The Accountability Cycle in Public Agencies: Lessons from Italian Experiences

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The Accountability Cyclein Public Agencies:Lessons from Italian Experiences

Alessandro Giosi, Silvia Testarmata, Sandro Brunelli

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McGraw-Hill

ISBN 978-88-386-6205-8

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DSI Essays Series

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University of Rome “Tor Vergata”Università degli Studi di Roma “Tor Vergata”

Department of Business Studies Dipartimento Studi sull’Impresa (DSI)

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The Accountability Cycle in Public Agencies: Lessons from Italian Experiences

Alessandro Giosi1, Silvia Testarmata2, Sandro Brunelli3

Abstract

The diffusion of Public Agencies seems to characterise the approach to public

management in European countries. Under New Public Management, the role

of politics is to provide strategic planning and economic policy target defini-

tion, whereas the administration is responsible for the management of public

services. Moreover, the separation between politics and administration is

strengthened by downsizing and decentralizing the public central administra-

tion.

The current paper argues that this split necessitates careful attention to the

adoption of models of accountability that respond to both citizen and political

information needs. Thus, with respect to public agencies, this paper models ac-

countability levels, defines an accountability cycle showing the relations be-

tween politics, administration, and citizens, and applies this model to the Ital-

ian case.

JEL Classifications: H11, H50, H70, H83, L31

Keywords:

Accountability; Public Agency; Planning and Management System; Perform-

ance Evaluation.

________________ 1 Assistant Professor of Accounting, University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Faculty of Econom-ics, Department of Business Studies. 2 Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Accounting, University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Faculty of Economics, Department of Business Studies. 3 PhD Student in Public Management and Governance, University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Faculty of Economics, Department of Business Studies.

Contents

1. Introduction 3

2. efinition of public agency 4

3. Accountability levels in the public sector 6

4. Research design: An interpretative model 14

5. Research method 19

6. Empirical results 21

7. Accountability mechanisms in public agencies 28

8. Conclusions 31

References 33

Editorial notes

Paper presented to IRPSM and Third Sector Study Group of EGPA “Interna-

tional Workshop on Social Audit, Social Accounting and Accountability”, Charles Uni-

versity of Prague, Czech Republic, 15-16 May 2008.

D

Introduction

The beginning of New Public Management (NPM), through the Reinventing

Government approach, is based on the implementation of organizational prin-

ciples and tools, which leads to the increase in citizens’ satisfaction and re-

quirements in the public sector. One of the main action levers of NPM is the

separation between politics and administration. In fact, the role of politics is

providing strategic planning and defining economic policy targets whereas the

administration is responsible for public services management. Moreover, the

separation of politics and administration has been strengthened by the public

central administration downsizing process and administrative decentralization.

This leads to public bodies characterized by strong autonomy, the so-called

«executive agencies» (Gains, 1999; Talbot, 2004). Therefore, the need to adopt

suitable models of accountability leading to coherence between administrative

action and predeterminated political targets and answers to the accountability

requirements coming from the citizens emerges.

In this context, the beneficial effects of the agencification phenomenon are

clear even if the evaluation of the effects on public service provision with re-

spect to the relationship between the public administration system (involving

both politics and administration level) and citizens is still lacking. Indeed, there

is still a dominance of national-oriented and static research focused on the

agencification phenomenon, but recently clear-cut international research pro-

jects such as OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) and

COBRA (Comparative public Organization data Base for Research & Analysis network)

researches have become more common.

Hence, this paper is based on OECD research published in 2002, “Distrib-

uted Public Governance”, which highlighted a series of issues arising from the use

of public agencies as a tool of NPM regarding the governance structure, budg-

et process, and, consequently, political coherence and accountability mecha-

nisms.

The delegation of operational functions to the public agency highlights the

political coherence of public agency behaviour, or the ability of the public

agency to achieve its political targets through the implementation of executive

programs. This fact shows the necessity of the budget process and ex post

4 A. GIOSI, S. TESTARMATA, S. BRUNELLI

evaluation (or accountability) of public agency activities. In particular, the

OECD study emphasizes that public agencies may have autonomist influences

which are offset by planning and control mechanisms, both ex ante, such as

the budget process, and ex-post, such as reporting mechanisms and audits.

However, although the OECD study highlights a variety of operating con-

texts of public agency models in its theoretical framework, it does not propose

modelling but is limited to a descriptive approach. Secondly, there is an ab-

sence of the Italian case in this international comparison. Therefore, this paper

proposes a modelling of accountability mechanisms in order to highlight which

factors make the public agency “accountable”, referring to internal control, po-

litical leadership, and citizens’ satisfaction. In addition, the paper is based on

Italian data in order to fill the gap in the literature on public agencies.

In the following sections a definition of the inquiry domain is discussed, as

are the theoretical framework and the principal results of academic research

concerning accountability mechanisms in the public sector. An interpretative

model of the public agency accountability cycle will be proposed and applied to

the Italian public agencies. Moreover, the selected cases, research protocol, and

research results referring to each case study will be discussed. In the final sec-

tion, the cases are compared in order to derive theoretical implications con-

cerning the public agency accountability cycle.

1. Definition of public agency

The creation of executive agencies specializing in specific operational tasks ne-

cessary for policy target achievement allows for outsourcing functions from

the hierarchy in order to recover efficiency in the production of public services

(Pollitt, 2005). Therefore, public policy and operational functions are subjected

to a sharp differentiation. Given the delegation of the provision of public ser-

vices, it is necessary to define a priori coordination and control mechanisms

that can be formalized in contracts (contracting-in) (Harlow, 1999). Governance

and accountability are two closely interrelated stages developing within the or-

ganization as well as between the organization and its task environment.

However, it should be noted that the public agency must be investigated in

relation to the national context. Different institutional contexts for which the

The Accountability Cycle in Public Agencies 5

same public administration has a different extent of competencies (welfare sys-

tems may be more or less developed) and various administrative systems may

have different characterizations of the variables involved in the governance

system and accountability rules. The diversity of institutional contexts is only

one possible influence in regards to modelling the governance and accountabil-

ity mechanisms of public agencies.

The same definition of public agency and its boundaries have recently be-

come a subject of research. In the international arena, the public agency model

emerges, as mentioned previously, as part of the functional and administrative

decentralization that has characterized public central administration regarding

the separation of policy functions from operational functions. The achievement of

executive agencies is made to coincide with the British Next Steps program de-

veloped in 1987. As a result, three parameters (tripod model) have been identified

at the international level in order to outline the public agencies phenomenon

(Pollitt et al., 2004).

These issues of agencification, specialization, and coordination are becom-

ing quite popular in theoretical and empirical research based on a variety of an-

gles (see, for example, the traditionally distinct research fields of agencification,

regulation, and coordination). There is still a dominance of national-oriented,

static research, but recently clear-cut international research projects, as well as

longitudinal research designs, have become more numerous (OECD, 2002;

COBRA, 2003; Pollitt et al., 2004; Christensen and Yesilkagut, 2005; Ongaro et

al., 2006).

However, if these are the characteristics that define the executive agencies,

then there are public organizations in every country performing tasks which do

not fully possess the characteristics outlined (OECD, 2002). Therefore, for this

research the broadest possible definition of public agency should be adopted in

order to include each organization whose aim is to manage the function of

public service production closely to the parent ministry, but not necessarily re-

gulated by contract. This concept of public agency is coherent with the OECD

approach.

In its research, OECD has examined the experiences of Canada, France,

Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the

USA starting from the legal framework analysis in order to outline a first classifi-


cation of public policy executive bodies. From the legal framework a different in-

tensity of ties with the political body can be derived in terms of governance and

accountability. The OECD model of analysis is based on three classes of analysis:

Departmental Agencies, Public Law, and Private Law Bodies. Typically, De-

partmental Agencies are divisions of the Ministry characterized by wide auton-

omy but no legal separation. Although the legal separation is more formal than

a substantial feature of “being public agency”, in this paper we assume it is a nec-

essary condition to delimitate the investigation field.

Applying this model of analysis to the Italian context allows for the detec-

tion of the following types of public agencies within Public Law bodies: Func-

tional Public Bodies and Executives Agencies. With the Private Law Bodies, it

is also possible to identify executive agencies according to the Next Steps ex-

perience, operating as a private enterprise in a competitive environment.

This problem involves the definition, analysis, and schematization of govern-

ance and accountability models, and studying these allows us to conduct interna-

tional comparisons between our country and those analyzed by OECD. Hence,

this paper analyses the governance mechanisms and related accountability re-

quirement in regards to the public agencies phenomenon in order to identify

which factors are crucial in making the public agency “accountable” concern-

ing internal control, political leadership, and citizen satisfaction.

2. Accountability levels in the public sector

In the literature4, three different aspects have been emphasised when discuss-

ing “accountability”: transparency, responsibility, and attitude to be account-

________________ 4 The theoretical framework is defined through the systematic research of the literature on the accountability concept and cycle connected with the public agencies phenomenon. The analy-sis was conducted by selecting the first five journals with the major impact factors according to the classification of the Italian Academy of Management that involves the disciplines of public administration, management, and public management since 1990 (American Review of Public Administration Review, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Man-agement and Money, Accounting Auditing and Accountability Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly). In addition, to answer the need for a multidisciplinary approach, the Ebsco and Econlit databases were also consulted. We selected 144 articles linked to our topic, according


able. In the public sector arena, the concept of accountability has endured an

evolution due to several changes in the management system of public bodies

since the end of the 1980s.

Although the concept of accountability is constantly changing, in the litera-

ture there is wide agreement on the fact that the accountability idea is changed

from a preoccupation about the procedures and rules in respect to a marked

emphasis on the processes and, in turn, on the results obtained by the public

administration. At the stakeholders’ level, on the contrary, the focus is changed

from a generic responsibility to the parliament (political accountability) to the pur-

suit of fairness oriented towards the market and customers (external accountabil-

ity), where the term customer means every individual who is a member of the

community (Guthrie, 1993; Cochrane, 1993; Ogden, 1995; Sinclair, 1995; Jones

and Pendlebury, 1996; Rubin, 1996; Broadbent, 1999; Parker and Gould,

1999).

Starting with an analysis about the conceptual definition of accountability, it

is necessary to take into account the varied amount and complexity of the vari-

ous classifications inborn in these conceptual definitions. In particular, some

authors focus much more on some aspects of the accountability concept than

others. From the literature assessment it emerges that a shared definition of

accountability does not exist; however, it is possible to identify common fea-

tures concerning some definitions.

Mulgan (2000) identified some key features of the accountability concept

concerning the public sector. He affirms that:

1. every author agrees on recognizing a greater complexity of the ac-

countability concept in the public sector than in the private one; and

2. all researchers think that dealing with accountability involves the con-

current presence of a principal (accountee) and an agent (accountor), in

which the principal has some expectations of the agent, who must ex-

plain and account for his answers to the principal.

_________________ to a search based on the following key words: accountability, public agencies, autonomy, planning and control, and performance management.


Generally speaking, there are many definitions and functions assigned to the

accountability concept. The differences resulting from the multiple aspects of

observation in accordance to the main meaning assigned to the accountability

concept can be detected. In particular, the accountability concept can be stud-

ied and operationalized in accordance with the following aspects and points of

observation found in the literature:

1. from the external or internal point of view (Caperchione and Pezzani,

2000);

2. according to various combinations of rationality (Gray and Jenkins,

1993);

3. with reference to the tasks or the results (Stewart, 1984), or, as other

authors assert (Taylor and Rosair, 2000), in respect to rules/procedures

or efficiency/effectiveness;

4. based on the autonomy degree of the agent and the principal expecta-

tions and powers - hierarchical, legal, professional, and political (Johns-

ton and Romzek, 1999);

5. in relation to different points of view in regards to responsibility, in-

volved subjects, and fixed standards (Barberis, 1998);

6. from the individual point of view (the single entity in the public admin-

istrative bodies) to a social point of view (Roberts, 1996);

7. based on prefixed standards and outcomes (Kearns, 2003); and

8. from top to bottom (downward accountability) or from bottom to top (up-

ward accountability) (Stone, 1995).

From the analysis carried out it emerges that the literature is rich with numer-

ous classifications regarding the meaning of the term “accountability”. Con-

cerning this, Table 1 shows a critical summary of the prevailing orientations

emerging from the thoughts of the major authors dealing with the accountabil-

ity concept.


Table 1: The Concept of Accountability in the Prevailing Literature

Author Vision of accountability

Stewart (1984)

The author establishes a scale of accountability (from accountability according to standard to accountability according to judgment):

− formal correctness and legality - at this level providing an account means providing exclusively a balance sheet;

− process - the activity of accountability is satisfied through strong control over procedures;

− performance - adding further information to the output is essential to control performance beyond the balance sheet;

− programs - adding to the previous information, information relative to the objectives to reach so as to make ex post verifications on the degree of attainment of the programmed objects;

− politics - producing a great amount of information in relation to all aspects of the previous levels of accountability (accountant, programs, objectives and outcomes) is essental to provide a political account.

Guthrie (1993)

The author is one of the greater supporters of the accountability concept shifting from an activity used to provide accountability at a high institutional level towards being a particular form of responsivness towards the market and citizens. In this sense, Guthrie establishes an evolution from ‘parliament accountability’ to ‘market-based accountability’.

Gray and Jenkins (1993)

The authors provide three codes of accountability coming from different combinations of rationality (such as legal, economic, technical, social and political ratioanlity):

− bookkeeping, where only two elements (economic and legal rationality) emphasize formal correctness and efficiency;

− managerial, besides economic and legal rationality there is the relevance of agent responsivness in order to assure regularity, coherence, and efficiency of public action; and

− professional, in which social rationality joins with previous rationalities to provide an accountability focused on accessibility, appropriatness, quality of goods and services, and customer satisfaction.

Sinclair (1995)

The author distinguishes six types of accountability:

− public, the responsibility of public administration to answer to stakeholders about administrative actions;

− political, the tie existing between civil servants and the general manager in accounting to the political level, which is in charge of requests from citizens;

− managerial, the constant monitoring of input, output, and outcomes;

− administrative, continuous control of the transformation process of input;

− professional, where the strong sense of belonging to public administration allows administrators to increase the satisfaction level of citizens; and

− personal, where you can see the moral values of the person working in the public sector.


Stone (1995)

The author distinguishes two types of accountability:

− upward accountability to ministers, parliament, and public organizations; and

− downward accountability to users, peers, interest groups, and citizens.

Roberts (1996)

Two approaches to the topic:

− self-centred, according to which hierarchical structures define single objects and verify their degree of attainment; and

− socializing, emphasising the interdependence between objectives and subjects that should reach them. The control is based on the sharing of professional laws, values, and trust.

Rubin (1996)

Different levels of who is accountable:

− answering to authority in a bureaucratic system (to demonstrate the respect of law);

− answering to citizens (as their money is used);

− indicating how financial resources and outcomes have been managed; and

− assuring citizens direct control over the processes starting from defining priorities to budget and resource allocation.

Barberis (1998)

The author sees accountability as a multicentric concept that changes in relation to the subjects involved, degree of autonomy, and fixed standards.

Johnston and Romzek (1999)

Based on both the degree of autonomy of the accountor (low, high) and the expectations and control ability of the accountee, the authors talk about four types of accountabilty:

− hierarchical, based on obedience towards the authority through rules, standards, and procedures;

− legal, based on norms and many external controls;

− professional, based on previous factors and the practices developed inside the administration; and

− political, which represents the ability to answer to stakeholders in the absence of a contractual obligation to do so.

Caperchione and Pezzani (2000)

Two profiles of accountability:

− external, where the managers of public administrations assume responsibility for their own actions and achievement of results in order to show themselves as accountable. The manager must then communicate the results to stakeholders, showing transparency on the performances; and

− internal, where the public administrators demonstrate the attitude in taking decision and consequently a greater degree of autonomy in acquiring knowledge of objectives toreach. They should provide account to make choices to catch up the objects as well.

Taylor and Rosair (2000)

The authors distinguish between two forms of accountability:

− fiduciary, for respecting norms and procedures; and

− managerial, concerning the two dimensions of efficiency and effectiveness.


An important aspect of accountability, especially with reference to public bod-

ies, is the link of account typology interconnecting who should be accountable

and who receives and assesses the accountability information. In some cases,

accountability derives from specific obligations (and therefore we could ob-

serve a classical relationship between principal and agent) whereas in other

cases accountability is optional. Therefore, the characteristics of the accounting

link strongly condition both the manners of the party providing accountability

information and the operational tools utilized to do so. Generally speaking, it

could be asserted that, relative to the public context, the existence of an ac-

countability process is determined by the following features:

1. a relation between two parts;

2. information transmission; and

3. an evaluation of the accountability process.

Therefore, the accountability process requires information availability but also

that this information is comprehensible, reliable, accessible, and widespread

(Herzlinger, 1996; Coy et al., 2001).

From the analysis of several academic contributions to accountability issue

it emerges that the existence of a “cycle” of accountability (Steccolini, 2003).

This cycle of accountability starts from an ex-ante definition of the object pro-

viding accountability information (programming moment) to the agent activity

of information production and communication (account moment) which, in

turn, is the basis of the principal evaluation assessment (judgment moment)

Mulgan (2000)

The author argues that the necessary conditions for a process of accountability of the public sector are:

− a relation between two parts;

− an activity of information transmission for providing account; and

− an evaluation of the account provided to express a judgment.

Kearns (2003)

The author asserts that the term accountability refers to providing an account of one’s activities, typically with respect to performance standards and outcomes, and defines two accountability models:

– based on the pre-fixed performance standards (explicit or implicit); and

– based on organizational behavior in the accountability process (reactive or strategic).


and newly feeds the planning process by redefining some parts of the content.

Other authors have emphasised that the accountability cycle is sometimes in-

terrupted and the ties among the process phases are not always clear and con-

sistent. It has been underlined (Hogheim, 1989) that, in the public administra-

tion field, the phases of the accountability cycle are insufficiently integrated

and the ties are exclusively identified between homogenous phases (e.g., evalua-

tion phase of a specific period and evaluation phase of the previous period).

Concerning public agencies, the accountability concept assumes a greater

complexity. In fact, we can observe that a principal-agent relationship is com-

posed of three levels: political, administrative, and related to the citizens. The

principal-agent (accountee-accountor) ties are as follows:

1. the administrative level is accountable to the political level but, at the

same time, is accountable to the citizens. In addition, the administrative

level simultaneously plays the role of accountor and accountee;

2. the political level is accountable to the citizens and is an accountee of

the administrative level; and

3. the citizens are the accountee of both the political level and the admin-

istrative level.

From the highlighted agency relationships, four levels of accountability emerge

(as shown in Figure 1):

1. Political level, in which the relationship between politics and admini-

stration is developed. In particular, the administration is accountable to

the political level for the operational activity put in action in order to

answer to the received directives;

2. Social level, in which the political level is accountable to citizens for

the effects of its action on the economic and social context, giving evi-

dence of the citizens’ satisfaction level in relation to the needs ex-

pressed by the community;

3. Internal level, in which the administration plays both principal and

agent roles. In fact, there are incessant monitoring processes and con-


trols at the administrative level regarding the activities carried out in

order to redefine the priorities and waves to execute directives coming

from higher levels; and

4. External level, in which the administration is in direct contact with the

citizens during the process of service provision. At this level, citizens

evaluate services based on evidence provided by the administrative

level. As a result of this assessment, the political level obtains relevant

feedback in order to redefine the strategies adopted to answer the re-

quirements of the citizens.

Figure 1: Public Agency Accountability Levels

In the literature, the political level of accountability means (for nearly all au-

thors) the principal-agent relationship between politics and citizens consisting

of a post evaluation by citizens regarding the satisfaction degree with the po-

litical level deriving from the goods or public services provided by the public


sector. In despite of the prevailing literature, Sinclair (1995) sees the political

level of accountability as the tie existing between employees and the general

manager who, in turn, accounts for the political level, which is in charge of the

citizens’ satisfaction. In relation to our research aim, the political level of ac-

countability is meant as the accountability process between the administrative

level and the political one, or in other words, how the administrative level ac-

counts for the politics in the case of delegation of the responsibility of public

service delivery. Therefore, three crucial aspects seem to emerge regarding the

accountability cycle in the public agencies, that are not investigated in depth:

1. the political level of accountability is almost exclusively conceived in re-

lationship to politics and citizens without sufficiently taking into ac-

count the importance of the continuous processes of negotiation (that

exists or should exist) between politics and administration;

2. there is no close examination of the accountability cycle of public agen-

cies in the presence of administrative decentralization and downsizing

phenomena (such as in the Italian case); and

3. several conceptions of accountability do not take into account the mu-

tual influence between the accountability cycle and the planning and

control processes.

Starting from this theoretical framework, we analyse the accountability cycle in

Italian public agencies. We aim to describe their models of accountability, in-

quire the relationships among the four levels of accountability, and identify the

factors that make a public agency accountable, starting from a definition of an

interpretative model of the accountability cycle in the case of the public

agency.

3. Research design: An interpretative model

The accountability cycle developing between the public sector and the com-

munity is a complex process involving different participants. It requires re-

source allocation allowing the public administration system to satisfy the ac-


countability requirements coming from different stakeholders (political leader-

ship, public administration, citizens).

The implementation of adequate planning and control systems is particu-

larly important for achieving the public and political targets, especially with ref-

erence to the public agencies. In this case, in fact, the planning and control sys-

tems seem to have greater relevance because the public agencies are opera-

tional tools in which the separation between politics and administration ap-

pears more visible and the coherence among administrative action, political

targets, and community needs assumes greater importance. Therefore, it seems

relevant to define the stages of the accountability cycle in order to identify the

links existing between the different actors and the evaluation aspects, whose

measurement and communication allow for the implementation of the ac-

countability process.

The relation between community and politics is held to a more general or

“social” level – in which society (the citizenship) shows its needs (social prob-

lems) that should be satisfied by public policies – as well as to an “individual”

level, characterised by the individual public services demanded of the public

administration system by the single citizen. These phases are the starting and

finishing phases of the planning process of public policies and service delivery,

involving a variety of subjects and requiring well-defined moments of evalua-

tion. The latter, in fact, provides feedback mechanisms and leads to the draft-

ing of a multiplicity of documents.

In particular, the definition phase of public policies (planning) mainly in-

volves politics at different levels (Parliament, Government, Prime Ministry,

Minister), where the output is the definition of a strategic plan, often of me-

dium to long term, setting out priorities (political targets) consistent with the

allocation of resources. Hence, the strategic targets of public policy should be

relevant to the needs expressed by the society. The latter, in fact, form the ba-

sis for the delegation conferred on the politicians by citizens through the elec-

tive mechanism that, indirectly, is the approval of a political program. As a re-

sult, the strategic plan and the targets it outlines are the basis for the prepara-

tion of the financial documents establishing and funding the public policies

that should be implemented through the administrative structural action and

operational programs.


In the quantification of the economic and financial effects of annual public

policies, a negotiation phase between politics and the administrative structures

seems necessary. In particular, the budget definition related to operational tar-

gets, expressed in terms of the levels of provided services, comes after a bar-

gaining phase. This phase involves the whole governance system of the public

agency and becomes even more complex with greater governance system

complexity and the various aspects of autonomy granted to the agency. Obvi-

ously, it is necessary to define a measure of consistency between the opera-

tional and strategic targets which determine the relationship between politics

and administration.

Once the expected service levels are defined by the political leadership, the

political leadership become only an indirect customer for the public agency. In

fact, contact with the citizens demanding the public service reveals the citizen

as the public agency’s main customer, and to whom it should answer directly.

The measurement of the degree of response to the citizen’s demands and the

evaluation of the provided service level are a crucial phase because they tend to

monitor the direct and immediate effects of the public service provided. This

measurement is indicated by the term ‘quality evaluation’. In this sense, cus-

tomer satisfaction is a measure of the quality levels in which the service was re-

ceived by the citizen and, under the proposed model, is a primary element of

external accountability. The customer satisfaction is added to the service char-

ter, which is a statement of intent, and the code of conduct, which defines the

administration’s aims in public service production.

However, social benefits (services), which are the output of operational

processes, constitute a variable that allows us to establish a system for measur-

ing the performance of the whole public sector, making it possible to define

the various levels of accountability. Referring to the evaluation model pro-

posed by the European Commission for co-financed programs by structural

funds, that is based on the distinction between output, immediate effects, and

long-term effects, and related respectively to operational targets as well as spe-

cific and comprehensive programs of action, it is possible to define an ade-

quate evaluation system, that, interpreted as a realization of the accountability

cycle, allows us to measure and communicate the following level of account-

ability, as shown in Figure 2:


– internal accountability;

– external accountability;

– political accountability; and

– social accountability.

The internal accountability requires defining the relationships between out-

put and resources (efficiency) and between output and operational targets defined

ex ante (operational effectiveness). In addition, the relationship between strategic

targets and operational targets (coherence), which highlights the public agency’s

ability to provide the pre-fixed level of service, should be taken into account.

However, the citizen’s contact with the whole public administration and the

service provided determine two more levels of accountability: the political ac-

countability and the external accountability.

Through a reporting system, the degree of the achievement of strategic tar-

gets set by public policies can be defined. The level of strategic effectiveness, pro-

duced by the political class through administrative actions, leads to the first

part of the political accountability that summarizes, in fact, the problem of

coherence between administrative action and political targets. The second part

is determined by the relationship between the achievement of the strategic tar-

gets and their impact on the citizens (political effectiveness), which measures the

long term effectiveness of the political action.

Moreover a citizen becomes the principal customer for the public agency as

a result of the public agency’s autonomy granted by the politics. Therefore,

completing the analytical process of external accountability includes analys-

ing the impact of services on the citizens’ condition, beyond the measurement

of the degree of satisfaction perceived by citizens upon received the service

(quality evaluation). Considering this, it is necessary to measure the level of effec-

tiveness through external relations existing between output and impact (external

effectiveness). A document that should fulfil this function is, without doubt, the

social report.

Defining what effects could be produced in the community by the public

administration’s activity in terms of output is not the end of the cycle. In order

to close the political accountability cycle, the consistency of the impacts with


Figure 2: Public Agency Accountability Cycle

Citizenship

PLA

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the strategic targets defined in the planning stage should be verified. The im-

pacts are generated gradually over time, and it is clear that the external and po-

litical effectiveness are measurable and verifiable only in the medium to long

term. This obviously results in a risk related to a lack of external and political

effectiveness evaluation.

The last, but not least, accountability level closing the whole accountability

process is the social accountability that aims to define the level of social ef-

fectiveness achieved and the degree of the public policy implementation. The

former is measured by verifying correlations between impacts on the commu-

nity and expressed needs (social effectiveness). The latter is measured by the degree

of alignment between strategic targets set out by the political leadership and

social problems (relevance).

4. Research method

The research method consists of systematic literature research and analysis of

empirical evidence following an explanatory multiple case study framework.

The systematic literature research allows us to define an analysis model of ac-

countability cycle that could be adopted in contexts where a greater level of

delegation from politics to the administrative level exists, such as the case of

public agencies. The aim of the multiple case study is to verify the Italian public

agencies’ behaviour in regards to the proposed model, starting from the legal

framework. Indeed, the aim of the case study analysis is to verify the distance

between the proposed ideal model, derived from a literature interpretation, and

the practice of public agencies in the Italian case. Hence, in this research, the

method is often used with a dual purpose, description and exploration of the public

agencies’ accountability cycle in the first logic stage, and a more explanatory ap-

proach in the second (Fattore, 2005; Yin, 1989).

According to the OECD approach, we selected three Italian public agencies

basing on their legal frameworks for including all kind of public agency. In It-

aly, the legal frameworks are Executives Agencies, Functional Public Bodies

and Private Law Bodies. For each of them it is analysed a case study consid-

ered exemplary, hence critical in order to analyse the relevant assets of account-

ability mechanisms. The aim is defining a model able to highlight, for each


analysis unit, those factors which are crucial in making the public agency “ac-

countable” in regards to internal control, political leadership, and citizen satis-

faction. Thus we select the following public agencies: Revenue Agency (AE),

Social Security National Institute (INPS) and National Procurement Agency

(CONSIP).

These cases represent various typologies of “public agency” that character-

ize the Italian case regarding legal features, governance models, and operating

systems. In particular, those public agencies have an essential role in the state

activity. In fact, the reduction of public expenditures and tax evasion battles

are two of the main strategic targets of politics, and also characterized the re-

cent political election (April 2008). Furthermore, the amount of financial re-

sources assigned to these public agencies is strictly related to the National

Budget. In addition, the CONSIP case is relevant because it allows for taking

account of the private corporate legal form; moreover, this agency comes from

the opposite process of downsizing, or the centralization process of opera-

tional functions. Hence, Revenue Agency, INPS, and CONSIP are preferable

when investigating whether governance mechanisms are functionally related to

the understanding of the accountability cycle. Thus, we decided to start with

semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis in order to explore the

public agencies phenomenon. Each public agency was investigated according

to a case study research protocol developed with well-defined steps, taking into

account peculiarities and particular features that emerged during the previous

analysis. The research steps were as follows:

1. selection of case studies;

2. semi-structured interviews with public agency managers;

3. analytical systematisation of documents;

4. processing and interpretation of data;

5. extrapolation of the research results;

6. discussion of the results of each case; and

7. discussion of the results in comparative terms.

We analysed the following documents for each case: specific regulations; stat-

ute and other legal documents regulating the organization; legal and internal

documents concerning the planning and control process; and financial state-


ments and all audited documents. By applying our interpretive model of ac-

countability cycle in the context of Italian public agency practice, we verify

empirically the development of the accountability cycle and the legal frame-

work incidence.

5. Empirical results

The following section presents the critical analysis of each case study in the

current research.

Revenue Agency

1. Legal framework, mission, task

The Revenue Agency is one of the four central executive agencies (the others

are State Property Agency, Territory Agency and Customs Agency) born with

legislative decree No. 300 of 1999 as a result of the Ministry of Finance reor-

ganization. The Revenue Agency was chosen for the current study due to its

greater proximity to citizens who represented taxpayers.

The Revenue Agency’s mission is tax compliance leading to fiscal fairness

of the tax system. Therefore, the operative task of this public agency is to carry

out all functions regarding the management of taxes as well as assisting and in-

forming taxpayers in order to achieve the highest fulfillment of tax obligations,

combat tax evasion, and manage tax disputes.

2. Corporate Governance Model

The Revenue Agency is subject to the supervision of the Ministry of Finance,

which maintains control over policy guidelines; however, the Revenue Agency

takes full managerial and operational charge of its affairs and is autonomous in

regards to regulations, management, assets, organization, accounting, and fi-

nance. The Revenue Agency’s internal general directives must be submitted to

the Ministry for approval, both in legitimacy and in merits. In addition, the re-

lationship between the Revenue Agency and the Ministry is regulated by a “per-

formance contracting”, allowing the Ministry to determine both the strategic tar-

gets of the agency and the resource allocation. Hence, this agency is a typical


example of the tripod model (Pollitt et al., 2004). Indeed, the Minister of Finance

defines the political targets regarding tax management through a three-year

strategic act, which is accompanied by a three-year convention (updated every

financial year) outlining the services to be provided, the programming objec-

tives to be reached, and the assignment of related financial resources. The Rev-

enue Agency, however, can collect further revenues through the provision of

services to public and private companies and organizations.

The governance structure seems sufficiently articulated, but most power is

concentrated in the general manager’s hands, which is a direct expression of

the Ministry of Finance. The general manager is responsible for the strategic

orientation of the public agency’s action. The board of directors, which is

chaired by the general manager, must approve the general manager’s proposals

and provides advisory functions for the general manager. In practice, the board

of directors appears as a group that is directed by the general manager rather

than as a decision-making body.

However, the Revenue Agency has adopted its own statute that defines the

administration model and governs its general functioning. This public agency

also defines its internal rules. The organizational architecture presents a com-

plex organigram, whose structure is divisional-functional and shows the pres-

ence of staff directions and cross-section committees. There are three man-

agement levels (central, regional, and local) and each direction has a specific

budget.

3. Accountability Cycle

The Revenue Agency is characterized by a high level of governance autonomy

(at the organizational, administrative, accounting, and financial levels) that is

offset by a developed planning and control system guaranteeing coherence with

political targets. In this context, coherence with public policy seems to be

heavily ensured by the presence of a strategic act and a convention regulating

the operational planning, both fixed by the parent ministry. Therefore, political

control of public agency activity appears strong. However, public agency au-

tonomy is strengthened by the definition of budget and strategic plans in com-

plete autonomy, apart from ministry approval.


In regards to the planning and control system, the presence of structured tools

emerges, such as the Balance Scorecard for strategic control and a “tableau de

bord” for monitoring operational activities that allow the public agency to an-

swer to the requirements of efficiency and operational effectiveness. Moreover, the

audit systems are well-developed. On the other hand, the Revenue Agency is

subject to D.Lgs. 286/99, so a dual system of strategic and operational control

emerges: the first control is a competence of the parent ministry, and the sec-

ond is the chief of both the P&C and Audit directions of the public agency. In

fact, the strategic controls are made by the parent ministry, whereas the P&C

group controls target achievement and the Audit group controls process com-

pliance with the procedures.

Therefore, the coherence with political targets is guaranteed by the parent minis-

try’s controls and evaluations. It should also be noted that, in this case, strategic

effectiveness is a competence of the Revenue Agency even though the corporate

governance model is narrow as a result of the high level of autonomy granted

to the public agency.

In addition, the Revenue Agency distinguishes itself from the other agencies

in the case study due to its customer satisfaction documents, which seem to be

the only element linking the public agency to the environment and the citizens.

Indeed, this agency produces several documents regarding external account-

ability: Service Charter, Customer Satisfaction Survey, and Social Report.

These documents allow the public agency to be held accountable to the citi-

zens in terms of quality evaluation and external effectiveness.

Finally, the political effectiveness, social effectiveness, and relevance are competences

of political leadership.

INPS

1. Legal framework, mission, and tasks

INPS (National Institute for Social Security) was established in 1933 as a pub-

lic body with legal character and managerial autonomy. The main activity con-

sists of the settlement and payment of both social security and welfare pen-

sions. INPS is a critical case study of the legal framework “Functional Public


Bodies”, and is more impressive for its size, catchment area, and number of

employees.

2. Corporate governance model

INPS presents a very strong economic and financial weight in relation to the

National Budget. Consequently, its corporate governance model is very com-

plex. Indeed, there are three governing bodies: Board of Directors, general

Manager, and CIV (strategic and supervision committee). This is a two-tiered

governance system based on the German model. Specifically, the board has

propositional and advisory functions whereas CIV can approve and deliberate

the various acts submitted by the other governing bodies. In addition, the Au-

dit Committee can control both administrative and accounting regularity, whe-

reas other important functions of control are part of CIV, and are oriented to-

ward both management and control.

Regarding the autonomy of governing bodies, the highest grade emerges.

Indeed, the CIV composition is characterized by a majority of independent

members. The autonomy of the governing bodies also involves the confirma-

tion of a general manager when political majority changes. Coherence mecha-

nisms of governance INPS seem to be ensured, on the one hand, by the pres-

ence of parent ministry representatives within the Board of Directors, and on

the other hand, by a periodic evaluation of the general managerial contract,

which is subordinate to the parent ministry approval.

3. Accountability cycle

The accountability cycle does not start from a strategic plan issued by the par-

ent ministry but starts with a document made and issued by the public agency,

a so-called programmatic relation approved by CIV in a board proposal.

Therefore, the political accountability level is less important, at least partially, be-

cause this level converges in the internal accountability level. On the one hand, the

INPS budget is connected with the National Budget, and on the other hand,

there are central government representatives both in the CIV and on the

board. Indeed, when considering the accountability levels, the crucial role cov-

ered by internal control processes should be underlined. The latter appears


well-developed because strategic planning comes from internal bodies, whereas

operational planning comes from continuous negotiations among all functions.

Even if the internal auditing systems are well-developed, they do not appear

to be a useful tool for controlling internal dynamics in the public agency. In

particular, the auditing function seems to involve checks on the planning and

control direction activity. Therefore, this situation could create conflicts within

the public agency. The external accountability level, on the contrary, seems very

weak. In fact, external controls operated by the Italian Court of Count are only

formal. Moreover, there is no specific function in charge of external controls.

Finally, we could argue that the correctness of the planning and control sys-

tems is ensured through a strong and fair governance model, although there

are no documents regarding strategic guidelines and the external checks are

weak. On the other hand, the absence of bodies dedicated to external checks

and the weakness of internal control could create a deep lack of harmony dur-

ing operational processes and any problems in the relation between public

agency and other shareholders (citizens, other public bodies, and so on).

CONSIP

1. Legal framework, mission, task

The CONSIP S.p.A. is a State-owned enterprise founded with a double aim:

the first is information system development of the Treasury Ministry and spe-

cific project management aimed to improve the information and communica-

tion technology level (s.c. IT area); the second is project management aimed at

rationalising the public administration expenditures through the use of infor-

mation and communication technology applied to the procurement processes

of public administration. It is no coincidence that the organizational choice of

the legislature, in the CONSIP case, would be a private corporation, which has

a streamlined organizational structure typically designed for the private sector,

in order to provide a lean and functional organizational structure able to oper-

ate quickly at the central agency.

CONSIP was born with the aim to take control of specific and relevant op-

erational processes with the creation of a specific body directly related to the

parent ministry, even if it involved the legal framework of the private sector.


Hence, this process is the opposite of that characterized by the British Next

Step experience and the tripod model based on disaggregation. In its activity,

CONSIP does not provide “direct” services to citizens, but appears as an op-

erating tool aimed at enhancing development and coordination between the

Ministry of Finance, the public administration systems, and suppliers.

2. Corporate governance model

The governance model adopted by CONSIP is aligned to that of a private cor-

poration. The Board of Directors has the highest decision power and can dele-

gate its power to a CEO. The Board of Directors consists of 9 members, with

one of these members elected as president. To date, 2 members are Parliament

representatives, 2 members are Ministry of Finance managers, and 5 members

are or have been members of the Board of Directors of private or State-owned

companies. Concerning its organizational profile, CONSIP moved from a divi-

sional structure to a functional structure in 2007, which simplified the business

processes. Moreover, the absence of a general manager should be underlined.

In addition, there is a supervising body (Supervision Committee) made up of

independent members appointed by the Board of Directors. The aim of this

body is to monitor the organizational model at each structural level and its co-

herence with the operational process, assessing risks between the structure and

processing forms which could provoke damage for the public agency.

As previously mentioned, the decision-making power is attributed to the

Board of Directors, but it is delegated to the CEO who reports quarterly to the

Board of Directors. Although the CEO could influence the board, a power

ownership of the CEO is not conceivable. However, the level of governing

bodies’ autonomy in respect to political power is reasonable. This is mainly due

to the presence of independent directors and the CEO’s confirmation at the

change of political majority. Moreover, the absence of directors appointed by

entities besides the ministry and the presence of parent ministry managers in

the Board of Directors lead to greater coherence between the management and

political targets.


3. Accountability cycle

Both core activities are regulated by contracts stipulated with the parent minis-

try with funds to cover the functional expenses and the investment. As already

underlined in the Constitutional Acts, CONSIP «works according to the strategic

target defined by the ministry». Hence, the public agency’s strategic planning regard-

ing the IT investment and the procurement targets are defined by the ministry

departments to outline the National Budget. Therefore, the ministry exclusively

delegates the operational processes management to CONSIP.

From this fact, it appears that the definition of CONSIP’s operational

budget is realized after approval of the annual and multi-year National Budgets

by Parliament. Therefore, the CONSIP budget definition does not seem in-

strumental to the quantification of public expenditures or to the evaluation of

political targets. Most often the budget has exclusively become an operational

planning commitment. Although it limits the public agency’s autonomy, this

lack of freedom in the budgeting process allows the public agency to be consis-

tent with the political targets fixed in the annual Financial Act.

The dependency characterizing the planning and programming phase puts

the budgeting process inside the relationship exclusively held between the par-

ent ministry, public agency, and the connected contract, excluding any other

interests and stakeholders. Although strategically dependent on the parent min-

istry, the public agency has an office responsible for strategic planning and

control tasks. It is evident that this function should answer to the “demand of

control” and come from the parent ministry. In particular, the ministry evalu-

ates the progress of the projects approved through a contract with the public

agency and relates this progress to the public expenditure trend forecasts. This

explains the development of the operational control and monitoring of efficiency,

operational effectiveness, and strategic effectiveness through the reporting system.

In addition, CONSIP focuses on its institutional customer requirements

coming from the parent ministry and other public bodies. Each year since

2004, the public agency has arranged a program to ensure “continuous im-

provement” based on the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM)

guidelines. The crucial requirements of the program are: strategic targets’ cen-

trality; focus on defined and verifiable targets; employees’ participation; results

comparability; and management commitment on total quality development. In


this context, the parent ministry’s satisfaction is assessed through selected sur-

veys. The questionnaires have different scopes: firstly, the inquiry is oriented

toward the parent ministry managers in order to evaluate the overall targets of

the public agency, and secondly it measures the achievement of operational ob-

jectives (service providing) through the collection of each ministry’s official

evaluation. The customer satisfaction results are a form of quality evaluation

monitoring.

CONSIP activity is oriented both toward the parent ministry (Ministry of

Finance) and other public bodies which intend to use CONSIP services. In-

deed, CONSIP has a relation with its suppliers as well as with the market in

general, whereas it does not have direct contact with customers (citizens) in re-

gards to expenditure rationalization. Therefore, the major key values of

CONSIP’s behaviour are transparency, voluntary disclosure, and information

spread. In addition, CONSIP drafted an ethical code in 2001, and has involved

supplier associations in procurement programming, especially through a web

communication system and an information system based on the Supervision

Committee’s activities.

CONSIP activated an external communication process of efficiency and ef-

fectiveness results in order to show its value creation towards the shareholder

(the Ministry of Finance) and other stakeholders. Hence, CONSIP aims to

achieve social corporate responsibility through its ethical code, the establish-

ment of a Supervision Committee, the annual report on operational activity,

and a specific report on other public administration testimonies regarding ser-

vices provided.

Moreover, the corporation’s social responsibility is highlighted in a dedi-

cated section on the public agency web site (www.consip.it). Although these

documents are crucial for the transparency of the public agency’s activities,

they do not highlight the external effectiveness measure. Finally, like other public

agencies, there is an absence of measures of political and social effectiveness.

7. Accountability mechanisms in public agencies

The case study analysis shows that if the service production cycle is decentral-

ized to organizations as public agencies in a broad sense, the accountability


process should be analysed, on the one hand, in regards to the relations be-

tween politics and administration and, on the other hand, in regards to the rela-

tionship developed between the whole public system (composed of both par-

ent ministry and public agency) and the citizenship (Johnston and Romzek,

1999). In order to explain the accountability mechanisms that concern these

relationships, the following matrix summarizes the accountability levels and in-

dicators system derived from the evaluation process adopted by the EU Com-

mission (see Figure 3). These indicators should be evaluated and diffused to

the community in order to define the results achieved through the administra-

tive action.

Figure 3: The Accountability Matrix in the Case of a Public Agency

En

vir

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ip

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inis

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ip

Social Accountability External Accountability

Political Accountability Internal Accountability

social effectiveness

relevance

external effectiveness

quality evaluation

operational effectiveness

efficiency

coherence

Agency competencePolitics competence

political effectiveness

INPS

RA

strategic effectiveness


The peculiarity of the proposed model, which has been verified in the analysed

cases, is the fact that external accountability must be separated from social ac-

countability. The first is attributed to the public agency, whereas the second

remains a politician’s competence as a result of the mandate received by the

citizens through the election (Barberis, 1998). In particular, external account-

ability was pursued by public agencies, even if it was not fully achieved in all

studied cases, independently of the granted autonomy degree, the adopted legal

framework, and the delivered service type (Mulgan, 2000).

In all analysed cases, the social problem is an indistinct need of the com-

munity (citizens) and the socio-economic context, whereas the output pro-

duced by the public agencies responds to a specific demand for services, com-

ing from the individual citizen or another public administration. Within the

realm of external accountability, the analysis of the perceived quality of pro-

vided services appears widespread in relation to the specific requirement of the

citizenship (Guthrie, 1993). In fact, every analysed public agency has adopted

customer satisfaction systems such as ethical codes and service charters. In ad-

dition, the external effectiveness analysis seems to be developed through the

establishment of social reports or other documents showing the medium and

long-term effects of programs on the community as well as the mission

achievement of the public agency (Stone, 1995).

However, it should be underlined that these tools seem to be structured in

contexts characterized by the provision of an individual service, greater auton-

omy, and a more complex organizational structure (Stewart, 1984; Caperchione

and Pezzani, 2000). Indeed, in the CONSIP case, despite the process aimed at

improving social responsibility, the public agency does not define an evaluation

process of its activity impact in the medium to long term. CONSIP tends

merely to ensure information diffusion referring to its activity with the aim of

transparency. This may be due to the fact that the planning and operational

control system is a part of the parent ministry’s operational processes and,

therefore, the impact assessments are the responsibility of the ministry office

(Stone, 1995).

Political accountability is due to the development of the ex-post relationship

between politics and administration (Sinclair, 1995). In particular, strategic ac-

countability tends to be more developed in practice as CONSIP and Revenue


Agency, in which the relationships are regulated through a contract and there is

a more streamlined governance model. Indeed, in the case of the Revenue

Agency, this evaluation phase is conducted by the public agency. First, it could

be attributed to the fact that the Revenue Agency is derived from a parent min-

istry expertise decentralization process, and second, from the trust relationship

with the ministry director.

In contexts in which there is greater autonomy and a more complex govern-

ance model, such as in the INPS case, strategic effectiveness is internalized by

the public agency. This entails the exit from the cycle of accountability with

obvious risks of auto-referentiality of the public agency (Johnston and Rom-

zek, 1999). However, political effectiveness is an indicator showing the

achievement of public policy targets, that does not appear to be measured and

evaluated through the analysis of the public agency’s documents because po-

litical effectiveness is an exclusive competence of the Ministry. This assess-

ment, however, is relevant to reactivate the entire planning and control process

and update the government’s strategic plans. In addition, at least in Italy, it has

relevance only among the politician figures, although Figure 3 shows that, in

the INPS case, there is a public agency tendency to take possession of this

evaluation phase as a result of its high autonomy.

However, in view of transparent relations with the community, a periodic

diffusion of the results achieved by public policies in different sectors would

be desirable. In fact, publishing only the government’s strategic plans does not

appear satisfactory, and the content of these strategic plans is often general. In

addition, the impacts generated by the achievement of political targets should

be the basis for drawing up the mandate report. This would be the main doc-

ument regulating relations between communities and politicians, showing the

political skills and abilities in order to satisfy the community’s expectations.

8. Conclusions

This paper started with a literature assessment regarding accountability concept

analysis and the public agencies phenomenon and, more generally, the relation-

ship between politics and administration, with a focus on international research

projects. The results of the current analysis indicate that the accountability cy-


cle tends to become more complicated in the presence of administrative decen-

tralization as a result of the different points of contact between the community

and the public administration system.

Indeed, we proposed an interpretive model for comparative studies of pub-

lic agency accountability. Separately investigating the relationship between the

community and politics from the relations between the administrative structure

(public agency) and citizens becomes relevant. The first has macro-economic

relevance, whereas the latter has micro-economic impacts. If tools that make

the public agency accountable to the citizens are developed, the information

flow between politics and the citizenship appears less structured and less de-

tailed. Moreover, we defined the accountability cycle and its distinctive aspects,

that allows us to analyse whether the public agency is held accountable. It also

allows us to identify which conditions make the public agency accountable.

Then, the accountability cycle was used to evaluate the Italian situation. To this

end, our model was based on the following assumptions:

1. different accountability levels exist, whose competence is shared be-

tween the political leadership and the public agency;

2. the planning and control system allows us to identify the key variables

and aspects of evaluation, and should be taken into account; and

3. each aspect of evaluation is made with reference to a specific account-

ability levels.

The empirical evidence has shown that specific aspects of political accountabil-

ity tend to become a public agency competence in the presence of strong dele-

gation and high autonomy. Inevitably, this leads to risk regarding implementa-

tion of the accountability cycle and produces frictions between politics and the

administration (public agency). A reunification of social accountability to po-

litical accountability could be assumed if the public agency were to become a

single actor qualified to respond to the citizens’ expectations. In this case, the

high degree of autonomy tends to be counterbalanced by the evaluation pres-

sures that come not from the political class, but from the community. The

proposed model could be replicated in different contexts and applied in com-

parative studies of public agencies. However, we recognize that the model is


based on a descriptive approach of the accountability process. Future research

might usefully define a quantitative measurement system of the evaluation as-

pects aiming to providing an ordinal scale of the cases studied.

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