomanyafederalproject....”14Thishasperhapsneverbeenastrueasitisnow.
ThepossibilitythatcourtscouldinterpretNEPAtorequireanagencytoprepareanEISforaprojectwithonlybeneficialsignificantimpactsalsocreatesapathwayforlitigationfromanygrouporindividualwishingtoblockaproject.NEPAdocumentshavebecomeameans,atleastinpart,toavoidlitigation.15Asaresult,agenciesmaypreparelengthy,bulkyimpactstatementsprimarilytoavoidafightincourt.16Ifthelitigationriskislargeenough,anagencymaybeforcedtoprepareanEIS,eveniftheybelievenonewouldberequiredunderacorrectinterpretationofNEPA,simplytoensuretheprojectcanproceed.Insomeinstances,thetimingoftheprojectcanbemoreimportantthanthecosttoanagency,andiflitigationcanbeprecluded,itmaybepossibletosaveaprojectthatwouldotherwisehavediedinthecourts.
TheDepartmentofDefenseReadinessandEnvironmentalProtectionInte-grationprogram(REPI)17providesanexampleofthetypeofprojectsthatareatrisk.Thepurposeofthisstatuteistoaddresstheincreasingproblemofencroachingdevelopmentaroundmilitarybases.18In2002,CongressauthorizedthevariousmilitarydepartmentstopartnerwithotherentitiestoacquirepropertyandevenenactconservationmeasuresforlandssurroundingmilitaryinstallationsusingREPI.19Militaryinstallationsprovideaconcentrationofpersonnelthatbusinessownersfindattractive.Mostbaseshaveanumberofrestaurantsandshopsrightoutsidetheirgates.Inaddition,thebasesgenerallyemployalargenumberofciviliansinadditiontotheuniformedmembers.HillAirForceBase,inUtah,claimstobethelargestemployerinthestate,withmorethan23,500civilian,militaryandcontractorpersonnel.20Allofthesepeoplehavetolivesomewhereandthedemandforhousingsurroundingmilitaryinstallationsisoftenfierce.However,allofthedevelopmentscannegativelyimpactthemissionofthebase,asamongotherimpacts,morepeoplelivingclosetoabasecomplainaboutthenoiseofaircraft,moreoffbaselightingaffectsnight-timetrainingandwildlifeispushedoutofthenewlydevelopedareasaroundthebaseandontotherelativelyopenmilitaryinstallations.21
14 Cronin,919F.2dat443(citingRiverRd.Alliance,Inc.v.CorpsofEng’rsofUnitedStatesArmy,764F.2d445,449(7thCir.1985)).15 FerloetAl.,supra note3,at3.16 Id.17 10U.S.C.§2684a(2013).18 SeeUnderSec’yofDef.forAcquisition,Tech.,andLogisticsREPI2013,7thAnnualReporttoCongress3(2013)(discussionofissuespertainingtoencroachmentonmilitaryinstallations)[hereinafterREPI2013].19 10U.S.C.§2684a(d)(2).20 SeeHillAirForceBase, OO-ALCMission,available at http://www.hill.af.mil/main/welcome.asp(lastvisitedJune21,2013).21 See REPI2013,supranote18,at2.
When There are No Adverse Effects 111
REPIisdesignedtoprovideatoolthatwillhelptopreventorremedythesomeoftheproblemscreatedbyencroachingdevelopment.ThemostcommonuseofREPIistoacquiresomesortofeasementthatwillpreventdevelopmentofthelandandleaveitinitsnatural,oratleast,itscurrentstate.22However,REPIprojectsdooccasionallyincludeenhancementstotheenvironment.Forexample,FortBenningisusingtheREPIprogramtobenefit8,600acresoflongleafpineforest.23ThisREPIprojectgoesbeyondmerelypreservingtheforestinitscurrentstate;instead,REPIpartnershaveactuallyalteredthecurrentlandscapebyrestoringthenativeforestandreplantingnativespeciesofgrassesandlongleafpine,creatinghabitatfortheendangeredgophertortoiseandred-cockadedwoodpecker.24Arguably,thisprojectcouldhaveasignificant,beneficialimpactontheenvironment.
In2012,therewereatotalof677REPIprojectsreported.25TotalREPIfundingwasjustover$215million.26Thisrepresentsapproximately$318,000perprojectonaverage.Ifthecheapestenvironmentalimpactstatementsreportedin2003were$250,000andsomemoreexpensiveimpactstatementscostinthemillions,itiseasytoseehowfundingforprojectscouldquicklybecomeexhaustedbyNEPApaperwork,resultinginadramaticreductioninthenumberofREPIprojectsthattheDoDcouldaccomplish.Obviously,thesizeandscopeoftheprojectsdifferandnotallREPIprojectswouldrequireanEISunderanystandard,sincesomewouldhavenoimpactontheenvironmentatall.Still,thecostofanEIScouldmakethemoreenvironmentallybeneficialprojects,suchastheoneatFortBenning,untenable.InterpretingNEPAtorequireanEISforbeneficialsignificantimpacts,merelytoexplainhowthegovernmentisgoingtohelptheenvironment,wouldresultinthewasteofatleast$250,000,andpotentiallymillionsofdollars.Worse,itwouldbecontrarytothedeclaredpurposeofNEPAforthestatutetobeusedtopreventsuchprojects,eitherthroughlitigationorbecauseofexcessivecost.
Thisarticlewillsupplementcurrentliterature,explainingthatdespitesomecasestothecontrary,requiringanEISforbeneficialsignificantimpactsisinconsis-tentwiththepurposeofNEPAandwithcurrentNEPAimplementation.Theprecisedefinitionofwhatconstitutesa“significantimpact”isunclearinbothNEPAandtheimplementingregulationspromulgatedbyCEQ.However,thisambiguitycanberesolvedbydeferringtoagencyinterpretationofagencypromulgatedNEPAregulations.Tothatend,PartIIofthisarticlewillprovideabackgroundoverviewofNEPAanditsrequirements.PartIIIwillexaminethecaselawthathasinterpreted
22 U.S.Dep’toFDeF.,PArtner’sGuIde to the DepArtMentoFDeFense’sReAdInessAnd EnvIronMentAl ProtectIonInItIAtIve(REPI),at9,available at http://www.repi.mil/Documents/Primers/Primer_REPI.pdf.23 REPI2012,supra note1.24 CharlesSeabrook,Wildlife and the Military Benefit from Forest Restoration,AtlAntAJ.&Const,Dec.7,2012,available at http://www.ajc.com/news/lifestyles/wildlife-and-the-military-benefit-from-forest-rest/nTNN7/.25 See REPI2013,supranote18,at3.26 See REPI2013,supra note18,at3.
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therequirementtoprepareanEISforbeneficialsignificantimpacts,andanalyzeNEPA’slegislativehistoryandimplementingregulations.PartIVwillthenlookatthepossibilityofagenciesrelyingontheirownagencypromulgatedregulationsforasolution.Thedeferencegiventoanagency’sinterpretationofitsownregulationsmaybethestrongestdefensetoanargumentthatanEISisrequiredforprojectswithsolelybeneficialimpacts.
II.BACKGROUNDANDOVERVIEWOFNEPAREQUIREMENTS
Inthe1960s,therewereseveralproposalsbeforeCongresssuggestingtheneedforanationalenvironmentalpolicyandproposinganexecutivecounciltoaddressgrowingconcernovertheenvironment.27TheSenatecommitteereport,addressingtheproposedNationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct,spokeoftheneedforenvironmentallegislation,noting:
ThereisnogeneralagreementastohowcriticaltheNation’spresentenvironmentalsituationhasbecome.Somerespectedscholarsinsistthatanumberofcrisesalreadyexist.Othersmaintainthatthereisyettimetopreventthem.Thereisnearlyunanimousagreement,however,thatactionisneededandthat,atleastinsomeinstances,dangerousconditionsexist.28
NEPAwasCongress’groundbreakingresponseandhasbeenheraldedasanenvi-ronmentalMagnaCartafortheUnitedStates.29TheActdidthreebasicthings.First,itdeclaredanationalenvironmentalpolicy.30Second,itincludedaprovisionthatrequiresagenciestocompletewhathasbecomeknownastheenvironmentalimpactstatementpriortoundertakinganymajorfederalactionsignificantlyaffectingthequalityofthehumanenvironment.31Finally,itcreatedaCEQ,whichamongotherduties,wastoadvisethePresidentonenvironmentalmattersandreviewtheprogramsofthefederalgovernmentinlightofthenewenvironmentalpolicy.32
CEQwassetupasathreemembercouncilchargedwithadvisingthePresidentandhelpingto“formulateandrecommendnationalpoliciestopromotetheimprovementofthequalityoftheenvironment.”33Inaddition,CEQhasbeenrecognizedasthearbiterofdisagreementsbetweenfederalagenciesinimplementing
27 LIndALuther,Cong.ReseArchServ.,RL33152,TheNAtIonAlEnvIronMentAl PolIcyAct(NEPA):BAcKground And IMpleMentAtIon2-3(2011).28 S.Rep.No.91-269,at13.29 DAnIelR.MAndelKer,NEPALAw And LItIgAtIon:TheNAtIonAlEnvIronMentAl PolIcyAct§1:1(2012).30 42U.S.C.§4331.31 Id.§4332(2013).32 Id.§§4342-44(2013).33 Id.§4342.
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NEPAandthenation’senvironmentalpolicy.34Perhapsmostimportant,however,wasthatin1970,PresidentNixonissuedanexecutiveorderdirectingCEQtoissueregulationsforthevariousfederalagenciestodirecttheircompliancewiththeproceduralportionsofNEPA.35Asaresult,CEQreplacedtheirinitialguidelineswithnewregulationsin1978,whichhavebeensubsequentlyinterpretedasbindingonallfederalagencies.36TheseregulationswillbediscussedindetailinPartIII.D.
NEPA’sdeclaredenvironmentalpolicyhasremainedunchangedfor44years.Congresshasstatedthatitisnationalpolicyto:
[U]seallpracticablemeansandmeasures,includingfinancialandtechnicalassistance,inamannercalculatedtofosterandpromotethegeneralwelfare,tocreateandmaintainconditionsunderwhichmanandnaturecanexistinproductiveharmony,andfulfillthesocial,economic,andotherrequirementsofpresentandfuturegenerationsofAmericans.37AgenciesmustcomplywithNEPAandthispolicy,“tothefullestextent
possible.”38NEPAalsocontainsanactionforcingprovisionwhichrequiresthatforeverylegislativeproposalor“othermajorFederalactionssignificantlyaffectingthequalityofthehumanenvironment...,”39agenciesprepareadetailedstatement,whichexplains:
(i)theenvironmentalimpactoftheproposedaction,
(ii)anyadverseenvironmentaleffectswhichcannotbeavoidedshouldtheproposalbeimplemented,
(iii)alternativestotheproposedaction,
(iv)therelationshipbetweenlocalshort-termusesofman’senvi-ronmentandthemaintenanceandenhancementoflong-termpro-ductivity,and
(v)anyirreversibleandirretrievablecommitmentsofresourceswhichwouldbeinvolvedintheproposedactionshoulditbeimplemented.40
ThisdetailedstatementiswhathasbecomeknownasEIS.
34 See42U.S.C.§4344(3);42U.S.C.§4332(C);42U.S.C.§7609(b)(2013);see also 40C.F.R.§1504.1(1979).35 Exec.OrderNo.11,514,3C.F.R.§123(1978).36 SeeAndrusv.SierraClub,442U.S.347,357(1979).37 42U.S.C.§4331(a).38 Id.§4332.39 Id.§4332(C).40 42U.S.C. §4332(C)(i)-(v).
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CourtshaverecognizedtwomainreasonsforpreparinganEIS.First,Section102requiresagenciestouseasystematic,interdisciplinaryapproachtoplanninganddecision-making,whichconsidersenvironmentalvalues.41Presumably,decision-makerswillutilizetheEIStomake,ifnotmoreenvironmentallyfriendlydecisions,atleastmoreinformeddecisions.ThesecondrecognizedpurposeoftheEISisnotsoeasilyfoundinthetextofNEPA.Nevertheless,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasrecognizedinformingthepublicthattheagencyhasconsideredenvironmentalconcernsisoneofNEPA’s“twinaims.”42Publicparticipation,whilenotspelledoutstrictlyintheActitself,isrequiredunderCEQregulations.43
TheseregulationscreatethreetiersofNEPAanalysis.Forprojectsthatwillhaveasignificantimpactonthehumanenvironment,theagencymustprepareanEIS.44Thisisthemostcomprehensivedocument,and,asnotedabove,themostexpensiveoptionforNEPAcompliance.It isalsotheonlyoptionthatactuallyappearsintheActitself.45Sincethepromulgatedregulationswentintoeffect,andduetothetimeandexpenseofcreatingthestatement,therehasbeenamarkedtrendawayfrompreparingafullEIS.In1973,approximately2,000EISswerefiledwiththeEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA).46By1979,thatnumberhadfallento1,273.47Tenyearson,astaggeringreductionhadoccurred,only370EISswerefiledin1989.48Thatnumberhassincefluctuated,buthoversaround500,withatotalof450EISsfiledin2009,themostrecentyearforwhichCEQhasmadedataavailable.49Conversely,CEQreportedby1993,over50,000environmentalassessmentswerebeingpreparedannually.50
TheEnvironmentalAssessment(EA)isashorterreportthatrepresentsthesecondtierofenvironmentalanalysisunderCEQ’sNEPAregulations.Someagen-cieshadadoptedtheapproachofdraftinganEAtodocumenttheirfindingthatnoEISwasrequired,evenbeforeCEQ’sbidingregulations.51However,theuniformdistinctionbetweenanEAandanEIS,anditsmandatoryuse,isacreationofthose
41 Id.§4332(A)-(B).42 BaltimoreGas&Elec.Co.v.NaturalRes.Def.Council,Inc.,462U.S.87,97(1983).43 See40C.F.R§1503(2012).44 See42U.S.C.§4332(C);40C.F.R.§1501(2012).45 42U.S.C.§4332(C).46 CEQ,EnvironmentalQuality25thAnniversaryReport,51(1997),available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/reports/1994-95/25th_ann.pdf[hereinafterCEQ25thAnniv.Report].47 CEQ25thAnniv.Report,supra note46,at534.48 Id.49 Id.;CEQ,EnvironmentalQuality,CalendarYear2009FiledEISs,available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/Calendar_Year_2009_Filed_EISs.pdf.50 CEQ25thAnniv.Report,supranote46,at51.51 SeeHanleyv.Kleindienst,471F.2d823(2dCir.1972)(discussingGSA-preparedenvironmentalassessmenttoshowEISwasunwarranted).
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regulations.52AnEAisdesignedtobeusedwhentheagencyisuncleariftheactionwillresultinsignificantimpactsorifitisthetypeofactionthatnormallyresultsinnosignificantenvironmentalimpactsbuthasnotbeencategoricallyexcluded.53
Inadditiontocreatingthetiersofenvironmentalanalysis,CEQregulationsrequiredagenciestopromulgatesupplementalregulations.54Thesesupplementalregulationsrequiredagenciestoidentifyclassesofactions,andcriteriaforclassesofactions,thatnormallyrequireanEISoranEA.55AgenciesalsowererequiredtoidentifyclassesofactionthatdidnotnormallyrequireanEAoranEIS.56Theseactionswouldqualifyforthethirdtierofanalysis,aCategoricalExclusion(CATEX).57
Categoricalexclusionsrepresentanentirelydifferenttypeofanalysis.IfanagencydeterminesanactionfallsunderaCATEX,furtheranalysis(underanEAoranEIS)isunnecessaryandtheagencymerelyrecordstheapplicableCATEX.58CEQreportsthishasbecomethemostcommonwayforagenciestocomplywithNEPA.59Categoricalexclusionsmustbepromulgatedbyagenciesasformalregulations,withpublicnoticeandcommentperiods,andmustbeapprovedbyCEQpriortoanagencyavailingthemselvesoftheiruse.60AnexampleofaCATEXfromtheU.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineers(hereinafter“Corps”),wouldbetheconstructionofasmallfloatingprivatepier.61Thisisanaction,whichwhilesubjecttotheCorps’regulation,hasbeendeterminednottoproduceanysignificantenvironmentalimpacts.Accordingly,theCorpscandetermineaCATEXapplies,andnoEAorEISisrequired.
UndertheCEQregulations,anytimeanagencyundertakesamajorfederalactionwhichisnotexemptfromNEPA,theremustbesomeformofNEPAcompli-ance.TheagencymusteitherprepareanEA,anEIS,ordetermineifaCATEXapplies.BoththeEAandtheEISarereleasedforpublicreviewandcomment.62ACATEXgenerallyrepresentsamoreroutineprojectoflittleinterest.TheCEQregulationsdonotspecifypubliccommentonsuchanactivity.ToachieveNEPAcompliance,courtshaveonlyrequiredthatagenciescreateashortdocument,made
52 See40C.F.R.§1501.53 Id.54 See40C.F.R.§1507(2012).55 See40C.F.R.§1507.3.56 Id.57 Id.58 See40C.F.R.§1508.4(2012).59 CEQ,CEQ issued NEPA Guidance on Categorical Exclusions on November 23, 2010,nAtIonAl envIronMentAl polIcy Act,available on www.nepa.govat http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/current_developments/new_ceq_nepa_guidance.html#exclusions(lastvisitedAug.5,2013).60 40C.F.R.§1507.3.61 33C.F.R.§325app.B§6(a)(1)(2012).62 See40C.F.R.§1501.4;40C.F.R.§1506.6(2012).
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contemporaneouslywiththedecisiontoundertaketheactivity, indicatingthatenvironmentaleffectshavebeenconsideredandaCATEXhasbeendeterminedtoapply.63
AllmajoractionsofafederalagencythatarenotexemptedfromNEPAmustfallintooneofthethreecategories:EIS,EA,orCATEX.Ifanagencyundertakesanactionthatisnotcategoricallyexcludedandisexpectedtohavenosignificantenvironmentalimpacts,theagencymustprepareanEAandmakeaFindingofNoSignificantImpact(FONSI).64If theactionwillhavesignificantenvironmentalimpacts,thentheagencymustprepareanEIS.65Thequestion,therefore,iswhatisconsideredtobeasignificantimpact?
Inmanycases,languagefromtheCEQandthecourtshasassumed,withoutexplicitlystating,thatsignificantenvironmentalimpactsissynonymouswithadverseenvironmentalimpacts.66Forexample,atleastoneearlycaseindicatedthatindecid-ingwhetheranactionhasa“significant”effect,theagencymustreviewtheadverseenvironmentaleffectstheactionwillcause.67EarlyCEQguidancealsoprovidedthattohaveasignificanteffect,theagencyactionwouldhavetoadverselyimpacttheenvironment.68The1978NEPAregulationswerenotasclear;however,andthecircuitsremainsplitastowhetheragencyactionsthatwillhaveonlybeneficialsignificantimpactsshouldbeanalyzedunderanEAoranEIS.
III.ANEISSHOULDNOTBEREQUIREDFORBENEFICIALIMPACTS
AlthoughNEPAcanbereadtorequireanEISforbeneficialsignificantimpactstotheenvironment,suchareadingwouldbeincorrectandmakeslittlesense.Nevertheless,somecommentatorshaveembracedthisinterpretation,thoughthereislittlebasisinstatuteorcaselawfortheiropinion.69AtleastonecircuithasalsoheldthatanEISwouldberequiredforbeneficialsignificantimpacts.70SuchanapproachignoresthespiritofNEPA’simplementingregulationsandattimes,asinthecaseofREPIprojectsdiscussedabove,wouldproduceresultsthatarecontrarytothepurposeoftheactitself.
63 See, e.g.,Californiav.Norton,311F.3d.1162,1176(9thCir.2002).64 40C.F.R.§1501.4.65 Id.66 SeeinfraPartII.D.67 SeeHanley,471F.2dat830-31.68 SeePreparationofEnvironmentalImpactStatements:Guidelines,38Fed.Reg.20,550-20,562,20,551-20,552(Aug.1,1973)(tobecodifiedat40C.F.R.pt.1500.6).69 See e.g.,NealMcAliley,NEPA and Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions,41Envtl.L.Rep.News&AnAlysIs,10197,10198-199(2011).70 Marsh,721F.2dat782-84.
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ToexplainwhyrequiringanEISforprojectswithonlybeneficialsignificantimpactsisincorrect,thisarticlewilladdressthecurrentcircuitsplitandwhatseemstobetheoriginofthebeneficialEIStheory.PartIII.CwilllooktothelegislativehistoryofNEPAandanalyzethepurposeofthestatute.Next,PartIII.DwillexaminetheCEQregulationsandhowtheyhavebeeninterpretedsincepromulgationin1978.Finally,PartIII.EwilllooktothedoctrineoffunctionalequivalenceandsomeoftheexclusionsCongresshasgrantedforstatutoryprograms,whichdemonstratethatabeneficialEISrequirementisinconsistentwiththecourts’interpretationsofNEPAandarguablytheinterpretationofCongress.
A.TheOriginoftheBeneficialEISandtheCircuitSplit
In2010,theNinthCircuitrecognizedasplitinthecircuitcourtsastowhetheranagencywasrequiredtoprepareanEISforprojectswithsignificant,thoughonlybeneficial,environmentalimpacts.71Inspiteofthis,atleastoneauthorhasarguedthatthereisinfactnosplitinthecircuits,72andthatinaccordancewiththeSixthCircuit,agenciesarenotrequiredtoprepareanEISundercurrentlawforbeneficialsignificantimpacts.73Thisargumentmakessomesense,particularlyinlightofaFifthCircuitcase,inwhichthecourtdistanceditselffromanapparentholdingthatanEISwasrequiredforprojectswithonlybeneficialsignificantimpacts.74However,ultimatelytheclaimthatthereisnocircuitsplitcannotbesupported.
TheEleventhCircuithasheldthataSupplementalEIS(SEIS)isrequiredforchangesinaprojectthatproduceonlybeneficialsignificantimpacts.75AnargumentthatthisdecisionisdistinguishablebecauseitdealsonlywiththepreparationofanSEIS,asopposedtoanEIS,failsbecausetheEleventhCircuithasalsoheldthat“[t]hestandardfordeterminingwhenanSEISisrequiredis‘essentiallythesame’asthestandardfordeterminingwhenanEISisrequired.”76Ifthe“post-[originalEIS]changesinthe[project]willhavea‘significant’impactontheenvironmentthathasnotpreviouslybeencoveredbythe[original]EIS,[anSEIS]isnecessary.”77Ifthestandardisessentiallythesame,itisimpossibletoseparatethestandardofwhentoprepareanSEISfromthestandardofwhenanEISisrequired.Itisinfactthesamestandard.IntheEleventhCircuit,therefore,therequirementforanEIS
71 Locke,626F.3dat1056.72 SeeShaunA.Goho,NEPA and the “Beneficial Impact” EIS,36WM.&MAryEnvtl.L.&Pol’yRev.367,375-76(2012)(arguingthereisnocircuitsplit,astheFifthandEleventhCircuitsdonotaddresspreparationofanEIS,butonlywhenasupplementalEISisrequired).73 Friends of Fiery Gizzard,61F.3dat506.74 Coliseum Square Ass’n,465F.3dat239(courthasnotarrivedatanswerastowhetheranEISisrequiredforsignificantpositiveimpacts).75 SeeMarsh,721F.2dat782-84.76 SierraClubv.U.S.ArmyCorpsofEng’rs295F.3d1209,1215-16(11thCir.2002)(citingEnvtl.Def.Fundv.Marsh,651F.2d983,991(5thCir.UnitAJuly1981)).77 Sierra Club,295F.3dat1216(internalcitationsomitted).
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wouldbetriggeredanytimethereisasignificantenvironmentalimpact,whetherbeneficialoradverse.78
1.TheSeemingOriginoftheBeneficialImpactEISRequirement
ThestoryofthisholdingandtheresultingcircuitsplitdoesnotbeginintheEleventhCircuit,butratherintheFifthCircuitin1973.79InHiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn,(hereinafter“Hiram Clarke”),theDepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopment(HUD)guaranteedandsubsidizedaloanfortheconstructionofanapartmentcomplex.80Giventheextentoffederalinvolvementintheproject,NEPAappliedandHUDevaluatedtheprojectunderagencyregulationsanddeterminedthatnoEISwasrequired,astherewerenosignificantadverseimpacts.81Projectopponentschallengedthisdecision,inpart,onthegroundsthatanEISshouldberequiredforanysignificantimpact,evenbeneficialimpacts.82Thecourtneverreachedthisissue,upholdingtherulingforthegovernmentafterfindingthedistrictcourthadconductedafullevidentiaryhearingandexploredthecontrollingfactors.83Thecourtdidnotdothis,however,withoutmakingsomeremarksthatwouldproveproblematic.Indiscussingtheappellants’argumentthatanEISshouldberequiredbecauseofbeneficialsignificantimpacts,thecourtprovidedlanguagethatwouldberelieduponinfuturedecisions:
Wethinkthiscontentionraisesseriousquestionsabouttheade-quacyof theinvestigatorybasisunderlyingtheHUDdecisionnottofileanenvironmentalimpactstatement.AclosereadingofSection102(2)(C)initsentiretydisclosesthatCongresswasnotonlyconcernedwithjustadverseeffectsbutwithallpotentialenvi-ronmentaleffectsthataffectthequalityofthehumanenvironment.84
CEQregulationsatthistimewereonlyguidanceandagencieswerenotboundbythemasmatteroflaw.85Sincetheguidancewasnotmandatory,italsodidnotrepresentauniformapproachbyallagencies.Moreimportantly,thisguid-ancewassubstantiallydifferentthantheregulationsCEQeventuallypromulgatedin1978andappearstohavelentmoreweighttotheargumentforabeneficialEISrequirementthanwouldlaterregulations.Thereweretwoimportantaspectsofthisinitialguidancethatexplainthecourt’srationale.First,theguidanceatissue
78 Marsh, 721F.2dat783-84.79 SeeHiramClarkeCivicClub,Inc.v.Lynn,476F.2d421(5thCir.1973).80 Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc., 476F.2dat422-23.81 Id.at426.82 Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc, 476F.2dat426 (emphasisadded).83 Id.at427.84 Id. (emphasisadded). 85 See StatementsonProposedFederalActionsAffectingtheEnvironment,36Fed.Reg.7724-7729(Apr.23,1971).
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whenthecasewasdecidedwaspublishedin1971anddidnotprovideanoptiontoproduceanEAasopposedtoanEIS,butsimplyreferredtoasingleenvironmentalstatement.86Therefore,thecourtmayhaveconcludedifanykindofNEPAcompli-ancewasrequired,therewasonlyoneoption—theEISmentionedinthestatute.
Second,underCEQ’s1971guidance,ineffectatthetimethiscasewasdecided,theconceptofsignificanteffectsontheenvironmentwasmuchbroader.Appellantsreliedonguideline5(c),whichstated:“Section101(b)oftheActindicatesthebroadrangeofaspectsoftheenvironmenttobesurveyedinanyassessmentofsignificanteffect.”87Section101(b)ofNEPAprovidesalistofobjectivesbywhichfederalprogramscouldimplementthenationalenvironmentalpolicy.Theseare:
(1)fulfilltheresponsibilitiesofeachgenerationastrusteeoftheenvironmentforsucceedinggenerations;
(2)assureforallAmericanssafe,healthful,productive,andestheti-callyandculturallypleasingsurroundings;
(3)attainthewidestrangeofbeneficialusesoftheenvironmentwithoutdegradation,risktohealthorsafety,orotherundesirableandunintendedconsequences;
(4)preserveimportanthistoric,cultural,andnaturalaspectsofournationalheritage,andmaintain,whereverpossible,anenvironmentwhichsupportsdiversityandvarietyofindividualchoice;
(5)achieveabalancebetweenpopulationandresourceusewhichwillpermithighstandardsoflivingandawidesharingoflife’samenities;and
(6)enhancethequalityofrenewableresourcesandapproachthemaximumattainablerecyclingofdepletableresources.88
Usingthesegoalstoanalyzeimpacts,itiseasytoseehowtheFifthCircuitmightreachtheconclusionthatNEPA’ssignificantimpactrequirementmightincludebeneficialimpacts,especiallywhentheEAwasnotanoption.Afterall,ifanagencyissupposedtosurveyimpactsto“preserveimportanthistoric,cultural,andnaturalaspectsofournationalheritage,andmaintain,whereverpossible,anenvironmentwhichsupportsdiversityandvarietyofindividualchoice,”89itwouldseemthatbeneficialimpactswouldhavetobepartoftheanalysis.Thesameistrueforseveral
86 Id.87 Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc.,476F.2dat426(citing36Fed.Reg.at7725(1971)).88 42U.S.C.§4331(b)(1)-(6).89 42U.S.C.§4331(b)(4).
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oftheotherobjectives.Inthiscase,giventhecourt’sfocusontheguidelinepointingtosection101(b),itsreasoningcanbeunderstood.
Thiswasnotthecorrectapproach,however,evenundertheearlyguidelines.Thecourtonlylookedatpartofsection5(c)ofthe1971guidance,theportionthataddressedwhateffects“neededtobesurveyedinanyassessmentofsignificanteffect.”90Thelistofgoalsdidnotdefinewhatasignificanteffectwas,itmerelyprovidedabackgroundforwhatwouldbeaffectedindeterminingifaneffectdidrisetothelevelofsignificance.Ultimately,theanalysisfromthecourtinthiscaseregardingthenecessitytoproduceanEISforbeneficialeffectswasincomplete.Thisisunderstandable,asitwasdictaandnotalargeportionoftheanalysisofthecase,sincethecourtrepeatedlyindicatedthatfailingtocomplywiththeCEQguidancedidnotviolateanysubstantiveduty.91Hadamorethoroughanalysisbeenperformed,itispossiblethecourtmayhavereachedtheconclusionthatbeneficialimpactsdidnotrequireanEIS.Nevertheless,giventheportionoftheguidancethecourtchosetorelyupon,thecourt’sconcernwithbeneficialeffectsisunderstandable.
WhenCEQpromulgatednewregulationsin1978,theyprovidedsubstantiallymoreinformationastowhatmightbeconsideredasignificantimpact.Thesenewregulationswerebindingonfederalagencies92andnolongerpointedtoSection101(b)ofNEPAasaguideforanymeasureofsignificanteffects.CEQinsteadpro-videdarathercomplexdefinitionof“Significantly,”that“requiresconsiderationofbothcontextandintensity.”93Underthenewregulations,contextmeantthatanalysisshouldfocusontheaffectedpopulationgroupsorregionsoftheaction.94Inotherwords,anagencyshouldaskwhethertheactionaffectsonlylocalpopulationsorinterestsorifithasmorefarreachingconsequences.Significancecouldthereforechangeunderthenewregulations,dependingonthelocalesandgroupsaffected.95Intensity“referstotheseverityoftheimpact.”96Theregulationsthenprovidealistoftenfactorstoconsiderinevaluatingintensity.Thenewfactorsaremuchmorefocusedonspecificeffects,ratherthanrelyingonpolicydeclarations.HadHiram Clarkebeendecidedundertheseregulations,itisentirelypossiblethecourtwouldhaveaddressedthediscussionofanEISforimpactsthataresolelybeneficial.
90 StatementsonProposedFederalActionsAffectingtheEnvironment,36Fed.Reg.at7725.91 See generallyHiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc.,476F.2dat426-27.92 SeeAndrus,442U.S.at357.93 40C.F.R.§1508.27.94 Id.95 40C.F.R.§1508.27.96 Id.
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2.TheFifthCircuit
In1981,thisissueagaincameupintheFifthCircuit inrelationtotheTennessee-TombigbeeWaterway(TTW).97TheTTWwasaprojectoftheU.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineerstocreateacanaldesignedtoconnecttheTennesseeRiverinthenorth,withtheBlackWarrior-TombigbeeWaterwayinthesouth.98TheTTWcreatedacontinuousroutebetweentheupperOhioandMississippivalleysandtheGulfofMexico.99TheprojecthadbeenaroundinoneformoranothersinceitwasfirstauthorizedbyCongressin1946,andtheinitialEISfortheprojectwaspreparedandfiledin1971.100ThesufficiencyofthatEISwaschallenged,butupheldbytheFifthCircuitin1974.101Subsequenttothatdecision,asonemightexpectinaprojectthatspanned253milesandcostmorethan$2billion,therewereseveraldesignchanges.102Theprojectshiftedononesection,fromthedesignofastandard“perchedcanal”usingartificialleveesonbothsides,toa“chainoflakes”design,withleveesononlyonesideandfloodingtothenaturalhillbarrierontheother.103Onanothersection,theCorpsdecidedtostraightentheTombigbeeRiver,bydiggingoutcutoffstoconnectbends.104Theprojectchangesalsocreatedanadditionalninemillioncubicyardsofspoilthatwouldrequiredisposal.105Inspiteofthesechanges,theCorpsmaintainedthatnoSEISwasnecessary.106
TodemonstratecompliancewithNEPA,theCorpscitedtoagencyregula-
tionsthatpermittedtheCorpstorelyonamoreinformaldocument“[w]heneveritisnecessaryonlytoclarifyoramplifyapointofconcernraisedafterthefinalenvironmentalstatementwasfiledwithCEQ[CouncilonEnvironmentalQuality](andsuchpointofconcernwasconsideredinmakingtheinitialdecision)....”107Thecourtnotedthatbytreatingallpost1971changesasinformalunderthissec-tion,theCorpshadfiled18volumesofinformalsupplementalreportsasopposedtoperformingaformalSEIS.108ThisledtotheFifthCircuitlayingoutforthefirsttimethelegalstandardforwhenanSEISisrequired.Itsholding,inpertinentpart,stated:
WethereforeholdthatNEPAdoesrequirethesupplementationofanEISwhensubsequentprojectchangescan,inqualitativeorquan-
97 See Marsh,651F.2dat983.98 Marsh,651F.2dat986.99 Id.100 Id.at987.101 SeeEnvtl.Def.Fund,Inc.v.CorpsofEng’rs,492F.2d1123,1139-40(5thCir.1974).102 Marsh,651F.2dat986-90.103 Id.at987.104 Id.at987-88.105 Id.at988.106 Id.107 Marsh,651F.2d at989(citing33C.F.R.§209.410(g)(3)(1981)).108 Marsh,651F.2dat989.
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titativeterms,beclassifiedas“majorFederalactionssignificantlyaffectingthequalityofthehumanenvironment.”42U.S.C.§4332.ThestandardoftheneedforanoriginalEISandoftheneedforasupplementtothatEIS,therefore,isessentiallythesame;itmerelyfocusestheinquiryonadifferentbodyofinformationtoevaluatethe“significance”oftheenvironmentalimpact.109
TheappellantspointedtoseveralimpactsthattheybelievedweresignificantandhadnotbeenconsideredintheoriginalEIS,astheyresultedfromtheprojectchanges.Theseincluded:increasedtrafficonthecanal,whichwouldmeanincreasedturbidity;banksloughingandpollution;increasedlossofwildlifehabitat;andthepossiblecreationofthousandsofacresofstagnant,eutrophicwater.110ThecourtappearedtobelievethattheseimpactscouldresultfromthechangeddesignandthattheyremainedunaddressedintheoriginalEIS.111Ifthatweretrue,itwouldhavebeenreasonableforthecourttoconcludethatthesenewadverseimpactsrequiredtheCorpstogobackandprepareaformalSEIS.Butthecourt’sanalysiswasnotbasedentirelyonthenewadverseeffectsthechangesmayhavecaused.
RelyingheavilyonHiram Clarke, thecourtalsopointedoutpotentiallybeneficialeffects,andappearedtoincludetheseasimpactsthatcouldnecessitateanSEIS.112Atonepointthecourtnoted:
[M]erelybecausesomeofthenewlandacquisitionsmayhavebeenintendedto“mitigateenvironmentalimpact”doesnotshieldthoseacquisitionsfromreviewunderNEPAandtheCorps’ownregula-tions.Theproperquestionisnottheintentbehindtheactions,butthesignificanceofthenewenvironmentalimpacts.AndeveniftheCorpswascorrectindecidingthatthenewlandusewillbebenefi-cialinimpact,abeneficialimpactmustneverthelessbediscussedinanEIS,solongasitissignificant.NEPAisconcernedwithallsignificantenvironmentaleffects,notmerelyadverseones.113
ThislanguageseemstocomestraightfromHiram Clarke,whichwouldmaketheanalysisreliantonregulatoryguidancethatnolongerexisted.WhentheCorpsattemptedtoarguethatanSEISwasnotrequired,astherewerenonewadverseimpacts, thecourt“[found]nosolidevidencethattheCorpsha[d]everaskedtherightquestion....”114Instead,inresponsetotheCorps’assertionthattherewerenonewadverseimpacts,thecourtagaincitedtoHiram Clarke,concluding:
109 Id.at991.110 Id.at992-95.111 Id.112 Marsh,651F.2dat994.113 Id.at993(citingHiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc.,476F.2dat426-27).114 Marsh,651F.2dat996.
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“[it]issimplythewrongstandard.NEPArequiresthediscussionofallsignificantenvironmentalimpacts,notjustadverseones.”115AccordingtotheFifthCircuit,the“material”questionbeforethecourtwas“doesthedesignhaveanysignificantnewenvironmentalimpacts,whetherbeneficialorharmful?”116OtherthancitingtoHiram Clarke,thecourtprovidednoanalysisforhowitreachedwhatseemedtobetheconclusionthattherequirementtoproduceanEIScouldbetriggeredbyaprojectwithonlybeneficialsignificantimpacts.
Thecourt’srelianceonHiram Clarkeignoredthenewregulationsthatwerepromulgatedin1978byCEQ.Theseregulations,asnotedabove,providedsubstan-tialguidanceonhowsignificantimpactsshouldbedefined117andwerebindingontheCorps.118Furthermore,theU.S.SupremeCourthadalreadydeterminedthattheseregulationswereentitledtosubstantialdeference.119Evenifoneweretoacceptthatthenewregulationsmightdefinesignificantimpactsasincludingbeneficialimpacts,thereisnoindicationthatthecourtlookedtothemforanyguidanceontheissue.TheonlyreferencetoCEQregulationswasindeterminingthestandardforwhenanSEISmightberequired.120Accordingly,thecourt’sanalysisinthisregardishighlysuspect,ifnotoutrightwrong.ThismaybepartofthereasonwhytheFifthCircuitappearedtodistanceitselffromthisconclusioninits2006decision.
InColiseum Square Association, Inc. v. Jackson,121(hereinafter“Coliseum Square”),opponentstoaHUD-financedbuildingprojectarguedthatanEISwasrequired“eventhoughtheproject[had]nosignificantnegativeenvironmentaleffects,solongasit[had]significantpositiveenvironmentaleffects.”122Inrespondingtothatargument,theCourtreferencedbothHiram ClarkeandEnvironmental Defense Fund v. Marsh.123Itnotedthat,whilethecourtidentifiedtheissueinHiram Clarke,itfailedtoactuallyprovidearulingontheissue.124TheCourtthendistinguishedEnvironmental Defense Fund v. Marsh,characterizingtheholdinginthatcaseasonlydeterminingwhetheranEISneedstodiscusspositiveimpacts.125AppellantslikelywerenotexpectingsuchanarrowinterpretationfromtheCourt,giventhelanguagecitedabove.Nevertheless,despitetheplainlanguageinEnvironmental
115 Id.at997(citingHiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc.,476F.2dat426-27).116 Marsh,651F.2dat994.117 40C.F.R.§1508.27.118 SeeAndrus,442U.S.at357.119 Id.120 Marsh,651F.2dat988-92.Footnotes4and10referencetheCEQregulationsincomparisontotheCorps’agencyregulations.121 465F.3d215(5thCir.2006).122 Coliseum Square Ass’n,465F.3dat239.123 Id.124 Coliseum Square Ass’n, 465F.3dat239(citingHiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc.,476F.2dat426-27).125 Coliseum Square Ass’n,465F.3dat239(citingMarsh,651F.2dat993).
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Defense Fund v. Marsh,theFifthCircuitdistanceditselffromanaffirmativeholdingthatanEISorSEISisrequiredforprojectswithonlybeneficialimpactsandrefusedtoprovideadefinitiveanswertothequestioninColiseum Square.126
3.TheEleventhCircuit
InOctober1981,asplitintheFifthCircuitresultedinthecreationoftheEleventhCircuit.127OnNovember3,1981,thenewly-formedEleventhCircuitpublisheditsfirstopinion,holding,inpertinentpart:
[D]ecisionsoftheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheFifthCircuit(the“formerFifth”orthe“oldFifth”),asthatcourtexistedonSeptember30,1981,handeddownbythatcourtpriortothecloseofbusinessonthatdate,shallbebindingasprecedentintheEleventhCircuit....128
TheFifthCircuitpublisheditsEnvironmental Defense Fund v. Marshdeci-siononJuly13,1981,and,assuch,wasbindingprecedentonthenewly-formedEleventhCircuit.129In1983,whentheEleventhCircuitwasaskedtoruleonasupplementalEISforchangestoaprojectwithonlybeneficialimpacts,itnaturallyturnedtotheFifthCircuitdecisionofafewyearsearlierinEnvironmental Defense Fund v. Marsh.130
InNational Wildlife Federation v. Marsh,131appellantschallengedtheEISforaHUD-financedcommunityimprovementprojectandimplementedbythecityofAlma.132TheEISanalyzedseveralimprovementprojectsresultingfromAlma’sselectionforparticipationintheModelCitiesProgramin1968.133OneoftheprojectswastheconstructionofareservoironHurricaneCreekthatbecameknownasLakeAlma.134AfinalEISwasfiledin1976,butEPAandtheFishandWildlifeService(FWS)objectedtotheprojectbecauseofenvironmentalconcerns.135Duetotheseconcerns,HUDrefusedtoreleasefundsfortheproject.136Ultimately,aspartof
126 Coliseum Square Ass’n,465F.3dat239.127 FifthCircuitCourtofAppealsReorganizationActof1980,P.L.96-452,94Stat.1994(1980).128 Bonnerv.CityofPrichard,Alabama,661F.2d1206,1207(11thCir.1981).129 Seegenerally,Marsh,651F.2dat983.130 SeeMarsh,721F.2dat782-83.131 721F.2d767(11thCir.1983).132 Id.at771.133 Id.at770.134 Id.135 Id.at771.136 Marsh,721F.2dat771.
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settlingthelawsuitthatfollowedHUD’sdecision,Almaagreedtoobtainasection404permitfromtheCorpsbeforeproceedingfurther.137
Aspartoftheprocesstoobtainthepermit,theCorpsheldapublichearing.138Thecourtnotedthatatthehearingopponentstotheproject“includednearlyallfederalagenciesinvolvedwithconservationandenvironmentalissues:theEPA;theExecutiveOfficeofthePresident,CouncilonEnvironmentalQuality(‘CEQ’);FWS;andtheBureauofOutdoorRecreation(‘BOR’)....”139Severalnon-governmentenvironmentalgroupsalsoopposedtheproject.140AlthoughtheDistrictEngineerrecommendeddenyingthepermit,theCorpscontinuedtoinvestigateit.141WhentheFWSissuedamitigationstudy,proposingthecreationof“greentreereservoirs”toamelioratethelossofsome1,400acresofswamp,theCorpseventuallyagreedtoissuethepermit,contingentonthemitigationplanbeingimplemented.142Afterseveralmorestudies,andanotherpublichearing,EPA,FWS,andBORwithdrewtheirobjectionstothepermitandthuswithdrewtheirobjectionstotheproject.143
TheNationalWildlifeFederation(NWF)thenfiledsuit,arguinginpart,thattheadoptionofthemitigationplanrequiredthepreparationofanSEIS.144TurningtoEnvironmental Defense Fund v. Marsh,theEleventhCircuitnoted:
‘[t]helegalstandardoftheneedforasupplementalEIS. . . iswhetherthepost-[originalEIS]changesinthe[project]willhavea‘significant’impactontheenvironmentthathasnotpreviouslybeencoveredbythe[original]EIS.’Ifa“significant”impactontheenvironmentwillresult,either“inqualitativeorquantitativeterms,”fromsubsequentprojectchanges,anSEISisrequired.145
Theproject’sproponentsarguedthataftertheextensivestudiesboththeCorpsandEPAagreedthemitigationplanwouldhavenonewadverseeffectontheenvironment.146However,thecourtwasunhappywiththatargument,notingthat“[n]eitheroftheseagenciesnortheAlmaofficialsfocusedonthedegreeofmitigation,thebeneficialimpact,oftheMitigationPlan.”147TheEleventhCircuitwasbound
137 Id.138 Id.at772.139 Marsh,721F.2dat772.140 Id.141 Id.142 Id.at772-73.143 Id.at773.144 Marsh,721F.2dat782.145 Id.(quotingMarsh,651F.2dat991).146 Marsh,721F.2dat782.147 Marsh,721F.2dat782.
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bybothFifthCircuitprecedentanditsownfromitsviewinEnvironmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, whenthecourt:
[M]adeclearthatevenifpost-EISchangesinaprojectarebenefi-cialtotheenvironmentorareintendedtomitigateenvironmentalimpact,ifthosechangesaresignificant,asupplementalstatementisrequired:“Theproperquestionisnottheintentbehindtheactions,butthesignificanceoftheenvironmentalimpacts.AndeveniftheCorpswascorrectindecidingthatthenewlandusewillbebenefi-cialinimpact,abeneficialimpactmustneverthelessbediscussedinanEIS,solongasitissignificant.NEPAisconcernedwithallsignificantenvironmentaleffects,notmerelyadverseones.”148
Unsurprisingly, theEleventhCircuit interpretedEnvironmental Defense Fund v. MarshthesamewaythattheappellantsinColiseum Squaredid,thatis,ifchangestotheEISresultinanewsignificantbeneficialimpact,thenanSEISisrequired.Accordingly,whentheEleventhCircuitconcludedthat“anumberofproposedprojectchanges. . .arelikelytohaveasignificant, thoughbeneficial,impactontheenvironment...,”wentontosay,that“[g]iventheplan’sdetailedproposalsformitigatinganyadverseenvironmentaleffectsresultingfromthecre-ationofLakeAlma,aswellastheroleoftheplaninallayingtheenvironmentalconcernsofallrelevantfederalagencies,weconcludethattheMitigationPlanwillhaveasignificantqualitativeenvironmentalimpact.”149Thecourtalsospoketothisconclusioninafootnotethatononehandtendstoilluminatetheirreasoning,andontheother,highlightstheproblemwithit.Footnote22reads:
WeemphasizethatwehavenoquarrelwiththeconclusionthattheGTRswillcausenoimpactonwaterquality.TheMitigationPlanwasintendedtomitigatetheeffectoftheprojectonwildlifeconsiderations.ItisthissignificantimpactthatwarrantsanSEIS.IftherewerenosignificantimpactfromtheplanitwouldnotqualifyasaMitigationPlanatall.WedefertothejudgmentoftheFWSandtheCorpsthatitisindeedaMitigationPlan.150
ItisindisputabletheEleventhCircuithasheldherethatbeneficialsignificantimpacts,whichwerenotdiscussedintheoriginalEIS,necessitateanSEIS.Thewaythecourtreachedthisconclusion,however,hasthreemajorproblems.First,theanalysisreliesonEnvironmental Defense Fund v. Marsh,whichwasbasedontheoutdatedandnolongervalidorapplicablereasoningfromHiram Clarke.Second,evenifacourtconcludedabeneficialsignificantimpactcouldtriggertheneedforanSEISoranEIS,itisproblematictoincludeamitigationplaninthatcategory.
148 Id.at782-83(emphasisinoriginal)(quotingMarsh,651F.2dat993).149 Marsh,721F.2dat784.150 Marsh,721F.2dat784n.22.
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ThiswillbediscussedingreaterdetailbelowwhenexaminingamitigatedFONSI.However,amitigationplan,bydefinition,isnotanindependentsignificanteffect.151Itisratheralessening,ormitigating,ofanotherwisepre-existingadverseeffect.MitigationhasbeenregularlyacceptedandevenencouragedbyCEQtominimizeimpactssuchthattheyfallbelowthethresholdofsignificance.152Thismitigationlessenspre-existingadverseimpactsthatotherwisewouldhavecreatedsignificantadverseeffectsandrequiredanEIS.
Third,definingmitigationasanindependentsignificanteffectwhichcantriggertheneedforanSEISprovidesaperverseincentiveforagenciestoavoidadoptingmitigationmeasuresoncetheirEIShasbeenfiled.GiventhattheU.S.SupremeCourthasheldanagencydoesnothavetohaveafullydevelopedmitiga-tionplantohaveacompleteEIS,itwouldbeinanagency’sbestinteresttoavoidmitigationwherepossibleaftertheEISisfiled.153Otherwise,anagencycouldfinditselfincourt,and/orhavingtostarttheformalEISprocessoverwithanSEIS,simplybecausetheymitigatedtheadverseeffectsoftheirproject.ThisperverseincentivetoavoidbeneficialeffectsisoneoftheproblemswithanyholdingwhichconcludesthatbeneficialimpactstriggertheneedforanEISorSEIS,astheresultscanactuallyruncontrarytothepurposeofNEPA.Includingmitigationasanindependenteffectonlyexacerbatestheproblem.
Finally,whileit ispossibletotryanddistinguishthiscaseasreferringonlytotherequirementforanSEIS,theargumentcannotbesupported.BecausetheEleventhCircuitreliedonthestandardexpressedinEnvironmental Defense Fund v. Marsh,itisthesamestandardforwhenanEISisrequired.154TheEleventhCircuithasquotedthatexactlanguageinothercases,notingasintheFifthCircuit,thestandardfordeterminingwhenanSEISisrequiredis“essentiallythesame”asthestandardfordeterminingwhenanEISisrequired.155Sincethecourtheldthatchangestotheprojectthatresultinasignificant,thoughbeneficial,impactrequireanSEIS,thesamewouldbetrueforanEIS.UnderNational Wildlife Federation,ifaprojecthasasignificantimpact,whetherbeneficialoradverse,anEISisrequired.
151 SeeinfraPartII.D.2.152 FinalGuidanceforFederalDepartmentsandAgenciesontheAppropriateUseofMitigationandMonitoringandClarifyingtheAppropriateUseofMitigatedFindingsofNoSignificantImpact,76Fed.Reg.3843-3853,3843(Jan.21,2011).153 SeeRobertsonv.MethowValleyCitizensCouncil,490U.S.332(1989)(courtheldNEPAdoesnotimposedutytoincludeafullydevelopedmitigationplanineachEIS).154 Marsh,721F.2dat782.155 Sierra Club,295F.3dat1215-16(quotingMarsh,651F.2dat993).
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4.TheSixthCircuit
In1995,theSixthCircuitalsoaddressedthequestionofthebeneficialimpactEIS.156ThiswasthefirsttimeacircuitcourtlookedspecificallyattheCEQregula-tionsandthedefinitionof“significantly”sincethenewregulationswerepublishedin1978.InFriends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Admin.,157theFarmersHomeAdministration(FmHA)fundedtheconstructionofareservoironBigFieryGizzardCreektoprovidedrinkingwaterforthetownofTracy,Tennessee.158SeveralsitesforareservoirhadbeenconsideredandthesiteselectedwasapprovedbyEPA,FWS,theCorps,theTennesseeValleyAuthority,thestateHistoricalCommission,andtheTennesseeDepartmentofEnvironmentandConservation.159FmHApreparedanenvironmentalassessmentandissuedafindingofnosignificantimpact,concludingthattheprojectwouldhavenoadverseimpacts.160Thelawsuitthatfollowedallegedthatsincetheprojectwouldhaveasignificantbeneficialenvironmentalimpact,anEISwasrequiredbeforetheprojectcouldgoforward.161
ItwasclearfromtherecordtheprojectwouldhaveabeneficialimpactontheresidentsofTracyCitybyprovidingthemwithanassuredsourceofcleanwater.162AndastheFifthandEleventhCircuitsconcluded,itispossibletoconstrueNEPAasincludingbeneficialimpactsastriggeringtheneedforanEIS.However,theSixthCircuitimmediatelynotedthat“[t]hestatute...mustbereadinlightoftheimplementingregulations.”163WhileNEPAitselfdoesnotprovideadefinitionforwhat“significantlyaffectingthequalityofthehumanenvironment”164mightmean,theCEQregulationsdoprovideadefinitionfor“significantly.”165Asnotedabove,thoseregulationsspecifythatwhetheranactionhasasignificanteffectsuchthatanEISmightberequiredturnsonanindividualassessmentofitscontextandintensity.166Thecourtreasoned:
Indeciding,onthebasisoftheassessment,whethertheproposedactionisoneaffectingthequalityoftheenvironment“signifi-cantly,”theagencymustlookatboththe“context”oftheactionandits“intensity.”40C.F.R.§1508.27(a)and(b).“Intensity,”§1508.27(b)explains,means“theseverityofimpact.”Thischoice
156 SeeFriends of Fiery Gizzard,61F.3dat502-03.157 61F.3d501(6thCir.1995).158 Id.at503.159 Id.160 Id.161 Id.at504(emphasisadded).162 Friends of Fiery Gizzard,61F.3dat504.163 Id.164 42U.S.C.4332(C).165 See40C.F.R.§1508.27.166 Id.
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ofadjectivesissignificant,wethink;onespeaksoftheseverityofadverseimpacts,notbeneficialimpacts.167
Lookingbeyondtheregulations,thecourtalsoaddressedthepurposeofNEPA:“OneofthecentralpurposesofNEPA,afterall,isto‘promoteeffortswhichwill . . .stimulatethehealthandwelfareofman.’42U.S.C.§4321.Timeandresourcesarenotunlimited,astheSupremeCourthasremindedus....”168Withthatinmind,thecourtfoundthat,“thehealthandwelfareoftheresidentsofTracyCitywillnotbe‘stimulated’bythedelaysandcostsassociatedwiththepreparationofanenvironmentalimpactstatementthatwouldnotevenarguablyberequiredwereitnotfortheproject’spositiveimpactonhealthandwelfare.”169
ThedirectionfromCEQinimplementingNEPAwasalsopersuasivetothecourt:“TheregulationsoftheCouncilonEnvironmentalQualitydirectfed-eralagencies‘tomaketheNEPAprocessmoreusefultodecisionmakersandthepublic,’notlessuseful;‘to reducepaperworkandtheaccumulationofextraneousbackgrounddata,’notexpandthem;and‘toemphasizerealenvironmentalissuesandalternatives’....”170Notingthatthiswasthereasontheenvironmentalassessmentprocesswascreatedinthefirstplace,thecourtstated,“[i]twouldbeanomaloustoconcludethatanenvironmentalimpactstatementisnecessitatedbyanassessmentwhichidentifiesbeneficialimpactswhileforecastingnosignificantadverseimpacts,whenthesameassessmentwouldnotrequirethepreparationofanimpactstatementiftheassessmentpredictednosignificantbeneficialeffect.”171
Quitesimply,thecourtrecognizedthatrequiringanEISforabeneficialimpactwouldprovidenobenefitsandwouldinfact,becontrarytothepurposeofNEPA.Withthisholding,theSixthCircuitprovidedanopinionthatwasbasedonthecurrentbindingimplementingregulations,whichareentitledtosubstantialdeference.172Indoingso,itreachedtheoppositeconclusionoftheEleventhCircuitandcreatedthecurrentsplitinthecircuits.However,theSixthCircuitalsoreachedthecorrectconclusion.
167 Friends of Fiery Gizzard,61F.3dat504(citing40C.F.R.§1508.27(emphasisadded)).168 Friends of Fiery Gizzard,61F.3dat505(citing42U.S.C.§4321(2012);Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460U.S. 766,776(1983);Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,435U.S.519,551(1978)).169 Friends of Fiery Gizzard,61F.3dat505. 170 Friends of Fiery Gizzard,61F.3dat505 (emphasisinoriginal)(quoting40C.F.R.§1500.2(b)(1995)).Thecurrentregulationreferencedbythecourtcanbefoundat40C.F.R.§1502(2012).171 Friends of Fiery Gizzard,61F.3dat505.172 SeeAndrus,442U.S.at357.
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5.OtherCases
TherearetwootherlinesofcasesthathavebeencitedasrequiringanEISforprojectswithbeneficialsignificantimpacts.ThefirstdealswithclaimsofexemptionfromtheNEPAprocessaltogether,suchascasesdealingwiththedesignationofcriticalhabitat.173AclaimofexemptionfromNEPAcomplianceisnotthesameasrequiringanEISforbeneficialsignificantimpacts.Thereisnoquestionthatinmostfederalactions,anagencymustdemonstrateNEPAcompliancebycompletinganEA,anEIS,ordocumentedrelianceonaCATEX.ThereisnocategoricalexemptionfromNEPAcomplianceforbeneficialimpacts,andtheagencymuststillutilizeoneoftheaboveapproaches.Accordingly,asotherliteraturehasdemonstrated,casesholdingthatanactivityisnotexemptfromNEPAcompliancecannotberelieduponforthepropositionthatasignificantbeneficialimpactrequiresthepreparationofanEIS.174
Thesecondlineofcasesariseswhenaprojecthassignificantimpactsthatarebothadverseandbeneficial,butoverall,willresultinanetbenefittotheenvironment.175CourtshaveheldthatanEISisstillrequiredfortheseprojectsandnotethatanargumentthatNEPAmaybeavoidedentirelybecausetheoverallimpactisbeneficialiscontrarytoCEQregulations.176TheCEQregulationsmakeclearthata“significanteffectmayexisteveniftheFederalagencybelievesthatonbalancetheeffectwillbebeneficial.”177Thishasalsobeenaddressedcompletelyinotherliterature,makingclearthatthislineofcasesdealswithactionsthatdohavesignificantadverseimpacts,thoughtheymayincludebeneficialeffectsaswell.178
B.StatutoryConstruction
Thelanguageinsection102ofNEPAisbroad,andcanbereadtorequireanEISforanysignificantimpact,includingbeneficialimpacts.ThetextcallingforanEISrequirestheagencyto:
(C)includeineveryrecommendationorreportonproposalsforlegislationandothermajorFederalactionssignificantlyaffectingthequalityofthehumanenvironment,adetailedstatementbytheresponsibleofficialon—
173 See, e.g.,DouglasCountyv.Babbit,48F.3d1495(9thCir.1995).174 See Goho,supra note72,at379-80(articleprovidesdiscussionofcasesclaiminganexemptionfromNEPAcomplianceandtheinsufficiencyofthisargumentforapplicationtobeneficialimpacts).175 See, e.g.,Envtl.Prot.Info.Ctr.v.Blackwell,389F.Supp.2d1174(N.D.Cal.2004).176 Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr.,F.Supp.2d.at1197.177 40C.F.R.§1508.27(2012).178 See Goho, supra note72,at380-81(emphasisadded).
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(i)theenvironmentalimpactoftheproposedaction,
(ii)anyadverseenvironmentaleffectswhichcannotbeavoidedshouldtheproposalbeimplemented....179
Therealquestioniswhatismeantby“significantlyaffecting”inthissection,anddoesthatincludebeneficialimpacts?Inlookingatthetworequirementscited,andattemptingtogiveeachoneanindependentmeaning,itwouldbeplausibletoconcludethatCongressintendedbeneficialimpactstobeincludedinthesubsection(i)requirementtoaddresstheenvironmentalimpact,sincesubsection(ii)specificallyaddressesadverseeffects.Yet,astheSupremeCourthasindicated,“[w]edonot,however,construestatutoryphrasesinisolation;wereadstatutesasawhole.”180Furthermore,when“...interpretingastatute,thecourtwillnotlookmerelytoaparticularclauseinwhichgeneralwordsmaybeused,butwilltakeinconnectionwithitthewholestatute...andtheobjectsandpolicyofthelaw....”181
Tothatend,itisimportanttolookatthepurposeofthestatute.In2009,PresidentBarackObamaindicatedthat“NEPAwasenactedtopromoteeffortsthatwillpreventoreliminatedamagetotheenvironment.. . .”182Thenin2011,thechairofCEQalsostatedthatNEPAwasenactedto“preventoreliminatedamagetotheenvironment.”183BothstatementsquotefromthecongressionallydeclaredpurposeofNEPA:
Todeclareanationalpolicywhichwillencourageproductiveandenjoyableharmonybetweenmanandhisenvironment;topromoteeffortswhichwillpreventoreliminatedamagetotheenvironmentandbiosphereandstimulatethehealthandwelfareofman;toenrichtheunderstandingoftheecologicalsystemsandnaturalresourcesimportanttotheNation;andtoestablishaCouncilonEnvironmentalQuality.184
AstheSixthCircuitconcluded,thispurposewouldbefrustratedbyaninterpreta-tionthatwouldrequireanagencytoexpendsubstantialtimeandmoneytoprepareanEISbeforegoingforwardwithaprojectthatwasalreadyinkeepingwiththedeclaredintenttoeliminatedamagetotheenvironmentandstimulatethehealthand
179 42U.S.C.§4332(C)(i)-(ii).180 UnitedStatesv.Morton,467U.S.822,828(1984)(citing,Stafford,444U.S.at535).181 Stafford,444U.S.at535(quotingBrownv.Duchesne,60U.S.183,194(1856)).182 ProclamationNo.8469,75Fed.Reg.885-886(Jan.7,2010).183 CouncilonEnvtl.Quality,MemorandumfromNancyH.Sutley,Chair,CouncilonEnvtl.Quality,toHeadsofFederalDepartmentsandAgenciesAppropriateUseofMitigationandMonitoringandClarifyingtheAppropriateUseofMitigatedFindingsofNoSignificantImpact,2(Jan.14,2011),available athttp://ceq.hss.doe.gov/current_developments/docs/Mitigation_and_Monitoring_Guidance_14Jan2011.pdf[hereinafterSutleyMemorandum].184 42U.S.C.§4321(2013).
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welfareofman.185SucharequirementwouldfrustrateNEPA’sdeclaredpurpose,asitwouldcreateanincentiveforagenciestoavoidactionsthatwould“eliminatedamagetotheenvironment.”186Worseyet,itcouldactuallypreventmanybeneficialactions,asitwouldmakethemtooexpensiveortootime-consumingtoimplement.
TheREPIprojectcitedinthebeginningofthisarticleillustrateshowread-ingNEPAtorequireanEISforbeneficialimpactsisactuallycontrarytoNEPA,whenreadasawhole.Aspointedoutabove,REPIfundsarenotunlimitedandthegoaloftheagencytocreateabuffercouldbemetbypurchasinglandandleavingituntouched.187Thereisnoneedtoengageinprojectsthatactuallyenhancetheenvironment.However,bydoingso,theagencynotonlymeetsthedeclaredpurposeofNEPAby“[encouraging]productiveharmonybetweenmanandhisenvironment...”and“[eliminating]damagetotheenvironment...,”188butalsomeetstheobjec-tivesofthedeclarednationalpolicyto“attainthewidestrangeofbeneficialusesoftheenvironmentwithoutdegradation...”andto“preserveimportant...naturalaspectsofournationalheritageandmaintain,whereverpossible,anenvironmentwhichsupportsdiversity....”189Finally,theprojectisalsoperfectlyinaccordwiththedeclarednationalpolicy“touseallpracticablemeansandmeasures,includingfinancialandtechnicalassistance,inamannercalculatedtofosterandpromotethegeneralwelfare,tocreateandmaintainconditionsunderwhichmanandnaturecanexistinproductiveharmony....”190
IfanEISwererequiredforthisproject,however,itisunlikelythatsufficientfundswouldbeavailabletoundertakeit.Certainly,fewerprojectsofthistypecouldbeexecuted.Mostlikely,theagencywouldsimplyavoidtheactionsthatenhancetheenvironmentsoastoavoidanysignificant,thoughbeneficial,effects.ItishardtoconcludethateliminatingprojectsthatactuallymeetthegoalsofNEPA,limitingtheirnumber,orevenprecludingtheirbeneficialenvironmentalimpactscouldbereadtobeinkeepingwiththepoliciesorpurposeoftheAct.
Accordingly,anotherpossible interpretationofsection102(C)is thatsubsection(i)simplyrequiresastatementoftheoverallenvironmentalimpacts,includingeffectsthatcouldbeavoidedwithappropriatemitigationorbychoosingenvironmentallyfriendlyalternatives.Subsection(ii)thenrequiresspecialatten-tionpaidtoanyunavoidableadverseeffects.Thishastheeffectofnecessitatingadiscussionofmitigationinidentifyingtheavoidableandunavoidableadverseeffects.Itdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthatthissectionrequiresbeneficialsignificantimpacts
185 Friends of Fiery Gizzard,61F.3dat505.186 42U.S.C.§4321(2013).187 See supra note22,at9.(commonusesofREPI)188 42U.S.C.§4321.189 Id.§4331(b).190 Id.§4331(a).
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totriggertheneedforanEIS.ThisinterpretationofNEPAappearstobetheoneembracedbyCEQ,withthecreationofthedistinctionbetweentheEAandtheEIS.
RecognizingthatNEPAisalsoenactedtoprovideinformationtothepublic,theEA,createdbyCEQregulations,canprovidethepublicwiththeoverallstate-mentoftheenvironmentalimpactofaproposedactionrequiredbySection102(C)(i),whentherearenosignificantadverseimpacts.191ItalsodemonstratesNEPAcompliance,documentingthelackofimpactssignificantlyaffectingthequalityofthehumanenvironment.ThemoredetailedEISwouldprovidespecialattentionandgreaterdetailforanyunavoidablesignificantadverseimpacts,asrequiredbysection102(C)(ii).192Whentherearenounavoidablesignificantadverseimpacts,itmakessensethatthedocumentwouldbeshorterandanEAwouldbeappropri-ate.CEQhasstressedtheimportanceofreducingpaperworkandfocusingonrealenvironmentalissues.193ThisinterpretationisfurthersupportedbytheacceptanceofamitigatedFONSI,whereotherwisesignificantimpactsaremitigatedtosomethinglessthansignificantandanEAhasbeenfoundtobeappropriate.194Itiscompel-lingthatCEQhasallowedalinetobedrawnbetweenanEAandtheneedforanEISbytheavoidance,ormitigation,ofadverseimpacts.195ThisfitsneatlyintotheinterpretationthatonlywhenthereareunavoidablesignificantadverseimpactsisthemoredetailedEISrequired.
TheproblemwiththisargumentisthatNEPAonlyrequiresanenviron-mentalstatementiftherearesignificantenvironmentalimpacts.Sothecounterar-gumentis,whywouldyouneedastatementatall,EAorotherwise,ifbeneficialimpactsarenotincludedinsignificantenvironmentaleffects,andtheprojectonlyresultedinsignificantbeneficialimpacts?Theanswer,andthereasonthatsuchacounterargumentfails, isfoundinthewaythatCEQhasinterpretedNEPA.UnderCEQregulations,nearlyallfederalactionsrequiresomedemonstrationofNEPAcompliance.AnactionmustfitaCATEXortheagencymustprepareeitheranEAorEIS.196Thisistrueevenforactionsthatanagencyknowswillnothaveasignificantenvironmentalimpactorevennoenvironmentalimpactatall.ThepurposesofNEPAarethusserved,inprovidinginformationtothepublic,anddemonstratingthatenvironmentaleffectshavebeenconsideredandtheactionwillnothavesignificantunavoidableadverseimpacts.
191 42U.S.C.§4332(C).192 42U.S.C.§4332(C).193 40C.F.R.§1502(2012).194 SeeFinalGuidanceforFederalDepartmentsandAgenciesontheAppropriateUseofMitigationandMonitoringandClarifyingtheAppropriateUseofMitigatedFindingsofNoSignificantImpact,76Fed.Reg.at3843.195 Id.196 40C.F.R.§1502.
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Intheend,findingthelineofsignificancebetweenanEAandanEISisaregulatorydistinctionandnotonebasedonstatutoryinterpretation,savethatitmayilluminatetheapproachCEQhastakentoimplementthestatute.Whiletheregulationsdosupporttheinterpretationthatbysimplyincludingsubsections(i)and(ii)in102(C),Congressdidnotautomaticallyintendforbeneficialimpactstoequatetowhatismeantby“significantlyaffectingthequalityofthehumanenvironment...,”197theydonotprovideadefinitiveanswer.Intheend,exactlywhatismeantby“significantlyaffecting”insection102isunclear.198Insuchacase,“[i]norderto‘give[theAct]suchaconstructionaswillcarryintoexecutionthewilloftheLegislature...accordingtoitstrueintentandmeaning’...weturntothelegislativehistory.”199
C.LegislativeHistory
TheHouseandtheSenatebothpresentedbillstoestablishanationalenvi-ronmentalpolicyandanexecutivecouncilforenvironmentalquality.200Theproposedpolicycontainedstronglanguage,directingtheuseofall“practicalmeansandmeasures,”tocomplywithitsdirectives.201However,therewasstillafearthatapolicyalonewouldnotbeenough.202SenatorHenry“Scoop”Jackson,thechairmanoftheSenateInteriorandInsularAffairsCommittee,relatedhisfears:
Ihavebeenconcernedwiththeinadequacyofthepolicydeclara-tioninthebillIhaveintroduced.Obviously,thisisnotenough...[W]hatisneededinrestructuringthegovernmentalsideoftheprob-lemistolegislativelycreatethosesituationsthatwillbringaboutanactionforcingprocedurethedepartmentsmustcomplywith.Otherwise,theseloftydeclarationsarenothingmorethanthat.203
Accordingly,thecommittee’sviewwasthattoensureagenciesembracedthenewenvironmentalpolicy,anylegislationneededtoincludeaction-forcingprocedures.204Withthatinmind,thecommitteereportexplained:
Toremedypresentshortcomingsinthelegislativefoundationsofexistingprograms,andtoestablishaction-forcingprocedureswhichwillhelptoensurethatthepoliciesenunciatedinsection
197 42U.S.C.§4332(C).198 Id.199 Stafford,444U.S.at535(quotingBrown,60U.S.at194(citationomitted).200 Luther,supra note27,at2-3.201 S.Rep.No.91-296,at1-2.202 See Ferloet Al.,supranote3,at2.203 Luther,supra note27,at1(quotingHearing on S.1075 and S. 1752 Before the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91stCong.116(1969)(statementofSen.HenryJackson,Chairman,S.CommitteeonInteriorandInsularAffairs)).204 S.Rep.No.91-296,at19.
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101areimplemented,section102authorizesanddirectsthattheexistingbodyofFederallaw,regulation,andpolicybeinterpretedandadministeredtothefullestextentpossibleinaccordancewiththepoliciessetforthinthisAct.205
TheSenatecommitteereportdoesnotspecificallyaddresswhatismeantby“sig-nificantlyaffectingthequalityofthehumanenvironment,”however,itistheonlycongressionalreportthatspeakstotheactionforcingprovisionsinSection102andprovidesthebestinsightintotheintentofthisprovision.206
Thetextofsection102intheSenateversionofNEPA,S.1075,wasslightlydifferentthanwhatultimatelymadeitswaytothePresidentandthesedifferencesexplainwhatisactuallymeantinsubsections(i)and(ii).207Table1highlightsthosedifferences.
Table1Section 102 (C) S. 1075 Section 102 (C) of the final NEPA
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a finding by the responsible official that —
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on —
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action has been studied and considered;
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided by following reasonable alternatives are justified by other stated considerations of national policy;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) local short-term uses of man’s environment are consistent with maintaining and enhancing long-term productivity; and that
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources are warranted.205
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.206
205 Id.at19-20.206 Ferloet Al.,supranote3,at2.207 S.Rep.No.91-296,at2.
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Despitethedifferences,ifthegeneralintentoftheprovisionremainsthesameinwhatwasultimatelypassed,asitwasintheSenatebill,anargumentthatbeneficialeffectsweremeanttobeincludedintherequirementforanEISmakeslittlesense.Theoriginallanguagecallsforacertification,andrequiresastudyoftheoverallenvironmentalimpact,withspecialattentionpaidto,andjustificationfor,unavoidableadverseconsequences.Intheversionthatwasultimatelysignedintolaw,therequirementtodiscussalternativeswasgivenadditionalemphasis.Thisisweakerthanarequiredcertificationandjustificationforunavoidableconse-quences,butstillrequiresfederalagenciestoconsiderhowtoavoidadverseeffects.Somealternativeswillobviouslyhaveanadverseenvironmentalimpactthatcan beavoided.Thesewouldstillbediscussedundersubsection(i).Subsection(ii),however,callsforspecialattentionforanyadverseimpactsthatcannotbeavoidedunderany alternativeandtrackswithsubsection(ii)oftheoriginallanguage.Theintentofboththedraftandfinalprovisionistoensurethatthegovernmenttakesstepstoavoidadverseconsequenceswheneverpossible.
Themaindifferencesbetweensubsections(i)and(ii)intheSenatebillandthelawthatwasultimatelypassedappearstobetheseparationoftherequirementtoaddressalternativestotheaction,andthedeletionofarequirementforanactualfindingthatadverseeffectsarejustifiedinlightofotherpolicyconcerns.Thesearesignificantdifferences,ashadS.1075passedinitsoriginalform,NEPAmaynothavebeenonlyaproceduralstatute,butcouldhaveactuallycalledforspecificenvironmentalresults.However,theoriginalwordingisstillverysuggestiveoftheintentofthefinalprovisions.
Thesection-by-sectionanalysisinthereportprovidesfurtherillumination.SubsectionCwasintendedtorequireactualfindingsbytheresponsibleofficialwithregardtomajorfederalactionssignificantlyaffectingthequalityofthehumanenvironment.210Thefindinginsubsection(i)wasintendedtobe“thattheenviron-mentalimpactoftheproposedactionhasbeenstudiedandthattheresultsofthestudieshavebeengivenconsiderationinthedecisionsleadingtotheproposal.”211Thisgenerallyjustexpressestheneedtoconsiderenvironmentalimpactsinagencydecisionmaking.Thefindinginsubsection(ii)wasintendedtobemoredramatic,beingthat:
Whereveradverseenvironmentaleffectsarefoundtobeinvolved,afindingmustbemadethatthoseeffectscannotbeavoidedbyfollowingreasonablealternativeswhichwillachievetheintendedpurposesoftheproposal.Furthermore,afindingmustbemadethattheactionleadingtotheadverseenvironmentaleffectsisjustified
208 Id.209 42U.S.C.§4332(C).210 S.Rep.No91-296,at20.211 Id.
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byotherconsiderationsofnationalpolicyandthoseotherconsid-erationsmustbestatedinthefinding.212
Asnotedabove,hadtheprovisionbeenenactedasoriginallywritteninS.1075,itwouldhavecreatedastatutethatdirectedsubstantiveresultsorafindingthatenvironmentalqualitywasoutweighedbyotherconsiderations.ThechangesseemtoindicatethatCongresswasnotcomfortablewithforcingthat levelofsubstantiverequirementonfederalagencies.Intakingouttheprovision, theremayhavebeenacompromise.Theproposedlanguagerequiredafindingthattheadverseeffectscouldnotbeavoidedbyreasonablealternativesandthattheeffectswerejustified.Theenactedlegislationinsteadbroketheprocessdown,callingforthediscussionofenvironmentalimpactsforallalternatives,andhighlightingtheadverseimpactsthatcouldnotbeavoidedunderanyalternative.Thisdoestwothings.Ithighlightstheneedforalternativesthatavoidadverseimpactswherepossibleandnecessitatesadiscussionofmitigation.
Lookingattheoriginaldraftof102(C),theinclusionofasectionrequiringadiscussionofover-allimpactsandadiscussionofwhyadverseimpactscannotavoidedisharmoniousandmakesperfectsense.Thetwoprovisionshavenothingtodowithrequiringthediscussionofbeneficialimpactsandeachhasitsowndistinctpurpose.Whiletheredraftedversionislessclear,theoriginalintentoftheprovisionsremainsthesame—toaddresstheoverallenvironmentalimpactsforallalternatives,withspecialattentionpaidtounavoidableadverseimpactsunderanyalternative.Byhighlightingtheneedtodiscussreasonablealternatives,Congresshasensuredthatwhiletheremaynotbeasubstantivemandate,atleasttheagencywillknowwhichalternativepresentsthebestenvironmentaloutcome.Thegeneralpurposeofthebills,asexpressedinthelegislativehistory,supportsthisinterpretation.Thereisnothingtosuggestthatinchangingtheprovisions,Congressintendedbeneficialimpactstobeincludedin“significantlyaffecting.”
ThediscussionofthepurposesofboththeSenateandHousebillsbothfocusonhaltingenvironmentaldegradationandsolvingcurrentandfutureenvironmentalproblems.TheHousebill,H.R.12549,calledfortheformationofanexecutivecouncilandwouldhaveaddedanenvironmentalpolicytoexistingstatutes.213Intheveryfirstparagraphofthereport,Congressdeclaredthatthepurposeofthebillwas“tocreateacouncilthatcanadvisethePresident,CongressandtheAmericanpeople...onstepswhichmayandshouldbetakentoimprovethequalityoftheenvironment.”214TheHouseCommitteefeltthat“[a]nindependentreviewoftheinterrelatedproblemsassociatedwithenvironmentalqualityisofcriticalimpor-
212 Id.213 SeeH.R.Rep.No.91-378(1969).214 Id.at115.
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tanceifwearetoreversewhatseemstobeaclearandintensifyingtrendtowardenvironmentaldegradation.”215
TheHousebill,inadditiontothecreationofthecouncil,calledforapolicysectionthatwould,“recognizetheimpactofman’sactivitiesuponhisenvironmentandthecriticalimportanceofmakingthatimpactlessadversetohiswelfare.”216Thus,whiletheHouseversionofthebillwaslimitedtothecreationofCEQandadeclarationofpolicy,itstillattemptedtofindwaystohaltenvironmentaldegrada-tionandsolvethepressingenvironmentalproblemsoftheday,asillustratedbythecommittee’suseofaquotefromtheNewYorkTimes:
Byland,sea,andair, theenemiesofman’ssurvivalrelentlesslypresstheirattack.Themostdangerousofalltheseenemiesisman’sownundirectedtechnology.Theradioactivepoisonsfromnucleartests,therunoffintoriversofnitrogenfertilizers,thesmogfromautomobiles,thepesticidesinthefoodchains,andthedestructionoftopsoilbystripminingareexamplesofthefailuretoforeseeandcontroltheuntowardconsequencesofmoderntechnology.217
TheSenatebillwasalsoclearlyfocusedonhaltingenvironmentaldeg-radation.Thecommitteebegan:“ItistheunanimousviewofthemembersoftheInteriorandInsularAffairsCommitteethatourNation’spresentstateofknowledge,ourestablishedpublicpolicies,andourexistinggovernmentalinstitutionsarenotadequatetodealwiththegrowingenvironmentalproblemsandcrisesthenationfaces.”218Thereportthencataloguesalonglistofenvironmentalproblemsdemon-stratingtheenvironmentalfailuresofthenation,including“thelossofvaluableopenspace;inconsistentand,often,incoherentruralandurbanland-usepolicies;criticalairandwaterpollutionproblems;diminishingrecreationalopportunity;continuingsoilerosion;needlessdeforestation;thedeclineandextinctionoffishandwildlifespecies;...andmany,manyotherenvironmentalqualityproblems.”219Thus,thecommitteedeclaredthat“[t]hepurposeofS.1075is,therefore,toestablishanationalpolicydesignedtocopewithenvironmentalcrisis,whetherpresentorimpending.”220
Toaddressthischallenge,thecommitteeindicatedNEPAwouldcontributetobetterfederalresponsetoenvironmentaldecision-makinginfiveways.221Thesefivebenefitsare:clarifyingthatagenciesdohaveauthoritytoconsiderenviron-mentalfactorsinmakingdecisions;theinclusionofbroadnationalenvironmental
215 H.R.Rep.No.91-378,at117.216 Id.at123.217 H.R.Rep.No.91-378,at117(quotingaNew York Times editorial).218 S.RepNo.91-296,at4.219 Id.220 Id.at9.221 Id.
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goalsandanaction-forcingprovision;authoritytoconductenvironmentalstudiesandsurveys;theestablishmentofCEQ;andtherequirementthatCEQprovideanannualenvironmentalreport.222Onlytwostatementshowever,directlybearonthisdiscussion.Thecommitteeindicatedthattheaction-forcingprovision,therequirementtoproduceanEIS,was“designedtoassurethatallFederalagenciesplanandworktowardmeetingthechallengeofabetterenvironment.”223Theverynextsentence,whileaddressingaseparatefactor,isevenmoreilluminating:“Oneofthemajorfactorscontributingtoenvironmentalabuseanddeteriorationisthatactions—oftenactionshavingirreversibleconsequences—areundertakenwithoutadequateconsiderationof,orknowledgeabout,theirimpactontheenvironment.”224
Thesetwosentencesdescribeoneof thetworecognizedpurposesforproducinganEIS—toprovideagencieswithenoughinformationtoadequatelyconsiderenvironmentalaffectsinmakingdecisions.Itistellingthatthesesectionsbothindicatethattheactionforcingprovision,orEIS,isgearedtoforcingagenciesto“worktowardabetterenvironment...”andhalting“environmentalabuseanddeterioration...”225Thereisnothinginthese“fivemajorways”inwhichNEPAwill improveagencydecision-makingthat indicates theactionforcingprovi-sionofNEPAwasmeanttoapplytoactionsthathadnoadverseimpactontheenvironment.226Quitethecontrary,thecommitteereportindicatesthatNEPAwasintendedtohelpthegovernmentplanandworktowardabetterenvironment,andforceagenciestoconsiderenvironmentalimpactsbeforetakingactionsthatwouldhaveunavoidableadverseeffects.Thefocusinbothcommitteereportsremainsonavoidingorminimizingenvironmentaldegradation.AnyinterpretationofNEPAthatwouldfrustratethatgoaliscontrarytothecollectivecommittees’declaredpurposeoftheact.
AnargumentcanbemadethatanEISforbeneficialimpactsisnecessarytosatisfytheotherrecognizedpurposeofproducinganEIS—toadequatelyinformandinvolvethepublicinagencydecision-making.TheSenateCommitteereportindicatedthat“[a]primarypurposeofthebillistorestorepublicconfidenceintheFederalGovernment’scapacitytoachieveimportantpublicpurposesandobjectivesandatthesametimetomaintainandenhancethequalityoftheenvironment.”227YetevenwiththisdeclaredpurposebytheSenate,therequirementforpublicparticipa-tionintheNEPAprocessisalmostnon-existentinthelanguageofthestatuteitself.Thecurrentrequirementforpublicparticipationisbasedinsteadalmostentirelyinregulation.Itispossiblethatthisstatementinthereport,quotedabove,didnotindicateadesiretoinvolvethepublictotheextenttheregulationsultimatelydid.Yet
222 Id.at9-10.223 Id.at9.224 S.RepNo.91-296,at9.225 Id.226 Id.227 Id.at8.
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publicparticipationisconsistentwiththelegislativehistoryandhasbeenrecognizedbythecourtsasoneofthetwopurposesofNEPA.228
Whilelimitedsupportforrequiringpublicparticipationcanbefoundin
NEPA’spolicystatement,“itisthecontinuingpolicyoftheFederalGovernment,incooperationwithStateandlocalgovernments,andotherconcernedpublicandprivateorganizations...,”229Section102requiresagencies,“makeavailabletoStates,counties,municipalities,institutions,andindividuals,adviceandinformationusefulinrestoring,maintaining,andenhancingthequalityoftheenvironment.”230However,theexplicitrequirementforpublicparticipationisfoundinCEQ’simple-mentingregulations.231Whilethelegislativehistoryindicatesadesiretoinvolvethepublicinenvironmentalagencydecisionmaking,anyargumentthatanEISforbeneficialimpactsisnecessarytomeetthispurpose,muststillinevitablyturnontheregulationspromulgatedbyCEQ.
Theseregulationsprovideanelegantsolution,ensuringthatthissecondprimarypurposeofNEPAismetevenwhentherearenosignificanteffectsonthequalityoftheenvironment.Inmostcases,theagencymuststillprepareanEAthatwillbeavailabletointerestedpartiesandthepublic.232WhiletherequirementforpublicparticipationinthedraftingofanEAisnotasextensiveasthatrequiredforanEIS,itisstillsufficient,giventhelowerrisktotheenvironmentofaprojectthathasnosignificantenvironmentalimpacts.TheEAthussatisfiesNEPA’spurposeofinvolvingandinformingthepublic,withouttheexpenseanddelayofanEIS.Tofullyexplorethisargument,itisnecessarytoturntothesourceofthespecificrequirement,theregulationspromulgatedbyCEQ.
D.CEQRegulations
In1978,CEQpromulgatedregulationsforimplementingtheproceduralaspectsofNEPA.233Theseregulationshaveremainedalmostentirelyunchangedfornearly35years.The1971regulationsoperatedasmereguidanceforfederalagencies,whichasnotedabove,didnotresultinauniformapproachtothestatute.234The1978regulations,however,werebindingonallfederalagenciesandhavebeenheldtobeentitledtosubstantialdeferencebythecourts.235
228 SeeBaltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,462U.S.at97.229 42U.S.C.§4331.230 Id.§4332(G).231 See40C.F.R§1503.232 See40C.F.R.§1501.233 ImplementationofProceduralProvisionsofNEPA,43Fed.Reg.55,978-55,990(Nov.29,1978).234 SeeStatementsonProposedFederalActionsAffectingtheEnvironment,36Fed.Reg.7724-7729(Apr.23,1971).235 SeeAndrus,442U.S.at357.
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1.DefiningSignificantEffectsontheEnvironment
Whiletheregulationsdonotprovideabright-lineruleastowhatmightbeconsideredasignificantimpactontheenvironment,thedefinitionsweresubstantiallyexpandedandincludeafairlydetaileddefinitionof“significantly,”aswellasahelpfuldefinitionofeffects.236Infirstreadingthestatute,itmightseemthattherewouldbesomedisagreementastowhatqualifiesasamajoractionforpurposesofsignificantlyaffectingtheenvironment.However,CEQhasstatedthat,“Major,”asdefinedbytheregulationsaspartofamajorfederalaction,“reinforcesbutdoesnothaveameaningindependentofsignificantly.”237Therefore,indeterminingwhatactionsrequireanEIS,thekeyisnotwhethertheactionisamajorone,butwhethertheactionwouldhaveasignificanteffectonthequalityofthehumanenvironment.
AsnotedinthediscussionofFriends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Admin.,theterm“significantly”isnotgivenasimpledefinitionintheregulations.238Instead,guidelinesareprovidedtohelpdeterminewhenanactionhassignificanteffects.Determiningifaneffectmightbesignificantrequires“considerationofbothcontextandintensity.”239Contextmeansthatthe“significanceoftheactionmustbeanalyzedinseveralcontextssuchassocietyasawhole(human,national),theaffectedregion,theaffectedinterests,andthelocality.Significancecanvarywiththesettingoftheproposedaction.”240Inotherwords,ifalltheenvironmentaleffectsarelimitedtoonesmallgeographicarea,suchastheconstructionofapark-inglot,significancemustbeanalyzedinthecontextofthatlocalgeographicarea.Conversely,iftheeffectsarefeltacrossthenationasawhole,suchastheproposedadoptionofanewgovernmentalprogramorstandard,significancemustbeanalyzedinthecontextofhowitwillaffecttheentirenation.
Intensity,asit isdefinedintheregulation,“referstotheseverityoftheimpact.”241Inordertodeterminetheintensityofaneffect,theregulationprovidesalistoftenfactorsforanagencytoconsider.242Mostofthesefactorsarestraight-forward:thedegreeofrisktotheenvironment;the“degreetowhichtheactionaffectspublichealthorsafety;”theproximityoftheactiontounique,protectedorculturallysignificantgeographicareas;andthedegreetowhichtheactionmightaffectathreatenedorendangeredspecies.243Alloftheserepresentadverseeffects
236 40C.F.R.§1508(2012).237 40C.F.R.§1508.18.238 SeeFriends of Fiery Gizzard,61F.3dat504(citing40C.F.R.§1508.27).239 40C.F.R.§1508.27.240 Id.241 40C.F.R.§1508.27.ThislanguagewasparticularlypersuasivetotheSixthCircuit,asitconcludedthat“onespeaksoftheseverityofadverse impacts,notbeneficial impacts.”Friends of Fiery Gizzard,61F.3dat504(emphasisinoriginal).242 40C.F.R.§1508.27.243 Id.
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whereanalyzingtheseverityoftheimpactmakessense.However,twoofthefactorsaredifferent.Onerequirestheagencytoconsiderwhethertheactionisconnectedtootheractionswhichcumulativelymighthaveasignificantimpact.244Thispreventsagenciesfromavoidingthoroughenvironmentalanalysisbybreakingprojectsintomultiplepartsthatindividuallydonothaveasignificantimpactontheenviron-ment.Theremainingfactoristheonethatpresentstheconfusion.Thisfactorstatesthatwhenevaluatingintensity,agenciesmustconsider“Impactsthatmaybebothbeneficialandadverse.AsignificanteffectmayexisteveniftheFederalagencybelievesthatonbalancetheeffectwillbebeneficial.”245
Aplausibleinterpretationofthisisthatbeneficialimpactscouldbesig-nificant.Readinisolation,thatisreasonable.But,thereisoneotherdefinitionthatalsomentionsbeneficialeffects—thedefinitionof“effects.”Itisimportanttonotethatintheregulations,theterm“effects”andtheterm“impacts”aresynonymousandusedinterchangeably.246Theverylastsentenceinthedefinitionofeffectsprovides:“Effectsmayalsoincludethoseresultingfromactionswhichmayhavebothbeneficialanddetrimentaleffects,evenifonbalancetheagencybelievesthattheeffectwillbebeneficial.”247Thissectionwhenreadliterally,impliesthatinordertohaveanything thatwouldqualifyasabeneficialeffect underNEPA,itmustfirstbepartofanactionthathasboth beneficialanddetrimentaleffects.Ifthatisthecase,thenwithoutanadverseimpact,weneverreachthestageofanalyzingtheeffect’sintensityorsignificance.Itistellingthatnowhereintheregulationsdoestheterm“beneficialeffects”everappearindependentofsomeadverseeffectinthesameaction.ThisinterpretationisalsosupportedbyCEQguidancedocuments.
InaguideforaligningNEPAwithEnvironmentalManagementSystems(EMS),CEQdescribedtheNEPAprocessinpartas“...forecastingtheimpactsofaproposedactionandreasonablealternatives,andidentifyingmitigationmeasuresforthoseimpactspriortomakingdecisionsandtakingaction(‘predict-mitigate-implement”model.’)”248ThisexplanationofNEPApresupposesanyanalysisofimpactsmustincludeadverseimpacts.ItissignificantthatinnoNEPAregulation,CEQguidance,CEQmemorandum,orpolicydocumentdoesCEQeverindicatethatbeneficialeffectsmustbeanalyzedforsignificance,independentofadverseeffects.Nowherearebeneficialeffectsevendiscussed,absentsomeadverseeffectinthesameaction.
ThemostconvincingsupportforthepropositionthateffectsonlyincludethoseactionswithadverseimpactscanbefoundintheCEQguidelinesthatpredate
244 Id.245 Id.246 40C.F.R.§1508.8.247 Id.248 CEQ,AlIgnIngNAtIonAlEnvIronMentAlPolIcyActProcesswIthEnvIronMentAlMAnAgeMent SysteMs, AGuIde ForNEPAAndEMSPrActItIoners2(2007).
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thecurrentregulations.Thedefinitionsof“effect”and“intensity”inthediscussionofbothbeneficialandadverseimpactsinthe1978regulationshaveverysimilarlanguage.Bothappeartobedrawnfromlanguagethatexistedinthe1973CEQguidance.249Justlikethe1978considerationofintensity,the1973guidancealsoprovidedalonglistofthingstoconsiderinevaluatingthesignificanceofanimpactontheenvironment.250Oneofthosethingstoconsiderindeterminingthesignificanceofaneffectwasthat“Significanteffectscanalsoincludeactionswhichmayhavebothbeneficialanddetrimentaleffects,evenifonbalancetheagencybelievesthattheeffectwillbebeneficial.”251
Thiswordingisslightlydifferentthanthe1978regulations,buttheintentappearstobethesame.Inthisversionitisclearerthattohaveasignificanteffect,theremustbeboth adverseandbeneficialeffects.Tofurtheremphasizethispoint,towardthelatterendofsection1500.6,CEQexplainswhatisrequiredforanactiontosignificantlyaffecttheenvironment:“Finally,theactionmustbeonethatsignificantlyaffectsthequalityofthehumanenvironmenteitherbydirectlyaffectinghumanbeingsorbyindirectlyaffectinghumanbeingsthroughadverseeffectsontheenvironment.”252Here,CEQhasexplicitlystatedthatforanimpacttobesignificant,itmustbeanadverseeffect.
Thislanguagedoesnotexistinthe1978regulations,butthereasonitwasremovedwasnotbecauseCEQintendedforbeneficialeffectstoresultinthekindofsignificantimpactthatwouldtriggeranEIS.Rather,thefocusoftheimpactontheenvironmentthatwastobeanalyzedchangedsomewhat.Asonecanseeinadditionstothefactorsinevaluatingintensityinthe1978regulations,itisnotjusttheeffectonhumanbeingsthatmustbeconsidered.Agenciesnowmustalsoconsidereffectstoendangeredspeciesanduniqueorscenicgeographicareas.253Yetevenwiththischangeoffocus,itwould,ofcourse,stillhavebeenpossibleforCEQtoleaveinlanguagethatexpresslystatedthatimpactsmustbeadversetobesignificant.
Sowhythen,wasthelanguagefrom1973regulationsthatexpresslyindi-catedanimpactmustbeadversetorisetothelevelofsignificantlyaffectingtheenvironment,absentfromthe1978regulations?Itisimpossibletosayforsure,butagain,thissimplyisnotanissuethatarisesfrequently,andwasprobablynotapriorityinthemindsofthecouncilwhenworkingontheregulations.Afterall,theproceduralprovisionsthattheseregulationsaddresswerecreatedtoforcethegovernmenttakeabetterenvironmentalapproachwithlessenvironmentaldamage.MostofthestatementsfromCEQdiscussingtheregulationspresupposeanadverseenvironmentalimpact.NeitherCEQnorthedraftersofthelegislationlikelyput
249 SeePreparationofEnvironmentalImpactStatements:Guidelines,38Fed.Reg.at20,551-52.250 Id.251 Id.252 Id.253 40C.F.R.§1508.27.
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muchthoughtintohowtoaccountforgovernmentactionsthatbenefittheenviron-ment,otherthantoencouragethem.Still,theintentthatonlyactionswithadverseeffectsrisetothelevelofsignificanceremainsdemonstratedinthepurposesoftheact,thepurposeoftheregulations,andthewaythatCEQhasinterpretedtheactandregulationsinthelast35years.
2.PurposeoftheRegulationsandCEQ’sInterpretation
Thepreambletotheregulationsin1978setoutthefollowingpurpose;“Weexpectthenewregulationstoaccomplishthreeprincipleaims:Toreducepaperwork,toreducedelays,andatthesametimetoproducebetterdecisionswhichfurtherthenationalpolicytoprotectandenhancethequalityofthehumanenvironment.”254NogoodargumentcanbeadvancedthatrequiringanEISforbeneficialimpactsreducespaperworkordelays.Bothofthesepurposesinfact,suggestthatnoEISshouldberequiredwhentherearenoadverseimpacts.
CEQstatedthattoreducepaperwork,“[t]heenvironmentalanalysisistoconcentrateonalternatives,whicharetheheartoftheprocess....”255Asdiscussedaboveinthelegislativehistory,theseparaterequirementforadiscussionofalterna-tiveswasintendedtofocusattentiononwaystoavoidadverseeffectsandensureagencieswereawarewhichalternativeproducedtheleastadverseimpacts.Inkeep-ingwiththat,CEQstatedthe“recordofdecisionmustindicatewhichalternative(oralternatives)consideredintheEISispreferableonenvironmentalgrounds.”256Thisrequirementneatlycapturestheintentofthealternativesdiscussioninthelegislativehistory—thatoffindingthealternativethatavoidsthegreatestadverseenvironmentalimpacts.PreparinganEISwhentherearenoadverseimpactstotrytoavoidmakeslittlesenseandinnowayreducespaperwork.Asmentionedabove,thispurposecanbestaccomplishedbyanEA.
CEQindicatedthattoreducedelays,“Ifanactionhasnotbeencategoricallyexcluded...butneverthelesswillnotsignificantlyaffectthehumanenvironment,theagencywillissueafindingofnosignificantimpactasabasisfornotpreparinganEIS.”257TheregulationsprovidethatthediscussionofimpactsinanEISshouldbelimitedtowhatisnecessary:“Asinafindingofnosignificantimpact,thereshouldbeonlyenoughdiscussiontoshowwhymorestudyisnotwarranted.”258Ifnoalternativesproduceasignificantadverseimpactontheenvironment,itisveryhardtojustifytheadditionalstudythatanEISwouldprovide.
254 ImplementationoftheProceduralProvisionsofNEPA,43Fed.Reg.55,978-55,990,55,978(Nov.29,1978).255 Id.at55,978.256 Id.at55,980.257 ImplementationoftheProceduralProvisionsofNEPA,43Fed.Reg.at55,979.258 40C.F.R.§1502.2.
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AnargumentcanberaisedthatanEISisneededtoaccomplishthethirdpurpose,thatofmakingbetterdecisions,buttheargumentisnotwellsupported.IfalternativesaretheheartoftheEISprocess,asquotedabove,thentheargumentwouldbethatanEISisneededtoprovidealternativesthatwillallowthedecision-makertoidentifythecourseofactionmostbeneficialtotheenvironment.Yetthisargumentfails,asanEAaccomplishesthesamething,inashorterformat.TheEAstillmustdiscussalternativesandtheirimpactsontheenvironment.259Ifonealternativeismorebeneficialthananother,thatwillstillberevealedandcanstillberelieduponinmakingdecisions.Indeed,viewedinlightofthepurposesofboththestatuteandtheregulations,onceitisdemonstratedthattherearenoadverseimpacts,nomorestudyiswarranted.ThisappearstobeCEQ’sinterpretationaswell,asdemonstratedbytheconceptofamitigatedFONSI.
CEQhasdiscussedthemitigatedFONSIseveraltimes.ThebasicconceptisthataFONSIcanbeissuedevenifanactionwouldhaveasignificantimpactontheenvironmentifthatimpactismitigatedaspartoftheproposalsothattheultimateimpactislessthansignificant.260LaterguidancefromCEQissuggestiveofnotjustwhatisexpectedofmitigatedFONSIs,butalsowhenanEAisappropriateingeneral.Asnotedabove,indiscussingtheappropriateuseofmitigationandmitigatedFONSIstheChairofCEQnotedthat“NEPAwasenactedtopromoteeffortsthatwillpreventoreliminatedamagetotheenvironment.”261ThemitigatedFONSIdoesthatbyencouragingagenciesto“[commit]tomitigatesignificantenvironmentalimpacts,sothatamoredetailedEISisnotrequired.”262
CEQandtheCaliforniaGovernor’sOfficerecentlyreleasedahandbookforintegratingstateandfederalenvironmentalreview,whichexplainedtheNEPApro-cessforamitigatedFONSI:“Ifthepotentiallysignificantimpactscanbemitigatedtoapointwhereclearlynosignificanteffectswouldoccur,thentheleadagencymayprepareaFindingofNoSignificantImpact....”263Thislanguagepresupposesthatanysignificanteffectisbynature,adverse.TheCaliforniaEnvironmentalQualityAct(CEQA)processwasalsoexplained:“Iftheprojectwillnothaveanyadverseimpacts,orsuchimpactscanbemitigatedtoapointwhereclearlynosignificanteffectswouldoccur,theleadagencymayadoptaNegativeDeclaration....”264
259 40C.F.R.§1508.9.260 SeeFortyMostAskedQuestionsRegardingCEQ’sNationalEnvironmentalPolicyActRegulations,46Fed.Reg.18,026-18,038,18,038(Mar.23,1981).261 SutleyMemorandum,supra note180,at2.262 FinalGuidanceforFederalDepartmentsandAgenciesontheAppropriateUseofMitigationandMonitoringandClarifyingtheAppropriateUseofMitigatedFindingsofNoSignificantImpact,76Fed.Reg.at3843.263 CEQandtheCaliforniaGovernor’sOfficeofPlanning,NEPAandCEQA:IntegratingStateandFederalEnvironmentalReviews,12(Draft for Public Review and Comment)(March2013)[hereinafterCaliforniaGovernor’sOfficeNEPAReport].264 CaliforniaGovernor’sOfficeNEPAReport,supra note260,at13.ANegativeDeclarationisroughlytheCaliforniaequivalentofaFONSI.
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Thislanguagespecificallyspellsoutthatasignificanteffectmustbeadverse,anditistellingthatCEQandtheGovernor’sofficethenconclude,“NEPAandCEQAlargelydictatethesameprocessfordeterminingtheneedforanEISorEIR.”265
Infact,whenhighlightingthedifferencesbetweenthetwoprocesses,thehandbooknotedthat:
Thereissomedivergencebetweenthelawsinthestandardfordeterminingsignificance.UnderCEQA,anEIRisrequiredifsub-stantialevidencesupportsafair argument thataprojectmay haveasignificantimpact,evenifothersubstantialevidenceindicatesthattheimpactwillnotbesignificant.UnderNEPA,moredeferenceisgiventotheagency’sdeterminationbasedonitsassessmentofthecontextandintensityofthepotentialimpacts(40CFR§1508.27),wherethatdeterminationisdemonstratedintheNEPAdocumentandsupportedbytheadministrativerecord.266
Whilethisisonlydraftguidanceandeveninitsfinalversionwouldnotamounttoalegallybindingdocument,itisneverthelesscompellinginitsdemon-strationofhowCEQinterpretssignificanteffects.Accordingtothishandbook,therealdifferencebetweenNEPAandalawthatspecificallyrequiresthateffectsbeadversetobesignificant,isthatfederalagenciesreceivemoredeferenceintheirdeterminationsofwhetheranimpactissignificant.
TheNEPAFONSIprocesspresupposesthatasignificanteffectisadverse,thestateprocessrequiresaneffectbeadversetobesignificant,andthehandbookindicatesthetwoprocessesarelargelythesame.TheconclusiontodrawfromthelanguagehereandinotherdiscussionsofthemitigatedFONSI,isifyoucanstructureanactionsuchthattherearenosignificantadverseimpacts,thenaFONSIisappro-priate.Therecanofcoursebebeneficialeffects,andthesemayneedtobediscussedinNEPAdocumentssuchasanEA.But,asignificanteffectontheenvironmentrequiringanEISonlyexistswheretherearesignificantadverseimpacts,andonlywhereitisnotpossibletomitigatethoseadverseeffectssufficiently.
Criticsofthisanalysismightpointoutmitigationwouldnotapplytobenefi-cialeffects;thus,therecanbenomitigatedFONSIforbeneficialsignificantimpactsandanydiscussionofamitigatedFONSIwouldhave tobebasedonadverseimpacts.Thisobservation,however,wouldbeuntrue.Itis,ofcourse,possibleforagenciestoavoidbeneficialeffectsinmanycases,suchasREPI,wheretheagencyneedonlyobtainlandoraneasement,asopposedtoanyactionthatmightactivelyenhancetheenvironment.Infact,itseemsquitelikelythatshouldNEPAbeinterpretedto
265 CaliforniaGovernor’sOfficeNEPAReport,supra note260,at13.AnEnvironmentalImpactReport(EIR)isroughlytheCaliforniaequivalentofanEIS.266 CaliforniaGovernor’sOfficeNEPAReport,supra note260,at13(emphasisinoriginal).
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requireanEISforbeneficialsignificantimpacts,agencieswoulddotheirbesttoavoidor“mitigate”beneficialsignificantimpacts.ProjectsliketheonetorestorethelongleafpineforestinGeorgia,notedatthebeginningofthisarticle,wouldlikelynotexist.Sucharesultwouldbeexactlytheoppositeofwhatthisaction-forcingprovisionofNEPAwasintendedtoproduce.Certainlythepurposeofhelpingandencouragingagenciestomakebetter,moreenvironmentallyconsciousdecisionswouldnotbeserved.Accordingly,suchaninterpretationcannotbefoundtobeinharmonywiththepoliciesandpurposesoftheactortheirimplementingregulations.WhendiscussingtheproceduralprovisionsofthenewregulationsCEQstated:
Mostofthefeaturesdescribedabovewillhelptoimprovedecision-making.This,ofcourse,isthefundamentalpurposeoftheNEPAprocess,theendtowhichtheEISisameans.Section101ofNEPAsetsforththesubstantiverequirementsoftheAct,thepolicytobeimplementedbythe“action-forcing”proceduresofsection102.Theseproceduresmustbetiedtotheirintendedpurpose,otherwisetheyareindeeduselesspaperworkandwastedtime.267
ThisisastrongstatementontheneedfortheNEPAdocumenttoadvancethepurposesoftheact.SincerequiringanEISforbeneficialimpactswillnotadvancethepurposeofpreventingoreliminatingenvironmentaldamage,theonlyremainingpurposeofNEPAthatcouldbeservedbyanEISforbeneficialimpactsisinformingandinvolvingthepublicinagencydecisions,yetthatargumentfailsaswell.
3.RequirementforPublicParticipation
TheargumentanEIS forbeneficialimpactsisrequiredbecauseoftheneedforpublicparticipationfailsattheoutset.AllagencyactionsnotcoveredbyaCATEXorexemptfromNEPAcompliancerequireatleastanEA.AnEAisstilladocumentavailabletothepublicandgenerallyallowsforpubliccomment.WhilecourtsdonotagreeonthelevelofpublicparticipationrequiredforanEA,it isimportanttonotenocourthasheldanEISneedstobepreparedsimplybecauseitprovidesenhancedopportunitiesforpublicinvolvement.Forthisargumenttosuc-ceed,allEAswouldhavetobeinvalidatedcategorically.SuchapositioniscontrarytotheintentofNEPAandCEQ’sinterpretationandissimplynotlegallysupportable.Nevertheless,thissectionwilladdresstheargumentanddemonstratethatfromapolicyperspective,anEISisnotrequiredforbeneficialsignificanteffects,duetoanargumentbasedontheneedforpublicparticipation.
Asdiscussedabove,verylittleissaidinthestatuteorthelegislativehistoryabouthowmuchpublicparticipationshouldberequiredintheNEPAprocess.ItispossiblethatCongressintendedtolimitpublicparticipationtoinformationsharing,particularlytheresultsofstudies,inordertofurtherresearchintoenhancingthe
267 ImplementationofProceduralProvisionsofNEPA,43Fed.Reg.at55,979.
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environmentandlimitingpollution.268It isalsopossible,totheextentCongressintendedpublicparticipation,theymayhaveonlyintendeditforprojectsdeterminedtohaveasignificantadverseeffectontheenvironment,asNEPAonlydiscussesoneenvironmentalstatement.269Whateverwasintended,theregulationspromulgatedbyCEQrequiresubstantialpublicparticipationinthedraftingofanEIS,beginningwiththepublicationofanoticetopreparetheEIS,solicitingcommentsonscop-ingandthenthedraft,andevenholdingpublichearingswhenappropriate.270TherequirementforpublicparticipationindraftinganEAislesswelldefined,butstillincludesinformationsharingand,inmostcases,opportunitiesforpubliccomment.Consideringthestatementsinthelegislativehistoryandthestatute,theseproceduressetoutintheregulationsforpublicnotificationandinvolvementintheEAprocessaremorethansufficienttosatisfythispurposeofNEPA.
ImplementationofpublicparticipationforanEAisvaried,andcourtsdisagreeastoexactlywhatisrequired.EarlyNEPAcasesrequiredthegovernmenttoprovideenoughinformationforthepublictoevaluatetheenvironmentalfactorsthatinfluencedtheagencydecision,andthenrequiredthatinformationfromthepublicbeabletoflowbacktothegovernment.271Sincethe1978regulations,somecourtshaverequiredthatwhenanEAisusedasthebasisofadecision,itmustbemadeavailabletothepublicforthefull45daycommentperiod,thesameasanEIS.272Butnotallcourtsagree.SomehavedeclinedtorequirethatEAsbemadeavailableforpubliccommentinallcasespriortofinalagencydecisions.273Muchlikethecourts,theregulationshavetworequirementsforpublicparticipation:Arequirementenvironmentalinformationbemadeavailabletothepublicandpublicofficials,274andarequirementto“solicitappropriateinformationfromthepublic.”
Notsurprisingly,agencyapproachestopublicparticipationinEAsvary.SomeagenciesmirrortheprocessforanEIS,whileothersjustmaketheEAandadraftFONSIavailabletothepublic.275Theregulationsdonotspecifytheexactamountofpublicinvolvementrequiredandmerelydirectagenciestoinvolvethepublictotheextentpracticable.276Evenso,inmostcases,agenciesprovidesomeopportunityforpublicfeedbackpriortodraftinganEA,andthenallowcommentsafteradraftEAisproducedandbeforeafinalEAisissued.277Examiningallagency
268 See, e.g.,42U.S.C.§4332(G).269 Id.§4332(C).270 See40C.F.R.§§1501.7,1502.19,1503,1506.6.271 Ferlo,et Al,supra note2,at122.272 SeeSaveOurEcosystemsv.Clark,747F.2d1240,1247(9thCir.1984).273 See GreaterYellowstoneCoalitionv.Flowers,359F.3d1257,1279(10thCir.2004)(citingPoglianiv.U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineers,306F.321235,1238-39(2dCir.2002)).274 See40C.F.R.§1500.1.275 CEQ,ACItIzen’sGuIde to NEPAHAvIngYourVoIceHeArd12(2007).276 40C.F.R.§1501.4(2012).277 Ferlo,et Al.,supra note268,at138.
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publicparticipationregulationsisfarbeyondthescopeofthisarticle,buttheDepart-mentofDefense(DoD)providesanexampleofhowpublicparticipationforanEAisactuallyhandled.
WithintheDoD,theEAandFONSIaregenerallyconsideredpublicdocu-mentsandareavailableforreview.278BoththeArmyandNavyrequirementsmimictheCEQregulations,pointingouthowimportantpublicparticipationisandrequiringthatthepublicbeinvolvedtotheextentpracticable.279TheAirForceprovidesmoredetailonhowpublicparticipationforroutineEAsistobehandledbytheEnviron-mentalPlanningFunction(EPF).TheAirForceregulationsrequireinpertinentpart:
TheEPFmustmaketheEAandunsignedFONSIavailabletotheaffectedpublicandprovidetheEAandunsignedFONSItoorganizationsandindividualsrequestingthemandtowhomevertheproponentortheEPFhasreasontobelieveisinterestedintheaction,unlessdisclosureisprecludedforsecurityclassificationreasons.280
Theregulationsthenallowforaflexiblecommentperioddependingonthemag-nitudeoftheaction.281Whiletheagencyisgivenlatitudetoadoptanappropriatecommenttimeframe,theregulationsnevermentionlessthana30-daycommentperiod.282Environmentaldocumentsareprovidedtointerestedpartiesfreeofchargeandthepublicisgivenanopportunitytoexpressconcernsandshapetheprojectpriortoadecisionbeingmade.283
ThisprocessisnotuniquetotheAirForceorDoD.ItismerelyanexampleofhowtheNEPAprocessforanEAsatisfiesarecognizedpurposeofpublicpar-ticipation,thatofprovidinginformationtothepublicandallowinginformationfromthepublictoflowbacktothegovernment.BecausetheEAprocesssatisfiesNEPA’spurposeofNEPA,evenfromapolicyperspective,theonlyremainingpublicparticipationargumentforanEISoveranEAissimplythatanEISisneededbecauseitprovidesmoreinformationandmoredetailedanalysis.Toanalyzethisargument,itisusefultolookatthehistoryanddevelopmentoftheEA.
LookingbackatthehistoryofNEPAandgiventhescarcedirectioninthestatuteitselfregardingprovidinginformationtothepublic,thecourtsdrasticallyinfluencedagencyapproachestoenvironmentalanalysisanddocuments.Inearly
278 Classifiedportionsofenvironmentaldocumentsarenotmadeavailableforpublicreview.See32C.F.R.§§775.11,775.5(2012);32C.F.R.§§651.36,651.13(2012);32C.F.R.§989.15,989.26(2012).279 See32C.F.R.§775.11;32C.F.R.§651.36.280 Id. §989.15.281 Id.282 Id.283 Id.
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cases,courtsfoundenoughfaultwiththecontentsofEISsthatmanyagenciesbegantoincludeasmuchinformationaspossibleintheiranalysissothattheycouldnotbechallengedinlitigation.284Whilethisapproachmightproduceacomprehensivedocument,itunderminedNEPA’sgoals,asthedocumentsbecametoolargeandtoofullofextraneousinformationtobereadilyusefulinidentifyingtheenvironmentaleffectsandbestapproachforaproject.285Inlargepart,the1978regulationswerecreatedtodealwiththeincreasingproblemofenvironmentaldocumentsbecomingsolargeandbulkythattheywereoflittleusetothepublicortodecision-makers.286Whilethepurposeofprovidinginformationtothepublicwasbeingmet,atleastinname,theselargedocumentsmayhaveactuallybeendetrimentaltothetruepurposeofpubliceducationandparticipation.287
PresidentCarterobserved:“Buttobemoreusefultodecision-makersandthepublic,environmentalimpactstatementsmustbeconcise,readableandbaseduponcompetent,professionalanalysis.Theymustreflectaconcernwithquality,notquantity.Wedonotwantimpactstatementsthataremeasuredbytheinchorweighedbythepound.”288Withthisdirection,CEQdraftedthe1978regulationswith,asnotedabove,thegoalsofsavingtime,reducingpaperworkandproducingbetterdecisions.289ItshouldnothavebeensurprisingthatCEQevenspecifiedhowlongatypicalEISshouldbe.Accordingtotheregulations,afinalEISshould“...normallybelessthan150pagesandforproposalsofunusualscopeorcomplexityshallnormallybelessthan300pages.”290CEQfurtherincludedaprovisionthatforlengthystatements,justthesummarycouldbecirculatedwiththefulldocumentavailableonrequest.291Presumably,itwasthepositionofCEQthatasummaryoftheEISwassufficientinmanycasestofulfilltheNEPApurposeofprovidinginformationtothepublic.
NodataisavailabletoshowjusthowmuchimpactthesepagelimitshadonthepreparationofanactualEIS,butaCEQreportfrom2003indicatedthatatypicalEISwould“rangefrom200tomorethan2,000pagesinlength,”and“require1tomorethan6yearstocomplete.”292Conversely,anEAcanbeproducedquickly,fromafewweeksto18months,dependingontheprojectanditscomplexity.293AtypicalEAforasmallprojectisalsousuallyonlyabout10to30pages,or50to
284 See Ferlo,et Al.,supranote3at14.Squillace(citingExec.OrderNo.11991(1977)).285 Ferlo,et Al.,supranote3at14.286 Ferlo,et Al.,supranote3at13.287 Ferlo,et Al.,supranote3at13.288 Ferlo,et Al.,supranote2at14(citingCEQ,ThePresident’sEnvironmentalProgram,M-12(1977)).289 ImplementationoftheProceduralProvisionsofNEPA43Fed.Reg.at55978.290 40C.F.R.§1502.7.291 Id.§1502.19.292 TaskForceReport,supra note12,at66.293 TaskForceReport,supra note12,at66.
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200pagesforamorecomplicatedproject.294BecauseCEQguidancestatesanormalEISshouldbelessthan150pages,andinmanycases,thesummaryoftheEISissufficienttomeettherequirementofinformingthepublic,itishardtoarguemoreinformationisneededthanwhatisalreadyfoundinanEAthatcouldeasilyrivalthesizeofwhatanEISwasintendedtobe.
AssumingtheEAhasmetitsburdenofprovidingqualityanalysis,italsoprovidestheamountofinformationthatisnecessary“toshowwhymorestudyisnotwarranted.”295Accordingly,itwouldsatisfythepublicinformationrequirementundertheCEQregulations,evenforanEIS.Itwouldalsomeetthepurposesoutlinedinthestatuteanddiscussedinthelegislativehistory.Aprojectwithnoadverseimpactsdoesnotrequireamulti-volume,multi-milliondollardocumenttoassessthecontextandintensityofthebeneficialimpacts,ortoprovideover-analysisofwhichbeneficialalternativeisthemostbeneficial.
“Ultimately,ofcourse,itisnotbetterdocumentsbutbetterdecisionsthatcount.NEPA’spurposeisnottogeneratepaperwork—evenexcellentpaperwork—buttofosterexcellentaction.”296Arguably,foranactionwithonlybeneficialimpacts,thepoliciesinNEPAhavealreadydonethis,byprovidingdirectiontoagenciestoengageinthistypeofactivity.RequiringanEISforsuchanactionisnotinkeepingwithanyofthepurposesofNEPA,andservesonlytofrustratethegoalsoftheAct
E.FunctionalEquivalence
Thedoctrineoffunctionalequivalencebearsdiscussingnotforitsownsake,butbecauseitillustratesageneralinterpretationofNEPAbythecourts,andarguably,evenCongress.ThemostcitedcaseforthecreationofthefunctionalequivalencedoctrinecameoutoftheD.C.Circuitin1973.297ThecontroversywasoverthepromulgationofanewsourceperformancestandardbyEPA.298EPApub-lishedproposedstandardsin1971,withfinalregulationsandadditionaljustificationforthemfollowingin1972.299ThestandardsandregulationswereissuedwithoutpreparinganEIS.300Thetimetableforadoptionofnewstandardsonlyallowedatotalof210daysfromproposaltoadoption.301Accordingly,itwouldhavebeenpos-sibleforthecourttoconcludethatpreparationofanEISwasnotpossible.Instead,thecourtfoundthatEPAwasexemptfromNEPAcomplianceforpromulgationof
294 TaskForceReport,supra note12,at66.295 40C.F.R.§1502.2.296 Id.§1500.1.297 SeeMAndelKer,supra note29,§5:15(citingPortlandCementAssoc.v.Ruckelshaus,486F.2d375(D.C.Cir.1973)).298 Portland Cement Assoc.,486F.2dat378.299 Portland Cement Assoc.,486F.2dat379.300 Id.301 Id.at380-81(citing42U.S.C.§1857c-6(b)(1)(1972).
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newsourcestandards,becausetheprocessthatEPAwentthroughtoproducethosestandardswasfunctionallyequivalenttotheNEPAEISprocess.302
ThecourtalsodiscussedabroaderexemptionforallactionstakenbytheEPA.303Whilenotactuallyrulingonthatissue,theD.C.Circuitsetoutseveralfactorsforconsideration,twoofwhicharerelevanttothisdiscussion:
(1)AnexemptionfromNEPAissupportableonthebasisthatthisbestservestheobjectiveofprotectingtheenvironmentwhichisthepurposeofNEPA...(4)Animpactstatementrequirementpresentsthedangerthatopponentsofenvironmentalprotectionwouldusetheissueofcompliancewithanyimpactstatementrequirementasatacticoflitigationanddelay.304
ThecourtdidnotultimatelyconcludethatEPAwasexemptedfromNEPAcompli-anceforallactions,butpresumablythesefactorsweighedintothedecisiontoexemptthepromulgationofnewsourceperformancestandards.305
Therule-makingproceduresarguablyprovidedtheequivalentofthepublicparticipationrequirementofNEPA.ThecourtalsoseemedtorelyonEPA’sfunctionofprotectingtheenvironment,concludingthatNEPA’spurposewassimilarlytoprotecttheenvironment.Thecourtreasoned:
EPA’sproposedrule,andreasonstherefor,areinevitablyanalerttoenvironmental issues.TheEPA’sproposedruleandreasonsmayomitreferencetoadverseenvironmentalconsequencesthatanotheragencymightdiscern,butadraftimpactstatementmaylikewisebemarredbyomissionsthatanotheragencyidentifies.TotheextentthatEPAisawareofsignificantadverseenvironmentalconsequencesofitsproposal,goodfaithrequiresappropriaterefer-enceinitsreasonsfortheproposalanditsunderlyingbalancinganalysis.306
Subsequenttothisruling,CongressstatutorilyexemptedactionstakenundertheCleanAirAct(CAA)fromcompliancewithNEPAsection102,byamendmentstotheCAAin1974.307
302 Portland Cement Assoc.,486F.2dat386-87.303 Id.at383-84.304 Id.305 Portland Cement Assoc.,486F.2d at383-84.306 Id.at386.307 15U.S.C.§793(2013).
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PriortotheD.C.Circuit’sdecisionandtheamendmentstotheCAA,Con-gresshadalreadyexemptedcertainactionsundertheFederalWaterPollutionControlAct(FWPCA).308Thisexemptionreads:
ExceptfortheprovisionofFederalfinancialassistanceforthepurposeofassistingtheconstructionofpubliclyownedtreatmentworksasauthorizedbysection1281ofthistitle,andtheissuanceofapermitundersection1342ofthistitleforthedischargeofanypollutantbyanewsourceasdefinedinsection1316ofthistitle,noactionoftheAdministratortakenpursuanttothischaptershallbedeemedamajorFederalactionsignificantlyaffectingthequal-ityofthehumanenvironmentwithinthemeaningoftheNationalEnvironmentalPolicyActof1969.309
AstheD.C.Circuithighlighted,“thedebateofalaterCongress[has]beendescribedbytheSupremeCourtasofferingahazardousbasisforinferringtheintentoftheearlierCongress.”310WhenlookingatthisexemptionandtheexemptionforactionsundertheCAA,theyhaveonestrikingthingincommon:theexemptedactionsareonesthatwillpresumably benefittheenvironment.
ThepromulgationofnewsourcestandardsundertheCAAisdesignedtoeffectuatethereductionofairpollution“throughtheapplicationofthebestsystemofemissionreductionwhich...theAdministratordetermineshasbeenadequatelydemonstrated.”311OtheractionsundertheCAA,suchasdesignatingcriteriapol-lutantsorsettingambientairqualitystandards,alsoaredesignedtobenefittheenvironment.Likewise,theexemptedportionsoftheFWPCAaredesignedtoreduceandlimitwaterpollution.ThetwoactionsspecificallynotexemptfromNEPAcompliancearetheconstructionofnewtreatmentfacilitiesandthepermittingofnewpollutantsources.312Constructionofatreatmentfacilitycouldobviouslyhaveadverseenvironmentalimpacts,dependingonthelocationandsizeofthefacility.Permittinganewpollutantsourcealsopresentsaveryrealdangerofadverseenvi-ronmentalimpacts.Infact,someadverseimpactisalmostguaranteed.ByprovidingtheseexemptionsfromNEPAcompliance,CongressappearstobeinterpretingNEPAtorequireanEISforadverseactionsandexemptingactionsthataredesignedtobenefittheenvironment.ItisverydifficulttoarguethattheCAAandtheFWPCAhavenothad,andcontinuetohave,beneficialsignificanteffectsontheenvironment.
308AnActtoAmendtheFederalWaterPollutionAct,P.L.92-500,86Stat.816(1972).309 33U.S.C.§1371(c)(2013).310 Portland Cement Assoc.,486F.2dat315(citingUnitedStatesv.Sw.CableCo.,392U.S.157,170(1968)).311 Portland Cement Assoc.,486F.2dat378(quoting42U.S.C.§7411(a)(1)(2013)).312 33U.S.C.§1371(c).
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ThefunctionalequivalenceexemptionhasalsobeenheldtoapplytoEPA’sactionsunderotherstatutesthathavenosubsequentexemptionbyCongress,includ-ingtheFederalInsecticide,FungicideandRodenticideAct(FIFRA),theSafeDrinkingWaterAct,theResourceConservationandRecoveryActandtheCleanWaterAct(CWA).313Afulldiscussionofthefunctionalequivalencedoctrineisbeyondthescopeofthisarticle,buttwocaseshighlighthowcourtshaveinterpretedthisexemptionasconsistentwiththeinterpretationofNEPArequiringanEISonlyforsignificantadverseimpacts.ThesetwocasescomefromtheNinthCircuitandtheTenthCircuit.
In1975,theTenthCircuitaddressedanorderfromtheEPAAdministratorsuspendingtheregistrationofcertainpesticidesunderFIFRA.314TheadministratordidsowithoutproducinganEIS.315UltimatelythecourtconcludedthatthereportproducedbyEPAstudyingtheproblemwassufficienttocomplywithNEPA.316Indoingso,thecourtreasoned:
Furthermore,thesubstanceofNEPAissuchastoitselfexemptEPAfromtherequirementoffilinganimpactstatement.Itsobjectistodevelopintheotherdepartmentsofthegovernmentacon-sciousnessofenvironmentalconsequences.TheimpactstatementismerelyanimplementdevisedbyCongresstorequiregovernmentagenciestothinkaboutandweighenvironmentalfactorsbeforeacting.Consideredinthislight,anorganizationlikeEPAwhoseregulatoryactivitiesarenecessarilyconcernedwithenvironmentalconsequencesneednotstopinthemiddleofitsproceedingsinordertoissueaseparateanddistinctimpactstatementjusttobeissuingit.Tosorequirewoulddecreaseenvironmentalprotectionactivityratherthanincreaseit.317
Inthisanalysis,theTenthCircuitembracedtheinterpretationofNEPArecognizedtwodecadeslaterbytheSixthCircuitinFriends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Admin.NEPAisdesignedtoempoweranddirectagenciestoconsiderenvironmentalimpactsandultimatelytakelessharmfulactions,notinhibitbeneficialaction.
In1992,theNinthCircuitaddressedaclaimthatEPAandtheU.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineersfailedtocomplywithNEPAbyenteringintoamemorandumofagreementastoguidelinesfordredgeandfillpermits.318Arguably,the1972exemptiondiscussedaboveandcreatedbytheamendmenttotheFWPCA,exempted
313 See generallyMAndelKer,supra note29,§5:15;Ferlo et Al.,supra note3,at245-47.314 SeeStateofWyo.V.Hathaway,525F.2d66(10thCir.1975).315 Id.at66-67.316 Id.at72-73.317 Hathaway,525F.2d.at71-72.318MunicipalityofAnchoragev.UnitedStates,980F.2d1320,1322(9thCir.1992).
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EPA’sactioninthecase.319Ultimately,however,thecourtdidnotruleonthatissue,insteadfindingthattheobligationsofEPAandtheCorpsarefunctionallyequivalenttothoseimposedbyNEPA.320Thecourtnoted:
ThepurposeofNEPAistoensurethatfederalagenciesconsidertheenvironmentalimpactoftheiractions.UndertheCWA,CongresshaschargedtheAdministratoroftheEPAwiththedutyofclean-ingupthenation’snavigablewaters.WeareconvincedthatinthecircumstancesofthiscaseanexemptionfromNEPAwillfacilitatetheEPA’seffortstocleanupthenation’swaters....321
Essentially,theNinthCircuithasrecognizedthatthepurposesofNEPAandtheCWAwouldnotbeservedbyrequiringanEISinsituationswheredoingsowouldbeadversetotheultimatebeneficialenvironmentaloutcome.Inrejectingtheplaintiffs’argumentagainsttheexemption,thecourtstated:
[Plaintiffs]wouldhaveusholdthattheEPA,theagencychargedwithprotectingtheenvironment,hasviolatedNEPA,astatutedesignedtoensurethatenvironmentalconsiderationsareweighedappropriatelybeforefederalagenciesact,byinterpretingitsguide-linesinamannerthatistooprotectiveoftheenvironment.Becausesuchareadingskewsthelogicalintentofthestatutes,werejectit.322
JustliketheTenthCircuit, theNinthCircuithasembracedtheideathatNEPAwasenactedtopreventandeliminateenvironmentaldegradationandusingthestatutetopreventbeneficialactionsiscounter-productive.
ThisarticledoesnotarguethatagenciesshouldbeexemptfromNEPAcomplianceforactionswithonlybeneficialconsequences.Anyactionsnotcat-egoricallyexcludedwouldstillrequireanEA.However,thedevelopmentofthefunctionalequivalencedoctrine,especiallytheexemptionsprovidedbyCongress,demonstratethatNEPAisconsistentlyinterpretedasbeingprimarilyconcernedwithactionsthathaveadverseconsequencesfortheenvironment.AninterpretationthatwouldrequireanagencytoproduceanEIS“...justtobeissuingit...,”323would“...[skew]thelogicalintentofthestatute...,”324andshouldthereforeberejected.
319 Id.at1327-28.320 Id.at1329.321 Id.322 Municipality of Anchorage, 980F.2dat1329.323 Hathaway,525F.2dat72.324 Municipality of Anchorage,980F.2dat1329.
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F.TheCorrectResolutionoftheCircuitSplit
WhentheEleventhCircuitheldthatanSEISwasrequiredforchangestoaprojectthatresultedinonlybeneficialimpacts,theholdingnecessarilymeantthatanEISforprojectswithbeneficialsignificantimpactswasrequiredaswell,sincethestandardforwhenanSEISisrequiredisthesameasthestandardforwhenanEISisrequired.325ThisholdingwasbasedonacasefromtheFifthCircuitwhich,whileappearingtosupportexactlytheconclusiondrawnbytheEleventhCircuit,laterdisavowedsuchaninterpretation.326NeithertheFifthCircuitnortheEleventhCircuitprovidedanyanalysisoftheregulationspromulgatedbyCEQin1978,andwhichtheU.S.SupremeCourthadalreadydeterminedwereduesubstantialdeference.327Itwasn’tuntiltheSixthCircuitaddressedtheissuein1995thatananalysisrelieduponthecurrentregulationspromulgatedbyCEQ.TheSixthCircuitlookedattheregulationsanddefinitionstocorrectlyconcludethatNEPA,asinterpretedbyCEQandimplementedbytheCEQregulations,didnotintendforagenciestohavetoprepareanEISforprojectswithonlybeneficialsignificantimpacts.328
ThelegislativehistoryandthetextofthebilloriginallyproposedbytheSen-atedemonstratethatwhatisactuallyrequiredinanEISisadiscussionoftheoverallenvironmentalimpactsoftheproject,withspecialattentionpaidtothesignificantadverseenvironmentaleffectswhichcannotbeavoidedunderanyalternative.329Thehighlightedrequirementfordiscussionofalternativesinthefinallaw,combinedwitharequirementtodiscussadverseimpactswhichcannotbeavoided,createsaprocessverysimilartotheoriginaltextfromtheSenatebill.330Theoriginalbillfocusedonrequiringtheavoidanceofadverseimpactsandjustifyingthosethatcouldnotbeavoided.331Inthefinalversion,thealternativesanalysissimplyprovidesawaytodiscussmitigationandavoidanceofthoseimpactsidentifiedinsubsection(i),whilesubsection(ii)requiresnoticeofanyadverseimpactswhichcannotbeavoidedormitigated.332
BoththeChairofCEQandPresidentObamahaverecentlyemphasizedthat“NEPAwasenactedtopromoteeffortsthatwillpreventoreliminatedamagetotheenvironment....”333ThishasbeenthefocusofNEPAsincethebeginning.NEPAwasdraftedandenactedtopreventcontinuedenvironmentaldegradation,notpreventenvironmentalenhancement.TheCEQregulationsweredraftedtopromote
325 SeesupraPartIII.A.326 SeesupraPartIII.A.1.327 SeesupraPartIII.A.;Andrus,442U.S.at357.328 SeesupraPartIII.A.4.329 SeesupraPartIII.B-C.330 42U.S.C.§4332(C).331 S.Rep.No.91-296,at2.332 42U.S.C.§4332(C).333 ProclamationNo.8469,75Fed.Reg.885-886;SutleyMemorandum,supra note180,at2.
When There are No Adverse Effects 157
betterdecisionswhilereducingpaperworkandtime.RequiringanEISforactionswithonlybeneficialsignificantimpactswillnotresultinanenvironmentallybetterdecision.Instead,ifrequiringanEISforprojectswithonlybeneficialimpactsdoesnotkilltheprojectoutright,itwillresultinmulti-yeardelaysandmillionsofdollarsinadditionalcost.ThecorrectinterpretationofNEPAisthereforeisthatanEISisnotrequiredforactionswithonlybeneficialsignificantimpacts.
TheREPIprojectatFortBenningisaperfectexampleofthekindofprojectNEPAmayhaveenvisioned44yearsago.WithNEPA’sstatedpolicyofthefederalgovernmentto“createandmaintainconditionsunderwhichmanandnaturecanexistinproductiveharmony...,”334thisprojectseemstobetheembodimentofthespiritofNEPA.Byrestoringandpreservingthepineforest,theprojectatFortBenningisdoingexactlywhatNEPAcallsfor—creatingandmaintaining“condi-tionsunderwhichmanandnaturecanexistinproductiveharmony...,”335ensuringmilitarytrainingcancontinuebyavoidingconflictingdevelopment,andrestoringandprotectingnaturalhabitatforendangeredspeciesandpublicenjoyment.
ThereareonlyaverylimitednumberofEISsfiledeachyearbyfederalagencies.In2009,acrosstheentirefederalgovernment,therewereonly450.336ThefactthisissuchasmallpercentageofthehundredsofthousandsoffederalactionsisbothatestamenttohowwellNEPAhasworkedatminimizingtheenvironmentalimpactsofthegovernment,andanindicationofhowassiduouslyagenciesavoidprojectswiththecostsassociatedwithanEIS.Agencybudgetsareonlysolarge,andhavebecomesmallerwiththeunexpectedeffectsofsequestration.337Whenanagencyhastoprioritizeitsactions,atatimewhenitisalsomakingdecisionsaboutfurloughingemployees,agencyactionsliketheREPIprojectatFortBenningarenotgoingtomakethecutiftheagencyhastoshouldertheadditionalcostsassoci-atedwithanEIS.Manyprojectsthatresultinonlybeneficialimpactsaresimplynotgoingtobevitalenoughtothefunctionoftheagencytojustifythecost.Suchprojectswillnotbefunded,oratbest,allbeneficialenvironmentaleffectswillbeavoided.InterpretingNEPAtorequireanEISforthistypeofprojectturnstheactonitshead,effectivelycreatingasituationwheretheenvironmentmustbesavedfromanactthatwasdesignedtoprotectit.Suchaninterpretationcannotbe,andisnot,correct.
IV.ASUGGESTEDAGENCYAPPROACH
Nomatterhowwellreasoned,sensible,andcorrecttheargumentthatnoEISisrequiredforactionswithonlybeneficialimpacts,itwouldbenaïvetoexpect
334 42U.S.C.§4331.335 Id.336 CouncilonEnvironmentalQuality,EnvironmentalQuality,CalendarYear2009FiledEISs,http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/Calendar_Year_2009_Filed_EISs.pdf.337 SeeZientsLetter,supra note13.
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thatnogroupwouldraisetheargumentifsuchanargumentstoodtobenefitthegroup’spositioninadispute.Sincefundingforlitigationisnotunlimitedoneitherside,thebestwaytopreventsuchanargumentfrombeingraisedistobeclearlypreparedtodefeatit.Withthatinmind,agenciescanandshouldtakestepstobereadytohandilydefeatthisargument.
Thebestsolutionfromtheperspectiveofanagencywouldbe,ofcourse,forCongresstoamendNEPA,clearlystatingthatonlysignificantadverseimpactsontheenvironmenttriggertheEISrequirement.However,giventhatNEPAhasremainedvirtuallyunchangedfor44years,thissolutionseemsunlikely.AlmostasgoodasolutionwouldbeforCEQtoaddbackintotheregulationsthe1973language,specifyingthatimpactsmustbeadversetotriggertheneedforanEIS.338Yettheseregulationsalsohaveremainedvirtuallyunchangedsincetheywerepublishedin1978.Anychangeatthispointseemsunlikely.
ThebestoptionleftforanagencyistoamendtheirownregulationstoensureanagencymayrelyontheseforaninterpretationthatanEISisnotrequiredforactionswithnosignificantadverseimpacts.ItmaybetemptingtosimplyrelyonCEQregulations,arguingthattheappropriateinterpretationisthatsetoutinPartIII.Dofthisarticle,thesameinterpretationreachedbySixthCircuit.339Suchanargumentwouldhopefullybepersuasive,butthereisnoguaranteethatthecourtwouldacceptit.Furthermore,asCEQwillnotbetherearguingthecase,thecourtmaywellaffordnodeferencetotheagency’sinterpretationofNEPA.340Accordingly,relyingontheCEQregulationswillnotforeclosetheissue.However,byamendingtheirownregulationstosetouttheinterpretationclearly,anagencywouldbeentitledtosubstantialdeferenceintheinterpretationofitsownregulations.341WhileagencyNEPAregulationsaresomewhatunusualinthecontextofagencydeferenceforimplementingregulations,agenciesareneverthelessentitledtothisdeference.342
InChevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,theU.S.
SupremeCourtestablishedtworulesfordeterminingifanagency’sinterpretationofastatuteitadministersisentitledtodeference.343First,thecourtmustdetermineifthelanguageatissueisambiguous,forifCongresshasclearlyspokentotheissue,
338 SeePreparationofEnvironmentalImpactStatements:Guidelines,38Fed.Reg.at20,552(regulationclarifyingtohavesignificantimpact,mustbeadverseeffectonhumanbeings).339 See Friends of Fiery Gizzard,61F.3dat501.340 SeeGrandCanyonTrustv.F.A.A.,290F.3d339,341-42(D.C.Cir.2002).341 SeeAuerv.Robbins,519U.S.452,461(1997);Bowlesv.SeminoleRock&SandCo.,325U.S.410,413-14(1945).342 See, e.g.,OhioValleyEnvtl.Coal.v.AracomaCoalCo.556F.3d177,193-94(4thCir.2009)(courtheldCorpsregulationsimplementingNEPAentitledtohighlydeferentialreview,orAuerDeference);Sylvesterv.U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineers,884F.2d394,399(9thCir.1989)(courtheldCorps’NEPAregulationsentitledtodeference).343 Chevron,U.S.A.Inc.v.NaturalRes.Def.Council,Inc.,467U.S.837,842-43(1984).
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thentherecanbenointerpretationotherthantheoneCongresshasdirected.344Ifthestatuteissilentorambiguous,ontheotherhand,thenthereviewingcourtmustdefertoanagency’sinterpretation,ifthatinterpretationisbasedonapermissibleconstructionofthestatute.345AstheSecondCircuitnoted,NEPA’slanguage“hasbeencharacterizedas‘opaque’and‘woefullyambiguous’....”346Certainly,NEPAhasfailedtodefine“significantly,”intermsofwhatexactlyismeantby“significantlyaffectingthequalityofthehumanenvironment.”347
NEPAisunusualthough,inthatnosingleagencyimplementstheAct.EachagencyisresponsibleforcomplyingwithNEPAandpreparingitsownenvironmentalimpactstatementsandassessmentsasappropriate.Inanalyzingcompliancewithactsthatsimilarlyapplytomultipleagencies,somecourtshaveconcludednosingleagency’sinterpretationofastatuteiscontrolling,andthusentitledtodeference.348Yetunlikesomeacts,suchastheFreedomofInformationAct,wherenosingleagencyoverseesimplementationofthatlaw,NEPAalsocreatedCEQ,whichisasingleagencywithauthoritytointerpretNEPA.Earlyon,theU.S.SupremeCourtheldthatCEQ’sinterpretationofNEPA,andtheregulationspromulgatedbyCEQ,wereentitledtosubstantialdeference.349CEQhas offeredadefinitionof“signifi-cantly,”althoughthatdefinitionalsofailstoaddresswhetherbeneficialeffectsalonequalifyunderthatdefinition.350HadCEQclearlyprovidedananswerastowhetherbeneficialeffectsalonecanqualifyasasignificanteffect,theanalysiswouldbeover.Unfortunately,whileitispossibletoascertainananswer,asdiscussedinpartIII.Dofthisarticle,CEQdidnotsetthatansweroutclearly.
CEQisentitledtodeferenceintheinterpretationofitsregulations,butotheragenciesmaynotbe.TheD.C.CircuitistheonlyCircuittosquarelyaddresstheissueofwhetheragenciesareentitledtodeferenceintheirinterpretationofCEQregulationssincethepublicationofthe1978regulations.TheD.C.Circuithasrecognizedthatwhileagenciesareentitledtodeferenceintheinterpretationoftheirownregulations,includingtheirNEPAimplementingregulations,351agenciesareentitledtonodeferenceintheinterpretationofNEPAorCEQ’simplementingregulations.352OthercircuitshavenotaddressedtheissueofinterpretingCEQregula-
344 Id.345 Id.346 Hanley,471F.2dat823(quotingCityofNewYorkv.UnitedStates,337F.Supp.150,159(E.D.N.Y.1972);LarryH.Voight,The National Environmental Policy Act and the Independent Regulatory Agency,5NAt.ResourcesLAw.13(1972)).347 42U.S.C.§4332(C).348 See, e.g.,Al-Fayedv.C.I.A.254F.3d300,307(D.C.Cir.2001)(holdingthatbecausetheFreedomofInformationActappliesacrossallfederalagenciesandnosingleagencyadministerstheAct,asingleagencyinterpretationisnotentitledtodeference).349Andrus,442U.S.at357.350 See40C.F.R.§1508.27;see also supra PartIII.D.351 Grand Canyon Trust,290F.3dat341-42.352 Id.
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tionsquiteassquarely,butsomehavebeenmoregenerousinupholdingwhatcouldbecharacterizedasanagencyinterpretationofNEPAbasedonagencyregulations.
TheNinthCircuithasappliedtheverydeferentialChevrontesttotheArmyCorpsofEngineersinterpretationofNEPAandagencyregulations.353Inthatcase,theCorpswasinterpretingitsregulationstodefinethescopeofwhatultimatelywouldbesubjecttoenvironmentalanalysis.354Thedevelopmentprojectwhichwasthesubjectofthedisputeincludedskiingfacilities,aresortvillageandagolfcourse.355TheCorpswasinvolvedbecauseapermitwasrequiredforthefillingofwetlandsintheareawherethegolfcoursewastobelocated.356NootherportionoftheprojectrequiredapermitfromtheCorpsoranyotherformofCorpsinvolvement.357Interpretingtheirownagencyregulations,theCorpsdeterminedthattheyshouldlimittheirNEPAanalysistothegolfcourse,asthatwastheextentoftheCorps’agencyaction.358Mr.Sylvesterdisagreedandfiledsuit.359InapplyingtheChevrontestfordeference,theNinthCircuitheld:
First,thecourtmustfollowanyunambiguouslyexpressedintentofCongress....Second,whenastatuteis‘silentorambiguous’withrespecttoaspecificissue,thecourtmustdefertotheagency’sinterpretationifbasedonapermissibleconstructionofthestatute....Whenweapplytheserulestothefacts,wefindnoclearinten-tionintheNEPAwithrespecttotheproperresolutionoftheissuebeforeus.Moreover,wecannotsaythattheCorps’interpretationisanimpermissiblereadingofthestatute.Wehold,therefore,thatthedistrictcourtshouldhavedeferredtotheCorps’regulationsasapprovedbytheCEQ.360
Arguably,theNinthCircuithasallowedtheCorpstonotonlyinterprettheirownregulationsbutNEPAaswell.ThecourtappearstogranttheCorpsthesamedeferenceasiftheinterpretationhadcomefromCEQ.SuchanapproachmakessensewhenonefollowstheNinthCircuit’sreasoning:
[T]heCAArequirestheEPAtoreviewtheCorps’regulationsanddesignatestheCEQasthearbitratorindisputesbetweenfederalagenciesonenvironmentalissues....Thisisnotdoneasanidleexercise.Itistoprovideguidancetoallwhomaybeconcerned,
353 Sylvester,884F.2dat394.354 Id.355 Sylvester,884F.2dat396.356 Id.at396-97.357 Id.358 Id.359 Id.360 Sylvester,884F.2d at399(citingChevron, U.S.A. Inc.,467U.S.at842-43).
When There are No Adverse Effects 161
includingcourts.Thus,eventhoughtheCorpsactuallypromulgatedtheregulations,webelievethattheprinciplesunderlyingChevronentitlethemto,andrequireustoextend,deference.361
TheNinthCircuitessentiallyconcludedeventhoughtheCorpspromulgatedtheregulations,thefactthoseregulationshadtobereviewedandapprovedbyEPAandCEQentitledtheCorpsregulationstoasmuchdeferenceasCEQregulationsintheirinterpretationofNEPA.362
TheNinthCircuitappearstobeononeendofthedeferencespectrum,whiletheD.C.Circuitisontheotherend,withothercircuitsfallingsomewhereinbetween.However,allcircuitsthathaveaddressedtheissueagreethatagencyinterpretationsoftheirownregulations,evenregulationsimplementingNEPA,areentitledtosubstantialdeference.363Accordingly,anagency’sbestoptiontominimizelitigationriskistosetoutclearlyinitsownregulationsthatinorderforanactiontotriggertheneedforanEIS,itmusthaveasignificantadverse effectonthequalityofthehumanenvironment.Courtswouldhavegreatdifficultyinreachingcompellingacontraryconclusioniftherequirementforasignificantadverseeffecttobepresentissetoutinanagencyregulation,approvedbyCEQ.
V.CONCLUSION
WhileatleastonecircuithasinterpretedNEPAtorequireanagencytoprepareanEISforactionswithonlybeneficialsignificanteffects,thatinterpreta-tionofNEPAisnotconsistentwiththepurposesoftheAct,ortheAct’slegislativehistory.NEPAwasenacted,inpart,toempoweranddirectthegovernmenttodealmoreeffectivelywithgrowingenvironmentalproblems.Itwasnotintendedtobearoadblocktoagencyactionsthatactuallyservetoenhancethehumanenvironment.WhileactionsthathavebothadverseandbeneficialeffectsrequireanEIS,actionswithnosignificantadverseeffectsshouldnot.RequiringagenciestoprepareanEISforactionswithnosignificantadverseeffectswillfrustratethepurposesofNEPA,causingagenciestoabandonprojectsthatmighthavebenefitedtheenvironment,orattheveryleast,causeagenciestoavoidthebeneficialeffectsthatcouldhaveresultedfromtheiractions.
361 Sylvester,884F.2dat399(citing42U.S.C.§7609(a)-(b)(1989)).362 Sylvester,884F.2dat399. 363 SeeOhio Valley Envtl. Coal,556F.3dat193-94(courtheldCorpsisentitledtosubstantialdeferenceininterpretingitsownNEPAimplementingregulations);UtahEnvtl.Cong.v.DaleBosworth,443F.3d732,742-43(10thCir.2006)(courtheldagency’sinterpretationofitsowncategoricalexclusionregulationentitledtosubstantialdeference);MississippiRiverBasinAlliancev.Westphal,230F.3d170,175(5thCir.2000)(courtheldCEQregulationsandtheCorpsentitledtosubstantialdeference);IowaCitizensforEnvtl.Quality,Inc.v.Volpe,487F.2d849,855(8thCir.1973)(courtheldFederalHighwayAdministration’sadministrativeinterpretationofNEPAentitledtogreatdeference).
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OpponentstoanagencyactionwillinevitablyraisetheargumentanEISisrequiredforany significanteffect.Tothatend,thebestdefenseanagencycanmusteristoamenditsownregulationstosetoutclearlythatnoEISisrequiredwhentheactionhasnosignificantadverseimpacts.Suchaninclusioninagencyregulationsissupportedbythelegislativehistoryoftheact,thepreviousversionsoftheCEQregulations,andthepreambletotheimplementingregulations.BothPresidentObamaandtheChairofCEQhaverecentlynotedthatthepurposeofNEPAisto“preventoreliminatedamagetotheenvironment....”364CEQhasalsowiselynotedthatNEPAprocedures,includingthosefortheproductionofanEIS,mustfurtherthepurposesoftheAct,“otherwisetheyareindeeduselesspaperworkandwastedtime.”365Bysettingoutinagencyregulationsthatanactionmusthaveasignificantadverse effectinordertotriggertheneedforanEIS,agenciescanavoidwastedtimeandresourcesandfurtherthegoalsofNEPAbyengaginginprojectsthatbenefittheenvironment.ForifNEPAisinterpretedtorequireanEISforprojectswithbeneficialsignificantimpacts,theremaynotbesufficientfundingortimetocompletethem.
364 ProclamationNo.8469,75Fed.Reg.885-886;SutleyMemorandum,supra note180,at2.365 ImplementationofProceduralProvisionsofNEPA,43Fed.Reg.at55,979.
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I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 165 II. DEVELOPMENTANDCURRENTSTATEOFTHELAW................. 167
A.Harmonization:1862–1963............................................................... 167B.Disharmonization:1962–Present....................................................... 172
1.GovernmentEmployees............................................................... 173 2.ContractorEmployees.................................................................. 175 3.GranteeEmployees...................................................................... 177
III. AGENERALLYAPPLICABLECRIMINALLAWWOULDADDRESSTHEINADEQUACIESOFTHECURRENTPATCHWORK........................................................................................ 178A.ConcerningContractors,WhytheCurrentPatchworkisInadequate179
1.ItDoesn’tRequireWhatit’sSupposedtoRequire...................... 179 2.NoEffectiveOversightorComplianceMechanisms................... 181 3.CommercialItemsExemption...................................................... 184 4.UntetheredandAmbiguousDefinitions....................................... 186
B.ConcerningGrantees,WhytheCurrentPatchworkisInadequate.... 188C.ConcerningPartiestoOtherTransactionAgreements,
WhytheCurrentPatchworkisInadequate........................................ 189 IV. AGENERALLYAPPLICABLECRIMINALLAWWOULD
CREATEANDHARMONIZELAW...................................................... 192A.AGenerallyApplicableCriminalLawWouldHarmonize
JudicialJurisprudence........................................................................ 192B.AGenerallyApplicableCriminalLawWouldFurtherImprove
GAOBidProtestJurisprudence........................................................ 195C.ClearStandardforContractPerformanceandAdministration.......... 198D.ClearStandardforGrantPerformanceandAdministration.............. 199E.ClearStandardforOtherTransactionAgreementPerformance
andAdministration............................................................................ 200
NON-GOVERNMENTALEMPLOYEES’PERSONALCONFLICTSOFINTERESTINPUBLICACQUISITION:ACASEFORGREATERHARMONIZATION
Major garrett jonathan Bruening*
* MajGarrettJ.Bruening,JudgeAdvocate,UnitedStatesAirForce(LL.M.,GovernmentProcurementLaw,TheGeorgeWashingtonUniversityLawSchool(2013);J.D.,TheUniversityofSouthDakotaSchoolofLaw(2006);M.B.A.,TheUniversityofSouthDakotaSchoolofBusiness(2004);B.S.B.A,TheUniversityofSouthDakotaSchoolofBusiness(2003))isanacquisitionattorneyattheResearchandSpecializedContractingBranch,AirForceMaterielCommandLawOffice,Wright-PattersonAirForceBase,Ohio.ThisarticleisderivedfromathesissubmittedinpartialsatisfactionoftherequirementsforthedegreeofMasterofLawsinGovernmentProcurementatTheGeorgeWashingtonUniversityLawSchool.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperaresolelythoseoftheauthoranddonotreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheUnitedStatesAirForce,DepartmentofDefenseorU.S.Government.
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LISTOFFIGURES
FIGURE1:LegalControlsConcerningConflictsofInterestandUseofNon-PublicInformationforPersonalGainApplicabletoGovernmentAcquisitionProfessionals(AppendixI).................... 206
FIGURE2:LegalControlsConcerningConflictsofInterestandUseofNon-PublicInformationforPersonalGainApplicabletoContractorAcquisitionProfessionals(AppendixVI).....................211
FIGURE3:LegalControlsConcerningConflictsofInterestandUseofNon-PublicInformationforPersonalGainApplicabletoGranteeAcquisitionProfessionals(AppendixXXIII)................... 228
V. ADDRESSINGOTHERPOTENTIALCOUNTERARGUMENTS...... 201A.AnotherCriminalLawWillSimplyIncreaseCosts.......................... 201B.NewCriminalLawUnnecessarytoDefendtheGovernment’s
Interests.............................................................................................. 203 VI. CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 205
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 165
I.INTRODUCTION
Integrityiscentraltopublicadministration.1Integrityisespeciallycentraltopublicacquisition.2Publicsystemspromotingintegritymustbothminimizetheopportunitiesfordeviationfromthepublic’sobjectivesandmaximizethepublic’sabilitytocorrectanyoccurringdeviations.3Asintegritysystemsmatureanddevelop,theychurnandreinventthemselves.Oldlawguardedagainsttheissuesofitsday.Newissuesdrovenewlaw.Newlawchangedoldlaw.Butinthatchurningprocess,sometimestheissuestheoldlawguardedagainstareforgotten.Forgotten,atleast,untilthosesameissuesemergedagain.
1 SeeExec.OrderNo.11,222,§101,30Fed.Reg.6,469,6,469(May8,1965)(“Wheregovernmentisbasedontheconsentofthegoverned,everycitizenisentitledtohavecompleteconfidenceintheintegrityofhisgovernment.Eachindividualofficer,employee,oradviserofgovernmentmusthelptoearnandmusthonorthattrustbyhisownintegrityandconductinallofficialactions.”).2 SeeStevenL.Schooner,Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law,2 puB. procureMent l. rev. 103, 103(2002)(citingintegrityas“pillar”inpublicacquisition).See alsoChristopherR.Yukins,Integrating Integrity and Procurement: The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law,36 puB. cont. l.J. 307, 307(2007)(arguingforgreaterintegrationofanti-corruptioninternationallawwiththeUnitedNationsCommissiononInternationalTradeLawModelLawonProcurementofGoods,Construction,andServices).Integrityisespeciallyimportantinthefederalsystemgiventhelargeamountofmoneymovingbothoutofthemarketastaxesandbackintothemarketthroughcontracts,grants,andothertransactions.Thegovernmentspentthefollowingbillionsofdollarscontractsandgrantsinthefollowingfiscalyears(format:FYXX,contracts,grants):FY10,$540.0,$614.3;FY11,$539.7,$567.0;FY12,$517.7,$538.6.USASpending.gov,available athttp://www.usaspending.gov/explore.Moneyspentonothertransactionisdiscussedseparatelylater.
Thepaperusestheterm“publicacquisition”broadlytocaptureallthemeansthefederalgovernmentfundsitsworkthroughnon-federalentities.Themostobviousmeansiscontractswhereinthegovernmentpurchasesgoodsorservicesforitsuse.However,thegovernmentcanaccomplishesotherwork,likebasicresearch,provisionofhealthcareandeducation,etc.,throughgrants,cooperativeagreements,andothertransactions.See31U.S.C.§6303(2013)(directingagenciestousecontractswhen“theprincipalpurposeoftheinstrumentistoacquirepropertyorservicesforthedirectbenefitoruseoftheUnitedStatesGovernment....”)(parentheticalsomitted);31U.S.C.§6304(2013)(directingagenciestousegrantswhen“theprincipalpurposeoftherelationshipistotransferathingofvaluetotheStateorlocalgovernmentorotherrecipienttocarryoutapublicpurposeofsupportorstimulationauthorizedbyalawoftheUnitedStates[and]substantialinvolvementisnotexpectedbetweentheexecutiveagencyandtheState,localgovernment,orotherrecipientwhencarryingouttheactivitycontemplatedintheagreement.”);31U.S.C.§6305(2013)(directingagenciestousecooperativeagreementswhen“theprincipalpurposeoftherelationshipistotransferathingofvaluetotheState,localgovernment,orotherrecipienttocarryoutapublicpurposeofsupportorstimulationauthorizedbyalawoftheUnitedStatesinsteadofacquiring...propertyorservicesforthedirectbenefitoruseoftheUnitedStatesGovernment[and]substantialinvolvementisexpectedbetweentheexecutiveagencyandthe...recipientwhencarryingouttheactivitycontemplatedintheagreement.”).3 SeeChristopherR.Yukins,A Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent Model,40puB. cont. l.J. 63,63(2010)(applyingeconomicagencytheorytofederalprocurementandnotingagentcontrolsexiststhroughmonitoringandsanctioningmeasures).
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Thelawconcerningconflictsofinterestinpublicacquisitionisonesuchexample.From1863to1962,foralmostahundredyears,federallawcriminalizedtheconflictitself:one’sperformanceofpublicacquisitionwithanentitywithwhichoneisfinanciallyinterested.Thislawwasgenerallyapplicableandimpliedregardlessofemployerorpublicacquisitionvehicleoneworkedunder.
Butthen,in1962,thelawchanged.Congresswidenedthefieldofprohibitedpersonalconflictsapplicabletogovernmentemployeesbutwhollydecriminalizedthesameactivityforeveryoneelse.Thus,overnight,Congresslegalizednon-governmentemployeesrecommendingthegovernmentdobusinesswithfirmstheyhadafinancialinterestin,opiningaboutthetechnicalqualificationsofsaidfirms,andevenselect-ingsaidfirmsforgovernmentbusinesswhensoempoweredthroughtheirpublicacquisitionvehicle.4Thelawwentfromwideandthintonarrowanddeep.
Since1962,andespeciallyinmoderntimes,therehasbeenarenewedinterestintheconflictsofinterestofnon-governmentalemployees5astheissuestheoldlawpreventedoraddressedbegantoemergeagainastheirpriorrestraintshadbeenremoved.6Agenciesworkinglargelyindependently,andevenCongress,re-inventedthewheeloverandoveragainthroughrules,regulations,contractoragreementclauses,andevenstatutes.Aloosepatchworkemerged.ThemostrecentremedialpatchisFARSubpart3.11,PreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,anditsassociatedclause,FAR52.203-16.Butitisnottheonlyone.
Thisarticleadvocatesthecriminalizationoftheevilitself:performanceofconflictedpublicacquisition.Doingsowouldcreateacommonfoundation7
4 See generally AdMInIstrAtIve conFerence oF the unIted stAtes, AdMInIstrAtIve conFerence recoMMendAtIon 2011-3: coMplIAnce stAndArds For governMent contrActor eMployees—personAl conFlIcts oF Interest And use oF certAIn non-puBlIc InForMAtIon10(2011),available athttp://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recommendation%202011-3%20%28Contractor%20Ethics%29.pdf(notingthatacquisitionsupportandoperations&managementservicespresentahigherriskofconflictedpersonalbehavior).But seeProfessionalServicesCouncil,ReviewofRegulatoryCoverageRegardingPreventionofPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployees(FARPCIComment)at6,available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAR-2011-0091-0002(governmentservicestradeassociationcontendingreferencedservicesdonot“perse,raisetheriskof”personalconflictofinterest).5 See, e.g.,NationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2013,Pub.L.No.112-239,§829,126Stat.1632,1841-2(2013)(directingtheSecretaryofDefensetodeterminewhethertheapplicationofcontractorpersonalconflictsofinterestregulationsshouldbeexpanded);ReviewofRegulatoryCoverageRegardingPreventionofPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployees(FARPCICOMMENT),76Fed.Reg.68,046(Nov.2,2011)(requestingpubliccommentonwhetherFARSubpart3.11shouldbeexpandedincoverageorapplicationonthesamedayFARSubpart3.11waspromulgated).6 SeeAdMInIstrAtIve conFerence oF the unIted stAtes, supra note4,at6.(describinghowtheout-sourcingoffederalacquisitionfunctionshasdrivenaneedfortighterethicalcontrolsoncontractoremployeesperformingthoseacquisitionfunctions).7 See generally id.at8-9(advocatingforagenerallyapplicablepersonalconflictofinterest
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uponwhichtheexistingdisparatesystems,totheextenttheyexist,caneitherarisetowardor,overtimechurntoward,harmonization.Thisarticledoesnotadvocateforparticularstatutorylanguage.Historyandthepresentdaygivedraftersmanyexamples.Someofthesearediscussedmorefullylater.Othersarefoundtheattachedfiguresfoundintheappendix.Instead,thisarticlefocusesonthecentralargumentitself:whysuchalawoughttoexist.
PartIbroadlyintroducesthearticleanditscentralthesis.PartIIrecounts
thedevelopmentandcurrentstateofconflictofinterestlawandcontrols.PartIIadditionallyreferencesthreefiguresfoundintheappendixwhereinbothcurrentconflictofinterestanduseofnon-publicinformationcontrolsarecatalogued.PartIIIdemonstrateswhycurrentconflictofinterestcontrolsareinsufficienttorecreatetheprotectionpublicacquisitionenjoyedforalmostahundredyears.PartIVaddressessomepotentialargumentsagainsttheenactmentoftheproposedfoundationallaw.Finally,PartVconcludesthisarticle.
II.DEVELOPMENTANDCURRENTSTATEOFTHELAW
Thispartdescribeshowpublicacquisitionconflictofinterest lawandcontrolsdevelopedandhowtheyapplytoday.Thissectionwillinitiallydemonstratehowtheemploymentstatusesintenselyrelevanttoconflictofinterestcontrolsonpublicacquisitiontodaywerelargelyirrelevantforalmostahundredyears.Then,willdescribehowthelawfracturedanddevelopedtowhatexiststoday.Finally,thispartwillinvitethereadertoreviewfigures1,2,and3foundintheappendixes.Doingsowillbothenablethereadertounderstandhowmanytimesthewheelhasbeenreinventedsince1962andprovidethereaderaninitialstartingpointforanothertoadvocateforparticularstatutorylanguage.Bytheend,thereadershouldunderstandthecurrentstateofconflictofinterestlaw,appreciatehowitcametobeso,andhavesomeideasonwhatanewlawmightlooklike.
A.Harmonization:1862–1963
Atleastasfarbackas1863,federallawcriminalizedcertainconflictsofinterestinpublicacquisitionregardlessoftheactor’semploymentstatus.8Thiscriminallawstated:
[N]oofficeroragentofanybankingorothercommercialcorpora-tion,andnomemberofanymercantileortradingfirm,orpersondirectlyorindirectlyinterestedinthepecuniaryprofitsorcontractsofsuchcorporationorfirm,shallbeemployedorshallactasan
prohibitionto“serveasaflooruponwhichagenciescouldbuildandwouldnotbeintendedtodeteradoptionofmoreexpansiveethicsregime,eitherindividuallyorthroughtheFARCouncil,totheextenttheagenciesfinditappropriate.”).8 SeeActofMar.2,1863,ch.67,§8,12Stat.696,698-9.CodifiedatRevStat§3490-3494(1878).
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officeroragentoftheUnitedStatesforthetransactionofbusinesswithsuchcorporationorfirm;andeverysuchofficer,agent,ormember,orperson,sointerested,whososhallact,shall,uponconvictionthereof,bepunished....9
Thiscriminallawappliedtoanypersonfunctioningasanagentforpublicacquisi-tion.Thelawmadenodistinctionintheemploymentstatusoftheagent:government,contractor,granteeemployee,oranythingbetweenoroutsidethosestatuses,thelawviewedallequallyandheldallequallytothesamestandard.10
In1909,Congressrewordedthestatuteslightlybutleftthegeneralthrustintact.
Noofficeroragentofanycorporation,jointstockcompany,orassociation,andnomemberoragentofanyfirm,orpersondirectlyorindirectlyinterestedinthepecuniaryprofitsorcontractsofsuchcorporation,jointstockcompany,association,orfirm,shallbeemployedorshallactasanofficeroragentoftheUnitedStatesforthetransactionofbusinesswithsuchcorporation,jointstockcompany,association,orfirm.Whoevershallviolatetheprovisionofthissectionshallbe[punished].11
Between1909andthenextminorrevisionin1948,tworeportedcasesconcernedtheoperationofthislaw.
Thefirst,United States v. Strang,12concernedwhetheragovernment-ownedcorporationisaninstrumentalityofthegovernment.Thesecond,Rankin v. United States,13 concernedwhetherthegovernmentcouldrefusetopayanimpliedcontractclaimfromanagentwhotransactedbusinessonbehalfofthegovernmentwhentheagentwasfinanciallyinterestedinthetransaction.Bothdemonstratethetypeofevilsthesegenerallyapplicableconflictofinterestlawssoughttothwart.
9ActofMar.2,1863,ch.67,§8,12Stat.696,698-9.10 Thislawwasnottheonlylawconcerningconflictsofinterest.Forvariousexamples,see, e.g.,Erwertv.Bluejacket,259U.S.129,135-7(1922)(holdingpubliclandtransactionbetweenIndianandassistantUnitedStatesattorneyvoidbecauseofstatutoryprohibitionof“trade”betweenIndiansandthose“employedinIndianaffairs....”);Waskeyv.Hammer,223U.S.85(1912)(federalminingclaimsurveyorpaidbyclaimantsthemselvesfoundtobeanemployeeofthegovernmentandstatutorilyprohibitedfromstakingaminingclaim);Prosserv.Finn,208U.S.67(1908)(federalspecialtimberagentheldemployeeofgovernmentandstatutorilyprohibitedfrompurchasingfederallands).11 SeeActofMar.4,1909,Pub.L.No.60-350,§41,ch.321,§41,35Stat.1088,1097.12 254U.S.491(1921).13 98Ct.Cl.357(1943).
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InStrang,theUnitedStateschargedMr.JamesH.Strangandotherswithviolating,andconspiracytoviolate,thepreviouslyreproducedlaw.14Mr.StrangwasaninspectorfortheFleetCorporation,theoperationalarmofthestatutorilyestablishedUnitedStatesShippingBoard.15Mr.StrangwasalsoamemberofthecopartnershipDuvalShipOutfittingCompany(Duval).16InFebruaryof1919,Mr.StrangsignedandexecutedthreeorderstoDuvalonbehalfofFleetCorporationforrepairworkonanothership.17Onceindicted,Mr.Strangmovedtodismiss.18Mr.StrangarguedtheFleetCorporation,asaprivatecorporationorganizedunderthelawsoftheDistrictofColumbia,wasseparateandapartfromtheUnitedStates.ProsecutorsarguedtheUnitedStatesownedall$50MsharesofFleetCorporationanditexecutedgovernmentalpowersoriginatingfromstatutorylaw.19TheSupremeCourtheldFleetCorporation“wascontrolledandmanagedbyitsownofficersandappointeditsownservantsandagentswhobecamedirectlyresponsibletoit.NotwithstandingallitsstockwasownedbytheUnitedStatesitmustberegardedasaseparateentity.”20
Strangdemonstrateshowtheproposedlaw,ifatleastbasedinpartonpriorlaws,cannaturallyfitonlypublicacquisitionratherthanprivateacquisitionforpublicpurposes.Strangshowsthefinelinebetweenthosetypesofacquisition.Whenanemployeeofatraditionalprimecontractorselectsasubcontractor,thatemployeeisnotengaginginpublicacquisition.21Theprimeis“aseparateentity.”22Butwhentheemployeeisadvising(orevenobligating)thegovernmenttopurchasefromfirmXorwritingspecificationstofavorfirmY,thatispublicacquisition.Strangshouldhelpaddressanyconcernsaboutexpansivecriminalliability.
In Rankin,thefederalWorksProgressAdministration(WPA)appointedMr.JohnH.RankinasDirectoroftheFourthPennsylvaniaDistrict.23Mr.Rankinwasalsothelong-termlessorofutilizedofficespaceonwhichhewaslosingmoney.24Mr.RankinprocuredbidsforWPAofficespace.25Mr.Rankindidnotacceptanyofthesubmittedbids,insteaddecidingtosublethisownemptyleasedofficespace
14 See Strang,254U.S.at492.15 Id.16 Id.17 Id.18 Id.19 Id.at493.20 Id.21 Thoughthelineisnotasclearwhentheprimeisactingasaleadsystemsintegratororotherwiseprovidinglargelyacquisitionservices.22 Strang,254U.S.at493.23 Rankinv.UnitedStates, 98Ct.Cl.357,358(1943).24 Id. at 358-9.25 Id.at358.
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toWPAatthelowestsquare-footageratereceivedviathebids.26WhenMr.Rankinrequestedpaymentforhisspace,thegovernmentrefused.Asnoleasehadactuallybeensigned,27Mr.Rankinsuedunderimpliedcontracttheory.28TheCourtofClaimsfoundMr.RankinwasclearlyanagentforthegovernmentintheacquisitionofWPAofficespaceandMr.Rankinhadattemptedtousetheprojectedfederalleasepaymentstooffsetaportionofhismonthlyrentpaymentobligation.29TheCourtofClaimsheldthatarrangementviolatedthereproducedabovestatuteand,thus,anyimpliedcontractwasvoid.30
Rankinclearlydemonstratestheeviltheproposedlawseekstoprevent.OnemayarguethatbecauseMr.Rankinwasagovernment,orspecialgovernment,employee,hisactswouldbecriminaltoday31andthecourtwouldhavereachedthesameresult.32Whilethatmaybetrue,thatargumentbothmissesthelargerpointandassumesakeyfact.Thelargerpointisthatitdoesnotrequireagovernmentemployeetoengageinconflictedpublicacquisition.Butmoreimportantly,suchanargumentpresupposesMr.Rankinwasafederalemployee.Mr.Rankinwasappointed“inhisindividualcapacity....”33Backthen,manypersonsstraddledthelinebetweenformalgovernmentemployeeandsimpleagentofthegovernment.Thelineswerenotasclearthenastheycanbenow.Buttoday,whilethelinesonpaperareclear,thelinesinpracticearenot.Rankinisagoodexampleofhowagenerallyapplicablelawcriminalizingconflictedpublicacquisitioncouldoperateoutsidean18U.S.C.§208context.
In1948,Congressrecodifiedthesubstanceofthe1909law.
Whoever,beinganofficer,agentormemberof,ordirectlyorindirectlyinterestedinthepecuniaryprofitsorcontractsofanycorporation,joint-stockcompany,orassociation,orofanyfirmorpartnership,orotherbusinessentity,isemployedoractsasanofficeroragentoftheUnitedStatesforthetransactionofbusinesswithsuchbusinessentity,shallbe[punished].34
26 Id.at360.27Mr.Rankinsignedtheleaseasthelessorbutneversenttheleaseoffforcounter-signingbythegovernment.Id.at361.28 Id. at366-7.29 Id.30 Id.at367.31 See18U.S.C.§208(a)(2013)(conflictofintereststatuteforgovernmentandspecialgovernmentemployees).32 See18U.S.C.§218(2013)(allowingagenciestovoidcontractsconnectedwithconvictionsof18U.S.C.§208).33 Rankin,98Ct.Cl.at358.34 SeeActofJune25,1948,Pub.L.No.80-772,ch.645,§434,62Stat.683,703.
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In1962,thislawwouldbesignificantlychangedtoitsmoderninceptionasapplyingonlytogovernmentemployees.35Butjustbeforethelawchanged,theSupremeCourtdecidedacasethat,likeRankin,demonstratedtheevilssuchalawattemptedtothwart,anddidso.ThiscaseisespeciallyhelpfulhereastheSupremeCourtgaveaverysalientanalysisofwhyone’semploymentstatusshouldbeirrelevantwhenguardingagainstconflictsofinterestinpublicacquisition.
InUnited States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.,36theSupremeCourtaffirmedthegovernment’svoidingofacontractwiththeMississippiValleyGenerat-ingCompany(“MississippiValley”)becauseofapersonalconflictofinterestarisingfromanongovernmentemployeenegotiatorandadvisor,Mr.AdolphH.Wenzell.37MississippiValleydidnotemployMr.Wenzell.Instead,heworked(before,during,andpresumablyafterhisworkwiththegovernmentontheinstantcontract)forabankinvolvedinpotentiallyfinancingthefederalworkMississippiValley’ssoughttosecure.38Therefore,Mr.WenzelstoodtofinanciallygainifMississippiValleyreceivedthecontract.
Thegovernmentdiscoveredtheconflictaftercontractformationandvoidedthecontract.MississippiValleythensuedforbreachdamagesandwonattheCourtofClaims.39Thegovernmentpetitionedforandwasgrantedcertiorari.40AttheSupremeCourt,thegovernmentarguedMr.Wenzell’sconflictofinterestgavethegovernmentcausetovoidthecontract.41
TheSupremeCourtagreed.MississippiValleyarguedMr.Wenzellwasnotanagentofthegovernmentbecause:
[Mr.Wenzell]tooknooathofoffice;hehadnotenure;...heservedwithoutsalary,exceptfor$10perdayinlieuofsubsistence;hisdutiesweremerelyconsultative,wereoccasionalandtemporaryandwerenotprescribedbystatute;andhewaspermittedtocontinueinhispositionasoneofthevicepresidentsanddirectorsofFirstBostonandtodrawhissalaryfromthatcompany.42
35 SeeActofOctober23,1962,Pub.L.No.87-849,76Stat.1119,1124-5.36 364U.S.520(1961).37 Id.at525-47.38 Id.39 See MississippiValleyGeneratingCo.v.UnitedStates,147Ct.Cl.1(1959).40 SeeUnitedStatesv.MississippiValleyGeneratingCo.,362U.S.939(1960).41 SeeUnitedStatesv.MississippiValleyGeneratingCo.,364U.S.at524.42 Id.at552(quotationsomitted).
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TheSupremeCourtfoundMr.Wenzell’semploymentnotdeterminative.
[Mr.Wenzell]whohastakennooathofoffice,whohasnotenure,andwhoreceivesnosalaryisjustaslikelytosubordinatetheGov-ernment’sinteresttohisownasisaregular,fulltimecompensatedcivilservant.Thisisundoubtedlywhy[18U.S.C.§434]appliesnotonlytothosewhoare‘employed’bytheGovernment,butalsoto‘(w)hoever...acts’asanagentfortheGovernment.43
Instead,theSupremeCourtfocusedontherelationshipbetweentheparties,whatthegovernmentknewandwhenitknewit,andMr.Wenzell’scontributionstothefinaldeal.TheSupremeCourt’sanalysisturnedontheextentofMr.Wenzell’sacquisitionsupportservicesratherthanformaltitlesorauthority.44
BothMississippi ValleyandRankinaregreatexamplesofhowagenerallyapplicablecriminallawcanguardagainstpersonallyconflictedpublicprocurement.Whatisespeciallynoteworthyishowbothcasesaroseinthecontextofaclaim.NotethatinStrang,thegovernmentactedinitssovereignprosecutorialrole,usingthelawasasword.Inthatcase,theSupremeCourtreadthelaw,andparticularlytheboundsofagency,tobefairlylimited.Butwhenthegovernmentactedinitsmarketrole,usingthelawasashieldtodefendagainstclaimsarisingoutoftransactionsrifewithpersonalconflictsofinterest, thecourtsreadthegenerallyapplicablecriminallawmoregenerously.Thesecasesdemonstratecourts’abilitytoeffectuatetheproposedgenerallyapplicablecriminallaw’sbroaderpolicyobjectiveswithoutgivingprosecutorsexpansivenewpowers.
B.Disharmonization:1962–Present
In1962,Congresscreatedthecurrentchapter11oftitle18tohousethevariouscriminalstatutesregardingbribery,graft,andconflictofinterest.45Thisrewritereplaced18U.S.C.§434,andahostofotherstatutes,withthemoderninceptionoftheconflictofinterestcriminalstatute,18U.S.C.§208.18U.S.C.§208expandedthescopeofpotentialcriminalbehaviorfrombusinesstransactionswithabusinessthepersonheldaninterestintoanypersonalandsubstantialinvolvementwithaparticularmattertouchingupontheperson’sfinancialinterests.46Therewasjustonecatch:18U.S.C.§208appliedthen,asitappliesnow,onlytogovernmentemployees.Thecoveragewentfromwideandthintonarrowanddeep.Therepealof18U.S.C.§434withoutareplacementcoveringnon-governmentemployeesdecriminalizedovernightwhathadbeencriminalforalmostahundredyears.
43 Id.44 Id.at533(describingthegermaneconduct).45 SeeActofOct.23,1962,Pub.L.No.87-849,76Stat.1119.46 Compare18U.S.C.§208(2013),withActofJune25,1948,ch.645,§434,62Stat.683,703(germanelawcodifiedat18U.S.C.§434).
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WhytherewritedroppedcoverageonthoseoutsideafederalemploymentstatusisnotapparentfromtheCongressionalRecord.47Theomissiondidnotseemintentional.Congresswasinterestedinensuringtherevisedstatutes,asawhole,facilitatedrecruitmentoftalent,especiallytemporarytalent,togovernmentservice.Inanefforttocreateamiddleground,Congressspecificallycreatedthe“specialgovernmentemployee”48categorytocatchtemporarilyemployedpersonswithin18U.S.C.§208andotherstatutes.49Thisdefinitionincludedthosewhoworkedforthegovernmentforfewerthan130outofthepreceding365days.50SuchacategorylikelyappliedtotheMr.Wenzellsofthe1960s.Butitcertainlyhaslittlevaluetoday.Rareistheonewho(intentionally)worksforthegovernmentfewerthan130daysoutofthepreceding365days.Sowhytheenactedstatutoryschemedecriminalizedcontractorandgranteeemployeesengaginginconflictedpublicacquisitionisunknown.
Withthedisharmonization,conflictofinterestlawlargelyfracturedintothreeseparatebodies.51Eachbodyoflawwillbeexaminedtocontinuethestoryfrom1962tothepresent.
1.GovernmentEmployees
Developmentsinconflictofinterestlawafter1962focusedalmostexclu-sivelyonfederalemployees.Initially,PresidentJohnF.Kennedyissuedanexecutiveorderthatrequiredvarioustoplevelofficials,boardandcommissionmembers,andhisstafftoensuretheirconductdidnotresultorappeartoresultinthe“[u]seofpublicofficeforprivategain[,a]nylossofcompleteindependenceorimpartiality[,ora]nyadverseeffectontheconfidenceofthepublicintheintegrityoftheGovernment.”52In1965,PresidentLyndonB.Johnsonfurtherrefinedthoserules,expandingtheirreachtoanyexecutivebranch“employee”andspellingoutspecificprohibitions.53TheEthicsinGovernmentActof197854codifiedthepracticeofroutinefinancialdisclosuresforcertainhighlevelgovernmentemployees55andestablishedthe
47 See, e.g.,107cong. rec.H14,774-82(Aug.7,1961),108cong. rec.S11,258-61(June21,1962),108cong. rec.S21,975-92(Oct.3,1962),108cong. rec.H22,311-3(Oct.4,1962)(variousdebatesandreportsabouttheproposedandenactedlaw).48 SeeActofOctober23,1962,Pub.L.No.87-849,§202,76Stat.1119,1121.49 See18U.S.C.§202(a)(2013).50 Pub.L.No.87-849,§202,76Stat.1121.Thegermanepartsofthedefinitionremaininthelawtoday.See18U.S.C.§202(a).51 Notethatemployeesofpartiesinothertransactionagreements(OTAs),likeOTAsthemselves,defyclassification.Assuch,theywillnotbediscussedparticularly.52 Exec.OrderNo.10,939,26Fed.Reg.3,951(May6,1961).53 SeeExec.OrderNo.11,222,30Fed.Reg.6,469(May11,1965).TheorderspecificsweresetagainstthesamepolicyoutlinedinPresidentKennedy’sorder.Compareid.at§201(c),withExec.OrderNo.10,939at¶2(essentiallythesamesixprincipals).54 Pub.L.No.95-521,92Stat.1824(1978).55 Id. atTitlesI,II,andIII.
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OfficeofGovernmentEthics(OGE).56OncetheOGEbecameaseparateagencyin1988,57PresidentGeorgeH.W.BushtaskedtheOGEwithpromulgating“asingle,comprehensive,andclearsetofexecutive-branchstandardsofconduct....”58
InexecutingPresidentBush’sorder,theOGEbuiltuponpriorexecutiveordersconcerningethics.Forexample,OGEprohibitedfederalemployeesfromengaging“inafinancialtransactionusingnon-publicinformation,norallowtheimproperuseofnon-publicinformationtofurtherhisownprivateinterestorthatofanother,whetherthroughadviceorrecommendation,orbyknowingunauthorizeddisclosure.”59Thisprohibitioncanbetracedthroughpriorexecutiveorders.PresidentKennedy’s1961orderprohibitedthefewgovernmentemployeesitconcernedfromusing“publicofficeforprivategain....”60PresidentJohnson’s1965orderexpandedtheapplicationoftheprincipletoallgovernmentemployeesandfleshedoutitsscopebyexplicitlyprohibitinggovernmentemployeesfromengaging“directlyorindirectly,[in]financialtransactionsasaresultof,orprimarilyrelyingupon,infor-mationobtainedthroughtheiremployment.”61AndPresidentBush’sorderrefinedthatlanguagetostate“[e]mployeesshallnotengageinfinancialtransactionsusingnon-publicGovernmentinformationorallowtheimproperuseofsuchinformationtofurtheranyprivateinterest.”62
56 Id.atTitleIV.Initially,theOGEwasunderthepriorincarnationoftheOfficeofManagementandBudget.See id.at§401(a)(“ThereisestablishedintheOfficeofPersonnelManagementanofficetobeknownastheOfficeofGovernmentEthics.”).LatertheOGEbecameaseparateagencyasitistoday.Onceaseparateagency,theOGEbecametheregulatoryauthorityforexecutivebranchethicsprogramsandrule-making.SeeMission & Responsibilities,unIted stAtes oFFIce oF governMent ethIcs,http://www.oge.gov/About/Mission-and-Responsibilities/Mission---Responsibilities/(lastvisitedAugust14,2014).57 SeePub.L.No.100-598,§3,102Stat.3031,3031(Nov.3,1988)(reauthorizingtheOfficeofGovernmentEthics).58 SeeExec.OrderNo.12,674,§201(a),54Fed.Reg.15,159(Apr.12,1989).NotePresidentBushlatermodifiedthisexecutiveorder;however,themodificationsarenotgermanetothisarticle.CompareExec.OrderNo.12,731,55Fed.Reg.42,547(Oct.17,1990),withExec.OrderNo.12,674,54Fed.Reg.15,159(Apr.12,1989)(minorchangestoappointeesanddelegations).59 StandardsofEthicalConductforEmployeesoftheExecutiveBranch,5C.F.R.§2635.703(a)(2013)(useofnon-publicinformation).See alsoStandardsofEthicalConductforEmployeesoftheExecutiveBranch,57Fed.Reg.35,006,35,032(Aug.7,1992)(thisrule’s“broadreachisaconsequenceofthebreadthoftheunderlyingprincipleasstatedin[ExecutiveOrder12,674].Whilespecificallyprohibitinganemployeefromengagingina‘financialtransaction’usingnon-publicinformation,theprincipleprovidesfurtherthatanemployeeshallnotallowtheuseofnon-publicinformationtofurther‘anyprivateinterest.’Thepurposeoftheprincipleisasmuchtoprotectnon-publicinformationasitistoensurethattheemployeeandothersdonotprofitfromtheimproperdisclosureofsuchinformation.”).60 Exec.OrderNo.10,939,§2(a),26Fed.Reg.3,951,3,951(May6,1961).61 Exec.OrderNo.11,222,§203(b),30Fed.Reg.6,469,6470(May11,1965).62 Exec.OrderNo.12,731,§101(c),55Fed.Reg.42,547,42,547(Oct.17,1990).
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Andthatiswherewearetoday:18U.S.C.§208andvariousinterpretativeregulations.63
2.ContractorEmployees
After1962,contractoremployees’conflictsofinterestwerecontrolled,ifatall,byad hocmeans.Someagenciespassedregulations.64Somemandatedcontractclauses.65Othersnegotiatedclausesparticulartocertaincontracts.66Withoutagenerallyapplicablecriminallaw,thegapingholeleftin1962becamemoreandmorepronouncedduringtheextensiveoutsourcingofgovernmentalfunctions,toincludeacquisitionfunctions,duringthefirstdecadeofthetwenty-firstcentury.
In2007,theAcquisitionAdvisoryPanel67(“Panel”)gavesomeattentiontothedisharmonizationinethicscontrolsbetweengovernmentandcontractoremployeeswhowereexecutingsimilarworkbutoperatingunderentirelydifferentethicsregimes.68WhilethePanelultimately“concludedthatitwasnotnecessarytoadoptanynewfederalstatutestoimposeadditional[conflictofinterest]requirementsuponcontractorsortheirpersonnel,”69thePaneldidrecommendtheFARCouncilreviewthecurrentregimeand“createnew,uniform,government-widepolicyandclausesdealingwith...personalconflictsofinterest,aswellastheprotectionofcontractorconfidentialandproprietarydata.”70
63 See infraFigure1.64 See infraFigure2.65 See id.66 See u.s. gov’t AccountABIlIty oFFIce,GAO-08-169,deFense contrActIng: AddItIonAl personAl conFlIct oF Interest sAFeguArds needed For certAIn dod contrActor eMployees52-6(2008),available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08169.pdf(discussingselectedconflictofinterestclauses).67 ThePanelwascreatedto“toreviewlawsandregulationsregardingtheuseofcommercialpractices,performance-basedcontracting,theperformanceofacquisitionfunctionsacrossagencylinesofresponsibility,andtheuseofGovernmentwidecontracts.”NationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2004,Pub.L.No.108-136,§1423(a),117Stat1392,1663(Nov.24,2003).WhilethePanelwasnotspecificallytaskedtoreviewthedevelopmentoftheblendedworkforce,thePanelfoundaddressingthematter“essential....”AcquIsItIon AdvIsory pAnel, report oF the AcquIsItIon AdvIsory pAnel to the oFFIce oF FederAl procureMent polIcy And the unIted stAtes congress23(2007),available athttps://www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/24102_GSA.pdf.68 SeeAcquIsItIon AdvIsory pAnel,supra note67.69 Id.at423.70 Id.at25(parentheticalsomitted).See also Id.at389-419(chapterentitled“AppropriateRoleofContractorsSupportingGovernment”);Id.at407-13(discussing“PersonalConflictsofInterest”forcontractoremployees);Id.at422-6(discussingrelatedrecommendations).
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SomeinCongresstookthispartofthePanel’srecommendationstoheart.IntheSenate,theAccountabilityinGovernmentContractingActof2007(“AGCA”)wasintroduced.71AsimilarbillwasintroducedintheHouse.72Bothversionsessen-tiallysoughttostudytheissuefurther.Bothpassedtheirrespectivechambersbutnottheotherchamber.Andneitherbillhadanythingtodowithgranteeemployees.
TheissueremainedaliveoutsideofCongress.73InMarch2008,theFARCouncilopenedacaserequestingcommentson“if,when,andhowservicecontractoremployees’[personalconflictofinterest]needtobeaddressed....”74TheFARCouncilextendedthecommentperiodonce75andreceived14comments.76Thecommentsrangedfromsupportingthegeneralthrustoftheregulationtostatingthecurrentdecentralizedagency-specificregimewassufficient.77
WhiletheFARCouncilponderedthematter,Congressmoveduptheirtimelinethroughsection841oftheDuncanHunterNationalDefenseAuthoriza-tionActforFiscalYear2009(hereinafter“Section841”).78Section841requiredtheAdministratorforFederalProcurementPolicyto“developandissueastan-dardpolicytopreventpersonalconflictsofinterestbycontractoremployeesper-formingacquisitionfunctionscloselyassociatedwithinherentlygovernmentalfunctions. . . .”79TheFARCouncilopenedanewFARcase80and,afternotice
71 SeeAccountabilityinGovernmentContractingActof2007,S.680,110thCong.§209(b)(aspassedbySenate,Nov.7,2007).72 SeeAccountabilityinContractingAct,H.R.1362,110thCong.,§302(a)(aspassedbyHouse,Mar.15,2008).73 See, e.g.,u.s. gov’t AccountABIlIty oFFIce,supra note66;[email protected],toauthor(Sept.27,2012,08:41EST)(onfilewithauthor)(containingJune2007speechfromOGEDirectorRobertI.CusicktotheDefenseIndustryInitiativeonBusinessEthicsandConduct).74 See FederalAcquisitionRegulation,ServiceContractorEmployeePersonalConflictsofInterest,73Fed.Reg.15,961,15,961(Mar.26,2008)(commentsrequested)[hereinafterFAR].75 See FAR,ServiceContractorEmployeePersonalConflictsofInterest,73Fed.Reg.34,600(June17,2008)(commentperiodextended).76 SeeFAR,ServiceContractorEmployeePersonalConflictsofInterest(June4,2008),available athttp://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAR-FAR-2008-0002-0025.77 See id.78 SeeDuncanHunterNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2009,Pub.L.No.110-417,§841,122Stat.4,356,4,537-9(Oct14,2008)(codifiedin41U.S.C.§2303(2013)).79 Id.at§841(a).80 See FAR,PreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,74Fed.Reg.58,584-9(Nov.13,2009)(FARCase2008-025).ThepriorFARcase,FARCase2007-017,waswithdrawnonJune29,2010,adatebetweenthefirstissuanceofFARCase2008-025onNovember13,2009,andtheresultingfinalrulepublicationonNovember2,2011.See RINData,RIN:9000-AK97,FAR,ServiceContractorEmployeePersonalConflictsofInterest(2012),available athttp://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201104&RIN=9000-AK97.TheFederalRegisterforJune29,2010,doesnotcontainareferencetothewithdrawingofFARCase2007-017.See RecoveryAccountabilityandTransparencyBoard,75Fed.Reg.37,287-706(June29,2010).
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andcomment,81publishedwhatisnowknownasFARSubpart3.11inNovemberof2011.82
Andthatiswherewearetoday:FARSubpart3.11overlayingapatchworkof(mostly)regulationsandcontractclauses.83
3.GranteeEmployees
Chapter11oftitle18andimplementingandsupplementalregulationsestablishthenormsforgovernmentemployeesconfrontedwithconflictsofinterest.FARSubpart3.11,inafashion,functionssimilarlyforcontractoremployees.Butlittlesimilargeneralguidanceexistswithinthegrantcommunity.
TheonlygenerallyapplicableconflictofinterestcontrolisfoundinOfficeofManagementandBudget(OMB)guidanceandforms.84OMBinitiallyreceivedauthorityto“prescribesuchrulesandregulationsasaredeemedappropriate”forgrantadministrationin1968undertheIntergovernmentalCooperationActof1968.85OMBhasretainedthatauthorityovertime.86OMBhasissuedvariouscirculars,beginningin1971,toprovideguidanceongrantawardandadministration, tostandardsofconductregardingconflictsofinterest.87
Whiletheconflictofinterestrulesforgranteeemployeesaremuchlessdefined,courtshaveaffirmedthegovernment’sabilitytovoidagrantawardtaintedwithconflictofinterestaswasdoneinMississippi Valley. InTown of Fallsburg v.
81 SeeFAR,PreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions(June4,2008),available athttp://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAR-2009-0039-0018.82 See FAR,PreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,76Fed.Reg.68,017(Nov.2,2011).83 See infra Figure2.84 SeeinfraFigure3.85 Pub.L.No.90-577,§403,82Stat.1098,1104(Oct.16,1968).86 Thisareaofthecodehasseensignificantrevision.See, e.g., ChiefFinancialOfficersActof1990,Pub.L.No.101-576,§202,104Stat.2838,2840(Nov.15,1990);Pub.L.No.97-258,§§6301-8,96Stat.877,1003-5(Sept.13,1982).However,throughthoserevisionsandthroughtoday,OMBretainedauthoritytosetgeneralgrantawardandadministrationpolicy.See31U.S.C.§503(b)(2)(C)(2013)(currently,theOMBDeputyDirectorforManagementissotasked).87 SeeGrantsandCooperativeAgreementswithStateandLocalGovernments,59Fed.Reg.52,224,52,225(Oct.14,1994)(requiringagenciestousetheSF-424candSF-424dforapplications);GrantsandCooperativeAgreementswithStateandLocalGovernments,53Fed.Reg.8,028,8,030(Mar.11,1988)(same).See alsoUniformAdministrativeRequirementsforGrantandAgreementswithInstitutionsofHigherEducation,HospitalsandOtherNon-profitOrganizations,58Fed.Reg.62,992,63,001(Nov.29,1993)(statingthesameconflictofinterestprohibitioncurrentlystatedat2C.F.R.§215.42);UniformAdministrativeRequirementsforGrantsandAgreementsWithInstitutionsofHigherEducation,Hospitals,andOtherNon-ProfitOrganizations(OMBCircularA-110),69Fed.Reg.26,281(May11,2004)(movingOMBCircularNo.A-110totheCodeofFederalRegulations).
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United States,88theEPAwithheldcost-sharingCleanWaterActgrantfundsfromtheTownofFallsburg,NewYork,whentheTownSupervisorresponsibleforawardingthegrant-fundedcontracts,hadaconflictofinterest.TheU.S.AttorneychargedandconvictedtheTownSupervisorofmailfraud,falsestatements,racketeering,andotheroffensesinvolvingtheconflictedgrant-fundedcontracts.ThedistrictcourtspecificallyfoundthattheTownSupervisorhadnotfullydisclosedhisfinancialrelationshipwithawardeecontractor,hadnotrefrainedfromcontractadministrationdutiesasdirected,andhadexecutedvariousformsfraudulentlytocoverhisconflict.89
Thegrantadministratorpulledfundingpursuanttothegrant’stermsfindingthatthegrantee,theTownofFallsburg,hadfailedtocomplywiththe“GranteeResponsibilityforStandardsofConduct.”90Onappeal,thecourtutilizedanAdmin-istrativeProceduresAct(APA)standardofreview91andheldtheagency’sdecisionreasonablethusaffirmingamodern-dayversionofMississippi Valley.
Andthatiswherewearetoday:variousmandatoryOMBregulationsandstandardformsandahelpfulcase.92
III.AGENERALLYAPPLICABLECRIMINALLAWWOULDADDRESSTHEINADEQUACIESOFTHECURRENTPATCHWORK
Thispartexamineshowcontractualandregulatorysolutionsareinadequateandwhyagenerallyapplicablecriminallawisnecessary.ThevacuumCongressleftin1962invited,naymandated,contractualandregulatorysolutionsfromagenciesmostaffected.Butwithoutagenerallyapplicablecriminallawonwhichtobuild,theseeffortswerespotty,narrow,andredundant.AsFigures2and3demonstrate,contractualorregulatorysolutionscomeinallshapesandsizes.Withoutacommonfoundation,harmonizationisdifficult,unnecessary,andunvalued.Agency-developedmechanismssharelimitedapplication,dissimilarmeans,andcannotholdindividualsresponsible.Agenerallyapplicablecriminallawwouldcreatethestructureonwhichtoaddressthoseshortcomings.Agenerallyapplicablecriminallawwouldcreatethenecessaryfoundation.Andthatfoundation,agenciescouldimplementnuancedcontrolmechanism,learnfromothers’experiences,andrelyonthecriminaljusticesystemforincrediblybadcases.Oneneedonlylookattheentireethicsregimecraftedaround18U.S.C.§208toseehowasinglecriminallawcansupportavibranthouseofanti-corruptioncontrols.Asimilarlawapplicabletocontractorandgranteeemployeescoulddothesame.
88 TownofFallsburgv.UnitedStates,22Cl.Ct.633(1991).89 Id.at638-9.90 Id.at639-40.91 Id.at641-2.92 See infraFigure3.
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A.ConcerningContractors,WhytheCurrentPatchworkisInadequate
EffectiveDecember2,2011,93FARSubpart3.11wasthefirstrealmacro-levelattemptatcontrollingconflictsofinterestamongstcontractoremployeesengagedinpublicacquisition.Priorregulationsconcernedorganizationalconflictsofinterest,94thoughsuchregulationsneednothavebeensolimited.95FARSubpart3.11perhapsattemptedtocreateacommonfoundationonwhichagencyFARsupplementscouldbuild.However,ittoosuffersfromlimitationsofapplication,purpose,andreach.
TheanalysisbelowwilldetailmanyofFARSubpart3.11’scoreproblematicissues.Specialattentionwillbepaidtohowparticularissuesevinceaneedforagenerallyapplicablecriminallawratherthanadministrativetinkering.96
1.ItDoesn’tRequireWhatit’sSupposedtoRequire
CongressmandatedFARregulationsthatwouldpreventpersonalconflictsofinterestbycontractoremployeesperformingacquisitionsupportfunctions.97WhatCongressgotwereFARregulationsthatmandatedcontractorsestablishasystemreasonablycalculatedtopreventemployeesfromperformingacquisitionsupportserviceswhileconflicted.Thus,Congressgotasystemgearedtowardaresultratherthantheresultitself.Thisswitchisespeciallyevidentwhencomparing
93 FAR,PreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,76Fed.Reg.68,017,68,026(Nov.2,2011).94 SeeFederalAcquisitionRegulationsforNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration,48C.F.R.subpart9.5(2013)[hereinafterFAR].95 SeeNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear1989,Pub.L.No.100-463,§8141,102Stat.2270,47-8(Oct.1,1988)(requiringtheenactmentofregulationsconcerningconflictofintereststandardsfor“persons”providing“such...servicesrelatedtoFederalcontracts...totheextentnecessarytoidentifyandevaluatethepotentialforconflictsofinterestthatcouldbeprejudicialtotheinterestsoftheUnitedStates.”)(codifiedat41U.S.C.§2304).See also41U.S.C.§1121(a),(b)(2013)(theAdministratoroftheOfficeofFederalProcurementPolicy“shallprovideoveralldirectionofprocurementpolicyandleadershipinthedevelopmentofprocurementsystems[and]mayprescribeGovernment-wideprocurementpolicies.”).96 See, e.g.,NationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2013,Pub.L.No.112-239,§829,126Stat.1632,1841-2(Jan.2,2013)(directingtheSecretaryofDefenseto“reviewtheguidanceonpersonalconflictsofinterestforcontractoremployees...inordertodeterminewhetheritwouldbeinthebestinterestoftheDepartmentofDefenseandthetaxpayerstoextendsuchguidance”beyondcontractoremployeesprovidingacquisitionsupportservices);ReviewofRegulatoryCoverageRegardingPreventionofPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployees,76Fed.Reg.68,046(Nov.2,2011)(requestingpubliccommentonwhetherFARSubpart3.11shouldbeexpandedincoverageorapplicationonthesamedayFARSubpart3.11waspromulgated).97 DuncanHunterNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2009,Pub.L.No.110-417,§841(a),122Stat.4356,4537-9(2008).Thelawparticularlyappliestocontractorswhosecontracts“involveperformanceofacquisitionfunctionscloselyassociatedwithinherentlygovernmentalfunctionsfor,oronbehalfof,aFederalagencyordepartment.”Id.at§841(a).See alsoFAR,48C.F.R.3.1106(a)(2)(2013).
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thestatutorybasisforthetwothrustsofFARSubpart3.11:conflictsofinterestanduseofnon-publicinformation.
Congress’spolicydirectiveandlistingofpolicyelementsconcernedcon-flictsofinterest.Congressfirstmandated“develop[ment]andissu[anceof]astandardpolicytopreventpersonalconflictsofinterestbycontractoremployeesperformingacquisition[support]functions....”98Congressthen,asoneofsevenpolicyenu-meratedelements,statedthedevelopedpolicyshallrequirecontractorsto“identifyandprevent”personalconflictsofinterest.99Thus,Congresssetapolicyfloorinthelistingofelements(i.e.,contractorsmusthaveasystem)andsetapolicyobjectiveinthedirective(i.e.,preventcontractoremployees’personalconflictsofinterests).
Incomparison,Congressonlysetapolicyfloorforcontrollinguseofnon-publicinformation,namelythat“eachcontractorwhoseemployeesperform[acquisi-tionsupportservicesmust]...prohibitcontractoremployeeswhohaveaccesstonon-publicgovernmentinformationobtainedwhileperformingsuch[acquisitionsupportservices]fromusingsuchinformationforpersonalgain....”100Controlsonuseofnon-publicinformationdonotappearintheearlierpolicydirective.101
Therefore,craftingFARSubpart3.11torequirecontractorsadoptcertaininternalemploymentpoliciesandensureemployeesaccomplishnon-disclosureagreementssatisfiesonlystatutorypolicyelements.However,craftingFARSubpart3.11tonotactuallymandatethepreventionof“personalconflictsofinterestbycontractoremployeesperforming”acquisitionfunctionsfailstomeetthelargerpolicydirective.
Thedistinctionhasadifference.Indoingso,theregulationshiftedtheultimatecomplianceburdenfromthecontractortothecontractor’semployee.102Thecommentstothefinalruleexplicitlystatedhowtheruleintentionallyshiftedtheburdenoffthecontractor:“Thereisnothinginthe[implementing]clausethatestablishescontractorliabilityforaviolationbyanemployee,aslongasthecon-
98 DuncanHunterNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2009§841(a).99 Id.at§841(a)(1)(B)(i).100 Id. at§ 841(a)(1)(B)(ii).101 Id.at§841(a).102 Forexampleofacontractorcounselnotingandusingthisburdenshiftingtothecontractor’sadvantage,seeKeithR.Szeliga&FranklinC.Turner,Preventing Personal Conflicts of Interest Among Contractor Employees Performing Acquisition Support Services,12-4BrIeFIng pApers1,6(2012)(“Although[it]isunlikelythatcoveredemployeeswillseekorobtainfinancialdisclosuresfrom[othermembersofthehousehold]inallcases,informingthemoftheobligationtodosowillprotectthecontractor’sinterests.”).See alsoProfessionalServicesCouncil,ReviewofRegulatoryCoverageRegardingPreventionofPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployees(FARPCIComment)at2,available athttp://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAR-2011-0091-0002(governmentservicestradeassociationsimilarlyrecognizingtheburdenshifting).
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tractorfollowedtheappropriatestepstouncoverandreporttheviolation.”103Thedifferenceissubtleyetimportant,especiallyinthecivilFalseClaimsActcontext.104
RevisingtheregulationtoshiftultimatecompliancebacktothecontractorwouldhelpmeettheexplicitCongressionalpolicydirective.Ifacontractorwasliable“foraviolationbyanemployee,”105thegovernmentwouldhaveitstraditionalcontractbreachremediesand,potentially,acivilFalseClaimsActcase.ButdoingsomaybeimpossiblebecausetheFAR,throughitsimplementingclauses,bindscontractors,nottheiremployees.Saveasoleproprietorshipcontractor,thegovern-mentisonlyinprivitywiththecontractorratherthantheindividualemployees.Thus,eveniftheregulationshiftedultimatecompliancebacktothecontractor,creatingessentiallyastrictliabilitycompliancepitfall,theregulationcouldnotdowhat18U.S.C.§434couldhavedone:holdtheindividualresponsibleandclearlysupportanysubsequentcontractvoidingorterminationforanacquisitionsupportcontractoremployee’sconflictofinterest.
2.NoEffectiveOversightorComplianceMechanisms
PresidentRonaldReaganwasfamouslyfondoftheRussianmaximdovorey no provorey,meaning“trust,butverify.”106Unfortunately,FARSubpart3.11makesthegovernmenttrustthecontractorwithfewmeansofverification.Theregulationprovidesnomechanismtoverifywhethertheresponsivesystemsactuallyidentifyandpreventpersonalconflictsofinterestandprohibittheuseofnon-publicinfor-mationforpersonalgain.Theregulationdoesnotfaciallyprovidethecontractingofficeraccesstothenon-disclosureagreementsorfinancialinterestdisclosures.107Infact,theregulationdirectssuspiciouscontractingofficersto“contacttheagencylegalcounselforadvice....”108Whilethecommunicationwithone’slegalcounselcouldbebeneficial,opencommunicationbetweenthecontractingofficerandthecontractorcouldlikelybemorebeneficial.Clearauthorityforroutinerecordsaccess
103 FAR,PreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,76Fed.Reg.68,017,68,022(Nov.2,2011).104 SeeUnitedStatesv.Sci.ApplicationsInt’lCorp.,626F.3d1257(D.C.Cir.2010)(holdingacontractorwithorganizationalconflictsofinterestwhosubmitsvouchersforpaymentofadvisoryservicescanbecivillyliableundertheFalseClaimsActwhenconflict-freeadvisoryserviceswerematerialtothegovernment’sdecisiontopay);UnitedStatesexrel.Harrisonv.WestinghouseSavannahRiverCo.,176F.3d776(4thCir.1999)(similarlyholdinganorganizationalconflictofinterestcansubstantiateaFalseClaimsActcase).105 PreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,76Fed.Reg.at68,022.106 RonaldReagan,RemarksonSigningtheIntermediate-RangeNuclearForcesTreaty(Dec.8,1987),available atwww.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/120887c.htm.107 SeeFAR,48C.F.R.3.1103(a)(1)(2013)(contractormanagesentireprocess).108 SeeFAR,48C.F.R.3.1105(2013)(contractingofficerswhosuspect“violation[s]bythecontractor...shallcontacttheagencylegalcounselforadvice....”).
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coulddriveearlyandopencommunications,reducingcomplianceandpotentiallitigationcosts.
Manycurrentmechanismsforpotentiallyaccessingtheinformationareinsufficient.Underthestandardservicesinspectionclauses,thegovernmentmayreviewthe“[c]ompleterecordsofallinspectionwork....”109Astheprovisionofacquisitionsupportservicesfreeofconflictsofinterestsisnotacontractrequire-ment(onlythecreationandmaintenanceofapreventativesystemis),inspectionrecordswouldnotnecessarilyincludeanindividual’sfinancialdisclosure.110Morelikely,responsiveinspectionrecordswouldonlyindicateanindividualcompletedafinancialdisclosureandthecontractorfoundnoconflictofinterest.Similarly,qualityassurancesurveillancemaybesimilarlyineffectual.Contractadministra-torscannotreadilyobserveandmeasurepersonalconflictsofinterestintheworkplace.111Also,theauditclauseappliestorecordssubstantiatingcostsratherthanquality.112Finally,disclosuresunderthebusinessethicsrulemaybeuntimelyforanon-goingacquisition.113
Whiletheregulationsleavethegovernmentfairlyblind,ifthegovernmentweretodiscoveracontractoremployee’sconflictofinterest,theregulationgiveslittlefurtherguidance.Thedraftregulationlistedfiveremedies,114thoughthatlan-guagewaslaterremovedasunnecessarilyduplicative.115Whilethelistedremedies
109 FAR,48C.F.R.52.246-4(b)(2013);FAR,48C.F.R.52.246-5(b)(2013).110 Potentially,asavvycontractingofficercouldaddlanguagetotheperformanceworkstatementstatingthatacquisitionsupportservicesshallbeperformed“bypersonsfreeofconflictsofinterest.”However,thisthenbegsthequestionwhynotstatesuchservicesalsobe“good,”“timely,”“accurate,”“insightful,”oranyotherdescriptoronewouldhopewouldgowithoutsaying.111 SeeFAR,48C.F.R.46.401(a)(2013)(qualityassuranceoccursto“determinethat...servicesconformtocontractrequirements.”).112 SeeFAR,48C.F.R.52.215-2(b)(2013).Thepromulgatingclauseexpandstheaccessto“records...tosatisfycontractnegotiation,administration,andauditrequirements....”FAR,48C.F.R.4.703(a)(2013).However,theclausegrantsaccessonlyforcostrecords.See FAR52.215-2(b)(2013);FAR,48C.F.R.52.215-2(c)(recordssupportingacontractor’scertifiedcostorpricingdata);FAR,48C.F.R.52.215-2(d)(“directlypertinentrecords”theGovernmentAccountabilityOfficerequests);FAR,48C.F.R.52.215-2(e)(materialssupportingcontractorpreparedreports).SeealsoFAR,48C.F.R.52.214-26(2013)(similarlanguageforcontractsprocuredwithsealedbiddingprocedures).113 SeeFAR,48C.F.R.52.203-13(c)(2)(ii)(G)(2013).AcontractorwouldreportdeliveryofconflictedacquisitionsupportservicesasapotentialcivilFalseClaimviolation.SeeUnitedStatesv.Sci.ApplicationsInt’lCorp.,626F.3d1257(D.C.Cir.2010)(holdingacontractorwithorganizationalconflictsofinterestwhosubmitsvouchersforpaymentofadvisoryservicescanbecivillyliableundertheFalseClaimsActwhenconflict-freeadvisoryserviceswerematerialtothegovernment’sdecisiontopay).114 SeePreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,74Fed.Reg.58,584,58,589(Nov.13,2009)(proposedFAR,48C.F.R.52.203-16(d)).115 SeePreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,76Fed.Reg.68,017,68,022(Nov.2,2011)(“WhilethelistofremediesincludedwithinFAR52.203-16specificallyidentifiedthoseremediesavailableforviolationsinvolvingpotentialconflicts,itwasnotintendedtocreatenewremedies.Forthisreason,theCouncilshaveremoved
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gavethegovernmentnonewauthority,theirinclusionwouldhaveclarifiedtheirapplicabilityandputthecontractorthatmuchmoreonnotice.
Beyondrestatingorreaffirmingwhatalreadyis,theregulationdidnotprovideanewremedy.Theremediespreviouslylisted116havelimitedapplicabilityespeciallyformediumtosmallsizedviolations.Insuchviolations(andlargeonestoo),aprocurementmayneedtoberedone,117oraresultingcontractvoidedorterminated,118thusgeneratingsignificantreprocurementand/orterminationcosts.119AviolationcouldalsotriggercivilpenaltiesundertheFalseClaimsAct.120Whilethelawdoesallowthegovernmenttorecoversuchcosts,statingthatremedyclearly,alongwithotherones,wouldhavebettercommunicatedtoallwhatremediesareavailable.
Additionally,FARSubpart3.11hasnoremedyagainstanindividual.Thus,enforcementislimitedtoactionsthecontractortakesagainsttheemployee.Whilethemostpowerfuloftheseactions,firing,iscertainlyamotivator,theregulationdoesnot,andcouldnot,requirethatoccurrence.Themosttheregulationcoulddoisempowerthecontractingofficertoprohibitthecontractorfromassigningthatemployeetotheacquisitionsupportfunctionofthecontract.Thatemployeecouldstillworkforthecontractoronadifferentpartofthecontractorinadifferentbusinesssegment.
Potentially,theagencycouldsuspendordebaranindividual.121Asuspendedordebarredindividualwouldbe“excludedfromconductingbusinesswiththe
theparagraph....”).116 Thoseremediesweresuspensionofcontractpayments,lossofawardfee,terminationfordefault,disqualificationfromsubsequentrelatedcontractualefforts,andsuspensionordebarment.See PreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,74Fed.Reg.58,584,58,589(Nov.13,2009)(proposedFAR,48C.F.R.52.203-16(d)).117Whiletypically,thecaselawspeaksintermsofconflictsofinterestbygovernmentemployees,see, e.g., SavannahRiverAlliance,B-311126,2008CPD¶88(Comp.Gen.Apr.25,2008)(protestorallegedfederalemployeewhogavereferenceschecksofkeypersonnelhadapersonalconflictofinterestwhenshegaveapositivereferencechecktoanofferorwhoemployedherhusbandandanegativereferencechecktotheprotestor),ittakeslittleimaginationtoenvisionacontractoremployeedoingactionthatleadtotheprotest.See, e.g.,CeladonLaboratories,Inc.,B-298533,2006CPD¶158(Comp.Gen.Nov.1,2006)(protestorallegedpersonalconflictsofinterestonthepartofnon-governmenttechnicalevaluatorsforaSmallBusinessInnovationResearchprogramphaseIselection).118 See PGBA,L.L.C.v.UnitedStates,389F.3d1219(Fed.Cir.2004)(affirmingCourtofFederalClaimsdecisiontoexercisediscretioninwhethertosetasideanawardedcontractdespitematerialerrorsintheawardprocessanddecision).119 SeeCDA,Inc.v.Soc.Sec.Admin.,CBCA1558,12-1BCA¶34,990(Mar.28,2012)(statingthethreeelementsnecessaryforthegovernmenttorecoverreprocurementcosts).120See UnitedStatesv.Sci.ApplicationsInt’lCorp.,626F.3d1257(D.C.Cir.2010)(holdingacontractorwithorganizationalconflictsofinterestwhosubmitsvouchersforpaymentofadvisoryservicescanbecivillyliableundertheFalseClaimsActwhenconflict-freeadvisoryserviceswerematerialtothegovernment’sdecisiontopay).121 SeeFAR,48C.F.R.9.406-2(c)(2013)(allowingdebarment“basedonanyothercauseof
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Governmentasagentsorrepresentativesofothercontractors.”122However,thecontractoremployercouldstillemploythatpersoninadifferentbusinesssegment.Therefore,thegovernmenthaslittlemotivationtopursuesuspensionanddebarmentofindividualsasthelisting’seffectiscomparabletowhatthecontractingofficercandounderFARSubpart3.11.
Simplyaddinglanguageaffirmativelyprovidingthecontractingofficer,orhisdesignee,accesstoFAR52.203-16generateddocumentswouldaddresstherecordsissue.123However,theotheridentifiedandrecurringissuewouldremain.
Acriminallawwouldprovidecontractorssignificantlymoremotivationtopreventconflictsandcooperatewithinvestigations.Andacriminallawwouldgivethegovernmentrecourseagainstanindividualandpotentiallythecontractor,underegregiousenoughfacts,foraidingandabetting,conspiracy,orunderothercriminalliabilitytheories.
3.CommercialItemsExemption
FederalAcquisitionRegulationSubpart3.11completelyexemptedcom-mercialprocurements.124TheFARCouncilhitchedthischangetothecomments.125However,nosubmittedcommentsuggestedsuchanexemption.126Thecommercialitemsexemptiondidnotappearinthedraftrule.127Theexemptionfirstappearedinthefinalrule.
soseriousorcompellinganaturethatitaffectsthepresentresponsibilityofthecontractororsubcontractor.”);FAR,48C.F.R.9.407-2(c)(2013)(allowingsuspension“foranyothercauseofsoseriousorcompellinganaturethatitaffectsthepresentresponsibilityofaGovernmentcontractororsubcontractor.”).122 FAR,48C.F.R.9.405(a)(2013).123 See generallyFAR,48C.F.R.3.502-2(h)(2013);FAR,48C.F.R.52.203-7(c)(3)(2013)(implementationoftheAnti-Kickbackstatutethatallowsgovernmentinspectionofrelevantcontractorrecordswhenaviolationissuspected).124 SeePreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,76Fed.Reg.68,017,68,025(Nov.2,2011)(proposedFAR,48C.F.R.3.1106andamendedFAR,48C.F.R.12.503(a)(2013)containinganexemptionforcommercialitemsandservices).125 Seeid.at68,017(statingtheCouncilreviewedthecommentsand“[a]saresultofthisreview,theCouncilshaveincorporatedsomechangesinthefinalrule,includingthefollowingmoresignificantchanges...[a]mended12.503(a)toclarifythatthestatute[41U.S.C.§2303(2013)]doesnotapplytocontractsfortheacquisitionofcommercialitems.”).See 41U.S.C.§2303(2013).ThisstatuteisaJanuary4,2011,codificationofSection841.Thestatutesaysnothingaboutcommercialitems.126 See FAR,PreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,available athttp://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAR-2009-0039-0018(Jan.13,2010)(TransmittalMemoandComments#1-19).127 SeePreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,74Fed.Reg.58,584,58,584-9(Nov.13,2009)(notincludinganexclusionofapplicabilityforcommercialitemprocurements).
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Thisexemptionappearstobemorearesultofinactionratherthanaction.BothSection841andFARSubpart3.11wereenactedafterOctober14,1994.Sec-tion841didnotcontainanycriminalorcivilpenaltiesoraspecificstatementofapplicabilitytocommercialprocurements,nordidtheFARCouncilmakeawrittendeterminationtomakeSection841applicabletocommercialitemprocurements.Thus,Section841andtheresultingFARSubpart3.11arenotapplicabletocom-mercialprocurements.128Presumably,Congressknewthelanguage“anycontract”129withoutmorereallymeant“anynoncommercialcontract.”But,itispossibletheysimplyforgotandnoonetoldthem.
ItisperhapsmoreunfortunatethepotentialCongressionaloversightbecameanactualoversightwhentheFARCouncilpublishedthedraftFARSubpart3.11withoutthecommercialitemsexemption.Potentially,somepubliccommentcouldhavebeenreceivedontheissue.SuchcommentswouldnothavebeeninvainastheFARCouncilhadauthoritythen,asitdoesnow,toapplySection841,andthusFARSubpart3.11,tocommercialpurchases.
Itisalsopossiblethisoversightcausedcertaincommenterstoapproveofthedraftrule.Forexample,theInspectorGeneral(IG)oftheGeneralServicesAdminis-tration(GSA)submittedapubliccommenttothepredecessorFARCase,FARCase2007-017,supporting“thedevelopmentofa[FAR]Rulethataddressestheissueofpersonalconflictsofinterestamongservicecontractoremployees.”130WhilethecommentdoesnotspecificallystatetheIGhopestheGSAwouldbenefitfromsucharule,onecanfairlyassumethebusyIGlenthissupportinhopesofhavingsucharuleapplytoatleastpartofhisoversightportfolio.WhenFARCouncilpublishedthedraftrule,withthecommercialitemsexemptionomitted,theDirector,InternalEvaluationandAnalysis,GSAIG,submittedextensivesubstantivesuggestionsandrecommendations,statingtheofficeoftheGSAIG“stronglysupportstheintentofthe[draftrule].”131Presumably,theIGandhisoffice“stronglysupport[ed]”thedraftruleandspentresourcetryingtoimproveitbecausetheythoughtitwouldapply
128 ProcurementlawspassedafterOctober13,1994,areinapplicabletocommercialprocurementsunlesstheFARCouncil“makesawrittendeterminationthatitwouldnotbeinthebestinterestoftheFederalGovernmenttoexemptcontractsfortheprocurementofcommercialitemsfromtheapplicabilityofthe[law].”See41U.S.C.§1906(b)(2)(2013);thelaw“providesforcriminalorcivilpenalties.”Id. at(d)(1);or,thelawexpresslystatesapplicabilitytocommercialitemprocurements.Id.at(d)(2).129 DuncanHunterNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2009,Pub.L.No.110-417,§841(a)(3)(A),122Stat.4356,4538(Oct.14,2008)(Section841(a)“shallapplytoanycontractforanamountinexcessofthesimplifiedacquisitionthreshold....”).130 See FAR,FARCase2007-017,ServiceContractorEmployeePersonalConflictsofInterestat9(June4,2008),available athttp://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAR-FAR-2008-0002-0025.131 SeeFAR,FARCase2008-025,PreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctionsat85(Jan13,2010),available athttp://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAR-2009-0039-0018.
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toasignificantportionoftheiracquisitionsupportservicesschedules.132Hadthedraftruleclearlycommunicatedthatcommercialpurchases,andthusasignificantchunkofGSAfacilitatedtransactions,wouldbeinapplicable,theGSAIGmighthavehaddifferentinput.
Understandinghow,legally,thisexemptioncametopassisnotthesameasjustifyingit.Whyistheprovisionofcommercialacquisitionsupportserviceslesspronetoconflictofinterestriskthannoncommercialacquisitionofsupportservices?133Why,forexample,arecommercialacquisitionsupportserviceslesspronetoconflictofinterestriskthannoncommercialconflictofinterest?Hasanyoneevenaskedthequestion?Itisperhapsthatlastquestionthatisthemostunsettlingasitispresentlythemostimportantofthethree.
AgenerallyapplicablecriminallawwouldclarifythatCongressmeant“any
contract”whenitsaid“anycontract”inSection841.SuchalawwouldmakeclearCongresswantedtheregulatoryproductofSection841applicabletocommercialprocurements.Ataminimum,suchalawwouldcausetheFARCounciltorevisitboththetermsandapplicabilityofFAR3.11.
4.UntetheredandAmbiguousDefinitions
ManydefinitionsinFARSubpart3.11areawkward,unhelpful,vague,andripeforlitigation.Acatalogueofthemcouldbeapaperinofitself.134Asanexample,thissectionwillexaminedanddemonstratehowoneofthemostimportantdefinitionsisalsoamongstthemostproblematic.
Currently,a“personalconflictofinterest”existsonlywhenthecompetinginterest“couldimpairtheemployee’sabilitytoactimpartiallyandinthebestinterestoftheGovernment....”135When“could”aninterestsoimpairanemployee?TheFARprovidesan“example”listofintereststhat“may”giveraisetoconflicting
132 ForexamplesofGSAschedulesoffering,inpart,commercialacquisitionsupportservices,see, e.g.,GSAFederalAcquisitionService,Schedule520,FinancialandBusinessSolutions, http://www.gsAelIBrAry.gsA.gov/elIBMAIn/schedulesuMMAry.do?schedulenuMBer=520(lastvisitedApr.3,2013);GSAFederalAcquisitionService,Schedule871,ProfessionalEngineeringServices,http://www.gsaelibrary.gsa.gov/ElibMain/scheduleSummary.do?scheduleNumber=871(lastvisitedApr.3,2013);GSAFederalAcquisitionService,Schedule874,MissionOrientatedBusinessIntegratedSolutions(MOBIS),http://www.gsaelibrary.gsa.gov/ElibMain/scheduleSummary.do?scheduleNumber=874(lastvisitedApr.3,2013).133 Infact,onemustwonderhowacquisitionsupportservicescanevenbeacommercialitem.Federalacquisitionisuniquetothefederalgovernment.Perhapsthisisanexampleofhowthe“ofatype”languagehasbeenstretchedtoofar.SeeFAR,48C.F.R.2.101(2013)(definitionofcommercialitem).134 See, e.g.,DavidJ.Ginsberg&RobertR.Bohn,Let’s Get Personal: A Guide to the Interpretation and Implementation of the FAR Personal Conflicts of Interest Rules,47-SUMprocureMent lAw.11,13-6(2012)(identifyingvarious“InterpretationandImplementationChallenges”).135 FAR,48C.F.R.3.1101(2013);FAR,48C.F.R.52.203-16(a)(2013).
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interests.136Buttheterms“example”and“may”affirmthepossibilitythelistedinterestsmightnotalwaysgiverisetoaconflictinginterest.137Forexample,couldahighlypaidcontractoremployee’s$1Kequityinvestmentina$1Mportfolio“impair”hisperformanceofacquisitionsupportservices?Whataboutalowlypaidcontractoremployee’s$1Kequityinvestmentina$5Kportfolio?
Thedefinitionofa“personalconflictofinterest”invitessubjectiveanalysisandtheexerciseofdiscretion.Buttheregulationveststheanalysisanddecisionwiththecontractor,mandatinginvolvementofthecontractingofficeronlyifanincidentoccurred.138Arecontractorsreallythebestsituatedtomakethosedecisions?Docontractorsreallywanttomakethosedecisions—andriskthegovernment,yearslater,second-guessingthem?Willnotqualityfallovertimeascontractorswithassertiveandproactivecomplianceofficersdriveupcostsforquality,andcontractorswithmoreliberalinterpretationsbecomemorecompetitiveinamorecost-drivenacquisitionsystem?Whowillthemarketencourageaspricecontinuestodrivefiscallystrappedagencies?
Thepurportedsafeharborof“de minimis”isunhelpful.139Thedefinitionofde minimisisessentiallytheabsenceofapersonalconflictofinterest.Presumably,theFARCouncilswantedtocarveoutagreyzonebetweenapersonalconflictofinterestandnopersonalconflictofinterest,muchliketheOfficeofGovernmentEthicshasforfederalemployees.140However,intheirunwillingnesstodotheneces-saryspadework,141theFARCouncilsimplydefinedde minimisastheabsenceofapersonalconflictofinterest.
Certainly,administrativerule-makingcouldtightenthis,andother,defini-tions.ButiftheFARCouncilsaretrulyunwillingto“createamirrorimageof18U.S.C.§208,”onwhatlegalstructurewilltheytethernewdefinitions?If18U.S.C.§208anditsassociatedregulationsaredisfavored,thenfromwhenceshallguidingprinciplesspringforth?Caselaw,aswillbeshown,isoflittlehelp.Regulationsare
136 Id.137 OnemustdigintothecommentsaccompanyingtherulestolearnthattheFARCouncillikelymeant“example”and“may”todenote‘including,butnotlimitedto.’SeePreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,76Fed.Reg.68,017,68,019(Nov.2,2011).138 SeeFAR,48C.F.R.3.1103(b)(2013);FAR,48C.F.R.52.203-16(b)(6)(2013).139 FAR,48C.F.R.3.1101(2013)(definitionof“Personalconflictofinterest”hasade minimisexception);FAR,48C.F.R.52.203-16(a)(2013).140 See, e.g., 5C.F.R.§§2634.301-2634.311(2013)(describingvariousreportingthresholdsforpublicdisclosurereporters);5C.F.R.§2634.907(2013)(similarlyforconfidentialreporters);5C.F.R.§2635.204(2013)(describingvariousexceptionstothegiftrule).141 SeePreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,76Fed.Reg.at68,019(circularlyarguingagainstconcernedrespondentsthat“[i]nthedefinitionof‘personalconflictofinterest,’theregulationaffordsflexibilityregardingdeminimisinterest,sinceitmaybedeterminedthatademinimisinterestwouldnot“impairtheemployee’sabilitytoact”withtherequiredobjectivity.”).
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supposedtobebuiltonunderlyingstatutes.Withoutsuchastatute,itshouldcomeaslittlesurprisehowdifficultcraftingmeaningfuldefinitionsis.Agenerallyapplicablecriminallawwouldgreatlyassistregulators.Havingastatutoryfoundationframestheissueandletstheregulatorsfocusontheircorecompetency—implementinglaw,notcreatingit.
B.ConcerningGrantees,WhytheCurrentPatchworkisInadequate
AsshowninTown of Fallsburg,142 thegovernmentcharged theTownSupervisorwithcrimesderivingfromtheunderlyingconflictofinterest.ButthegovernmentcouldnotchargetheTownSupervisorwiththeactivitydrivingthecriminaltrain:theconflictofinterestitself.HadtheTownSupervisorsimplynotactedsostrenuouslytofurtherhisinherentconflictofinterest,nofederalcrimewouldhavehappened.That’sbecausetheunderlyingconflictitselfisnotcriminal.Andwithoutthecriminalconviction,thegrantadministrator’sargumenttosupportgrantwithholdingbeforetheCourtofClaimswouldhavebeenpotentiallymuchharder.
Figure3, infra,demonstratestheonlygenerallyapplicablelawagainstgranteeemployeesperformingpublicacquisitionwhileconflicted:aformrequiringanassurance.Thisassuranceisoneofnineteen143ortwenty144theapplicantforthegranteeprovides.Manyoftheseassurances,suchastheoneconcerningconflictsofinterest,speakoffuture,notcurrent,compliance.Thus,agranteecanreceivegrantmoneywithoutadequatesafeguardsdevelopedorimplementedbysimplypromisingtodothespadeworklater.
Moretroublingisthelackoflawunderpinningtheconflictofinterestassur-ance.OMBgrantcircularsonlyapplyconflictofinterestrulestonon-governmentgrantees.145Forgovernmentgrantees,OMBcircularsaresilentonconflictsofinterest.Infact,forgovernmentgranteesonlyasingleparagraphinasinglestandardformpurportstoprotectagainstconflictedgranteeemployeesusinggrantmoneytoprocurementgoodsandservicesfromfirmsinwhichtheemployeehasafinancialinterest.Andeventhemostlawabidinggrantorcouldstillallowconflictedpublicacquisition.Forexample,considerifagranteevolunteerawardedacontracttoanentitywithwhomthevolunteerhadafinancialinterest.TheOMBguidanceexistingspeaksintermsofemployees.146Withoutdefinitions,guidance,anunderpinning
142 22Cl.Ct.633(1991).143 SeeoFFIce oF MgMt. & Budget, exec. oFFIce oF the presIdent, stAndArd ForM 424B,available athttp://apply07.grants.gov/apply/forms/sample/SF424B-V1.1.pdf(19assurances).144 SeeoFFIce oF MgMt. & Budget, exec. oFFIce oF the presIdent, stAndArd ForM 424d,available athttp://apply07.grants.gov/apply/forms/sample/SF424D-V1.1.pdf(20assurances).145 See oFFIce oF MgMt. & Budget, exec. oFFIce oF the presIdent, oMB cIrculAr no.A-102(Revised),grAnts And cooperAtIve AgreeMents wIth stAte And locAl governMents(1997),available athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a102/(conflictofinterestunmentioned).146 See oFFIce oF MgMt. & Budget, exec. oFFIce oF the presIdent, stAndArd ForMs 424B,supranote143,at¶3&oFFIce oF MgMt. & Budget, exec. oFFIce oF the presIdent, stAndArd ForMs
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criminallaw,orotherlegalfoundation,agrantadministratormayhaveatoughtimefindingthegranteeviolatedtheassurance,evenunderthedeferentialAPAstandard.147Thiswouldbeespeciallytrueas,likeunderFARSubpart3.11,thegranteeisonlyrequiredtoestablishasystemreasonablycapableof,notactually,preventingcon-flictedpublicacquisition.
Likeinthecontractingcommunity,agenerallyapplicablecriminallawcanestablishaclearnormagainstconflictedpublicacquisitioninthegrantcommunity,regardlessofemploymentorgranteestatus.OMBandotheragenciescouldthencrafttheirimplementationofthatlawintotheirgrantregulatoryframework.
C.ConcerningPartiestoOtherTransactionAgreements,WhytheCurrentPatchworkisInadequate
Ifprotectionsagainstcontractoremployeesperformingconflictpublicacquisitionareineffectualandinadequateforgranteeemployees, thentheyaresimplynonexistentforemployeesofothertransactionagreements(“OTAs”).
Bywayofbackground,OTAsisacatch-alltermusedtodenotealltheothertransactionagreementsthatseemlikeacontract,grant,cooperativeagreement,ormixtureofthosevehicles,butisn’tanyoneofthemparticularly.TheCongressionalResearchServicedefinedanOTAsas“aspecialtypeofvehicleorinstrumentusedbyfederalagenciesforresearchanddevelopmentpurposes....”148Thisdefinitionisslightlymisleading.Indeed,OTAsarepresentlyusedlargelyforresearchanddevelopmentpurposes.However,theauthorityitselfcomesfromCongresssimplygrantinganagencyauthorityconductsomeformofpublicacquisition,asdefinedinthisarticle,149outsidetheconfinesofacontract,grant,orcooperativeagreement.150
424D,supranote144,at¶7.147 See5U.S.C.§706(2013)(settingthejudicialreviewstandardforagencydecisions).148 l. elAIne hAlchIn, cong. reseArch serv., other trAnsActIon (ot) AuthorIty1(2011),available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34760.pdf.149 SeeStevenL.Schooner,Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law,2 puB. procureMent l. rev. 103, 103(2002)(citingintegrityas“pillar”inpublicacquisition).See alsoChristopherR.Yukins,Integrating Integrity and Procurement: The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law,36 puB. cont. l.J. 307(2007)(arguingforgreaterintegrationofanti-corruptioninternationallawwiththeUnitedNationsCommissiononInternationalTradeLawModelLawonProcurementofGoods,Construction,andServices).Integrityisespeciallyimportantinthefederalsystemgiventhelargeamountofmoneymovingbothoutofthemarketastaxesandbackintothemarketthroughcontracts,grants,andothertransactions.Thegovernmentspentthefollowingbillionsofdollarscontractsandgrantsinthefollowingfiscalyears(format:FYXX,contracts,grants):FY10,$540.0,$614.3;FY11,$539.7,$567.0;FY12,$517.7,$538.6.USASpending.gov,available athttp://www.usaspending.gov/explore.Moneyspentonothertransactionisdiscussedseparatelylater.150 SeeNancyO.Dix,FernandA.Lavalle&KimberlyC.Welch,Fear and Loathing of Federal Contracting: Are Commercial Companies Really Afraid to do Business with the Federal Government? Should They Be?,33puB. cont.L.J.5,23(2003)(OTA“isdefinedinthenegative,asaninstrumentother than aprocurementcontract,grant,cooperativeagreementor[cooperative
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Infact, thefirstCongressionalgrantofOTAauthorityplacednosubject-matterlimitsontheauthority.151
TheexactextentandusageofOTAsisunknown.WhilesomecommentershavestatedOTAsmayinclude“manyhundredsofagreementsandbillionsworthofobligations...”152actualfiguresareunknown.Atbest,OTAsareaminorsliceofthepublicacquisitionpie,totalingnomorethan$7.1Binfiscalyear2012,$8.1billionin2011,and$3.5Bin2010—atinyfractionofthe$1T-plusspenteachofthosefiscalyearsbetweencontractsandgrants.153
SignificantusersofOTAsincludetheDepartmentofDefense(“DoD”)154andDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(“DHS”).155However,boththeFederalAviationAdministration(“FAA”)156andtheTransportationSecurityAdministration(“TSA”)157andhavestatutoryothertransactionpowertoo.In2004,CongressgavecivilianagenciesothertransactionauthoritysimilarthatofDoD’sOTAauthorityuntilSeptember30,2008.158ThisgrantedOTAauthoritytoengageinresearch“to
researchanddevelopmentagreement].”).151 SeeNationalAeronauticsandSpaceActof1958,PubL.No.85-568,§203(b)(5),72Stat.426,430(1958)(presentlycodifiedat51U.S.C.§20113(e))(authorizingNASAto“enterintoandperformsuchcontracts,leases,cooperativeagreements,orothertransactionsasmaybenecessary....”).152 RichardL.Dunn,Other Transactions—Another Chance?,50NO.5gov’t contrActor¶39(2008).153 SeeUSASpending.gov,http://www.usaspending.gov/explore(lastvisitedMay1,2014).EventheseothertransactionfiguresareinflatedastheyincludepaymentstotheUnitedNations,RedCross,etc.,thatrepresentnopublicacquisitionactivity.However,controllingforthoseamountsispresentlyimpossible.154 See 10U.S.C.§2371(a)(2013)(grantingOTAauthority“incarryingoutbasic,applied,andadvancedresearchprojects.”);10U.S.C.§2373(2013)(grantingothertransactiontobuy“ordnance,signal,chemicalactivity,andaeronauticalsupplies,includingpartsandaccessories,anddesignsthereof...consider[ed]necessaryforexperimentalortestpurposes....”).ForfurtherinformationconcerningDoD’susageofOTAs,seeUnderSecretaryofDefense:Acquisition,Technology,andLogistics,“Other Transaction” Authority (OTA) for Prototype Projects(2001),available athttps://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=37937.155 See6U.S.C.§391(a)(1)(2013)(grantingauthoritysimilartothatfoundin10U.S.C.§2371).ThisauthoritywillsunsetonSeptember30,2013;ConsolidatedandFurtherContinuingAppropriationsAct,Pub.L.No.113-6,§525,127Stat.198,371(Mar.26,2013).ForfurtherinformationconcerningDHS’susageofOTAs,seeu.s. gov’t AccountABIlIty oFFIce, gAo-08-1088, dep’t oF hoMelAnd securIty: IMproveMents could Further enhAnce ABIlIty to AcquIre InnovAtIve technologIes usIng other trAnsActIon AuthorIty (2008).156 See49U.S.C.§106(l)(6)(2013)(grantingtheFAAauthority“toenterintoandperformsuchcontracts,leases,cooperativeagreements,orothertransactionsasmaybenecessary....”).157 See49U.S.C.§114(m)(1)(2013)(grantingtheTSAthesameauthority“providedtotheAdministratoroftheFederalAviationAdministrationunder[49U.S.C.§106(l)]”).158 SeeNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2004,Pub.L.No.108-136,§1441,117Stat.1392,1673-4(Nov.24,2003).
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facilitatedefenseagainstorrecoveryfromterrorismornuclear,biological,chemical,orradiologicalattack...,”providedtheDirectorofOMBauthorizedtheproject.159
AnagencywithOTAauthorityneednotfollowtheFAR,OMBguidance,oragreatmanyotherlawsonetypicallywouldthinkwouldapplytopublicacquisition.Forexample,theAnti-KickbackActdoesnotapply.160Nordoestheprohibitionagainstusingappropriatedfundstoinfluencegovernmentdecision-makersapply.161Manyotherlawsdonotapply.162ThisfreedommakesOTAspotentiallyenticingtobothpartieswaryofthecomplexitiesofgovernmentacquisitionandgovernmentacquisitionprofessionalswithlittlefundstopayforadditionalFAR,grant,orcoop-erativeagreementdrivenaccounting,overhead,andcompliancecosts.163However,thisfreedomcomespartiallyatthecostofmanyexistingpublicpolicyprotections.Whatismosttroublingisthathaphazardlegalroulettereplacedthoughtfulpublicdiscourseonwhatlawsapply,anddonotapply,toOTAs.Thus,lawslikelymeantforgeneralapplicability,likethetwocitedatthebeginningofthisparagraph,areinapplicablenotbecauseofaffirmativeCongressionalconsiderationandactionbutbecausethedraftsmenlikelysimplydidnotthinktolistoutyetanothervehicleofpublicacquisition.
Morebroadly,onemaywonderwhetherpublicacquisitionoccursinOTAs.Theshortanswerisnothingpreventsit.NothingprohibitsanagencyotherwisevestedwithappropriateOTAauthorityfromusingaprivateentitytoaccomplishorfacilitatepublicacquisition.164Forexample,theNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(“NASA”),FAA,andTSAallhavegeneralOTAauthority.TheirauthoritymateriallydiffersfromthatofDoDorDHSastheirOTAauthorityistiedtoresearchanddevelopmentorprototypingactivities.SowhiletheriskofconflictedpublicacquisitionmaybelowinOTAs,itdoesexist.Certainly,theanti-corruptionpatchworkquiltcoversthatrisk,regardlessofitssize,theleast.
159 41U.S.C.§1904(a)(1)(2013).160 See41U.S.C.§52(2)(2013)(defininga“kickback”asvalueprovidedtoany“primecontractor,primecontractoremployee,subcontractor,orsubcontractoremployee....”).161 See31U.S.C.§1352(a)(1)(2013)(“NoneofthefundsappropriatedbyanyActmaybeexpendedbytherecipientofaFederalcontract,grant,loan,orcooperativeagreementtopayanypersonforinfluencingorattemptingtoinfluenceanofficeroremployeeofanyagency,aMemberofCongress,anofficeroremployeeofCongress,oranemployeeofaMemberofCongressinconnectionwithanyFederalaction....”).162 ForapartiallistoflawsinapplicabletoOTAs,seel. elAIne hAlchIn, supra note 148, at19-22.163 See, e.g., SusanB.Cassidy,JenniferPlitsch&StephanieH.Barclay,Another Option in a Tightening Budget: A Primer on Department of Defense “Other Transactions” Agreements,48-SPGprocureMent lAw.3,3-10(2013)(discussingtheadvantagesofOTAswithnontraditionalcontractorsanddecreasedfederalfunding);RichardL.Dunn,supra note152at¶39(similarlydiscussingadvantagesofOTAs).164 Forexample,seeG&TConveyorCo.v.AlleghenyCounty,2011WL5075353(W.D.Pa.2011)(notreportedinF.Supp.2d)(TSAprovideddefendantfundsunderacost-sharingOTAtoconstructanin-lineexplosivedetectionsystem;defendantselectedplaintiffasthecontractor).
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IV.AGENERALLYAPPLICABLECRIMINALLAWWOULDCREATEANDHARMONIZELAW
Thispartdiscusseshowagenerallyapplicablecriminallawwouldcreateandharmonizelawconcerningnon-governmentalemployeesengaginginpublicacquisitionactivitieswhilehavingapersonalconflictofinterest.
TheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsoftheFederalCircuit(“FederalCir-
cuit”)hasoscillatedonwhataplaintiffallegingthetaintofpersonalconflictofinterestmustshowtogainreview,giventheabsenceofstatutesandregulations.Incontrast,theGovernmentAccountabilityOffice(“GAO”)hasadoptedatotalityofthecircumstancesanalysis,usingstatutoryandregulatorytextstoguide,ratherthanunderpin,theiropinions.Andthecommonlawsurroundingothertransactionsisalmostentirelyblank.
Agenerallyapplicablecriminal lawwouldgivea labelandanalyticalframeworktoaknown,butnotexplicitlystated,wrong.Allstakeholders,agencies,tribunals,contractors,grantees,non-governmentemployeeswouldbenefitfromaclear,conciselywritten,criminalstatutedemonstratingwherethemostfundamentaloflinesaredrawn.
Thefirstsectionwilldiscussthematterincontextofthecourts.ThesecondsectionwilldiscussthematterinthecontextofGAO.Thethirdandfourthsec-tionsbrieflydiscussthematterinthecontextofcontractandgrantperformance,respectively.Finally,thefifthsectiondiscussesthematterinthecontextofotheragreements.
A.AGenerallyApplicableCriminalLawWouldHarmonizeJudicialJurisprudence
TheFederalCircuitistheappellatecourtfortheboardsofcontractappealsandtheCourtofFederalClaims.165Assuch,itsholdingsarebindingonthesetribunals.Fordisputesand,since1970inScanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Schaffer,166proteststheFederalCircuit(oritspredecessorsininterestpriortoitsestablishmentin1982),hasreviewedagencycontractingactionsagainstan“arbitrary,capricious,anabuseofdiscretion,orotherwisenotinaccordancewithlaw,”167standard.Howapersonalconflictofinterestallegedtohavetaintedagovernmentdecisionjuxtaposesagainstthatstandardhasnotalwaysbeenclear.
165 See28U.S.C.1295(a)(3),(10)(2013)(grantingtheFederalCircuitappellatejurisdictionoverthestatedentities).166 424F.2d859(D.C.Cir.1970).167 Id.at874(quoting5U.S.C.§706(2)(A)).Thisbootstrappedstandardofreviewwaslaterstatutorilyappendedtothetrialclaimscourts’jurisdiction.SeeAdministrativeDisputeResolutionActof1996,Pub.L.No.104-320,§12(a)(3),110Stat.3870,3875(Oct.19,1996)(codifiedat28U.S.C.§1491(b)(4)).
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In1981,athreejudgepaneloftheCourtofClaimsinBaltimore Contractors, Inc.168splitthreewaysonwhetherthetrialcourtmustgrantfinalitytoa1975contractappealboard’sdecisionundertheWunderlichAct169whentheboardmembersareperceivedtohaveconflictsofinterest.170Themajorityopinionheldthatperception,absentanyprooforviolationoflaw,wassufficienttodisregardtheWunderlichAct’sstampoffinalitytypicallyassignedtoboarddecisions.171Thecourtremandedthemattertoatrialjudgeforade novoopiniononthecompleterecordwithoutdeferencetotheboard’sdecision.Theconcurringjudgeconcurredinresultonly,statingtheFifthAmendment172guaranteedthecontractoranimpartialboard.173Thedissentingjudgetookissuewithbothopinions.174Thedissentarguedtheboard’ssuperiorsteeringcommitteecouldallowsuchpersonalconflicts.Thedissentthoughttheorganizationshouldabletointernallyadministeritscontractdisputeaffairswithoutjudicialinterferenceprovideddeterminationswerenot“fradulentorcapriciousorarbitraryorsogrosslyerroneousasnecessarilytoimplybadfaith,orisnotsupportedbysubstantialevidence.”175ThusBaltimore Contractors establishedprecedenceforlookingatthetotalityofthecircumstancessurroundingtheperceivedfairnessofgovernmentactionratherthanrequiringaspecificstatutoryorregulatoryviolation.
In1983,thethenrecentlyconstitutedFederalCircuitpartiallywalkedBaltimore Contractorsback.InC.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed.,176theFederalCircuitreversedaClaimsCourtdecision177enjoiningcontractawardbasedonperceivedpersonal
168 643F.2d729(Cl.Ct.1981).169 SeeWunderlichActof1954,Pub.L.No.83-356,68Stat.81(May11,1954)(codifiedthenat41U.S.C.§§321-2).TheWunderlichActwasdesignedtoabrogatetheSupremeCourtcaseUnited States v. Wunderlich,342U.S.98(1951).InWunderlich,theSupremeCourtheldareviewingcourtcouldnotoverturnanagency’sfinaldecisionongovernmentcontractualmattersabsentfraud.Congressactedafewyearslatertostatetheagency’sdecision“shallbefinalandconclusiveunlessthesameisfraudulentorcapriciousorarbitraryorsogrosslyerroneousasnecessarilytoimplybadfaith,orisnotsupportedbysubstantialevidence.”WunderlichAct,Pub.L.No.83-356,§1.TheWunderlichActwaslaterapparentlyrepealedupontheenactmentoftheContractDisputesActof1978,Pub.L.No.95-563,§14(i),92Stat.2383,2391(Nov.1,198),thoughonemustreadthelegislativehistoryforconfirmation,seeS.Rep.No.95-1118,at34(1978).170 SeeBaltimoreContractors,Inc.,643F.2d729(Cl.Ct.1981).TheboardwasspeciallycreatedtoheardisputesarisingfromArchitectoftheCapitolcontractsfortheconstructionoftheRayburnHouseOfficeBuilding.Id.at729-32.TheboardmemberswereexclusivelyGAOemployeesappointedtoserveatthepleasureofthesteeringcommittee,sharedofficespaceandadministrativesupportwithcontractadministrationpersonnel,andexecutedotherdutieswhileservingontheboard.Id.at731-3.171 Seeid.at733-4.172 Seeu.s. const.amend.V(“Nopersonshall...bedeprivedoflife,liberty,orproperty,withoutdueprocessoflaw....”).173 SeeBaltimore Contractors, Inc.,643F.2dat735-6.174 See id.736-47.175 Id.at734.176 719F.2d1567(Fed.Cir.1983).177 Itappearsthesametrialjudge,JudgeSpector,pennedbothtrialdecisionsappealedinBaltimore Contractors, Inc.andC.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed.Seeid.at1569;Baltimore Contractors, Inc.,
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conflictsofinterestandallegedviolationsofpersonnelethicsregulations.178Atissuewerelooseemploymentopportunitiesdiscussedbetweenthesuccessfulofferorandmembersofthesourceselectionteampriortocontractaward.TheFederalCircuitdeclinedtoutilizetheestablishedfourteengeneralprinciplesofpublicserviceestablishedinregulations,179firstfoundinPresidentBush’sexecutiveorder,180asguidance.Rather,theFederalCircuitstatedsuchregulations“merelyprovide[d]generalstandardstoguidegovernmentemployeesintheperformanceoftheirduties.Itdoesnotcreatespecificandprecisestandards,theviolationofwhichwouldjustifyenjoiningthe[government]fromawardingacontract.”181Asnospecificlawprohibitingtheseloosediscussionsthenexisted,thecourtappliedthedeferentialAPAanalysisandheldtheawardwasnot“arbitrary,capricious,[or]anabuseofdiscretion.”182Thus,theFederalCircuitsignaledtheneedforplaintiffstoallegeaviolationofaspecificethicslaworregulationcomplainingofaconflictofinterestratherthanageneralpolicyagainstthem.
TheFederalCircuitdecidedC.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed.beforetheFARbecameeffectiveApril1,1984.183TheFARincludedaregulation,FAR3.101-1,thatdirectedcontractingofficersto“avoidstrictlyanyconflictofinterestoreventheappearanceofaconflictofinterestinGovernment-contractorrelationships.”184Thus,theques-tionbecamewhetherthisratherpolicy-orientatedregulationwasspecificenoughtodriveaconflictofinterestallegationunderC.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed.,thussignalingashiftbacktowardthemajorityrationaleinBaltimore Contractors.TheonlyFederalCircuitcaseaddressingthisquestionisGalen Med. Assoc., Inc.185Here,theprotestorallegedcertaingovernmentemployeeproposalevaluatorshadaconflictofinterestbecausethesuccessfulofferorlistedthemaspastperformancereferences.186Thecourtfound“nocodesectionforbid[ding]anagencyofficiallistedasonetovalidate
643F.2dat729.178 See C.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed.,719F.2d at1581.179 Currently,thefourteenprinciplesarefoundat5C.F.R.§2635.101(b)(2013).180 SeeExec.OrderNo.12,731,§101,55Fed.Reg.42,547,42547(Oct.17,1990).181 C.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed.,719F.2dat1581.See alsoUnitedStatesv.MississippiValleyGeneratingCo.,362U.S.939(1960)(affirmingvoidingofcontractonthebasisofcontractorconflictofinterestviolatingcriminalstatutedespitenochargesagainstindividual).182 C.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed,719F.2d.at1581-2.PleasenotethiscasewasdecidedbeforetheadoptionoftheProcurementIntegrityAct.CompareOfficeofFederalProcurementPolicyActAmendmentsof1988,Pub.L.No.100-679,§6,102Stat.4055,4063(Nov.17,1988),withC.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed,719F.2d.1567(decidedOct.28,1983).183 CompareEstablishingtheFederalAcquisitionRegulation,48Fed.Reg.42,102,42,108(Sept.19,1983)(regulationseffectiveApr.1,1984),withC.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed.,719F.2d1567.(decidedOct.28,1983).184 EstablishingtheFederalAcquisitionRegulation,48Fed.Reg.42,102,42,108(Sept.19,1983).Thislanguagehasnotchangedintheinterveningyears.Compare id.,withFAR,48C.F.R.3.101-1(2013).185 369F.3d1324(Fed.Cir.2004).186 Id.at1335.
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pastperformancereferencefromservingasanevaluator.”187Then,thecourtwentfurther:“eventotheextenttheregulationsrequirethatanyconflictofinterestoreventheappearanceofaconflictofinterestingovernment-contractorrelationshipsbeavoided,[FAR3.101-1],[theprotestor]hasfailedtoshowanypotentialsymbioticrelationshipbetweenthetechnicalevaluatorsand”thesuccessfulofferor.188WhethertheFederalCircuittrulymeanttoelevatethepolicystatedinFAR3.101-1beyond“merelyprovid[ing]generalstandardstoguidegovernmentemployees,”189isnotentirelyclear.TheCourtofFederalClaimshastakenitthatway.190ButtheFederalCircuit’sphraseologysoundslikethecourtisansweringaquestionnotasked.Thus,afuturecourtmayhewtowardtheclearholdingofC.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed. ratherthanthisextraargumentaskedandansweredinGalen Med. Assoc.
Whilethesecasesdealtchieflywithconflictsofinterestonthepartofgovernmentpublicacquisitionactors,oneneedhavelittleimaginationtoapplythelessonstoanon-governmentalactor.TheFederalCircuitappreciateshardandfastlawonwhichtogroundaconflictofinterestanalysis.Thelackofsuchalawfornon-governmentalactorsleavesonlythedictainGalen Med. Assoc.tobuttresstheusageofFAR3.101-1.Failingthat,C.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed. suggeststhatwithoutaclearlawprohibitingaconflictofinterestamongstnon-governmentalactors,suchconflictsofinterestarepoorvehiclesforabidprotestorappeal.
B.AGenerallyApplicableCriminalLawWouldFurtherImproveGAOBidProtestJurisprudence
IncontrasttotheFederalCircuitanditssubordinatetribunals,GAOislesstiedtospecificstatutesorregulations.191Whenaconflictisalleged,GAOismorelikelytoadoptatotalityofthecircumstancesapproach,thoughnotwiththosespecificwords.GAO’sanalysistypicallystartswithwhetherthepersonallegedtohaveaconflicthasbothanofficialroleintheprocurementandapersonalstakeinthe
187 Id.at1336.188 Id.189 C.A.C.I.,Inc.-Fed.v.UnitedStates,719F.2d1567,1581(Fed.Cir.1983).190 See e.g.,MORIAssoc.,Inc.v.UnitedStates,102Fed.Cl.503,525(2011)(“[T]heFederalCircuit...hasrecognizedthat[FAR3.101-1]imposesrequirementsuponprocurementofficials.”)(citingGalen Med. Assoc., Inc.,369F.3dat1336 ).Researchdidnotdiscloseanyboardsofcontractappealscasesconcerningconflictedacquisitionsupportservices.191 See, e.g., Sci.PumpCorp.,B-255737,94-1CPD¶246(Comp.Gen.Mar.25,1994)(statingwhetheremployee“violated18U.S.C.§208andrelatedregulationsisnotwithinthepurviewofourbidprotestregulations....Ourreview...islimitedtowhethertheapplicableprocurementregulationsprohibit”theawardeefromwinningthecontractgiventheemployee’sactions);DevelopmentAssoc.Inc.,B-187756,77-1CPD¶310(Comp.Gen.May5,1977)(“Thereisnostatutoryorregulatoryauthorityforourofficetoissueformalopinionsonconflictofinterestquestions....Notwithstandingourposition...wehave,onoccasion,offeredviewsaboutconsiderationsbearingonallegedviolationsofstandardsofconductastheyrelatedtoproprietyofparticularprocurement.”).
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outcome.192Ifsuchcompetinginterestsarefound,GAOwillthenrequire“convincingproof”thatthoseindividuals“exertedimproperinfluenceintheprocurementonbehalfoftheawardee,oragainsttheprotestor.”193TheGAOconductsafact-intensiveanalysistodetermineiftheallegationissubstantiatedand,ifso,howtheconflictimpactedtheprocurement.194TheGAOalsogivesdeferencetoagencydecisions
192 See, e.g.,TPL,Inc.,B-297136,2006CPD¶104(Comp.Gen.June29,2006)(listingvarioustimestheinquiryhasbeenapplied).193 PhacilInc.,B-406628,2012CPD¶202(Comp.Gen.July5,2012).See alsoAdvancedSys.Tech.,Inc.;Eng’g&Prof’lServ.,Inc.,B-241530,91-1CPD¶153(Comp.Gen.Feb.12,1991)(protestallegingprocurementofficialshadvariouspersonalandfamilialconflictsofinterestdeniedbecauseprotestorlackedproofofimproperact).
Foratime,GAOhadaseriesofcaseswhereGAO,arguably,didnotrequireconvincingproofofimproperinfluence.Inreviewingprotestsonpublic-privatecompetitions,seeoFFIce oF MgMt. & Budget, exec. oFFIce oF the presIdent,cIr. no. A-76revIsed(2003),available athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a076_a76_incl_tech_correction#1.GAOheldthemerepresenceofthesameagencyemployees(andsupportingcontractors,ifapplicable)bothrunningandcompetinginthesamecompetitionviolatedFAR3.101-1.See, e.g.,Dep’toftheNavy—Reconsideration,B-286194.7,2002CPD¶76(Comp.Gen.May29,2002)(protestsustainedwhensameagencyemployeesandsupportcontractorwroteA-76competitionperformanceworkstatement);DZS/BakerL.L.C.;MorrisonKnudsenCorp.,B-281224,99-1CPD¶19(Comp.Gen.Jan.12,1999)(protestsustainedwhen14of16A-76competitionevaluatorsoccupiedpositionssubjecttotheA-76study).
TheGAOusedFAR3.101-1toestablishthestandardofconductrequired.Then,GAOwouldapplyorganizationalconflictofinterestanalysisandessentiallyifoneofthebidders,thegovernment,waswritingitsownspecifications.See, e.g.,DZS/Baker,99-2CPD¶19,2(“FARsubpart3.1doesnotprovidespecificguidanceregardingsituationsinwhichgovernmentemployees,becauseoftheirjobpositionsorrelationshipswithparticulargovernmentorganizations,maybeunabletorenderimpartialadvicetothegovernment.However...FARsubpart9.5addressesanalogoussituationsinvolvingcontractororganizations.Accordingly,althoughFARsubpart9.5,byitsterms,doesnotapplytogovernmentagenciesoremployees,webelievethatindeterminingwhetheranagencyhasreasonablymetitsobligationtoavoidconflictsunderFAR§3.101-1,FARsubpart9.5isinstructiveinthatitestablisheswhethersimilarsituationsinvolvingcontractororganizationswouldrequireavoidance,neutralizationormitigation.”).
OnceOMBCir.A-76wasrevisedtoprohibitgovernmentemployeesfrombeingonbothsidesofanA-76competition,borrowingfromorganizationalconflictofinterestlawbecameunnecessary.See CRAssoc.,Inc.,B-297686,2006CPD¶61(Comp.Gen.Mar.7,2006)(A-76competitionprotestdeniedwhenagencyuseddisinterestedemployeestoruncompetition,noimproperinfluencefound),ITFacilityServ.-JointVenture,B-285841,2000CPD¶177(Comp.Gen.Oct.17,2000)(additionally,potentialconflictofinterestfound“insignificant”whenoneevaluatorwasmarriedtoagovernmentemployeewhosepositionwassubjecttotheA-76competition).FormorebackgroundonGAO’sanalysisduringthattime,seeu.s. gov’t AccountABIlIty oFFIce, letter to oge regArdIng conFlIcts oF Interest In A-76 cost coMpArIsons,B-281224.8,99-2CPD¶103(Comp.Gen.Nov.19,1999).194 SeeTextronMarineSys.,B-255580,94-2CPD¶63(Comp.Gen.Aug.2,1994)(fact-intensiveanalysisregardingNavycivilianemployee’sinvolvementwithaprocurementhisfutureemployerwon).
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allowingaconflictwhenthecontractingofficerhasinvestigated,documented,andtakenreasonableactiontomitigatetheconflict’seffects.195
Forexample,inCeladon Laboratories,GAOwasconfrontedwithanallega-tionofconflictsofinterestamongstnon-governmentactorsprovidingacquisitionsupportservicesfortheagency.196Fouroffournon-governmentSmallBusinessInnovationResearchPhaseIproposaltechnicalevaluatorsfoundtheprotestor’sproposal,basedonsiLNAtechnology,technicallyunacceptable.197Theprotestorallegedallfournon-governmentevaluatorshadconflictsofinterestbecauseeach“workfor,orareassociatedwith...siRNAtechnology,atechnologythatCeladon,withoutrebuttal,assertswasdirectlycompetitivewiththe[siLNA]technologyitofferedinitsproposal....”198
Despitebeinguntimely,GAOfoundthe“significantissue”199exceptionapplied.
Weneednotresolvewhetherthisprocurementwas[timely]. . .withinthemeaningofourtimelinessrulesbecausewefindthatthisprotestisappropriateforconsiderationunderthesignificantissueexceptiontoourtimelinessrules. . . .Theissuehere—theapplicationofconflictofinterestregulationstopeerreviewevalu-atorsinSBIRprocurements—isnotonethatwehavepreviouslydecidedandisonethatcanbeexpectedtoariseinfutureSBIRprocurements.200
Theagencyarguedeachevaluatorhadreceivedtrainingonconflictsofinterestandcertifiedheorshedidnothaveanyconflictsofinterest.201Furthermore,thecontractingofficerverifiedeachevaluatorcertifiedheorshehadnoconflictofinterestandfoundnoevidenceofbiasintheevaluation.202TheGAOfoundthisinvestigationinsufficientandsustainedtheprotest.
195 SeeBattelleMem’lInst.,B-278673,98-1CPD¶107(Comp.Gen.Feb.27,1998)(successfulofferorproposedusingacertaingovernmentfacilitytoconducttestingandgovernmentemployeesofthatfacilitywereevaluatingtheproposals,contractingofficeridentifiedandevaluatedthepotentialconflictofinterestandfoundtheconflictinsignificant,GAOfoundcontractingofficer’sactionsanddeterminationsreasonable).196 SeeCeladonLab.,Inc.,B-298533,2006CPD¶158(Comp.Gen.Nov.1,2006).197 Seeid.at2.198 Id.199 See4C.F.R.§21.2(c)(2013)(TheGAOmayconsideranuntimelyprotestwhentheprotest“raisesissuessignificanttotheprocurementsystem....”).200 CeladonLab.,Inc.,2006CPD¶158,4.201 See id.at5.202 Id.
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Whileitistruethatthe[agency]regulationscontemplateaself-assessmentbyevaluatorsastowhethertheythinktheyhavearealconflictofinterest,theregulationsdonotcontemplatethataself-certificationbytheevaluatorisallthatiseverneededtosatisfytherequirementthatheorshedoesnothavearealconflictofinterest,particularlywhere,ashere,specificandcolorableallegationsofarealconflictofinterestonthepartoftheevaluatorswerebroughttotheattentionofcognizantagencyofficials....Whilewedonotdecidewhethertheevaluatorsherehadrealconflictsofinterest,therecordshowsthattheagencyfailedinitsobligationtodeterminewhethertheseindividuals’employmentcausedthemarealconflictofinterestthatcouldbiastheirevaluation....203
Takingthisprotestonestepfurtherillustrateswhyadoptionofacriminallawregardingthistypeofconductcouldbehelpful.Whatifthecontractingofficerhaddonemoreinvestigationanddiscoveredtheunderlyingrelationships?Againstwhatstandardwouldthecontractingofficergaugetheagency’stoleranceforaconflict?Inthiscase,thecontractingofficerhadaparticularagencyregulationconcerningconflictsofinterest.204However,thecontractingofficer’sutilizationofthisfairlydevelopedandspecializedregulationalongwithindependentdocumentedinvestigationdidnotsavetheprocurement.Considerthecaseofacontractingofficerwithoutthebenefitofthatagency’sparticularregulations.Againstwhatlegalstandardsistheconflicttobeinvestigated?Iftheconflictoccurredinthepast,whatlevelof“conflict”canthecontractingofficerfindacceptable?Andwhatchancedoesthatdecision,notgroundedinadirectlyapplicablelaworpolicy,havetostandinaprotestatGAO?Withoutaguide,205thecontractingofficerisleftwith“[t]hegeneralrule...toavoidstrictlyanyconflictofinterestoreventheappearanceofaconflictofinterestinGovernment-contractorrelationships,”206astandardtheCourtofFederalClaimsdoesnotutilizeandGAOcitesobligatorilybeforedivingintothenutsandboltsofthematter.Agenerallyapplicablecriminalpublicacquisitionconflictofinterestlawwouldgiveallstakeholdersafoundationonwhichtoguide(andjudge)theiractions.
C.ClearStandardforContractPerformanceandAdministration
Inalllikelihood,mostcontractoremployeeconflictofinterestissueswillneverreachbeyondcontractperformanceandadministration.Contractingofficers,projectmanagers,complianceofficers,andcounselwillreviewspecificquestionsagainstmeagerandgreyjurisprudenceandguidance.207Afundamentalcriminallaw
203 Id.at5.204 Seeid.at7.205 Seeinfra Figures2and3forpotentialsourcesofguidance.206 FAR,48C.F.R.§3.101-1(2013).207WhatlittlehasbeenwrittenaboutFARSubpart3.11hasgenerallyfocusedonexplainingthe
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canclarifythelinesforallstakeholders,thusbringingameasureofstructureandpredictabilityinwhatcouldotherwisebearacetothebottom.
Forcontractors,agenerallyapplicablecriminallawwouldgivesomethingtofurthermotivateemployees.Onecommentatorhasalreadyhintedatinformationasymmetrybetweenthecontractorandcontractors’employeesconcerningpotentialpersonalconflictsofinterest.208Thesameasymmetryexistsinthefederalfinancialdisclosuresystembetweensupervisorsandtheirfilingemployees.However,federalfilershavetheadditionalmotivationtomakefulldisclosuresbecausedoingotherwiserisksviolatingfederalcriminallaw.209Creationofasimilarlawwouldservesimilarpurposesthusdrivingmoredisclosuresandgreaterachievementofthelaw’sintent.
Additionally,agenerallyapplicablecriminallawwouldgivestructuretotheconflictofinterestanalysisFARSubpart3.11requirescontractorstoaccomplish.Contractorswouldhaveclearerstandardsofwhatconstitutesanimpermissibleconflictofinterestand,thus,whatis,essentially,apermissibleor,inFARSubpart3.11parlance,ade minimisconflictofinterest.Contractorswouldhaveabetterideawhattheircomplianceeffortswillinvolveandthusneedtobuildinlessriskcostsintotheirproposal.Andcontractorswouldhaveabetterchanceatdefeatingauditorsandotherssecond-guessingtheirdecisionsbecauseagenerallyapplicablecriminallawwouldsetthestandard.Theonuswouldbeontheagencyto,throughrule-makingorclause,raisethegenerallyapplicablestandard.
D.ClearStandardforGrantPerformanceandAdministration
TheSupremeCourthasrecognizedagranteeemployeecanhold“apositionofpublictrustwithofficialfederalresponsibilities:allocatingfederalresources,pur-suanttocomplexstatutoryandregulatoryguidelines,intheformof...contracts.”210Thelogicbehindthisstatementisclearwhenoneconsidersthe“official”federalpoweragranteeemployeecanexercise.Granteeslargelyoperateindependently,awardingfederallyfundedcontractsoutsidetheFARandmanyotherfederalregula-torycontrols.Thecombinationofmoneyandminimaloversightandcontrolcanbreedconflictsofinterest.
rulethoughsomewritings,see, e.g., KeithR.Szeliga&FranklinC.Turner,supra note100,at6;DavidJ.Ginsberg&RobertR.Bohn,supra note134,at11,havenotedvariousissues.208 SeeKeithR.Szeliga&FranklinC.Turner,supra note102,at5-6(notingthecontractor’sdutyextendstoinformingemployeesoftheirobligationtoreportfinancialinterestsofmembersoftheirhouseholds,nottoactuallyensuretheemployeesactuallycomply).209 See18U.S.C.§208(2013).Federalemployeesalsomustcertifytheirdisclosuresaretrueandcorrecttothebestoftheirknowledge.Falselycertifyingcandriveafalsestatementviolation.18U.S.C.§1001(2013).UniformpersonneladditionallyhavecriminalliabilityundertheUniformCodeofMilitaryJustice.10U.S.C.§907(2013).210 Dixsonv.UnitedStates,465U.S.482,497(1984)(affirmingfederalbriberyconvictionsofexecutivesofaprivatenonprofitprogramadministeringafederalhousinggrant).
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Theguidanceprovideddoeslittletoappraisegranteesandgrantofficerswherethelineisandwhetherithasbeencrossed.Theassurancerequiresthegrantee’sfuturesystemto“prohibitemployeesfromusingtheirpositionsforapurposethatconstitutesorpresentstheappearanceofpersonalororganizationalconflictofinterest,orpersonalgain.”211Whatisan“appearance”ofaconflict?Isthetestsubjectiveorobjectiveorboth?Whatifonegrantofficerusesonetestandanotherusesanother?Ifso,isthegrantofficeracting“arbitrar[ily],capricious[ly]...orotherwisenotinaccordancewiththelaw,”orabusinghisorherdiscretion?212Agenerallyapplicablecriminallawcouldsetthefloorofsuchananalysis.Certainly,OMBorthegrantingagencycouldprohibitconflictsbeyondwhatthestatuteallows.Butwithoutagenerallyapplicablecriminallawtoinitiallygroundtheregulations,thebareregulationsserveastheprimarysubstantiveauthority.Regulationsmakemoresensewhenreadagainstastatutoryframework.Agenerallyapplicablecriminallawcouldgivethoseregulationsthenecessaryframeworkonwhichtobuildtheirregulatoryanticorruptionhouse.213
E.ClearStandardforOtherTransactionAgreementPerformanceandAdministration
ThecategoryofOTAsisaprimeexamplehowagenerallyapplicablecriminallawagainstconflictpublicacquisitioncouldformasinglestandardacrossallvehiclesofpublicacquisition,eventheonesthatdefyanaffirmativelabel.
Rightnow,thereisnostandardatallregardinghowprivatepersonsshouldconductpublicacquisitionunderanOTA.Nostatuteapplies.Noregulationapplies.Noruleapplies.Nopolicyexists.214Likeforcontracts, thepublicreliesontheindividualagreementofficeroractivitytoforeseethepotentialriskandinsertapreventativeclause.ThisisespeciallyunlikelybecauseOTAsaresupposedtobefreeof“unnecessary”requirementsandthusmoreenticingforprivateparticipation.215
211 oFFIce oF MgMt. & Budget, exec. oFFIce oF the presIdent, stAndArd ForMs 424B,supra note143,at¶3;oFFIce oF MgMt. & Budget, exec. oFFIce oF the presIdent, stAndArd ForMs 424D,supra note144,at¶7.212 5U.S.C.§706(2)(A)(2013).See alsoBennettv.NewJersey,470U.S.632,646(1985)(holding,inpart,thatwhenanagency“hasproperlyconcludedthatfundsweremisusedunderthelegalstandardsineffectwhenthegrantsweremade,areviewingcourthasnoindependentauthoritytoexcuserepaymentbasedonitsviewofwhatwouldbethemostequitableoutcome.”).213 Forexample,theconflictofinterestprohibitionatFAR3.101-1clearlyexceedsthescopeof18U.S.C.§208.Bydoingso,regulationcommunicatestheexpectationofahigherstandardofconductthanwhattheunderlyingcriminallawprovides.214 See, e.g.,UnderSecretaryofDefense:Acquisition,Technology,andLogistics,“Other Transaction” Authority (OTA) for Prototype Projects(2001),available athttps://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=37937(nodiscussionofconflictsofinterestorethicsinwritinganOTA).215 See generallyNancyO.Dix,FernandA.Lavalle&KimberlyC.Welch,supra note148,at27.(“ThelatitudeaffordedtotheGovernmentby[OTAs]enablesthesovereigntoattractcontractorsthattraditionallywouldnot,orcouldnot,dobusinesswiththeGovernment.”).
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Ifoneacceptsthatpublicacquisitionshouldbefreeofpersonalconflictsofinterests,theemploymentstatusoftheactorsandthepublicacquisitionvehicleshouldnotmatter.Onlytheactofacquiringgoodsorservicesusingthepublicfiscshouldmatter.Enactingagenerallyapplicablecriminallawprohibitingconflictedpublicacquisitionestablishesanormapplicabletoallformsofpublicacquisition,toincludeOTAs.
V.ADDRESSINGOTHERPOTENTIALCOUNTERARGUMENTS
Thispartaddressesafewpotentialarguments,notpreviouslydiscussed,againsttheproposedgenerallyapplicablecriminallaw.Obviously,moreconcernsthanthosenotedbelowexist.Theintentionhereistoaddresswhattheauthorperceivestobesignificantcounterargumentsthathaveyettobedirectlyaddressed.
A.AnotherCriminalLawWillSimplyIncreaseCosts
Forthisargumenttomakesense,oneoftwothingsmustexist.First,privateentitiesmustcurrently,orreservetherighttosomeday,assignpersonallyconflictedprivatepersonstoperformdelegatedortaskedpublicacquisitionactivities.Thiswouldmeantheproposedgenerallyapplicablecriminallawwouldremovepresentpersonnelflexibilitythusdrivingincreasedpersonnelcosts.Ifthisistrulythecase,thenperhapsthenecessityoftheproposedlawbecomesobvious.Butmorelikelythetalentpoolcontainsfewtrulyconflictedpersons.
Theotherfactthatmustexistforisthisargumenttomakesenseisthatprivateentitieswillincuradditionaladministrativemonitoringcoststoensureanemployee’sconduct,beingpotentiallycriminal,doesnotcauseorganizationallegalliability.216Thismeritsfurtherconsideration.
Forcontractors,currentFARrequirementssuggestmanypotentialcompli-ancecoststheproposedgenerallyapplicablecriminallawwoulddrivearealreadybeingincurred.ConsiderthatFARSubpart3.11alreadyrequiresthecontractortoestablishacomplianceandmonitoringsystemconcerningpersonalconflictsofinterest.217Thecontractorneednotdevelopaparallelsystem.ThecontractorcoulddesigntheFARSubpart3.11mandatedcomplianceandmonitoringsystemtoaccommodatefurthersafeguardstheproposedgenerallyapplicablecriminallaw
216 See, e.g., 18U.S.C.§2(2013)(aidingandabettingcriminalstatute,affixingcriminalliabilityforanother’sconductwhenthedefendant“aids,abets,counsels,commands,inducesorprocures”thecrime’scommission);18U.S.C.§1031(2013)(majorfraudscriminalstatute,requires“intent—(1)todefraudtheUnitedStates;or(2)toobtainmoneyorpropertybymeansoffalseorfraudulentpretenses,representations,orpromises,”inconnectionwithagrantorcontractvaluedover$1M);UnitedStatesv.President&FellowsofHarvardColl.,323F.Supp.2d151,190-4(D.Mass.2004)(holdingtheparentorganizationnotliableundertheFalseClaimsActbecauseparentorganizationdidnotknow,andwasnotrecklessinnotknowing,thatcertainemployeeshadconflictsofinterest).217 SeeFAR,48C.F.R.52.203-16(b)(1)(2013)(requiringthecontractortoestablishasystemto“screencoveredemployeesforpotentialpersonalconflictsofinterest....”).
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inherentlysuggests.Forexample,theexistingsystemcouldrequireaffirmativedisclosuresofpotentialconflicts,likeisdoneundertheOGEregulations.218Thiswouldprovidethecontractornoticeofallpotentialconflictsratherthanrelyingontheemployeetocorrectlyconducthisorherownanalysis—ananalysisalreadyfraughtwithsubjectivityanddiscretion.Inconstructingsuchasystem,thecontractorcouldadoptandtailorlargeswathsoftheOGErulestominimizedevelopmentcosts.
DovetailingFARSubpart3.11compliancewithcompliancesafeguardslikelynecessaryfromtheproposedgenerallyapplicablecriminallawisonlyapartialanswer.SomecontractorsprovideacquisitionsupportservicesasacommercialserviceandthuswillnothaveFAR52.203-16intheircontract.219Additionally,granteesandOTApartieswilllikelylacksophisticateddisclosurerequirements.220Sowhataboutthesereceiptantsoffederalfundingwhoaccomplishpublicacquisition?
Unfortunately,additionalcostsmightbenecessaryforthoseentities.Legalcounselwilllikelyadvisesomesortofdisclosureformandreviewprocesstoensuretheorganizationisnotfacilitatingacrime.However,freelyavailableOGEformsandregulationscangreatlysimplythedisclosuretask.Locallyimplementedbrightlinerulescanalsoreducecosts.Forexample,notgrantingwaiversandnotallowingoneaccomplishingpublicacquisitiontotouchanycontractinwhichthatpersonhasaninterestatallcanfurtherreducethecomplianceresourcesnecessary.Balancingtestsanddiscretiontaketimeandresources.It isdoubtfulthetalentpoolissoshallowthatsuchthingsaretrulynecessary.Additionally,contractorswithouttheFAR52.203-16clauseintheircontractsandallgranteesshouldbeaccomplishingbasicconflictofinterestscreeninganywaytominimizeFalseClaimsAct221liabilityexposureorjeopardizetheirfunding.222
218 See generally5C.F.R.§2634.901-909(2013)(requirementsforconfidentialdisclosureoffinancialinformation).219 SeePreventingPersonalConflictsofInterestforContractorEmployeesPerformingAcquisitionFunctions,76Fed.Reg.68,017,68,025(Nov.2,2011)(excludingcommercialitemsfromFARSubpart3.11).220 Evenmanygovernmentalgranteeswilllackconflictofinterestdisclosurerequirements.Foraninitialreviewoffinancialdisclosurerequiresforprocurementofficialsamongstthevariousstates,seeYourState,StateIntegrityInvestigation,http://www.stateintegrity.org/your_state(lastvisitedMar.24,2013)(clickonthedesiredstate,thenthebuttonlabeled“Procurement,”thenindicator8.1,thennumber206entitled“[i]nlaw,thereisamechanismthatmonitorstheassets,incomes,andspendinghabitsofpublicprocurementofficials;”withinthe“Sources”boxisoftenalegalcitationtodirectfurtherresearch).See alsodAnIelle M. conwAy, stAte And locAl governMent procureMent (AmericanBarAssociation2012)(chapter12concernsethicsinstateprocurementgovernancestructures).221 SeeUnitedStatesv.Sci.ApplicationsInt’lCorp.,626F.3d1257(D.C.Cir.2010)(holdingacontractorwithorganizationalconflictsofinterestwhosubmitsvouchersforpaymentofadvisoryservicescanbecivillyliableundertheFalseClaimsActwhenconflict-freeadvisoryserviceswerematerialtothegovernment’sdecisiontopay);UnitedStatesexrel.Harrisonv.WestinghouseSavannahRiverCo.,176F.3d776(4thCir.1999)(similarlyholdinganorganizationalconflictofinterestcansubstantiateaFalseClaimsActcase).222 See TownofFallsburgv.UnitedStates,22Cl.Ct.633(1991)(granteelostgrantafteragent
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Finally,privateentitiesshouldensuretheircomplianceisproportionaltothelegalriskgenerated.AdvisinglegalcounselandcomplianceofficerswhobelievetheproposedcriminallawwouldsignificantlyimpacttheirorganizationshouldalreadyhavemuchofthisstructurepresentlyestablishedgiventheriskofFalseClaimsActlitigation.ThenumberofFalseClaimsActcasestheDepartmentofJusticefiledfarexceedsbymanymagnitudesthenumberofprosecutionsoccurringundertheproposedcriminallaw’sexistingcousin,18U.S.C.§208.223Therefore,entitiesshouldensuretheircomplianceeffortsremainfocusedonFalseClaimsActliabilityriskandonlymaketweaksnecessarytoaccommodateanynewrisktheproposedgenerallyapplicablecriminallawpresents.Therefore,oneshouldnotexpectthislawtoindependentlydrivemanynewcosts.
B.NewCriminalLawUnnecessarytoDefendtheGovernment’sInterests
Thesmallnumbersof18U.S.C.§208cases224filedandthelackofdatademonstratingprivatepersonsareaccomplishingconflictedpublicacquisitionsbegsthequestion,whysuchalawisneeded?ThisargumentisespeciallytemptinggiventheapparentabilityoftheFalseClaimsActtoreachentitieswhoenableconflictedemployeestoperformpublicacquisition.Theprospectofstatutoryandtrebledamages225arguablymotivatesmanyalready.Additionally,contractorshavethebusinessethicsrule226andFARSubpart3.11227alreadyapplicable.Theresponsivestepsthoseentitieshavealreadytakenhavearguablygeneratedthesecondandthirdordereffectslikelyreducingtheriskofconflictedpublicacquisition.
InpartsIIIandIV,thisarticletoucheduponmanystructuralimprovementstotheexistinganti-corruptionregimeagenerallyapplicablecriminallawcoulddrive.Theyneednotbeindividuallyrepeatedhere.However,itbearsrepeatingthatacriminallawagainstanyperson’sconflictedpublicacquisitionwillcreateafoundationuponwhichregulators,agencies,andotherscanharmonizetoandbuildupon.Harmonizationcanreducetransactioncostsandprovideobjectivestandardsuponwhichprivateentitiescanbetterestimatetheircompliancecosts.Thiscan,
forgranteeengagedinpublicacquisitionwithanorganizationinwhichtheagentwasfinanciallyinterested).223 TheDepartmentofJusticechargedfewdefendantswithviolating18U.S.C.§208.See BureauofJusticeStatistics,Dep’tofJustice,http://bjs.gov/fjsrc/tsec.cfm(lastvisitedMar.24,2013)(FYXX,numberofdefendants:FY10,7;FY09,4;FY08,4;FY07,6;FY06,6;FY05,8).Duringthatsametimeframe,theDepartmentofJusticeinvestigatedfarmoreFalseClaimsActcases.SeeCivilDiv.,Dep’tofJustice,http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf(listvisitedApr.3,2013)(“newmatters”means“newlyreceivedreferralsinvestigations,andquitamactions.”)(FYXX,numberofFalseClaimsAct“newmatters”:FY10,715;FY09,565;FY08,541;FY07,495;FY06,456;FY05,511).224 Seeid.225 See31U.S.C.§3729(a)(2013).226 See FAR,48C.F.R.subpart3.10(2013).227 SeeFAR,48C.F.R.subpart3.11(2013).
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inturn,leadtolowerpricesbothfromknowingwhatthestandardtrulyisupfrontandnothavingtopricetheriskofanespeciallyconservativecontracting,grant,oragreementofficerdemandingmorecompliancewithinthegray.
Thelackofhorrorstoriesmeanslittle.228Alreadylittleprosecutionoccursunder18U.S.C.§208—butthatdoesnotmeanitshouldberepealed.Theproposedgenerallyapplicablecriminallaw’slargervalueishowitcreatesthebaseuponwhicheveryonecanbuild.Itsabilitytoserveasaprosecutionchargeisanimportantsystematicsafetyvalveforespeciallybadactors,butthatisnotthelaw’scorevalue.Additionally, littleinformationexistsconcerningtheextentofprivatepersonsperformingpublicacquisitionserviceswhileconflicted.Thus,thelackofhorrorstoriesmayreflectalackofinformationmorethanalackofexistence.Andregard-lessofone’sagreementwiththatstatement,Figure2demonstratesCongressandagenciesapparentlyfeelthereisasignificantproblem—otherwisewhy,especiallyforthelesspoliticallydrivenagencies,wouldthecataloguedcontrolsexistifnottoaddressaneed?
Morefundamentally,whyshouldprivateemployeesnotbepotentiallyheldcriminallyliableforperformingpublicacquisitionwithanentityinwhichheorshehasafinancialinterest?Federalemployeescanbeimprisoned,fined,andlabeledafelon229forthat,andmore,conduct.Whyshouldothersengaginginthesameconductbesimplyreassignedor,atworst,fired—assumingtheirsupervisionevencares?230Whyshouldinvestigatorsandprosecutorshavetofindcriminalconductderivativeoftheconflictofinterestbeforetheycanfilecharges?Afterall,theFARalreadyrequiresacontractortoinformthegovernmentwhen“theContractorhascredibleevidencethataprincipal,employee,agent,orsubcontractoroftheContractorhascommitted...[a]violationofFederalcriminallawinvolving...conflictofinterest....”231SinceitsenactmentinDecemberof2007,thislanguagehasbeenessentiallyworthlessasnosuchlawexists!232Agenerallyapplicablecriminallawasproposedwouldfillthatvoid.
228 SeeAdMInIstrAtIve conFerence oF the unIted stAtes, supra note4,at 5(“Whetherornotthereisanywidespreadpatternofethicalabuses,theexistenceofsignificantethicalriskscanerodepublicconfidenceinthegovernmentprocurementprocessandinthegovernmentitself.”).229 See18U.S.C.§216(a)(2)(2013)(establishingthepenaltyforwillfulviolationsof18U.S.C.§208).Lessthanwillfulviolationswouldbeamisdemeanor.See18U.S.C.§216(a)(1).230 Suspensionordebarmentoftheemployeeispossible.SeeFAR,48C.F.R.9.407–2(a)(9)(2013)(makingcommissionofacts“indicatingalackofbusinessintegrityorbusinesshonestythatseriouslyanddirectlyaffectsthepresentresponsibility”agroundforsuspension).SeeFAR,48C.F.R.9.406–2(a)(5)(2013)(makingcommissionofacts“indicatingalackofbusinessintegrityorbusinesshonestythatseriouslyanddirectlyaffectsthepresentresponsibility”agroundfordebarment).231 FAR,48C.F.R.52.203–13(b)(3)(i)(A)(2013).See alsoFAR,48C.F.R.3.1003(a)(2)(2013)(statinganycontractornotreportingsuchconductmaybesuspendedordebarred).232 ThedraftersandtheOGEwereoddlyconcernedwithorganizationalconflictsofinterestratherthanpersonalconflictsofinterest.SeeContractorCodeofBusinessEthicsandConduct,72Fed.Reg.65,873,65,877(Nov.23,2007)(referencingaDepartmentofEducationInspectorGeneral’s
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 205
VI.CONCLUSION
Foralmostahundredyears,from1863to1962,thelawdidnotcarewhoapersonworkedfororhowthatperson’semployergottheworktostartwithwhenguardingagainstatleastsomeoftheactsconstitutingpublicacquisition.Whensomeoneusedafederalacquisitionvehicleentrustedtothemtoenrichthemselves,thelawclearlysaidno.
Butthatwasundonein1962.Withoutreason,cause,orperhapsevenknowl-edgeorintent.Initsplacegrewaformalisticandlegalisticdecision-treethatfirstandforemostcaredwhoaperson’semployerwas,ratherthanwhatthatpersondid.Since1962,someofthelittlegearsofthegreaterfederalmachinehaveadapted,creatingreamsandreamsofregulationsalltrying,andlargelyfailing,tomimicinsomeformatleastpartoftheprotectionasingleparagraphhadprovidedforninety-nineyears.
Reinvigoratingthispartofourjurisprudencewouldcreateasinglestandard,jettisoningunnecessaryandimmaterialquestionsofwhoworksforwhoandhow.Fromthatsinglestandard,wemaydecidetoholdgovernmentemployeestoahigherstandard,as18U.S.C.§208does.Andfromthatsinglestandard,thelawcanfinallybeharmonized.Procurementregulationscouldbuildfromasinglelaw,implementingitfortheparticularsrelevanttoitsneeds.Grantregulationscoulddothesame.AndOTAswouldactuallyhavesomethingprohibitingconflictedpublicacquisitionbyprivateindividuals.
Howthatlawreadsandwhatitshouldspecificallysayisaquestionforanotherday.Thisarticlehasadvocatedforagenerallyapplicablecriminallawprohibitingconflictedpublicacquisition.Historythroughthepresentdayprovidesmanyexamplestobuildfrom—fromtheoriginalCivilWarstatuteanditsiterationstothe1962governmentemployee-onlylawoftoday;fromtheearliestregulatoryattemptstocontrolwhatCongressunleashedin1962totoday’sFARSubpart3.11policystatements.Thoseandmorearecataloguedintheappendixgivingpotentialdraftersaplacetostart.
Hopefully,thisarticlehasdemonstratedwhythosedraftersshouldgetbusy.
auditwhereinaprimecontractorunder$5Mdidnotflowdowncertainorganizationalconflictofinterestclauses).Whynoonerealizedthatorganizationalconflictofinterestisnotafederalcrime,andthusisirrelevanttoFARSubpart3.10,isunknown.
206The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
AppendixI
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Gov
ernm
ent
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
1. 18 U
.S.C
. §
208(
a)
Parti
cipa
tion
“per
sona
lly
and
subs
tanti
ally
. . .
th
roug
h de
cisi
on,
appr
oval
, dis
appr
oval
, re
com
men
datio
n, th
e re
nder
ing
of a
dvic
e,
inve
stiga
tion,
or
othe
rwis
e, in
a .
. .
parti
cula
r m
atter
in
whi
ch, t
o hi
s kn
owle
dge,
he
, his
spo
use,
min
or
child
, [an
d ce
rtai
n or
gani
zatio
ns a
ffilia
ted
with
the
empl
oyee
] has
a
finan
cial
inte
rest
[.]”1
No
stat
utor
y de
finiti
ons
but O
GE,
in c
onsu
ltatio
n w
ith th
e Att
orne
y G
ener
al, e
mpo
wer
ed to
ex
empt
cer
tain
fina
ncia
l in
tere
sts
as “
too
rem
ote
or to
o in
cons
eque
ntial
to
affe
ct th
e in
tegr
ity
of th
e se
rvic
es”2 a
nd
“pro
vide
gui
danc
e w
ith
resp
ect t
o th
e ty
pes
of
inte
rest
s th
at a
re n
ot
so s
ubst
antia
l as
to b
e de
emed
like
ly to
affe
ct
the
inte
grity
of t
he
serv
ices
.”3
Non
e.N
one.
“[W
]hoe
ver,
bein
g an
offi
cer
or e
mpl
oyee
of
the
exec
utive
bra
nch
of th
e U
nite
d St
ates
G
over
nmen
t, o
r of
any
in
depe
nden
t age
ncy
of th
e U
nite
d St
ates
, a
Fede
ral R
eser
ve
bank
dire
ctor
, offi
cer,
or e
mpl
oyee
, or
an
office
r or
em
ploy
ee
of th
e D
istr
ict o
f Co
lum
bia,
incl
udin
g a
spec
ial G
over
nmen
t em
ploy
ee[.]
”4
Figu
re 1:L
egalControlsConcerningConflictso
fInterestandUseofN
on-PublicInformationforP
ersonalG
ainApplicable
toGovernm
entA
cquisitionProfessionals
118U.S.C.§208(a)(2013).
218U.S.C.§208(b)(2)(2013).
318U.S.C.§208(d)(2)(2013).
418U.S.C.§208(a)(2013).
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 207
AppendixII
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
Co
ntro
l
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Gov
ernm
ent
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
2. 17
C.F.
R. §
24
0.10
b -5
Non
e.N
one.
Proh
ibits
insi
der
trad
ing
unde
r “c
lass
ical
”5 and
“m
isap
prop
riati
on”
theo
ry.6
Info
rmati
on th
e pe
rson
ha
s a
duty
not
to
disc
lose
.7
App
lies
to s
ecur
ity8
tran
sacti
ons
by a
n in
side
r or
one
who
ow
es
a du
ty o
f non
disc
losu
re
to th
e so
urce
of t
he
insi
de in
form
ation
.9
5U.S.v.O
’Hagan,521U.S.642,651-2(1997)(“Underthe‘traditional...theory’ofinsidertradingliability,[15U.S.C.§78j]and[17C.F.R.§240.10b-5]are
violatedwhenacorporateinsidertradesinthesecuritieso
fhiscorporationonthebasiso
fmaterial,non-publicinformation.Tradingonsuchinformationqualifiesas
adeceptivedeviceunder[15U.S.C.§78j],wehaveaffirmed,becausearelationshipoftrustandconfidence[exists]betweentheshareholdersofacorporationand
thoseinsiderswhohaveobtainedconfidentialinformationbyreasonoftheirpositionwiththatcorporation....”)(quotationsomitted).
6Idat652(“The‘misappropriationtheory’holdsthatapersoncommitsfraudinconnectionwithasecuritiestransaction,andtherebyviolates[15U.S.C.§78j]
and[17C.F.R.§240.10b-5],whenhemisappropriatesconfidentialinformationforsecuritiestradingpurposes,inbreachofadutyow
edtothesourceofthe
information.Underthistheory,afiduciary’su
ndisclosed,self-servinguseofaprincipal’sinformationtopurchaseorsellsecurities,inbreachofadutyofloyaltyand
confidentiality,defraudstheprincipaloftheexclusiveuseofthatinformation.Inlieuofpremisingliabilityonafiduciaryrelationshipbetweencompanyinsiderand
purchaserorsellerofthecom
pany’sstock,themisappropriationtheorypremisesliabilityonafiduciary-turned-trader’sdeceptionofthosewhoentrustedhimwith
accesstoconfidentialinformation.”)(quotationsomitted).
7Se
e17C.F.R.§240.10b5-2(2013)(providingoperativedefinitions).
8Se
e15U.S.C.§78c(2013)(definingsecurity).
9O
’Hag
anat652-3(“[T]hemisappropriationtheoryoutlawstradingonthebasiso
fnon-publicinformationbyacorporate‘outsider’inbreachofadutyow
ednotto
atradingparty,buttothesourceoftheinformation.Themisappropriationtheoryisthusdesignedto‘protec[t]theintegrityofthesecuritiesm
arketsagainstabusesb
y‘outsiders’toacorporationwhohaveaccesstoconfidentialinformationthatwillaffectth[e]corporation’ssecuritypricewhenrevealed,butwhoowenofiduciaryor
otherdutytothatcorporation’sshareholders.’”)(citationsomitted).
208The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
AppendixIII
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Gov
ernm
ent
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
3. Offi
ce
of G
ov’t
Et
hics
Parti
cipa
tion
“per
sona
lly
and
subs
tanti
ally
in a
n offi
cial
cap
acity
in a
ny
parti
cula
r m
atter
in
whi
ch, t
o hi
s kn
owle
dge,
he
or
any
pers
on w
hose
in
tere
sts
are
impu
ted
to
him
und
er th
is s
tatu
te
has
a fin
anci
al in
tere
st,
if th
e pa
rticu
lar
matt
er
will
hav
e a
dire
ct a
nd
pred
icta
ble
effec
t on
that
inte
rest
.”10
Proh
ibiti
on s
elf-
defin
ing.
11
Shal
l “no
t eng
age
in a
fin
anci
al tr
ansa
ction
us
ing
non-
publ
ic
info
rmati
on, n
or a
llow
th
e im
prop
er u
se o
f no
n-pu
blic
info
rmati
on
to fu
rthe
r hi
s ow
n pr
ivat
e in
tere
st o
r th
at
of a
noth
er, w
heth
er
thro
ugh
advi
ce o
r re
com
men
datio
n, o
r by
kn
owin
g un
auth
oriz
ed
disc
losu
re.”
12
“[I]n
form
ation
that
th
e em
ploy
ee g
ains
by
reas
on o
f Fed
eral
em
ploy
men
t and
that
he
kno
ws
or re
ason
ably
sh
ould
kno
w h
as n
ot
been
mad
e av
aila
ble
to
the
gene
ral p
ublic
.”13
“[O
]ffice
r[s]
or
empl
oyee
[s] o
f an
agen
cy, i
nclu
ding
a
spec
ial G
over
nmen
t em
ploy
ee [a
nd] o
ffice
rs
but n
ot e
nlis
ted
mem
bers
of t
he
unifo
rmed
ser
vice
s.”14
10 5C.F.R.§2635.402(a)(2013).Theregulationpurportstosimplyrestatethestatutoryprohibitionfoundat18U.S.C.§208(a);however,theregulationincludesa
fourthelementnotmentionedinthestatute:resolutionofthe“particularmatter”musthavea“directandpredictableeffectonthatinterest.”S
eeU.S.v.Stadd,636
F.3d630,639-40(D.C.C
ir.2011)(sidesteppingquestionofwhether“directandpredictableeffect”isanactualelementof18U.S.C.§208(a)byholdingifitwas
error,sucherrorwasharmless).
See
also18U.S.C.§208(b)(2)(2013)(empoweringtheOGEtoexemptfrom
thestatutoryprohibition“financialinterest[s]...too
remoteortooinconsequentialtoaffecttheintegrityoftheservices....”).
11 S
ee5C.F.R.§2635.402(b)(2013)fordefinitionsofspecificterms.
12 5C.F.R.§2635.703(a)(2013).
13 5C.F.R.§2635.703(b)(2013).
14 5C.F.R.§2635.102(h)(2013).B
ut se
eu
.s. d
ep’t
oF d
eF.,
5500
.07-
r, J
oIn
t et
hIc
s reg.§1-300b(30Aug.1993)(C
7,17Nov.2011)a
vaila
ble
athttp://www.dtic.
mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/550007r.pdf(applyingsupplementalstandardsofethicalconducttoenlistedmilitarymem
bers).
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 209
AppendixIV
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
Co
ntro
l
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Gov
ernm
ent
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
4. U.S
. Co
urts
Confl
icts
of i
nter
est
shou
ld b
e av
oide
d.15
“[H
]e o
r sh
e (o
r th
e sp
ouse
, min
or c
hild
re
sidi
ng in
the
judi
cial
em
ploy
ee’s
hou
seho
ld,
or o
ther
clo
se re
lativ
e of
th
e ju
dici
al e
mpl
oyee
) m
ight
be
so p
erso
nally
or
fina
ncia
lly a
ffect
ed
by a
matt
er th
at a
re
ason
able
per
son
with
kno
wle
dge
of th
e re
leva
nt fa
cts
wou
ld
ques
tion
the
judi
cial
em
ploy
ee’s
abi
lity
prop
erly
to p
erfo
rm
offici
al d
uties
in a
n im
parti
al m
anne
r.”16
Proh
ibite
d fr
om
empl
oyin
g “c
onfid
entia
l in
form
ation
” fo
r “p
erso
nal g
ain.
”17
Non
e.“[
A]ll
em
ploy
ees
of th
e ju
dici
al b
ranc
h ex
cept
Ju
stice
s; ju
dges
; and
em
ploy
ees
of th
e U
nite
d St
ates
Sup
rem
e Co
urt,
th
e A
dmin
istr
ative
Offi
ce
of th
e U
nite
d St
ates
Co
urts
, the
Fed
eral
Ju
dici
al C
ente
r, th
e Se
nten
cing
Com
mis
sion
, an
d fe
dera
l pub
lic
defe
nder
offi
ces.”
18
15 u
.s. c
ou
rts,
gu
Ide
to Ju
dIc
IAry
po
lIc
y, c
od
e o
F co
nd
uc
t Fo
r Ju
dIc
IAl
eMpl
oy
ees,Vol.2,PartA
,Chapter3,C
anon3(F)(1),a
vaila
ble
athttp://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/V
ol02A-Ch03.pdf.Additionalconflictofinterestcontrolsexist.S
ee Id.atC
anon3(F)(2).
16 Id
. See
als
o Id
. atC
anon3(F)(4)(additionalrulesd
efininga“financialinterest”).
17 Id
.atC
anon3(D).
18 Id
.at310.10(a).
210The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
AppendixV
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Gov
ernm
ent
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
5. Cong
.N
one.
19N
one.
“[
M]a
y no
t use
non
-pu
blic
info
rmati
on
deri
ved
from
suc
h pe
rson
’s p
ositi
on a
s a
Mem
ber
of C
ongr
ess
or
empl
oyee
of C
ongr
ess
or g
aine
d fr
om th
e pe
rfor
man
ce o
f su
ch p
erso
n’s
offici
al
resp
onsi
biliti
es a
s a
mea
ns fo
r m
akin
g a
priv
ate
profi
t.”20
Non
e.M
embe
rs a
nd
empl
oyee
s of
Con
gres
s.21
19 BoththeSenateandHousehaveguidanceregardingconflictsofinterestintheirrespectiveethicspublications.S
ee, e
.g.,
u.s
. sen
Ate
sele
ct
co
MM
Itte
e o
n e
thIc
s, th
e se
nAt
e c
od
e o
F oFF
IcIA
l c
on
du
ct,110thCong.(2008),a
vaila
ble
athttp://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=efa7bf74-4a50-46a5-
bb6f-b8d26b9755bf,
ho
use
oF r
epr
esen
tAtI
ves
co
MM
Itte
e o
n s
tAn
dA
rd
s oF o
FFIc
IAl
co
nd
uc
t, h
ou
se e
thIc
s MA
nu
Al,110thCong.(2008ed.),a
vaila
ble
athttp://
ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/documents/2008_House_Ethics_Manual.pdf,u
.s. h
ou
se o
F rep
res
entA
tIv
es, c
oM
MIt
tee
on
eth
Ics,
ru
les r
egA
rd
Ing
pe
rso
nA
l FI
nA
nc
IAl
trA
nsA
ctI
on
s(Nov.29,2011),a
vaila
ble
athttp://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/fin%20trans%20pink%20sheet.pdf.
20 StopTradingonCongressionalKnowledgeA
ctof2012,Pub.L.N
o.112-105,§3,126Stat.291,292(2012).
21 S
eeStopTradingonCongressionalKnowledgeA
ctat§3.
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 211
AppendixVI
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
1. 17
C.F.
R. §
24
0.10
b-522
Non
e.N
one.
Proh
ibits
insi
der
trad
ing
unde
r “c
lass
ical
” an
d “m
isap
prop
riati
on”
theo
ry.
Info
rmati
on th
e pe
rson
ha
s a
duty
not
to
disc
lose
.
App
lies
to s
ecur
ity
tran
sacti
ons
by a
n in
side
r or
one
who
ow
es
a du
ty o
f non
disc
losu
re
to th
e so
urce
of t
he
insi
de in
form
ation
.
Figu
re 2:L
egalControlsConcerningConflictso
fInterestandUseofN
on-PublicInformationforP
ersonalG
ainApplicable
toContractorAcquisitionProfessionals
22 Forcitationsrelevanttothisentry,s
ee in
fraFigure1,R
ow2.
212The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
2. Fede
ral
Acq
uisi
-tio
n Re
gula
-tio
n 23
“The
Con
trac
tor
shal
l -
(1) H
ave
proc
edur
es in
pl
ace
to s
cree
n co
vere
d em
ploy
ees
for
pote
ntial
pe
rson
al c
onfli
cts
of
inte
rest
[and
] [p]
reve
nt
pers
onal
con
flict
s of
in
tere
st[.]
”24
“‘Pe
rson
al c
onfli
ct
of in
tere
st’ m
eans
a
situ
ation
in w
hich
a
cove
red
empl
oyee
has
a
finan
cial
inte
rest
, pe
rson
al a
ctivi
ty, o
r re
latio
nshi
p th
at c
ould
im
pair
the
empl
oyee
’s
abili
ty to
act
impa
rtial
ly
and
in th
e be
st in
tere
st
of th
e G
over
nmen
t w
hen
perf
orm
ing
unde
r th
e co
ntra
ct.”
25
Cont
ract
ors
shal
l “P
rohi
bit u
se o
f non
-pu
blic
info
rmati
on
acce
ssed
thro
ugh
perf
orm
ance
of a
G
over
nmen
t con
trac
t for
pe
rson
al g
ain[
.]”26
“[A
]ny
Gov
ernm
ent o
r th
ird-p
arty
info
rmati
on
that
(1) I
s ex
empt
from
di
sclo
sure
und
er th
e Fr
eedo
m o
f Inf
orm
ation
A
ct (5
U.S
.C. §
552
) or
othe
rwis
e pr
otec
ted
from
dis
clos
ure
by
stat
ute,
Exe
cutiv
e or
der,
or re
gula
tion;
or
(2) H
as
not b
een
diss
emin
ated
to
the
gene
ral p
ublic
and
th
e G
over
nmen
t has
not
ye
t det
erm
ined
whe
ther
th
e in
form
ation
can
or
will
be
mad
e av
aila
ble
to
the
publ
ic.”
27
Empl
oyee
s or
se
lf-em
ploy
ed
subc
ontr
acto
rs
pref
orm
ing
an
acqu
isiti
on fu
nctio
n cl
osel
y as
soci
ated
with
in
here
ntly
gov
ernm
enta
l fu
nctio
ns.28
23 TheFARappliestoexecutiveagencies.S
ee41U.S.C.§133(2013)(statingthatthefollowingorganizationsaresu
bjecttotheFA
R:the“Executivedepartm
ents”
ofAgriculture,C
ommerce,D
efense,Education,Energy,HealthandHum
anServices,Hom
elandSecurity,HousingandUrbanDevelopment,Interior,Justice,Labor,
State,Transportation,Treasury,VeteransA
ffairs,s
ee5U.S.C.§101(2013);the“Militarydepartments”—
AirForce,Army,andNavy,se
e5U.S.C.§102(2013);
“anestablishm
entintheexecutivebranch(otherthantheUnitedStatesPostalServiceorthePostalR
egulatoryCom
mission)w
hichisnotanExecutivedepartm
ent,
militarydepartment,Governm
entcorporation,orpartthereof,orpartofanindependentestablishm
ent,”5U.S.C.§104(1)(2013);and,“whollyownedGovernm
ent
corporation[s]”oftheCom
modityCreditC
orporation,Com
munityDevelopmentFinancialInstitutionsFund,Export-ImportBankoftheUnitedStates,FederalCrop
InsuranceCorporation,FederalPrisonIndustries,CorporationforN
ationalandCom
munityService,G
overnm
entN
ationalM
ortgageA
ssociation,OverseasP
rivate
AppendixVII
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 213
AppendixVIII
InvestmentC
orporation,PennsylvaniaA
venueDevelopmentC
orporation,PensionBenefitG
uarantyCorporation,SaintLaw
renceSeaw
ayDevelopmentC
orporation,
SecretaryofHousingandUrbanDevelopmentw
hencarryingoutdutiesandpow
ersrelatedtotheFederalH
ousingAdm
inistrationFund,TennesseeValleyAuthority,
PanamaCanalCom
mission,M
illennium
ChallengeCorporation,andtheInternationalC
leanEnergyFoundation,31U.S.C.9101(3)(2013).B
ut se
eDep’tof
TransportationandRelatedAgenciesA
ppropriationsAct,Pub.L.N
o.104-50,§348,109Stat.436,460-1(1995)(codifiedat49U.S.C.§40110(d))(allowingthe
FederalAviationAdm
inistration,apartoftheDepartmentofT
ransportation,toestablishitsownprocurem
entregulationseparateandapartfrom
theFA
R).
24 FAR52.203-16(b)(2013).
See
alsoDuncanHunterN
ationalD
efenseAuthorizationActforF
iscalYear2009,Pub.L.N
o.110-417,§841,122Stat.4356,4537-9
(2008)(theprogenitorofFARSubpart3.11),PreventingPersonalConflictso
fInterestforContractorEmployeesP
erformingAcquisitionFunctions,76Fed.Reg.
68,017(N
ov.2,2011)(fi
nalrule).
25 FAR52.203-16(a)(2013).Thedefinitionalsostates“[a]deminimisinterestthatwouldnot‘impairtheem
ployee’sabilitytoactim
partiallyandinthebest
interestoftheGovernm
ent’isnotcoveredunderthisdefinition.(1)A
mongthesourceso
fpersonalconflictso
finterestare—(i)Financialinterestso
fthecovered
employee,ofclosefamilymem
bers,orofothermem
bersofthecoveredemployee’shousehold;(ii)Otheremploymentorfi
nancialrelationships(includingseekingor
negotiatingforprospectiveem
ploymentorbusiness);and(iii)Gifts,includingtravel.(2)F
orexample,financialinterestsreferredtoinparagraph(1)ofthisd
efinition
mayarisefrom
—(i)Com
pensation,includingwages,salaries,commissions,professionalfees,orfeesforbusinessreferrals;(ii)Consultingrelationships(including
commercialandprofessionalconsultingandservicearrangem
ents,scientificandtechnicaladvisoryboardmem
berships,orservingasanexpertwitnessinlitigation);
(iii)Servicesprovidedinexchangeforhonorariumso
rtravelexpensereimbursem
ents;(iv)R
esearchfundingorotherformso
fresearchsupport;(v)Investmentinthe
formofstockorbondow
nershiporpartnershipinterest(excludingdiversifiedmutualfundinvestments);(vi)Realestateinvestments;(vii)Patents,copyrights,and
otherintellectualpropertyinterests;or(viii)Businesso
wnershipandinvestmentinterests.”Id.
26 FAR52.203-16(b)(2)(ii)(2013).
27 FAR52.203-16(a)(2013).
28 S
eeFAR3.1106(2013).“Acquisitionfunctioncloselyassociatedwithinherentlygovernm
entalfunctionsmeanssu
pportingorprovidingadviceor
recommendationswithregardtothefollowingactivitiesofaFederalagency:(1)P
lanningacquisitions[,](2)D
eterminingwhatsupplieso
rservicesaretobeacquired
bytheGovernm
ent,includingdevelopingstatem
entsofw
ork[,](3)D
evelopingorapprovinganycontractualdocum
ents,toincludedocumentsdefiningrequirements,
incentiveplans,andevaluationcriteria[,](4)E
valuatingcontractproposals[,](5)A
wardingGovernm
entcontracts[,](6)A
dministeringcontracts(includingordering
changeso
rgivingtechnicaldirectionincontractperformanceorcontractquantities,evaluatingcontractorperformance,andacceptingorrejectingcontractorproducts
orservices)[,](7)Terminatingcontracts[,](8)D
eterminingwhethercontractcostsarereasonable,allocable,andallowable.”FAR52.203-16(a)(2013).
214The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
3. Coun
cil
on
Envi
ron-
men
tal
Qua
lity
Cont
ract
ors
deve
lopi
ng
envi
ronm
enta
l im
pact
st
atem
ents
“sh
all
exec
ute
a di
sclo
sure
st
atem
ent p
repa
red
by th
e le
ad a
genc
y, o
r w
here
app
ropr
iate
the
coop
erati
ng a
genc
y,
spec
ifyin
g th
at th
ey h
ave
no fi
nanc
ial o
r ot
her
inte
rest
in th
e ou
tcom
e of
the
proj
ect.”
29
The
cont
ract
or h
as
“pec
unia
ry o
r ot
her
inte
rest
s in
the
outc
omes
of t
he
[env
ironm
enta
l im
pact
st
atem
ent]
.”30
Non
e.N
one.
Co
ntra
ctor
s cr
eatin
g en
viro
nmen
tal i
mpa
ct
stat
emen
ts o
n be
half
of
a fe
dera
l age
ncy.
31
29 40C.F.R.§1506.5(c)(2013).S
eeIm
plem
entationofProceduralProvisions,43Fed.R
eg.55,978;55,987;56,001(Nov.29,1978).
30 GuidanceRegardingNEPARegulations,48Fed.Reg.34,263;34,266(July28,1983).S
ee a
lsoFortyM
ostA
skedQuestionsConcerningCEQ
’sNational
Environm
entalPolicyActRegulations,46Fed.Reg.18,026,18,031(M
ar.23,1981)(questions17aand17bconcernconflictso
finterest).
31 S
ee40C.F.R.§1506.5(c)(2013).W
hiletheregulationlikelymeant“contractors”inthesenseofagoingbusinessconcernratherthanitsindividualemployees,the
textcouldallowanagencytoim
putetheconflictsofitsemployeestothecontractor.Thism
ightbeespeciallyappropriateifthecontractorissm
allorhasasp
ecific,
dedicatedteam
performingthecontract.
AppendixIX
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 215
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
4. Dep
’t. o
f H
ealth
&
Hum
an
Serv
ices
Requ
irin
g in
stitu
tions
re
ceiv
ing
Publ
ic H
ealth
Se
rvic
e (P
HS)
fund
ing
to “
dete
rmin
e w
heth
er
any
sign
ifica
nt fi
nanc
ial
inte
rest
s re
late
to
PHS–
fund
ed re
sear
ch;
dete
rmin
e w
heth
er
a fin
anci
al c
onfli
ct o
f in
tere
st e
xist
s; a
nd, i
f so,
de
velo
p an
d im
plem
ent
a m
anag
emen
t pla
n th
at
shal
l spe
cify
the
actio
ns
that
hav
e be
en, a
nd s
hall
be, t
aken
to m
anag
e su
ch fi
nanc
ial c
onfli
ct o
f in
tere
st.”
32
“[A
] sig
nific
ant fi
nanc
ial
inte
rest
that
cou
ld
dire
ctly
and
sig
nific
antly
aff
ect t
he d
esig
n,
cond
uct,
or
repo
rting
of
[Pub
lic H
ealth
Ser
vice
] fu
nded
rese
arch
.”33
Non
e.N
one.
A
n “I
nves
tigat
or”
who
is
“th
e pr
ojec
t dire
ctor
or
pri
ncip
al In
vesti
gato
r an
d an
y ot
her
pers
on,
rega
rdle
ss o
f title
or
pos
ition
, who
is
resp
onsi
ble
for
the
desi
gn, c
ondu
ct, o
r re
porti
ng o
f res
earc
h fu
nded
by
the
PHS,
or
pro
pose
d fo
r su
ch
fund
ing,
whi
ch m
ay
incl
ude,
for
exam
ple,
co
llabo
rato
rs o
r co
nsul
tant
s.”34
32 45C.F.R.§94.5(a)(2013).S
eeObjectivityinResearch,60Fed.Reg.35,810,35,818(July11,1995)(fi
nalrule).
33 45C.F.R.§94.3(2013).Theregulationcontainsalengthydefinitionoftheterm“significantfinancialinterest.”Id
.Generally,thetermmeansreceiptofover$5,000
duringthepasttw
elvemonthsfromaprivateorpubliclytradedcom
pany;possessionofanow
nershipinterestinapublicallytradedcom
panyexceeding$5,000;
possessionofanyownershipinterestinaprivatecompany;and,possessionofanyrelatedintellectualpropertyrights,bythebytheInvestigator,theInvestigator’s
spouse,ortheInvestigator’sdependentchildren.Id
.34 45C.F.R.§94.3(2013).
AppendixX
216The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
5. Dep
’t. o
f En
ergy
“[S]
hall
not b
e pe
rmitt
ed
to m
ake
or in
fluen
ce
any
deci
sion
s on
beh
alf
of th
e co
ntra
ctor
whi
ch
dire
ctly
or
indi
rect
ly
affec
t the
inte
rest
of
the
Gov
ernm
ent,
if th
e em
ploy
ee’s
per
sona
l co
ncer
n in
the
matt
er
may
be
inco
mpa
tible
w
ith th
e in
tere
st o
f the
G
over
nmen
t.”35
Non
e.“M
anag
emen
t and
op
erati
ng c
ontr
acto
r em
ploy
ees
shal
l not
use
pr
ivile
ged
info
rmati
on
for
pers
onal
gai
n, o
r m
ake
othe
r im
prop
er
use
of p
rivi
lege
d in
form
ation
whi
ch is
ac
quire
d in
con
necti
on
with
thei
r em
ploy
men
t on
con
trac
t wor
k.”36
Non
e.
Empl
oyee
s of
a
man
agem
ent a
nd
oper
ating
con
trac
tor.37
35 DEA
RS970.0371-6(a)(2013).
SeeRew
riteofRegulationsGoverningM
anagem
entandOperatingContracts,65Fed.R
eg.80,994,81,012(Dec.22,2000)(fi
nal
rule).Contractoremployeesalso“shallnot,undercircum
stancesw
hichmightreasonablybeinterpretedasanattempttoinfluencetherecipientsintheconduct
oftheirduties,acceptanygratuityorspecialfavorfromindividualso
rorganizationswithwhomthecontractorisdoingbusiness,orproposingtodobusiness,in
accomplishingtheworkunderthecontract.”DEA
RS970.0371-6(a)(2013).Suchemployeesalsomaynottakeoutsideemploymentthatw
ill“[a]ppeartocreatea
conflict-of-interestsituation.”DEA
RS970.0371-7(b)(2013).
36 DEA
RS970.0371-5(2013).
37 S
ee su
pranotes3
5and36.
AppendixXI
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 217
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-P
ublic
In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
6. Fede
ral
Dep
osit
Insu
ranc
e Co
rp.
(FD
IC)
Shal
l “av
oid
a co
nflic
t of i
nter
est
[and
] be
ethi
cally
re
spon
sibl
e[.]”
38
“(1)
Has
a p
erso
nal,
busi
ness
, or
finan
cial
inte
rest
or
rela
tions
hip
that
rela
tes
to th
e se
rvic
es y
ou
perf
orm
und
er th
e co
ntra
ct; (
2)
Is a
par
ty to
litig
ation
aga
inst
[the
FD
IC],
or re
pres
ents
a p
arty
that
is
; (3)
Sub
mits
an
offer
to a
cqui
re
an a
sset
from
[the
FD
IC] f
or w
hich
se
rvic
es w
ere
perf
orm
ed d
urin
g th
e pa
st th
ree
year
s, u
nles
s th
e co
ntra
ct a
llow
s fo
r th
e ac
quis
ition
; or
(4) E
ngag
es in
an
activ
ity th
at
wou
ld c
ause
[the
FD
IC] t
o qu
estio
n th
e in
tegr
ity o
f the
ser
vice
you
pr
ovid
ed, a
re p
rovi
ding
or
offer
to
prov
ide
[the
FD
IC],
or im
pairs
you
r in
depe
nden
ce.”
39
“Nei
ther
you
nor
any
pe
rson
who
per
form
s se
rvic
es o
n yo
ur b
ehal
f m
ay u
se .
. . in
form
ation
ob
tain
ed fr
om [t
he
FDIC
] or
a th
ird p
arty
in
conn
ectio
n w
ith a
n FD
IC
cont
ract
[.]”40
Non
e.41
All
empl
oyee
s w
ho
“per
form
[], d
irect
ly o
r in
dire
ctly
, con
trac
tual
se
rvic
es o
r fu
nctio
ns o
n”
the
FDIC
’s b
ehal
f.42
AppendixXII
38 12C.F.R.§366.9(2013).S
ee a
lsoMinimum
StandardsofIntegrityandFitnessforanFD
ICContractor,67Fed.Reg.69,990,69,992-3(Nov.20,2002).
39 2C.F.R.§366.10(2013).
40 12C.F.R.§366.13(a)(2013).
41 Theregulationsprovidetw
o,non-inclusive,examplesofinappropriateuseofconfidentialinformation.Bothexam
plesconcernthedisclosureofinformationtoa
thirdparty.N
eitherexampleconcernsacontractemployee’suseoftheinformationforpersonalgain.S
ee12C.F.R.§366.13(b)(2013).
42 12C.F.R.366.0(c)(2013).
218The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
7. Def
., D
ep’t
. of
—Fe
d-er
ally
Fu
nded
Re
sear
ch
& D
evel
-op
men
t Ce
nter
(F
FDRC
)
“Wor
k pe
rfor
med
. . .
sh
all b
e ch
arac
teri
zed
by
a ne
ed fo
r un
ques
tione
d ob
jecti
vity
, div
orce
d fr
om a
ll co
nflic
ting
inte
rest
s, fi
nanc
ial
and
com
mer
cial
. Thi
s in
clud
es .
. . p
erso
nal
confl
icts
of i
nter
est o
f em
ploy
ees[
.]”43
“[P]
erso
nal a
ctivi
ties,
re
latio
nshi
ps, o
r fin
anci
al
inte
rest
s” in
clud
ing
“gift
s [a
nd] o
utsi
de
activ
ities
” th
at m
ay
caus
e th
e em
ploy
ee to
“l
ack
obje
ctivi
ty o
r be
pe
rcei
ved
to p
oten
tially
la
ck o
bjec
tivity
[.]”44
FFRD
C m
ust h
ave
“pol
icie
s an
d pr
oced
ures
to
pro
tect
pro
prie
tary
, pr
ivile
ged,
and
sen
sitiv
e in
form
ation
from
di
sclo
sure
.”45
Non
e.
FFRD
C em
ploy
ees
“in
a po
sitio
n to
mat
eria
lly
influ
ence
rese
arch
fin
ding
s an
d/or
re
com
men
datio
ns.”
46
43 S
eeM
emorandumfrom
TheUnderSecretaryofD
efensetotheServiceSecretariesetal.,su
bject:FederallyFundedResearchandDevelopmentC
enter(FFRDC)
AvoidanceofConflictofInterest(26Jan.2007),a
vaila
ble
athttp://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/logistics_material_readiness/acq_bud_fin/10-F-0034Conflict_of_
InterestPolicies&
Procedures_to_be_Included_in_FFR
DC_Sponsoring_Agreements.pdf.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
AppendixXIII
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 219
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
8. Def
., D
ep’t
. of
—So
urce
Se
lecti
on
“[A
]ctu
al o
r po
tenti
al
confl
ict o
f int
eres
t is
sues
are
reso
lved
pri
or
to g
ranti
ng a
cces
s to
an
y so
urce
sel
ectio
n in
form
ation
.”47
Onl
y a
refe
renc
e st
ating
“(
See
CFR
2635
).”48
Non
-dis
clos
ure
agre
emen
t.49
Non
e.
Mem
bers
of a
sou
rce
sele
ction
team
.50
47 M
emorandumfrom
theDirector,D
efenseProcurementandAcquisitionPolicy,OfficeofT
heUnderSecretaryofD
efensetoM
ilitaryServices’Acquisition
Personnel,subject:DepartmentofD
efenseSourceSelectionProcedurespara1.4.1.2.6(4M
ar.2011),a
vaila
ble
athttp://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/
USA
007183-10-DPA
P.pdf.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
AppendixXIV
220The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
9. Dep
’t. o
f th
e A
ir
Forc
e
Mus
t rep
ort “
real
, ap
pare
nt, p
ossi
ble,
or
pote
ntial
con
flict
of
inte
rest
[s]”
and
sub
mit
a “C
onfli
ct o
f Int
eres
t St
atem
ent .
. . t
o th
e Co
ntra
cting
Offi
cer
indi
catin
g m
y pe
rson
al
stoc
k ho
ldin
gs p
rior
to
acc
essi
ng s
ourc
e se
lecti
on in
form
ation
.”51
Non
e.
“I d
o so
lem
nly
swea
r or
affi
rm th
at I
will
no
t div
ulge
, pub
lish,
or
reve
al b
y w
ord,
co
nduc
t, o
r an
y ot
her
mea
ns,”
sou
rce
sele
ction
or
prop
riet
ary
info
rmati
on.”
52
Non
-dis
clos
ure
oblig
ation
onl
y ap
plie
s to
sou
rce
sele
ction
53 a
nd
prop
riet
ary
info
rmati
on.
Mem
bers
of a
sou
rce
sele
ction
team
.54
51 PolicyMem
o11-C-04,ActingDeputyAssistantSecretary(C
ontracting),subject:MandatoryAirForceSourceSelectionProcedure(8M
ay2011),a
vaila
ble
at
http://ww3.safaq.hq.af.m
il/shared/media/docum
ent/A
FD-110511-038.pdf[hereinafterS
AF/AQC,S
ourc
e Se
lect
ion
Proc
edur
es].Contractoremployeesp
articipating
inthesourceselectionmustalsocertify“thatneitherInorm
yimmediatefamily,tothebestofm
yknow
ledge,possessanyfinancialinterest”inanyofferorexceeding
$15,000.Id.at16.
52 Id
. at15.
53 S
ee 41U.S.C.§2101(7)(2013)(definingso
urceselectioninformationundertheProcurementIntegrityActas“anyofthefollowinginformationpreparedforuse
byaFederalagencytoevaluateabidorproposaltoenterintoaFederalagencyprocurem
entcontract,ifthatinformationpreviouslyhasnotbeenmadeavailable
tothepublicordisclosedpublicly:(A)B
idpricessu
bmittedinresponsetoaFederalagencysolicitationforsealedbids,orlistsofthosebidpricesbeforepublic
bidopening[;](B)P
roposedcostso
rpricessu
bmittedinresponsetoaFederalagencysolicitation,orlistsofthoseproposedcostso
rprices[;](C
)Sourceselection
plans[;](D)Technicalevaluationplans[;](E)Technicalevaluationsofproposals[;](F
)Costorpriceevaluationsofproposals[;](G
)Com
petitiverangedeterminations
thatidentifyproposalsthathaveareasonablechanceofbeingselectedforawardofacontract[;](H
)Rankingso
fbids,proposals,orcom
petitors[;](I)R
eportsand
evaluationsofsourceselectionpanels,boards,oradvisorycouncils[;](J)O
therinformationmarkedas“sourceselectioninformation”...bytheheadoftheagency,
thehead’sdesignee,orthecontractingofficer....”).
See
alsoFAR2.101(2013)(definingso
urceselectioninformationsimilarly).
54 S
ee SAF/AQC, S
ourc
e Se
lect
ion
Proc
edur
es, s
upranote51,at22-3.
AppendixXV
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 221
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
10.
U.S
. A
genc
y fo
r In
t’l
Dev
elop
-m
ent
“[C]
ontr
acto
r em
ploy
ees
or c
onsu
ltant
s sh
all
not e
ngag
e “d
irect
ly
or in
dire
ctly
. . .
in a
ny
busi
ness
, pro
fess
ion
or o
ccup
ation
in th
e Co
oper
ating
Cou
ntry
or
oth
er fo
reig
n co
untr
ies
to w
hich
he/
she
is a
ssig
ned,
nor
sh
all h
e m
ake
loan
s or
in
vest
men
ts to
or
in a
ny
busi
ness
, pro
fess
ion
or o
ccup
ation
in th
e Co
oper
ating
Cou
ntry
or
othe
r fo
reig
n co
untr
ies
in w
hich
he/
she
is
assi
gned
.”55
Non
e.N
one.
Non
e.
All
USA
ID s
ervi
ces
cont
ract
s in
volv
ing
perf
orm
ance
ove
rsea
s.56
55 48C.F.R§752.7027(e)(2013).S
ee a
lsoPhysicalFitnessandM
edicalPrivileges,56Fed.R
eg.7,586,7,587(F
eb.25,1991)(fi
nalrule).
56 S
ee48C.F.R.§752.7027(2013)(pream
bletoclause).
AppendixXVI
222The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
11.
Envi
ron-
men
tal
Prot
ec-
tion
Age
ncy
Cont
ract
or m
ust r
epor
t “a
ctua
l or
pote
ntial
pe
rson
al c
onfli
ct o
f in
tere
st[.]
”57
A “
rela
tions
hip
of a
n em
ploy
ee, s
ubco
ntra
ctor
em
ploy
ee, o
r co
nsul
tant
w
ith a
n en
tity
that
may
im
pair
the
obje
ctivi
ty
of th
e em
ploy
ee,
subc
ontr
acto
r em
ploy
ee,
or c
onsu
ltant
in
perf
orm
ing
the
cont
ract
w
ork.
”58
May
not
dis
clos
e “c
onfid
entia
l bus
ines
s in
form
ation
[.]”59
“[A
]ny
info
rmati
on
whi
ch p
erta
ins
to th
e in
tere
sts
of a
ny b
usin
ess,
w
hich
was
dev
elop
ed
or a
cqui
red
by th
at
busi
ness
[.]”60
Confl
ict o
f int
eres
t co
ntro
ls a
pply
to
empl
oyee
s “w
orki
ng
on o
r ha
ving
acc
ess
to
info
rmati
on re
gard
ing
this
con
trac
t[.]”
61
The
disc
losu
re o
f no
n-pu
blic
info
rmati
on
cont
rols
app
ly c
ontr
acto
r em
ploy
ees
prov
idin
g “a
dvis
ory
serv
ices
[.]”62
57 48C.F.R.§1552.209-73(b)(2013).
See
alsoAcquisitionRegulationConcerningConflictso
fInterest,59Fed.R
eg.18,600,18,620(Apr.19,1994)(fi
nalrule).
58 48C.F.R.§1552.209-73(b)(2013).
See
alsoAcquisitionRegulationConcerningConflictso
fInterestat18,610(“Thecriticaltestthatacontractormustuse
regardinganypotential[personal]conflictiswhetheraconflictexistsw
hichwouldim
pairtheperson’sobjectivityinperformingtheworkunderanEPAcontract.).
59 48C.F.R.§1509.505-4(2013).
60 40C.F.R.§2.201(c)(2013).TheEnvironm
entalProtectionAgencyhasextensiveregulationsondisclosureofinformation,manyrelevanttocontractoroperations.
See
gene
rally40C.F.R.Part2,PublicInformation(2013).
61 48C.F.R.§1552.209-73(b)(2013).
62 48C.F.R.§1509.505-4(2013).
AppendixXVII
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 223
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
12.
Nuc
lear
Re
gula
-to
ry
Coun
cil
(NRC
)
NRC
has
a p
olic
y ag
ains
t no
n-co
mpe
titive
pr
ocur
emen
ts w
ith
cont
ract
ors
empl
oyin
g ce
rtai
n fo
rmer
NRC
em
ploy
ees.
63
Polic
y pe
rtai
ns to
fo
rmer
NRC
em
ploy
ees
sepa
rate
d fr
om th
e N
RC
for
less
than
two
year
s.64
Any
info
rmati
on
prot
ecte
d fr
om re
leas
e by
eith
er th
e Pr
ivac
y A
ct o
r Fr
eedo
m o
f In
form
ation
Act
.65
As
defin
ed in
the
Priv
acy
Act
66 a
nd F
reed
om o
f In
form
ation
Act
.67
N/A
63 S
ee48C.F.R.§2009.100(a)(2013).S
ee48C.F.R.§2052.209-70(2013)(implem
entingclause).
See
alsoAcquisitionRegulation(NRCAR),64Fed.R
eg.49,322,
49,327(S
ept.10,1999)(fi
nalrule).
64 S
ee48C.F.R.§2009.100(a)(2013).
65 “(1)If,intheperformanceofthiscontract,thecontractorobtainsaccesstoinformation,su
chasN
RCplans,policies,reports,studies,financialplans,internal
dataprotectedbythePrivacyActof1974ortheFreedomofInformationAct,thecontractoragreesn
otto:(i)Usethisinformationforanyprivatepurposeuntilthe
informationhasb
eenreleasedtothepublic;(ii)Com
peteforw
orkfortheCom
missionbasedontheinformationforaperiodofsixmonthsaftereitherthecompletion
ofthiscontractorthereleaseoftheinformationtothepublic,w
hicheverisfirst;(iii)Subm
itanunsolicitedproposaltotheGovernm
entbasedontheinformation
untiloneyearafterthereleaseoftheinformationtothepublic;or(iv)R
eleasetheinformationwithoutpriorw
rittenapprovalbythecontractingofficerunlessthe
informationhasp
reviouslybeenreleasedtothepublicbytheNRC.(2)Inaddition,thecontractoragreesthat,totheextentitreceivesorisg
ivenaccesstoproprietary
data,dataprotectedbythePrivacyActof1974ortheFreedomofInformationAct,orotherconfidentialorprivilegedtechnical,business,orfi
nancialinformation
underthiscontract,thecontractorsh
alltreattheinformationinaccordancewithrestrictionsplacedonuseoftheinformation.”48C.F.R.§2052.209-72(e)(2013)
(internalparentheticalso
mitted).
66 S
ee5U.S.C.§552a(2013).
67 S
ee5U.S.C.§552(2013).
AppendixXVIII
224The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
Co
ntro
l
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
13.
U.S
. Co
urts
68
No
cont
ract
or e
mpl
oyee
m
ay b
e an
“offi
cer
or
empl
oyee
” of
the
fede
ral
gove
rnm
ent a
nd n
o pe
rson
with
a fi
nanc
ial
inte
rest
in a
pri
vate
ly
owne
d co
ntra
ctor
sh
all b
e an
“offi
cer
or
empl
oyee
” of
the
fede
ral
gove
rnm
ent.
69
“No
empl
oyee
, pri
ncip
al,
or a
ffilia
te”
may
hav
e a
confl
ict o
f int
eres
t.70
A s
pous
e, c
hild
, or
pare
nt’s
ow
ners
hip
inte
rest
in th
e co
ntra
ctor
w
ill b
e im
pute
d to
the
pers
on.71
Will
not
dis
clos
e an
y in
form
ation
“re
ceiv
ed
or g
ener
ated
und
er th
e co
ntra
ct[.]
”72
Non
e.Co
nflic
t of i
nter
est
cont
rols
app
ly to
al
l em
ploy
ees
of
cont
ract
ors
prov
idin
g se
rvic
es.73
Dis
clos
ure
of n
on-p
ublic
in
form
ation
con
trol
s ap
ply
to e
mpl
oyee
s of
co
ntra
ctor
s pr
ovid
ing
expe
rt o
r co
nsul
tant
se
rvic
es.74
68 Inadditiontothecontrolslistedhere,theCodeofConductforJudicialE
mployeescanbeappliedtocontractors.
See
u.s
. co
urt
s, g
uId
e, c
od
e o
F co
nd
uc
t Fo
r
Jud
IcIA
l eM
plo
yee
s,Vol.2,PartA
,§310.10(d)(2013),a
vaila
ble
athttp://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/V
ol02A-Ch03.pdf(“Contractors
andothernonem
ployeesw
hoservethejudiciaryarenotcoveredbythiscode,butappointingauthoritiesmayim
posetheseorsimilarethicalstandardso
nsuch
nonemployees,asappropriate.”).
69 u
nIt
ed s
tAte
s co
urt
s, g
uId
e to
Jud
IcIA
ry p
olI
cy
, so
lIc
ItAt
Ion
pr
ov
IsIo
ns A
nd
co
ntr
Ac
t c
lAu
ses,Vol.14;A
pp.1B,C
lause1-1(2013),a
vaila
ble
athttp://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Procurement/G
uide/Vol14-Ch01-Appx1B.pdf?page=1#page=1.
70 Id
.atA
pp.1B,C
lause1-5(a).
71 Id.atA
pp.1B,C
lause1-1(d).
72 Id
.atA
pp.1B,C
lause5-5.
73 Id
.atA
pp.1B,C
lause1-5.
74 Id
.atVol14,Ch.5,§520.75.
AppendixXIX
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 225
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
14.
Fede
ral
Avia
tion
Age
ncy
“[N
]on-
Fede
ral”
m
embe
rs o
f a “
serv
ice
orga
niza
tion”
sha
ll no
t ha
ve re
al o
r ap
pare
nt
confl
icts
of i
nter
est.
75
Regu
latio
n ad
opts
de
finiti
ons
foun
d in
18
U.S
.C. §
208
and
5 C
.F.R
. Pa
rt 2
635.
Non
e.N
one.
Empl
oyee
s of
a “
serv
ice
orga
niza
tion.
”76
75 F
eder
Al A
vIA
tIo
n A
dM
InIs
trAt
Ion
, Ac
qu
IsIt
Ion
MA
nA
geM
ent
polI
cy(2008),¶3.1.5;¶4.2.3.14.4,a
vaila
ble
athttp://fasteditapp.faa.gov/am
s/do_action?do_
action=ListTO
C&contentUID=4
.76 “Aserviceorganizationisanyorganizationthatmanagesinvestmentresourcesregardlessofappropriationtodeliverservices.Itm
aybeaserviceunit,program
office,ordirectorate,andmaybeengagedinairtrafficservices,safety,security,regulation,certification,operations,com
mercialsp
acetransportation,airport
developm
ent,oradm
inistrativefunctions.”Id
.atA
pp.C
.
AppendixXX
226The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
15.
Trou
bled
A
sset
s Re
lief
Prog
ram
Proh
ibits
any
“pe
rson
al
confl
icts
of i
nter
est[
.]”77
“[M
]ean
s a
pers
onal
, bu
sine
ss, o
r fin
anci
al
inte
rest
of a
n in
divi
dual
, hi
s or
her
spo
use
or a
ny
depe
nden
t chi
ld th
at
coul
d ad
vers
ely
affec
t th
e in
divi
dual
’s a
bilit
y to
per
form
und
er th
e ar
rang
emen
t, h
is o
r he
r ob
jecti
vity
or
judg
men
t in
suc
h pe
rfor
man
ce,
or h
is o
r he
r ab
ility
to
repr
esen
t the
inte
rest
s of
the
Trea
sury
.”78
Shal
l not
“[u
]se
or
allo
w th
e us
e of
any
no
n-pu
blic
info
rmati
on
to fu
rthe
r an
y pr
ivat
e in
tere
st[.]
”79
“Any
info
rmati
on th
at
Trea
sury
pro
vide
s to
a
reta
ined
enti
ty u
nder
an
arra
ngem
ent,
or
that
the
reta
ined
enti
ty o
btai
ns
or d
evel
ops
purs
uant
to
the
arra
ngem
ent[
.]”80
Confl
ict o
f int
eres
t co
ntro
ls a
pply
to “
key
indi
vidu
als.”
81
Use
of n
on-p
ublic
in
form
ation
con
trol
s ap
ply
to “
reta
ined
en
tities
.”82
77 31C.F.R.§31.212(a)(2013).S
ee a
lsoTA
RPConflictso
fInterest,76Fed.R
eg.61,046,61,050(Oct.3,2011)(fi
nalrule).
78 31C.F.R.§31.201(2013).
79 31C.F.R.§31.217(b)(2)(2013).
80 31C.F.R.§31.217(a)(2013).
81 S
ee 31C.F.R.§31.212(a)(2013).“Keyindividualmeansanindividualprovidingservicestoaprivatesectorentitywhoparticipatespersonallyandsu
bstantially,
through,forexample,decision,approval,disapproval,recommendation,ortherenderingofadvice,inthenegotiationorperformanceof,ormonitoringfor
complianceunder,thearrangem
entw
iththeTreasury.”31C.F.R.§31.201(2013).
82 S
ee 31C.F.R.§31.217(b)(2)(2013).“Retainedentitymeanstheindividualorentityseekinganarrangementw
iththeTreasuryorhavingsuchanarrangem
entw
ith
theTreasury,butdoesn
otincludespecialgovernm
entemployees.A‘retainedentity’includesthesubcontractorsandconsultantsithirestoperformservicesunderthe
arrangem
ent.”31C.F.R.§31.201(2013).
AppendixXXI
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 227
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Con
trac
tor
Empl
oyee
s do
the
Cont
rols
App
ly
16.
Info
rma-
tion
Tech
. Ex
chan
ge
Pro-
gram
83
Ass
igne
d pe
rson
nel
“dee
med
” fe
dera
l em
ploy
ee fo
r “s
ectio
n[]
208
. . .
of ti
tle 1
8”84
No
stat
utor
y de
finiti
ons
but t
he O
ffice
of
Gov
ernm
ent E
thic
s,
in c
onsu
ltatio
n w
ith
the
Attor
ney
Gen
eral
, em
pow
ered
to e
xem
pt
cert
ain
finan
cial
inte
rest
s as
“to
o re
mot
e or
to
o in
cons
eque
ntial
to
affe
ct th
e in
tegr
ity
of th
e se
rvic
es”85
and
“pro
vide
gui
danc
e w
ith
resp
ect t
o th
e ty
pes
of
inte
rest
s th
at a
re n
ot
so s
ubst
antia
l as
to b
e de
emed
like
ly to
affe
ct
the
inte
grity
of t
he
serv
ices
.”86
Ass
igne
d pe
rson
nel
“dee
med
” fe
dera
l em
ploy
ee fo
r “s
ectio
n[]
1905
. . .
of ti
tle 1
8”87
an
d “m
ay n
ot h
ave
acce
ss to
any
trad
e se
cret
s or
to a
ny o
ther
no
n-pu
blic
info
rmati
on
whi
ch is
of c
omm
erci
al
valu
e to
the
priv
ate
sect
or o
rgan
izati
on fr
om
whi
ch h
e is
ass
igne
d[.]”
88
Non
e.Pr
ivat
e se
ctor
em
ploy
ees
assi
gned
to a
genc
ies
unde
r th
e In
form
ation
Te
chno
logy
Exc
hang
e Pr
ogra
m.
83 TheInformationTechnologyExchangeProgramexistedforfi
veyearsafterD
ec.17,2002.S
ee5U.S.C.§3701-7(2013)(theprogram
).Se
e al
soE-Governm
ent
Actof2002,Pub.L.N
o.107-347,§209(c),116Stat.2899,2925-32(2002)(establishingtheprogram).In2009,Congressp
rovidedtheSecretaryofDefense
authoritytoconductaverysimilarprogram
,butnoassignmentcouldcom
menceafterS
ept.30,2013.SeeNationalD
efenseAuthorizationActforF
iscalYear2010,
Pub.L.N
o.111-84,§1110,123Stat.2190,2493-5(2009).
84 5U.S.C.§3704(b)(2)(B)(2013).
85 18U.S.C.§208(b)(2)(2013).
86 18U.S.C.§208(d)(2)(2013).
87 5U.S.C.§3704(b)(2)(B)(2013).
88 5U.S.C.§3704(b)(3)(2013).
AppendixXXII
228The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
AppendixXXIII
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of I
nter
est
Cont
rol
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Gra
ntee
Em
ploy
ees
do th
e Co
ntro
ls A
pply
1. 17
C.F.
R. §
24
0.10
b-589
Non
e.N
one.
Proh
ibits
insi
der
trad
ing
unde
r “c
lass
ical
” an
d “m
isap
prop
riati
on”
theo
ry.
Info
rmati
on th
e pe
rson
ha
s a
duty
not
to
disc
lose
.
App
lies
to s
ecur
ity
tran
sacti
ons
by a
n in
side
r or
one
who
ow
es
a du
ty o
f non
disc
losu
re
to th
e so
urce
of t
he
insi
de in
form
ation
.
Figu
re 3:L
egalControlsConcerningConflictso
fInterestandUseofN
on-PublicInformationforP
ersonalG
ainApplicabletoGrantee
AcquisitionProfessionals
89 Forcitationsrelevanttothisentry,s
ee in
fraFigure1,R
ow2.
Non-Governmental Employees’ Personal Conflicts 229
AppendixXXIV
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
Co
ntro
l
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Gra
ntee
Em
ploy
ees
do th
e Co
ntro
ls A
pply
2. Offi
ce o
f M
anag
e-m
ent &
Bu
dget
(O
MB)
90
—St
an-
dard
Fo
rms
for
All
Gra
nt
App
li-ca
nts
The
“dul
y au
thor
ized
re
pres
enta
tive
of th
e ap
plic
ant”
cer
tifies
the
appl
ying
org
aniz
ation
“[
w]il
l est
ablis
h sa
fegu
ards
to p
rohi
bit
empl
oyee
s fr
om u
sing
th
eir
posi
tions
for
a pu
rpos
e th
at c
onsti
tute
s or
pre
sent
s th
e ap
pear
ance
of p
erso
nal
or o
rgan
izati
onal
con
flict
of
inte
rest
[.]”91
Non
e.
The
“dul
y au
thor
ized
re
pres
enta
tive
of th
e ap
plic
ant”
cer
tifies
the
appl
ying
org
aniz
ation
“W
ill e
stab
lish
safe
guar
ds to
pro
hibi
t em
ploy
ees
from
usi
ng
thei
r po
sitio
ns fo
r . .
. pe
rson
al g
ain.
”92
Non
e.A
ll.
90 S
ee31U.S.C.§503(b)(2)(C)(2013)(TheOMB“DeputyDirectorforM
anagem
entshallestablishgeneralm
anagem
entpoliciesforexecutiveagenciesandperform
thefollowinggeneralm
anagem
entfunctions:...PerformallfunctionsoftheDirector...relatingto...grant,cooperativeagreem
ent,andassistancemanagem
ent
....”).TheOMBpromulgatesg
rantregulationsundertw
oseparateregimes:institutionsofhighereducation,hospitals,andothernon-profitorganizations;and,
state,local,andtribalgovernm
ents.C
ompa
re2C.F.R.§215.0(2013)(statinggrantregulationsunderPart215oftheTitle2oftheCodeofFederalRegulations
appliestoinstitutionsofhighereducation,hospitals,andothernon-profitorganizations),
witho
FFIc
e o
F Mg
Mt.
& B
ud
get
, ex
ec. o
FFIc
e o
F th
e pr
esId
ent,
oM
B
cIr
cu
lAr n
o.A
-102(R
evised),
gr
An
ts A
nd
co
ope
rAt
Ive A
gr
eeM
ents
wIt
h s
tAte
An
d l
oc
Al
go
ver
nM
ents¶1(1997)(statingOMBCircularNo.A-102“establishes
consistencyanduniformityamongFederalagenciesinthemanagem
entofgrantsandcooperativeagreem
entswithState,local,andfederally-recognizedIndiantribal
governments.”).
91 o
FFIc
e o
F Mg
Mt.
& B
ud
get
, ex
ec. o
FFIc
e o
F th
e pr
esId
ent,StandardForms4
24B¶3&424D¶7,a
vaila
ble
athttp://apply07.grants.gov/apply/
FormLinks?family=15.C
ompa
re2C.F.R.§215.12(2013),w
itho
FFIc
e o
F Mg
Mt.
& B
ud
get
, ex
ec. o
FFIc
e o
F th
e pr
esId
ent,
oM
B c
Irc
ulA
r n
o.A
-102(R
evised),
gr
An
ts A
nd
co
ope
rAt
Ive A
gr
eeM
ents
wIt
h s
tAte
An
d l
oc
Al
go
ver
nM
ents,attachment¶(1)(c)(1)(1997)(bothsetsofgrantrulesrequireagenciestousecertain
standardformslikeSF-424BandSF-424D
).92 S
ee su
pra note91.
230The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
AppendixXXV
A.
Aut
hori
tyB.
Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
Co
ntro
l
C. Defi
niti
on o
f “Co
nflic
t of
Inte
rest
”
D.
Cont
rol o
n U
se o
f Non
-Pu
blic
Info
rmati
on
E. Defi
niti
on o
f “N
on-
Publ
ic In
form
ation
”
F. To w
hich
Gra
ntee
Em
ploy
ees
do th
e Co
ntro
ls A
pply
3. OM
B—In
stit.
of
Hig
her
Lear
ning
, H
ospi
tals
, or
Oth
er
Non
-Pr
ofit
Gra
ntee
s
“No
empl
oyee
, offi
cer,
or a
gent
[of t
he g
rant
ee]
shal
l par
ticip
ate
in
the
sele
ction
, aw
ard,
or
adm
inis
trati
on o
f a
cont
ract
sup
port
ed b
y Fe
dera
l [gr
ant]
fund
s if
a re
al o
r ap
pare
nt c
onfli
ct
of in
tere
st w
ould
be
invo
lved
.”93
“[W
]hen
the
empl
oyee
, offi
cer,
or a
gent
, any
m
embe
r of
his
or
her
imm
edia
te fa
mily
, his
or
her
par
tner
, or
an
orga
niza
tion
whi
ch
empl
oys
or is
abo
ut
to e
mpl
oy a
ny o
f the
pa
rties
indi
cate
d he
rein
, ha
s a
finan
cial
or
othe
r in
tere
st in
the
firm
se
lect
ed fo
r an
aw
ard.
”94
Non
e.N
one.
Thos
e pa
rtici
patin
g in
the
“the
sel
ectio
n,
awar
d, o
r ad
min
istr
ation
of
a c
ontr
act s
uppo
rted
by
Fed
eral
[gra
nt]
fund
s[.]”
95
4. OM
B—St
ate,
Lo
cal,
and
Trib
al
Gov
ern-
men
ts
Non
e.N
one.
N
one.
Non
e.N
one.
93 2C.F.R.§215.42(2013).
94 Id
.95 2C.F.R.§215.42(2013).
Beyond Skynet 231
I. APPLYINGTHELAWSOFWARTOAUTONOMOUSCYBERWEAPONS................................................................................. 239A.TheLawsofWarProhibitCertainAutonomousCyberweapons....... 241B.RespectingthePrincipleofDistinction............................................. 243C.RespectingthePrincipleofProportionality....................................... 245D.AnInevitableUseCase:AttackingDual-UseStructuresatthe
OutsetofHostilities........................................................................... 248E.TheNecessarySafeguardstoEnsureAutonomous
Cyberweapons’Legality.................................................................... 252 II. THEROLEOFCIVILIANSANDCONTRACTORSINTHE
DESIGNOFAUTONOMOUSCYBERWEAPONS.............................. 253A.AnOverviewofCivilians’ProtectedStatusunderLOAC................ 254B.TheUnclearStatusofCyberweapons’DesignersandProgrammers258C.TheResponsesfromAmericanMilitaryDepartmentstothis
Dilemma............................................................................................ 263D.ASuggestedFrameworktoEnsureCivilians’ProtectedStatus........ 266
III. THELEGALROLE:REVIEWINGCYBERWEAPONSFORCOMPLIANCEWITHTHELAWSOFWAR...................................... 271
IV. CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 276
BEYONDSKYNET:RECONCILINGINCREASEDAUTONOMYINCOMPUTER-BASEDWEAPONSSYSTEMSWITH
THELAWSOFWAR
Captain ChriStopher M. KovaCh*
* CaptChristopherM.Kovach,JudgeAdvocate,UnitedStatesAirForce(J.D.,cum laude,UniversityofPittsburgh(2008);M.S.,InternationalRelationsandNationalSecurityStudies,TroyUniversity(2011);B.S.,InformationSciences&TechnologyandFrench,PennsylvaniaStateUniversity(2005)),isaLegalAdvisortotheNorthAmericanAerospaceDefenseCommand(NORAD),ContinentalU.S.Region,601stAirandSpaceOperationsCenter,TyndallAirForceBase(AFB),Florida.PreviousassignmentsincludeChiefofMilitaryJustice,AeronauticalSystemsCenter,Wright-PattersonAFB,Ohio;ContractsandFiscalLawAttorney,CombinedJointInteragencyTaskForce435,Kabul,Afghanistan;andDeputyChiefofMilitaryJustice,KadenaAirBase,Japan.MemberoftheBaroftheStateofPennsylvania.Theauthorthanksthefollowingcontributors:ColonelMichaelGuillory,FloridaAirNationalGuard;LieutenantColonelNeilH.Stallings,U.S.AirForceReserves;CaptainRebekahByrd,U.S.AirForce;andMr.EdwardRopplefortheirinsightsandassistanceincraftingthisarticle.
232The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
Skynet was a computer system developed for the U.S. military by the defense firm Cyberdyne Systems. Skynet was first built as a “Global Digital Defense Network” and given command over all computerized military hardware and systems, including the B-2 stealth bomber fleet and America’s entire nuclear weapons arsenal. The strategy behind Skynet’s creation was to remove the possibility of human error and slow reaction time to guarantee a fast, efficient response to enemy attack.1
Theprecedingdescriptionis,asanyoneconversantinAmericancinemaknows,purelyfiction.Thecomputersystemthatgainedself-awarenessonlytowreakhavocuponhumanitylivesinsidetheTerminatormoviefranchise.Butthequestionsconcerningthedangerofpseudo-sentientcomputersraisedbyJamesCameron’s1984filmneverthelessproveprescienttoday,whereUnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense(DoD)regularlyemploysautonomousweaponssystems.Ina2012memo-randumoutliningpoliciesconcerningtheiruse,theDeputySecretaryofDefensehighlightedadesiretoavoidunintendedengagementsandminimizetheprobabilityoftheiroccurrence.2Otherwisestated,DoDseekstoavoida“Skynetmoment,”3whereapreprogrammedweaponsysteminadvertentlyattacksaninnocenttarget.4
1 ReferencingthepurelyfictionalSkynetartificialintelligencenetworkemployedintheTerminatorfranchise,popularizedbyArnoldSchwarzenegger.Skynet (Terminator),wIKIpedIA,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skynet_(Terminator)(lastvisitedJan.2,2013).Thisshouldnotbeconfusedwiththewhollyrealarrayofmilitarysatellites,coincidentallynamedSkynet,launchedbytheUnitedKingdom.JonathanAmos,UK’s Skynet Military Satellite Launched,BBc news(Dec.19,2012),http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20781625.2 u.s. dep’t oF deF., dIr.3000.09,AutonoMy In weApons systeMspara.1(b)(21Nov.2012)[hereinafterDoDDir.3000.09],available athttp://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf(thedirective“[e]stablishesguidelinesdesignedtominimizetheprobabilityandconsequencesoffailuresinautonomousandsemi-autonomousweaponsystemsthatcouldleadtounintendedengagements”).3 TheDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforForceDevelopmentmadeasimilarallusion.AaronMehta,U.S. DoD’s Autonomous Weapons Directive Keeps Man in the Loop,deFensenews(Nov.27,2012),http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121127/DEFREG02/311270005/U-S-DoD-8217-s-Autonomous-Weapons-Directive-Keeps-Man-Loop(“‘Thisdirectiveis,foronce,outaheadofevents,’‘Thisisn’tsomethingwhereweallofasuddenrealizedsomeone’soutthereabouttodevelopaTerminatoranddecidedwebettergetadirectiveout.That’snotthecase.’”).4 Forinstance,unmannedaerialvehiclesliketheMQ-1Predatordrone“canloiteroverpotentialtargetsforhoursbeforefiringtheirmissiles,”makingthemincrediblyversatile.See, e.g.,Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Death from Afar,the econoMIst (Nov.3,2012),http://www.economist.com/news/international/21565614-america-uses-drones-lot-secret-and-largely-unencumbered-declared-rules-worries.NoDoDproposalhassuggested,orevenhinted,automaticallyfiringweapons—thatis,amachine“pullingthetrigger”—butthetopicdrawsamplecommentary.Forinstance,asThe Economistpithilynotes,“[b]omb-droppingremote-controlledplaneswillsoonbecommonplace.Whatif,byanothercountry’sreasonablelights,America’sdroneattackscountasterrorism?Whatif,accordingtothegeneralprinciplesimplicitlygoverningtheObamaadministration’sowndronecampaign,1600PennsylvaniaAvenueturnsouttobealegitimatetargetforanothercountry’sdrones?WerewetowillMrObama’srulesofengagementasuniversallaw,a laKant,wouldwefindourselvesinharm’sway?Isuspectwewould.”Obama’s Drone Guidelines: Bombing Kant’s Test,the econoMIst(Nov.30,2012),http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/11/obamas-drone-guidelines.
Beyond Skynet 233
Thispolicy,forwhateverreason,failstodiscussthegrowingautonomypresentincomputer-basedweaponssystems,or“cyberweapons.”5Italsoignorestheirincreasingprevalence.
ForthepurposesofthisArticle,“autonomouscyberweapons”areessentiallycomputer-basedvariantsofDoD’straditionaldefinitionofautonomousweaponry,whichareweaponssystemsthat:
onceactivated,canselectandengagetargetswithoutfurtherinter-ventionbyahumanoperator.Thisincludeshuman-supervisedautonomousweaponsystemsthataredesignedtoallowhumanoperatorstooverrideoperationoftheweaponsystem,butcanselectandengagetargetswithoutfurtherhumaninputafteractivation.6
Theymightallowanend-useroroperatortochangesomeattackparametersandindeedoverrideoperations,buttheypossessdecision-makingalgorithmscraftedbyprogrammersbeforetheweapon’sdeployment.Forthesereasons,theydifferfromtraditionalsemi-autonomousweapons,suchas“fireandforget”weaponsthatrelyupontechnologytoacquire,track,andengagehuman-selectedtargetsbecauseinthosecases,“humancontrolisretainedoverthedecisiontoselectindividualtargetsandspecifictargetgroupsforengagement.”7Inthecaseofautonomouscyberweapons,thishumancontrolis,atbest,sharedbetweentheprogrammerandtheoperator;andinsomecases,theoperatormightexercisealmostnocontrolwhatsoever.8
Attheoutset,becausethelawofarmedconflict(LOAC)appliesonlytorecognized“attack,”definingthatlevelofbelligerenceiscrucial.Butnoconsensusdefinitionexists,andothervarietiesofcomputer-basedattacksmightqualifyinstead,suchasespionage,theftofintellectualproperty,orgarden-varietycriminalactivity.TheDoDdefinitionofcyber-attackprovesmostuseful,insofarasitcodifiestheviewsoftheAmericangovernmentandostensiblybindsitsmilitarydepartments.In2011,followingthecreationoftheUnitedStatesCyberCommand(USCYBERCOM),a
5 Thisdirective“[d]oesnotapplytoautonomousorsemi-autonomouscyberspacesystemsforcyberspaceoperations;unarmed,unmannedplatforms;unguidedmunitions;munitionsmanuallyguidedbytheoperator(e.g.,laser-orwire-guidedmunitions);mines;orunexplodedexplosiveordnance.”DoDDir.3000.09,supranote2,para.2(a)(3)(b).6 DoDDir.3000.09,supranote2,PartII.7 Id.8 Thus,unlikedumbbombsorpressure-activatedlandmines,autonomouscyberweaponsboastdecision-makingalgorithmsthatdistinguishfriendfromfoeanddictatehowtheweapon(oftenapieceofmalwareormaliciouscodethatwreakshavoconattachedcomputers)movesthroughanetwork.Theclosestanalogymightbecomputer-guidedweaponrycurrentlydeployedaboardnavalvesselsandaircraft.Thesesystemsstrikepreselectedtargetswhencertainparametersaremet.Autonomouscyberweaponsdotoo,butcouldalsopossessthecapacitytolearnandadjusttodynamicbattlefieldconditions.
234The Air Force Law Review • Volume 71
subordinatecommand9organizedbeneathUnitedStatesStrategicCommand,theleadagencyforcarryingouttheAmericanmissionincyberspace,10theJointChiefsofStaffadoptedthisdefinition:
Ahostileactusingcomputerorrelatednetworksorsystems,andintendedtodisruptand/ordestroyanadversary’scriticalcybersystems,assets,orfunctions.Theintendedeffectsofcyberattackarenotnecessarilylimitedtothetargetedcomputersystemsordatathemselves—forinstance,attacksoncomputersystemswhichareintendedtodegradeordestroyinfrastructureor[commandandcontrol]capability.Acyberattackmayuseintermediatedeliv-eryvehiclesincludingperipheraldevices,electronictransmitters,embeddedcode,orhumanoperators.Theactivationoreffectofacyberattackmaybewidelyseparatedtemporallyandgeographicallyfromthedelivery.11
Perhapsthemostnotableexampleofasuccessfulattackdeliveredbyanautonomouscyberweaponis“Stuxnet,”acomputerwormthatinfectedIranianindustrialsites,damagingitsuraniumenrichmentstationsanddealingarealsetbacktoIran’snuclearambitions.Somehaveremarkedthattheworm“accomplish[ed]whatsixyearsofUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilresolutionscouldnot.”12Noord-nancewasdropped;nobootstrampledthroughTehran.OthermemorableincidentsincludethoseonEstoniaandGeorgiain2007and2008,andtheemergingthreatofacyber-attackonU.S.criticalinfrastructureledtheformerSecretaryofDefense,
9 Technically,U.S.CyberCommand(USCYBERCOM)isa“subunified”commandbeneathU.S.StrategicCommand(USSTRATCOM).AndrewFeickert,The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress,cong. res. servIceR42077(Jan.3,2013),http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf.USSTRATCOMisacombatantcommand,ofwhichtheU.S.possessesnine:U.S.AfricaCommand(USAFRICOM);U.S.CentralCommand(USCENTCOM);U.S.EuropeanCommand(USEUCOM);U.S.NorthernCommand(USNORTHCOM);U.S.PacificCommand(USPACOM);U.S.SpecialOperationsCommand(USSOCOM);U.S.SouthernCommand(USSOUTHCOM);U.S.StrategicCommand(USSTRATCOM);U.S.TransportationCommand(USTRANSCOM).Thosefocusingongeographyhaveprimarymilitaryauthorityinthatregion.Theothers,calledfunctionalcombatantcommands,spangeographicallinesentirelyandfocusuponspecialoperations,transportation,andU.S.nuclear,space,andcomputer-basedcapabilities.10 OonaA.Hathaway,RebeccaCrootof,PhilipLevitz,HaleyNix,AileenNowlan,WilliamPerdue,andJuliaSpiegel,The Law of Cyber-Attack,100 cAlIF. l. rev. 817,824(2012)(notingthatthelawsofwarapplyonlytothe“smallsubsetofcyber-attacksthatdoconstitutearmedattacksorthatoccurinthecontextofanongoingarmedconflict”)[hereinafterTheLawofCyber-Attack].11MemorandumfromGen.JamesE.Cartwright,toChiefsoftheMilitaryServs.,CommandersoftheCombatantCommands,Dirs.oftheJointStaffDirectorates,subject:JointTerminologyforCyberspaceOperations5(Nov.2011).12 DanielleWarner,From Bombs and Bullets to Botnets and Bytes: Cyber War and the Need for a Federal Cybersecurity Agency,85 cAlIF. l. rev. postscrIpt1(2012).
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LeonPanetta,towarnofa“digitalPearlHarbor”in2012.13Morepointedly,unliketraditionalmunitions,weaponslikeStuxnetboastaprolongedshelflife—IranrecentlyclaimedthatthevirusagaintargetedoneofitsnuclearpowerplantsafterStuxnetallegedlyspreadtocomputersinIndonesia,India,theUnitedStates,andelsewhereduetoaprogrammingbug.14
Closertohome,thedaybeforeDoDannounceditspolicyregardingautono-mousweaponssystems,theDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency(DARPA)issuedanannouncementofferingfundingforits“PlanX”project,whichaimstocreatean“end-to-endsystemthatenablesthemilitarytounderstand,plan,andman-agecyberwarfareinreal-time,large-scale,anddynamicnetworkenvironments.”15Specifically,PlanXcontemplatesleveragingmachineassistancetoautomateandsimplifythecyberwarfareprocess.16Italsoaimstoincorporateexistingtoolkits,suchasthecommerciallyavailableCANVASframeworktothefreelyavailableMetasploitsystem.17Oncecompleted,theweaponcouldenableoperatorsto“deployattacklibrariesfroma‘playbook’...[although]thecodewillbebuiltwithchecksonwhatsortsofthingsitcandowithouthumandirection.”18However,thesoftwarewillusuallyoperateindependently,addressingDoD’sprincipalcomplaintagainstmanuallyoperatedcybersystems:thathumansaretooslow.19
13 DavidZ.Bodenheimer,Cyberwarfare in the Stuxnet Age: Can Cannonball Law Keep Pace with the Digital Battlefield?,the scItech lAwyer,vol.8,no.3(Winter2012),available at http://www.crowell.com/files/2012-bodenheimer-the-scitech-lawyer.pdf.14AdrianneJeffries,Stuxnet Strikes Again, Iranian Official Says,the verge(Dec.25,2012),http://www.theverge.com/2012/12/25/3803216/stuxnet-strikes-again-iranian-official-says.15 DefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency,Broad Agency Announcement BAA-13-02: Foundational Cyberwarfare (Plan X)(Nov.20,2012),https://www.fbo.gov/utils/view?id=49be462164f948384d455587f00abf19,at8-9[hereinafterDARPAAgencyAnnouncement].16 Id.at12.17 Id.at17.Thesesoftwareprogramsaredesignedtoprovidetheiruserswithinformationconcerningthetargetsystem’ssecurityvulnerabilities.See, e.g.,TonyBradley,Metasploit Framework: Walking the Thin Line Between a Tool and a Weapon,syMAntec.coM, http://netsecurity.about.com/cs/hackertools/a/aa041004.htm(lastvisitedJan.3,2013);PukhrajSinghandK.K.Mookhey,Metasploit Framework,syMAntec.coM (Nov.2,2010), http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/metasploit-framework-part-1.18 SeanGallagher,U.S. Cyber Weapons Exempt from Human Judgment Requirement,Ars technIcA(Nov.29,2012),http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/11/us-cyber-weapons-exempt-from-human-judgment-requirement.19 “Inessence,thecurrentmanualapproachhasdefinedthewaycyberoperationsareconceivedandwouldbeconducted—asasynchronousactions.Manualprocessesprovidenocapacityforreal-timeassessmentandadjustmenttoadapttochangingbattlespaceconditions.Thecurrentparadigmisasimpleprogressionofplan,execute,plan,execute,plan,execute...howeveriftheprocesscanbetechnologicallyoptimizedandthetime-intensiverequirementsminimized,commanderswillbeabletoleveragecybercapabilitiesinamoreflexiblemanner,consistentwithkineticcapabilities,toachievereal-time,synchronouseffectsinthecyberbattlespace.”DARPAAgencyAnnouncement,supranote15,at6.
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PlanX,accordingtoDARPAdirectorAratiPrabhakar,simplifiesthedomainofcyberspace,withplaybookattacks“aseasytolaunchasanAngryBird.”20AtademonstrationinOctober2012,adesignfirmvyingforoneoftheprogram’scontractsshowcasedtheequivalentofa40-inchiPadwiththeabilityformultiplepersonstooperateitsimultaneously,andanothercompany,whichpreviouslyworkedonvideogamesandG.I.Joetoys,proposedagame-likeuserinterfacethatdazzledPentagonofficialsandCapitolHillstaffers.21
ThisArticleexploreshowLOACappliestotheseautonomouscyberweap-ons,orsoftwareusedtolaunchattacksinthedomainofcyberspace.PartIexamineswhetherthelawsofwarpermitthedeploymentofautonomouscyberweapons.Itbeginsbyassessinghowtheprinciplesofproportionalityanddistinctionapply.Next,sinceLOACprohibitsanyattackthatmightcauseexcessivecollateraldamagewhencomparedtothemilitaryadvantagegained,thissectioncriticallyexaminestheimportantcaseofdual-usefacilities,meaningtheinfrastructurejointlyusedbythemilitaryandcivilians.22Finally,itconcludesbyexploringwhatmechanismsareneededtoensuretheseweaponsrespectthelawsofwar.
PartIIanalyzesthecompositionofnon-uniformedDoDpersonnelincyber-weapons’designphasesandhowLOACimpactstheirstatusascombatants.Civiliansoftenparticipateinthedesign,creation,andmaintenanceofsoftware,eitherasdirectemployeesofthegovernmentemployingthem;asauthorsofsoftwareincorporatedintolarger,morecapablecyberweapons;orascontractorshiredtodesignasystemthatboastsoffensivefeatures.Involvingnon-uniformedpersonnel,suchasciviliansandcontractors,inthedesignofautonomouscyberweaponscouldplacethemwithinthereachofLOACforpossibleviolationsofthelawsofwar.Thisisproblematic,ascurrentDoDpolicylimitsparticipationincyber-attackstouniformedmilitarypersonnel.ButhowtheDepartmentconductsbusinesscouldexposeitsciviliansandcontractorstocriminalviolationsorthelawsofwarregardlessofitsstatedpolicies.23
20 NoahSchachtman,This Pentagon Project Makes Cyberwar as Easy as Angry Birds,wIred(May28,2013),http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/05/pentagon-cyberwar-angry-birds/all/.21 Id.22 ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andRelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofInternationalArmedConflicts(Protocol1),art.51(5)(b),June8,1977,1125U.N.T.S.3[hereinafterAP1].23 OnearticleincorrectlynotesthatNationalGuardmembersmaynotcarryoutcyber-attacks.TheLawofCyber-Attack,supranote10,at854n.151(“Theallocationofresponsibilitiesforcyber-warfarehasbeenexaminedbytheU.S.armedforces—therecentlydeclassifiedAirForcecyberspaceoperationsdocumentexplainsthatNationalGuardmembersmaytrainfor,butnotcarryout,cyber-attacks.”).ThecomplexitiesofwhatstatusDoDpersonnelarecurrentlyoperatingunderiscertainlycomplex,butthegoverningAirForceregulationnotesthatNationalGuardorAirGuardmembersinTitle10,orfederalstatus,maycarryoutcyber-attacks.u.s. dep’t. oF AIr Force, AIr Force doctrIne docuMent3-12,cyBerspAce plAnnIng(30Nov.2011)[hereinafterAFDD3-12],available athttp://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFDD3-12.pdf.Thisislikelybecause,unlessactivatedunderfederalstatus,aGuardmemberfollowsonechainofcommand,whichflowsfromhisstate’sgovernor.
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PartIIIconsidersDoD’sprocessforformallyreviewinganautonomouscyberweapon’scompliancewithLOAC.Withcurrentguidance,thereexistsarealriskthatlegaladvisorsprovidingon-demandadviceduringacyberweapon’sopera-tionknowslittleabouttheweaponoritscapabilities.Thisinvitescollateraldam-age,andDoDcandobetter.Itsattorneysmustbetechnologicallysavvy,capableofaskingpointedquestionsaboutitspossibleeffects.Thissectionexploresthecurrentlegalreviewprocessforcyberweaponsandidentifiespotentialshortfalls.24Italsoofferssuggestionsforimprovingtheprocess,groundedintheassumptionthat,whileeventheuntrainedcanreadilygrasptheeffectsofmostconventionalweapons,cyberweaponsaredifferent.Moreover,theinjectionofautonomyandtheinterconnectednessofcomputernetworkscomplicatetheirdeployment.Inresponse,DoDmuststimulatethedevelopmentandtrainingofuniformedpersonnel,bothtoenhancecyberwarfarecapabilitiesandtoprovideitsoperatorswiththeknowledgeandsituationalawarenesstobetterensurecompliancewiththelawsofwar.
FailingtoadaptcurrentprocessestotheidiosyncrasiesofnoveltechnologiesriskstriggeringunintendedengagementstheUnitedStatesseekstoavoid,aswellasabrogatingitsdutiesunderinternationallaw.25AnylaxityinreviewingtheimpactofautonomousweaponsalsoinvitesentirelyplausiblescenariosthatcouldrunafoulofLOAC,suchasinadvertentlyshuttingdownhospitalgenerators,residentialpowersystems,orevenoverwhelmingnon-affiliatedInternetServiceProvidersmerelycarryingtrafficofallkinds.26
Theconnectednessofcomputernetworksexpandedsignificantlyinrecentdecades:theysupportnations’defense,economicsecurity,andpublichealthefforts.27
24 u.s. dep’t. oF AIr Force, Instr.51-402,legAl revIews oF weApons And cyBer cApABIlItIes(27July2011)[hereinafterAFI51-402],available athttp://www.epublishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI51-402.pdf.25 “Inthestudy,development,acquisitionoradoptionofanewweapon,meansormethodofwar,aHighContractingPartyisunderanobligationtodeterminewhetheritsemploymentwould,insomeorallcircumstances,beprohibitedbythisProtocolorbyanyotherruleofinternationallawapplicabletotheHighContractingParty.”AP1,supranote22,art.36.WhiletheUnitedStatesisnotapartytothisProtocol,becausesomearguethatitmightrisetothelevelofcustomaryinternationallaw,itseemsprudent.Pragmatically,italsoreflectsin-placeDoDpracticeswhichmightbebetterrefined.26 EllenNakashima,Obama Signs Secret Directive to Help Thwart Cyberattacks,wAsh. post(Nov.14,2012),http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-signs-secret-cybersecurity-directive-allowing-more-aggressive-military-role/2012/11/14/7bf51512-2cde-11e2-9ac2-1c61452669c3_story.html;JakobKellenberger,International Humanitarian Law and New Weapon Technologies,Int’l coMM. oF the red cross(Aug.8,2011),http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/new-weapon-technologies-statement-2011-09-08.htm.27 U.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(asU.S.GeneralAccountingOffice),Technology Assessment: Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Protection,GAO-04-321,at18(May2004),available athttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04321.pdf.AstheGAOreportattests,computersystemsandnetworkswerenotexactlydesignedwithsecurityinmind,leavingthemvulnerable.Thisreport,towhichtheauthorcontributed,wasreleasedin2004.Thingsarenotmuchbetterin2013.ReferencingtheGAO’spersistentbutoft-ignoredcallsforaction,onecommentatornotes
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IntheUnitedStates,thesesystemsaresovitaltothenation’scontinuedoperationsthattheir“incapacityordestruction...wouldhaveadebilitatingimpactonsecurity,nationaleconomicsecurity,nationalpublichealthorsafety,oranycombinationofthosematters.”28Andthesecivilian-ownedcriticalinfrastructuresitesassuredlyoccupyhigh-rankingslotsonbothdefendedassetlistsandadversaries’targetlists.29
Onecancertainlyimaginethat,inresponsetoathreatfromahostilecountry,theUnitedStatescouldattempttooverwhelmandsanitizetheirnetworks—muchlikeAmericastrivestoachievedominanceinthetraditionaldomainsofair,land,theseas,andspace.30Theequivalentofa“no-flyzone”inthecyberspacedomainisreadilyconceivable.Moreover,givenDoD’sinherentmandatetodefendagainstallattacksandtherealpossibilitythatautonomouscyberweaponscouldbeemployedagainstadversaries,adheringtothelawsofwarwhiledevelopingthisemergentdomainwillprovechallenging.
Theintersectionoflawandtechnologymustresolvetheseissues.Rejectingthisassertion,theformerDeputyJudgeAdvocateGeneraloftheAirForce,ProfessorCharlesJ.Dunlap,Jr.,suggeststhatuntanglingthesefactualcomplicationsrestssolelywithinthedomainofleadership,notoflaw:
that“[y]earsofrecommendationsfromtheGovernmentAccountabilityOfficeandinspectorsgeneralhavefailedtosignificantlyimprovethecountry’scybersecuritypostureatatimewhentheUnitedStatesisbecomingincreasinglyreliantonaninterconnectedinformationinfrastructure.”WilliamJackson,U.S. Not Prepared for ‘Potentially Devastating’ Cyberattacks, House Panel Told,gcn.coM(Mar.17,2011),http://gcn.com/GIG/gcn/Articles/2011/03/17/Critical-infrastructure-vulnerable-to-attack.aspx.See alsoRichardChirgwin,AusCERT 2012: Kaspersky Says Cyber-Attacks Could ‘Take Us Back to the Pre-Electric Era’cso.coM (May18,2012),http://www.cso.com.au/article/424988/auscert_2012_kaspersky_says_cyber-attacks_could_take_us_back_pre-electric_era_/;Critical U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerable to Cyber Attack, Congress Fails to Act,puBlIc BroAdcAstIng systeM (Aug.8,2012),http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/science/july-dec12/cybersecurity_08-08.html.28 42U.S.C.§5195c(e)(2006).TheHomelandSecurityActof2002incorporatedthisdefinition.Pub.L.No.107-296,§2,116Stat.2135,2140(codifiedat6U.S.C.§101(4)(2006)).Fornationaldefensepurposes,asimilardefinitionisalsoused.50U.S.C.app.§2152(2)(2006).29 See,e.g.,DanielFineren,Energy Assets in Front Line of Cyber War,reuters(May31,2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/31/cyber-attacks-energy-idUSL5E8GT5AD20120531(“Globalenergyinfrastructureismorevulnerablethanever....[b]utthebiggestthreattoeverythingfrompowergridstodigitaloilfieldsmaycomefrommalwarebasedontheStuxnetworm,widelythoughttohavebeensponsoredbywesterngovernmentagencies,securityexpertssay.”).30 SeeJoInt chIeFs oF stAFF,JoInt puB.3-0,JoInt operAtIons,atV-47(Aug.11,2011)[hereinafterJP3-0],available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf(“Thecumulativeeffectofdominanceintheair,land,maritime,andspacedomainsandinformationenvironment(whichincludescyberspace)thatpermitstheconductofjointoperationswithouteffectiveoppositionorprohibitiveinterferenceisessentialtojointforcemissionsuccess.JFCsseeksuperiorityinthesedomainstopreparetheoperationalareaandinformationenvironmentandtoaccomplishthemissionasrapidlyaspossible.”).
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Theability(orinability)todeterminefactsisnotalegalissuebutatechnicalproblemforthespecialiststosolve.[...]Thesamecanbesaidforthelegalrequirementtoassesstheimpactonciviliansandcivilianobjectsbeforelaunchingacyberattack.[...]Again,if theabilitytomakethecalculationsthatpoliticalleadersandpolicymakersrequireasmuchaslawyersisinadequate,thatisatechnical,notalegal,issue.31
Thisistrue,butlawmuststillkeeppacewithtechnology.Andinorderforthelawtobeappliedtothefactsathand,theunderlyingtechnologymustbeunderstood.Cyberspaceisanewdomaininwarfare,buteffectsthatshapethedigitalbattlefieldproduceveryrealconsequences.Intheend,thecomplexitiesandinterdependenceofcomputersystemsdragthequestionofcollateraldamagetotheforefrontmoreforcefullythaneverbefore.
I.APPLYINGTHELAWSOFWARTOAUTONOMOUSCYBERWEAPONS
Attheirmostbasiclevel,thelawsofwar32attemptto“restricttheaimofwarfaretotheachievementofmilitaryobjectives.”33Circumscribingtheemploymentofcertainweaponscontributestothisobjective.UnderLOAC,thetwofundamentalprinciplesgoverningweaponusearedistinctionandproportionality.34Theyapplyregardlessoftheweapontype.Inotherwords,softwarecounts.Butthecondi-
31 StewartA.BakerandCharlesJ.Dunlap,Jr.,What Is the Role of Lawyers in Cyberspace?,ABA JournAl(May1,2012),http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/what_is_the_role_of_lawyers_in_cyberwarfare/.MajorGeneralDunlapmissesthemark:inorderforlawyerstoprovideadequatecounseltotheirdecision-makingclients,apartnershipwhichreducestheriskofnon-compliancewithLOAC,theymustbeequippedtoworkarm-in-armwithtechnicalspecialists.Otherwisestated,cyberweaponsarenotdumbbombs;anoperator’skeystroke—combinedwithautonomousprogramming—couldproducepotentiallyunknownorunanticipatedeffects.32 ForthepurposesofthisArticle,thelawsofwar,forsimplification’ssake,refertojus in belloanalysesconcerningthelegalityofacyber-attack.ThisArticledoesnotaddressthequestionofwhatconstitutesan‘armedattack’inviolationofarticle51oftheUnitedNationscharter.Additionally,asonescholarnotes,inrecentliteraturethe“terms‘armedconflict,’‘war,’and‘useofforce’areusedvirtuallyinterchangeably[and]theterms‘lawofarmedconflict,’‘lawofwar,’and‘internationalhumanitarianlaw’”allrefertothesamebodyofGenevaandHaguelawthatregulatestheconductofpartiestoanarmedconflictbywayoftheprinciplesofdistinction,militarynecessity,proportionality,humanity,andchivalry.”DavisBrown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict,47 hArv. Int’l l.J. 179, 181n.14(2006).ForacomprehensiveanalysisoftheinterpretationofArticles2(4)and51oftheUnitedNationsCharter,whichrestrictstheuseofforcesaveinself-defenseagainstanarmedattack,seeMatthewC.Waxman,Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4),36yAle J. Int’l l. 421(2011).33 DuncanB.Hollis,Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations,11 lewIs & clArK l. rev. 1023, 1033(2007).34 See, e.g.,KennethAndersonandMatthewWaxman, Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers,HooverInstitutionPolicyReviewno.176(Dec.1,2012),http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/135336.
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tionsofcyberwarfarecomplicatejus in bello analyses,asanattack’sresultisnot“immediatelylethalordestructiveandmayonlycausetemporaryincapacityofnetworksystems.”35Thesesystems,oftencivilian-ownedandoperated,runtrains,routeairtraffic,regulatetelecommunicationssignalsandtheInternet,andprovidethebackbonefortheoperationofglobalfinancialmarkets.36
Attheoutset,givingtargetingresponsibilitytocomputersraisespreexist-ingconcernsabouttheuseofautonomousweaponssystemsaltogether.Blendingadvancesinautomationwithideasdrawnfromsciencefiction,scholarsanticipatethatthefuturecouldeasilybringpreprogrammedsentryrobots;dronesthatdynami-callyhuntprey;andevenTransformers-likerobotscapableofassemblingtogethertocreatealarger,morepowerfulweapon.37Withthemcomeahostofwell-foundedobjectionsbaseduponinternationallaw38andevenpragmaticconcernsregardingtheproliferationofroboticarmiesandthedehumanizationofwar.39WhentheRus-sianDeputyPrimeMinisterannouncesthatMoscowenvisionsdeployingrobotscapableofengagingterroristswithoutharmingcivilians,allwhilepossessingtheindependencetoevacuateinjuredsoldiers,theseconcernsbecomemoregroundedinreality.40
Yetsoftwareisalreadyautonomous—bydefinitionitcontainsinternallogicthatmustbefollowed,thoughattimesitmightpausetoawaituserinput.Thisautonomywillsurelygrowinthefuture,asweaponsboastevenmorerobustinternaldecision-makingalgorithms,likethekinddestinedforPlanX’splaybooks.Inthesecases,thehumanelementinheresinthedesigners’instructions.Muchlikesmartbombsandclustermunitions,whichboasttheabilitytodetonateatacertaintime,oradesignatedlocation,computer-basedweaponssystemsrelyuponthesame,
35 TheLawofCyber-Attack,supranote10,at850.36 JonathanA.Ophardt,Cyber Warfare and the Crime of Aggression: The Need for Individual Accountability on Tomorrow’s Battlefield, 9 duKe l. & tech. rev. 1, 2-3(2010).37Anderson&Waxman,supranote34.38 See, e.g.,huMAn rIghts wAtch, losIng huMAnIty: the cAse AgAInst KIller roBots(Nov.2012),available athttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf(“Fullyautonomousweaponshavethepotentialtoincreaseharmtociviliansduringarmedconflict.Theywouldbeunabletomeetbasicprinciplesofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,theywouldundercutother,non-legalsafeguardsthatprotectcivilians,andtheywouldpresentobstaclestoaccountabilityforanycasualtiesthatoccur.”).39Anderson&Waxman,supranote34;see alsoJonathanY.HuangandJarrodM.Rifkind,The Challenges of Emerging Technologies to Human Assumptions in War Ethics,PresentationattheFortLeavenworthEthicsSymposiumbytheCommandandGeneralStaffCollege(Dec.5,2012),available athttp://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.leavenworthethicssymposium.org/resource/resmgr/2012_papers/huang_and_rifkind-challenges.pdf.40 ClayDillow,Russia Is Building Robots to ‘Neutralize’ Terrorists,populAr scIence(May21,2013),http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-05/russia-building-robots-will-neutralize-terrorists.
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buttoamuchmorecomplicateddegree,andthisraisesseveralquestionsunderthetraditionallawsofwar.
Despitethechallengesposedbycomputer-basedweaponry,theUnitedStateshascodifieditsintenttofollowinternationallawinthedomainofcyberspace.41Andalthoughtheevolutionoftechnologyoutpacesthelaw,actorsmarshalingthetechnologyforthepurposesofwarmustneverthelessassesswhatlimitsthatcircumscribeitsuseapply.42Buttheselaws,designedtoprotectciviliansonthebattlefield,neverformallycontemplatedprotectingcivilianinformationsystems.43Thus,beforedelvingintotheprinciplesofdistinctionandproportionality,theinitialquestionworthexploringiswhetherLOACevenpermitstheuseofautonomouscyberweaponslikeStuxnetandsimilarprograms,someofwhichattackanddisabletargetedcomputersorcontrolsystemswithabandon.
A.TheLawsofWarProhibitCertainAutonomousCyberweapons
Theprincipleofdistinction,codifiedinArticles51(2)and52(1)ofAddi-tionalProtocolIoftheGenevaConventionsof1949,requirespartiestoconflictsto“distinguishbetweenthecivilianpopulationandcombatants.”44Otherwisestated,itreflectsanaffirmativedutytominimizeharmtononcombatantsandtheirproperty.45Attacksunabletodistinguishbetweenthesesetsofpersonsaredeemedindiscrimi-nateandconsideredunlawful.46Conversely,toreduceconfusionthroughoutthe
41 u.s. dep’t. oF deFense, cyBerspAce polIcy report: A report to congress pursuAnt to the nAtIonAl deFense AuthorIzAtIon Act For FIscAl yeAr 2011, sectIon 934 (Nov.2011)[hereinafterDoDCyberspacePolicyReport],available athttp://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0411_cyberstrategy/docs/NDAA%20Section%20934%20Report_For%20webpage.pdf.TheUnitedStates’officialpositionisthat“[t]helawofwarencompassesallinternationallawfortheconductofhostilitiesbindingontheUnitedStatesoritsindividualcitizens,includingtreatiesandinternationalagreementstowhichtheUnitedStatesisaparty,andapplicablecustomaryinternationallaw.”u.s. dep’t. oF deF., dIr.2311.03E,dod lAw oF wAr progrAM,para.3.1(May9,2006),available athttp://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101e.pdf.42 Hollis,supranote33,at1036(notingthat“thelawofwargoverns[informationoperations]evenwithoutmentioningitspecifically.”)(citingAP1,supranote22,art.35.1(“[T]herightofthePartiestotheconflicttochoosemethodsormeansofwarfareisnotunlimited.”)).43 TheLawofCyber-Attack,supra note10,at821(notingthatthelawsofwarapplyonlytothe“smallsubsetofcyber-attacksthatdoconstitutearmedattacksorthatoccurinthecontextofanongoingarmedconflict.”).44AP1,supranote22,art.48.45 “Inordertoensurerespectforandprotectionofthecivilianpopulationandcivilianobjects,thePartiestotheconflictshallatalltimesdistinguishbetweenthecivilianpopulationandcombatantsandbetweencivilianobjectsandmilitaryobjectivesandaccordinglyshalldirecttheiroperationsonlyagainstmilitaryobjectives.”Id.art.48.46 “Thecivilianpopulationassuch,aswellasindividualcivilians,shallnotbetheobjectofattack.Actsorthreatsofviolencetheprimarypurposeofwhichistospreadterroramongthecivilianpopulationareprohibited.”Id.art.51(2).Similarprotectionextendstocivilian-ownedobjects.“Attacksshallbelimitedstrictlytomilitaryobjectives.Insofarasobjectsareconcerned,militaryobjectivesarelimitedtothoseobjectswhichbytheirnature,location,purposeoruse
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battlefield,LOACalsoexertsapositivedutyuponnoncombatantstoremainawayfromongoinghostilities;otherwisetheyforfeitthisaegisofprotection.47However,responsibilityformanagingtheemploymentofweaponsremainswithmilitarycommanders.48
MostLOACinquiriesconcernaweapon’spost-engagementuse,suchaswhethercombatantstargetedprotectedgroupsorsitesortheweaponresultedinunnecessarydamage.Forinstance,theyanalyzewhetherabomberpilotdroppedord-nanceuponapermissibletarget,orwhetherMarinesinanurbanfirefightadequatelyassessedtheriskofharmingciviliansbeforeengagingtheirenemy.Responsibilityforaweapon’susegenerallyattachestobothitsuserandthemilitaryofficerincommand:thespecificuse,nottheweaponitself,bearsscrutiny.However,someweaponsmaybesimplyunabletotelltargetsapartdespitethebesteffortsoftheoperator.49Inthesecases,theweaponitselfisconsidered“inherentlyindiscriminate”andoutrightprohibitedbythelawsofwar.50
Thus,autonomouscyberweaponsthatlaunchuncontrollable,indiscriminateattacksareprohibitedbythelawsofwar.Broadlystated,everycyberweaponmustbespecificallyengineeredtorespectthesestrictures.Theymust“possesstheabilitytobeaimed,ortoaim[themselves],atanacceptablelegallevelofdiscrimination.”51Fallingbeneaththatthresholdofdiscriminationmandatesaweapon’sprohibition.Inthisregard,cyberweaponsarenodifferentthanconventionalweapons,fewofwhich
makeaneffectivecontributiontomilitaryactionandwhosetotalorpartialdestruction,captureorneutralization,inthecircumstancesrulingatthetime,offersadefinitemilitaryadvantage.”Id.art.52(2).47 UnderLOAC,onlylawfulcombatantsmayparticipatedirectlyinhostilities,orelsetheylosetheirprotectedstatus.Id.art.51(3).48 Thiswasnoeasytask,evenbeforetheadventofcyberweapons.OneU.S.Armycolonelwritesthat:
Moderntechnologydemandsanalmostinstantaneousconsiderationofmilitarynecessity,humanity,andchivalry.[Acommander]mustdistinguishrelevantfromirrelevanttargets,seekingonlythedestructionoflegitimateobjectives.HeisexpectedtoperformtheSolomon-liketaskofproportioningtheamountofmilitarydestructionwiththemilitaryvalueoftheobjective.Thevoicesofhumanityremindacommanderthatwarisapoliticalweapon.Gratuitousunnecessarysufferingordestructionisirrelevanttohismilitarypurposeandoftencounter-productive.Somehowheistodivinetheleastcoercivemethod.Addingtothecomplexity,aretheremnantsofchivalryorprofessionalcourtesywhichimposeuponarep-resentativeofaproudmilitaryprofessionlineageandtraditionwhichhavetheirownimperatives.
WilliamG.Eckhardt,Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable Standard,97 MIl. l. rev. 1, 3(1982).49Anderson&Waxman,supranote34.50 Id.51 Id.
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arebanned,likepoisonous,chemical,andbiologicalweapons.52Althoughtheseweaponscanbeaimedbytheiroperators,theireffectsarenotfullycontrollableandthereforeriskimpactinglargenumbersofthecivilianpopulationindiscriminately.53
Fromtheaboveprovisos,thisArticleassertstwoex-anteconclusions:(1)directlyattackingpurelymilitarycomputersystems,assumingabsolutelyzeroriskofcrossoverintoothernetworksispermissible,somethinglikelyunattainableintherealworld;and(2)LOACprohibitscyberweaponsthatindiscriminatelyattackallcomputersystemsonagivennetworkorconnectednetworks.Viruses,orotherformsofself-propagatingmaliciouscode,fallintothislattercategory.Theyassaultallunprotectedcomputerswithabandon.54However,beyondthisspectrum’stwoedgecases,thecalculusbecomesmorecomplex,andmostcyberweaponsoccupyacasebetweentheseendpoints.
B.RespectingthePrincipleofDistinction
Toensurecyberweaponsoperatewithinthispermissiblerange,engineerscouldprogramthemwithfixedlistsofpermissibletargets.Doingsoplacestheweaponclosertotheendpointreservedforattackingsolelymilitarysystems.Theweaponmightevenpossessanexpandedtargetlist, includingciviliantargets,followingavalidcollateraldamageestimate.Cyberweaponsdeliberatelycreatedtoseekoutaspecifiedsetoftargetscomplywiththelawsofwar,becausedecision-makingprocesstakesplaceduringthecyberweapon’sdesignphase,accomplishedbyahumanandsubjecttoanex antecomplianceanalysisunderLOAC.
Conversely,wherecomputersexerciseanylevelofautonomyinselectingadditionaltargets, theyslowlyinchtowardstheotherendofthespectrum.Thesoftwareemploys“inductivereasoningaboutcharacteristicsoflawfultargetsnot
52 See,e.g.,ProtocolfortheProhibitionoftheUseinWarofAsphyxiating,PoisonousorOtherGases,andofBacteriologicalMethodsofWarfare,June17,1925,26U.S.T.571,94L.N.T.S.65;ConventionontheProhibitionoftheDevelopment,ProductionandStockpilingofBacteriological(Biological)andToxinWeaponsandonTheirDestruction,Apr.10,1972,26U.S.T.583,1015U.N.T.S.163;ConventionontheProhibitionoftheDevelopment,Production,StockpilingandUseofChemicalWeaponsandonTheirDestruction,Jan.13,1993,32I.L.M.800(1993).53 Brown,supranote32,at195.Bysomestates’definitions,soarenuclearweapons.TheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrosspurportsthatallusesofnuclearweaponswouldentailindiscriminateeffectsandthusbeprohibited.Duringthe1995Nuclear Weapons casebeforetheInternationalCourtofJustice,Australia,Ecuador,Egypt,Iran,Japan,Lesotho,Malaysia,theMarshallIslands,Nauru,NewZealand,Rwanda,theSolomonIslands,SriLanka,Switzerland,andZimbabweadoptedthepositionthatLOACprohibitstheuseofnuclearweapons.SeeInt’lComm.oftheRedCross,Practice Relating to Rule 71—Weapons That Are by Nature Indiscriminate,available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule71(lastvisitedJune9,2013);LegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons(July8,1996),I.C.J.Reports226,available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b2913d62.html.54 TheLawofCyber-Attack,supranote10,at851.
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alreadyonthelist,”andcomparesthesequalitiesonthefly.55Heuristics,inthisscenario,examineadditionaltargetsusingbuilt-inparameters.Thispracticeessen-tiallyamountstothecomputer-basedequivalentofprocedurallyidentifyingatarget,whichthelawsofwarallow.Infact,unlikedeterminingwhetheraputativeenemypossesseshostileintent,orwhetheraircraftintendtolaunchastrike,proceduralidentificationincyberspacemightevenbeeasier.
Standardobjectionsagainstautonomyinweaponssystemshavetradi-tionallyfocusedupontheanecdotalscenarioofroboticcombatantsattemptingtodistinguishbetweencombatantsandcivilians,ascenarionotsofar-fetched,ifonebelievesRussianpressreleases.56Butwhendealingonlywithcomputers,thisquestionofdeducingintentchangessignificantly:thedecision-makingtakesplaceduringsoftwaredesign,andthecomputermerelyfollowstheprogrammer’scode.Afterdeployment,cyberweaponsoftencanswiftlyidentifytheirtargets’functionanddiscernwhetherthecomputeris,forexample,aWebserver,ane-mailserver,aWindows-basedcomputerattachedtonetwork,oraSCADA-basedcontrollerforahydroelectricdam.Moreover, theycanalsodiscerntowhichnetworkatargetbelongs(e.g.,civilianormilitary),anddecipherhowthatnetworkismapped.57
Thefewerbuilt-inengagementparameters,themoreuncheckedautomationtheweaponpossesses.Andthiskindofautonomyplacesthecyberweaponfirmlytowardstheendofthespectrum(representedbycomputerviruses)prohibitedbythelawsofwarduetoitsindiscriminatenature.Respectingtheprincipleofdistinctionrequiresthatcyberweaponsboastarobusttargetingalgorithmfullyvettedpriortoemployment.Inthesecases,specialscrutinymustbedirectedtowardstheabilityofthesystemto“learn”andadapt.
Theroleforlawyersandtechnologistsiswithheuristics.Heuristicsarelawful,providedtheweaponconsistentlyemployspreprogrammedparametersthatrestrictitstargeting.58Butthisrequiresathoroughexaminationofhowcyberweaponsprocedurallyidentifyapotentiallawfultarget.Forinstance,whencomputerscientistsdisassembledStuxnet,theyuncoveredamixedbag.Thewormcontainedcodethatdestroyeduranium-enrichingcentrifugesonlyphysicallylocatedatNatanz,designed
55 Id.56 HumanRightsWatch,supranote38,at31-32.57 Onescholarsuggeststhat“marking”militarycomputersystemswithpurelyelectronicidentifiers,muchasotherprotectedsitesarelabeledundertheGenevaConventions,couldaidinrespectingtheprincipleofdistinction.Searchingforelectronicmarkerscouldbebuiltintoevenanautonomouscyberweapon’sheuristics,aidingtheirtargeting.Brown,supranote32,at196.58 LOACdoesnotrequiretheinstallationof“ethicalgovernors”thatprohibitweaponsfromattackingciviliansystems,butitdoesrequirethatprotectionsagainstindiscriminatetargeting,ifcreatedandappliedtoaweapon,notbesubjecttoequallyindiscriminate“rewriting.”See,e.g.,HeatherRoff,When U.S. Weapons Are Autonomous, Who is Responsible?,HuffingtonPost:Canada(Sept.27,2012),http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/heather-roff/the-dods-new-moral-code-f_b_1910608.html.
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toreducecollateraldamageifStuxnetspreadelsewhere,whichiteventuallydid—allacrosstheglobe.59However,inordertodistinguishbetweencomputerswithintheNatanzfacilityitself,thecodedetectedwhetherthecomputerranSiemens’SimaticStep7software,whichcontrolsmachinesusedforindustrialproduction.60IfthecomputerranStep7,Stuxnetinfecteditstarget.Fortunately,thoughStuxnetevenspreadtocompanieslikeChevron,itwithhelddeliveringitspayload.61
Thus,Stuxnet’srudimentarytargetingalgorithmscouldhavebeenimproved,butatleasttheyseeminglyworkedasintended.Inshort,assumingsomethingakintoStuxnetwasamilitary-gradecyberweapon,LOACpermitsitsdeploymentwhentheprincipleofdistinctionisadequatelyrespected.Incarryingoutitsattack,theweaponmayevengatheridentifyinginformationaboutothersystemsitencounters.Further,thelawsofwarpermitstrikingnew,potentialtargetsaftercomparingthemtobuilt-inparameters.Butitcannotadjustthoseoriginalparametersbaseduponnewinformation,asthiskindofdecision-makingshiftsthecyberweaponawayfromthespectrumdepictedaboveandtowardsascenariowherethemachineitselfeffectivelyreviewsitsownproposedchangestotargetingparameters.Doingsoabrogatesanyreviewprocessentirely,andthissituationmustbeavoided.
C.RespectingthePrincipleofProportionality
Thein bellolegalityofaweaponalsodependsupontheprincipleofpropor-tionality,codifiedinArticles51(5)(b)and57(2)(iii)ofAdditionalProtocolI.Thisconstraintuponaweapon’suseprohibitsattacksthat“maybeexpectedtocauseincidentallossofcivilianlife,injurytocivilians,damagetocivilianobjects,oracombinationthereof,whichwouldbeexcessiveinrelationtotheconcreteanddirectmilitaryadvantageanticipated.”62Anadditionalconstraint,enumeratedinArticle51(4)(a),prohibitsoperatorsfromlaunchingindiscriminateattacks,orthosewhichtendtostrikebothlawfulandprohibitedtargetswithoutdistinction.63
59 DanGoodin,Puzzle Box: The Quest to Crack the World’s Most Mysterious Malware Warhead,ArsTechnica(Mar.14,2013),http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/03/the-worlds-most-mysterious-potentially-destructive-malware-is-not-stuxnet/.60 Id.61MichaelLee,Stuxnet Infected Chevron, Achieved Its Objectives,ZDNet(Nov.9,2012),http://www.zdnet.com/stuxnet-infected-chevron-achieved-its-objectives-7000007144/.62AP1,supranote22,art.51(5)(b).63 Thisvariesfrom,colloquiallyspeaking,weaponsthatcannotbeaimed,andinsteadprohibitsanattackerhimselffromtargetingthecivilianpopulation.Aqualifyingexamplewouldbedroppingmunitionsuponastate’scenterofgovernment,wherethecollateraldamagewouldextendwellintothecivilianpopulation.Id.art.85(3)(a).Notethatindiscriminateattacksaredifferentfromattacksthatdonotdiscriminate:theformerdealswithunnecessarilyexcessivecollateraldamage;thelatterfocusesonattacksthatcannottellthedifferencebetweenlawfulandprohibitedtargets,irrespectiveofthelevelofdamageinflicted.SeeTheLawofCyber-Attack,supra note10,at850.n.130.
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Inotherwords,LOACrequiresabalancingtestpriortoaweapon’semploy-ment,onewhichessentiallydisallows“overkill.”Thiscalculuslimitstheapplicationofforce,whichmaybeusedonly“totheextentnecessaryforwinningthewar.”64Assumingthatagivencyberweaponcaneffectivelydistinguishbetweenprohibitedandlawfultargets,theiremploymentstillinvitesuncertaintyanddoubt.Forexample,disruptinganAmericanmilitaryunit’saccesstotheInternetwouldbepermissibleunderLOAC.However,thevastmajorityofunclassifiedInternettrafficconductedbytheU.S.militarytosustainitsday-to-dayoperationsrunsalongcommerciallines.Ifanadversary’spieceofmaliciouscodeinadvertentlydisruptscivilians’accesstotheInternet,doesitconstituteaviolationofthelawsofwar?Usinganotherexample,whatabouthackingintocommandandcontrolsystemsthatoperateconventionalweaponsandintroducingerrorsthatpreventweaponsfromtest-firing?
Witha twistof irony, the secondexample respectsboth fundamentalprinciplesofLOAC.Itsolelytargetsamilitarycomputernetworkandcreatesnoimmediatelydiscerniblespillovereffectontothecivilianpopulation,eventhoughintroducingsoftwareerrorsleadingtopotentialmisfirescouldprovecatastrophic.Conversely,theInternetoutageexampledemonstratesanimmediate,unintended,anddeleteriouseffectuponthecivilianpopulation,evenabsentmuchrisktothelivesandpropertyofcivilians.
Computernetworksrouteinformation;theimpactofaweapondependsonwhatinformationtheycarry.AsProfessorCharlesDunlapnoted,pragmaticconcernswhollyindependentoflegalrulesplayanimportantrolehere,anddecision-makersshouldassessthepolicyimpactsofwhollypermissiblecyber-attacks.65Still,theinterconnectednessofsystemsconfoundstheproportionalityanalysis.
WhileLOACrequiresbalancingmilitaryadvantageagainsttheadverseeffectuponthecivilianpopulation,withoutsufficientinformationaboutthetargetanditsconnectedsystems,thiscalculusisalmostimpossibletoachieve.66Situationalawarenessmustbeobtainedpriortoaweapon’semployment.Itmustbeupdatedcontinuouslythroughoutitsusage.And,crucially,theremaybecaseswhereoperatorscannotsuccessfullyassessthebreadthofatargetedcomputernetworkorgaugethe
64 HumanRightsWatch,supranote38.65 Baker&Dunlap,supranote31.66 Brown,supranote32,at60.Moreover,LOACfurtherprohibitstargetingobjectsnecessaryforthesurvivalofthecivilianpopulation,suchasirrigationworks,agriculturalareas,andlivestock.AP1I,supranote22,art.54.And,whilealengthydisruptionofInternetserviceswouldnotimpactthesurvivalofthehumanrace,theUnitedNationshasneverthelessaffirmedInternetaccessasabasichumanright.unIted nAtIons,report oF the specIAl rApporteur on the proMotIon And protectIon oF the rIght to FreedoM oF opInIon And expressIon, A/HRC/17/27(May16,2011),available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf.Thissuggeststhatgreaterweightshouldbegiventocivilians’continuedaccesstoInternetconnectivity—attheveryleast,affordingitthesameprotectionaslivestock.
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anticipatedeffectsofasuccessfulattack.Insuchcases,LOACprohibitslaunchingthecyberweaponwithoutmorereliableintelligence.
ProfessorMichaelSchmittdiscussesthepossibilityofequippingautonomousweaponssystemswithsensorsthatidentifytargetsandnotesthathumandesignerscouldbakethisfunctionalityintotheweaponsystem.67Aswiththeprincipleofdistinction,heuristicsmaydiscernlegitimatetargets.Thechiefdifficultyarisesfromhowsystemslinktogether—inotherwords,“collateralcomputerdamage.”Asecondary,equallytroublingconcernfocusesonwhatthecomputercontrols;thisisimportantforthosecomputersthatruncriticalinfrastructuresites,suchasnuclearpowerplants,dams,sewagesystems,airtrafficcontrolsystems,andrailways.
Programmaticconstraints,insomerespects,lessenthisrisk.Forinstance,softwarecansiftbetweendata,analyzeitscontent,andpermitthetraffickingofunassociatedciviliancommunications.Simultaneously,itcouldrestricttheflowofcombatants’data,inasortofsmallerversionofChina’sGreatFirewall.Onescholarsuggeststhatmilitarysystemsberequiredto“mark”theirtraffic,systems,andnetworkselectronically,muchastraditionalmilitaryforcesarerequiredtowearuniformsthatdistinguishthemfromcivilians.68Suchaframeworkwould,ifimplemented,drasticallyreducetheriskofcollateralcomputerdamage,providedotherbelligerentsplayedbytherules.
Similarly,cyberweaponscouldscoutthetargetedsystemandidentifycon-nectedcomputersbeforelaunchingamaliciouspayload.Iftheweaponencountersconnectedciviliancomputers,itcouldqueryitsoperatorbeforeassailingitstarget;ifnosuchcollateraldamageconcernexists,itwouldproceedaccordingly.Whenatargetpursuedbyoperatorsusingconventionalweaponsisnotidentifiedonapreviouslyvettedlist,problemsmultiply.69
Similarissuesarisewhencyberweaponsseeconnectedsystemsnotprevi-ouslyaccountedfor,meaningthatminimizingcollateralcomputerdamagerequirestheemploymentofprogrammaticsafeguards.First,althoughacyberweaponmayinitiallybelaunchedatarelativelyisolatedcomputernetwork,suchasvarioussecurednetworksemployedbytheAmericanmilitary,thingshaveatendencytospread—thisishowStuxnetinfectedChevronafterbesiegingIran.Thus,weaponsdesignersmustaccountforthispossibility.Launchingtheequivalentofanindis-criminatecomputervirusintoasecurednetworkmightpassaprima facietestunder
67MichaelN.Schmitt,Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics,HarvardNationalSecurityJournalFeature(2013),available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=2184826.68 Brown,supranote32,at196.69 JeffreyS.Thurnher,No One at the Controls: Legal Implications of Fully Autonomous Targeting,JointForcesQuarterlyno.67,77-84(Oct.2012),http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a564052.pdf.
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LOAC,buttheriskofcollateraldamageistoogreat.Second,thesesafeguardsmustexistpriortodeployment.Forinstance,iftheweaponinterruptscommunications,itshouldneverthelessallowmessagesfromandtoprohibitedtargetstocontinue.Andwhentheweapondisruptsordegradescomputersattachedtoagivennetwork,itshouldassessthenatureofallconnectednodes:someinnocentnodesmaybeclassifiedasacceptablecollateraldamage,butthisisnotguaranteed.Eventhemerepresenceofunidentifiedsystemscouldimpactwhethertocontinueanattack.Inshort,iftheweaponencountersausecaseforwhichitsdesignershadnotplanned,itmustpauseandawaitfurtherhumaninput.70
Smartlydesignedsystemswillrequirehumaninputwhentheenvisionedtargetpossessestheabilitytocauseimmediate,deleteriousspilloverintothecivilianpopulation(e.g.,powerplants,sewagesystems,andhydroelectricdams).Inotherwords,thegreatertheriskofimmediatedamagetothecivilianpopulation,asdefinedbytraditionalcollateraldamageassessments,thelesscyberweaponsshouldrelyuponautonomoussystemswithouthumanoversight.Underthisanalysis,malwarelikeStuxnetshouldpossessthoroughlyreviewedlevelsofdecision-makingcapability,havediscreteusecaseswhichmilitaryplannerscananalyzepriortodeployment,andboastamplesafeguardsthatprotectunintendedtargetsfromreceivingtheweapon’smaliciouspayload.
D.AnInevitableUseCase:AttackingDual-UseStructuresattheOutsetofHostilities
Evenifcertaincyberweaponspassthoseinitialhurdles,justlikethebomberpilotdroppingordnance,theymustbeaimedappropriatelyandtakepossiblecol-lateraldamageintoconsideration.Cyber-attackshave“advancedtothepointwheremilitaryforcesnowhavethecapabilitytoinflictinjury,death,anddestructionviacyberspace”withoutputtinghumancombatantsinharm’sway.71Theweaponsarenovel;soarethelawscircumscribingtheirusage.Moretothepoint,atthebegin-ningofhostilities,itisaxiomaticthatcyberweaponshaveacrucialroletoplay,astheydidinEstoniain2007.InAprilofthatyear,unknownelementsinsideRussiaemployedabotnetthatstrucknearlytheentirecountry’selectronicinfrastructure,leavingEstonianinformationtechnologyspecialistswithoneoption:cuttingofftheworldtothecountry’sdomesticnetworks.72Approximatelytwoweekslater,thebotnetsstopped,shiftinggearstoothertactics,suchassendingspamworldwide.73
70 Notethatthiscriterionrequiresoperatorsnotanticipatingthescenarioatall:iftheweaponencountersanenvisionedscenario,evenonedefinedby“if-then”statementsbakedintothesoftware,itmaycontinuewithoutinterruption.71 Brown,supranote32,at180.72 HälyLaasme,Estonia: Cyber Window into the Future of NATO,JointForcesQuarterlyno.63,58-63(Oct.2011),available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=689675.73 JoshuaDavis,Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,wIred(Aug.21,2007),http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff_estonia?currentPage=all.
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AlthoughMoscowofficiallyeschewedinvolvementwiththecoordinatedattack,ithardlystretchestheimaginationtoimaginethestrikeasaself-terminatingwarningshotlaunchedacrossthebowofEstonia’sdigitaldomain.Moreimportantly,eventakingRussia’swordsatfacevalueandassumingthatRussianhackersmerelycoordinatedtheirefforts,itwasasuccessfulproofofconcept:Tallinn’sbankingsitesandinternalgovernmentserverswereoverloadedandrendereduseless.74Andthatmerelyinvitesonetopondertheefficacyofasimilar,state-sponsoredattack.
Already,DoDspecificallyenvisionsattacksuponAmerica’scriticalinfra-structure—andsurelyplansonattackingadversaries’infrastructureaswell.WeaponslikePlanXcontemplatedisruptionstoInternetservice,whichnearlyeveryoneuses,includingmilitaryentities.Thisisonlynatural,ascyberwarfaregenerallysparessoldiers’livesandrequiresnoexpenditureofmaterielorordnance,onlybandwidth.Moreover,asseenwithStuxnetandinEstonia,cyberweaponscanachievemilitaryobjectiveswithoutcausingdamagecomparabletotraditionalkineticattacks.75Theoreticalexamplesofpossibleobjectsofcyberwarfareincludetargeting:
[A]nelectricutility...toaffectapowergridthatsuppliesatelecom-municationscompanyusedtoattacktheattacker.Oratransportationsystemcouldbesubjectedtorepeated,apparentlyrandomattackstocreatealossofconfidenceinthegovernment.Similarly,hospitalorschooldatabasescouldbeattackedtodisruptactivitiesattheheartof...personalsecurity.76
TheGovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO),theagencyresponsibleforprovid-ingnonpartisaninvestigativereportstoCongressinawatchdogcapacity,hasforyearsnowconsistentlywarnedlawmakersagainstthebrittlenessandvulnerabilityofAmerica’scriticalinfrastructure.77Othernations’infrastructure—potentialtar-gets—likelysufferfromsimilardebilitations.
74 Id.75 SusanW.Brenner&LeoL.Clarke,Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts,43 vAnd. J. trAnsnAt’l l.1011,1013(2010)(citingArieJ.Schaap,Cyberwarfare Operations: Development and Use Under International Law,64 A.F. l. rev. 121, 158(2009)(“[B]enefitsincludelessphysicaldestruction,lesscostthanothertypesoftraditionalwarfare,andtheabilitytostillachievethesameresultswithlessrisktomilitarypersonnel.”));JeffreyT.G.Kelsey,Note,Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare,106 MIch. l. rev. 1427, 1440-41(2008)(“Unlikeaconventionalattack,acyberattackcouldneutralize...targetswithoutcausingphysicalinjurytotheciviliansorphysicaldamagetothesite.”);DorothyE.Denning,Barriers to Entry: Are They Lower for Cyber Warfare?,IOJournal,Apr.2009,at6-10(explainingthattheeffectsofcyberweaponsarelessdevastatingthanthoseofkineticwarfarebecausecyberwarfaremoreindirectlyresultsindeathandoftenproducesmoreshort-termeffects).76 SusanW.Brenner&LeoL.Clarke,Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Casualties,13 sMu scI. & tech. l. rev. 249, 252(2010).77 U.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,supranote27.
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Butattacksuponcriticalinfrastructurecancauseampledamage,sometimesunintentionally.ConsideramalfunctioninStuxnetthat,insteadofshuttingdownIranianreactors,insteadcausedthemtoexplode.Inthosecases,cyber-attackscouldconstituteviolationsofthelawsofwar.78Moreover,theproliferationofdual-usefacilitiesandsystemscomplicatestheabilityofcyberweaponstolimittheireffectssolelytolawfultargets.79Ofcourse,notalltargetsarelawfulones:LOACprohibitscombatantsfromdirectlyattackingplaceslikehospitalsandschools.Forinstance,wherethe“destructionofbridges,railroads,communicationscenters,andfuelsupplies...offersadefinitemilitaryadvantage,”thosefacilitieshavehistoricallybeenconsideredlawfultargetsifdeemedpartofmilitaryinfrastructure.80
Buttelecommunicationssystemsprovemoretroubling,andyettheywillinevitablyappearontargetlistsanyway.Doingsoundoubtedlyachievesthecondi-tionsof“cyberspacesuperiority,”whichDoDdoctrinerecognizesascrucialforenablingfreedomofactionandmaximizingcommanders’options.81FewcouldarguethatshuttingdownaccesstotheInternetandbankingsitesfortwoweeksisbloodierandmore“warlike”thandroppingbombs.
AlthoughDoDinformationflowsacrosssecure,military-restrictednet-works,whichwouldundoubtedlyqualifyaslawfultargets,muchofitsgeneral,day-to-daynetworktrafficroutesthroughtheunclassifiedInternet.Thesamegoesforinformationfromseniorcivilianofficials.TherecentimbroglioconcerningGeneralDavidPetraeus,theformerdirectoroftheCentralIntelligenceAgency,demonstratedthatclandestinemessagessometimespassthroughpubliclyavailablesystems.82Doesthismakecommerciale-mailservers,suchasGoogle,validmilitary
78 Brown,supranote32,at188(“AnactthatviolatesLOACifcarriedoutbyconventionalmeansalsoviolatesLOACifcarriedoutbyaninformationattack.Obversely,anactthatisnotawarcrimeifcarriedoutbyconventionalmeanscannotbeconvertedtooneifaccomplishedelectronically.”).79 TheLawofCyber-Attack,supra note10,at852-53.Thisareaofthelawremainsunsettledandripefordisagreements.
ThecircumstancesunderwhichanattackonadualusetargetislegalundertheLOACarenebulous,tosaytheleast....[A]nattackmaystillrunafoulofProtocolI’sprovisionsifit isindiscriminate;itmightnotbelimitedtosolelymilitaryobjectivesortheimpactmightbedisproportionatelyfeltbythecivilianpopulation.Thereisadivergenceofopinionamongcommentators,particularlyregardingproportionality--somemaintainthatonlydirectciviliancasualtiesresultingfromanattackshouldbeconsidered,whileotherswouldincludeallindirecteffectsandcollateraldamage,whichcanbesubstantialevenintargetedattackslikeStuxnet.
ScottJ.Shackelford&RichardB.Andres,State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing Problem,42 geo. J. Int’l l. 971,1004-05(2011).80 Brown,supranote32,at193-94.81 JP3-0,supra note30,atV-48.82MaxFisher,Why David Petraeus’s Gmail Account is a National Security Issue,wAsh. post(Nov.10,2012),http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/10/why-david-petraeuss-
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targets?WhataboutTier1InternetServiceProvidersthatrouteunclassifiedmilitarynetworktrafficaswellastheaveragecitizen’s?
Presumablytheanswerdependsonwhetheranattackagainstitsserversaimstodisrupt,degrade,ordestroythem.Thelawfulnessofattacksondual-usefacilitiesturnson“whetherthemilitaryadvantagegainedbyattackingthetargetoutweighstheadverseeffectonciviliansandthecivilianpopulation.”83Inconventionalwarfare,statesmightmerelyrestrictthegeneralpopulationfromdepotsormilitarybases,asLOACrequiressequesteringciviliansandtheirpropertyfrompossiblemilitaryobjectives.84However,whenthatseparationisunfeasible,dual-usestructuresaresubjecttoattack.
Withcomputernetworks,thisinvitesbroadlevelsofpermissibility.Onescholarevensuggeststhatbecause“95%ofallU.S.militarytrafficmovedoverciviliantelecommunicationandcomputersystems,”allcomputernetworksarefairgame.85Thisrealizationplacesthequestionsquarelywithinthedomainofproportionality,whichitselfturnsuponthecalculusbetweentheanticipatedmilitaryadvantageandtheexpectedlosstocivilianobjects.ThisArticlesubmitsthat,muchlikehowthesynthesisofgreaterautonomyandfewerengagementparametersmakesacyberweaponmorevirus-like(andthusprohibited),anattackthatfailstoadjustinresponsetochangesinmilitaryadvantagefailstorespecttheprincipleofproportionality.
Forbetterorworse,theattacksleviedagainstEstoniawerethe“right”waytofight:theytargetedgovernmentcomputers,crippledthecountry’seconomicmobilizationbydenyingaccesstobankingsitesandATMs,andtheymanagedtoavoidhamperingimpermissiblecriticalinfrastructuresitelikehospitals.Moreimportantly,unlikethetitularTerminatorsofthemoviefranchise,theattacksself-terminatedastheperceivedmilitaryadvantagelessened—thatis,aftertheaggres-sorsprovedtheirpoint.Thisfacthammershometheimpermissibilityofvirus-likeautonomouscyberweaponsforanotherreason:theypossesstherisktocrossintodual-usestructuresbutlacktheabilitytoadjusttomilitarynecessity.86
gmail-account-is-a-national-security-issue/.83 Brown,supranote32,at194.84AP1,supranote22,art.58.85 Hollis,supranote33,at1044.86Attacks“whichmaybeexpectedtocauseincidentallossofcivilianlife,injurytocivilians,damagetocivilianobjects,oracombinationthereof,whichwouldbeexcessiveinrelationtotheconcreteanddirectmilitaryadvantageanticipated,”areprohibitedanddeemedindiscriminate.AP1,supranote22,art.51(5)(b).
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E.TheNecessarySafeguardstoEnsureAutonomousCyberweapons’Legality
Cyberweaponsare,bydefinition,perfectlycontrollable.Theyfollowtheinstructionsoftheircodewithoutfail;anyrandomnessinjectedintotheirprogram-mingisbyconsciousdesignorprogrammeroversight.Inthissense,autonomyincyberweaponsseemssomethingofamisnomer:ifcomputers“learn,”theydosobyexercisinglearningalgorithms.Andthesealgorithmscanbedesignedtorespectthelawsofwar.87Asnotedabove,LOACwouldonlyoutrightprohibitcyberweap-onswithoutanyprogrammaticconstraints,withtheremainingtypesofweaponsevaluatedonacase-by-casebasis.88Conductinganindividualizedevaluationofcyberweaponsmustinvolveathoroughanalysisofitsprogramming,andthisanalysismustverifythatagivencyberweaponpossessesthosenecessarysafeguards.
First, inordertorespecttheprincipleofdistinction,theweaponmustadequatelydifferentiatebetweenpermissibleandprohibitedtargets.Itcouldemployapreviouslyvettedlistoftargetsorrelyinsteaduponheuristicsthatdynamicallyassesswhetherapotentialtargetconformstoprescreenedparameters,suchasrunningacertainpieceofsoftwareorbeingphysicallylocatedinagivenarea.Thissecondcaserequiresheightenedlegalscrutiny,butcouldneverthelesscomplywiththelawsofwar.However,cyberweaponscannotadjustthesepreprogrammedheuristics,orengagementparameters,throughadaptivelearningalone.Theymustinsteadreachbacktotheoperatorsforhumaninput.89
Second,concerningtheprincipleofproportionality,cyberweaponsmust,tothemaximumextentpossible,limitboth“collateralcomputerdamage”andreal,physicaldamagecausedbycomputerfailure.Inthefirstcase,datacanbesiftedandanalyzed,allowingcivilians’informationtocontinueflowingwhilecombatants’datascreechestoahalt.Suchaframeworkaccountsforattacksupontelecommunicationsnetworks.Inthesecondcase,concerningothercriticalinfrastructuresites—suchaselectricalfacilitiesorwaterdistributionsystems—acollateraldamageassessmentmustbeconductedpriortoaweapon’semployment.
Insum,faultyheuristicsmightleadtounintendedengagements.Ortheycouldlessenrisksbyprovidingoperatorswithadditionalsituationalawareness,justliketargetingpodsonfighteraircraftornightvisiongoggles.90TheriskofStuxnet’s
87 Brown,supranote32,at196.88 See Schmitt,supranote67,at7.89 Decidingwhetheratargetconformstocertainlevelofprescreenedqualities,thusmarkingitasatarget,essentiallymeanspausingandexaminingthedataonthetargetedsystem,orexaminingthedatatraffickedbetweenthatsystemandothers.If,indoingso,thecyberweaponencountersane-mailserverassociatedwiththemilitaryorgovernment,itcouldcheckitsbuilt-inparametersandrealizethattargetislawful.Conversely,dynamicupdatingofparametersgoesbeyondsimple“if-then”comparisons.Rather,itinvolvesthecyberweaponitselfaddinglevelsofcomparisonthroughassessingthebattlespace—otherwisestated,by“learning.”90 DoDintendsforcomputersystemsautonomouslytoperformtaskslike“generatingoptimal
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successfuldeploymentisthatitcouldsetbadprecedent.Fullyautonomous,“fireandforget”softwarerequiresthemoststringentoversight.Intheidealcase,well-designedautonomycanactuallyincreasecompliancewiththelawsofwar.91Buttheweaponsmustbespecificallydesignedtotakeadvantageofthosetechnologicaladvances,andtheymustbefullyvettedpriortodeployment.
II.THEROLEOFCIVILIANSANDCONTRACTORSINTHEDESIGNOFAUTONOMOUSCYBERWEAPONS
Inrecentyearsthesharpdividebetweentherolesperformedbyciviliansandbymilitarymembershaslessened.Civiliansregularlyserveasdirectorsofmilitaryentities,andtheyoftenmaintainanoutsizedroleingovernmentprocurementactions.Thetwenty-firstcenturybroughtwithita“growingmilitarydependencyoncivilians,andoncivilianobjectsandactivities.”92Thatdependenceincludesutilizingcivilianstoperformhistorically“military”roles,suchasprovidingsecurityduringpeacekeepingefforts.Incertaincases,thisshifthasnotgoneunchallenged.Forexample,theuseofprivatesecuritycontractorsinregionscharacterizedbyhotbedsofconflict,suchasinIraqandAfghanistan,drewamplescrutiny.93
Conflictzonesincyberspacehavethusfarescapedsimilarattention,chieflyduetotheirnoveltyandthelackofbroadconsensusonhowthelawsofwarapplytociviliansparticipatingincyber-attacks.However,thedutiesperformedbyciviliansandcontractorswillundoubtedlyacquireincreasingimportance.Uniformedmilitaryforcescannotmeetthechallengesofthetwenty-firstcenturyalone.Theirnumberssimplydonotallowforthatluxury.
Inthenearfutureandperhapsbeyond,privatecontractorsandcivilianswillfurnishsupportandpossiblyconductcyberoperations.94Onlycombatantsmayemployweaponsandwagewar.Butcyberweaponsmaybedividedintothreedistinctelements—thecode,thecomputersystem,andtheoperator’sinput—and
plans,monitoringplanexecutionandproblemsolving,selectingorallocatingresources,analyzingdataorimagery,implementingoractivatingthenextstepintheplan,reactingtotheenvironmenttoperformthebestactionandlearning.”u.s. dep’t. oF deF., tAsK Force report: the role oF AutonoMy In dod systeMs21(July2012)[hereinafterAutonomyReport],available athttp://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/AutonomyReport.pdf.Note,however,thatDoDD3009.09wasreleasedmonthslater,inNovember2012.See supranote2.91Waxman,supranote32,at444.92MichaelN.Schmitt,Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict,19 MIch. J. Int’l l. 1051, 1068(1998).93 See, e.g.,ChristopherM.Kovach,Cowboys in the Middle East: Private Security Companies and the Imperfect Reach of the United States Criminal Justice System,connectIons,vol.IX,no.2(2010),available at http://connections-qj.org/system/files/09.2.02_kovach.pdf?download=1.94 NilsMelzer,Cyberwarfare and International Law: Ideas for Peace and Security34(2011),available athttp://unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf2-act649.pdf.
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allaresubjecttothelawsofwar.95Thus,theintegrationofciviliansintomilitaryoperationswagedbycyberweaponsraisesasalientquestion:dothelawsofwarrestrictwhatdesignersofciviliancyberweaponsmaydo?96
A.AnOverviewofCivilians’ProtectedStatusunderLOAC
Theprincipleofdistinction,whichprotectsciviliansfrombeingtheobjectofattack,formsthebedrockprincipleofthelawsofwar,illustratedbytheAdditionalProtocoltotheFourthGenevaConventionof1949.TheConventionalsodictatesthatonlycombatantsmaylawfullytakepartinhostilities.97SinceLOACrecognizesnogeographicallimitations,thisrestrictionappliesequallyincyberspace.
Article50(1)oftheAdditionalProtocolillustratesthatacivilianis“anypersonwhodoesnotbelongtooneofthecategoriesofpersonsreferredtoinArticle4(A)(1),(2),(3),and(6)oftheThirdConventionandinArticle43ofthisProtocol.”98Moreover,unlessonefallswithintheseexclusions,theyareconsideredciviliansbydefault.AsProfessorSchmittexplains,thisdistinctionbetweencombatantandcivilianisbinary,fortheyare“oppositesidesofthesamecoin.”99Article43(1)oftheAdditionalProtocolprovidesthat:
[T]hearmedforcesofaPartytoaconflictconsistofallorganizedarmedforces,groupsandunitswhichareunderacommandrespon-sibletothatPartyfortheconductofitssubordinates,evenifthatPartyisrepresentedbyagovernmentoranauthoritynotrecognizedbyanadverseParty.Sucharmedforcesshallbesubjecttoaninternaldisciplinarysystemwhich, inter alia,shallenforcecompliancewiththerulesofinternationallawapplicableinarmedconflict.100
Moreover,Article43(2)oftheAdditionalProtocolexplicitlydefinescombatantsas“[m]embersofthearmedforcesofaPartytoaconflict(otherthanmedicalpersonnelandchaplains)”101Uponfirstglance,thisdefinitionsuggeststhatonlyuniformedmembersofthearmedforcesqualifyaslawfulcombatants,andthatonlycombatantsmaylaunchcyber-attacks.But,othersourcesextendthedefinition.102Therelevant
95 Brown,supra note32,at184.96 Forathoroughanalysisoftheevolutionofinternationallawconcerningtheprotectionofciviliansduringtimesofwar,seeBrenner&Clarke,supranote75,at1015-24.97AP1,supranote22,art.51.98 Id.art.50(1).99MichaelN.Schmitt,Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees,5 chI. J. Int’l l.511,523(2005).100AP1,supranote22,art.43.101 Id.102 Brenner&Clarke,supranote75,at1022.
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partsofArticle4oftheThirdGenevaConventionof1949exemptthefollowingfromcivilianstatus:
(1) MembersofthearmedforcesofaPartytotheconflictaswellasmembersofmilitiasorvolunteercorpsformingpartofsucharmedforces.
(2) Membersofothermilitiasandmembersofothervolunteercorps,includingthoseoforganizedresistancemovements,belongingtoaPartytotheconflictandoperatinginoroutsidetheirownterritory,evenifthisterritoryisoccupied,providedthatsuchmilitiasorvolunteercorps,includingsuchorganizedresistancemovements,fulfillthefollowingconditions:
(3) thatofbeingcommandedbyapersonresponsibleforhissub-ordinates;
(a) thatofhavingafixeddistinctivesignrecognizableatadistance;
(b) thatofcarryingarmsopenly;(c) thatofconductingtheiroperationsinaccordance
withthelawsandcustomsofwar.103
Satisfyingtheabovecriteriagrantsprisoner-of-war(POW)status.
Article4(A)(1)addressescombatantstatusthatoccursafterformalincor-porationbythestate,orde jurestatus,whereasArticle4(A)(2)conferscombatantstatusmerelybaseduponthegroup’scollectiveactions.104And,becausethesefourcriteriaalsoapplytogroupscreatedunderArticle4(A)(1),astheyconstituteanimplicitdefinitionofthearmedforces,theyfurtherrestrictthosewhomightwagewarafterformalincorporationbythestate.105Article43(3)addsanothercriticalrestrictiontothisprocess,proscribingthat“[w]heneveraPartytoaconflictincor-poratesaparamilitaryorarmedlawenforcementagencyintoitsarmedforcesitshallsonotifytheotherPartiestotheconflict.”106Absentproperincorporationandnotification,paramilitaryorganizationsactoutsidethelaw.107
103 GenevaConvention(III)RelativetotheTreatmentofPrisonersofWarart.4,Aug.12,1949,6U.S.T.3316,75U.N.T.S.135[hereinafterGC3].TheAdditionalProtocoltoGenevaConvention(IV)alsodetailsthosepersonseligibleforprisoner-of-warstatus.AP1,supra note22,arts.43-44.ThesameconditionsalsoappearintheFourthHagueConvention.SeeHagueConvention(IV)withRespecttotheLawsandCustomsofWaronLandannex,art.1,Oct.18,1907,36Stat.2277,187Consol.T.S.429.104 Schmitt,supranote99,at523-24.105 Id. at525.106AP1,supranote22,art.43(3).107 Schmitt,supranote99,at525(“Thismakesitpatentthatunincorporatedparamilitaryandlaw
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Thus,barringformalrecognitionandincorporationbythestate(whichisprovedbysuchfactorsasenlistmentcontracts,oathsofoffice,andwearingdistinctiveuniforms),civilianscannotreadilyenjoyArticle4(A)(1)protection.Indeed,“somecountriesrequirecertaincivilianemployeesinkeypositionstoserveas[military]reservists;thisfacilitatestheirrapidchangeofstatusintheeventofarmedconflict.”108CiviliansnotoccupyingsuchpositionscouldreadilybeviewedaslackingArticle4(A)(1)status.
Ontheotherhand,otherparamilitarycorpsmaycarryoutattacksandenjoyArticle4(A)(2)protection,providedthey“possessmilitarycommand,control,anddisciplinarycharacteristicsanalogoustotheregularforcestheyjoin.”109Butthiscaveat,alongwiththefourcriteriadescribedabove,arenoteasilysatisfied.Norcanthemerefunctionsuchagroupperformsgrantittheveneerofcombatantstatus.Infact,onescholarsuggeststhatbecauseparamilitaryandlawenforcementgroupsmustformallybeincorporatedtoachievecombatantstatus,othergroupsofgovernmentemployeesmustdothesame,leavingthemunabletomerelyrelyuponthelesserrequirementsofArticle4(A)(2).110
WheredoesthisleavethoseemployeesrelevantforthepurposesofthisArticle,suchasnon-uniformedciviliansattachedtotheDepartmentofDefenseorcomputernetworkexploitationexpertsworkingfortheCentralIntelligenceAgency?Unlessformallyattachedandincorporatedintothearmedforces—withuniforms,acommander,andwieldingrootkitsopenly—theycannotlawfullylaunchcyber-attacks.
Itmightbearguedthat,inmanycases,theseciviliansmerelyaccompanythearmedforcesandperformsupportfunctions.Thiscategoryincludespersonssuchaswarcorrespondents,laundrycrews,orsupplycontractors,andthesepersonsreceivePOWstatusifcaptured.111However,theytoopossessnolegalrighttoengagein
enforcementagenciesarecivilianinnatureforthepurposesofhumanitarianlaw.”).108 Id.at524.109 GeoffreyS.Corn,Unarmed but How Dangerous? Civilian Augmentees, the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Search for a More Effective Test for Permissible Civilian Battlefield Functions,2 J. nAt’l sec. l. & pol’y 257, 264(2008).110 Schmitt,supranote99,at525.Note,however,thataccordingtoSchmitt,whilethislogicexcludesgroupsofcivilianemployeesfrombandingtogethertowagewar—becauseoftheincorporationrequirement—theArticle4(A)(2)inquirymightapplytoprivatecontractors.111 GC3,supranote103,art.4(A)(4)(“Personswhoaccompanythearmedforceswithoutactuallybeingmembersthereof,suchascivilianmembersofmilitaryaircraftcrews,warcorrespondents,supplycontractors,membersoflabourunitsorofservicesresponsibleforthewelfareofthearmedforces,providedthattheyhavereceivedauthorization,fromthearmedforceswhichtheyaccompany,whoshallprovidethemforthatpurposewithanidentitycardsimilartotheannexedmodel.”).Othernon-combatantcivilians,suchasthose“takingnoactivepartinthehostilitiesincludingmembersofthearmedforceswhohavelaiddowntheirarmsandthoseplacedhorsdecombatbysickness,wounds,detention,oranyothercause,”qualifyas“protectedpersons”andmustreceiveothersafeguardsagainstinhumanetreatment.GenevaConvention(IV)Relativetothe
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hostilitiesthemselves.112Whiletheymaybecomecasualtiesduetotheirproximitytothearmedforces,theyarenotlawfultargetsduetotheirrelationshiptothearmedforces.113ThecommentarytotheAdditionalProtocolformalizesthisdivide:
Allmembersofthearmedforcesarecombatants,andonlymembersofthearmedforcesarecombatants.Thisshouldthereforedispensewiththeconceptof“quasi-combatants,”whichhassometimesbeenusedonthebasisofactivitiesrelatedmoreorlessdirectlywiththewareffort.Similarly,anyconceptofapart-timestatus,asemicivilian,semi-militarystatus,asoldierbynightandpeacefulcitizenbyday,alsodisappears.Acivilianwhoisincorporatedinanarmedorganization...becomesamemberofthemilitaryandacombatantthroughoutthedurationofthehostilities....114
Insum,onlymembersofthearmedforcesorothercorpsassociatedwiththemilitarythatrespecttraditionalcommandstructuresandfallwithintheregularforces’chainofcommandqualifyascombatants.115Unaffiliatedciviliansandthoseofferingbenignsupportstandoutsidethisparadigm;theyareshieldedfromattackaslongastheyremainonthesidelines.However,whencivilians—includingthoseperformingsupportfunctions—directlyparticipateinhostilities, theylosethisprotectionandmaybetargetedbyhostileforces.116Insuchcases,theywouldbesubjecttocriminalprosecutionandcouldevenbetriedbymilitarycommission.117
Practicallyspeaking,civiliansmaybeinvolvedinthedesign,maintenance,andsomeaspectsoftheoperationofcyberweapons.Conventionalcomputer-basedattackandexploitation,suchashackingintoanadversary’scomputernetworktoretrieveinformation,canconstituteanattackunderthelawsofwar.Butautonomycomplicatesthequestion.Forthefirst timeinhumanhistory,decision-makingalgorithmsthatpossiblyimplicateLOACaredesignedinlaboratoriesfarremovedfromthebattlefield,mostoftenbyciviliancomputerscientists.
ProtectionofCivilianPersonsinTimeofWarart.3(1),Aug.12,1949,6U.S.T3516,75U.N.T.S.287[hereinafterGC4].112 Brown,supranote32,at191.113 Corn,supranote109,at267.114 Int’l coMM. oF the red cross,coMMentAry on the AddItIonAl protocols oF 8 June 1977 to the genevA conventIons oF 12 August1949(YvesSandozetal.eds.,1987),at515,available athttp://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=470&t=com.115 Corn,supranote109,at267.116AP1,supra note22,art.51(3);GC3,supranote101,art.4(A).117 Brenner&Clarke,supranote75,at1022-23.
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B.TheUnclearStatusofCyberweapons’DesignersandProgrammers
Thecombatantstatusoftheoperatorofacyberweapons(thatis,theper-sonseatedatacomputerconsolewho,undertheexampleofPlanXdescribedabove,choosestargetsanddeployscertaintoolkits;orthepersonwholaunchestheStuxnetwormintotheNatanznetwork),maybedispensedwithfairlyeasily.Activelylaunchinganddirectingtheweaponunmistakablyconstitutesparticipationinhostilitiesandmustbecarriedoutbyalawfulcombatant.Equallysimplearecasesinvolvingdesignersofconventionalweaponssystems.Traditionally,civilianweaponsdesignershavenotbeendeemedtohavedirectlyparticipatedinhostilities,whichwouldforfeittheirprotectedstatusunderLOAC.118ThestatusofavendorlikeBoeingsellingfighteraircrafttotheAirForceisclear:thedesignersqualifyasunaffiliatedcivilians.
Butdesignersofautonomouscyberweaponsoccupymurkierterritory.Todate, theUnitedStateshasnotpromulgatedunclassifieddocumentationregard-ingthepermissibilityofpossiblenon-combatants,suchasdesignersdevelopingsoftwarethatwilleventuallybeusedincyber-attacks.119Norhasinternationallawkeptpacewiththisedgecase.Inotherwords,theoperativequestioniswhetherthedesignerofacyberweaponinvitesexposuretoLOACmerelybycodingaweaponthatpossessesrobustdecision-makingalgorithms,whicharelaterdeployedbyathirdparty.Thisquestionturnsonwhethersuchactionsaredeemedtoconstitutedirectparticipationinhostilities,whichmakestheseciviliansbothtargetablebyadversepartiesandpunishablefortheircrimes.Andunfortunately,thattermisnotdefinedbytreatylaw.120
TheUnitedStates,foritspart,hastraditionallydefined“directparticipationinhostilities”ratherbroadly.In2002,althoughithasnotratifiedthebaseConventionontheRightsoftheChild,theUnitedStatesaccededtotheOptionalProtocolonInvolvementinArmedConflict.121Indoingso,theUnitedStatesissuedanunder-standingregardingthetreatmentoftheterm.122Underthisview,whichstressesthe
118 TheLawofCyber-Attack,supranote10,at853.119 Ithas,however,restrictedtheparticipationoftheNationalGuard.NationalGuardsmenmustbein“federal”statusbeforeparticipatingincyber-attackmissions.Seesupranote23.Ofcourse,Guardsmen—evenifin“state”status—wouldstillbeconsideredcombatants.Inotherwords,thisprohibitionismoreanattempttoconformtoensurecleanerlinesofcommand,asincertaincasesNationalGuardsmenareboundtofollowtheordersofthegovernoroftheirhomestate.120 nIls Melzer, Int’l coMM. oF the red cross, InterpretIve guIdAnce on the notIon oF dIrect pArtIcIpAtIon under InternAtIonAl huMAnItArIAn lAw41(2009),available athttp://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf.121 OptionalProtocoltotheConventionontheRightsoftheChildontheInvolvementofChildreninArmedConflictart.1,May25,2000,2173U.N.T.S.222.122 Theunderstandingstatesthat,withrespecttoArticle1oftheProtocol,
Beyond Skynet 259
causalrelationshipbetweenone’sactionsandtheeffectuponthebattlefield,theeffortsofcivilianweaponsdesignersmightqualifyasdirectparticipation:
Suppose,however,thatinsteadofbuildingoff-the-shelfCNA[com-puternetworkattack]tools,theprogrammerdesignsdestructivecode,custom-built totheintelligencemappedbythecomputerreconnaissanceexpert.Imaginefurther,thatheworkscloselywiththemapperandroutinelyadjustsortweaksthecode,uptothemomentofattack.SucheffortsensurethattheCNAleveragesthemostrecentintelligenceandproducesexactlytheattacker’sintent,includingaminimizationofcollateraldamageandcasualties....The CNA weapon designer also may strain the boundaries of permissible civilian contributions to combat.123
TheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)hasofferedfurthernonbindingguidanceonthisquestionofunsettledlaw.Accordingtoitscriteria,aspecificactmustmeetthefollowingcriteriatoqualifyasdirectparticipationinhostilities:
(1) theactmustbelikelytoadverselyaffectthemilitaryopera-tionsormilitarycapacityofapartytoanarmedconflictor,alternatively,toinflictdeath,injury,ordestructiononpersonsorobjectsprotectedagainstdirectattack(thresholdofharm),and
(2) theremustbeadirectcausallinkbetweentheactandtheharmlikelytoresulteitherfromthatact,orfromacoordinatedmili-taryoperationofwhichthatactconstitutesanintegralpart(directcausation),and
(3) theactmustbespecificallydesignedtodirectlycausetherequiredthresholdofharminsupportofapartytotheconflictandtothedetrimentofanother(belligerentnexus).124
[t]heUnitedStatesunderstandsthephrase‘directpartinhostilities’tomeanimmediateandactualactiononthebattlefieldlikelytocauseharmtotheenemybecausethereisadirectcausalrelationshipbetweentheactivityengagedinandtheharmdonetotheenemy.Thephrase‘directparticipationinhostilities’doesnotmeanindirectparticipationinhostilities,suchasgatheringandtransmit-tingmilitaryinformation,transportingweapons,munitions,orothersupplies,orforwarddeployment.
MessagefromthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesTransmittingTwoOptionalProtocolstotheConventionontheRightsoftheChild,S.treAty doc. no.106-37,atVII(2000).123 SeanWatts,Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack,50 vA. J. Int’l. l.391,429(2010)(emphasisadded).124 Melzer,supranote120,at16.
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Followingthesecriteria,intheICRC’sview,bothcomputernetworkattackandcomputernetworkexploitationwouldcountasdirectparticipation.125
TheProgramonHumanitarianPolicyandConflictResearch(HPCR)atHarvardUniversityreleasedadditionalcommentaryonthissubject,notingthatwhencomputer-basedoperations“directlycausedeath,injuryordestruction,orsystemmalfunctionsadverselyaffectingthemilitarycapacityormilitaryoperationsoftheenemy,”theyqualifyasdirectparticipation.126
Conversely,“indirect”participationinhostilities—orbeingpartofthegeneralwareffort—doesnotdepriveciviliansoftheirprotectedstatus.Thiswouldnotonlyincludeinnocuousactionslikebuyingwarbondsorparticipatinginrationingprograms,butalsoconductingscientificresearchanddesign.127TheICRCstressestheimportanceofdirectness,notingthatevenassemblingandstoringaweaponsuchasanimprovisedexplosivedevice(IED)wouldnotcountasdirectparticipation,eventhoughanuninterruptedcausallinkexistsbetweentheweapon’screationanditsdetonation.128
Regrettably, thecaseofprogrammersofautonomouscyberweapons(orindeed,autonomousweaponsgenerallyspeaking)remainsunsettled.InthisArticle’sview,thedecision-makingalgorithmsembeddedwithinautonomouscyberweaponsmandatedifferenttreatmentfortheirdesigners.Atthispoint,withoutconsensusintheinternationalcommunitytogiverisetocustomaryinternationallawor,moreusefully,formaltreaties,themostonecandoisemployanalogies.Bylookingattwowell-knownautonomouscyberweapons,onecanassesswhether,assumingtheirdesignerswerecivilianssupportingagovernment’swareffort,theireffortsamountedtodirectparticipationinhostilities.
First,recallthatStuxnet,initssimplestform,assesseditstarget’sgeographi-callocationanddeterminedwhetherthetargetranindustrialcontrolsoftware.Ifbothquestionswereansweredaffirmatively, it launcheditspayload.Although
125 Id.at48-49.126the progrAM on huMAnItArIAn polIcy And conFlIct reseArch, hArvArd unIversIty, MAnuAl on InternAtIonAl lAw ApplIcABle to AIr And MIssIle wArFAre (May15,2009),available athttp://ihlresearch.org/amw/HPCR%20Manual.pdf.Curiously,however,thecommentarytotheManualnotesthatmerelyhackingintoamilitarybase’sintranetdoesnotautomaticallyqualifyasparticipationinhostilities.the progrAM on huMAnItArIAn polIcy And conFlIct reseArch, hArvArd unIversIty, coMMentAry on the MAnuAl on InternAtIonAl lAw ApplIcABle to AIr And MIssIle wArFAre—sectIon F: dIrect pArtIcIpAtIon In hostIlItIes,available athttp://www.ihlresearch.org/amw/manual/category/section-f-direct-participation-in-hostilities[hereinafterHPCRCommentary].127 Melzer,supranote120,at53-54.Buteventhishaslimits,andtheICRCnotedthatinextremesituations,suchas“wheretheexpertiseofaparticularcivilianwasofveryexceptionalandparticularlydecisivevaluefortheoutcomeofanarmedconflict,suchasthecaseofnuclearweaponsexpertsduringtheSecondWorldWar.”Id.at53n.122.128 Id.at53-54.
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strategicguidancewasundoubtedlypassedtotheprogrammer,suchaslimitingthedestructivepayloadtoIraniannuclearsites,thedesignerimplantedthatguidanceatatacticallevel.Notonlydidtheprogrammerdesigntherulesetthatidentifiedtheselectedtarget,butthatcoderalsochosethattypeof“warhead”thatachievedthedesiredmilitaryeffect.
Second,inthecaseofGauss,asuccessortoStuxnet, itsprogrammersnotonlyincorporateddecision-makinglogic,suchthatonlyspecificallytargetedcomputersriskattack,buttheweaponeffectivelyemploysstealthcapabilities.Onmostcomputers,“themoduleremainscloakedinanimpenetrableenvelopethatpreventsresearchersandwould-becopycatsfromreverseengineeringthecode.”129Becauseofthisconcealment,boththeweapon’stargetingmechanismandhowitspreadsfromonecomputertoanotherremainhidden.
Inbothcases,programmerslikelyreceivedstrategicguidancefromstateactors,especiallygiventhesophisticationoftheweapons.InStuxnet’scase,thestrategyprobablyamountedtocripplingIran’snuclearprogramwhileensuringothertargets,ifstruckbytheweapon,sufferednoilleffects.Afterreceivingthisstrategy,theprogrammerseffectivelyconductedtactical-levelplanning,eitheraloneorjointlywithstatesponsors.Intheend,theweaponwasprogrammaticallyboundbyrulesandcriteriacraftedbythecoders.130
AstheHPCRnotes,“[i]ssuingordersanddirectivestoforcesengagedinhostilities;makingdecisionsonoperational/tacticaldeployments;andparticipatingintargetingdecision-making”areallformsofdirectparticipationinhostilities.131Thissortoftactical-levelplanninggoesbeyondthe“decisions”thatembeddedsystemsinotherweaponsmighttake,suchasthedetonatorattachedtolandmines;navigationalaidsthatcontrolthepost-launchflightofmissiles;ortheradioreceiverusedinsomeformsofIEDs.Indeed,asProfessorSchmittsuggests,civilianswho“engageintacticallevelplanningorapprovalaredirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesandtherebylegitimatetargets.”132
Thedifferenceliesintheinterfacebetweenthedesigner’swill—vialinesofcode—tothecapacityoftheweaponitselftoacquireandprosecutepossibletargets.Infact,targetacquisition,whichamountstoidentifyingpossiblesetsoftargetsforengagement,isanothercommonlyacceptedexampleofdirectlyparticipatinginhostilities.133Moreover,withGauss,elementsofactiveconcealmentserveasfurther
129 Goodin,supranote59.130 Eveneasieristhecaseofprogrammerswhomodifycodeinpreparationforanattack,becausetheireffortscouldconstituteperformingacontinuouscombatsupportfunction.131 HPCRCommentary,supranote126.132 Schmitt,supranote99,at5443(citingMichaelN.Schmitt,State Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law,17 yAle J. Int’l l.609(1992)).133 HPCRCommentary,supranote127.
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evidenceofspecific,tacticalactionundoubtedlydesignedbytheprogrammertoachievesomespecific,operationalgoal.
SomemightarguethattheplanningtakingplaceintheResearchandDevel-opment(R&D)labconstitutesonlyapreparatorymeasure,onefarremovedfromthebattlefield(especiallyincaseswhereagovernmentcommissionsthecreationofaweaponfromacontractor).Butevenpreparatoryactscanqualifyasparticipationinhostilities.134Thequestionisnaturallyoneofdegree,andtheexamplesintheICRC’s2008studydistinguishbetweenthosemeasuresandotherfunctionswhichmerelybuildthecapacitytowagewar.Notably,theICRC’sanalysisreliesuponacausalchainmorethananythingelse;itcitesloadingbombsontoanairplaneforanattackatanunspecifiedtimeinthefutureasdirectparticipation,butexemptstransportingbombstoawarehouseforfutureusebybelligerents.135
Inthecaseofautonomouscyberweapons,althoughthegeographicalandtemporallinkbetweenaweapon’sdesignanditsdeploymentcouldbequitetenuous,neitherofthesefactorsdiminishesthecausallinkbetweentheprogrammer’stacticalplanning,thedecision-makingalgorithmsembeddedinthecodeitself,andtheeffectstheweaponinflicts.Indeed,ifmerely“transmittingtacticaltargetinginformationforanattack”qualifiesasdirectparticipationinhostilities,surelycraftingexactlyhowaweaponoperatesdoestoo.136
Unfortunately,theUnitedStatescurrentlyrefrainsfromdefiningtheconceptof“autonomy”altogether.Instead,itsDefenseDepartmentadoptedadefinitionwhichsolemnizesthesymbiotichuman-computerrelationship,whichrejectseventhepossibilityofafullyautonomoussystem:
Themilestonesandroadmapsbasedoncomputerfunctionsneededforsomelevelofautonomy—ratherthantoachieveacapabilitythroughthebestcombinationofhumanandmachineabilities—fosterbrittledesignsresultinginadditionalmanpower,vulner-abilitiesandlackofadaptabilityfornewmissions.Castingthegoalascreatingsophisticatedfunctions—ratherthancreatingajointhuman-machinecognitivesystem—reinforcesfearsofunboundedautonomyanddoesnotpreparecommanderstofactorintotheirunderstandingofunmannedvehicleusethatthereexistnofullyautonomoussystems,justastherearenofullyautonomoussoldiers,sailors,airmenorMarines.137
134 Melzer,supranote120,at66.135 Id.136 Id.at48.137 DoDAutonomyReport,supranote90,at23.
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Accordingtothisapproach,eventhemostautomatedsystemsare“jointhuman-machinecognitivesystems.”138Whenappliedtoenhancednavigationortargetingpodsattachedtoaircraft;intelligence-gatheringtoolsthatparsecopiousamountsofrawdata;orevensomethingsimpler,likespamfiltersonelectronicmailservers,thisringstrue.
ButastheexampleofStuxnetillustrates,cyberweaponsexerciseinternaljudgmentafterbeinglaunched.Inotherwords,thehumanelementincyberweaponsmaybecomeincreasinglyfurtherremovedfromthefinalimpact.Inthesecases,aportionofthedecision-makingprocessishard-codedintothesystemitself,suchthatoperatorsandendusersmaynotcompletelyunderstandorevenhavetheabilitytofullycontrolitsinnerworkings.Andhazilydefinedframeworksofteninvitecriticism.139
C.TheResponsesfromAmericanMilitaryDepartmentstothisDilemma
Fortheabovereasons,thisArticlesuggeststhatdesignersofautonomouscyberweaponscouldfaceLOACexposure.Giventhisarea’snovelty,thereexistsnoconsensusregardingthisquestion.ButorganizationswithintheUnitedStatesgovernmenthaveneverthelessconsideredwhatlimitationsshouldbeimposeduponciviliansandcontractorsinvolvedinthedesignandoperationofcyberweapons.A2010memorandumfromTheJudgeAdvocateGeneraloftheAirForcetoDoD’sGeneralCounsel“raisedconcernsabouttheinsufficiencyofDoD’spoliciestodeterminepreciselywhatDoDcivilianactivitiesordutieswerepermissibleinrelationtocomputernetworkattackoperationsand,intheabsenceofclarificationonthesematters,recommendedthatAirForceleadershiplimitDoDcivilianrolesinsuchcyberspaceoperations.”140Andinconductingfurtherinvestigations,theGAOnotedina2011reporttoCongressthatAirForceofficialsresponsibleforitscyberspaceprogramechoedthisuncertainty,wonderingwhetherAirForcecivilianscouldevenconductcyberoperations.141TheNavy,ontheotherhand,tookamoreconservativeapproachandstatedthatitsciviliansonlyperform“supportroles,”butcouldexpandtheirmissionsetdependinguponfutureneeds.142TheGAOcalledfor“agreaterlevelofdetail...withregardtothecategoriesofpersonnel—military,
138 Id.at24.139 Forinstance,onecommentatornotesthatDoD’s“positionpresentsanicelittleloopholewithwhichtostopdebateaboutincreasedautonomyinweaponssystems.Thecriticsays,‘weworryaboutattributingresponsibilitytoaweaponthatdecidestofireonatargetbyitself.’TheDoDresponds‘thereisahuman-machinecognitivesystem,andsodon’tworry,thereisahumanthere!’Butthequestionremains:where?Howfarremovedisthisperson?Thecommander?TheGeneral?ThePresident?”Roff,supranote58.140 u.s. governMent AccountABIlIty oFFIce,depArtMent oF deFense cyBerspAce eFForts: More detAIled guIdAnce needed to ensure MIlItAry servIces develop ApproprIAte cyBerspAce cApABIlItIes,GAO-11-421,13(May2011),available athttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11421.pdf.141 Id.142 Id.
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governmentcivilian,orciviliancontractor—thatmayconductcyberspaceopera-tions,”andthemilitaryservicesagreed.143
Bydesign,LOACestablishesafirmlinkbetweencommand,theabilitytolawfullylaunchattacks,andtheliabilityofmilitarycommandersandindividualoperatorsforthemisconductofpersonnelonthebattlefield.144TheDoDrecognizesthatnumerousparties(e.g.,thedesigner,theoperator,andthecommander)playimportantrolesinthedeploymentofacyberweapon.ButDoD’scurrentofficialpolicymandatesonlythat“[p]ersonswhoauthorizetheuseof,directtheuseof,oroperateautonomousandautonomousweaponsystemsmustdosowithappropriatecareandinaccordancewiththelawofwar,applicabletreaties,weaponsystemsafetyrules,andapplicablerulesofengagement(ROE).”145Butthispolicyexcludescyberweapons;italsoseeminglyexemptsdesigners.
Abetter,morerobustpolicymustconsiderprogrammerswhentheircodepossessesenoughdiscretiontowarrantexposuretoLOAC.Inthecaseofautono-mouscyberweapons,thedesignerperformstactical-levelplanninginvolvingtargetacquisitionbeforetheoperatoreventouchesacomputerterminal.Thus,if theprogramcommitsawarcrimeduesolelytologiccontainedwithinitsprogramming,theweapon’sprogrammersmustbeheldaccountable.146Ontheotherhand,whereaLOACviolationstemsfromanoperatordirectinganattackagainstanunlawfultarget,theprogrammerwouldbeabsolvedofliability.Additionally,thecommanderorciviliansupervisor, ifhe“kneworshouldhaveknownthattheautonomousweaponhadbeensoprogrammedanddidnothingtostopitsuse,”wouldshareresponsibility.147
Certainly,ifcyberweaponsdesignerswereformalizedaslawfulcombatants,thistensionandconfusionwouldquicklydissipate.Theywouldpossesstherightto
143 Id.at10.144 Corn,supranote109,at271.145 DoDDir.3000.09,supranote2,para.4b.146 Schmitt,supranote67,at22(citationsomitted).147 Id.The“knownorshouldhaveknownstandard,”asappliedtocommandersorresponsiblesupervisors,isidenticaltothestandardtowhichthesepersonsareheldvis-à-vistraditionalwarcrimes.See,e.g.,WilliamH.Parks,Command Responsibility for War Crimes,62 MIl. l. rev. 1, 94(1973)(“Almostuniversallythepost-WorldWarIItribunalsconcludedthatacommanderisresponsibleforoffensescommittedwithinhiscommandiftheevidenceestablishesthathehadactual knowledge orshould have had knowledge, andthereafterfailedtoact.”).ThisisknownastheYamashitastandard,followingInReYamashita,327U.S.1(1946).See alsoMichaelL.Smidt,Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations,164 MIl. l. rev. 155(2000);MarkS.Martins,“War Crimes” During Operations Other than War: Military Doctrine and Law Fifty Years After Nuremberg—And Beyond,149 MIl. l. rev. 145(1995);L.C.Green,Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law,5 trAnsnAt’l l. & conteMp. proBs. 319(1995);u.s. dep’t. oF ArMy, FIeld MAnuAl 27-10, the lAw oF lAnd wArFAre(July1965)[hereinafterFM27-10],available athttp://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm27_10.pdf.
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carryoutlawfulattacks,includingallphasesofwarfare—includingthetactical-levelplanningembodiedinwritingdecision-makingalgorithms.Ontheotherhand,ifthesefunctionswerecarriedoutbyanon-combatantcivilian,thatpersonforfeitsPOWprotectionandheractionscouldalsobeconsideredtantamounttocriminalacts.148Theurgencyofthefirstforfeiture,contingentuponcapturebyahostileforce,resonatesweakly:operatorsofcyberweaponsgenerallysitinairconditionedofficebuildingsorsecuremilitarycompounds.ThelikelihoodofopposingforcesdirectlytargetingandcapturingAmericanpersonnelisadmittedlylow.
Butthesecondforfeiture,exposingciviliansorcontractorstocriminalliabilityorviolationsofthelawsofwar,provesmoreprescient.Asfaraspossiblelawsuitsgo,onecommentatorpredictsanincreaseinlitigationandnotesthathistori-callytheAmericangovernmentindemnifiedcontractorsfromthird-partyliability.149Butthisdefenseistriggeredonlywhencontractorsconformto“reasonablyprecisespecifications,”whichinpracticehasbeensupplantedbyrequiringcontractorstomeetperformancestandards.150Thedesignofcyberweaponswillundoubtedlyfallintothelattercategory,notonlyduetopresentconvention,butbecausecallinguponaweapontoachieveacertaineffect(e.g.,“capableofdismantlingthecontinuousoperationsofthetargetedelectricpowerplant”)isfareasiertodraftthandemandingcertainsnippetsofsourcecode.151
Ineithercase,DoDmustfullydefinepermissiblerolesforcivilians.TheDepartmentpubliclyadmitsagrowingdemandforindividualsversedininfor-mationtechnology,readytodefendagainsttheincreasingthreatofdefendingagainstcyber-attacks.Further,itpledgedto“catalyzeU.S.scientific,academic,andeconomicresourcestobuildapooloftalentedcivilianandmilitarypersonneltooperateincyberspaceandachieveDoDobjectives.”152Oneinitiative,theCyberCorpsprogram,spearheadedbytheUniversityofTulsa,eventrainsundergraduates
148 Brown,supranote32,at190.149 Bodenheimer,supranote13,at3.150 Id. (citingBoylev.UnitedTechnologiesCorp.,487U.S.500,512(1988)).151 SeeDARPAAgencyAnnouncement,supranote15(showcasingaprimeexampleofanagencyannouncementforacyberweaponusingperformance-basedrequirements).152 u.s. dep’t. oF deFense, strAtegy For operAtIng In cyBerspAce10-11(July2012),available athttp://www.fas.org/man/eprint/dod-cyber.pdf.Thestrategyclaimsfurtherthat
DoDmustmakeitselfcompetitiveifitistoattracttechnicallyskilledpersonneltojoingovernmentserviceforthelong-term.Toachieveitsobjectives,DoDwillfocusontheestablishmentofdynamicprogramstoattracttalentearly,andtheDepartmentwillleveragethe2010PresidentialInitiativetoimprovefederalrecruitmentandhiringprocesses.DoDwillalsoworkwiththeExecutiveOfficeofthePresidenttoexplorestrategiesdesignedtostreamlinehiringpracticesforitscyberworkforceandexchangeprogramstoallowfor“nopenalty”cross-flowofcyberprofessionalsbetweenthepublicandprivatesectorstoretainandgrowinnovativecybertalent.”
Id.at11.
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incyber-espionage;theyoftenfindcareersinAmericangovernmentagencies.153Whenthesebuddingcyber-warriorsjoinDoD,UnitedStatesCyberCommand(USCYBERCOM),createdin2010,trainsandequipsthem.154
ThesamegoesfordelineatingtheidealcompositionofforcesdedicatedtoAmerica’scyberspaceforces.155USCYBERCOMplanstoaddanadditional1,000civilianemployeestothe“networkoperationsandsecurityworkforceoverthenexttwoyears.”156GeneralWilliamShelton,thecommanderoftheAirForce’sSpaceCommand,claimedinJanuary2013thatcyberspaceis“theWildWestbecauseyoucanbeanywhereanddoanythingandbeeffective.AllyouneedisanInternetconnection,therightskillsandalaptopandyou’reinthegame.”157Thismaybetrue,butDoDalsoneedsclearerpoliciestoensuretheactivitiesofitsprogrammersandoperatorscomplywithLOAC.
D.ASuggestedFrameworktoEnsureCivilians’ProtectedStatus
Ordinarily,thisproblemcouldbesolvedbyrelyingsolelyuponuniformedpersonnel,buttheserviceslacktherequiredtechnicalskills.Indeed,asdemandforcyberweaponsincreases,militaryforceswillundoubtedlytraintheiruniformedmenandwomen,buttheywillalsorelyuponciviliansandhirecontractorstoshouldertheexpandedmission.Thisamountsto“blurringthedistinctionbetweenciviliansandmilitarypersonnel.”158
Forinstance,ProfessorsBrennerandClarkeproposethatciviliansshouldbe“integrated”directlyintothemilitary,whichalsoimplicatesthecriteriarequiredbyArticle4(A)(2)oftheThirdGenevaConvention.LouiseDoswald-Beck,formerlywiththeICRC,sharesthisconclusionandevensuggeststhatpersonnelinvolvedin
153 KenDilanian,Cyber Corps Program Trains Spies for the Digital Age,l.A. tIMes(Nov.22,2012),http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/22/nation/la-na-cyber-school-20121123.154 Feickert,supranote9,at22(“USCYBERCOMisasubunifiedcommandthatissubordinatetoUSSTRATCOM.USCYBERCOMplans,coordinates,integrates,synchronizes,andconductsactivitiestodefendDoDinformationnetworksandalsoconductscyberspaceactivitiestoenableU.S.militaryactivities.”).155WesleyR.Andrues,What U.S. Cyber Command Must Do,JoInt Forces quArterlyno.59at118-19(2010),available at http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59_115-120_Andrues.pdf(“Todate,noall-inclusiveIOcareerstructurehasbeencodified,duelargelytoalackofServiceconsensusontheextentandmakeupofcoreIOskillsandforcecomposition.Thus,thekeyintentoftheDoDinstruction—toestablishpolicy,definitions,andresponsibilitiesfortheforce—hasnotyieldedadecisivedeliverable.”).156 SeanGallagher,Air Force’s Cyber Commander Says Iran Is Next Big ‘Net Menace,ArsTechnica(Jan.18,2013),http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/01/air-forces-cyber-commander-says-iran-is-next-big-net-menace/.157 Id.158 Brown,supranote32,at183.
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cyberwarfarewearuniformsaltogether.159However,toqualifyunderthisdefinition,aresponsibleofficermustcommandeverymember.160Butunderanyproposedplanforintegration,thecommandrelationshiparrangementmustbeassured.161
BrennerandClarkenotethatarecentamendmenttotheUniformCodeofMilitaryJustice(UCMJ),theunitarybasisofcriminallawforthearmedforces,162potentiallysolvesthisdilemma.In2006,Congressextendeditsjurisdiction,insomecases,tociviliansservingwiththearmedforces.163Article2(a)(10)oftheUCMJprovidesthat“[i]ntimeofdeclaredwarorcontingencyoperation,personsservingwithoraccompanyinganarmedforceinafield”aresubjecttomilitaryjurisdic-tion,andthuscommandauthority.164TheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,inamemorandumreleasedin2008,elaborateduponthisjurisdictionalextension.ForoffensescommittedwithintheUnitedStates(andviolationsofLOACcanbechargedundertheUCMJ165),theSecretaryofDefenseretainstheauthoritytoformallybringchargesandcourt-martialciviliansaccompanyingtheforces.166
Inshort,commandauthorityexists,providedtheciviliansorcontractorsfallundertheambitofArticle2(a)(10).ProfessorGeoffreyCornargues,however,thatthemerepenalauthorityofcommanderstoimposesomepunishmentmaynotbeenoughtoeffectivelyqualifyacorpsofciviliansforcombatantstatus—afullregimeofcommandandcontrol,definedbythesuperior-subordinaterelationship,mustexist.167
159 LouiseDoswald-Beck,Computer Network Attack and the International Law of Armed Conflict,incoMputer networK AttAcK And InternAtIonAl lAw163(MichaelN.Schmitt&BrianT.O’Donnelleds.,2002).160 GC3,supranote103,art.4(A)(2).161 Brenner&Clarke,supranote75,at1057-74.162 UniformCodeofMilitaryJustice,10U.S.C.§§801-946(2012).163 See,e.g.,Kovach,supra note93.164 10U.S.C.§802(a)(10)(2012).Additionally,10U.S.C.§101(a)(13)notesthatacontingencyoperationisa“militaryoperation”that“(A)isdesignatedbytheSecretaryofDefenseasanoperationinwhichmembersofthearmedforcesareormaybecomeinvolvedinmilitaryactions,operations,orhostilitiesagainstanenemyoftheUnitedStatesoragainstanopposingmilitaryforce;or(B)resultsinthecallororderto,orretentionon,activedutyofmembersoftheuniformedservices...oranyotherprovisionoflawduringawarorduringanationalemergencydeclaredbythePresidentorCongress.”165 Forexamplesofpossiblechargingstrategies,see MartinN.White,Charging War Crimes: A Primer for the Practitioner,ArMy lAwyer(Feb.2006),available athttp://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/war_crime_charging.pdf.166MemorandumfromtheSecretaryofDefense,totheSecretariesoftheMilitaryDepartments,subject:UCMJJurisdictionoverDoDCivilianEmployees,DoDContractorPersonnel,andOtherPersonsServingwithorAccompanyingtheArmedForcesOverseasDuringDeclaredWarandContingencyOperations(Mar.10,2008),available athttp://www.justice.gov/criminal/hrsp/docs/03-10-08dod-ucmj.pdf.167 Corn,supranote109,at260n.6(“Simplysubjectingacivilianaugmenteetomilitary
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Inorderforthisproposaltosucceed,DoDcivilianspossessingthediscretiontopotentiallycommitviolationsofLOACmustformallybeattachedtothearmedforcesandsubjecttotheordersofthecommanderholdingoverallresponsibilityforthemission.Thisshiftbasicallydemandsformalinductionintothearmedforces,atleastinthe“reservist”capacitymentionedbyProfessorSchmittinthediscussionconcerningArticle4(A)(1)oftheThirdGenevaConventionabove.Qualifyingcivil-iansmustbesetapartfromotherclassesofcivilianswhomerelyperformsupportfunctions.Inotherwords,tothemaximumextentpossible,thecorpsofciviliansparticipatinginthedevelopmentofautonomouscyberweaponsmustact,inmanyrespects,likeaparamilitaryorganization.168Andtheymustbecommandedandsubjecttoaformaldisciplinarystructure,notjustsupervised.
Moreover,onescholararguesthatonlythosesubjecttocommandauthorityshouldbeabletoexercisediscretionthatcouldresultinalawofarmedconflictviolation.169Wheredesignerstranslatestrategicguidancetotactical-levelplanningintheformofdecision-makingalgorithms,thatsortofdiscretionalreadyexists.Andthoseincommandareresponsiblefortheactionsoftheirinferiors,regardlessof“whethertheconflictamountstoaninternationalarmedconflict,acivilwar,oranoperationundertheauspicesoftheUnitedNationsorsomeotherinternationalorganization.”170
Beyondthequestionsraisedbyordinarycivilians,whomightqualifyforcombatantstatusunderArticle4(A)(1)oftheThirdGenevaConvention,contrac-torsmightinsteadenjoyprotectionunderArticle4(A)(2)providedtheymeettheapplicablecriteria.However, thethresholdcriterioniswhetherthecontractorpossessesindependencefromthearmedforcesandtheabilitytoconductoperationsautonomously(as,forexample,aprivatesecuritycompanymight,orforthepur-posesofthisarticle,thecontractorawardedDARPA’sPlanXcontract).Otherwise,withoutthisrequisiteautonomy,thecontractor“wouldbeindistinguishablefromArticle4(A)(1)militiaandvolunteercorps,”andwouldinsteadfunctionaspartofthemilitary.171
disciplinaryauthoritywouldnot,intheopinionofthisauthor,transformthecivilianintoa‘memberofthearmedforces’forpurposesoftheLOAC.Thepenalauthorityofamilitarycommanderisonlyoneaspectofcomprehensivecommandandcontrolandunitdisciplineoverafightingforce.Rather,thecomplexrelationshipbetweensuperiorandsubordinate,andtherelationshipamongallmembersofamilitaryunit,producethecohesionanddisciplineinherentintheconceptof‘militaryunit.’”).168 GC3,supranote103,art.4(A)(2).169 Corn,supra note109,at261.170 Green,supranote147,at371.171 Schmitt,supranote99,at528(“IncraftingArticle4,thedraftersadheredtothedistinctioninArticle1ofthe1907HagueRegulationsbetween‘militiaandvolunteercorpsformingpartofthearmyandthosewhichareindependent’—hence,Article4(A)(1)andArticle4(A)(2).”).
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ProvidedthecontractorexercisesindependenceandsatisfiestheremainingArticle4(A)(2)criteria—havingacommander;bearingfixed,distinctivesigns;carryingarmsopenly;andconductingoperationsinaccordancewiththelawsofwar—theycouldpossiblyqualifyasaparamilitaryorganizationthatgrantsitsmemberscombatantstatus.172Butwhilesuchanalogiesmayringtrueforprivatesecuritycompaniesoperatinginconflictzones,itseemsincrediblyunlikelythatprospectiveDefenseDepartmentcontractorswouldindependentlyreformtheirorganizationstogivetheirITdepartmenttheveneerofBlackwater.
Instead,themostworkablesolutioninvolvesformalizationandincorpora-tionsimilartothatwhichordinarygovernmentcivilianemployeesparticipatinginthedesignoroperationofcyberweaponsshouldreceive.However,whilemostofthoseArticle4(A)(2)criteria,suchaswearingdistinctiveclothingandconductingoperationsinaccordancewithLOAC,seemsurmountable,havinga“commander”provesdifficult—forstatutoryfiscalreasons.
ItiswellestablishedthatonlyCongressitselfmayauthorizetheexpenditureofpublicfunds.173Contractorsprovideservicesorproductsinexchangeforappropri-atedfunds.AsnotedbytheFederalCircuit,“federalexpenditureswouldbewhollyuncontrollableifGovernmentemployeescould,oftheirownvolition,enterintocontractsobligatingtheUnitedStates.”174Inotherwords,whiletheUnitedStatespossessestheauthoritytocontractwithindividuals,thisauthorityislimited,highlyguarded,andheavilyregulated.175
TheFederalAcquisitionRegulation(FAR)176providesstringent,sometimesbyzantinerestrictionsongovernmentprocurement.177TheFARvestscontractingauthorityintheheadoftheagency—forexample,theSecretaryofDefense,whomayfurtherdelegatethisauthority.178Here,asappliedtocontractorpersonnelinvolvedwiththedesignandoperationofcyberweapons,onlyrarelywouldthecommandersofentitiestowhichcontractorsareassignedpossesstheauthoritytocontract(or,morebluntly,totellcontractorswhattodo).Thisinvitessometension:tellingacontractorto“fixthat”or“adjustthisweapon”couldleadtounauthorizedcommit-mentsoffederalfunds.Moreover,thiscodifiedbreakinauthoritybetweentheoneresponsibleforthecontractor’sconductunderthelawsofwarandthecontractorhimselfstronglysuggeststheinapplicabilityofthatArticle4(A)(2)criterion.
172 GC3,supranote103,art.4(A)(2).173 UnitedStatesv.MacCollom,426U.S.317(1976).174 CityofElCentrov.UnitedStates,922F.2d816,820(Fed.Cir.1990).175 UnitedStatesv.Tingey,30U.S.(5Pet.)115(1831).176 gen. servs. AdMIn. et Al., FederAl AcquIsItIon reg.[hereinafterFAR].177 TheDepartmentofDefensehasitsownsupplement,theDefenseFederalAcquisitionRegulationSupplement.u.s. dep’t oF deF., deFense FederAl AcquIsItIon reg. supp.[hereinafterDFARS].178 FAR,supranote177,§1.601(a);DFARS,supranote177,§202.101.
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CertainlyanyconflictbetweenviolationsoftheAntideficiencyAct,whichprohibitsthepracticesdescribedabove,andpreventingviolationsofthelawsofwarmustberesolvedinfavorofthelatter.179Butasitstands,theexistenceofcom-mandauthorityforcontractorpersonnelinvolvedwiththedesignandoperationofcyberweaponsdependsprincipallyuponwhethertheyfallundermilitaryjurisdiction,presumablyviatheUCMJ.Becausecontractorsarebeholdentocontractingofficersandnotcommanders,theirlinktothedisciplinarystructuresrequiredbyLOACtoqualifyaspossiblecombatantsisfarmoretenuousthancivilians’.
Inanidealworld,DoDwouldrelysolelyuponin-housememberstodesignoffensivecyberweapons.GiventhecurrentcompositionofAmericanforces,how-ever,thiswilllikelyproveunfeasible.Forqualifyingcontractorpersonnel,exposuretothejurisdictionoftheUCMJ,explicitlyrecognizedinthecontractvehicle,couldleadtoprotectionundertheGenevaConventionsasalawfulcombatant.Othersafeguardsshouldbeemployed,suchasdefininganexplicitcommandandcontrolrelationship.TheDepartmentcouldconsiderinvestingthecommanderhavingresponsibilityfortheoverallmissionwithawarranttoobligateappropriatedfunds.Regardingcriminalprosecutionorthelogisticsofindemnificationforpossiblelawsuits,thegovernment,asithasinthepast,mayoptinsteadtoshielddefensecontractorsfromfinancialliabilityarisingfromlawsuits.180
Insum,ifDoDplanstorelyupontheexpertiseofciviliansandcontrac-tors(andallsignspointtothispracticecontinuing),theirstatusmustbeclarified.SpecificregulatorychangesmustclarifytheflowofcommandresponsibilityandguaranteeindividualsassociatedwiththedeploymentofautonomouscyberweaponstheprotectionsofLOAC.
Formalizingthechainofcommandresponsibilityreducestheriskthatciviliansandcontractorpersonnelaffiliatedwithcyberweaponsprogramswouldbedeemed“unlawfulcombatants.”Whereahealthyportionofaweapon’sdiscretiondependsentirelyuponsourcecodewrittenbyprogrammerslongbeforeaconflictbegins,thisriskmustbeaddressed.ApplyingtheseprinciplesensuresAmericancompliancewithLOAC,animportanteffortinitsownright;italsoguaranteesthatthoseinterestedincontributingtothecountry’sdefensearenotdeterredordissuadedbytheriskoflitigation.Intheend,anysustainableplanforresolvingthisproblemmustensurethatU.S.civiliansinvolvedinthecreationofautonomouscyberweaponsqualifyaslawfulcombatants.181
179 TheAntideficiencyActreferstoseveralstatutesthatallowforadministrativeandcriminalsanctionsinresponsetotheunlawfulobligationandexpenditureofappropriatedfunds.31U.S.C.§§1341-42;1350-51;1511-19(2012).180 See,e.g.,Hercules,Inc.v.UnitedStates,516U.S.417,420-22(holdingthattheriskoflossforinjuriesperpetuatedbytheAgentOrangechemicalsfelluponthemanufacturersoftheproductratherthanthegovernment).181 Somehavecalledforthecreationofastandingbranchofthemilitarydedicatedtoprosecutingcyberwarfare.Thatmaybeinevitable,anditmayevenbeadvisable,butchangetakestime.See,
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III.THELEGALROLE:REVIEWINGCYBERWEAPONSFORCOMPLIANCEWITHTHELAWSOFWAR
TheUnitedStatesagreesthatsignificantmodificationstoweaponssys-temsrequirecompetentlegalreviewinordertoaddresstheconcernsdescribedabove.Inordertopassmuster,suchareviewmustgenerallyensuretheweapon’sdecision-makingalgorithmsconcerningtargeting,oritsbuilt-inrulesofengagement(ROE),182enable“evencomputerslackingbackgroundinformation. . . toavoidharmingnoncombatantsandfriendlypersonnel.”183DoingsomaintainstheLOAC’sfundamentalprinciplesofdistinctionandproportionality.Acoherentanalysisshouldalsoexplore,basedontheweapon’slevelofautonomy,potentialliabilityforitsdesignersandoperators.GeneralKeithAlexander,formerdirectoroftheNationalSecurityAgencyandformercommanderofUSCYBERCOM,haspubliclycalledforROEfocusedoncyberweapons.Currently,therearenone.184
Instead,theWhiteHousepossessesbroadauthoritytomarshalitscyber-weaponsagainstfoes,reservingtherightto“orderapre-emptivestrikeiftheUnitedStatesdetectscredibleevidenceofamajordigitalattackloomingfromabroad.”185Accordingtothecurrentframework,DoDoffensiveactionremainscontingentupondirectpresidentialapproval.186Whilethisarguablyraisesotherpolicyconcerns,thefactthatstreamlinedengagementprocessesexist,butwell-definedrestrictionsontheirusebymilitaryandintelligenceagenciesdonot,istroubling.
Theproposedsolutiontothisentiredilemma,exemplifiedbyDARPA’sPlanXsystem,whichmanagescyberwarfarebygivingitsoperators“playbooks”
e.g.,NatashaSolce,The Battlefield of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New Military Branch—The Cyber Force,18 AlB. l.J. scI. & tech. 293(2008).182 Inconventionalterms,rulesofengagement(ROE)dictate“whocanshootatwhat,withwhichweapons,when,andwhere.”Martins,supra note147,at174(quotingFredGreen,An Address to the American Society of International Law, on the Subject of Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity (1992)(usingthisinformaldefinitionofROE),reprintedin86AM. soc’y Int’l l. proc.39,62-67(1992)).Incyberspace,ROEgovernessentiallythesamethings,substituting“shoot”for“target,”albeitwithnon-kineticsystemsdesignedtodegrade,disrupt,ordestroyofanadversary’snetworksorcriticalinfrastructure.183MarcusSchulzke,Robots as Weapons in Just Wars,24 phIl. & tech. 293, 300(2011).184 EllenNakashima,Pentagon Proposes More Robust Role for Its Cyber-Specialists,wAsh. post(Aug.9,2012),http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagon-proposes-more-robust-role-for-its-cyber-specialists/2012/08/09/1e3478ca-db15-11e1-9745-d9ae6098d493_story.html.185 DavidE.SangerandThomShanker,Broad Powers Seen for Obama in Cyberstrikes,n.y. tIMes(Feb.3,2013),http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/us/broad-powers-seen-for-obama-in-cyberstrikes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&.186 SeanGallagher,President Given “Broad Authority” to Order Cyber Attacks,ArsTechnica(Feb.4,2013),http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/02/president-given-broad-authority-to-order-cyber-attacks/.
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fromwhichtoselectattacks,asksdesignerstobuildROEdirectlyintothesoftwareitself.Theagencyannouncementstates:
EnforcingRulesofEngagement(ROE).Plansshouldbeconstructedtoprogrammaticallylimitandenforceoperatoroptionsandactions,accordingtoacommander’sspecifiedROEs.ByintegratingROEsdirectlyintoaplan,theycanbeseamlesslyintegratedintoamis-sionscriptduringthescriptsynthesisprocess.Thisallowsformalanalysistechniquestomathematicallyprovethelimitationsofanoperator’sabilitytonegativelyaffectthemissionandoperatewithoutauthority.187
Thus,thecodepolicesitself.Itreliesuponelectronicgovernorsthatrestricttheweapon’semployment.However,softwaremalfunctions.BugscouldleadtothoseunintendedconsequencesDoDseekstoavert.Moreover,evenpreplannedusecasesmustbethoroughlystudiedtoguardagainstboth“collateralcomputerdamage”andreal,physicalcollateraldamagetononcombatants.Cyberweaponsleveragenewtechnologies;theyarenotmerelynewerwaystodeliverexplosivemunitions.Inmanyaspects,conventionalweaponsaremucheasiertoassess.Asonescholarnotes,whilemostofus“donotknowhowtoflyairplanes...weknowabouttheeffectsofaerialbombing.”188AshorttriptoWikipediareadilyexplainssimpleconceptslikeblastradius,andmaps(orGoogleEarth)instantaneouslydisplayschools,hospitals,andresidentialareas.
ThisArticleassertsthatreviewingacyberweaponnecessarilyimplicatesboth:(1)athoroughtechnicalreviewofaweapon’ssourcecode;and(2)consequencemanagementthroughstudyingthepotentialeffectsofemployment.Thesetwinaimsarecomplementary,andlegalanalysispervadesboththreads.Still,someattorneysandpolicywonks,suchasStewartBaker,acknowledgetheriskbutpessimisticallyforecastthesuccessoftheseanalyses:
Inthatclimate[discussingtheapplicationofairpowerduringtheSecondWorldWar],all it tookwasasingleerrortobreakthelegallimitsirreparably.Anderrorwasinevitable.Bombsdroppedbydesperatepilotsunderfiregoastray.Butsodocyberweapons.StuxnetinfectedthousandsofnetworksasitsearchedblindlyforNatanz.Theinfectionslastedfarlongerthanintended.Shouldweexpectfewererrorsfromcodedraftedintheheatofbattleandflungathazardtowardtheenemy?Ofcoursenot.Butthelessonforthe
187 DARPAAgencyAnnouncement,supranote15,at16.188 PhilipSpoerri,Round Table on New Weapon Technologies—Conclusions,Int’l coMM. oF the red cross(Sept.13,2011),http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/new-weapon-technologies-statement-2011-09-13.htm.
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lawyersandthediplomatsisstark:Theirefforttoimposelimitsoncyberwarisalmostcertainlydoomed.189
Despitethesedifficulties,DoDpolicyneverthelesschargesitslawyerswithensuringallitsweaponscomplywithLOAC.190Thispolicyrequiresweaponsacquisitionandprocurementtobe“consistentwithallapplicabledomesticlawandtreatiesandinternationalagreements...,customaryinternationallaw,andthelawofarmedconflict.”191Andqualifiedattorneysmustconducttheselegalreviews.192Further,inthespecificcaseofcyberweapons,theAirForcehassincepromulgatedadirectiveextendingandimplementingDoDpolicy.Theotherserviceshavenotyetdoneso,butthegeneral,high-levelnatureoftheAirForcepolicy,compoundedbyitsbrevity(itconsistsonlyofsevenpages)andlackofservice-specificelements,laysthefoundationforotherdirectivesfromtherestofthearmedforces.
TherelevantAirForceInstructionmandatesthefollowingprocessforrequestingalegalreviewforanewcyberweapon:
2.1.Uponcognizantlegalauthority’srequest,AirForcepersonnelwillprovidethefollowinginformation,sothatajudgeadvocate,orGeneralCounselintheinstanceofaspecialaccessprogram,maycompletethereviewsrequiredbythisInstruction:
2.1.1.Ageneral descriptionoftheweaponorcybercapabilitysubmittedforlegalreview.2.1.2.Statementsofintended use(suchastypesoftargets)orcon-ceptofoperations.2.1.3.Thereasonably anticipated effectsofemployment,toincludealltests,computermodeling,laboratorystudies,andothertechnicalanalysisandresultsthatcontributetotheassessmentofreasonablyanticipatedeffects.193
Inshort,thereviewingattorneyonlyseesthereasonablyanticipatedeffectsofaweapon’sintendeduse:abroad,generalsketchwithoutreferencetothecodeitself.Admittedly,doingotherwisewouldbepracticallyimpossible.TheDoD
189 Baker&Dunlap,supranote31.190 Gallagher,supranote186(“Sofar,theonlysoftware-basedattackthathasbeenattributedtotheUnitedStates(thoughneverofficiallyacknowledgedbytheU.S.government)hasbeentheStuxnetvirus,whichwasreportedlycodevelopedwithIsraeliintelligencetodisableproductionequipmentinanIraniannuclearfacility.Othersophisticatedmalwareattacks,suchasFlame,Duqu,andGausshavenotbeendefinitivelytiedtotheUnitedStates,butanalystsatKasperskyLabsandotherantivirusandnetworksecurityfirmshavedescribedthemas‘state-sponsored.’”).191 u.s. dep’t. oF deF., dIr. 5000.01, the deFense AcquIsItIon systeMpara.E1.1.15(Nov.20,2007),available athttp://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500001p.pdf.192 Id.193AFI51-402,supranote24,para2.1(emphasisadded).
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predictsthatprograms’linesofcodewillincreaseinnumber,effectivelyblockinganyeffortstotestprogramsexhaustively;andthattestingwillthusrequire“ana-lyticaltoolsthatworkwithrealisticassumptions,includingapproachestobounduncertaintycausedbylearning/adaptation.”194TheAirForceInstructionrecognizestheselimitations.Itappropriatelyauthorizesitsattorneystorequestrelevanttechnicalanalysesanddocumentsthatshedlightuponthecyberweapon’spossibleeffects.
ButtheInstructionseeminglyfailstoenvisiondiscussionsbetweencounselfortheAirForceandthedesignersofthecyberweapon.Nordoesitconsiderthatthereviewinglawyerwillonlyoccasionallyenjoyathoroughbackgroundintheimpli-catedsubject.Forexample,asofFebruary2013,ofthetwelveAmericanattorneyscurrentlyassignedtotheAirForceOperationsandInternationalLawDirectorate,theentitychargedwithtakingtheleadonreviewingcyberweapons,twopossessedengineeringdegrees;onehadpreviousexperiencewithUSCYBERCOM;andothersweretrainedextensivelyininternationalandcomparativelaw—thisisagoodthing.
Butitcouldbebetter.ThisArticlesubmitsthat,withtheadventofsuchnoveltechnology,attorneysbothdeserveandrequiretrainingtograspitscomplexities.ThegoverningAirForceInstructionitselfdemandsthatlawyersassess:
3.1.1.Whetherthereisaspecificruleoflaw,whetherbytreatyobliga-tionoftheUnitedStatesoracceptedbytheUnitedStatesascustomaryinternationallaw,prohibitingorrestrictingtheuseoftheweaponorcybercapabilityinquestion.3.1.2.Ifthereisnoexpressprohibition,thefollowingquestionsarecon-sidered:
3.1.2.1.Whethertheweaponorcybercapabilityiscalculatedtocausesuperfluousinjury,inviolationofArticle23(e)oftheAnnextoHagueConventionIV;and3.1.2.2.Whethertheweaponorcybercapabilityiscapableofbeingdirectedagainstaspecificmilitaryobjectiveand,ifnot,isofanaturetocauseaneffectonmilitaryobjectivesandciviliansorcivilianobjectswithoutdistinction.195
Thelegalreviewprocesscorrectlyrequiresattorneystoassessaweapon’scompliancewiththeprincipleofdistinction.Butinthecaseofcyberweapons,thesine qua non ofcompliance(andnoncompliance) isthe programmingitself.TherestoftheDefenseDepartmentseeminglyrecognizesthistruism.TheDoDrequiresitsprocurementofficerstostructurecyberweaponsacquisitions“toacquirefullgovernmentownershipof...software,includingsourcecodeandalldocumentationrequiredtoenableathirdpartyupgradetothefunctionalcapability.”196
194 DoDAutonomyReport,supranote90,at91.195AFI51-402,supranote24,para.3.1.1-3.1.2.196 DoDAutonomyReport,supranote90,at60-61.TheReportgoesontonotethat“[m]ostof
Beyond Skynet 275
Sofar,theInstruction,signedandapprovedbytheJudgeAdvocateGeneraloftheAirForce(who,asnotedabove,expressedconcernsin2010regardingtheparticipationofciviliansincyber-attacks)seemsreasonable.197Butthepolicycon-cludesbystatingthatanypossibleissueswithaweapon’semployment,operation,ortargetingfalloutsidethelegalreviewprocessaltogether.Thatanalysisisleftinsteadtotheoperationslawattorneyadvisingthecommanderhavingresponsibilityforagivencyber-attack.198Theoriginallegalreviewcouldconceivablyaddressamyriadofconcerns,rangingfromliabilityissuesstemmingfromtheparticipationofciviliandesignerstoidentifyingquestionableusecasesthatcouldimpactcol-lateraldamageassessments.Butthisscarcelybenefitstheattorneystandingbesidetheoperator’sterminal.
ProfessorDunlap,himselftheformerAirForceDeputyJudgeAdvocateGeneral,arguesfora“legalrequirementtoassesstheimpactonciviliansandcivilianobjectsbeforelaunchingacyberattack.”199ThisArticleagrees.Butwithoutknowing(tosomedegree)theinternalworkingsofthecyberweapon,theattorneyprovidingcounseltotheoperatorsuffersrealdisadvantages.SodoestheeffortofbothtopreventLOACviolations.
ThisArticleproposestwoinitiativestomitigatetheserisks.First,DoDmustcodifyabridgebetweendesignersandoperators,includingbetweenthereviewingattorneyandtheattorneyprovidingon-demandcounselabouttargeting.Whatevertools,tests,andcorrespondencethereviewingattorneyviewedmustbepassedalongtotheadvisingattorney.Thisincludes,astheAirForceInstructionrequires,thereasonablyanticipatedeffectsoftheweapon’semployment.Second,bothattorneysmustbetrainedonthecyberweapon’suseandoperationalcapacity.Unliketheverybasicsofdroppingmunitions,somethingquicklygraspedbylaypersons,themilitaryshouldtakeaprogressiveapproachandrecognizethatallpersonnelinvolvedinthedeploymentofcyberweaponsneedspecializedtraining.Currently,logisticalaspects,suchasformalizedtraining,remainunsettled.GeneralSheltonrecentlyannouncednewpersonnelhiresat24thAirForce,whichsupportsUSCYBERCOM:about80percentwillbemilitary,buttheserviceshave“yettodecidehowthenewworkerswillberecruitedandwhatqualificationswillbeneeded.”200
theunmannedsystemscurrentlyintheDoDinventoryconsistofcontractor-proprietary,on-boardautonomyandcontrolsoftware,withoftenclosed,proprietaryoperatorcontrolsystems(OCS).Undersuchcircumstances,thegovernmentisconstrainedtoreturningtothedevelopmentcontractorforallenhancements,oftenslowingthepaceofinnovationandevolutionofoperationalcapability.”Id.at11.Inotherwords,muchlikebeingbeholdentoMicrosoftforupgradesoftheWindowsoperatingsystem,DoDisequallyreliantuponcontractorsforOCS.197 See supraII(A).198AFI51-402,supranote24,para.3.3.199 Baker&Dunlap,supranote31.200 BrianEverstine,AF to Add More than 1,000 Cyber Workers,ArMy tIMes(Feb.4,2013),http://www.armytimes.com/article/20130131/NEWS/301310332/AF-add-more-than-1-000-cyber-workers.
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Expandedpersonnelnumbersrequireaconcomitantimprovementoftheweaponsevaluationprocess.Doingotherwiseinvitesrisk,butcontinuingwiththestatusquoaddslittlevaluetocommandersconcernedwithmissionachievement.Decision-makersthroughouttheDoDshouldpushhardfortheseadvancements,includingtheattorneyspepperedthroughouttheDepartment,whopossessavestedandlegitimateinterestinperfectingtheircraft.Inordertodoso,educationandtrain-ingareneeded,perhapsintheformofspecialized“tracks”thataffirmthegrowingimportanceofcyberwarfare.Seniorleadersandflagofficersrecognizetheneed.Infact,theChiefInformationOfficeroftheAirForcecalledforanevaluationoftheservice’sabilitytosupportUSCYBERCOM.201TheDepartment’sGeneralCounselanditsJudgeAdvocatesGeneralshoulddothesame.
IV.CONCLUSION
Accordingtosecurityexperts,theStuxnetvirus,unofficiallyattributedtotheUnitedStatesandIsrael,“attackedanddestroyedonlyspecificgascentrifugesusedtohighlyenrichuranium,operatingataspecificspeed...uniquetothemachinesoperatingattheNatanzfacility”inIran.202Findingsfromsecurityexpertsconfirmedthis;theweapon,withitsbuilt-inROEtoupholdtheLOACprincipleofdistinction,initiallyprovedharmlesselsewhere—untilaprogrammingbugallegedlyallowedthewormtoinfectothercomputersviatheInternet.203Evenmorerecently,inMay2013,inastorywhoseelementsarebecomingincreasinglymorecommon,attackerstargetedthecomputersofAmericangovernmentemployeesinvolvedinnuclearweaponsresearchtoinstallmalware.204
Programmingerrorshappen,andsoftwarecanbedefectivebydesign,ariskcompoundedbyincreasingdegreesofautonomy,whichnecessarilyinvokesmorelinesofcode,morecontingencies,andmoredecisionstakenatthemachinelevel.Or,softwarecouldworkexactlyasintendedandplaceournation’scriticalinfrastructureatrisk.Ineithercase,whilethelawsofwararecapableofrespectinghumanitarianvaluesduringtheuseofautonomousweaponssystem,respectingtheseprinciplesrequireseffort.205
201 Id.202 JohnRichardson,Stuxnet as Cyberwarfare: Applying the Law of War to the Virtual Battlefield,29J. MArshAll J. coMputer & InFo. l.1,21(2011).203 Jeffries,supranote14.Fortunately,identifyingtheprogrammingerrorcouldproveentirelypossible.In2012,weapon’ssourcecodewasleakedontotheInternet,allowingittobestudiedandrepurposedforalternativeuses.ThomasRicker,Stuxnet Source Code Could Open a Pandora’s Box of Cyberwarfare,the verge(Mar.5,2012),http://www.theverge.com/2012/3/5/2845848/stuxnet-source-code-opens-a-pandoras-box-of-cyberwarfare.204 DanGoodin,Internet Explorer Zero-Day Exploit Targets Nuclear Weapons Researchers,ArsTechnica(May3,2013),http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/05/internet-explorer-zero-day-exploit-targets-nuclear-weapons-researchers/.205 Schmitt,supranote67,at23.
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Thiseffortcallsforadditionaltraining;arecognitionthatcyberwarfareundoubtedlywilloccupyalargerportionoftheDepartmentofDefense’sstrategyinthefuture;andanunderstandingthatpersonnelchargedwithsupportingthecyber-mission,bothuniformedmilitarymembersandcivilianemployees,shouldoperatewithinaframeworkdesignedtoavertviolations.ThisArticlehasshownthattheUnitedStateshasessentiallyengagedina“cart-before-horse”approachtocyberwarfare,planningnewmethodsofattackwithoutestablishingfundamental,bedrockprocedurestoensurecompliancewiththelawsofwar.PresidentObamarecentlyidentifiedcyber-securityasoneofhisconcerns, issuinganExecutiveOrdercallingforbolsteringthenation’sdefenses.206Undeniably,identifyingandneutralizingthreatsispartofarobustdefensiveposture,meaningthatDoDshouldtaketheleadindevisingROEandweaponsreviewprocessestoworkinharmonywithothercyberspaceinitiatives.
Failingtoactcouldimpactattainingmilitarycommanders’practicalandstrategicgoals.Confusionoverthepermissiblescopeofnoveltechnologies’employ-ment—alongwithpracticallyunavoidableconfusionoverhowthetechnologyworks—hampersmilitaryefforts.IntheUnitedStates,commanders“tendtobequitewaryofinnovativebutrelativelyuntestedmeansofwarfare,particularlywhentherulesofconductaresoarcaneandill-defined.”207Theydeservebetter.Moreimportantly,sodotheciviliansfacingacyberweapon’spossible“unintendedconsequences.”
206 Exec.OrderNo.13636,78Fed.Reg.11739(Feb.19,2013).207 Brown,supranote32,at183.
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