Radical Islam and Political Terrorism in Southeast AsiaCarlyle A Thayer Professor of Politics Director UNSW Defence Studies Forum School of Humanities & Social Sciences The University of New South Wales at Australian Defence Force Academy [email protected]Winter School on Globalisation and Its Counter Forces co-sponso red by Swedish School of Advanced Asia-Pacific Studies and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore February 23-27, 2004
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8/14/2019 Thayer Radical Islam & Terrorism in Southeast Asia
Radical Islam and Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia
Carlyle A. Thayer*
‘We must not confuse a few al-Qaeda escapades with Southeast Asian Islam asa whole’ Robert W. Hefner, March 25, 2003.
Introduction
Prior to the Bali bombings of October 12, 2002, the conventional view of Islam in
Southeast Asia, and Islam in Indonesia in particular, was that it was different
from Islam in the Middle East, Pakistan and Central Asia. Islam in Southeast
Asia was viewed not only as moderate but inward looking and tolerant. The
conventional view also held that radical Islam represented a tiny minority and
was not influential politically either domestically or in regional affairs.
*I would like to acknowledge my intellectual debt to Greg Barton who provided me with copiesof three of his unpublished manuscripts. This paper draws heavily on the various reports issuedby the International Crisis Group and Political Islam in Southeast Asia, Conference Report,Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.. March 25, 2003. All references may be found in thebibliography.
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The vast majority of Southeast Asia’s Muslims are Sunni.1 In many areas Islam
has become intertwined with pre-existing values and belief systems associated
with folk religion, Buddhism and Hinduism. This intermixing resulted from the
history of Islam’s arrival from the twelfth century. The bearers of Islam spread
their views peacefully and not by force of arms. They adapted to local customs
and conditions. A broad historical overview would also reveal that a tiny
minority of Muslims have been drawn to more puritanical or extremist variants
of the faith.
The Bali bombings challenged the conventional view of Islam. The causes of
terrorism were now widely perceived as closely linked to Islamic politics. The
bombings exposed an extensive terrorist network in Indonesia that had well-
established links with militant groups not only throughout Southeast Asia but
internationally to al Qaeda. The reluctance of the Indonesian government to
1The Sunni tradition is known in Arabic as the Ahl-i Sunnah (the People of Sunnah). The word
‘Sunnah’ means custom, method, or path and refers particularly to the example of the prophetMuhammed as found in the Hadith. The Sunnis are those who follow the tradition of the prophetand his companions in understanding the Islamic faith. Shia Muslims hold the same fundamentalbeliefs of other Muslims, with the principle addition being that they also believe in an imamate,which is the distinctive institution of Shia Islam. Islam experienced a schism about a century after
death of the prophet Mohammed. The dispute centred around the appointment of a caliph. TheShias argued that only a direct descendant of the Prophet could be appointed, while the Sunniargued any person approved by the religious community was eligible. The caliph had substantialpolitical and military power but no inherent religious authority. Sunni Muslims view the caliphas a temporal leader only and consider an imam to be a prayer leader, but for the Shia the historiccaliphs were merely de facto rulers, while the rightful and true leadership continued to be passedalong through a sort of apostolic succession of Muhammed's descendants, the Imams (whencapitalized, Imam refers to the Shia descendant of the House of Ali). This dispute becameentrenched in doctrine.
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well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation all have separate definitions. Some
countries have attempted to side step this semantic problem by drafting laws
defining terrorist acts. Other countries view these so-called ‘terrorist acts’ as
criminal offenses. The inability of the international community to define
terrorism has resulted in giving carte blanche to international terrorism experts to
pick and choose which groups to include.
One possible way out of this conundrum is to define a terrorist group as any
group proscribed by the United Nations. A caveat needs to be entered that the
UN lists only those groups associated with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.
The present UN lists three groups in Southeast Asia as terrorist organizations: al
Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah2 and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
There are equally vexing semantic difficulties in discussing politically active
Islamic groups. There is a tendency among security analysts to lump all Islamic
groups, associations and political parties together in a discussion of radical
Islamic groups. As yet there is no agreed definition of key terms. A quick survey
of the literature produces the following: Islamic fundamentalism, Islamisation,
Islamism, Islamist, political Islam, radical Islam, militant Islam and Islamic
extremism.
2Indonesia has not yet declared JI a terrorist organization. JI’s leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir wasfound guilty of involvement with JI. But the Indonesian court said it lacked the evidence todemonstrate that Ba’asyir was JI’s amir or spiritual leader.
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There is near unanimous agreement among the Muslim elite in Southeast Asia
that Islamic fundamentalism is a totally inappropriate and inaccurate term to use
in the context of political terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism is a conservative
belief that sharia law should be introduced to govern daily life.3
Islamisation is the process of religious self-awareness and spiritual renewal that
has been underway among Muslims in Southeast Asia for a decade or more. It
refers to the adoption of pious religious habits such as fasting during the holy
months, saying daily prayers, and adopting Muslim dress (tunics for men,
headscarves for women).
Islamism is ‘the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as
personal life’.4 Islamists are who want legislated recognition and a direct role for
Islam as the religion of the state.
Political Islam may be defined as ‘those individuals and organizations that gain
their legitimacy from Islam and that seek to gain power through electoral
processes and to participate in representational institutions such as parliament
3International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections . Asia Report no.71, Jakarta and Brussels, December 18, 2003, 13, note 40.
4Sheri Berman, ‘Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society’, Perspectives on Politics (AmericanPolitical Science Association), June 2003, 1(2), 257.
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and local assemblies’.5 Barton argues that it is necessary to distinguish between
two types of political Islamism (conservative and radical) and militant Islamism.6
The term radical Islam is often used by international terrorism experts as a short
hand equivalent for extremists and terrorists. Country specialists argue that
radical Islam is more a religious than a political movement and should not be
equated with terrorism. Indeed some radical Islamic groups oppose terrorism
and violence. Radical Islam contains both democratic and anti-democratic
elements and a diversity of beliefs including: radical, revolutionary, utopian and
extreme.
The sources of radical Islam in Indonesia are both internal and external. Most
contemporary radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia are composed of
modernist Muslims who were oppressed during the New Order.7 Modernist
Muslims argue that the true basis of Islam is the Koran and the example of the
Prophet Mohammed and they believe Islam should play a greater role in
government. The largest modernist organization in Indonesia is the
Muhammidiyah. In the years after independence the Masyumi party represented
5Political Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.,March 25, 2003, 2.
6Greg Barton, ‘Islam, Islamism and politics in post-Soeharto Indonesia’, unpublished manuscript,December 25, 2003, 6-8.
7Generally, orthodox Muslims in Indonesia can be divided into two very broad religious streams,the modernist and traditional. Traditionalists base their views on Islamic tradition handed downby history including even Javanese traditions. The leading traditionalist organization is NahdatulUlama (NU). Traditionalists accept the secular state.
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development of a plethora of radical Islamic groups was encouraged by the
impact of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 which resulted in the collapse of
the New Order and the weakening of the Indonesian state.
Militant Islam has two meanings. Militant Islam may be defined as the support
of violence in the defence of Islam. At one level it may take the form of public
displays of strength (brandishing swords) designed to intimidate rivals. The
second meaning of militant Islam is the support of violence when Islam is
perceived to be under attack. In its most extreme form, militant Islam supports
preemptive jihad against its enemies.
Islamic extremism has been defined ‘as those groups which have a
fundamentalist disposition. They hold to a strict doctrinal or scripturalist view of
the faith and have a conviction that Islam must be implemented in its full and
literal form, free of compromise. They are trenchantly reactive, whether through
language, ideas, or physical violence, to what are seen as corrosively secular,
materialist or deviationist forces’.8 Islamic extremism often views radical Islam
as not going far enough. It is in this tiny fringe that modern day political
terrorism ( jihadi extremism) may be located.
Finally, arising from the discussion above, it should be noted that there is no
clear distinction between moderate and radical Islam. These groups do not
8Political Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H.Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.,March 25, 2003, 13.
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represent a dichotomy so much as a continuous spectrum. Nevertheless, the use
of the terms moderates and radicals is a useful shorthand way of drawing
attention to differences in political outlook. Secondly, any analysis that places
political Islam or Islamic politics in the context of terrorism risks distorting our
analysis. There is much more going on in the Islamic community than just
political terrorism and it is this activity that represents mainstream Islam in
Southeast Asia. Political terrorism represents an extremist fringe within larger
society.
Indonesia
Indonesian Islam has been heavily influenced by domestic folk religion and
Sufism.9 Political violence is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Violent
extremist groups have existed since independence in 1949. They made their
appearance in three distinct historical periods: (1) late 1940s to early 1960s in
form of Darul Islam; (2) mid-1960s to late 1990s, a period of state repression of
political Islam; and (3) mid-1990s during which there was a revival of Islamic
radicalism initially instigated by the Suharto regime itself. One rallying call
among various Islamic groups, including radicals, is for the adoption of the
9Islamic mysticism shaped by Persian and Indian thought; see Greg Barton, ‘Making sense of Jemaah Islamiyah terrorism and radical Islamism in Indonesia’, unpublished paper, January 14,2004, 12.
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themselves from al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda established links
with only two major groups in Southeast Asia, JI and the ASG, and both have
been proscribed by the UN as terrorist organisations.
The Islamic Defenders Front13 (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) was founded on
August 17, 1998. It soon developed the largest paramilitary organization in
Indonesia. Total FPI membership has been placed at 40,000 of whom 5,000 were
residents of Jakarta. The FPI is not a product of al Qaeda machinations but rather
the product of patronage by factions within Indonesia’s deeply divided political
and military elite. As Robert Hefner remarked, the FPI is heir to Indonesia’s
tradition of elite-sponsored Islamist para-militarism dating back to the 1970s.14 In
the 1990s the FPI was used as the elite’s cats paw to mount violent attacks on
pro-democracy activists. The FPT is more properly viewed as a vigilante
movement because its main activity has been to harass and physically attack
nightclubs, gambling dens, red-light districts, and other sites of vice and iniquity.
Within days of the Bali bombings the Islamic Defenders Front suspended its
activities.
Laskar Jihad (Holy War Fighters) represents the second largest but best funded,
coordinated and armed Islamic paramilitary group to emerge after the fall of the
13Sometimes translated as the Defenders of Islam Front.
14Robert W. Hefner, ‘Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Assessing the Trends’, in Political Islam inSoutheast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School ofAdvanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.., March 25, 2003, 8.
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During the 1999 elections both PAS and UMNO vied with each other in
promoting the Islamization of Malaysian society.
UMNO has sought to control both public Islamic discourse and the political
opposition, including PAS. In June 2001 acting under provisions of the Internal
Security Act authorities arrested over 70 individuals who were charged with
being members of a militant Islamic organization, KMM,19 and Jemaah
Islamiyah. In December 2001/January 2002 fifteen alleged JI members were
arrested in Singapore. A second wave of arrests followed in August.
Chart 1 JI's Organisational Structure
Mantiqi 1 and 2
1. Malaysia-Singapore
2. Western Indonesia
Mantiqi 3 and 4
3. Mindanao, Sabah, Sulawesi
4. Papua and Australia
Disciplinary Council Religious Council
Governing Council
Central Command
Amir
Police interrogations revealed a regional organizational structure that divided
Southeast Asia up into four regions or mantiqi (see Chart 1) with a special focus
on operations in Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. In other words, the
radical Islamic network had a regional and not a national focus. While a number
of PAS members were detained in Malaysia, the majority of detainees were
19Malaysia initially identified its alleged domestic terrorists as members of KumpulanMujihaddin Malaysia (KMM). Then, without explanation, redesignated the group as KumpulanMilitan Malaysia to conform to the government’s view that the detainees were domestic militantsand not international jihadis. There is disagreement by analysts over whether KMM actuallyexists or is a term invented by the government. KMM’s membership is miniscule.
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Some elements of the MILF, however, have been implicated in international
terrorism. The MILF provided training facilities at Camp Abu Bakar to the JI
during 1996-2000. Recent reports indicate that JI members continue to train MILF
militants and that JI members are still undergoing paramilitary training on
Mindanao.20
The Abu Sayyaf Group represents an exception to this picture. It was formed in
1993 by Filipino veterans of the Afghan conflict. But the ASG has failed to grain
traction among the majority of the Muslim community in Sulu, Tawi Tawi and
Basilan. The ASG quickly degenerated into criminal behaviour to such an extent
that al Qaeda may have distanced itself and sought out ties with the MILF
instead. The ASG’s links with al Qaeda were tenuous at best and atrophied if not
were extinguished in 1995 with the death of its founder.
The ASG is an atypical Muslim separatist group in that includes new converts to
Islam and non-Muslims among its members. The ASG today may total around
200 fighters, divided between eighty percent common criminals and twenty
percent Islamic militants. Prior to 1995, the ASG was probably the only Islamic
group in the Philippines to have espoused global Islamic demands (eg. freeing
those convicted in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center). The ASG is the
20Oliver Teves, Associated Press, ‘Terror group members from Indonesia training rfecruits in
Philippines’, November 26, 2003; Kimina Lyall, ‘Manila admits JI training continues’, The Australian, December 12, 2003; Kimina Lyall, ‘JI grows terror in Philippines’, The Weekend Australian, December 13-14, 2003; and Karen L. Lema and Friena P. Guerrero, ‘Gov’t says no large JI presence in Mindanao’, Business World, December 17, 2003.
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There has been a marked upsurge in violence since late 2001. An estimated fifty-
six security personnel have been killed since then. In January 2004 there was
unexplained spate of violent attacks in southern Thailand. In the most serious
incident, a military camp was attacked and over one hundred assault rifles were
stolen from its armory; at the same time eighteen schools were set on fire. Thai
government authorities have been unable to identify the attackers. Speculation is
rife that this violence may be linked to criminal activity, police-military rivalry or
the revival of separatism. Police and security officials have identified Gerakan
Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) as the most likely perpetrator, but Barisan
Revolusi Nasional (BRN), PULO, and New PULO have been implicated as well.22
A key GMIP leader fought in Afghanistan and GMIP may have had links with
KMM in Malaysia.23 GMIP has been described by ‘observers’ as a ‘loose
gathering of gangs’ with ‘no real political ideology’ and should not be equated
with the BRN and PULO.24
22‘Barrack raided, 20 schools torched in South’, The Nation [Bangkok], January 5, 2004; ‘Wanted
rebel leader a key suspect’, The Straits Times Interactive, January 6, 2004; ‘Bt1m reward for topsuspect’, The Nation, January 7, 2004; ‘New command post to be set up Defence minister wantsfull-scale force’, The Bangkok Post, January 6, 2004. Rohan Gunaratna has also identified JemaahSalafiah as a Thai extremist group; see: Patrick Goodenough, ‘Thailand Gov’t Urged to GetSerious with Terrorists’, CNSNews.Com, January 9, 2004.
23Alisa Tang, Associated Press, ‘Terrorist group helping insurgents, Thailand says’, January 9,2004.
24‘Attackers had “outside help”’, The Nation, January 9, 2004.
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The exact size of the Muslim community in Cambodia, mainly ethnic Chams, is
unknown but may number several hundred thousand. There is little historical
evidence of Islamic militancy or extremism among this group. But in 2003, the
police made a number of arrests of both Cambodian citizens and foreigners on
charges of links to international terrorism and JI.25 At least twenty-eight foreign
teachers have been expelled. Three of those arrested were associated with the al-
Mukara school which taught Wahhabi religious beliefs and received funding
from Saudi Arabia. Another detainees was associated with an Islamic school
outside Phnom Penh funded by a Kuwaiti charity.
Myanmar is host to a Muslim minority totaling 3.8 percent of the population. The
Rohingyas are an Islamic minority group located in the western state of Arakan.
An estimated 200,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh as refugees/displaced
persons. Militant Rohingyas were reportedly present at a regional planning
meeting held under JI auspices. Extremist Rohingyas reportedly have also made
contact with terrorist groups based in Afghanistan (under Taliban rule),
Bangladesh and Kashmir.26
25Ker Munthit, Associated Press, ‘3 Muslim Foreigners Arrested in Cambodia’, The Guardian, May28, 2003; Michael Kitchen, Voice of America, ‘Cambodian Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah TerroristGroup’, June 12, 2003; Ek Madra, Reuters, ‘Cambodia, Thailand Take Aim at Militant Islam’, June12, 3003; ‘JI cell members may be set free in Cambodia’, Radio Australia, December 19, 2003; andEk Madra, Reuters, ‘Cambodia to Try Egyptian, Thai Militant Suspects’, January 5, 2004.
26Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror . Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003,173-175.
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and that this process will continue.27 Barton notes that Indonesia’s lower classes
are becoming increasingly disenchanted with President Megawati’s brand of
secular-nationalism and could be receptive a program that fuses Islam and
economic populism (eg. morality, social justice and economic nationalism).
Barton also argues that there is a real possibility Islamist political parties will
enjoy considerable leverage after the 2004 elections when they can expect to
enjoy strong party-political and military connections and support. In these
circumstances, radical Islamists would have a catalytic effect on influencing
Muslim society especially if they employed violence.
The long term trends indicate that the secular political traditions dating back to
the colonial era in countries with Muslim populations are eroding. There is a
growing belief in the region that Islam should not be confined to the private
sphere. In sum, there is clear evidence that Islamisation has spread in Southeast
Asia. But this process has not resulted in the rise of political Islam as a major
force. The Indonesian case is instructive. In the post-Suharto era, the major
Islamic parties have been riven by factionalism and personality disputes. As
noted, there was a decline in electoral support for Islamist parties between 1955
and 1999. There is also evidence that public support for the constitutional
recognition of Islamic law has dropped markedly.
27Greg Barton,. ‘Indonesia at the Crossroads: Islam, Islamism and the Fraught Transition toDemocracy’, Paper presented to the Conference on Islam and the West: the Impact of September11’, organized by Monash University and The University of Western Australia, Melbourne,August 15-16, 2003, 27.
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