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TeleologicalmortalityinPlato’sTimaeus
XiJi
SubmittedtoUniversityCollegeLondonfortheDegree
of DoctorofPhilosophyinClassics
SupervisedBy:DoctorJennyBryan
I,XiJi,confirmthattheworkpresentedinthisthesisismyown.
Whereinformationhasbeenderivedfromothersource,Iconfirm
thatthishasbeenindicatedinthethesis.
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Abstract
This thesis aims to showhowPlato attempts to bridge the gap
between immortal andmortal
natureintheTimaeus.Itexploresthesimilaritiesanddissimilaritiesbetweentheconstitutionof
theimmortalexistents,i.e.thecosmicsoulandhumanimmortalsouls,andthemortalexistents,
i.e.thecosmicbodyandthehumanbodies.Intheknowledgeofthesimilarities,thatis,thesoul
andbodyarefashionedusingtheFormsandReceptacleascommoncomponents,thedistinction
between the immortal souls and mortal bodies seems not to be an
absolute one. The
dissimilarities lie in that the twokinds of existents are
created in differentways,which entail
thattheydifferinstructuresandmodesofmotion.Thesimilaritiesanddissimilaritiesaltogether
explainswhythe immortalsoulsandmortalbodiesappear
tobeutterlydifferentexistentsbut
canbeconnectedtoandcommunicatewitheachother.Theembodimentofthecosmicsoulinthe
cosmicbodyyieldsaneverlastingcreaturesuchasthecosmositself.Whereastheembodimentof
the human immortal soul in thephysical body results in the
former’s beingdisrupted and the
generationof twokindsofmortal souls, i.e.
spiritedandappetitivepartsof souls.The spirited
partofsoul isdesignedasan intermediarybetweenthe
immortalsoulandthebodyaswellas
betweentheimmortalsoulandtheappetitivepartofsoul.Thetripartitesoulanditsinteraction
with the mortal body reveal Demiurgic concerns for humans.
Humans are endowed with
mortality intentionally for the sake of cosmic completion and
perfection. The Demiurgic
compensatory arrangement, i.e. the structural affinity between
the cosmos and humans and
purposefully designed bodily parts and organs, allows humans,
asmortal creatures, to bridge
theirowngapwiththeeverlastingcosmosbyimitatingthelatter.
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Acknowledgements
Iwould like to extend thanks to peoplewho have so generously
contributed to thework
presentedinthisthesis.
Mygreatestdebtinwritingthethesisistomydoctoralsupervisor,Dr.JennyBryan.Ithank
hernotonlyforhertremendousacademicsupportbutalsoforherpatienceandencouragement.
DuringmytimeasaPh.D.studentattheDepartmentofGreekandLatinatUCL,Ihavebeen
sofortunatetobepartofadynamiccommunityofclassicalresearchers.Iamverygratefultomy
secondarysupervisor,Dr.PeterAgocs,whohashelpedtoexaminethefirstthesischapterforme.
IalsowanttothankDr.StephenColvin,whofirstintroducedmetomydoctoralsupervisorand
hasbeenhelpfuleversince.
I would also like to acknowledge Prof. Xuefu Zhang of the
Department of Philosophy at
ZhejiangUniversity,whointroducedmetoancientphilosophywhenIwasanundergraduateand
hasbeensupportiveeversince.
Finally,Imustexpressmyveryprofoundgratitudetomyparentsforprovidingmewithnot
only financial supportbutalsocontinuousencouragement
throughoutmyyearsof researching
andwritingthisthesis.IcouldnothavebeenpursuingmyPh.D.degreewithoutthem.
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Contents
Abstract................................................................................................................................................1
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................................2
Contents...............................................................................................................................................3
Introduction........................................................................................................................................4
Chapter1Cosmologyandteleology...............................................................................................7Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................71.1Timaeus’cosmologyandtheTimaeus...............................................................................................81.2Αἰτίαandintentionalteleology.........................................................................................................111.3Theconceptionofdivinecraftsmanship........................................................................................171.4Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................23
Chapter2ThephysicalaccountofmortalityintheTimaeus....................................................25Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................252.1MortalityinthePhaedoandtheTimaeus.....................................................................................262.2Theconstitutionofthehumanbody................................................................................................282.3Thephysicalprocessofdeath.............................................................................................................36Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................................43
Chapter3Theimmortalsoul..........................................................................................................44Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................443.1Theconstructionofcosmicsouls.......................................................................................................453.2Thecreationofindividualhumanimmortalsouls....................................................................573.3Theallotmentoftheindividualimmortalsoulsandthecauseofevils............................59Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................................62
Chapter4Themortalsouls.............................................................................................................64Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................644.1Πάθημαandαἴσθησις.............................................................................................................................654.2Emotionsandthemortalpartsofsoul...........................................................................................72
4.2.1Angerandthespiritedpartofsoul........................................................................................744.2.2Theappetitivepartofsoul........................................................................................................79
Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................................86
Chapter5Theteleologicalmortality.............................................................................................88Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................885.1Theinevitabilityandnecessityofmortality.................................................................................905.2Thecombinationofimmortalsoulandbody...............................................................................945.3TheDemiurgicconcernsforhumans..............................................................................................98Conclusion........................................................................................................................................................102
Conclusion......................................................................................................................................104
Bibliography...................................................................................................................................107
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Introduction
This thesis studies how, according to Timaeus’ cosmology, Plato
bridges, or attempts to
bridgethegapbetweenimmortalityandmortality.Thesubjectmightstrikeoneasodd.Indeed,it
mightseemratherplain,first,thatPlatoholdsadualisticstandontherelationshipbetweensoul
andbody;1
second,thatevenifhedidintendtoreconciletheapparentlyincompatiblenatureof
immortal soul and mortal body, a prima facie reading of the
Timaeus would not disprove a
dualisticinterpretation,letalonespeakinfavorofthebridge-the-gaptheory.Sincethelate19th
century,therehasinfactarevivalofinterestintheTimaeus,andPlato’sviewsoncosmologyand
psychology have drawn more and more attention of classical
scholars.2 However, the topics
pertinenttoimmortalandmortalnaturesareusuallycarriedoutinisolationfromeachother.For
instance,ThomasRobinson’sPlato’sPsychologyconsistsofaprofoundstudyofTimaeus’account
ofsoul’sconstitutionandnature,butvirtually fails
toprovideaclearaccountofwhat it is that
bindsanimmortalsoultoamortalbody.3
Certainly, some scholars have noticed that the Timaeus has
offered a complex and
constructiveaccountof the soul-bodymatter, andPlato reveals a
shiftingattitude towards the
role of body in that account. For example, Thomas Johansen, in
his book Plato’s Natural
Philosophy, notes that both soul and body enjoy spatial
extension and their motions in space
enables the soul-body interaction.Butmostof thework focuseson
issuesof the interactionof
soul’s circular and body’s rectilinear motions, and thus lacks
explanation of how, based on
Timaeus’accountofspace,anincorporealsoulwouldpossessesspatialattributesthatallowits
interaction with a physical body.4 And more generally, Johansen
places the emphasis on the
dissimilarities of soul andbody rather than similarities,
evenwhenhementions that soul and
body share some spatial attributes in common. An extensive
treatment of how, according to
1
TheimpressionofPlato’sholdingadualisticstandontherelationshipbetweensoulandbodyowesmainlytohisremarksinthePhaedo,whereheclaimsthatthebodyisaprisonforthesoulandthelatterwouldbecomebetterwithouttheinterferencefromtheformer(66b-c,67d,82d-e).2
ForgenericexegesesoftheTimaeus,seeArcher-Hind(1988),Taylor(1928),Cornford(1937).Forcosmologicalandpsychologicalinterpretation,seeMohr(1985),Robinson(1995),Johansen(2004),Carone(2005),Vlastos(1995),Mohr&Sattler(2010),Broadie(2012).3
Cf.Robinson(1995).4 Cf.Johansen(2004)138-142.
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Timaeus’account,theimmortalsoulandmortalbodyformaunionandareabletocommunicate
witheachother,despitetheirsalientdifferenceinnature,islackingtothisday.5
LetusnowturntotheTimaeusitself.InTimaeus’tellingofthecosmicandhumancreation,
thesoul-bodyproblemoccupiesa largeand importantsection.6
Ibelievethat this iswherewe
findthatPlatobridges,oratleastattemptstobridge,thegapbetweenimmortalsoulandmortal
body.ItismyaiminthisthesistoshowthatPlatohasrevealedwhatnatureimmortalsouland
mortal body share in common that allows their communication both
in the cosmos itself as a
wholeandinthehumanperson.Itisalsomygoaltoarguethatmybridge-the-gapinterpretation
will account for the possibility of human’s imitation of the
cosmos, which supports the
Demiurge’s ultimate goal of cosmic completion andperfection.
For, it is acknowledged that, in
Timaeus’account,Platodemonstratesalargercosmologicalframeworkthatunderpinsmanyof
hislateethicalviews.7
Thusthecosmologicalbackgroundisessentialforanunderstandingofthe
meaningof human life.Andwe can find answers abouthumanhappiness
and thebestway to
achieveit
inPlato’sappreciationoftherelationbetweenhumansandthecosmos.Accordingto
theTimaeus,asweshallsee,humanhappinessresidesinthegoodnessofthewholecosmosand
theDemiurge.AsIshallargue,imitationofthecosmosisthemostpracticalmethodtheDemiurge
bestowed upon humans, which is grounded by the analogous origin
and nature between the
cosmos and the human race, in order that the human race can
bridge the gap between the
cosmosthatisadivineandimmortalbeingandthemselvesasbeingmortalcreatures.
IwillapproachtheoverallsubjectmatterofhowPlatobridgesthegapbetweenimmortality
andmortalitybydevelopingacomprehensiveinterpretationoftheconstitutionoftheimmortal
soulandmortalbodyaswellashowthesetwoareboundtogetherandhowtheyinteractwith
eachother.Inthefirstchapter,Iwillgiveasketchofthecosmologyandteleologydemonstrated
intheTimaeussoastoprovidethecontextinwhichimmortalityandmortalityisexamined.Iwill
5
AlthoughtheconnectionandinteractionbetweenimmortalsoulandphysicalbodyreceivesrelativelylessattentioninthestudiesoftheTimaeus,thereissomegoodliteratureonit.Cf.Brennan(2012),Brisson(1997),Carone(2005),Karfík(2005),Lorenz(2012).6
Cf.Tim.27a-34bThecreationofcosmicbody;34c-37cThecreationofthecosmicsoul;41d-42dThecreationofhumanindividualimmortalsoulsandtheembodimentofreincarnationofthosesouls;42e-44dTheembodimentofimmortalsouls;44d-47dThecreationofthehumanbody;64a-69aSenseperceptionandaffection;69a-72dThecreationofthemortalsouls;72e-76eThecreationofbodilypartsandorgans;78e-79eTheprocessofrespiration;80a-81eTheprocessofmetabolism,aging,anddeath;82a-86aThenatureofsicknessandthreeclassesofdiseases;86b-87bThediseasesofthesoul;87c-90dThebalancebetweenthesoulandthebody.7
Cf.Carone(2005),Johansen(2004).
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also lay some stress on the concept of the Demiurge who actually
performed the creative
activities according toTimaeus’ account. InChapter2, Iwill
investigate the constitutionof the
cosmicbodyandthehumanbodywithregardtothematerials,i.e.theelementalsolidsthatthe
Demiurgeusedtocomposethem.ItwillcontaindiscussionoftheFormsandtheReceptaclethat
are thecomponents in fashioningtheelementalsolids. InChapter3,
Iwillbe talkingabout the
constitution of the cosmic soul and individual immortal souls of
humans. Chapter 3 will
demonstratethatthedistinctionbetweenimmortalsoulandmortalbodyisnotanabsoluteone
in that the Demiurge employed the Form and the Receptacle as
integral components in
constructingboththeimmortalsoulandmortalbody,andtheirdissimilarityliesonlyinthatthe
ways in which the Demiurge actually constructed them. In Chapter
4, I will look at the
constructionofthetwomortalkindsofsoul,i.e.thespiritedpartofsoulandtheappetitivepartof
soul. By redefining the concept of πάθημα and αἴσθησις, I will
argue that the ingredients the
lessergodsusedtocreatethemortalsoulsalreadycontaintheparticipationoftheimmortalsoul.
In thisway, themortalkindsofsoul functionas intermediaries in
thecommunicationbetween
theimmortalsoulandmortalbody.Itisnoteworthythatthespiritedandappetitivepartsofsoul
play different role in the process of communication. In Chapter
5, I will explore the teleology
operating within immortality and mortality in the cosmological
context. I will show that
mortalityisinevitableandnecessaryforthecompletionandcontinuousgoodnessofthecosmos
asawhole. Forhumans,mortality isundesirableon
theonehandandnecessaryon theother,
since itensures theopportunity forevery individual immortalsoul
toregain itsperfectionand
purity.Iwillalsoarguethatthereisaffinityinthestructurebetweenthecosmosandthehumans.
Andsuchaffinitypromotestheimitationthatthestructuralsimilaritiesallowhumanstopractice.
Inthisway,thegapbetweenthecosmosthatisadivineandimmortalcreatureandthehuman
racethatisamortalkindofcreatureisbridgedbyhumansthemselves.
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Chapter1Cosmologyandteleology
Introduction
AccordingtoTimaeus’cosmogonicalaccount, thecreationof
thehumanrace ispartof the
creationofthecosmosasawhole.Forthisreason,theinvestigationofthenatureofhumanrace
cannotbeconductedwithoutabrief introductionof itscosmological
context.Furthermore, the
originofthehumanraceispresentedastheresultofdeliberateDemiurgiccreationratherthan
natural evolution. Hence, to develop a comprehensive
understanding of the distinctive
mortal-immortalnatureofthehumanracerequiresnotonlyanexaminationoftheconstitution
ofthesoulandbodybutalsoanaccountoftheteleologyoperatingbehindthecreationofhuman
beings.Andthelatterinturnalsocallsfortheapprehensionofthecosmologicalcontextwithin
which the origin and nature of human beings is demonstrated.
Additionally, the role the
Demiurge plays in Timaeus’ cosmological monologue is
indispensable to the study of the
cosmological context. Therefore, in this first chapter, Timaeus’
cosmology, teleology, and the
conceptoftheDemiurgeareexaminedinordertocharacterizePlato’saccountofcosmiccreation.
Itaimstoprovidethecosmologicalframeworkunderwhichhuman’stwofoldnatureofmortality
and immortality are to be investigated in Chapter 2 and 3, and
also the teleology operating
behindsuchatwofoldnatureinChapter4.
IfirstgiveasketchofwhattheTimaeusisaboutandexaminetherelationoftheaccountof
the origin and nature of human beings to Timaeus’ cosmology and
furthermore to the whole
Timaeus. The study of that relationship will reveal that,
firstly, human’smortal and immortal
nature needs to be understood in a cosmological context; and
secondly, the teleologies that
operatebehindthecosmiccreationandthegenerationofthehumanraceareconsistent.Having
shownthatitis,Iwillthenscrutinizewhatweshouldmakeofthisteleologyinthecontextofthe
Timaeus. A specification of the teleology that Timaeus holds in
his cosmological accountswill
show that Timaeus’ cosmological teleology is intentional rather
than natural, that is,why and
howthecosmoscameintobeing,asitis,issubjecttothegoodintentionandcreativeactivitiesof
the Demiurge. Finally, I will take a look at the Demiurge who
performed the calculation and
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deliberation so as to bring the cosmos into being as it is and
who serves as an explanatory
principlethataccountsforthegoodnessofthecosmos.
1.1Timaeus’cosmologyandtheTimaeus
Plato’sTimaeus1
openswithSocrates’recapitulationofadiscussionfromthepreviousday,2
whichdescribedabestkindofpoliticalconstitutionandcitizenquite
familiar toreadersof the
Republic.3 Today,4
Socrateswishestobeentertainedinreturnandwantstohearhowacitysuch
asthatdepictedinyesterday’s5 talkwouldfareatwarwithothercities.6
Theotherparticipants
of today’s conversation have worked out a plan for the
reciprocal accounts. At Timaeus
20d7-26e1,Critiasgivesa conciseversionofhis
intendedaccountaboutancientAthens, a city
fromninethousandyearsagothatsurprisinglymatchesthe idealcity7
Socrateshasportrayed,
and its wars against Atlantis.With Socrates’ approving the
Athens-Atlantis story, Critias then
suggeststhatTimaeusshouldgiveacosmologicalaccountbeforehegivesafullydetailedaccount
ofthewarfarebetweenthetwocities.Critiassetsouthisplanasfollows(27a2-b6):
Allright,Socrates,whatdoyouthinkoftheplanwe’vearrangedforourguestgifttoyou?WethoughtthatbecauseTimaeusisourexpertinastronomyandhasmadeithismainbusinesstoknowthenatureoftheuniverse,heshouldspeakfirst,beginningwiththeoriginoftheworldand
concluding with the nature of human beings. Then I’ll go next, once
I’m in possession
ofTimaeus’accountoftheoriginofhumanbeingsandyouraccountofhowsomeofthemcametohaveasuperioreducation.I’llintroducethem,asnotonlySolon’saccountbutalsohislawwouldhave
it, intoour courtroomandmake themcitizensof our ancient city – as
really being
thoseAtheniansofoldwhomthereportofthesacredrecordshasrescuedfromobscurity–andfromthenonI’llspeakofthemasactualAtheniancitizens.8
1
Theargumentinthischapterandtheotherfollowingchaptersisalltext-based,includingtheDemiurge’sworkofcosmiccreationandtherealityoftheinterlocutors.ThatmeansIwillnotbetalkingabouttheauthenticityofthecharacterTimaeusorthedifferencebetweenahistoricalSocratesandaPlatonicfictitiousSocrates.BecausethereisnohistoricalevidenceshowingtheexistenceofTimaeusofLocri,Iwillsimplytakeitthatthetextrepresentsitsauthor,Plato’sviewpoints.FordiscussionoftheidentityofTimaeus,seeCornford(1937)2-3).FordiscussionofthetwoSocratesfigures,seeVlastos(1971),Kahn(1992),andBenson(1992).2
Cf.Tim.17c1-3and17c6-19b2.3
FortheviewthatSocrates’talkreferstotheRepublic,seeTaylor(1928)13,Johansen(2004)chapter1.Forobjection,seeCornford(1937)4-5andClay(1997)50-51.4
ForabriefintroductionofthedebateonthedramaticdateoftheTimaeus,seeZeyl(2000)xxvi-xxvii.5
Forthefrequencyoftheword‘yesterday’(χθές)intheTimaeus,seeOsborne(1996)footnote3.6
Cf.Tim.19b3-c8.7
BecauseSocratescallsthecity‘bestpossible’at17c,forconvenienceofreference,Iwillrefertoitas‘idealcity’inthefollowingdiscussion.8
Ifnotspecified,allquotationsfromtheTimaeusarefromthetranslationbyZeyl(2000).OTCgreektextoftheTimaeusisusedinthisthesis:Σκόπειδὴτὴντῶνξενίωνσοιδιάθεσιν,ὦΣώκρατες,ᾗδιέθεμεν.ἔδοξενγὰρἡμῖνΤίμαιονμέν,ἅτεὄνταἀστρονομικῶτατονἡμῶνκαὶπερὶφύσεωςτοῦπαντὸςεἰδέναιμάλισταἔργονπεποιημένον,πρῶτονλέγεινἀρχόμενονἀπὸτῆςτοῦκόσμουγενέσεως,τελεωτᾶνδὲεἰςἀνθρώπων
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From this passagewe can tell that Timaeus’ cosmology and
Critias’ Athens-Atlantis story
stand together in response to Socrates’ request. Socratesmakes
it clear thatwhathewants to
hearaboutisthemartialperformanceofthebestkindofcity,whichincludesthecitizens’martial
behaviour andnegotiation skills thatwould reflect positively on
their education and training.9
BearingSocrates’ request inmind,his interlocutors arrangeaplanof
accounts that covers the
originofthecosmos,thenatureofhumanbeings,andthecharacteristicsoftheidealcitizens,so
astofulfillSocrates’wish.Itisunderstandablethat,inorderthatthecharacteristicsoftheideal
citizensshouldbefullyillustrated,anaccountoftheoriginofhumanbeingsisbothdesirableand
suitableasapreliminarytotheaccountofhowtheidealcitizenspossessingsuchanaturewere
educated,trainedandwouldfareinwar.However,doessuchapreliminaryaccountnecessarily
havetoincludetheoriginofthecosmosasinTimaeus’cosmology?Consideringthefactthatthe
cosmoshascomeintobeingalongtimeagobeforetheexistenceofancientAthens,whatdoesthe
originofthecosmoshavetodowiththecharacteristicsoftheancientAtheniancitizensandtheir
correspondingperformanceinwar?
Before answering this question, one point worth stressing is
that, at the moment when
Critiasintroducestheoverallplan,Timaeus’cosmologyisyettobedelivered,whichmeansthat,
withinthedialogue,thestructureandcontentofTimaeus’cosmologyseemstobedeterminedby
thepurposeitsetsouttoserve,nottheotherwayround.Thatistosay,Timaeus’cosmologydoes
notaimatdevelopinganaccountoftheoriginofthecosmosperse,butratherismotivatedbythe
constructionofacompletedemonstrationoftheidealcityandcitizensinactionfromtheoutset.
Thisbeing thecase, it is reasonable tosuggest that,
throughCritias’ introductionof theoverall
plan,PlatoisencouraginghisreaderstounderstandthecosmologyTimaeusisabouttopresent
not only as an account of the origin of the entire cosmos but
also as an account that is
fundamentally politically oriented in termsof its connection
toCritias’ and Socrates’ accounts.
Moreimportantly,Socrates’commentsonCritias’plan,i.e.‘acomplete(τελἐως),brilliantbanquet
ofspeeches(τῶνλὀγων),’10
indicatethatademonstrationofamobilepoliticalconstitutionthat
φύσιν.ἐμὲδὲμετὰτοῦτον,ὡςπαρὰμὲντούτουδεδεγμένονἀνθρώπουςτῷλόγῳγεγονότας,παρὰσοῦδὲπεπαιδευμένουςδιαφερόντωςαὐτῶντινας,κατὰδὲτὸνΣόλωνοςλόγοντεκαὶνόμονεἰσαγαγόντααὐτοὺςὡςεἰςδικαστὰςἡμᾶςποιῆσαιπολίταςτῆςπόλεωςτῆσδεὡςὄνταςτοὺςτότεἈθηναίους,οὕςἐμήνυσενἀφανεῖςὄνταςἡτῶνἱερῶνγραμμάτωνφήμη,τὰλοιπὰδὲὡςπερὶπολιτῶνκαὶἈθηναίωνὄντωνἤδηποιεῖσθαιτοὺςλόγους.9
Cf.Tim.19b3-c8.10 Cf.Tim.27b7-8.
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contains cosmology is to be regarded as ‘complete’. In other
words, if Timaeus and Critias
provide Socrateswith adiscourseof the ideal city in
actionwithout a cosmological account, it
mightbepossiblethatsuchadiscourseisnotcomplete.11
Thisisalsoaclaimthatcosmologyis
essentialtotheoveralldemonstration.Theessentialstatusofacosmologicalaccount,Ithink,lies
in the fact that Platowants the nature of human beings to be
examined in the context of the
originofthecosmosasawhole.Thatis,todevelopasufficientlycomprehensiveunderstanding
of thenatureofhumanbeingsrequiresthe
investigationnotonlyofwhatthenatureofhuman
beingsisbutalsoofwhyandhowthenatureofhumanbeingsbecameasitis.Andtheknowledge
of the lattercanonlybegraspedbythe inspectionof theoriginof
thehumanrace,which isan
integralpartoftheoriginofthecosmosasawhole.Thatistosay,thenatureofhumanbeingsis
rooted in the origin of the cosmos and thus a cosmological
account is indispensable in
understandingthecoming-into-beingofsuchanature.
According toCritias’plan,
theoriginofhumanbeingsservesasaconnecting linkbetween
Timaeus’ cosmology and Critias’ Athens-Atlantis story. Timaeus’
cosmology fits in the overall
demonstration in that theoriginof thecosmosasawholecontains
theoriginofhumanbeings
andthenatureofhumanbeingsneedstobeunderstoodundertheframeworkofcosmogony.And
the Athens-Atlantis story can only be presented after Timaeus’
cosmology, for the education,
training,andwarfareoftheidealcitizensshouldbepresentedinthecontextofanunderstanding
of thenatureofhumanbeings.Thereason forsuchanarrangementof
speeches is thatagood
politicalconstitutionshouldbeestablishedasaimingatthebest
interestof itscitizens,andthe
bestinterestofthecitizensisdecidedbytheverynatureofthemashumanbeings,whichhasits
origin intheoriginofthecosmosasawhole.Therefore,
theoriginofthecosmosisnecessarily
significant for the Athens-Atlantis story in that the knowledge
of cosmogony provides a
cosmologicalperspective for theunderstandingof
thenatureofhumanbeings, theverynature
thatunderpinsthepoliticalstructureofagoodcitysuchasancientAthens.
11
TheTimaeusisseenaspartoftheTimaeus-Critiastrilogy,whichisinfactunsatisfactorilyincomplete.TheCritiaswasleftunfinished(breakingoffinmid-sentenceafter14Stephanuspages)andtheHermocrateswasnevercomposed(notmentionedinthepreludeintheTimaeusbutintheCritias108a-b).HereI’mnotsayingthatthedialoguewouldbecompleteaslongasitincludesTimaeus’cosmology;rathermypointisthatasintroducedintheprelude,thedemonstration(Timaeus’andCritias’)isexpectedtobecompleteandsuchcompletioncannotbefulfilledwithoutTimaeus’cosmologicalmonologue.Furthermore,ifthedialoguewereevertobecomplete,ithadtoincludeTimaeus’cosmology,butnottheotherwayround.Butthethemeofmythesisisnotaboutpoliticsafterall,soIwillnotbetalkingabouttheAtlantisstorytoldintheCritiasindetailbutrathermentionitasreferencewhereveritisnecessary.
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On thebasisof theaboveobservations,wecannowclaimthat the
teleologyoperatingat
thelevelofDemiurgiccreationiscongruouswiththepoliticalorientationatthelevelofTimaeus’
cosmologicalnarration.This isbecausehumanbeingsare integral to
the cosmos, and thus the
kind of goodness the cosmoswas created to strive for is also the
ultimate goal forwhich the
humanracewasconstructed.Inthiscase,apoliticalconstitutionaimingatgoodnessforhuman
beingsisequallyaimingtocontributetooverallgoodness.Itfollowsthatnotonlythenatureof
humanbeingsbutalsothenatureofapoliticalconstitutionshouldbeunderstoodinthecontext
of cosmogony and cosmology, for the ends of an ideal city
consist in its contribution to the
realizationofoverallcosmicgoodness.
AsIhavepointedoutattheverybeginningofthischapter,thestudyofthemortal-immortal
nature of human beings requires the understanding of both the
cosmological context within
which the origin of the human race is demonstrated and the
political context, i.e. theTimaeus
discourseasawhole,towhichtheaccountofhumanoriginandnatureisintegral.Nowwiththe
foregoingobservationsinplace,wecanconcludethat,firstofall,theinvestigationofthecosmic
and political teleology behind the creation of the human race is
of benefit to the study of the
immortal-mortal nature of human beings. Secondly, the account of
the origin and nature of
human beings may in turn, on the one hand, reflect on the
teleology underlying the creative
decisionsoftheDemiurge,andontheotherhand,beindicativeofthenaturalcharacteristicsof
the ideal citizens. This is because, firstly, the cosmic
teleology demonstrated in Timaeus’
cosmology iscongruouswiththepolitical
teleologyunderlyinghisnarration.Andsecondly, the
origin and nature of the human race is an essential part of
Timaeus’ cosmological discourse.
Bearing those conclusions in mind, I now proceed to look at the
teleology illustrated in the
Timaeus that underlies the creation of the cosmos and the
establishment of the political
constitution.
1.2Αἰτίαandintentionalteleology
Timaeus’ cosmology is teleological, of the sort that is called
intentional teleology or
unnatural teleology,12 for, throughout his cosmogonic monologue,
Timaeus has repeatedly
12 Cf.Lennox(1985).
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demonstrated that the Demiurge or the lesser gods endowed a
cosmic part with this or that
attributeinorderthatsuch-and-suchacertainendshouldbemet.Τhisendisregardedasαἰτία
of the coming-into-being of that cosmic part, in a sense that
the structure or property of that
cosmicpart iscomingtobeforthesakeoftheresults.13
Inthissection,Iwanttoconsiderand
distinguish the specification of the causal accounts Plato
offers in Timaeus’ cosmological
monologue by making a comparison with those in the Phaedo.14 The
justification for making
such a comparison between thePhaedo and theTimaeus is that the
two dialogues differ from
eachotherinperspectivesandemphases,sothatthecomparisonbetweenthemwillhelpusto
discover if Plato had ever endowed the word αἰτία with a
distinctive connotation under the
frameworkofcosmologicalteleology.
IntheTimaeus,Platodistinguishestwokindsofcauses,primarycauses(αἰτία)andauxiliary
causes (ξυναίτια). The primary causes are those which possess
intelligence and thus fashion
whatisbeautifulandgood,andtheauxiliarycausesarethosewhich,withoutthepersuasionand
guidance of intelligence, produce only random and disorderly
effects every time. 15 The
distinctionmadeintheTimaeus, I
think,echoeswhatissaidinthePhaedo. InSocrates’ famous
autobiography,hedistinguishesthecause(τὸαἴτιον)fromthatwithoutwhichthecausewould
not be able to act as a cause (ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὖ τὸ αἴτιον
οὐκἄνποτ᾽εἴη αἴτιον) (99b). Socrates
explainshisdistinctionbypointingoutthatitisnothisphysicalconstitution(bones,sinews,and
soon)thatiscausinghimtositintheprison;butinstead,hisbeliefthattostayinprisonismore
rightandhonorablethantoescapeandrunaway.Thelatteristhecorrectanswertothequestion
why Socrates is sitting in the prison. Here Socratesmakes a very
clear statement aboutwhat
cannotbecountedascauses:whenhesaysthatthosethatcanbothserveastheexplanationof
onethingandofitsoppositeshouldnotberegardedasthecauseofthatthing,16
thatis,Socrates’
bodily constitutionofbonesand sinewswouldhavehelpedhimrunaway
toMegara ifhehad
decidedagainststaying.Thisrequirementforwhatmakesasatisfactorycausalaccountbecame
cleartoSocratesashesoughtforatrueteleologicalorcausalaccountinhisstudyofthenatural
13 Cf.Furley(1996)60.14
IpersonallytaketheviewpointthattheTimaeusislaterthanthePhaedo.ForthedebateabouttheplaceoftheTimaeusintheorderofPlatonicdialogues,seeZeyl(2000)xvi-xx,Cooper(1997)xii-xviii,Owen(1965),Cherniss(1965),andBrandwood(1992).15
Cf.Tim.46e.16 Cf.Sedley(1998)121.
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13
philosophers. Unfortunately, according to Socrates, these
natural philosophers generally take
physicalandmaterialphenomena,sounds,air,hearingandsoon,astruecauses(ἀληθῶςαἰτίας).
The same worry is described in the Timaeus, where it is said
that most people think those
phenomenathatproduceeffectslikecoldorheat,compactnessordispersal,arethetruecauses
ofallthings(46a-d).
T. K. Johansen has noticed a difference of terminology between
the Phaedo and the
Timaeus.17 In the Phaedo, Socrates claims that it is absurd to
call those material or physical
explanations causes (Phd. 99a). On the contrary, later in
theTimaeus, Plato indeed calls those
material or physical explanations ‘co-causes’ (ξυναίτια). The
reason for the terminological
change, is because in the Phaedo, before Socrates moves on to
his second journey (δεὐτερον
πλοῦν),he fails to findout
thetruecauses,andwithouttheattendanceofanytruecauses, it is
problematic to call those material explanations causes of
anything, since they are necessary
conditionswhich serve the achievement of the true cause.Whereas,
in theTimaeus, Plato has
explicitlyexplainedwhatthetruecausesare.Therefore,callingthosethatareundertheguidance
oftruecausesandassistinfulfillingthetruecauses‘co-causes’willnotprovokeanyconfusion,as
longasonebearsinmindaveryclearunderstandingofthedifferencebetweenprimarycauses
andauxiliarycauses.
Besides Johansen’splausible explanation, Iwant to add
thatdifferent terminologiesmight
also be rooted in the different emphases and contexts of the
Phaedo and the Timaeus. In the
Phaedo, inSocrates’ first
journey,ashestudiesAnaxagoras’naturalphilosophy,hemovesfrom
expecting some satisfactory explanation through mind to becoming
disappointed about
Anaxagoras’ descent to material causes (97c-98e). In fact,
before he continues his reading of
Anaxagoras,Socrateshasalreadypresumedsomecriteriaforestablishingtruecauses.Allthings
are under the arrangement of Intelligence (νοῦς) (97c), and a
true cause should be able to
explainwhysomethingisasitisofnecessity(ἀνάγκην)andwhyitisbetter(ἄμεινον)forittobe
so(97e).AndwhenhefindsthatAnaxagoras’causesfallbacktothemateriallevelandturnoutto
failtomeethiscriteria,Socratesdecidestoassertthattheyarenottruecausesatall:tocallthose
thingscauses is tooabsurd
(99a).TheexamplegivenbySocrateshimself, thathis sitting in the
prison rather than running away is not the result of his bodily
constitutionbut becauseof his17 Cf.Johansen(2008)104.
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14
intelligent decision, shows us his preference for intelligent
explanations as true causes over
physical ones. Butwe still cannot confirmwhat true causes really
are, because from Socrates’
preferencewecanonly learn thathe thinks truecausesmustrelate to
intelligence,andrejects
theuseofmaterialorphysicalexplanationsas truecauses. I think
thesignificanceofSocrates’
firstjourneyintoAnaxagoras’naturalphilosophyisnottoactuallydevelopanycausaltheorybut
rathertoruleoutbewilderingelements;thatistosay,itsrealachievementistoeliminatenatural
philosophy’s explanations from being real or true causes. And
only with such a premise can
Socrates begin his second ‘sailing’, seeking for a causal
account amongnon-material elements.
Thatiswhyhedoesnotcallthethingswithoutwhichacausewouldnotbeabletoactasacause
‘causes’,forheisrejectingthem.
ThecontextisutterlydifferentintheTimaeus.ThesubjectoftheTimaeusiscosmiccreation,
andforanintegratedstoryofcosmiccreationitisnotsufficientonlytopresentwhathascometo
beoutofthecausativeactivityoftheDemiurge,butacomparableexpositionofhowthingshave
come to be as such physically is also required. Thus the
accounts in theTimaeus contain the
formation of immortal souls and the creation of physical things.
Furthermore, fully half of
Timaeus’monologue is concernedwith the origin of the cosmos’
physical body,which clearly
showsthatthematerialaccounthasequalimportancewiththeintelligentaccount.Soitisnota
surprisethatwhenhecomestoanalyzethecausalaccountofsomething,bothitsintellectualand
materialaspectsshouldbetakenintoconsideration.
AnotherdifferencebetweenthePhaedoandtheTimaeuswithregardtothecausalaccountis
in their emphases. In the Phaedo, the specification of causes is
under discussion, and the
emphasis of this discussion is on categorizing various kinds of
explanations and finding out
among themwhich kind is qualified to be considered a true cause,
while in the Timaeus, the
distinction of causes is straightforwardly offered without any
further discussion about the
distinctionitself.Previoustothedistinction,Timaeusexplainsindetailhowtheeyespossessthe
physical power of sight (45b-46a). Immediately following his
introduction of the difference
betweenprimaryandauxiliarycauses,heanalyzestheintelligentpurposeofsightastheprimary
cause.Furthermore,Timaeusremindshisaudiencethatotherbodilyfunctionshavecometobe
outofsimilarcauses:thatis,thepursuitofthegood.Inmyopinion,Timaeus’introductionofthe
distinctionofcauses isnotmerely for
thesakeofmakingsuchadistinction.Despitesettingup
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15
thepursuitofthegoodasthegeneralprimarycauseofeverything,aparticularbodilyorganhas
its own corresponding function, and through the assistance of
suchunique functions a human
being shall enjoy his own appropriate way of pursuing the
general good. That the Demiurge
endowedbodilyorganswithparticularfunctionssothattheycancontributetofulfillthegreater
goodnessshouldalsobeaccountedasatruecause.Takeeyesandearsforinstance:throughthe
function of sight and hearing,men can learn harmony from
observing the orbits of stars and
listeningtopropermusic.Thateyesandearshaveparticularwaysofachievingthegoodshould
alsoberegardedastruecausesofwhythegodcreatedthehumanracewitheyesandears.Ishall
talkaboutthisinmoredetailinthefollowingdiscussion.Inbrief,inthePhaedo,Plato’saimisto
findoutwhata truecause is,whereas in theTimaeushealreadyhas
theanswerandwants to
enquire further into the particular causes of a certain thing
from both primary and auxiliary
perspectives.ThisiswhyitisfinetohaveauxiliarycausesintheTimaeusbutnotinthePhaedo.
As to thediscussionofprimary (or ‘true’) causes, I think
theemphasizedaspects arealso
slightlydifferentwhenwecomparethePhaedoandoftheTimaeus.InthePhaedo,Socratesinhis
‘secondjourney’definesa‘truecause’asfollows:‘ifFthingsare(orbecome)FbecauseofF’—or
asmore subtly formulatedbyD.N Sedley, ‘that F things
shouldbemadeFby thepresenceof
somethingwhichessentiallybringstheFormF-nesswithit’.18 I
thinkthePhaedo focusesmore
onthe‘formal’aspectofcausation.Thatistosay,theproposition‘FthingsareFbecauseofF’is
based on two premises: 1) F things are or exist or have come to
be already, and 2) F things
manifestthepropertiesthatqualifythemtobenamedFaftertheFormofF-ness.Forexample,
snowandfireexist,andsnowiscoldandfirehot.ThequestionthePhaedoasksiswhysnowis
coldandfireishot,buttheexistenceitselfofsnowandfireremainsoutsideitsareaofconcern.
Instead, the existence of snow and fire is taken for granted by
Socrates and his companions.
Throughout the entire Phaedo, the creative agency or action is
absent. This absence might
suggest that in the Phaedo there is no need to discuss the
existence of things. This may be
because theobjects that thePhaedowants todiscussall
existalready,and thusanydiscussion
concerningthecausesofthosethings
isbasedonthefactthattheyarebeingassuch,not from
theperspective that they come to be as such fromnon-existence.
On the contrary, that other
perspectiveistheveryonefromwhichtheTimaeusexpoundsitsaccountofcreation.AtTimaeus18
Cf.Sedley(1998)115.
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16
28a4-6Platosaysthat‘everythingthatcomestobemustofnecessitycometobebytheagencyof
some cause (ὑπ᾽αἰτίου), for it is impossible for anything to
come to bewithout a cause’. The
Timaeusfocusesonansweringthequestionwhyandhowthingscometobe:theemphasisthere
is on theprocess of creation.Taking the snowand fire example
again, the causal question the
Timaeuswouldaskiswhysuchthingsassnowandfireshouldbecreatedandcometobeasthey
are.
AsIhavearguedabove,IthinkthatPlato’suniqueperspectiveoncausesintheTimaeus
is
foundedontheideathattheparticulargoodsomethingbeingdesignedtopursueshouldalsobe
categorizedasaprimarycauseofthatthing.LikeImentionedinpreviousdiscussion,botheyes
and ears serve the purpose of discovering the harmony from
theworld inwhichwe live and
applying it to the transformationof our
ownunderstanding.Nevertheless, eyes and earswere
createddifferently.Eyesweregiventhecapacityofsight,bywhichwemightobservetheorbits
ofintelligenceintheheavens(47b).Andthenwecouldinventnumberandtheideaoftimeand
begininquiringabouttheuniverse:apursuitthat
leadsuseventuallytophilosophy(47a).Ears
were assigned the capacity of hearing, by which wemight listen
to logos, music, and rhythm
(47c-d). And thenwe could learnharmony from sounds and express
harmony through sound,
andbysuchmeanswecouldfindanallyinsoundwhoassistsusinstablizingourowninternal
orbits(47d-e).Thisexampleofeyesandearsmaysuggestthat,fromtheperspectiveofcreation,
especiallywhenexplainingacertainthing’scomingtobe,itmaynotbesufficientmerelytosay
thatthecreationofsomethingisforthepursuitofthegood;instead,theexplanationneedstobe
specific. While the pursuit of good is no doubt the true cause
of eyes, and does explain the
purposetheexistenceofeyesserves,stillitfailstogiveanexplanationwhyeyeswerecreatedas
eyes,notears,sincethesamecausecanwellexplaintheexistenceofearsandotherbodilyorgans.
Mypointisthatthepursuitofgoodisunquestionablytheprimaryandtruecause,butthatwhen
itcomestoseekingacausalaccountforaparticularthingasatisfactoryanswerneedstobemore
precise.
NowbasedontheuniqueperspectiveoftheTimaeusthatIhaveanalyzedpreviously,Iwant
to investigate what primary causes and auxiliary causes are,
using the example of eyes and
eyesight. Let’s beginwith auxiliary causes. If we eliminate the
creative activities of the lesser
gods from Timaeus’ description of the construction of eyes
(45b-46a), the whole account
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17
becomesamerecollectionofmechanicalprinciplesdescribinghowthegodstookadvantageof
diverse properties of solids to make them serve the function of
sight: the properties which
explain, for example, how images are produced inmirrors or in
any other reflecting surfaces
(46a-c). The explanation of images is a very good example that
shows the mechanical and
automaticprocessesatworkincasesofinteractionbetweenphysicalproperties.Suchaprocess
itselflacksapurposeandhasnoessentiallydifferenteffectsontheresults.Theimagesofobject
AandobjectBproducedinamirrorareessentiallythesame,sincetheyareboththereflections
of something. Likewise, Socrates’ bodily constitution can be
employed in the service both of
stayinginprisonsittingandrunningawaytoMegara.Nevertheless,itisatleastfairtoclaimthat
it is themechanicalprocessthatproducesthe
imagesofobjectAandB,andthat it isSocrates’
bodily constitution that enables him to remain sitting. As Plato
admits, the auxiliary causes
(ξυμμεταίτια)givetheeyesthepowerofsight(46e).Ithinktheauxiliarycausesofathingbeing
FintheTimaeusrefertothosethatatthemateriallevel,orphysically,enabletheexistenceofa
thingasFandthemanifestationofitsF-ness.Acorrespondingquestion,takingforinstancethe
exampleoftheeyes,iswhatthephysicalconstitutionofeyesmightbe,andwhatthemechanical
principle of eyesight is. According to the Timaeus, the
auxiliary causes are ‘employed in the
service of the god as he does his utmost to bring to completion
the character ofwhat ismost
excellent’ (56c-d).As Ihavearguedpreviously, thepursuitofgood is
theprimarycause forall
thingsinageneralsense,butwhenitcomestoinquiryaboutacertainobject,thecausalaccount
shouldbe able to explainwhat specificpurpose the coming-to-beof
thisobject is supposed to
fulfill inorder to achieve theultimatepurposeofmaking the
cosmosas goodandexcellent as
possible.If,therefore,wearetoaskacorrespondingquestionabouttheprimarycause,takingthe
sightexampleagain,itmaybewhattheparticulargoodthateyesbringforthwasforthegodwho
createdthem.
1.3Theconceptionofdivinecraftsmanship
In the above section, I have argued that αἰτία denotes not only
cosmic goodness as the
ultimate cause of and purpose for the coming-into-being of
things but also the particular
explanatoryaccountofhowthingscometobeasthingswhichcouldfulfilltheirparticularroles
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18
incontributingtocosmicgoodness.Andwecannoticethatthereisalwaysacreativeagency19
in
thecausalaccount.Inthissection,Iwillfocusondiscussingtheconceptofdivinecraftsmanship.
Aswecansee, inTimaeus’
cosmologicalmonologue,heoffersadiscourseofhowadivine
craftsman or the Demiurge (ὁ δημιουργός) created the cosmos by
endowing the pre-cosmic
chaoswithgoodnessandorder.He transformed thepre-cosmicdisorder
intomaterials for the
constructionof corporealentities, that is, thewholecosmicbody
towhichan immortal cosmic
soul, constructedby theDemiurgehimself,wasbound.Thuscame
intobeing thecosmosasan
eternal
livingcreature.AndtheDemiurgealsocreatedthecelestialstarsandthe
lessergodsto
whomhethengavethetaskofcreatingthehumanraceandothermortalcreaturestohousethe
individual immortal souls he himself constructed. Readers since
Plato’s own time have been
arguing whether the concept of a divine craftsman is
indispensable in Timaeus’ cosmological
framework.Somescholarssuggestedthat
theDemiurgecanbeequatedwithotherelements in
Timaeus’ cosmology,20 since some of the terminologies employed
by Timaeus to portray the
Demiurge’s creative actions, for example, that the Demiurge used
a mixing bowl (ἐπὶ τὸν
πρότερονκρατῆρα)tocreatetheimmortalsouls,21
ifreadliterally,whichwouldentailthatthe
Demiurgeusedabowlasthecontainertocreatethecosmicsoul,wouldonlyproduceabsurdities,
whereasametaphoricalreadingcanexplainawaysuchabsurdities.Thushowfararewetotake
theconceptionthatthecosmoswascreatedbytheDemiurgeseriously?Wastherereallyadivine
craftsman at all, the onewho brought the cosmos into being a
certain numbers of years ago,
along with time itself? Or is the Demiurge merely a metaphorical
figure Timaeus employs to
serveapedagogicalpurpose22 so
thatreadersmightunderstandmoreeasily thecausalroleof
Intelligenceinthecosmosthathasexistedalwaysandwillexistforaninfinitetimespan?
The exposition of the concept of the Demiurge brings about the
investigation of another
controversialissue,thatis,whetherthecosmoswascreatedchronologicallyashavingatemporal19
Timaeushasusedthesingular‘god’indescribingthecreationofthecosmicbody(27a-34b),cosmicsoul(34c-37c),andindividualimmortalsouls(41a-b).Andhehasmadeitreallyclearin41a-dthattheagencywhocreatedthehumanbodywasthelessergods.However,heusesindiscriminatelythesingular‘god’andplural‘gods’asthecreator/creatorsofthehumanbody.Cf.singular46e,71a,74d;plural47c,75b,77a.Cf.Gerson(1990),pp268,note87.20
FortheviewthattheDemiurgeisreducibletooneoftheotherelementsinTimaeus’cosmology,seeArcher-Hind(1888)38-40,tothecosmicsoul;Cornford(1937)37-38,totheReason;Perl(1998);foranargumentthattheDemiurgerepresentsnomorethananimpersonalintelligentcausation,seeCarone(2005)chapter2.FortheargumentsfortheDemiurge’sirreducibility,seeRobinson(1993),Broadie(2012)chapter1.
21 Cf.Tim.41d4.22 Cf.Aristotle,OntheHeavens279b32-280a1.
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19
beginning.23 That the cosmos has a genetic origin is significant
for the conception of divine
craftsmanshipinthat,asSedleyconcludes,theformerservesasanindispensablepremiseforthe
latter.24 Sedley takes Timaeus’ words at 28c2-3 as specific to
the coming-into-being of the
cosmosand infers from it that thecosmoshavingabeginning is the
sufficient conditionof the
cosmoshavingacraftsman.Andwhetherornottheformerisalsoanecessaryconditionofthe
latter,thesameconclusioncanbereached.IagreewithSedley’sinterpretation.Andadditionally,
I want to lay some emphasis on the intentional perspective of
the teleology illustrated by
Timaeus. In my view, Timaeus’ words at 28c2-3 cannot be read
alone but belong to his
comprehensive reasoning from 28a4 to 29a6. And themain point
Timaeus tries to convey in
those lines isnotmerelythatthecosmoshavingageneticoriginentails
itshavingacraftsman,
but more importantly that a beautiful cosmos such as ours coming
into being at a temporal
beginning entails that the well-intentioned Demiurge implanted
goodness and order to the
pre-cosmic chaos modelling after the Forms.25 I shall elaborate
my point in the following
discussion.Forthesakeofclarity,IquoteTimaeus’wordsat28a4-29a6infull.
Noweverythingthatcomestobemustofnecessitycometobebytheagencyofsomecause,foritisimpossibleforanythingtocometobewithoutacause.Sowheneverthecraftsmanlooksatwhatisalwayschangelessand,usingathingofthatkindashismodel,reproducesitsformandcharacter,then,ofnecessity,allthathesocompletesisbeautiful.Butwerehetolookatathingthathasbeenbegotten,hisworkwilllackbeauty.Nowastothewholeheaven,orworldorder–let’sjustcallitbywhatevernameismostacceptableinagivencontext–thereisaquestionweneed
to consider first. This is the sort of questionone shouldbeginwith
in inquiring into
anysubject.Hasitalwaysbeen?Wastherenooriginfromwhichitcametobe?Ordiditcometobeandtakeitsstartfromsomeorigin?Ithascometobe.Foritisbothvisibleandtangibleandithasabody–andallthingsofthatkindareperceptible.And,aswehaveshown,perceptiblethingsaregraspedbyopinion,which
involvessenseperception.Assuch, theyare things thatcometobe,things
that are begotten. Further,wemaintain that, necessarily, thatwhich
comes to
bemustcometobebytheagencyofsomecause.Nowtofindthemakerandfatherofthisuniverseishardenough,
andeven if I succeeded, todeclarehim toeveryone is impossible.And
sowemust
gobackandraisethisquestionabouttheuniverse:whichofthetwomodelsdidthemakerusewhenhefashionedit?Wasittheonethatdoesnotchangeandstaysthesame,ortheonethathascometobe?Well,ifthisworldofoursisbeautifulanditscraftsmangood,thenclearlyhelookedattheeternalmodel.Butifwhatit’sblasphemoustoevensayisthecase,thenhelookedatonethathas
23
ForadiscussionofNeoplatonicexegesesofcosmogony,seePhillips(1997).Foradiscussionofdifficultiesraisedbyaliteralchronologicalreading,seeDillon(1997)andTarán(1972).24
Cf.Sedley(2007)105-106.25
Inthischapter,IwillnotbetalkingaboutthenatureoftheFormsperse,butonlytheparadigmaticfunctionoftheFormsinTimaeus’cosmology.FordiscussionofthenatureoftheFormsintheTimaeusparticularly,seeOstenfeld(1997)andFerber(1997).
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20
cometobe.Nowsurelyit’scleartoallthat
itwastheeternalmodelhelookedat,
for,ofallthethingsthathavecometobe,ourworldisthemostbeautiful,andofcausesthecraftsmanisthemostexcellent.26
FromthispassagewecanseethatTimaeus’argumentisasfollows.Firstofall,hecomesup
with a generic reasoning27 about the cause of things that come
to be (28a4-b2), that is,
everythingthatcomestobemusthaveacause,andthosewhosecauseisacraftsmanlookingat
the changeless model and reproducing them are of necessity
beautiful, otherwise not.28 This
servesasaparadigmforthelaterargumentofthespecificcaseofcosmiccreation.
Asforthecosmos,therearetwostatementsTimaeustakesasself-evidentfactsthatheuses
asthepremisesofhisreasoning.Oneisthatthecosmosisvisible,tangible,andhasabody,and
thus isperceptible (28b7-c1).Theother is that the
cosmoswithinwhichheandhis audiences
live is the most beautiful (29a5), which is a plain fact to
Timaeus. From the first statement
Timaeusinfersthatthecosmoshasanoriginfromwhichitcametobe(28b7,28c2-3),basedon
thedistinctionhemakesbetweenbeingandbecomingandtheirrespectivemethodsofcognition
at27d6-28a4.Thatistosay,thingsthatcometobearegraspedbyopinion,andthedevelopment
of opinions involves sense perception (28a2-3), whichmeans that
things that come to be are
perceptible.Nowsincethecosmos isperceptible,
itmustbelongtothingsthatcometobe,and
thushascometobehavingacause.Atthispoint,wecannotyetclaimthatthecosmoscametobe
26
πᾶνδὲαὖτὸγιγνόμενονὑπ΄αἰτίουτινὸςἐξἀνάγκηςγίγνεσθαι·παντὶγὰρἀδύνατονχωρὶςαἰτίουγένεσινσχεῖν.ὅτουμὲνοὖνἂνὁδημιουργὸςπρὸςτὸκατὰταὐτὰἔχονβλέπωνἀεί͵τοιούτῳτινὶπροσχρώμενοςπαραδείγματι͵τὴνἰδέανκαὶδύναμιναὐτοῦἀπεργάζηται͵καλὸνἐξἀνάγκηςοὕτωςἀποτελεῖσθαιπᾶν·οὗδ΄ἂνεἰςγεγονός͵γεννητῷπαραδείγματιπροσχρώμενος͵οὐκαλόν.ὁδὴπᾶςοὐρανὸςἢκόσμοςἢκαὶἄλλοὅτιποτὲὀνομαζόμενοςμάλιστ΄ἂνδέχοιτο͵τοῦθ΄ἡμῖνὠνομάσθω-σκεπτέονδ΄οὖνπερὶαὐτοῦπρῶτον͵ὅπερὑπόκειταιπερὶπαντὸςἐνἀρχῇδεῖνσκοπεῖν͵πότερονἦνἀεί͵γενέσεωςἀρχὴνἔχωνοὐδεμίαν͵ἢγέγονεν͵ἀπ΄ἀρχῆςτινοςἀρξάμενος.γέγονεν·ὁρατὸςγὰρἁπτόςτέἐστινκαὶσῶμαἔχων͵πάνταδὲτὰτοιαῦτααἰσθητά͵τὰδ΄αἰσθητά͵δόξῃπεριληπτὰμετ΄αἰσθήσεως͵γιγνόμενακαὶγεννητὰἐφάνη.τῷδ΄αὖγενομένῳφαμὲνὑπ΄αἰτίουτινὸςἀνάγκηνεἶναιγενέσθαι.τὸνμὲνοὖνποιητὴνκαὶπατέρατοῦδετοῦπαντὸςεὑρεῖντεἔργονκαὶεὑρόνταεἰςπάνταςἀδύνατονλέγειν·τόδεδ΄οὖνπάλινἐπισκεπτέονπερὶαὐτοῦ͵πρὸςπότεροντῶνπαραδειγμάτωνὁτεκταινόμενοςαὐτὸνἀπηργάζετο͵πότερονπρὸςτὸκατὰταὐτὰκαὶὡσαύτωςἔχονἢπρὸςτὸγεγονός.εἰμὲνδὴκαλόςἐστινὅδεὁκόσμοςὅτεδημιουργὸςἀγαθός͵δῆλονὡςπρὸςτὸἀίδιονἔβλεπεν·εἰδὲὃμηδ΄εἰπεῖντινιθέμις͵πρὸςγεγονός.παντὶδὴσαφὲςὅτιπρὸςτὸἀίδιον·ὁμὲνγὰρκάλλιστοςτῶνγεγονότων͵ὁδ΄ἄριστοςτῶναἰτίων.οὕτωδὴγεγενημένοςπρὸςτὸλόγῳκαὶφρονήσειπεριληπτὸνκαὶκατὰταὐτὰἔχονδεδημιούργηται·27
Iholdtheviewthatwhenὁδημιουργόςandπαράδειγμαarefirstintroducedhereat28a4-b2,thedistinctionbetweenacraftsman’susingachangelessandageneratedparadigmistobeagenericconsiderationwithnospecificreferencetotheDemiurge,thecosmiccreator.Cf.Dillon(1997)28andBroadie(2012)27-28.28
Onanuanceofthereadingof28a4-b2thatwhetherthecauseofthings’coming-into-beingreferstoacraftsmanexclusively,IconsultandagreewithJohansen’sinterpretation.Cf.Johansen(2004)70-71.Whenandonlywhenthecosmosexhaustivelycontainsallthosecometobecanthecauseofthingscomingtobeandacraftsman(theDemiurge)exclusivelyrefertoeachother.HoweveratthetimewhenTimaeusismakingthisgenericreasoning,theargumentofthecosmosbeingtheexhaustiveAllisyettobedeveloped.Fortheviewthatthecosmos’beingtheAllisanunspokenpremisethroughouttheTimaeus,seeBroadie(2012)8.
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byacraftsman.This isbecause,
inhisgenericreasoning,Timaeusdoesnotsaythateverything
thatcomestobemustcometobebyacause,wherethiscauseisnecessarilyacraftsmandoing
such and such. Rather, he only says thatwhen the cause is a
craftsman doing such and such,
thingswould come to be accordingly. Thereforewhat Timaeus has
confirmed so far ismerely
that thecosmoshasageneticcauserather than that
thecosmoshasacraftsmanas itsgenetic
cause.
OnepointworthstressingisthatthesignificanceofTimaeus’genericreasoningat28a4-b2
is thatheemphasizes therelationshipbetween thecraftsmanshipand
theoutcome in thecase
wherethecauseisacraftsman.Thatis,firstofall,onlywhenthecraftsmanlooksatthekindof
model that is always changeless can the product he reproduces
turn out to be beautiful. By
contrast,ifthecraftsmanchoosesthekindofmodelthatbelongstotherealmofcomingtobe,the
outcomewouldnecessarilyturnouttobelackinginbeauty.Thepointhereisthatthecraftsman
gets to choose between two alternatives,whichmeans the intention
of the craftsmanmatters.
Secondly, the craftsman also has to reproduce the form and
character (28a8) of themodel he
looksatsothatwhathecreateswouldresemblethemodelandbecomebeautiful.Thismeansthe
calculationanddeliberationofthecraftsmanmattersduringthecreation.Inaword,when,and
only when, a craftsman chooses the changeless model to look at
and reproduce its form and
characterinhisproductcantheoutcometurnouttobebeautiful.
NowsincethecosmoswithinwhichTimaeusandhisaudienceliveisthemostbeautiful,the
coming-into-beingofthecosmosmustthenbetheresultoftheDemiurge’screatingitlookingat
theeternallychangelessmodel(29a6-b1).29
WhattheDemiurgeconfrontedbeforehiscreation
was the pre-cosmic chaos, which was in discordant and disorderly
motion (30a4-5). But the
Demiurgewantedeverythingtobegoodandnothingtobebadso
faraspossible (30a2-3),sohe
chose to implant order in the pre-cosmic disorder. In other
words, it is because of the good
intention of the Demiurge that he chose what is eternally
changeless as the model for the
creation of the cosmos. And it was through careful calculation
that the Demiurge decided to
createthecosmosasalivingcreaturewithintelligence(30b1-6).
29
Thisargumentationisvalidonlywheneverythingcomingtobebythehandofacraftsmanlookingatthechangelessmodelisthesufficientandnecessaryconditionofitcomingtobeasbeautiful.However,Timaeus’reasoningat28a6-b1onlyconfirmsthattheformeristhesufficientconditionofthelatterandisimplicitaboutwhetherornotitisalsoanecessarycondition.
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22
From this argument, we can claim that the cosmos’ having a
generic origin is indeed
requiredfortheconceptionofadivinecraftsmanship.Andthroughfurtherinspection,Ipointout
thatthecoming-into-beingofthecosmosasthemostbeautifullivingcreatureistheresultofthe
Demiurge’s good intention of hoping everything to be as good as
possible and his creative
activities accordingly. In short, Timaeus’ teleology is
intentional, in a sense that the goodness
throughout the cosmic creation and within the cosmos itself as a
whole is endowed by the
intention of the Demiurge. And the concept of the Demiurge
itself is granted by the cosmos’
havingatemporalbeginning.ThuswecansaythattheDemiurgicteleologydemandsatemporal
beginning,inotherwords,thecosmos’havingatemporalbeginningisneededinordertoground
the teleological structure of the cosmos, in which a good
Demiurge aiming for goodness is
essential.
Yetanobjectionarisesfromtheveryideathatthecosmoshasatemporalbeginning.Thatis,
if time came to be along with the cosmos and before the cosmos
came to be there was the
pre-cosmic chaos, then it seems that the pre-cosmic chaos
existed at a time before time. By
showing that the timecreatedby
theDemiurgecanbeunderstoodasmeasurable time,Vlastos
hasplausiblyexplainedawaythisincompatibility.30
ItisworthaddingtoVlastos’viewpointthat
thecreationoftimeitselfisindicativeoftheDemiurge’screativedecision.For,ontheonehand,
timecameintobeingasanearthlymovingimageoftheeternalnatureofthechangelessmodel
theDemiurgelookedat(37d5).Ontheotherhand,timewasmadeaccordingtonumber(37d6),
which was bestowed by the Demiurge upon pre-cosmic matter
(53b4-5) in order to replace
disorder with order. Therefore, the creation of time exemplifies
the Demiurge’s intention of
makingthecosmosresembletheeternalmodelascloselyaspossible(37d2).
The good intention of theDemiurge is challenged byTarán.31 He
askswhy theDemiurge
wouldallowtheexistenceofthepre-cosmos,andwhy,iftimeisassociatedwithnumbermarked
by celestial motions, the Demiurge imposed order on pre-cosmic
disorderly motions at that
specificpointof theirmotive succession?Whynot another ‘time’ so
that time couldbegin five
minutes earlier or later. I shall use an analogy to answer this
question. Imagine drawing a
coordinate invoidspace.Afterdrawingthecoordinate, there isapoint
inthisspacewhich isa
30 Cf.Vlastos(1939)and(1964).31 Cf.Tarán(1972)381.
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23
starting point (0, 0, 0) and every position in this space is
then defined accordingly. Tarán’s
question,ifappliedinthiscoordinateanalogy,islikethis:whydidn’twechoosethepoint(2,2,2)
tobethestartingpoint(0,0,0)?Andtheanswersimplyisbecausetherewasnopoint(2,2,2)or
anyotherpointatallinthisspacebecausenopositionwasdifferentiatedbeforethecoordinate
cameintobeing.Likewise,therecouldnotbeanotherpointoftimethatwasfiveminutesearlier
thanthebeginningoftimebeforetherewasabeginningoftimeasbeingareference.Andthisis
the very reason why the cosmos’ having a temporal beginning is
so significant, because it
necessitatesthecausalroleoftheDemiurgewhointroducedorderandbeautytothepre-cosmos,
whichisinturnessentialtotheteleologicalframeworkofTimaeus’cosmology.
1.4Conclusion
Inthischapter,IhavelookedatthecosmologicalbackgroundtheTimaeusshowsfromthe
perspectives of cosmology, teleology, and the concept of the
Demiurge. First of all, from the
cosmological perspective, I have argued that since the creation
of human race is part of the
creation of the cosmos as a whole, the study of human’s twofold
nature of mortality and
immortality must be undertaken in its cosmic context. In other
words, when it comes to the
discussionoftheconstitutionofhuman’sbodyandsoulandtheinteractionbetweenthosetwoin
Chapter2and3,therelationshipbetweenthecreationofhumanraceandthatofthecosmosasa
whole will necessarily be taken into consideration. Furthermore,
I have also argued that the
teleologyoperatingbehindthecreationofhumanraceisconsistentwiththatbehindthecreation
ofthecosmosasawhole.Sowecanclaimthatthecreationofthehumanraceisessentiallyinthe
serviceof
thecosmicgoodness.Forthisreason,whenitcomestoChapter4’sdiscussionof
the
teleologyofthecreationofhumanracewithregardtoPlato’saccountofhuman’stwofoldnature
ofmortality and immortality and his attempt at bridging the gap
between those two natures,
cosmic goodness as the ultimate creative purpose ought to be
considered as an indispensable
contextualelement.
Secondly,IhavealsodemonstratedTimaeus’distinctivecausalaccount.Timaeus’teleology
is intentional andDemiurgic, in a sense that all the cosmic
creation is to serve thepurpose of
cosmicgoodnessandperfection.AndasalientfeatureaboutTimaeus’teleologyisthat,notonly
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isthecausewhysomethingcomesintobeingimportant,butthecreativeprocessofhowitcomes
intobeinginordertofulfillitscauseofbeingcreatedisalsosignificant.Itisbecausethecreative
process of something reveals the particular good it is designed
to contribute to the overall
goodness.Bearingthis
inmind,Chapter2and3willexplorehowtheDemiurgebestowedboth
mortalandimmortalnatureuponthehumanrace,andChapter4will
investigatetheparticular
goodwithwhichthehumanracehasbeenendowedbypossessingsuchatwofoldnature.
Thirdly, Ihaveargued that theDemiurgeplaysan indispensable role
inTimaeus’account,
foritguaranteesthattheresultofcosmiccreationisgoodandperfect.Onethingtobestressedis
thatIhavenotandwillnotdiscusswhattheDemiurgeis.Sofar,Ihaveconfinedmyargumentto
thatthereisandneedstobeaDemiurgicelementinTimaeus’cosmiccreation,because,onthe
onehand,intentionalteleologycallsforapremisesuchastheDemiurge,andontheotherhand,
thatthecosmoshasagenericoriginisasufficientconditionofthecosmoshavingacraftsman.In
Chapter2and3,thediscussionofthematerialsemployedtobethecomponentofhumans’body
and soul will also involve and further explore the necessity of
the Demiurge in Timaeus’
cosmology.
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25
Chapter2ThephysicalaccountofmortalityintheTimaeus
Introduction
ThemainquestionoftheoverallthesisishowPlatocollapsesthedistancebetweenhuman’s
mortalandimmortalnature.Toanswerthisquestion,itrequirestheinvestigationofnotonlythe
natureofmortalitybutalso thatof immortality, and the
relationshipbetween the twoaswell.
Thischapterwillcontributetoansweringthemainquestionbylookingathuman’smortalnature.
Sinceitisobviousthattheimmortalnatureisattributedtothesoul1
andthemortalnaturetothe
body due to the soul’s being indissoluble and the body’s being
the very opposite,2 then, to
developanaccountofmortality is to lookat thephysical aspectof
ahumanbeing, that is, the
humanbodyanditsdissolubility.Furthermore,asIhavearguedinthefirstchapter,thecreation
ofthehumanraceisanessentialpartofthecreationofthecosmosasawhole,whichmeansthat
the investigation of the physicality of human body should not be
conducted without the
consideration of its cosmological context. So, in short, this
chapter aims to explore themortal
natureofhumanrace fromthephysicalperspectiveof thebody.The
investigation involvesthe
humanbody’sconstitution,exploringhowthemortalnatureisbestowedtothehumanrace,and
itsdecomposition,explaininghowthemortalnaturemanifestsitselfinahumanbeing.
As to the manifestation of mortality, it is commonly known that
the mortal nature is
manifestedasthedeathofahumanbeing.Anddeath,bydefinition(thedefinitionaccordingto
Timaeus’descriptionat81b4-e5),isnothingotherthantheseparationofthesoulfromthebody.
That is tosay, tounderstandhumanmortality thoroughlyalsocalls
for the investigationof the
soul’sdeparturefromthebody,whichinturnisgroundedintheexaminationoftherelationship
betweenthesoulandthebody.Thus,beforethematterofimmortality,thatis,theconstitutionof
the soul, is covered in Chapter 3, in this chapter, I will
confine my interpretation to matters
relatingonlytothephysicalaspectoftheprocessofdeath,andleavethediscussionofhowthe
1
Inthischapter,Ispeakofthesoulindistinctively(withoutanyspecificreferencetoeithertheimmortalpartofsoulorthetripartitesoulasawhole)onlyforthesakeofexplanatorypurpose.ThetripartitenatureofthesoulillustratedinTimaeus’cosmologyshallbediscussedinChapter3and4.2
Cf.Tim.41b7-d3.
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26
immortalsoulinteractswiththemortalbodyinthefollowingchapter.
Ishallstartwithabriefdiscussionregardingthenecessityofhavingadetailedandlengthy
accountofmortality inTimaeus’narration,bycomparingPlato’s
shiftingattitudes towards the
bodyofhumansinthePhaedoandTimaeus’cosmology.Ithenapproachthematterofmortality
fromtwoperspectives.Firstly,Ishallexaminetheconstitutionofthehumanbody,intermsofthe
natureofthematerialsoutofwhichandthemannerinwhichthehumanbodywasconstructed
asdissoluble.Sincethematerialsusedtoconstructthehumanbodyarethesameasthoseofthe
cosmic body, that is, the four elemental solids, the
investigation will turn to demonstrate the
constitutionoftheelementalsolidssoastoshowhow,atthemicro-level,mortalityisbestowed
tothehumanbodyattheverybeginning.Secondly,Iinvestigatethephysicalprocessofdeathso
astoseehowtheembodimentanddepartureofthesoulrelatestotheinevitabledissolubilityof
thehumanbodyandthesubsequentdeath.
2.1MortalityinthePhaedoandtheTimaeus
InthePhaedo,apartfromdefiningdeathasthebody’scomingtobeseparatedbyitselfapart
from the soul and the soul’s coming tobe separatedby itself
apart from thebody (64c), Plato
offersnofurtherdetailsabouthowsuchseparationofthesoulandthebodyhappensandwhyit
happens.ForSocratesinthePhaedo,3
thebodyisratheraconcern,foritmightverylikelybring
contaminationtothesoulandisanobstacleforthesoulinlearningthetruth.4
Heencourageshis
audiencetodisdainthebodyandrefrainfromassociatingthemselveswithit,becausethebodyis
merely a disposable container for the soul. However, years, or
perhaps decades later, in the
Timaeus,Platomakesaveryexplicitexplanationofthephysicalconstitutionofthebody5
aswell
aswhat happens before the dying process finally reaches the
pointwhere the soul leaves the
body(81b4-e5).Then,whydoestheproblemofmortalitysuddenlybecomeworthdiscussingin
theTimaeus?Thequestion,Isuggest,canbeansweredfromtwoperspectives,thatis,firstly,from
theperspectivethatconcernsthecosmologicalcontextwithinwhichthedescriptionofthebody
3
Fordiscussionaboutthehistoricalvs.PlatonicSocrates,seeChapter1,footnote1.4
Cf.Phd.65b-67a.5
Cf.Tim.42e8-a4and44d3-45b2,asummaryofthelessergods’constructingthehumanbody;45b2-c2,theconstructionoftheeyes;70a7-72d3,theconstructionofsomebodilyorgansthathousethemortalpartsofsoul;72e1-81e5,theconstructionoftherestofthebody,suchasthebowel,themarrow,bones,flesh,sinew,etc.andtheprocessofrespirationandmetabolism,ageinganddeath.
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27
and death is offered, and secondly, from the perspective that
concerns the explanation of
mortality in its own right. The Phaedo’s entire discussion
emphasizesmatters concerning the
soul.Hence,it
lookslikethepurposeoftalkingaboutdeathisonlytointroducethekeysubject
matter,i.e.theimmortalityofthesoulanditsreincarnation,alongwiththeproblemofthepurity
ofthesoulassociatedwithit.
Inthiscase,mattersconcerningthebodyordeathbythemselves
are irrelevant and thus Plato is in no need of analyzing them in
their own right. In contrast,
Timaeus’ monologue is a discourse of cosmogony and cosmology and
is thus composed of
accountsconcerningthecomingtobeofvariousentities,amongwhichthecreationofthehuman
raceisoneoftheindispensableparts.Thatistosay,itisratherreasonablethatTimaeusincludes
atlengthinhisdemonstrationtheconstructionofthehumanbody,alongwithitsbirth,growth,
and decay, for the creation of the human race is necessary for
the completed creation of the
cosmosasawhole.6
Furthermore,asIhavepointedoutinChapter1,todevelopcomprehensive
understandingofthehumanrace,itcallsforinvestigationsnotonlyofitsimmortalfeaturesbut
alsoof itsmortal ones.Thismeansaphysical accountofmortality
isnecessary for theoverall
Timaeus.
ItisnoticeablethatSocrates’attitudeofcontempttowardsthehumanbodycouldappearto
discourageinterestinresearchonthebody.AndTimaeusalsoclaimsthatthesoulfeelspleasure
whenit
fliesawayfromthebody(81d7-e1).Socrates’attitudeandTimaeus’assertiontogether
promptthefollowingquestion:ifthebodyisofleastimportanceanditwouldbeabetterthing
for thesoul tobe free fromtheconnectionto
thebody,whywouldtheDemiurge,whowanted
everythingtobegoodandnothingtobebadifpossible(30a2-3),havethesoulembodiedinthe
firstplace?IsitpossiblethatthisisanexemplificationofthelimitationoftheDemiurge’screative
powerwhenhedealtwiththepre-cosmicchaos?Orisitindicativeofthepossibilitythatthebody
isinfactofsomeusetothesoulafterall?Butifitis,whywasthehumanracecreatedsuchthat
thesoulwouldeventually flyaway fromthebodyand leave it
todecompose?Thosequestions
cannotbeansweredwithout theknowledgeof theconstitutionof
thebody, theconstitutionof
the soul (with reference to the elaboration in Chapter 3), and
the connection and the
disconnectionbetweenthesoulandthebody.Inaword,inordertounderstandcomprehensively
for what reasons the Demiurge endowed the human race with
mortality, it is necessary to6 Cf.Tim.41b7-c2.
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28
developaphysicalaccountofmortality.
Nevertheless,
fromtheaboveargument,wecanseethat,althoughTimaeusdoesnotclaim
thatthebodyisassignificantasthesoultoahumanbeing,itisatleastreasonabletosuggestthat
Platohaschangedhisviewthatthebodyisnothingbutahindrancetothesoul.Thismeansthat
the body might be of benefit to an embodied soul at some point,
and might be able to
communicate with the soul and thus provides either help or harm
to the soul. In conclusion,
Plato’s shifting attitude towards the mortal nature of human
race in the Timaeus might be
indicativethathedoesnotdeclarefortheideathatthereisanutterlyunbridgeablegapbetween
thebodyandsoul,notatleastinTimaeus’cosmologicalcontext.
2.2Theconstitutionofthehumanbody
At the commandof theDemiurge,7 the lesser gods took over the
task of constructing the
bodyofhumanbeings.Thematerialstheyusedtocreatethehumanbodywereborrowedfrom
thecosmicbody,thatis,theelementarysolidsoffire,water,air,andearth,whichthelessergods
intended to pay back at the very beginning.8 This means that
thematerials out of which the
human bodywas constructed are the very samematerials out of
which the cosmic bodywas
created.Consequently,thepropertiesthatareattributedtothecosmicmaterialscanequallybe
ascribedtothematerialsofthehumanbody.Thisbeingthecase,itisreasonabletosuggestthat
thephysicalprinciplesoperatingbehindthecosmicbodyare,
toacertaindegree,applicable to
thehumanbody.ThissuggestionfindssupportingevidenceinthefactthatTimaeusemploysthe
inter-transformation of the four kinds of elementary solids as
the most basic explanatory
principle not only to demonstrate various cosmic phenomena but
also to account for the
construction and functions of different bodily organs and parts,
along with their respective
physical processes. 9 That the explanation of the elementary
solids and their
inter-transformation is applied consistently throughout Timaeus’
cosmological account is
understandable,foreverythingthatpossessesaphysicalbodyisintegraltothecosmicbodyand
7 Cf.Tim.41a-d.8 Cf.Tim.42e-43a.9
Cf.Tim.61e-63e,theperceptionofhot,cold,hard,soft,light,andheavy,alongwiththeconceptofdownandup;64a-65b,thenatureofpleasureandpain;77c-78e,veinsandirrigationinbody;78e-79e,respiration;80a-81e,metabolism,ageing,anddeath;82a-86a,diseases.
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29
thusisnecessarilysubjectto,attheelementallevel,theverysamephysicalprinciplesoperating
behindthecosmicbody.Forthisreason,itisjustifiabletosuggestthattoexaminethematerials
of the human body is to examine the materials of cosmic body,
that is, the four kinds of
elementarysolids.
AccordingtoTimaeus’demonstrationat53c-55c,thefourkindsofelementalsolids,i.e.fire,
water, air, and earth, can be further separated intomore basic
constituent parts, that is, two
kinds of triangles. Thismeans, the triangles are the originating
principles of the four kinds of
elemental solids, and thus the ultimate constituentmaterials of
the cosmic and human bodies
alike. Considering the complexity of the issue of the elemental
triangles and solids, I shall not
offer a full and thorough discussion of the coming-into-being
and nature of the elemental
triangles and solids. But instead, I shall confine my
investigation to matters that provide
necessarybackgroundknowledgetotheexaminationofthephysicalaccountofbodilymortality,
that is, thedestructibility, themateriality,andthestructureof
thetrianglesandfourelemental
solids.IwillexplaininthefollowingdiscussionwhyItakethosemattersasmostimportantand
essentialtotheunderstandingofmortality.
Are the trianglesdestructibleornot?Thisquestionnaturally
followson thedescriptionat
Timaeus 81d ‘they themselves (the triangles) are easily divided
by those entering from
without’,10 which seems to imply that the triangles can be
further broken up and thus are
destructible. If they are, this might seem to lead to an
inconsistency in the account. This is
because,Timaeus’ account (53c-54b) is not specificwhether ornot
triangles canbe rebornor
replenished.Sothetriangleswerepresumablyperishableandtherewerenonew-borntriagnles,
thenthesumofthetrianglesandsolidswouldgetsmallerandsmallerastheresultoftheirbeing
destroyed by other triangles and solids, and given a long enough
period of time, all triangles
would eventuallyperish.At last,without any triangles and solids
left, thephysical bodyof the
cosmos would perish as well. This is however obviously
inconsistent with the assumption,
expressed atTimaeus 36e,11 that the cosmos as awhole is
imperishable. In that case, that the
trianglesaredestructibledisagreeswiththefactthatthecosmosisaneverlastingcreatureunless
ofcoursethetrianglesaresomehowtoberebornorreplenishedtocompensateforearlierlosses.
10 αὐτὰδὲὑπὸτῶνἔξωθενἐπεισιόντωνεὐπετῶςδιαιρεῖται11
…itinitiatedadivinebeginningofunceasing,intelligentlifeforalltime.
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Anotherproblemraisedbythepossibilitythatthetrianglesaredestructibleistobefoundinthe
phrase ‘theoriginatingprinciple (ἀρχἠν)of fireandof
theotherbodies’ (53d),which I take to
imply that the triangles are indestructiblewith reference to
some similar usages of thisword
ἀρχή elsewhere in Timaeus and Phaedrus. At Phaedrus 245d,
Socrates says that an ἀρχή is
somethingthat iswithoutcomingtobefromanythingelse, it
isthusnecessarily indestructible,
forotherwise themortal thingswhichcome tobe from
itwouldeventuallycease tocome into
existence. And in the Timaeus, when using ἀρχή in just this
sense, Plato uses it to indicate
indestructible entities, such as the model the cosmos comes to
be after (28b), the God who
created the cosmos (29e), the subjugation of Necessity towise
persuasion (48a), and so on.12
Therefore, ‘theoriginatingprinciple’
in53dcanbemeantinthesamewayandimpliesthatthe
triangles are indestructible, since there is nothing to show
that ἀρχή in 53d is being used
differentlyfromtheothercitedcontext.But, is
itpossiblethatPlatocouldreallybemakingthe
opposite implication in the Timaeus? Or is there any
interpretation that might reconcile our
readingof53dand81d?
R. J. Hankinson’s interpretaion of ἀρχή in the Phaedrus will be
useful here.13 Hankinson
offersasolutiontotheproblemthatanἀρχήitselfmaypossiblycometobefromanothersource.
Hesuggests
ifweunderstandtheἀρχήasstrictlyspeakingtheἀρχήofsomepropertyorsome
particularthing,thenaslongasthepropertyorthingexists,thisἀρχήwillbetheultimatecause
foritsexistence,beyondwhichthereisnoothersource.Thisdefinitionsatisfiesthedescription
in the Phaedrus. And, if, in the meantime, we see this ἀρχή not
strictly but as something
individualinitself,thentheἀρχήcanindeedcometobefromanothersource.Hereisananalogy
tohelpunderstandHankinson’ssuggestion.Ifwedrawastraightlineextendingfromapointona
coordinatemap, thispoint thencanbe regardedas theἀρχήof this
linebecause itdefines the
startingpointforthisline,andaslongaswehavethisline,thispointwillalwaysbethestartfor
itandwillnotvanish.Andastothepointitself,itcomestobefromourrandomchoiceofposition
onthecoordinatemap.
12
Tim.48b,thefourelementalsolidsinthesensethatthey’vebeenmistakentobetheἀρχή;48c,originorultimatesourceofallthings.TheGreekwordἀρχήappearsintheTimaeus28times,including28b(3times),29e,48a,48b(4times),48c(twice),and53d(twice).Andat42eand79c,ἀρχήindicatesthesoulparticularly,whileat17b,20a,21d,24b,24b,36e,44a,48d(3times),48e,55e,57d,69a,69b,73b,73c,79c,80b,89c,90e,itsimplymeansthebeginning.13
Cf.Hankinson(1988)98-101.
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Thus, when Plato presumes the triangles to be the ἀρχή of
elemental solids, I think he
probablymeansthatthetrianglesareindestructibleonlyinalimitedsense,thatis,aslongasa
solid exists, its triangles are indestructible. In otherwords,
ifwe imagine the triangles, in the
strictsense,astheἀρχήoftheelementalsolids,aslongastheelementalsolidsexist,thetriangles
willbetheultimatesourcefortheirexistence,beyondwhichthereisnoothersource.Inthiscase,
thetrianglesareindestructible,andwecanonlyanalyzeasolidintotriangles,regardlessofthe
possibilitythattheremightbesomemoreultimatecomponent(Tim.53d).Butinthemeantime,
ifwelookatthetrianglesfromtheperspectiveoftheirownindividualexistenceratherthanas
theoriginatingprincipleofelementalsolids,
itwilldonoharmtothepriorinterpretationifwe
admit that the triangles
themselvesarecreatedandcanpossiblybedestroyed. In thisway,we
eliminatetheproblemofpotentialinconsistencyintheTimaeus,thatis,itisnotcontradictoryto
thinkof the trianglesas theἀρχήof theelemental solidsandas
tobedestructibleat thesame
time.Thatthetrianglesareindestructibleonlyinalimitedsense,i.e.intermsofbeingtheἀρχήof
elemental solids, is not a strong claim in thatwe are still
confrontedwith thematter that the
triangles, being seen on their own, are indeed perishable. This
entails that the cosmoswould
maintaineternalexistenceifonlythetrianglescouldberebornorrepleanished.Iwilldealwith
thatmatterbyexaminingthematerialityofthetriangleswithregardtohowthetrianglescameto
beinthefirstplace.
The reason why I think the triangles’ materiality worth
discussing is because, as I have
arguedabove,thetrianglesarethebasiccomponentsofthehumanbody,henceitisthetriangles’
materialitythatdeterminesthematerialityofthehumanbody.Since,theinvestigationofhumans’
mortalityreliesonthestudyof thephysicalityofhumanbody, it is
thenalsoreasonabletosay
thattheunderstandingofthephysicalaspectofhumans’mortalnatureisgroundedinthatofthe
triangles’materiality.Furthermore,thematerialityofthetrianglesdeterminesthematerialityof
themarrow,whichisthemediumthatbindsthesoultothebody(73b-c).Ourunderstandingof
the triangles’materialitywill thereforeaffect the
futurediscussionofhowthesoul isboundto
themarrow,whosenature,particularlyasitimpactsontheproblemofthebody’decomposition,
istobeunderstoodinthelightofhowweunderstandthetriangles’materiality.
Many interpretations canbe sustained in thedebateabout
thematerialityof the triangles
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andthusithasbeenexaminedfromvariousperspectives.14
ItwillbecomeadigressionifItryto
coveralltheperspectivesexistingliteraturehasdemonstrated.Butfromthepointofviewofmy
overall argument, it is necessary to state my position on this
issue to the extent that such a
statementcanat
leasthelptosolvethetwoproblemsraisedattheendofthediscussionofthe
triangles’ destructibility, and provides a coherent background
to the understanding of the
triangles’nature,andhowthey fit
intoourdiscussionofhumanmortality.Furthermore,as the
trianglesarealsothematerialsofthecosmicbody,adiscussionofthematerialityofthetriangles
willprepareusforaninvestigationintotherelationshipbwteenhumanbeingsandthecosmos
andtheteleologyoperatingbehindthehumanrace’sbeingcreatedasbothmortalandimmortal.
InthecontextoftheTimaeus,whatdoesitmeantosaythatsomethingismaterial?Before
exploringtheanswertothatquestion,amorefundamentalproblemneedstobedealtwith,that
is,isitevenapproporiatetoemploytheconceptofmaterialityinintepretingTimaeus’cosmology?
For, Timaeus’ discourse does not involve the concept of
materiality by itself. Instead, Plato
merelyclaimsthatthefourelementalsolidshavebodilyform(Tim.53c),andthatthecosmosasa
whole is visible and tangible andhas abody, inotherwords,
perceptible (Tim. 28b-c).Andhe
attributesthosefeaturestothingthatcomestobesoastodistinguishitfromthosewhichalways
is. ‘Materiality’, I think,
ismerelyaterminterpretersemploytodenotethosefeatures,sowhen
weemploythisterminthediscussionrelatedtotheTimaeusweshouldrefertoitascautiouslyin
arestrictedsenseasthecosmologicalcontextallows.Furthermore,itisworthemphasizingthat
itisnotthesametosaythattheelementalsolidsarematerialandthatahumanbodyismaterial.
Aswecansee,at61e-63eand65c-68d,Platoelucidatestheprincipleofsenseperceptionusing
the explanation of triangles and solids. Fromhis expositionwe
can learn that sensation is the
resultofthemovementofinteractionofelementalsolids.Thismeansthatasinglesolidsdoesnot
possesseitherthenatureofbeingperceptibleorthecapacityofperceivingontheonehandandit
is themovementofmany trianglesandsolids thatenables theactof
senseperceptionand the
attributeofbeingperceptibleontheother.15
Thisbeingthecase,wecanconcludethatwhenwe
say that elemental solids, the human body, and the cosmos
aswhole are allmaterial things it
meansthattheyallpossessbodilyforms.Andthenatureofbeingperceptiblecanbeseenasthe
14
ForvariousinterpretationsofwhatthetrianglesaresinceAntiquity,seeMiller(2003)173-179.
15
Foranelaborateargumentonthemechanicalprinciplesofperceivingandbeingperceptible,seeChapter4,4.1Πάθημαandαἴσθησις.
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movements of elemental solids on amicro levelmanifesting
themselves in human and cosmic
bodyonamacro level.Then,bearing inmind that
thecomponentsofhumanbodyandcosmic
bodyariseinthesamesource,thatanythingthat
ismadeoutofthesamesourceasthehuman
bodycaninteractwiththebody,andthuscanbecountedasvisible,tangible,andhasabody,in
otherwords,perceptible.
Sofar,Ihavearguedthattheelementalsolidsbeingmaterialmeanstheyhavebodilyforms,
and human body is also material since it is composed of
elemental solids. And due to the
movementof the
interactionofelementalsolids,humanbodythenpossessessenseperception,
and thus the nature of being visible, tangible, and perceptible
embodies themateriality of the
elemental solids on a macro level. Now that we have defined
materiality in Timaeus’
cosmologicalcontext, itseemstobe inappropriate tosay that the
trianglesarematerial in that
sense,sincePlatodoesnotmentionwhetherornotthetrianglesthemselvespossessbodilyform
(53c).Thisbeingthecase,weareconfrontedwithaquestion:isitpossibleforTimaeusthatthe
basis, i.e. the triangles, ofmaterial existence, i.e. the four
elemental solids, humans, etc. is not
themselvesexactlymaterial?Inotherwords,isitpossiblethat,intheTimaeus,Platoistryingto
blur the boudary line betweenmaterial and non-material existence
by constructing elemental
solids that has depth out of the triangles? For Plato does not
confirm that the triangles
constituting the elemental solids are two-dimensional existence
but