Technology and Friction in the Schlieffen Plan · 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Technology and Friction in the Schlieffen Plan 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

Technology and Friction

in the Schlieffen Plan

Core Course 2 Essay

LTCOL Philip J, Exner, USMC/Class of 1996

Course 2: Foundations of Military Thought and Strategy

Seminar: J

Faculty Seminar Leader: COL Dave Tretler

Faculty Advisor: COL Gary G. Gisolo

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“Evecthmg KI war IS ten sunple, but the simplest thmg 1s &fficult The difficulties accumulate and end bq producing a kmd of fncuon that 1s inconceivable unless one has elpenenced it Countless mmor lncldents - the kmd you can never really foresee - comblne to lower thz general level of performance so that one always falls far short of the intended goal w

Carl von Clausewitz’

INTRODUCTIOS

One of the pnnclpal reasons that Germany lost World War I was the falure of the “Schheffen

Plan of 1905.“2 its strategic scheme to knock France quickly out of the war The plan involved a mlde

counter-clockwise sweep by the German nght (Northern) flank through Belgmm and Luxembourg and

around Pans m order to outflank the French Army which was concentrated m posmons further south

along the German-French border. The Germans then mtended to surround and destroy the French

Army m a “kesselschlacht,” or “deaslve battle of encirclement and anndulatlon It3 Success hmged on

rapid moblhzatlon as well as openhonal speed and concentration to resolve the issue quickly and the

plan was utterly dependent on the rrulroads In August 1914, the plan fell short As a result. Germany

had to fight a two-front war of attnnon which eventually bled her mto submlsslon

The fadure of the Schheffen Plan can be traced to its neglect of many of Clausewltz’s most basic

pnnaples Yet interwoven throughout all of Its shortcommgs IS another fundamental factor that

Clause\Lltz did not discuss m great detail but which contnbuted to each fatlure and carnes enormous

relevmce to modem U S strategic mlhtary thought- excessive rehance on technology ’

B> “technology” I mean both the specific mechamcal devices as well as the systems through

which they are mtegrated mto rnlhtary operations. Thus. “r,ulroads” include not only the trams. tracks

;md other physlcal ObJects associated with transport but &o the moblhzatlon schedules. stagmg plans.

clnd other mtanglble elements which constnuted the control system that enabled It to contnbute to the

niMq effort Understood In this “ay. technology was related to nearly every instance where the

plm neglected key pnnclples of Clausewltz

Schheffen s mordmate dependence on technology bpral, 0 from d rejection c)t Cldusewltr F concept

ot “hcllol~ ” Thus m turn led to an o\erl)-ambmou\. mtlevlble @n .md m ~rnbalan~cd m!htdr)-

E\ner 7

pohucal relationstip’ Thus paper explores those Clausewltzlan weaknesses of Schheffen’s Plan m

hght of technology. pamcularl) the rallroads and will suggest some lessons wluch apply today

BACKGROUND

The ongms of the Schheffen Plan date b;ick almost 50 years before the opening of WWI From

Its earliest days, Germany’s mam fear was a two-front war with France and Russ&. From the time of

-Moltke the Elder. chef of the German General Staff from 1857-1887’. much of Germany’s war

plannmg effort was dn-ected toward prepanng for such an eventuahty The Schheffen Plan of 1905

was actually the sixteenth plan Schheffen had devised agamst France and the mneteenth he had made

for 3 two-front war * Therefore to understand the Schheffen Plan it IS helpful to trace the evolunon of

the war plans from wluch it descended

When Schheffen became chef of the German General Staff m 1891, he mhented plans which had

been lrugely debeloped by Moltke the Elder Those plans for a two-front war were based on an

offenslke-defensive strategy which rehed on a short, quick mlhtary acuon. followed by a speedy

polihcal conclusion on at least one front! Moltke was a self-professed dlsclple of Clausewnz who

behe\ecl his mentor’s admonmon that “of all the possible arns m war, the destruction of the enemy’s

armed forces always appears as the highest “’ ’ Sonetheless. he firmly grasped the potential Impact of

“fnctlon”” and “fog”” and recogmzed the &fficulty of wmnmg a quick victory on either frontI SIX

qears after the France-Prussian wu. Moltke wrote that even after a declslve battle in France early In a

future two-front war “It must be left to diplomacy to see If it can achieve a peace settlement on thus

front “” Moltke thus adopted Clausewltz’s “other way” to vlctory” seizing mlhtafy obJecn\es of

political value Though he opposed pohtlcal mvolvement 111 the acn.A conduct of the war Moltke

reLogmzed the importance of tallonng the m~htary ObJecti~cs to the pol~ucal ones.

SCHLIEFFEN Ah-D “FRICTIO\ ’

In bharp contrast to Moltke the Elder. Schheffen essenudly rejected Clausewltz Y concept ot

“h-Icnon “‘6 He bellebed that thorough pre-plmmg would rcmo\e IIIO\~ of rhc uncert.unty %rom minq

Exner 3

operation and “compel the opponent to conform substanaally to one s own operational strategy “‘-

To the degree that he recogmzed fncaon at all, It was purely techmcal in nature. Schheffen regarded

fncnon m terms of effklency and orgamzaaon. hence somethmg that could be controlled through

derrtlled pre-planmng and centralized control’* Over time. the pnmary goals of speed and

concentration were overshadowed by subsidiary issues of tlmmg of mobihzatlon orders, ralroad

schedules, equipment mamtenance. swltchmg coo&nation efficient use of the hmlted ra11 lines, and

other secondary planmng factors Because of tis exclusive focus on the internal fncuon of techmcal

efficiency, he discounted other more crmcal forms of fnctlon such as surpnse by the enemy,

mlsunderstandmg. frulure of allies, weather, etc. Thus, Schheffen fouled to grasp Clausewltz’s wider

meanmg of the term, resultmg m far greater fnchon on the battlefield where hs plan could not meet

tis expectations

CREATIOh- OF NEW VITL~JX4BILITIES

Technology seldom simplifies war, and nearly always makes it more comphcated Since war IS a

clash of opposmg, reactmg w~ll$~, reduction of fnchon m one area tends to create it in others where

II hadn’t existed before ” The mtroductlon of new tactics or technology often creates new strategic

vulnerablhtles as the enemy reacts to the mnovanons or unforeseen dependencies emerge For

example, m Schheffen s plan. radroads ahlch were introduced to move the instruments of \%ar became

strategic targets themselves. generatmg a new set of execution problems. targets, and countermeasures

Tlus perverse propensity for increased fnctlon to anse from mnovatlons designed to reduce It IS

funher aggravated by the natural tendency of military planners to exploit any new capablht) to Its

hmlt Development of a system of efficient. high-capacity rdllroads led to plans mvolvmg much luger

forces and greater distances than were previously possible The resulting plans required the higher

volume made possible by railroads for its success

Synergy cuts both ways Technologies or novel tacucs whlcb multiply effectl\eness when they

work can dlvlde It by an eben bigger factor when they kul The expedlenrs tor dealmg with ;L system

Evner 1

P

breakdoan may not have been developed because the users had not toreseen 2x21-y way m which It

can fall or be neutrahzed Older less “efficient” altematlves whxh possibly could have compensated

for a falure of the new system may have been discarded, especmlly d the new technology represents a

slgmficant Improvement and resources are hmlted.” Thrs may create a cntlcal dependency on a angle

technology whose hmltauons and vulnerabdmes may not be fully understood until the war amkees

Thus. railroads which made the Schheffen Plan possible became an enormous hablhty when disrupted

or neutralized. forcing delay and redlrectlon of the strategic effort and mfhchng severe hardships on

the soldiers Centrahzatlon of control, made possible by the telegraph. became delay, paralyas. and

strategic blindness when it was cut, integration of effort was lost, and front line umts waned for

orders. losing valuable opportumty Technology greatly increases the speed and danger of war

CHA_\;GE IX CLLMINATING POINT”

Another result of Schheffen s duregard of the fnctlon caused by enemy reaction was tis fadure to

foresee the change m the culmmatmg pomt of hl.s attack The same quahtles of rrulroads which

i”‘ increased the number of troops and supphes and the speed at wluch they could be moved also

expanded the size and scope of the battlefield propomonately Although the Germans could move

more fdster and further. so could the Allies The French had learned to make use of the rxlways

themselves and capitalized on their mtenor lines to keep pace with the German moves, neutrahzmg

much of the strategic advantage Schheffen had planned to exploit Tlus rendered his ObJectIves too

ambmous. and the German attack expended Itself before actievmg the complete envelopment called

for under the plan As a rule. fnctlon reduces the effecuveness of any operational plan and retards the

culminating point of the proposed effort While this does not mean failure for ebery plan. It does

mean that few achieve LU they intend In the case of the Schhetfen Plan hoxtever. this reduction 111

the culmmatmg point was tantamount to complete trulure \mce the plti was the foundatmn ot ccn

overall Germs ndtlonal strategy which depended on d rapid total victory on the We\tem Front

Evnrr 5

POLITICAL-MILITAIXY RELATIONSHIPS

Clausewnz‘s prmcrple of war as mstrument of ~011~);~ defines war’s role, but does not preclude

mllmuy partrctpanon m polmcal decisions relaang to the mtl~tary24 In fact, Clausewttz urged a role

for the mrhtary cluef m the cabinet to ensure that the mrhtary mstrument is used m a manner I

consistent with its capabilities.25 Moltke the Elder understood tlus balance As dtscussed earlier. he

saw that the nation s strength lay m the coordinated acnvmes of both mrhtary and pohtrcal spheres

Accordmgly, diplomacy was an integral part of hrs war plans and worked to offset some of

Germany’s mthtary resource hmttattons Hrs successors drd not share hrs grasp of that prmctple I 1

Waldersee, Schheffen’s predecessor, was removed after only two years as Chtef of the Generali I

Staff for hrs excessive meddling m pohhcs 1-6 Schheffen displayed the opposrte tendency, focusmg I

more on the techmcal aspects of war plannmg and neglecting lus responstbrlines to fold pohttcal

flexibthty mto hrs war plans.”

Schheffen s plans were developed m such rsolauon from the changmg political landscape of the

late 19th century, that then techmcal punty and abstractton became a habthty They rose like ivory I

towers built on mtl~tary theory alone. unmoved wuh the binder of pohucal reality In Schheffen. :

Clauseutu s proper and respectful detachment lrom political entanglements degenerated into an ,

mdrlference to the polmcal forces dnvmg the nations toward ~var. His strategtes fixated on the mere

/ mechamcs of surroundmg and destroymg the enemy army Freed from cumbersome polrttcal

restnctrons. hrs plans became mcreasmgly complex, ambmous. and ngrd. progressively excludmg ,

allowance for any sort of fnctror? In an effort to achieve the efficiency required to fully evplott the /

ratlroads. Schheffen standardrzed mobrhzatton schedules and orgamzauonal procedures lctimg ,

ulttmately to standardtzatton of war Itself. Polmcal objectives becme secondary to the mrhtary

ObJectIves of the war plans This apathy about the polmcal problems posed by the tangled web of

alliances at the mm of the century ulumately resulted m a mthtary plan so inflexible that it overrode

polmcai con\tderattons and became. Itself. one of the cctuses leading up to the war

Euner 6

The Schheffen Plan’s most serious fault was at the strategic level First, the plan depended on

technologies v,hlch could only be controlled at the expense of pohtlcal and strategic flevlblhty The

cnncalit] of efficiently usmg all rail cars and lines meant that each tram load depended m some

fastion on a previous one. As a result the complexity of mtegratmg moblhzatlon and deployment

timetables made It practically Impossible to partmlly mobilize or to execute only a part of the plan.

The mterdependencles were too great to untangle when time was short m August 1914 So when the

Kaiser approached Moltke the Younger, who replaced Schheffen. to ask about his options for

responding to the developing threat from French and Russmn mobihzatlons, he was given the extreme

opuons of doing nothmg or going to war.29 Once the Schlieffen Plan was set in monon, the

timetables drove the conduct of the war until the fncDon wiuch Schheffen had ignored ground the

offensive m France to a halt

Second once the war began. the Schheffen Plan faded to provide any useful secondary ObJeCUL es

whch could be used to aclueve the national secunty goals through negotiation or other means. should

the mlhtary effort end m a stalemate After the departure of Blsmarck and the abandonment of Moltke

the Elder s offensne-defensive strategy, German mlhtary strategy grew to depend on a rapid victory

against one side m anv two-front war Since German mditary forces were m..uiequate tor a two-front d

mar. degeneration mto a war of attntlon destroyed the basis of German war plans and put German) in

the gravest danger To ensure victory. Schheffen relied on the strategic advantages oftered by the

ralroads and retreated mto the msular world of schedules. telegraph lines. and orgamzanonal

structures. neglecting the possiblhty that. should his plan fa11. he noould have to depend on a

diplomcltic solution ” The only hope tor Schlreffen was the mlhtary one quick destructmn of the

French Army When that faled he had no fall-back position

Clausewltz would have been appalled He had wntten. “The on14 qucsuon. therctore IS uhether.

when war is being planned the political blew should give way to the purely military Subordinating

rhe pohticd point of blew to the mrlam would be absurd for it IS pohcy th;lt htl\ created the i%dr

Exner 7

Pohcy 1s the guiding mtelhgence and war only the mstrument. not vice versa “‘I Schheffen and

c Moltke the Younger are without excuse. They both knew that their responslblhtles extended beyond

presentmg a stenle war plan to the &user. Clausewitz wrote, “Sor indeed 1s It sensible to summon

soldiers and ask them for purely mlhtary advIce.“32 Nonetheless Moltke the Younger presented the

problem to the Kaser as a stnctly operational one, pressing tirn to moblhze and to yield pohtlcal

Judgment and caution to the mflexlble tunetables of the Schheffen Plan

Clausewltz also pointed out that, “The first. the supreme, the most far-reachmg act of Judgment

that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kmd of war on wluch they are

embarkmg. neither mlstakmg it for, nor uymg to turn it mto, somethmg that IS alien to its nature “33

Schheffen’s faded to recogmze how his unbndled exploltatlon of technology’s capabihhes and tus

neglect of the pohtlcal nature of war had transformed Its nature Technology greatly expanded its

scope and destrucuveness, while tis fadme to establish secondary objecoves wluch would support a

diplomatic solution placed the fate of Germany at the mercy of hs rrulroad timetables, rrusmg the

f@-- stakes to the pomt where lt became a war of nahonal surv~al

In d-us light. WWI was fundamentally the result of a complete policy frulure The Kaiser

abdicated his responslbdmes as the pohucal leader by not demanding subordmauon of the mlhtary

goals to his political ones He faded at his most fundamental responstbihty when he allowed Moltke

the Younger to use the war plans. developed for no particular pohhc~l ObJectlve to dnve the nation

into war

Finally, Clausewltz wrote, 70 one st;llts a war - or rather no one m hrs senses ought to do so -

without first being clear m his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to

conduct it The former is its political purpose. the latter its operational ObJ2CtiV2.“3’ The Schheffen

Plan had the latter but was developed w&out the former The closest thmg to a strategic purpose was

avoidance of a protracted two-front war But even that negative goA was ,m abstraction H hlch begged

H-Y the que$uon of the underlqmg pohticd purpose for Germmy s entry

F

E\ner Y

Th: monstrous absurdity of WWI from Germany’s perspectne lay m its utter lack of necessity or

compellmg purpose The French, at least had strong reasons revenge and recovery of &ace-

Lorrrtlrfe But Kaser Wilhelm allowed Germany to dnft mto a war with monumental thoughtlessness

about what he hoped to achieve - or what it might cost Mlhons of people pad with their lives

APPLICATION

Railroads and telegraphs were to Schheffen what stealth and mformanon technology on the

battlefield are to some mthtary planners today The spectacular success of some newly employed

technologies dunng Desert Storm has tempted some strategists to announce that technology has

“revolutlomzed” the modem battlefield. It IS the same clam that has been made many ames before

But technology IS no panacea. If cleverly applied, it may bestow a strategic or tactical advantage ‘5

But. advantages denved from technology are temporal, relahve. and dependent on the reactions of our

actual or potential opponents Each mnovanon prompts a countermeasure by a potenaal adbersary3”.

affectmg the dynamic of the battlefield and the nature of the war m which it IS used Sometunes. as m

Desert Storm. the advantage is so great that it can be exploited fully w&m the temporal limit

However. that very success mvanably transforms the next war Defeat 1s a better teacher than victory,

bo \%e must be careful of the lessons we take from our wm

To&q s modem culmm,mng point may not be a geographic posmon on a map. but rather a limit

to the reach of the technologies we use When we rely. not on human blood and effort. but on

computer systems precision weapon systems. or other technololes to defeat an adversary . the

hmltatlons of what they can achieve. where they can reach when they are effective and how many we

cm afford become cntlcal and define the modem technologic;il equivalent to Clausewitz s

“~ulmmaang point “3- Once that potnt IS reached. the attacker can advance no hmher toward his

ObJective md has lost the uuti&ttve In modem warfare with its many forms Jnd its olten-blurred

lines with the political realm the culmm,mng point may not be 50 much a geographic location

determined by hums hmitatlons ah clll mabthty to advance lustier dgaimt certain elements ot enemy

power agamst which our chosen weapons are impotent or of no further value Military planners must

understand that power IS limited as much by how we employ it as by IIS techmcal possibilities

The potential culminating point of our power in any conflict scenario dehmits our capabilities. and

capabilities dnve mtentions Political ambitions are fed by expanding capabilities and the perception

of strerigth, while perceptions of weakness tend to blunt or restnct national goals Hence. the

implicaaons of technology on national capabilities cannot be divorced from political goals. Both the

stren,oths and vulnerabilities of technologies must be considered in assessing the degree of added

capability they give to national power Therefore, a military leader is derelict m his dunes if he does

not carefully evaluate the impact of new technologies or if he oversells them as an elixir for increasmg

national capabilities or reducing the undesirable side-effects of war such as brutality or violence

Unfortunately. after Desert Storm, some leaders exaggerated the capabilities and advantages of some

new technologies in order to get funding, broaden roles and missions. or other political purposes,

without cntically evaluating their limitations

As technological improvements proliferate faster than they can be integrated into warflghting

systems. it is especially cnacal to appreciate that new vulnerabilities come with them Shrinking

budgets. Goldwater-Nichols, the emerging role of the CIYCs, and other developments are dnving DOD

to increased centralizaaon of weapons, (?I’, navigation. supply, and other systems This trend IS

accelerating despite numerous examples of vulnerability to sabotage, espionage, and neutralization

Our increasing reliance on new technologies for warflghang should be a major source of concern for

mihtary leaders We have already developed critical dependencies which could produce catastrophic

results 11 exploited by our potential enemies. many ot whom are Jctively seeking to do Just that

Regardless of the immediate danger. we must not be lulled into complacency by a sense of

technological supenonty Those technologies which reduce the fncaon of war should never be given

VOICZ to deny the relevance of the danger they were designed to alleviate Otherwise, like Germany

we ma) someday he railroded into a tragic wa by an txcessive reliance on technology

1. Carl von Clausewitz. On War. Ed and Trans Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Prmceton Pnnceton CP. 1976‘1 119

2. In 1914 Molrke the Younger. who replaced Schheffen. had made some mmor changes to the plan (e g strengthenmg the southern part of the line) Some have said that. had he executed the plan as concetved by Schheffen. Germany mtght have won. That can never be known and IS mghly problematic Moltke the Younger’s modlficahons to the ongmal plan were not major, and, more Importantly. they did not correct some of the more egregious deficiencies of Schheffen’s plan which are discussed m thrs paper and elsewhere Thus, the German offensive was substanually based on the Schhelfen Plan of 19435. and, though Mohke the Younger executed it. the plan was essentially Schhetien’s Accordmgly, Schheffen should be awarded responslbdlty for its major flaws. Larry H Addmgton. The Patterns of War Since the E1,ohteent.h Centurv (Bloommgton: Indmna UP, 1994) 106-l 10

3 Addmgton 105-106

4. In Schheffen’s case the technologies involved were relahvely simple by today’s standards and centered around transportahon and commumcation Yet, they represent a legmmate basis for comparison with today’s more modem technology “Technology,” as used m thrs paper, comprises the full systems mcludmg both the physlcal ObJects denoted by the term, and the control systems which render it useful m war As systems, railroads and telegraph both were sufficiently complex to JUSh@

comparison with today s systems, and the lessons to be drawn from those older technologies are snll applicable

5. Clausewitz 606-608

(” 6. Gunther E Rothenberg, “_Lioltke, Schheffen. and the Doctrme of Strategic Envelopment” Makers of Modem Strategy from Machlavelh to the yuclear Age Ed Peter Paret. (Pnnceton- Prmceton I-7 1986) 306

-I Schheffen s term ran from 1891- 1906 Rothenberg 297

8 Rothenberg 3 15

0 < . Rothenberg 306-307

l0. Clausewltz 92 (cf. 577. 596 >

11. Lfoltke wrote that. “So plan of operations can look with any certamty beyond the first meeting with the maJor forces of the enemy ” H~JO Holbom “The Prusso-German School- Moltke md the Rare ot the General Staff’ Makers ot Modem Strategy from Machravelli to the Suclear Aee Ed Peter Paret (Princeton Pnnceton UP 1986) 259

:2 After Konmggratz. Moltke spoke of the Idea of moving sepxate ,u-mles so as to ~0x1 at the

declslve moment on the enemy s flank “No foresight can guarantee such a final result of operattons with separate armies Tlus depends, not merely on calculable factors spxe and time but also often on the outcome of pre\ious minor battles. on the weather. on false new5: in brief. on Al that 1s callsd chance ,rnd luck in human life ” Holbom 288

Evner 11

13 _ Shortly after the dramatrc vrctory m the France-Prussmn war. he wrote, “Germany cannot hope to nd I self of one enemy by a quick vrctory m the west m order to turn agamst the other ”

b Rothen erg 306

* 1

-= . Rothenberg 307

15. Clausewnz 92

16. Rothenberg 3 12

17 * Rothenberg 3 14

1%. Rothenberg 3 14

19. Clausewnz 75

20. In any complex plan or system there IS always a “cntrcal path” whrch represents the bottleneck of the process and contams the greatest vulnerabrhhes of any plan Removal of one bottleneck often creates a new cntrcal path, mcreasmg the effiaency of the system, but opemng up a new set of threats If the greatest factor m the speed of an army is the limit on how fast its soldiers can march, mtroducmg trucks may dramatrcally increase the army’s speed. But m the process, you will also have introduced numerous vulnerabrhtres relatmg to mamtenance, logrshcs, linkage to roads and weather, dependence of ttmetables on thmgs whrch didn’t affect schedules before. and a host of other comphcattons. Thrs m no way lmphes that technoiogrcal mnovauons are necessanly bad But the more dramatic the Improvement, the greater the potent& imbalance m the event of farlure, the more dependent on the new technology, the more rmportant It IS to build redundancy; the greater the potentml improvement. the more cauwous should one be

21. These “less effectrve” systems may not produce as rmpressrve results, but they often lack the vulnera

1 thtres of new technologies Even m modem wars, we have had to resort to the most basic of

“techno ogres” when the more modem ones broke down Thus. when satellites. fiber optics. or radios break down. we have had to resort to messengers When radroads. or trucks. or C-17s break down. we will have to resort to walking and manual transport There wtll always be a need for couriers and forced marches and human strength. Thrs tenet does not come from atavistic oppositron to progress, but from the fact that the technologres which are mtroduced to reduce one of Clausewnz’s elements of dtffrcuity become targets themselves.

22. Ciausewnz 566-567

23. “War IS not merely an act of pohcy. but a true polmcal mstrument. a contmuaaon of pohtical intercourse. carned on wuh other means ” Clausewnz 87

24. Clausewrtz 605-608

25. Clausewit 608

26 Rothenberg 3 11

21 Rothenberg 3 11-3 12. 3 19

f- 2 8 Rothenberg 311-312

Evner 12

2 9 . Rothenberg 311-12, 319

3 0 . Rothenberg 305-311

31. Clauseu uz 607

32 Clausewnz 607

33. Clausewttz 88

3L. Clausewnz 579

3.5 Elevahon of any smgle tacnc or mnovaaon to preemmence may occasionally produce a startlmg vxtory but It 1s usually made possrble for one of two reasons Fn-st. the defeated srde lacked the knowledge, technology, or tacncal/strategrc development to employ an effective countermeasure (e g . breech loaders of Brmsh vs Chmese muskets, needle gun vs muskets. satellites/mtegrated comxnumcanon III Desert Storm, etc.> Second, and more often, the defeated side had itself Ignored one or more developments or had farled to properly employ It or assess rts unportance. Thrs usually involves underestimatmg the effechveness of a particular new weapon or tactic which is avarlable to both sides, and for which there is adequate nme to develop and test new tacncs or employment strategies.

Systems may eventually evolve to the pomt where then rehabrhty, slmplicrty, umversahty or redund

T cres render them no longer decrsrve m the scheme of battle. or at least remove them from the

focus o cnhcahty m a general sense. A road system may become sufficrently dense that there are no obvrous choke pomts Radios may prohferate to the point that the farlure of any one wrll not cost the campargn Yet all mstruments of war are subject to the efforts of both chance and the enemy to

/“- neutrahze, drsrupt. slow down. or otherwrse de,orade then effecnveness m the conduct of war Radios may be Jammed Roads can be washed or bombed out an-craft can be grounded by weather, etc

36. Clausewnz 75

37. Clausewnz 566-567