Term Limits and Their Consequences - SUNY Pressterm limits would produce new opportunities for minority and female incumbents, and undoubtedly produce an increase in the number of

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INTRODUCTION

No American legislative reform attracted more attentionduring the last years of the twentieth century than term

limits. Unlike most legislative changes, which come fromwithin the government, term limits were the result of pres-sures from outside government. The desire to restrict thelength of time incumbent legislators could serve in office wasso widespread that it generated a popular political move-ment that conducted petition drives to put the measure onstate ballots all across the country. Once on the ballot, termlimits proved to be very popular with voters and with only afew exceptions, passed, often by large margins.

The effort to have term limits placed on legislators is afascinating example of state-level grassroots politics. It illus-trates how a small number of political activists can dramati-cally alter government operations. It also shows how directdemocracy provisions found in many states’ constitutionscan be used to impose significant restrictions on elected offi-cials. The establishment of term limits also demonstrates howa seemingly minor alteration to the electoral system can haveprofound consequences on the legislative process.

WHY STUDY TERM LIMITS?

On the surface term limits may seem like only a small changein the way legislators gain and retain office. Term limits,

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© 2012 State University of New York Press, Albany

technically, only restrict the number of times an incumbentcan be reelected and place no further regulations on how leg-islators seek office. However, while term limits appear toaffect only a limited number of incumbent politicians, theirimpact on the political system has been far-reaching. Restrict-ing incumbent legislator tenure has completely reshapedgovernmental power in the states that have adopted termlimits. Term limits, by changing election rules, have alteredthe selection of the people who make laws, and thus theyhave had a major influence on public policy. They have dra-matically changed the composition of legislative bodies andimpacted the authority of the individuals who lead them.They have altered the way legislatures function, and even, insome cases, changed the balance of power between the leg-islative chambers and the executive branch. Term limits,therefore, need to be studied because their impact has beenso significant.

Additionally, in a more academic sense, studying termlimits helps further an understanding of the role of popularpolitical movements in the governmental process. Examiningterm limits and the politics that surround them helps answerthe question of why a seemingly innocuous electoral modifi-cation provided the impetus for so much grassroots activism.It also helps explain why they generated such contentiousdebate between advocates and opponents. Several questionswith major ramifications that need to be examined include:Why did restricting the years that elected lawmakers canserve in office become such a major concern for so manypolitical activists? Why did term limits prove to be so popu-lar with the voting public? How could this seemingly minorelectoral technicality generate so much passion both insideand outside government? The answers to these questions arefar from simple, and are themselves a subject for debate.

The final most important goal of a study of term limits isto discover their real impact on American government so thatscholars and citizens in the future can render judgment ontheir effectiveness and desirability. This book discusses theearly predictions about term limits and explores the evidenceto see which ones turned out to be true. Only after a compre-

2 TERM LIMITS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES


hensive examination will it become clearer whether theclaims of term limit supporters were more valid than therival contentions of their opponents.

HOW TERM LIMITS HAVE BEEN STUDIED

In the decade and a half since the beginning of their adoption,the methods used to examine term limits and their conse-quences have gone through a complete evolution. The origi-nal debate surrounding term limits contained more politicalrhetoric than academic study. Term limit advocates and oppo-nents could only conjecture about the ramifications of chang-ing the rules of legislative elections because of the absence ofany systematic scholarly inquiry. To compensate for the lackof credible scholarship on the impact of term limits, some pre-liminary academic studies conducted in the early 1990sattempted to project the impact of term limits by using datafrom non-term-limited legislative bodies. These early projec-tions, however, were limited by a lack of substantive evidencenecessary for valid analysis. The type of evidence neededcould only be collected after term limits were fully imple-mented and their impact felt. Such data only started becomingavailable in 1996, when the first forced retirements began tooccur. From this point on academic interest in the subjectexpanded rapidly, and numerous studies that used a varietyof approaches were conducted. Definitive conclusions aboutthe consequences of term limits, however, remain elusivebecause their full impact has not been completely realizedeven after nearly two decades, especially in states that havemore generous limits (Kousser 2005).

THE EARLY DEBATE

Term limits emerged as a public issue in the late 1980s andwas on the ballot in three states in the 1990 election. Virtuallythe entire early term limit debate lacked any real evidence tosubstantiate the claims made by supporters and detractors.

Introduction 3


Since no empirical studies existed, logic and reason mixedwith some vague historical references were the only toolsavailable to support the arguments both for and against termlimits. With a lack of hard evidence to confirm the often con-flicting claims surrounding the issue, most voters based theiropinion of term limits on faith alone.

There was an abundance of rhetoric, however, despite theabsence of valid evidence. Term limit supporters relied pri-marily on theoretical arguments to bolster their notion thatrestricting tenure in office makes legislators more compliantwith constituent demands and thus more reflective of publicopinion (Jacob 1994). Historical references also were usedinstead of empirical evidence by term limit proponents tosuggest that limited incumbent time in office makes legisla-tive bodies more deliberative (Will 1992). Term limit oppo-nents utilized similar unsubstantiated methods to contendthat limited tenure in office handicaps effective governing(Cain 1994) and decreases needed policymaking expertise(Eastland 1993; Kesler 1994).

It is not surprising that the opinionated authors whoengaged in the early term limit polemic could not base theirarguments on reliable data. The lack of scholarly empiricalanalysis of term limits precluded any other possibility.Despite early public interest in term limits, scholarly examina-tions of the impact of term limits on legislator behavior wereslow to develop. Even the early attempts at rigorous scholar-ship were purely theoretical and based only on speculation.

EARLY SCHOLARSHIP

Even though term limits began being placed on state legisla-tures after the 1990 election, by the mid-1990s, the duration oftime since their first enactment was still insufficient for theirimpact to fully manifest and be recorded. Some limited pre-liminary studies, however, using data from non-term-limitedlegislatures began to appear. These pioneer works of legisla-tive term limits used a variety of methodologies.



TABLE 1. STATUS OF TERM LIMITS IN THE FIFTY STATES

States with LegislativeTerm Limits

States That NeverEnacted LegislativeTerm Limits

States That OnceHad Term Limits,but Repealed Them

Arizona Alabama IdahoArkansas Alaska MassachusettsCalifornia Connecticut OregonColorado Delaware UtahFlorida Georgia WashingtonLouisiana Hawaii WyomingMaine IllinoisMichigan IndianaMissouri IowaMontana KansasNebraska KentuckyNevada MarylandOhio MinnesotaOklahoma MississippiSouth Dakota New Hampshire

New JerseyNew MexicoNew YorkNorth CarolinaNorth DakotaPennsylvaniaRhode IslandSouth CarolinaTennesseeTexasVermontVirginiaWest VirginiaWisconsin


One of the first studies to project term limits’ potentialinfluence on legislator effectiveness utilized a longitudinalapproach to illustrate that increasing time in office increaseslegislative efficiency, but has the reverse effect on attention todistrict affairs (Hibbing 1991). While this study did notdirectly examine term limits, its findings were relevant to theterm limit debate and were often cited. By 1992, a number ofscholars began using credible methodological techniques toproject the potential ramifications of term limits. These tech-niques included the gathering of empirical data and the con-struction of mathematical models that could project possibleconsequences. The research conducted by these scholars gaveshape to a number of important questions, but unfortunatelyproduced conflicting findings that did little to resolve thedebate on term limit desirability. Some of the first questionsscholars attempted to answer were: What would be the influ-ence of term limits on the electoral success of minority andfemale candidates? How would they affect the authority oflegislative leaders? Would term limits increase the number ofminorities and females who obtained leadership positions?Additional research tried to determine if term limits wouldchange legislators’ career patterns and create a tendency forincumbents to leave office before the end of their tenure.

Thompson and Moncrief (1993) conducted one of the firstexaminations of the impact of term limits on female andminority candidates. They collected data on past legislatorbehavior that enabled them to assert that term limits wouldfacilitate the election of women to legislative bodies. Theyreasoned that the ascendance of women to public office wasblocked by the tendency of incumbents to remain in office forlong periods of time. They believed that since legislativeincumbents had major advantages over challengers, openseats provided the best opportunities for women to beelected. Thompson and Moncrief concluded that term limitsroutinely would create open seats and therefore help womenget elected to legislative bodies in greater numbers.

Thompson and Moncrief also examined the retention ratesof minority and non-minority state legislators and made thefirst effort to directly consider the impact of term limits on the



racial/ethnic composition of a legislative body. Their logicalinterpretation of past state legislative patterns suggested thatterm limits could increase the electoral opportunities forminority candidates. Their study contended that a majorimpediment to the electoral success of minority candidateswas also incumbency. Thompson and Moncrief believed thateven if the number of minority candidates increased, theirascendancy to office would be constrained by the largenumber of incumbents who run for reelection. They positedthat minorities’ best opportunity for success would be to runfor vacant seats. Term limits, by forcing incumbents out ofoffice who would otherwise win reelection, would increasethe number of open legislative seats and thus would improvethe election opportunities for minorities. The conclusion thatterm limits would benefit minority candidates, however,assumed that legislator behavior patterns established beforeterm limits would remain constant after they were in effect.

Gilmour and Rothstein (1994) conducted a similar studythat focused on the potential impact of term limits at thenational level. They utilized a dynamic algebraic model toproject the influence of term limits on the replacement ofincumbents by each party in Congress. Their conclusion wasthat the constant removal of incumbents required by termlimits would result in each party frequently finding replace-ments that were less likely to hold the seat. They reasonedthat new incumbents would not have time to develop thesame base of support as their predecessors and thus wouldbe more vulnerable to challengers. They posited that even aminority party might suffer a net loss of seats if it could notfind good replacements. Consequently, even though theirprojections tended to suggest that the party out of powerwould pick up a net gain in strength, they believed that theuse of term limits by a minority party would be a risky strat-egy. Gilmour and Rothstein’s algebraic model, however,assumed that officeholders would not depart from their seatbefore the end of the term of office, thus they did not con-sider the possibility that term limits might impact attrition.

Another early scholarly analysis on a different termlimit–related topic focused on the reasons for the public’s

Introduction 7


enthusiasm for restricting officeholder tenure (Boeckelman1994). This study provided fundamental information on whyterm limit propositions were passing at such a high rate. Anadditional study attempted to demonstrate that repeatedreelections tend to improve the quality of legislators(Mondak 1995). The implication of this study was that termlimits, by reducing the number of times an incumbent couldbe reelected, would tend to reduce the overall effectiveness oflegislative bodies.

Reed and Schansberg (1995) created an intricate mathe-matical simulation model to predict the makeup of the Houseof Representatives under either three- or six-term limitations.Their model produced results on the election of female andminority candidates that contradicted Thompson and Mon-crief’s findings. The model asserted that if incumbent contin-uation rates of service based on previous House patternsremained intact, the average length of congressmen’s servicein office would decrease dramatically under term limits.They also suggested that this would increase leadershipvacancies and create a massive wave of incoming freshmenevery six years or every twelve years (depending on thenumber of allowable terms). Reed and Schansberg then usedthese findings to draw conclusions about term limits’ impacton minority candidates’ electoral success. Their model pro-jected that opportunity for minority candidates, under eithera maximum of three or six terms in office, would significantlydecrease. Their calculations indicated that term limits benefitgroups that exit Congress the quickest. Since minority incum-bents stay in office longer than their non-minority colleagues(17.8 compared to 13.3 years), minorities would be adverselyaffected by term limits. Reed and Schansberg were cautiousabout this finding, however, and suggested that their modelmight overstate the disadvantages term limits would pro-duce for minority candidates. Since minority incumbentstend to represent minority districts, and thus are replaced byother minority candidates, the disadvantages could be neu-tralized. Consequently, they believed that term limits couldbe expected to have only a slightly negative influence on thetotal number of minorities.



Reed and Shansberg’s model concluded, however, thatterm limits could help female candidates. Their model indi-cated that female congressional incumbents stay in office forshorter periods of time than their male colleagues; thus, termlimits would give them an advantage. The issue of congres-sional incumbent attrition rates was also considered by Reedand Schansberg, who conjectured that term limits wouldcreate a massive wave of incumbents leaving office when themaximum allowable terms in office had expired. They con-cluded that this change would occur regardless of thenumber of allowable terms in office because incumbentswould attempt to stay in office as long as possible.

The question of term limits’ effect on leadership attain-ment was addressed by Hodson et al. (1995), who conducteda study that logically forecasted the impact of term limits onminorities and women obtaining legislative leadership posi-tions. This study suggested the rapid turnover created byterm limits would produce new opportunities for minorityand female incumbents, and undoubtedly produce anincrease in the number of members of both groups whowould become legislative leaders. This conclusion was basedprimarily on logical inferences from empirical evidence.

METHODOLOGICAL WEAKNESSES OF EARLYPRE-IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES

Despite these early studies that attempted to document theeffects of term limits, the body of valid data necessary forreliable analysis only developed later. After the 1996 election,sufficient time had finally elapsed that enough credible datacould be gathered for at least preliminary comprehensiveanalysis. The conclusions of most of the studies conductedbefore this time must, therefore, be considered speculativebecause they lack data from completely rotated term-limitedlegislatures. The authors of these early studies generallyaccept this limitation in their methodology and typicallybemoan the paucity of reliable empirical data on which tobase their model construction. The studies conducted by

Introduction 9


Thompson and Moncrief, Gilmour and Rothstein, Reed andSchansberg, Mondak, and Hodson et al. were all designed tologically forecast the ramifications of term limits on Congressand other legislative bodies. Thompson and Moncrief’s pro-jections, however, are based exclusively on examining datafrom legislatures without term limits. This was the case invirtually all the early studies. This methodology, while intel-lectually supportable, is limited due to its reliance on datataken only from the past behavior of non-term-limited leg-islative bodies. The imposition of term limits on a legislatureis clearly an intrusive factor that can modify previous behav-ioral tendencies (Petracca 1995). Data derived from a non-term-limited legislature, therefore, cannot be properlyutilized to predict the future actions of a term-limited body.

Additionally, to correct for some of the weaknesses of theearly works, studies by Francis and Kenny (1997) and Carey,Niemi, and Powell (1998) used data from states “with” termlimits to draw a wide range of conclusions. Both of thesestudies, however, were forced to draw their conclusionsbefore term limits had been fully implemented. This meantthat these researchers were investigating the effect of termlimits before they had created their first forced retirement ofincumbents. Consequently, their conclusions must also beconsidered speculative.

METHODS USED IN LATER STUDIES

After the full implementation of term limits began in somestates, empirical data started becoming available, and new,more valid academic study became increasingly possible.Studies that relied on empirical evidence usually took one ofseveral forms. Some simply compared demographic and elec-tion information from term-limited states with non-term-lim-ited states and subjected the results to statistical testing.Other investigations used surveys to measure the opinions ofpolitical participants impacted by term limits (i.e. legislaturesand lobbyists). After term limit implementation there wasalso an increase in case studies and anecdotal observation of



political insiders. This type of study relied primarily ondescriptive narratives from legislative leaders and others.Since they were based on actual observations of real legisla-tures functioning under term limits, they were more crediblethan the early speculative rhetoric and statistical projections.However, because they were based on individual subjectiveobservations, they still had personal biases. Regardless of themethods used, this type of research began providing the firstvalid depiction of the impact of term limits on the electoralsystem of the states that had adopted them.

Empirical Studies

Research using data from California, the first state to have alegislative chamber with a complete term-limit-induced rota-tion of incumbents, revealed that term limits produced somecompletely unanticipated results (Caress 1996). The transitionperiod in California (the time from term limit enactment untilthe time of total rotation of incumbents) was characterized bya significant increase in voluntary early retirements creating acommensurate increase in the number of special elections tofill the vacancies.

Francis and Kenny (1997) examined additional states withterm limits and observed that limiting the careers of incum-bents made them far more likely to leave office before the endof their allowable time in order to seek other career opportu-nities. Francis and Kenny utilized a dynamic equilibriummodel to project the impact of term limits on tenure and insti-tutional turnover. They predicted that term limits wouldincrease legislator attrition rates as the incentive for remain-ing in office decreased. They anticipated that an eight-year-term cap at the state level would lead to a turnover rate of 36percent and could exceed 50 percent if a chamber-hoppingpattern emerged. Their study suggested that incumbentswould constantly seek promising positions while still inoffice and would resign when a better opportunity presenteditself. They concluded that the number of lame duck mem-bers serving their last term would be rather small because of

Introduction 11


an increase in voluntary early retirement. They therefore con-cluded that the massive wave of incoming freshmen wouldnot appear as predicted by Reed and Shansberg because ofthe continuous replacement of exiting incumbents.

Additional studies using data from state legislatures bothwith and without term limits indicated that, while there wasan overall increase in the number of females elected to statelegislatures, the impact of term limits was neutral (Caress1999).

Surveys of Legislators

A large-scale survey of legislators in states both with andwithout term limits indicated that restrictions on tenure hadlittle significant influence on the demographic characteristicsof incumbents (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998). While thisstudy investigated the background of incumbents firstelected both before and after term limit enactment, it wasconducted prior to the complete mandatory retirementrequired by term limits in most states, and thus provides onlyan incomplete illustration of the influence of term limits onthe election prospects of minority candidates.

Moncrief and Thompson (2001) followed their earlierwork with a survey of state lobbyists. This survey of the per-ceptions of 245 lobbyists in five term-limited states revealedthat they believe that term limits have made their job moredifficult because legislators under term limits are far lessknowledgeable and attentive to statewide issues and havemore difficulty following parliamentary procedures. Thissurvey also showed that lobbyists feel that governors, admin-istrative agencies, and central staffs also gained influencebecause of term limits.

All of these studies provided useful insights but had limi-tations that soon became apparent. In empirical researchthere is a tendency to only examine what can be statisticallymeasured. Scholars of term limits frequently examined thedemographic characteristics or party affiliation of successfulcandidates for term-limited legislatures. Assessing the quality



of legislation or the influence of lobbyists, however, could notbe quantified and was avoided in this type of research.Survey research also has limitations because the results areself-reported. People filling out questionnaires can be moti-vated to give less than truthful answers.

Additional Post-Implementation Studies

In the first decade of the twenty-first century there has been agreat expansion of comprehensive studies of term limits. Anextensive review of the term-limited state legislature inMichigan found that term limits had numerous conse-quences, some predicted and some unanticipated (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 2004). The elaborate findings of thiscomprehensive work will be frequently cited in this book. Alater study of term limits in California found an increase inthe election of female state legislators with most of the newfemale legislators replacing term-limited incumbents (Cainand Kousser 2004). This work will also be cited in a laterchapter. Along with the California case study by Cain andKousser, the Joint Project on Term Limits (a project of theNational Conference of State Legislatures, the Council ofState Governments, and the State Legislative Leaders’ Foun-dation) also did state-specific studies of term limits inArkansas (English and Weberg 2005), Colorado (Straayer andBowser 2005), Maine (Powell and Jones 2005), and Ohio(Farmer and Little 2005). The findings of these studies areextensive and are also referred to later in this text.

Additionally, several rational choice scholars began con-structing models that were designed to explain aspects ofvoter behavior that brought about term limits (Lopez andJewell 2007; Friedman and Wittman 1995). These models,which borrowed extensively from econometrics, used mathe-matical calculation to explain under what circumstancesvoters would support limits on incumbent tenure. Despitetheir elegant formulas, these models had limited usefulness.While they were logically appealing, they were seldom basedon empirical evidence and therefore are not used in this text.

Introduction 13


THIS BOOK

This book provides a comprehensive overview of both thepolitical and functional aspects of term limits. In order to pro-vide a more complete picture of the consequences of termlimits, the book uses a broad range of methodologicalapproaches. It attempts to be more than just a summary ofcurrent research findings on the effects of term limits, eventhough this is an important part of the text. It provides a his-torical context and a discussion of the political factors thatcontributed to the development of a term limit politicalmovement. It provides a framework for understanding whyterm limits emerged as a major issue and why they proved tobe so popular with the American electorate. It discusses dif-ferent ideas about why term limit initiatives virtually alwayspassed when placed on the ballot. It looks at the conse-quences of term limits on the improved electoral opportuni-ties for minority and female candidates and at the way theyhave weakened the power of legislative leaders. To put a per-sonal face on term limits, interviews with selected legislatorswho felt the full force of term limits are also included. Sum-maries of their careers and how term limits impacted themare examined in detail. Additionally, interviews with legisla-tive staffers who personally witnessed the changes broughtby term limits are also provided. The predictions of earlyadvocates and opponents are then revisited to see whichwere realized and which never happened. The focus is onmany of the questions raised, but not always satisfactorilyanswered, by the early studies. And finally, the future of theterm limit movement and the consequences of its actions arediscussed.

California, the first state to have all incumbents in a leg-islative chamber forced out of office because of term limits,will be the major focus of this book. This book, however, ismore than a text on California state politics. Besides being thefirst state to feel the full impact of term limits, California isfertile ground for research on term limits for several othersignificant reasons. It has a full-time, bipartisan state legisla-ture that in many respects resembles the U.S. Congress in



both its operations and electoral politics. The California StateLegislature had very extreme limits (three two-year terms inthe lower chamber and two four-year terms in the upperchamber) placed on it that tend to exaggerate and make morevisible the effects of term limits. California has a dynamicpolitical environment that in some ways is a microcosm ofthe nation, but with its own unique qualities. While Califor-nia’s experience with term limits may not be universal, itnonetheless can function as a valuable indicator of the condi-tions that may accompany term limit adoption in other statesand at the congressional level. It also can facilitate future par-adigm construction of legislator behavior under the stress ofchanging terms of office. Other states are also used to provideadditional perspectives. Michigan’s experience with termlimits is frequently examined in this book. Michigan, whichenacted its term limits two years after California, gave itsincumbents the exact same limitations as California (threetwo-year terms in the lower house and two four-year termsin the upper house) and can act as a valuable source of com-parison. Georgia’s state legislature, which has no term limits,is also sometimes examined in the text because it offers aninteresting contrast to the term-limited legislatures of Califor-nia and Michigan.

The structure of this book is divided into three separatebut related sections. The first section, containing chapters 2and 3, examines the political circumstances surrounding theeffort to establish term limits. It provides both a historicaloverview and critical analysis. The second section investi-gates the actual influence of term limits on both the electoralsystem and the legislative process. This section includeschapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 and relies more on empirical data anddirect observations. The last section, which contains chapters8, 9, and 10, uses interviews and a variety of other sources ofinformation to evaluate the consequences of term limits andto discuss their potential future.

After this introductory chapter, chapter 2 traces the devel-opment of the political movement that arose to support termlimits. It describes how this term limit movement was agrassroots, direct democracy movement, which differs from

Introduction 15


traditional mass political movements. Chapter 3 scrutinizesavailable data on why term limits were consistentlyapproved at the polls by the voting public. Chapter 4 exam-ines in detail electoral information to determine how termlimits facilitated the election of women to legislatures, whichwas one of the major claims of early term limit advocates.Chapter 5 does the same for the election of ethnic and racialminority candidates. In both cases these chapters show thatdramatic increases in legislative diversity may have beenaccelerated by term limits but are the actual result of otherdemographic and political forces. Chapter 6 looks at alter-ations to legislator career paths that are linked to term limitimposition, while chapter 7, using evidence from the Califor-nia Assembly, traces the destabilizing effect of term limits onlegislative leaders and how more orderly transition patternshave emerged. Chapter 8 contains personal interviews withCalifornia legislators, staffers, and others who have been per-sonally affected by term limits. The experiences of the twolegislators illustrate both how traditional career patterns areno longer possible and how current legislators have adaptedto the realities of the new term-limited political environment.Chapter 9 revisits some of the early predictions and looksinto the future of term limits both at the state and nationallevels. Finally, the conclusion in chapter 10 summarizes thebook’s findings.



Term Limits and Their Consequences - SUNY Pressterm limits would produce new opportunities for minority and female incumbents, and undoubtedly produce an increase in the number of

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