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Can Histories be True? Narrativism, Positivism, and the "Metaphorical Turn"Author(s): Chris LorenzSource: History and Theory, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Oct., 1998), pp. 309-329Published by: Wiley for Wesleyan University
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
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Wiley and Wesleyan University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History
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CAN HISTORIESBE TRUE?NARRATIVISM,POSITIVISM,AND THE "METAPHORICALURN"'
CHRIS LORENZ
ABSTRACT
Narrativism,as representedby HaydenWhite and FrankAnkersmit,can fruitfullybe ana-
lyzed as an inversion of two brandsof positivism. First, narrativist pistemology can be
regardedas an inversion of empiricism. Its thesis that narratives unction as metaphors
which do not possess a cognitive content is built on an empiricist, "picture view" of
knowledge. Moreover, all the non-cognitive aspects attributed o narrativeas such are
dependent on this picture theory of knowledge and a picture theory of representation.
Most of the epistemologicalcharacteristicshat White and Ankersmitattribute o histori-
cal narratives hereforeshare the problemsof this picture theory.
The article'ssecond thesis is that the theories of narrativeexplanationcan also fruit-fully be analyzed as inversions of positivist covering-law theory.Ankersmit's brand of
narrativism s the most radical n this respectbecause it posits an opposition betweennar-
rative and causal modes of comprehension while simultaneously eliminating causality
from narrativist istoricalunderstanding.White's brandof narrativisms moreof a hybrid
than is Ankersmit's as far as its theoryof explanation s concerned;nevertheless, it can
also be fruitfully interpretedas an inversion of covering-lawtheory, replacing it by an
indefinite multitudeof explanatory trategies.
Most of the strikingcharacteristicsof both White's andAnkersmit'snarrativismpre-
suppose positivism in these two senses, especially their claim that historicalnarratives
have a metaphorical tructureandthereforeno truth-value.These claims are hard to rec-
oncile with the factualcharacteristics f debatesby historians; hisproblemcan be tracked
down to the absence in "metaphorical" arrativismof a conceptualconnection between
historicalnarrativesandhistorical research.
I. INTRODUCTION
My aim in this essay is to unearth and to criticize certain deep presuppositions of
what I shall call "metaphorical narrativism." To this end, I shall lump togetherunder this label the two quite distinct philosophies of history of Hayden White
and Frank Ankersmit.2 Because of their intellectual efforts-preceded by a few
1. I am indebted to the Von HumboldtFoundationfor financial support in the form of a Von
Humboldt Research Award and to Larry Griffin (VanderbiltUniversity), JTrn Rusen (Bielefeld
University), Axel van den Berg (McGill University), the participantsof the "Social History"collo-
quium at the "Arbeitstelle ur VergleichendeGesellschaftsgeschichte" n Berlin in Spring 1997.
2. Their major books are: Hayden White, Metahistoty: The Historical Imagination in
Nineteenth-CentutyEurope (Baltimore, 1973); Tropics of Discourse: Essays in CultutralCriticism
(Baltimore, 1978); The Contentof the Form:Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation.(Baltimore, 1987). F. R. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian s
Language (Groningen, 1981 and The Hague, 1983); Denken over geschiedenis: Een overzichtvan
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others', such as WilliamWalshand LouisMink-philosophy of historyhas in the
recent past driftedaway from philosophy of science and social science in the
directionof philosophy of art, literature, hetoric,and aesthetics.This move was
a conscious reactionto the dominantview of the previous decades, that is, to the
positivist conception of (social) science. In this article I shall argue that
metaphoricalnarrativism an be understoodboth as a frontal attackagainst pos-
itivism and, more importantly,n specificrespects as its reversal(therebycontin-
uing to share its presuppositions).
I will not tryto analyze White's and Ankersmit'smetaphoricalnarrativismsn
toto, but concentrateon two conceptual ssues that have aroused as much atten-
tion as confusion.3The first issue is their thesis that the narrative orm of historyimplies that the notion of truthas correspondence annot be appliedto historical
stories in contrastwith the individualstatements hatcollectively makeup these
stories. Historicalnarratives herefore are characterizedby them as "fictional"
and/or"metaphorical." he second issue is their thesis that narrativesare self-
ses contradictthe intuitions of some working historians and therefore deserve
closer examination.
It makesgood sense to analyzemetaphoricalnarrativism s a counter-positionto positivism in both its guises. First, metaphoricalnarrativism developed in
opposition to positivism with a small p, that is the positivism of facts, alias
empiricism. Second,it developed n oppositionto Positivism with a capitalP,that
is the covering-law view of explanation. Metaphorical philosophy of history
deliberatelyattacked the main tenets of positivism and analytical philosophy.
inodernegeschiedfilosofischeopvattingen(Groningen, 1984); De navel van de geschiedenis: Over
interpretatie,representatieen historische realiteit (Groningen,1990); History and Tropologv:TheRise and Fall of Metaphor (Berkeley, 1994); De spiegel van het verleden. Exploraties I:
Geschiedtheorie(Kampen, 1996); De inacht van representative. xploraties II: Cnltinajilosofie&
esthetica (Kampen, 1996); Macht door representatie.Exploraties III: Politiekefilosofie (Kampen,
1997);AestheticPolitics: Political PhilosophybeyondFact and Value Stanford,1998). My references
to NarrativeLogic are to the 1981 edition. As my main goal is to analyze the conceptualstructureof
metaphoricalnarrativism will neglect the historicaldevelopmentof both White's and Ankersmit's
positions and, where necessary,deal with it in the notes.
3. For the discussions on White cf. L. Kramer, "Literature,Criticism and Imagination:The
LiteraryChallengeof HaydenWhite and DominickLaCapra,"n The New CulturalHistory,ed. Lynn
Hunt(Berkeley, 1989), 97-128; Noel Carroll,"Interpretation, istoryandNarrative,"The Monist 73(1990), 134-167; Paul Roth, "HaydenWhite and the Aesthetics of History,"Historyof the Human
Sciences 5 (1992), 17-35; Wulf Kansteiner,"HaydenWhite's Critiqueof the Writingof History,"
History and Theory 32 (1993), 273-296; John Zammito,"AreWe Being TheoreticalYet?The New
Historicism, he New Philosophy of History and 'Practicing'Historians," ournal of ModernHistory
65 (1993), 783-814; two issues of Storia della Storiografia Geschichteder Geschichtsschreibung)4
(1993) and 25 (1994) concerningWhite's Metahistory;PaulRicoeur, "Geschichteund Rhetorik,"n
Der Sinn des Historischen: GeschichtsphilosophischeDebatten,ed. H. Nagl-Docekal (Frankfurt m
Main, 1996), 107-126; RichardT. Vann et al., "Forum:Hayden White: Twenty-FiveYears On,"
History and Theory 37 (1998), 143-194. For Ankersmitcf. Hans Kellner,"Narrativityn History:
Post-structuralismand Since," History and Theory, Beiheft 26 (1987) (The Relpesentation ofHistorical Events), 18-22; Perez Zagorin, "Historiography nd Postmodernism:Reconsiderations,"
History and Theory 29 (1990), 263-296; and my "Het maskerzonder gezicht. F. R. Ankersmit's
filosofie van de geschiedschrijving,"Tijdschrift'oorGeschiedenis97 (1984), 169-194.
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First,White and Ankersmit ejectthe presupposition hat the narratios just a col-
lection of individual,descriptive tatementsand that its explanatory ogic can be
analyzed n these terms.Withregard o narratives his tenetof analyticalphiloso-phy is thus thrown n the philosophicalgarbagecan and replacedby the notion of
the autonomousnarrative.The narratios now introducedas an autonomous in-
guisticentity with formalproperties hattranscend he level of thedescriptive sin-
gularexistential)statement,although he narratio s built out of suchstatements.
White andAnkersmitarguefor the autonomyof the narrativebecause in their
view the narrativepossesses featuresthatcannot be reducedto those of its state-
ments. According to White the plot-structure of narratives is such a non-
reducible quality. Therefore White characterizesthe historicalnarrativeas an
"extendedmetaphor."4ccordingtoAnkersmit, he sameset of statementscan be
connected from differentpointsof view-with different nterpretations r narra-
tive substances (laterlabeled as historical representations5) as a result. The cru-
cial narrativisticmessage in this context is that neitherthe mode of emplotment
nor the viewpointcan be locatedin realitybutonly in the linguistic universeof
narrative. t is the historianwho imposes a linguistic, literarystructureon the
past in the past nothing real corresponds o it.6Whoeverforgets this will fallvictim to the "fictionsof factualrepresentation,"n White's famousphrase.'
4. White, "The HistoricalText as LiteraryArtifact," n Tropicsof Discourse, 91.
5. To prevent confusion it is essential to note from the outset that Ankersmit'sconcept of repre-
sentationis fundamentallydifferentfrom Rorty's. Rorty identifies representation n epistemology
with nirvro-ing objects in the mind of a knowing subject-and from therehe develops his own anti-
representationalistposition. Ankersmit, however, taking a lead from Gombrich, Goodman, and
Danto, identifies representationnot with mirroring,but with an unmodifiedway of substituting an
objectfor its
symbolic representation.As
soonas the
processof
representation s codified, it stopsbeing interestingas representation nd is relegatedto the domain of epistemology.
Rorty's concept of representation,however, is problematical,because all representation s repre-
sentationfor knowingsubjects.Fundamental or representations not mirroring,butmaintenanceof
structurewith a reductionand induction of complexity at the same time. See T. Mormann,"Ist der
6. White's argument s based on the presumeddifferencesof lives and stories. 'Lives are lived and
stories aretold," accordingto White (and Mink), who thereforeconcludethat(hi)storiesabout lives
must be structurally ifferent rom the lives themselvesand can't be realistically"copied" n the story
form. For a fundamental ritiqueof this remarkable rgument ee Carroll,"Interpretation, istoryand
Narrative,"144-145. In contrastto Ankersmit,White sometimes plays with the notion of "narrativetruth."t is evident, however, hat forWhite narrative ruthcannot be interpreted ccording o the cor-
respondence heoryof truthgiven his emphasison the impositionof literarystructuresby the histo-
Theory,"n Contentof the Formn,8, he merely statesthat his literaryanalysisof historywriting rais-
es "the more general question of the truth of literature tself."Furtherhe claims that ignoring the
"specifically iteraryaspectof historicalnarrative"eads to ignoring"whatever ruth t may convey in
figurative erms."Butbefore,on 46, he has stated:"Butthe 'truth'of narrative orm can display itself
only indirectly, hat is to say by means of allegoresis. What else could be involved in the representa-
tion of a set of real events as, for example, a tragedy,a comedy,or farce?"In "'Figuring he Nature
of the Times Deceased': LiteraryTheoryand HistoricalWriting," n The Futureof LiteraryTheory,ed. R. Cohen (New YorkandLondon, 1989), the same ambiguitypertains:"Storiesare told or writ-
ten, not found.And as for the notion of a 'true'story, this is virtuallya contradiction n termninis. ll
storiesarefictions. Whichmeans,of course,thattheycan be trueonly in a metaphorical ense andin
the sense in which a figureof speech can be true.Is this trueenough?"Cf. Carroll,"Interpretation,
HistoryandNarrative,"135-136.
7. White, "The Fictionsof FactualRepresentation,"n Tropicsof Discourse, 121-134.
Whenwe look at the metaphorical urn n narrative hilosophy of history in its
oppositionto this brandof positivism we can observean interesting eature:the
type of narrativismdefended by White and Ankersmit represents the simple
negation or reversal of the traditionalpositivistic view. Thereforeit shares its
fundamental onceptual structure.By this I refer to two characteristic onceptu-
al oppositions.First,both positions sharea specific argumentative ogic, which
RichardBernsteinaptly labeled the "either-or ogic,"alias the Cartesian Anxiety.
According to this (originally theological) argumentative cheme, arbitrariness
and chaos constitute heonly alternativesor a firmfoundation: itherknowledge
claims can be firmlyfoundedin empiricaldata,or claims to knowledgearearbi-
traryand a sheer figmentof imagination.Fantasy is thus presupposed o be theonly alternative or and only opposition to foundation.3 As we shall see, this
arguments usedby WhiteandAnkersmit o claim a non-cognitivestatusforhis-
toricalnarratives.Second, I referto the oppositionof literal to figurativeuses of
language.After all, positivismhadbannedall figurative,metaphoricaluse of lan-
guagefromscience-including history-because it presupposed hat,in contrast
to the literal,descriptive,or referentialuse of language(thatgives us information
aboutreality),metaphorical anguageconsisted of "merewords"(thatprovideno
informationaboutrealityat all). Thereforeonly the literal use of languagewas
regarded as cognitive and capable of being true or untrue. This opposition
between literal and metaphorical language-presupposed in positivism-is
retained n "metaphorical"arrativismn an inverted orm: now descriptivestate-
ments are treated as mere information, hardly worth a serious philosopher's
attention, and metaphorical language is upgraded to the real thing.14
A truenarrativeaccount, according to this view, is less a productof the historian'spoetic talents,as
the narrative ccountof imaginaryevents is conceivedto be, than t is the necessary resultof theprop-
er applicationof historical 'method.'The formof discourse, the narrative, dds nothing to thecontent
of the representation; ather t is a simulacrumof the structure nd processes of real events. And inso-
far as this representation esembles the events that it represents, t canbe taken as a true account."For
White's view on the relationshipbetween a chronicle and narrative ee 43: "In historical discourse,
the narrative erves to transform nto a storya list of historicalevents that would otherwise be only a
chronicle."It is most significant,however, to observethatthe first historianwho wrote a systematic
treatiseon "doing history,"Johann-GustavDroysen in his Historik,does not fit in this "traditional"
there is some support or our being, a fixed foundationfor our knowledge, or we cannot escape the
forces of darknessthatenvelop us with madness, with intellectual and moralchaos."An "anything
goes" skepticism, therefore, s the only alternative or foundationalism.
14. Cf. White, "TheQuestionof Narrativen ContemporaryHistoricalTheory," 8-49, on the rela-
tionshipbetweenliteral andfigurativeuse of languageand on the impossibilityof reducingthe latter
to the former. In the discussion with his critics in his more recent"LiteraryTheory and Historical
Writing,"22-33, White relativizesall the conceptual oppositions that are central to his tropological
theory between the literal andthe figurative,betweenreferentialandnon-referentialdimensionsof
language,and betweenfact and fiction and reinterpretshem in terms of a continituui. I shall argue,however,that the maintheses of metaphoricalnarrativism re dependenton the oppositionof the lit-
eralandthe figurativeandthe oppositionof thefacticityof literaland the "fictionality"of figurative
uses of language, because these oppositions are presupposed in White's either-or argumenta-
tion. A continuumjust won't do thejob. Cf. Kansteiner,"White'sCritique ofWriting of History,"
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Consequently,epistemologyand aesthetics tradeplaces in philosophyof history
as well: epistemology-up till thenregardedas the breadandbutterof analytical
philosophy of history-is thrownout and aestheticstakes its place.I5I shall argue
below that this is a consequenceof the fact that narrativism lso preservesa deepconceptual dichotomy, inherent in positivism, between "objective" empirical
observationand "subjective" nterpretation.Lingeringbehindthese opposites is
the classical contrastof foundationalismbetween epistemeand doxa, as I hope
to show.
The either-or logic just referred o can be seen at work in the way narrative s
analyzed in metaphoricalnarrativism: ither the narrativeof the historianis a
simple by-productof research,as the "traditional," ositivisticview would have
it, or it has nothing to do with researchat all. Either the narrativesof historians
are empiricallyfounded-as the "traditional," ositivistic view would have it-
or historical narrativeshave no empiricalfoundationsat all and are the product
of literary imagination.Either language is transparent nd referentialvis-a-vis
reality-as the "traditional," ositivisticview would have it-or language s self-
referentialand opaque.
The same logic of reversal can be seen at work in White's and Ankersmit's
positionswith regard o the truth-claimof narratives.Rejectingthe view thatthetruthof narrative s the by-productof historicalresearch, hey simply negatethe
truth-claimof narrativealtogether.This move should be resisted and criticized
since the presuppositionof the truthof historical narratives s crucial as long as
we presuppose hathistoryis a discipline andnot a form of art.
By invertingempiricism,however,both White andAnkersmithave atthe same
time retained t instead of rejectingit. This invertedempiricismfulfills a crucial
functionin metaphoricalnarrativism ecause the plausibilityof the fundamental
theses on the fictionalityof narrativitys completely dependenton its implicitcontrastwith empiricism.As Noel Carrollhas argued,White's identificationof
all interpretationwith imposition, imaginaryconstruction,andliterary nvention
presupposes the possibility of knowledge without interpretation-and that is
286, who also signals this problem in the later writings of White: "White's decision to introducea
more dialectical element into his structuralistmethodology implies a renegotiationof the status of the
fact with regard o the plot structuresof the historical text. Once the strict separationof the two lev-els is canceled,his earlierradicalepistemologicalrelativism s undermined.The proposedcontinuum
can be interpreted ll the way towardsthe pole of factual accuracy.Thus the possibility of represen-
tational transparency, hown out the frontdoor, returns hrough he back."
15. Ankersmitdraws this conclusion explicitly with his introductionof the vocabularyof repre-
sentationin the late 1980s. See Ankersmit,"HistoricalRepresentation,"n Historyand Tropology,102:"Thesuggestion [of the vocabularyof representation]s rather hat the historiancould meaning-
fully be comparedto the painter representinga landscape,a person, and so on. The implication is,
obviously, a plea for a rapprochement etween philosophyof history and aesthetics."See also 105-
106, where he identifies science with "codified representation" nd restricts epistemology to this
realm. Historical and artistic representation, owever,are"indifferento epistemology' accordingtoAnkersmit.By retaining epistemology for the domain of science he is distancinghis position from
Rorty's. See his "Van heorienaarverhaal.RichardRortyover taal en werkelijkheid,"n De machtvan
rep-esentatie, 183-218.
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empiricismpure and simple.In the same spirithis argument hat narrativesqual-
itate qua are fictional-because they do not mirror the past in the way pho-
tographsand replicas do-presupposes an empiricist picture theory of knowl-
edge and an empiricist theory of truthas directcorrespondence.'6 Carroll here-
fore is completely right to label White as a "closet empiricist,"n thrallto a bad
picture theory of language, but he does not fully recognize the crucial functions
of empiricism in White's philosophicalbuilding: without empiricism there sim-
ply areno plausible arguments or the basic tenets of metaphoricalnarrativism.
A similar criticism is applicable to Ankersmit'sbrandof metaphoricalnarra-
tivism. Ankersmit oo introduces he same remarkable, utdated,empiricist pic-
ture theory of knowledge as a contrastto his own position and in orderto lend
his metaphor heory plausibility and a philosophicalprofile."8 he same contrast
is offered between narrativesand replicas or mirrors n orderto deny the former
a cognitive status andto bridge the gap between history and literature."9n his
philosophytoo a remarkable implisticrealism is introducedn orderto discred-
it realistic interpretations f narrativesaltogether.20
16. See for instanceWhite, "HistoricalText as LiteraryArtifact," 8: "it is wrong to think of a his-tory as a model similar to a scale model of an airplaneor ship, a map, or a photograph.For we can
check the adequacyof this latterkind of model by going and looking at the original and, by applying
the necessary rules of translation, eeing in what respect the model has actually succeededin repro-
ducing aspects of the original."See furtherhis "Interpretationn History," n Topics of Discour-se,
51, where he refers to "traditional" istoriansand their idea that they have to interpret heir materials
"in order to construct he moving patternof images in which the form of the historicalprocess is to
be mitr-ved."See also his "The Question of Narrative n ContemporaryHistorical Theory,"27, on
"traditional" istorians:"The form of the discourse, the narrative, dds nothing to the content of the
representation; ather t is a siinulacr-unmf the content and processes of real events. And insofar as
this representationesembles the events it represents, t is a minmesisf the storylived in some regionof historical reality,and insofaras it is an accurate imitation,t is to be regardeda truthfulaccount
thereof' [my italics]. See also Carroll, "Interpretation,History and Narrative," 138-140, and
Bernstein's fundamentalcritiqueof metaphysicalrealism alias objectivism. Bernstein's observation
that this type of realism is "no live option" anymorehits the nail on the head.Thereforewe should
ask what functions this "dead"option fulfills in metaphoricalnarrativism.Cf. Bernstein, Beyond
Objectivismand Relativism,12.
17. Carroll, "Interpretation,History and Narrative,"147-148. I think Carroll's reference to the
'empiricist residue" 147) in White is therefore ncorrect.
18.Also in his laterwritingsAnkersmitkeeps identifying "scientific" anguage with "transparen-
cy" (alias "codified representation') in order to create a contrast with the nontransparency nd"opaqueness" f historical anguage(aliasunmodifieddepresentation").ee for instance"Historyand
Postmodernism" nd "HistoricalRepresentation"n his Histonyand TRopology.19. Ankersmit,NarrativeLogic, 91-92: "We cannot glimpse at history.We can only compareone
book with another ... We do not 'see' the past as it is, as we see a tree,a machineor a landscapeas
it is. We see the past only througha masqueradeof narrative tructures while behind this masquer-
ade there is nothingthathas a narrative tructure)." nd 19: "Nearest o the narratio s the novel and
amongstall kinds of novels it is, of course, the historicalnovel that comes closest to the narratio."
20. Ankersmit,NarrativeLogic, 83: "[The narrative ealist] regards he narratioas a kind of pic-
tureof the past: thereis a controllablecorrespondencebetweenphotographsandpictures taken as
a whole as well as in detail and thatpartof visible reality depicted by them. And it is believedthatthere is similarcorrespondencewith the past. I shall call the adherentsof this 'picturetheory'narra-
tive realists. Narrative dealism,on the otherhand, rejectsthe picture theory.'No wonder,following
Ankersmit,even Popperends up being labeled as a "scientific dealist."See Narrnativeogic, 97.
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Empiricismalso shows up in White's and Ankersmit'srepresentationof his-
toricalresearch.Since they contrastnarrative o researchand defend an inverted
empiricism for the level of narrative his was to be expected. In White's case
empiricism can even be traced in his terminology when he refers to historical
events as "elements"and to stories as "compositions"of these elements in his
introduction o Metahistory.21 is wording in this context is important.He refers
to events and not to facts; in this way he eschews the problem of interpretation
at the level of research,because contrary o events facts have to be stated in fac-
tual statements.Since he identifiesinterpretationwith narrativizingand fiction-
alizingthis is theonly way he canescapethetantalizingconclusion that facts are
fictional.22The "omission" of the problem of interpretationat the level ofresearch n White's narrativism herefore s far from accidental.23
21. White, Metahistoty, 5: "First he elements of the historical field are organized nto a chronicle
by the arrangement f the events to be dealt with in the temporalorderof their occurrence; hen the
chronicle is organized nto a story by the furtherarrangement f the events into thecomponentsof a
'spectacle' or process of happening,which is thought o possess a discerniblebeginning, middle, and
end."In the same spirit he refers in a recent text to (archival)"information" oncerning past events
thathas to be processed n "historicaldiscourse" n order o become "historical."Cf. White, "Literary
Theory and Historical Writing,"20, and Kansteiner,"White's Critique of the Writing of History,"
284: "Onthe level of the single event/factWhite retainsanelement of positivist stabilitywhich stands
in contrast o the epistemological arbitrarinesshat he posits on the second level, the level of the con-
ceptual frameworkof the historical writing."
White, however,keeps waveringon this issue, because later he sometimes resortsto an anti-posi-
tivistic, Nietzscheanposition. Cf. his "Fictionsof FactualRepresentation," 27-128:"there s no such
thing as a single correctdescriptionof anything,on the basis of which an interpretation f thatthing
can subsequentlybe broughtto bear. . . . All original descriptions of any field of phenomena are
already nterpretations f its structure...."
22. White sometimescomes close to admitting his paradoxicalconsequenceof his position. SeeH. White, "A Rejoinder: A Response to Professor Chartier's Four Questions," Storia della
event, person, process, relationship,or what have you into a 'function'of a discourse without 'fic-
tionalizing' it, by which I mean 'figurating' t. The translationof the stuff of reality into the stuff of
discourse is a fictionalizing." n "LiteraryTheoryand HistoricalWriting"White,however, explicitly
denies that he obliteratesthe distinction between fact and fiction, althoughit is not clear on what
grounds(35). Now he defends tropological analysisto the point of almost equating t with an episte-
mological positionone could derive fromE. H. Carr's What s History?In the same move, however,
the emphasis s now shiftedfrom thefictionalityof figuration o its factuality, hus addingto the exist-
ing ambiguity n this matter:"Ifthere is no such thing as 'raw facts,' but only events under differentdescriptions,then factualitybecomes a matterdescriptive protocols used to transformevents into
facts. Figurativedescriptionsof real events are not less 'factual'-or, as I would put it, 'factologi-
cal'-in a differentway. Tropological heory implies that we mustnot confuse 'facts' with 'events."'
"Who would confuse them in 1990?"seems to me a legitimate question.
For criticism of this type of use of the term "fiction"cf. Ann Rigney, "SemanticSlides: History
and the Concept of Fiction," in History Making: The Intellectual and Social Formation of a
Discipline, ed. R. Thorstendahl ndI. Veit-Brause Stockholm, 1996), 31-47.
23. In "LiteraryTheoryandHistoricalWriting"White stateson 20: "Historicaldiscoursedoes not,
then, producenew informationabout the past, since the possession of bothold and new information
about the past is a preconditionof the compositionof such a discourse.Nor can it be said to providenew knowledge about the past insofar as knowledge is conceived to be a productof a distinctive
method of inquiry.What historical discourse producesare interpretationsof whateverinformation
aboutandknowledge of the pastthe historiancommands."On 21 he explicitly characterizes"histor-
ical discourse as interpretation nd historicalinterpretation s narrativization."n "Interpretationn
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In Ankersmit'scase too empiricism lurks in his representationof historical
research.Afterelaboratingon the similar statusof scientifictheories and histor-
ical narratives,he halts the trainat the same station as Whitedoes and probably
for the same reasons: he simply asserts thatthe "theory-ladenness f empirical
facts" does not apply to historicalfacts ... because "historiansalways use a-the-
oretical, ordinaryanguage."24n empiricistrepresentation f historicalresearch
thus turns out to represent he epistemological flipsideof a metaphorical epre-
sentationof the historicalnarrative. n its zeal to redressthe "traditional"denti-
fication of professionalhistorywith the applicationof researchmethods and in
its neglect of history writing,metaphoricalnarrativism nds up omitting histori-
cal researchaltogether rom the discipline'sidentifyingcharacteristics.25
III.NARRATIVISMAS INVERTEDPOSITIVISM 2):
NARRATIVISMAS AN INVERSIONOF THE COVERING-LAWVIEWOF EXPLANATION
The firstconsequence of the "metaphoricalurn" rom an explanatorypoint of
view is the most importantone, namely,the narratios bornas a linguisticentity
independentof the individual statements t contains.26The claim that these nar-
ratiosat the same time constitutethe explanationsof what is described by theirstatements s a break with-and reversalof-the covering-lawview of explana-
tion. Ankersmit'sargumentson this issue are more explicit than White's and
thereforeI will firstanalyzehis line of reasoning.
Ankersmit'sclaim that narrativesare self-explanatory, ust as metaphorsare,
is founded on his characterization f historicalinterpretations-labeled by him
as narrative substancesor "Nss"-as self-referential.This somewhatparadoxi-
cal characteristic ollows from the conceptualstrategyI signaledbefore, thatis,
the separationof history writing from historical research. Historicalresearch,
ideally, producestrue singular,descriptivestatementswhich refer to pastreality,
and historical narrativesconsist of collections of those statements. Far more
important o Ankersmit s the point-of-view function of narratives,which is the
productof the way the historianorganizes the descriptivetruestatements nto a
narrativewhole or Ns. Every Ns is defined by the sum total of these singular
History,"58-59, White shunsthe problemof interpretation t the level of research n the ambiguous
statement hat "thereare at least [my italics] two levels of interpretationn everyhistoricalwork:one
in which the historian constitutesa story out of the chronicle of events and another n which, by a
morefundamentalnarrative echnique,he progressively dentifies he kindof storyhe is telling-com-
edy, tragedy,romance, epic, or satire, as the case might be." Cf. Alex Callinicos, Theories and
Narratives:Reflectionson the Philosophy of History(Cambridge,Eng., 1995), 76-78.
24. Ankersmit,NarrativeLogic, 230-231.
25. It shouldbe notedthatAnkersmitacknowledges hecomplementarity f the philosophyof his-
toricalnarrativeand the philosophy of historicalresearch,but he remains silent abouttheir relation-
ship.Cf. Ankersmit,NarrativeLogic, 6-9, andhis History and Tropology,2-6.
26. See, however, Gorman'scritiqueof Ankersmit's extual holism in J. Gorman,"Philosophical
Fascinationwith Whole HistoricalTexts,"review of Ankersmit'sHistory at-d Tropology, n History
and Theory36 (1997), 406-415.
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statements:altering one statementwould yield a different Ns. Therefore every
singularstatementcontainedby a Ns is a logical propertyof the Ns because it is
necessary for its identity.Therefore he narrativistuniverse is basically identicalto the universe of Leibniz's monads, in which a logical-and thus necessary-
harmonyreigns supreme:narratives n their point-of-view capacity cannot con-
tradictone another,according o Ankersmit,but can only be different.The unique
identity that the proponentsof classical Historismusmistakenlyattributed o his-
torical reality itself therefore should be attributed o historical narratives,so
Ankersmitargues.
Ankersmit'snext and crucial move is the deduction of an explanatoryneces-
sity fromthe logical necessity in the narrativistic-linguistic-universe: "Thus,when the past (i.e. not Nss) is described n terms (of the narrative tatements)of
Nss, we can say that the past has been explained, because the Nss embodying
such an explanationcould not have been different.The explanandum i.e. what
falls withinthe scope of a Ns) is explained by what defines the narratio's cope
(i.e. thestatementscontained n a narratio)."27"Nowwe knowwhatwas the cause
of theechec of theCoveringLaw Model: a set of singularstatementsmaybe suf-
ficient to give a historicalexplanation."28
Along withempirical awsAnkersmit'snarrativism liminates the principleof
causality from its explanatory ogic: "Historicalunderstandings achieved by
describing the past with the help of a strong and vigorousNs and not by the dis-
accordingto White these explanationsdo not belong to the narrativeproperbut
only to the chronicle, that is, the type of orderthat events possess before they are
properly"narrativized" y the historian."To all appearancesWhite incorporatesthis level of explanation n the phase of researchand this could explain why any
furtheranalysis is missing.
The same holds for the striking act thatinWhite's philosophy there's no con-
nection whatsoeverbetween these explanationsbelongingto the level of chroni-
cle and White's three types of narrative xplanation.Elucidating what types of
relationships we encounter in history he consequently restricts his analysis to
narrativerelationships localized-in a surprisingly Collingwoodian spirit in
the historian'smind:"Histories, hen,are not only aboutevents but also aboutthepossible sets of relationships that those events can be demonstrated o figure.
These sets of relationshipsare not,however, mmanent n the eventsthemselves;
they exist only in the mind of the historian reflecting on them."32Just like
Ankersmit's,White's narrativism oo is susceptible to a strongpull of idealism.33
As is well known, White's threefoldschematizationof quadripartite xplana-
tory strategiesresultsin twelve explanatorycombinations.But because he does
not claim that his scheme is exhaustiveof explanatorypracticesin historythere
might be many more.34So Paul Ricoeur hits the nail on the head in remarking
thatWhite'snarrativismn the end leads to a "tropologicalnflation" hatmay be
interpretedas anotherway of invertingthe covering-law model of explanation,
Insteadof instructinghistorianshow to follow The Pathof Real Science, White
instructs hem that all strivingfor scientific explanationand foundation s futile,
because all they will achieve in the end is self-createdlinguistic constructions
imposedon a chaos of (archival)"information."35
31. White, "The Question of Narrative n ContemporaryHistoricalTheory," 5: "But such assess-
ments [explanations] ouch only that aspect of the historicaldiscourseconventionallycalled its chron-
icle. It does not provide us with any way of assessing the contentof narrative tself." As Callinicos
has stressed,White wavers between the idea that events present hemselvesto the historian n a com-
pletely unstructured, haotic form before they are "narrativized"nd the idea that they presentthem-
selves in their temporalorder,as a chronicle. Cf. Callinicos, Theoriesand Narrativhes,4-75.
32. White, "HistoricalText as LiteraryArtifact,"94. Cf. Ankersmit,NatrrativeLogic, 117 on nar-
rative substances:"Nss function only at the level of words"andthereforeare non-referential.
33. In History aind TRopology,107, Ankersmit claims that the vocabulary of representation s
"beyond"he problemof realism versusidealismand that this problem s only createdby andin epis-temology. Implicitlyhe thusrejects "narrativedealism"as developed originallyin Narr-ativeLogic:
"The inestimablepositive achievementof epistemology has been to create in the transcendental go
the indispensableplatform hat is a prerequisite or all science. Its limitation,however, has been that
in attributing ll cognitive primacy o the transcendental go it has effected the melting away of both
reality itself and the representationn art and history. Epistemologyhas thus created the unpleasant
dilemma of having to choose between a realisticand an idealistic interpretation f scientificknowl-
edge. Moreover, he representation f reality by the individualcognitive subjectthat is not reducible
to a transcendental go has since been seen as a doubtfulenterprise roma cognitive point of view."
The "price"Ankersmit is paying for placing metaphoricalnarrativism"beyond" he dichotomy of
thesis of a "hidden mpiricism" nWhite's andAnkersmit'srepresentation f his-
torical researchis correct, and if I am also correct that their conceptions of
metaphorical explanation are developed in direct contrast with this "hidden
empiricism'-and thereforearedependenton it-then we can easily understandwhy metaphoricalexplanation s conceived as purely linguistic and why narra-
tivism provides no connection between metaphoricalexplanation and factual
research.
Whiterepresents he most seriouscase in this respectbecause he explicitly and
frequentlycontrastsknowledge o interpretationwhenhe identifies nterpretation
with narrativizingand "fictionalizing."This contrastharks back to the classical
opposition of epistemology to hermeneutics,which is again derivedfrom the
classical oppositionbetweenepisteine and doxa. As Tom Rockmorepointedoutin relation to Gadamer'shermeneutics, his classical opposition denies interpre-
tationthe statusof a scientific cognitive operationand restricts it to subjective
conviction. And as he points out, this oppositionpresupposes n its turnthe clas-
sical identification of knowledge with founded, "absolute"knowledge.40 This
basic conceptual opposition in White's metaphoricalnarrativism eads to his
abandonmentof epistemology and rationality.Because White presupposes that
narrative, nterpretive trategiesare non-cognitive,the choice between different
narrativeexplanations cannot be relatedto factual argumentsand be rational.
Explanationaccording o White, therefore,must be a purely linguisticoperation,
guided by aesthetic or moral criteria:otherwise the epistemological problemof
representational dequacywould return o hauntWhite's agenda. Thus, it is not
accidental hathis narrativism oes not containanyepistemologicalcriteriaother
thantruth n its correspondence ense. For if a relationshipbetween the narrative
and factual levels were established,White's narrativism at least in its original
form would face major nconsistencies.In the end the fundamentalproblemwith White's narrativism onsists of its
continuing implicit alliance to foundationalismand its inseparablecompanion,
skepticism(skepticismbecause arbitrariness resents tself as theonly alternative
40. T. Rockmore,"Epistemologyas Hermeneutics,"The Monist 73 (1990), 116.
41. White, Metahistoty, xii, 4, 20, 26. For White's problems n this case, see the conclusion of the
present article and Kansteiner in note 14. For the absence of epistemological criteria other than
"truth," ee Carroll,"Interpretation,History and Narrative,"160-161: "To be an adequatenarrative,indeed to be an adequatehistoricalaccountof any sort, a candidateneeds to do more than merely state
the truth(indeed, an historicalaccount could containonly true statementsand be judged unaccept-
able). It must also meet variousstandards f objectivity.""Likeany othercognitive enterprise,histor-
ical narrationwill be assessed in terms of rationalstandardswhich, though theyareendorsedbecause
they appear o be reliableguides to the truth,are not reducibleto the standardof truth."Whiteover-
looks the possibility of objective standards-like comprehensiveness-that are "truthtracking":
"Thus, n evaluating he selections and deletions the narrativehistorianmakes, we need not feel that
we must embracesome specialstandard f truth, ike metaphoricalruth.Rather,ourconcernwith his-
torical narratives s thatthey be true in the ordinarysense of truthand that our assessments of their
adequacy in terms of standards like comprehensiveness are keyed to determining truth." Cf.McCullaghon elucidationof truthand fairness as criteria or historicalknowledgein his The Truthof
Histoi-, 13-62.
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to knowledge based on a firm foundation).42 een in that light it is not so strange
that White's concept of interpretationmanifests a striking similarityto the "tra-
ditional"concept of interpretation e set out to combat: n both concepts, empir-ically founded knowledge and interpretation ppear as opposites.43This is the
inevitableconsequence of linking both knowledge and rationalityexclusively to
nonexisting infallible foundations of knowledge (such as truth in the picture-
theory sense). (As I will show shortly,as soon as we enter the world of real nar-
ratives,however, we only encounterfallible and competingknowledge claims-
andthis holds for individualstatementsas well as for narrativesas wholes.)
Ankersmit ravels a similartrajectoryas White and ends up with similarprob-
lems. He too constructs an opposition between knowledge and interpretationwhile absorbing nterpretationn aesthetics.44Therefore t is not accidental that
siderabledifferences.Also in his case theexplanatorypower of narrativess con-
ceptualized on the linguistic level since Nss are purely linguistic instruments.
This means that narrative explanation is conceptualized as an interrelationship
between statements and not as a relationshipbetween statementsand reality.45
And because statements can be interrelated n many different ways, there is
always a pluralityof narrative xplanationsof the same set of factual statements.
Of course,thecovering-lawmodelof explanation s also formal,becauseit states
the formal criteriathat must be satisfied for an argument o count as a scientific
explanation.However, the empirical adequacyof this formalmodel of explana-
tion is guaranteedbecause its explanans contains an empirical law,from which
theexplanandurms logically deduced(in combinationwith the statementsof ini-
tial conditions). By means of a causal mechanismthe formalmodel is anchored
in empiricalreality,so to speak (at least in covering-lawtheory).46n the case of
42. White's critiqueof "empiricism" ecently has been elevated to the agendaof a new journal,
RethinkingHistory (first issue, Spring 1997). Refuting "empiricism" n history is becoming a boom-
ing industry.See the "Editorial"n the first issue by Alan Munslow; KeithJenkins,"Introduction:On
Being Open about Our Closures," n The PostmodernHistoryReader,ed. Keith Jenkins(London and
New York, 1997), 1-36; and K. Jenkins, On "What s Historv?":FriomCarr and Elton to Rortyand
White London and New York, 1995).
43. Cf. White, "Interpretationn History," 5, where he describeshis competitors n philosophyof
history as theoristswho grant hat "interpretationmay enter nto the historian'saccount of the past at
some point and recommend hat historians ryto distinguishbetween those aspects of theiraccountsthat are empiricallyfounded and those based on interpretative trategies."
44. See note 5. Withregard o the relationshipof hermeneutics-and thus interpretation- to aes-
thetics,Ankersmitdistanceshis position clearlyfromGadamer's.See his "HistoricalRepresentation,"
102: "Meaninghas two components: he world, and the insight that it can be representedn a certain
way, that it can be seen from a certainpoint of view. We mustthereforedisagreewith the hierarchi-
cal order of representationand hermeneuticswhen he [Gadamer]writes that 'aesthetics has to be
absorbed nto hermeneutics.'The reverse is in fact true: aesthetics,as the philosophyof representa-
tion, precedesthat of interpretation ndis the basis for explaininginterpretation."
45. Ankersmit'scomparisonof historywith a natural cience thatonly disposes of (formal)math-
ematics and not of (empirical)experimentalmeansto test theadequacyof its theories bringsthe same
point home. Cf. his "De activiteitvan de historicus," n Hermeneutiek n culture Interpretatie n cle
kunst-en cultuurwvetenschappen,d. F. R. Ankersmitet al. (MeppelandAmsterdam,1995), 94-95.
46. There is no need here to questionthe statusof the covering-lawmodel itself nor its relation-
ship to the disciplineof history,because my only point is its relationship o the metaphoricalmodel
Thi t t d l d d f 189 15 134 113 M 8 J l 2013 10 54 30 AM
cannot regardmetaphoricalphilosophy of history as an adequateanalysis of his-
torical practice.The best we can do is try to learn from its mistakes and to ana-
lyze where its subjectivisticdrift stems from. This observation eads me to my
conclusion.
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued that the subjectivisticdrift of metaphoricalnarrativephilosophy
can be explained by its reversalof the two brandsof positivismI identified ear-
lier on, the positivism of factsand the positivism of covering-lawexplanation.As
both forms of positivism were derived fromthe dominant mage of naturalsci-ence, metaphoricalnarrativism wes its fundamental haracteristics o its rever-
sal of the nineteenth-century aturalscience model. So in a sense the ghosts of
Hume, Comte, and Hempel still hauntphilosophy of history,albeitin a negative
shape. As I have argued,the attackon both flanks of positivismhelps to explain
the fundamental raitsof metaphoricalnarrativism ndespeciallyits drifttowards
fictionalism and towardsthe mistaken parallelism of historyand literature.For
although metaphoricalnarrativism urely deserves credit for the rediscoveryy
that historiansproducetexts and thathistorythereforepossesses textual aspects,it is equally mistaken n its essential identificationof history with its textualqual-
ities (althoughWhiteis not entirely consistent on this score given his critiqueof
textualismin Foucault and Derrida).49 his is so because of a trivial but funda-
mental fact, namely, that history, contrary to all fictional literature, s always
about somethingoutside the text-the real past.This referentialquality of his-
torical narrativesexplainswhy the constructionof narratives boutthe past is an
activitywithdisciplinary, ntersubjective ontrols,becausetheways in which we
refer with wordsto thingsareintersubjective.The fact that reference s not self-
evident cannot be regardedas an argumentcontrathe referentialqualityof lan-
guage because reference is never a simple given.50 f this were to count as an
argumentone could on the same grounds argue againstthe reference of individ-
ual statements-in historyas well as all empiricalsciences (a position not even
White or Ankersmitsupports).
The same appliesfor the notion of truth, or the idea that the truthof individ-
ual statements-in contrast o the truthof a narrative-is self-evident andbeyonddebate,as picturetheories of knowledge suggest, cannotbe upheld.At both lev-
els the establishmentof truthandfalsity is dependenton fallible, intersubjective
conventions;the difference between individual statementsand complete narra-
49. Cf. White, "The Absurdist Moment in Contemporary Literary Theory," in Tropics of
tives is thereforea differencein degree and not in kind.51But, as stated earlier,
truthby itself is-contrary to what White and Ankersmitsuggest on the basis of
theirpicturetheory of knowledge-not a very exciting epistemological criterion,
although t is a constitutivevalue for cognitive activity as such. This is the con-
sequence of the fact that since episteme proved to be a false ideal, its distinction
with doxa has evaporated,and fallibilistic truth-theorieshave taken the place of
foundationalismandits picture theories of truth.This means that since Popper's
Logik der Forschung n 1934 epistemology has exchanged its interest in direct
truth-criteria or criteria to assess the relative quality of claims to truth alias
knowledgeclaims(in the form of theories,research-programs, aradigms,ornar-
ratives). With this goal epistemology has developed truth-tracking riteria-to
use Carroll'sapt phrase-such as scope, explanatorypower, comprehensiveness,
and so on and these are the criteria hatreallymatterwheneverwe want to assess
rival knowledge claims. Being true means somethingrather rivial ike "in accor-
dance with the known facts and not(yet) falsified,"but truth n this sense is mere-
ly a necessary and not a sufficientcondition for cognitive quality.52 his applies
to individualstatementsas well as to completenarratives nd theories.
Neither at the level of individualdescriptivestatementsnor at the level of thenarrativeorganizationof those statements s it possible to disentanglethe refer-
ential, descriptive rom the metaphorical,point-of-view function,because all lin-
guistic representationsof reality at the same time constitutepoints of view at
reality, recognizedas such or not. The singular descriptive statements"In 1997
freedom fightersin Zaire succeeded in ending Mobutu'scorruptdictatorship"
and"In1997rebels in Zaire succeededin overthrowingpresidentMobutu's egit-
imategovernment"bothcarry points of view, just as would complete narratives
on the subject.At both levels it is not thepresence or absence (the either-or)ofa point of view that matters-there is no viewfrom nowhere in both cases. Both
White and Ankersmitseem to hold thatthe pointsof view at the level of singu-
lar descriptive statementsare uncontestableand that the opposite is the case at
the level of total narratives.Theirargument hatthe notion of truthonly applies
to individualdescriptive tatements ollows directly rom thispresupposition. hey
fail to adduceany argument, owever,why we shouldfollow this, by nowfamiliar,
either-orscheme.Again, as long as there are differences n this respectbetween
statementsandnarratives,hesedifferencesare in degreeand not in kind.5351. The identificationof conventional and arbitrary, ften encountered n postmodernistcircles,
should be resisted by all means-unless one is prepared o label all of natural cience as arbitrary. s
Popper pointed out in 1934, even the acceptance of the most elementaryobservationalstatements
(Protokol-or Basissdtze) requiresconventionaldecisions by the scientificcommunity.See Criticism
and the Growthof Knowledge, ed. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Cambridge,Eng., 1970), esp. 102-
116 for the discussion on conventionalism n naturalscience in relationto the debate on Thomas
Kuhn's Structureof ScientificRevolutions.
52. Cf. Nelson Goodman, Waysof WorldinakingIndianapolis,1978), 18: "Truth, ar from being
a solemn and severe master, s a docile and obedient servant.The scientistwho supposes that he is
single-mindedlydedicated to the search for truthdeceives himself. He is unconcernedwith the triv-
ial truthshe could grindout endlessly;andhe looks to the multifacetedand irregular esults of obser-
vations for little more than suggestions of overall structures nd significantgeneralizations.He seeks
system, simplicity, scope; and when satisfiedon these scores he tailors truth o fit."
53. McCullaghargues along similar ines regarding he truthconditionsof metaphorical anguage.
See his The Truthof History,62-82.
Thi d l d d f 189 15 134 113 M 8 J l 2013 10 54 30 AM
The complexity of the notion of truth n the case of narratives or scientific the-
ories) cannotbe used as an argumentagainst t, for as long as we presuppose hat
historicalnarratives efer to a real past and thus representknowledge of the past,
historicalnarratives onstitutetruth-claims hat must be elucidatedand not anni-
hilated by philosophy of history.54How these claims are justified in practice is
anotherproblemthat need not botherus here because the meaning and the estab-
lishment of truth are distinct problems. This holds for individual statementsas
well as for narratives.
The importanceof the intersubjective haracterof the rules of "doing history"
in contrast o "doing literature" annot be overemphasizedbecause it constitutes
history's distinguishing hallmark as an empirical discipline. In contrast to
authorsof fiction,historiansdeal with anobjectand with definitionsof theobject
that are open to public scrutiny and debate.And so is the evidence they use to
back up theirarguments,because as a consequence of the public character f his-
tory historical narratives annotjust be presented, as aretheirfictionalcounter-
parts, but they standin need of constant empirical and logical backing.55These
characteristicsare manifest in the old habit of historians,contrary o all authors
of fiction,of criticizingone anotherfor the empiricaland conceptual nadequa-
cies of their stories as a whole and notjust for the individual statementsnarra-tives contain.In the recent debateon Goldhagen'sHitler'sWillingExecutioners,
for instance,one problemis the adequacyof the point of view embodiedin his
narrative ather han merely the truthof the individualstatements.
Itis the rule-govemedharacterf history hatmakes t an intersubjectiventerprise,
as the formernarrativist ionel Gossmanhas emphasized: Historians o apparently
believe hat hereareprocedures f verification ndcriteriaor udgingbetweendiffer-
enthypotheses ndnarratives."Modemhistoriography,ike modemscience, s apro-
fers from neoclassical r Romantichistoriography."56Itis not accidental hatmany
postmodernistsegardRomantic istoriographys theparadigm f all historywriting.)57
It is this permanentnecessity of argument as a consequenceof historicalnar-
ratives'truth-claims)hatexplains why there is such a thing as historical debate
which keeps the motorof history as a discipline running.And this is where the
rationalityof history can be localized, as Lionel Gossman,Allan Megill, and
54. In this respectDavidCooper's emarks n metaphor nd ruth re mportant. oopercriticizes hose
theoriesof metaphor ndtruth hat ail to elucidatewhy truth s a fundamental alueguidingourcognitive
activities.See his "Truth nd Metaphor,"n Knowledge ndLanguage,ed. Ankersmit ndMooij, 37-49.
55. This aspect of history is also stressed by Megill, "Recounting he Past."
56. Cf. L. Gossman, "The Rationalityof History," n BetweenHistoty and Literature,313, 315.
See also 309: "The way historianscommunicatewith each other and criticize each other's work sug-
gests that they indeed expect their colleagues to be able to recognize the force of contraryarguments
and narratives o adjusttheir own accordingly-either by developing answers to these argumentsor
by revising their own." See also A. Megill and D. McCloskey, "The Rhetoric of History," n The
Rhetoric of the Human Sciences: Language and Argument n Scholarship and Public affairs, ed. J.Nelson, A. Megill and D. McCloskey (Madison, 1987), 228, 235.
57. Cf. my Konstruktionder Vergangenheit,177-187, and F. R. Ankersmit, "The Origins of
PostmodernistHistoriography,"n Historiographybetween Modernism and Postmodernism, d. J.
Topolski(AmsterdamandAtlanta, 1994), 107-119.
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Paul Ricoeuralso have emphasizedrecently."8 o if history s characterized y its
narrative orm alone one disregards he fuel of its motor:historiansdon't claim
to presentjust a story but a true story,and this truth-claim s its distinguishinghallmark.The basic problemwith metaphoricalnarrativismas a philosophy of
history is that it does not account for this difference, although of course it
acknowledgesthe truth-claimof the individual statementscontained n a histor-
ical story.
In the end this neglect can be tracedback to the inabilityof metaphoricalnar-
rativism to connect history writing with historical research.Both White and
Ankersmitdisconnect,as we observed, the referential,descriptive,or literal con-
tent of metaphorsand the non-referential r figurativecontentof metaphors;andboth authors dentify the constructionof narrative xclusively with the non-ref-
erentialaspects.As a consequence of this split the problemsof truthandrefer-
ence arerelegated solely to the phase of researchwhile the problemof the rela-
tionship between research and narrativedisappearsin a philosophical black
hole.59
The disappearance f the relationshipbetween researchand narrative s in my
opinion fatal for any philosophy of history,since the dynamicsof history can
only be found in the relationshipbetween researchand narrative.60 therwise
why would historiansbotherabout research at all?6' Therefore, t is significant
thatin a confrontationbetween White's narrativism nd practicinghistorians-a
confrontationarisingout of the historiography f the Holocaust-White's theo-
ry got into very seriousproblems.Manyof White's crucialdistinctions,such as
the distinction between chronicle and narrativeand between "non-narrativized"
eventsin researchandtheir ater"narrativization"n history writing,weresevere-
ly criticizedby historianssuch as ChristopherBrowning,MartinJay,andCarloGinzburg.62White's narrativism s built on two distinctionsthatdo not show up
58. Cf. note 56. For Ricoeursee his "Geschichteund Rhetorik."
59. The restorationof this relationship is also Ricoeur's main objective in "Geschichte und
Rhetorik."He concludes thatthe connection betweenthe two componentsof classical rhetoric-the
theory of argumentation nd the theoryof tropes-is dissected by White. By identifying historywrit-
ing only with.tropologyWhite turnsa blind eye on its argumentative oundationsand its relationship
with the researchof past realityand searchfor truth.As a resulthistorywriting s cut loose from epis-
temology andultimatelydissolves in the tropologicalhalf of rhetoric.Ricoeur thereforepleads for a
systematicconnectionbetweenboth componentsof classical rhetoricand a rehabilitation f the epis-temological dimensionsof history.
60. I have analyzed this relationship and the dynamics of a historiographicaldiscussion in
"BeyondGoodandEvil? The GermanEmpireof 1871 and ModernGermanHistoriography,"ournal
of ContemporaryHistory30 (1995), 729-765.
61. Ankersmit,"HistoryandPostmodernism," 72, comes close to denyingthe role of research n
postmodernisthistory by completely dissolving historyin the interpretation f other interpretations:
"Themodernisthistorianfollows a line of reasoningfrom his sources and evidence to an historical
reality hiddenbehind the sources. On the otherhand, in the postmodernistview, evidence does not
pointtowards hepast butto otherinterpretations f the past;for thatis what we in fact use evidence
for.To expressthis by meansof imagery:for the modernist, he evidence is a tile which he picks up
to see what is underneath t; for the postmodernist,on the otherhand,it is a tile which he steps on in
orderto move on to other tiles: horizontality nsteadof verticality."
62. I am referring o theiressays in Probingthe Limits of Representation:Nazismnnd the "Final
Solution, ed. S. Friedlknder(Cambridge,Mass., 1992). See C. Browning, "German Memory,
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over the past half-century, here is no clean distinction between 'facts' and 'interpretation,'n which
the latteremerges as self-evident or is constructedout of the undisputed aw materialsof the former."
"For he history of one day in Jozefow, as for all history,virtuallyevery 'fact' was an act of interpre-
tation in itself, which is to say that it resulted from a judgment of the historian.""Although would
not disagree that t is the plot that determines he narrative, would add that the questions being posed
shape the plot and narrative ogether.""In my view there are no distinct and separatecategories of
attestable act on the one hand and pure interpretation n the other. Ratherthere is a spectrumor a
continuum."Cf. also M. Jay, "Of Plots, Witnesses and Judgments," n Probing the Limits, ed.Friedldnder, 05: "Another onsiderationalso militates against the unfettered reedom of historians o
narrativizearbitrarily, nd this concerns the communityof others that reads and judges theirwork."
"It is not so much the subjective imposition of meaning, but rather he intersubjective udgmentof
meanings that matters."See also Kansteiner,"White'sCritiqueof the Writing of History,"290-293.
63. White, "HistoricalEmplotment and the Problem of Truth," n Probing the Limits, ed.
Friedlinder,40.
64. In "HistoricalText as LiteraryArtifact,"85, White has significantly"softenedup"his original
position without giving it up: "The importantpoint is that most [my italics] historical sequences can
be emplotted in a numberof differentways...." Ankersmit'sargumentconcerningthe explanatory
power of narratives uns into similar problems as White's. On the one hand Ankersmitclaims thatevery Ns is explanatoryby definition,on the other hand he states in NarrativeLogic, 246, that a Ns
or a set of singularstatements"maybe [my italics] sufficient" o give a historicalexplanation.
65. For theconceptionof LakoffandJohnsonsee C. Forceville,PictorialMetaphor nAdvertising
(Wageningen,1994), 27-32; for Hesse's conception, see M. Hesse, "Models, Metaphorsand Truth,"
in Knowledge and Language, ed. Ankersmitand Mooij, 50-67.
urativeuse of language doesn't hold water. Mary Hesse has defended this view
which is a defense of realismat the same time: "Justas observation anguage is
theoretical and analogical through and through, but is still the basis for realistdescriptionsandcognitive inference,so I shall now arguethat natural anguage
is metaphoricalthrough and through, and yet has cognitive meaning." "I am
going to arguethatmetaphoricmeanings have logical priorityover literal mean-
ings in a way analogousto the priorityof theoreticalover 'observational'mean-
ings in science."66 his view is based on the argument hat all types of metaphors
are built into our ordinary descriptive language.A descriptive statement like
"White's theory has no solid foundationin historiography"hides the built-in
metaphor"Theoriesare like buildings."The circumstance hatmany metaphorsare not (any longer) recognized as such does not alter this fact. The enormous
advantageof this type of analysisof metaphor s that it does not contradict he
truth-claimof historical narrativeson a priori groundsand does not implicate
any a priori view on the explanatorypowerof narrativeas such.67
In my view the truth-claimsof history vis-a-vis literature emainessential and
thereforecannot be treatedas accidental.This crucial difference should prevent
philosophersfrom treating history and fiction as two exemplarsof the same
species, that of the narrative,of which the historicalstory, ideally, just happens
to be somehow connected to the search for truth. For whenever this happens
philosophersof historyend up on the wrongtrack.The stylistic or other textual
aspects of history writing then are substituted or history itself, and the philo-
sophical resultof this substitution, s thatphilosophyof history is treated as a
branchof aestheticsor of literarytheory.This is essentially what has happened
duringthe last two decades and therefore t is no coincidence thatmany (perhaps
even most) books on philosophyof history nowadaysareproduced n literaturedepartments.68
So paradoxically,n thelastanalysis he fundamental roblemwithmetaphorical
philosophyof historyturnsout to be, all its attention or the linguisticdimensions
of historynotwithstanding,hatit has forgotten o elucidatethe linguisticrootsof
the word"history"tself. For theoriginalmeaningof theGreekwordhistoria s not
story,butinquiry.Andtherefore,wheneverhistoricalnarratives re characterized s
"true tories,"heemphasisshouldbe puton the adjectiveand not on the noun.
University of Leiden / Free University of Amsterdam
66. Hesse, "Models, MetaphorsandTruth," 4.
67. In "LiteraryTheoryand HistoricalWriting"White is moving in this directionby relativizing
the differences between the literalandthe figurativeuses of language withoutspelling out the conse-
quences for his original position.
68. Cf. Megill and McCloskey, "The Rhetoricof History," 35: "The need is not to abandonepis-
temological standards.These too are part of the discipline and of its conversation.They mark out a
successful attempt o make history, ike science, cumulative.Yet at the sametime they create an obsta-
cle. Historythattries to do withoutrhetoric oses its contact with the widerconversationof mankind."See also J.Nelson,A. Megill, andD. McCloskey,"Rhetoricof Inquiry,"n TheRhetoricof theHunian