8/11/2019 Teacher Incentives http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/teacher-incentives 1/49 Teacher Incentives Paul Glewwe, Nauman Ilias, and Michael Kremer Abstract Advocates of teacher incentive programs argue that they can strengthen weak incentives, while opponents argue they lead to teaching to the test!" #e find evidence that e$isting teacher incentives in Kenya are indeed weak, with teachers a%sent &'( of the time! #e then report on a randomi)ed evaluation of a program that provided primary school teachers in rural Kenya with incentives %ased on students* test scores! +tudents in program schools had higher test scores, significantly so on at least some e$ams, during the time the program was in place! An e$amination of the channels through which this effect took place, however, provides little evidence of more teacher effort aimed at increasing longrun learning! -eacher attendance did not improve, homework assignment did not increase, and pedagogy did not change! -here is, however, evidence that teachers increased effort to raise shortrun test scores %y conducting more test preparation sessions! #hile students in treatment schools scored higher than their counterparts in comparison schools during the life of the program, they did not retain these gains after the end of the program, consistent with the hypothesis that teachers focused on manipulating shortrun scores! In order to discourage dropouts, students who did not test were assigned low scores! Program schools had the same dropout rate as comparison schools, %ut a higher percentage of students in program schools took the test! .epartment of Applied /conomics, 0niversity of Minnesota! /mail1 pglewwe2apec!umn!edu 3ompetition /conomics, Inc!, #ashington, .3! /mail1 nilias2competitioneconomics!com .epartment of /conomics, 4arvard 0niversity5 -he 6rookings Institution5 3enter for Glo%al .evelopment N6/7! /mail1 mkremer2fas!harvard!edu #e would like to thank 7achel Glennerster, /d Kaplan, 8anina Matus)eski, and 3ourtney 0m%erger for very helpful comments and assistance! #e are especially grateful to +ylvie Moulin and 7o%ert Namunyu for outstanding work in the field and to /mily 9ster for outstanding research assistance in the 0!+! #e thank the #orld 6ank and the MacArthur :oundation for financial support! '
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Advocates of teacher incentive programs argue that they can strengthen weak incentives, whileopponents argue they lead to teaching to the test!" #e find evidence that e$isting teacher
incentives in Kenya are indeed weak, with teachers a%sent &'( of the time! #e then report on arandomi)ed evaluation of a program that provided primary school teachers in rural Kenya withincentives %ased on students* test scores! +tudents in program schools had higher test scores,significantly so on at least some e$ams, during the time the program was in place! Ane$amination of the channels through which this effect took place, however, provides littleevidence of more teacher effort aimed at increasing longrun learning! -eacher attendance did notimprove, homework assignment did not increase, and pedagogy did not change! -here is,however, evidence that teachers increased effort to raise shortrun test scores %y conducting moretest preparation sessions! #hile students in treatment schools scored higher than theircounterparts in comparison schools during the life of the program, they did not retain these gainsafter the end of the program, consistent with the hypothesis that teachers focused on
manipulating shortrun scores! In order to discourage dropouts, students who did not test wereassigned low scores! Program schools had the same dropout rate as comparison schools, %ut ahigher percentage of students in program schools took the test!
.epartment of Applied /conomics, 0niversity of Minnesota! /mail1 pglewwe2apec!umn!edu
.epartment of /conomics, 4arvard 0niversity5 -he 6rookings Institution5 3enter for Glo%al .evelopment
N6/7! /mail1 mkremer2fas!harvard!edu
#e would like to thank 7achel Glennerster, /d Kaplan, 8anina Matus)eski, and 3ourtney 0m%erger for very helpfulcomments and assistance! #e are especially grateful to +ylvie Moulin and 7o%ert Namunyu for outstanding work inthe field and to /mily 9ster for outstanding research assistance in the 0!+! #e thank the #orld 6ank and theMacArthur :oundation for financial support!
-eacher incentive programs have en;oyed growing popularity! In the 0nited +tates, a
num%er of teacher incentive programs have %een introduced in the past decade, generally
offering annual merit pay on the order of <'( to ='( of an average teacher>s monthly salary
?American :ederation of -eachers, &'''@!< 0nder the No 3hild eft 6ehind ?N36@ act, passed
in &''<, poorly performing schools face sanctions across the 0nited +tates! Israel has provided
incentives to teachers %ased on students> scores ?avy &''&a, %@ and a #orld 6ank program in
Me$ico will provide performance incentives to primary school teachers!
Advocates of incentive pay for teachers note that teachers currently face weak incentives,
with pay determined almost entirely %y educational attainment, training, and e$perience, rather
than performance ?4ar%ison and 4anushek, <BB&5 4anushek et al!, <BBC5 4anushek, <BBD5
ockheed and Eerspoor, <BB<@, and argue that linking teachers> pay to students> performance
would increase teacher effort!
9pponents of test score%ased incentives argue that since teachers* tasks are multi
dimensional and only some aspects are measured %y test scores, linking compensation to test
scores could cause teachers to sacrifice promoting curiosity and creative thinking in order to
teach skills tested on standardi)ed e$ams ?4olmstrom and Milgrom, <BB<5 4annaway, <BB&@!
In many developing countries, incentives for teachers are even weaker than in developed
countries! -hus, for e$ample, in our data teachers are a%sent from school &'( of the time and
a%sent from their classrooms even more freFuently! #ork in progress suggests that a%sence rates
among primaryschool teachers are &D( in 0ganda, &( in India, <D( in /cuador and <( in
Peru! ?3haudhury et al!, &''@!
< /$amples include programs in 7hode Island in <BBB, .enver in <BBB&''', .ouglas 3ounty, 3olorado %eginning
in <BB= and Iowa %eginning in &''< ?9lsen, <BBB5 /ducation 3ommission of the +tates, &'''@! A <BBB program in3alifornia offered a onetime award of H&,''' to teachers in underperforming schools whose students showedsu%stantial gains ?9lsen, <BBB@!
?-eaching effort can thus %e seen as uno%serva%le effort to maintain asset value in 4olmstrom
and Milgrom>s framework!@
Assume that teachers* utility is given %y @,? seC M U −= where M is teacher pay and C
is a utility cost that depends on %oth teaching and signaling effort! In this specification, e and s
can %e either su%stitutes or complements! :or e$ample, they could %e su%stitutes if there is a
fi$ed amount of time in the day that must %e allocated %etween them! 9n the other hand, they
could %e complements if there is a fi$ed cost to teachers of attending school at all!
+uppose teacher pay is BT M +=α ! If '= B , so pay is independent of performance,
teachers will choose effort in teaching and signaling such that the marginal product of each is
eFual to )ero! As noted %y 4olmstrom and Milgrom ?<BB<@, C 1 ?','@ and C 2 ?','@ may %e
negative, so some effort may %e e$erted even if 6 '! -eachers may care a%out their students, or
en;oy e$erting some effort even in the a%sence of performance incentives!
If the government or an NG9 makes a surprise announcement that pay will %e linked to
test scores for a single year, teachers will change %oth teaching and signaling effort to satisfy the
first order conditions implied %y the a%ove eFuations! +pecifically, teachers will e$ert teaching
and signaling effort such that1 @,? see
C B
e
L
∂
∂=
∂
∂ and @,? se
s
C B
s ∂
∂=
∂
∂γ ! If e and s are
complements in the utility function, or if utility is additively separa%le, then %oth types of effort
will increase! If they are su%stitutes in the utility function then incentives may increase one type
of effort at the e$pense of the other! -hus in this model, incentives could potentially either
increase or decrease teaching effort!
3learly, there is a continuum %etween e$erting effort on promoting longterm learning and trying to manipulate
shortrun test scores! -he e$treme of manipulating shortrun scores would %e actually cheating at the time of the test5less e$treme versions would include going over Fuestions from previous years> e$ams, and teaching testtakingstrategies such as guessing on multiple choice Fuestions! #ithin the category of promoting learning, teachers couldfocus narrowly on the curriculum to %e tested or could promote learning more %roadly! 9ne could imaginegenerali)ing this model to allow teachers to choose from a menu of activities, with varying components of true andsignaling effort, %ut results would presuma%ly %e similar!
In the model, if it were possi%le to cheaply and accurately monitor individual
performance on %oth tasks as part of an incentive program, then a wage contract could induce
teaching effort without inducing signaling effort! 4owever, while distinguishing teaching and
signaling effort would %e e$pensive and inaccurate at the individual level, particularly if tied to
an incentive program, there are potential ways to distinguish them empirically at the aggregate
level, at least if results are not tied to compensation! :irst, outside o%servers may %e a%le to
o%serve teachers> activities directly! :or e$ample, in Kenya, some schools conduct what are
known locally as preps"Le$tra test preparation or coaching outside of normal class time, often
during school vacations! 9ne could potentially interpret preps as including a higher rate of
signaling to teaching effort than ordinary classroom attendance! +econd, improved learning
should have a longrun effect on test scores, whereas under the model signaling has only a short
run effect!= -hus a finding that test score gains do not persist is consistent with the hypothesis
that the program led only to e$tra coaching specific to the test at hand! It is more difficult to
reconcile this result with the hypothesis of increased longrun learning! A third potential way to
distinguish efforts to increase longrun learning from test preparation activities is to check if test
scores improved primarily in su%;ects prone to memori)ation!
Note that under the model, parents and local communities may not o%;ect to teachers>
investing in shortrun test preparation, since students* prospects for further education and la%or
market success depend on test scores as well as underlying learning! -est preparation, however,
is assumed to %e socially wasteful, in that it reFuires teacher effort %ut does not improve the
underlying learning that affects total output in society!
3. ac!ground
= In practice, some types of signaling may have a longrun effect on test scores! :or e$ample, helping students cheat
will only increase scores in the short run, %ut teaching students to guess on multiple choice e$ams or %etter allocatetheir time could raise scores on other tests and in the long run!
-his section provides some %ackground on primary school teaching in Kenya and
provides evidence that teacher a%sence is widespread in the area of the study!
-eacher hiring, firing, and transfer decisions in Kenya are made centrally %y the Ministry
of /ducation! 4iring is %ased primarily on academic Fualifications!
+alaries are set through
collective %argaining %etween the government and the politically powerful Kenyan National
0nion of -eachers ?KN0-@! In <BBJ, the starting salary for teachers was Ksh ,<J ?HCC@ per
month, and a typical teacher in our sample earned appro$imately Ksh J,''' ?H<<B@ per month!D
-aking into account generous %enefits, total teacher compensation was appro$imately H&,''' a
year, or more than five times annual G.P per capita!J
-eachers> salaries depend primarily on education and e$perience! -here is little
opportunity for performance%ased promotion or increases to salary! -eachers have strong civil
service and union protection and are difficult to fire! In some cases teachers who have performed
very %adly are transferred to less desira%le locations, while the government may look more
favora%ly on reFuests for transfers to more desira%le postings or to home areas from teachers
who perform well!
Although incentives provided to teachers %y their employer are weak, every school is
supposed to have a parent committee, and these committees sometimes provide gifts for teachers
when schools perform well on the national e$ams! +imilarly, communities sometimes refuse to
allow e$ceptionally %ad teachers to enter the school, thus putting pressure on the Ministry of
/ducation to arrange a transfer for the teacher! 4owever, only a minority of school committees
provide supplemental %onuses, and school committees typically only attempt to influence the
national authorities in e$treme situations!
Primary school teachers in Kenya typically have completed two years of teacher training %eyond secondary school!
A small num%er of teachers were hired under an older system in which primary teachers had only a J th gradeeducation and two years of teacher training!D -his is assuming an e$change rate of C!J shillings per dollar, the <BBJ dollarshilling e$change rate!J Authors* calculations %ased on value of housing allowance and other %enefits! -his is calculated from salary scales
and represents a salary for a teacher with average education and e$perience in a sample of schools in the area!
-he incentives program was designed so as not to provide incentives for teachers to ;oin
program schools! 9nly teachers who were already assigned to an incentive school as of March of
the first year were eligi%le for a pri)e! 4owever, the program could potentially have reduced the
e$it rate of teachers from the incentive schools!
In fact, the e$it rate was not significantly different %etween program and comparison
schools ?-a%le &, 3olumns < and &@!1& -he entry rate was higher in the incentive schools for the
first year of the program, and lower for the second, although in neither case was the difference
statistically significant ?-a%le &, 3olumns and =@! 1'
#e also considered the possi%ility that teachers in treatment schools in lower grades
would attempt to transfer into teaching higher grades, even though this would not actually make
them eligi%le for the program! -here is no evidence of differential transfers across grades! In
treatment schools J!=( of teachers transfer from a nonincentive grade to an incentive grade
during the program5 in comparison schools J!( do!
&.2 Teacher Attendance
-eacher attendance was not affected %y the incentive program! In the year prior to the
esta%lishment of the program, each of the <'' schools was su%;ect to two random, unannounced
visits at which the presentRa%sent status of each teacher in grades = to C was recorded! +imilar
visits were made five times in year < and three times in year &!1( :or each teacher in each year, an
< All regressions in this paper allow for schoollevel random effects to take account of the possi%ility that there
may %e correlation %etween error terms for students or teachers in the same school! Note that in the random effectregression framework the coefficient on the constant term is not e$actly eFual to the mean of the omitted category!
<D -he transfers include voluntary transfers due to family reasons ?such as marriage@ or involuntary transfers such as
disciplinary actions against teachers or staff %alancing needs ?to replace teachers who retire, die, or move!@
<J +ome visits did not take place, for e$ample due to vehicle %reakdowns! <!== visits were made to the average
school in year ', =!JC in year <, and &!B in year &! #e focus on teacher a%sence data %ased on visits to schools,
attendance rate was computed as the proportion of visits during which the teacher was present!
Note that teachers were recorded as present if they were at the school, even if they were not
teaching when the visit took place! :ollowing standard Intentionto-reat ?I--@ methodology, the
sample included only those teachers who were assigned to program or comparison schools in
year '! Any teachers who changed schools %etween year ' and year < or %etween year < and year
& were classified with their initial schools!1)
Prior to the program, schools that would later %e selected to %e program schools have
slightly higher teacher attendance, although the difference was insignificant ?-a%le , 3olumn
<@!1* In year < of the program, teacher attendance was actually slightly lower in the incentive
schools, and in year & the attendance was slightly higher in incentive schools ?-a%le , 3olumns
& and @, although %oth coefficients are insignificant and Fuite small!2+
&.3 ,o#e-or! Assign#ent
:or a random su%set of students in grades = to C for each school, information was
collected from the students on whether they were assigned any homework on the previous day!
In general, homework assignment was much more common in the higher grades! In <BBJ, <=(
of grade = students report having homework assigned the previous day, versus =( of grade C
students! -reatment schools assigned slightly more homework than comparison schools prior to
the program, although the difference is far from significant ?-a%le =, 3olumn <@! After the launch
rather than on official school logs, %ecause school logs are often not filled out! 4owever, schoollog data alsosuggest no effect of the program on a%sence!
<C -his could only %e done for those teachers who switched schools and remained in the sample of <'' schools!
+ince there are no data on the teachers who switched to other schools, they were dropped from the analysis!
<B -he results here are ro%ust to a specification in which each visit is treated as a %inary opportunity for attendance
and month of visit is controlled for!
&' 7esults are also similar when lower primary school teachers are used as a control in a regression in which
attendance of all the teachers in the schools is regressed on a dummy for the program, on whether they are a lower primary teacher or an upper primary teacher, and on an interaction term!
students attend! I3+ also administered e$ams to students in grades through C!&< In year <, the
I3+ tests were administered in /nglish, Math, and +cience! In years & and , they were
administered only in /nglish and Math!&& #e have data on the district e$am scores and the K3P/
test scores from %oth intervention years ?< and &@ as well as the postprogram year ?@! :inally,
we have information on the I3+ tests for all participating schools for %oth of the intervention
years!& #e were una%le to o%tain the data for comparison schools in -eso district for year <!
3onseFuently, analysis of the district e$am scores for year < is restricted to schools in 6usia
district!
+ecurity is generally tight in Kenyan e$ams to prevent cheating! .istrict e$ams were
supervised %y three to four teachers from a neigh%oring school! 6ecause the K3P/ e$am
determines the future scholastic paths of the eighth grade students who take it, these e$ams are
even more strictly monitored and supervised!
In <BBC, one case was identified in which the headmaster of a program school colluded
with the teachers assigned to supervise the schools to allow cheating on the district e$am! -hat
school was disFualified from the competition in <BBC %ut was allowed to participate in <BBB!
-he scores from that school were not included in the analysis in <BBC, %ut their scores were
included in <BBB!
'.3 E0a# Partici%ation
&< :or a complete description of the I3+ tests and their administration, see Glewwe et al! ?&''<@! -hese tests were
also administered in <BBD and <BBJ!
&& In year ' and year <, all three e$ams were fairly similar in format and content! +eparate e$ams were given for
each grade and the e$ams had a multiplechoice format! 4owever, the I3+ e$ams in year & and were Qmultilevel,"with the same test given to all students in grades through C! /asy Fuestions in the %eginning of the test could %eanswered %y all students, including those in grade , while Fuestions %ecame progressively harder! -he finalFuestions were %ased on material seen only in the eighth grade! -hese e$ams also had a Qfill in the %lank," asopposed to a multiple choice format!
& In the postprogram year, &J of the <'' schools were involved in a deworming pro;ect! -his ena%led us to collect
I3+ test score data from that su%set of schools for that program year!
of /ducation employees, %ut instead are locally hired and paid %y parents. In this program,
school committees were given funds with which to provide %onuses to preschool teachers,
conditional on their not missing more than a specified num%er of days of class! If the funds were
not spent on the teachers, school committees could use them for other preschool purposes, so
headmasters and school committees argua%ly had a strong incentive to monitor preschool
teachers! Preliminary work suggests that the program yielded little if any improvement in
a%sence rates, and it is clear that headmasters did not strictly enforce the rules reFuiring teacher
attendance as a condition of the %onus %eing provided! More %roadly, headmasters are already
reFuired to keep log %ooks of teacher attendance, and inspectors are supposed to monitor them
%ut log %ooks are often not even filled out!
0ltimately, an analysis of the pro%lem must turn to the political economy of education!
Given that Kenya>s centrali)ed education system is not producing adeFuate incentives, it may %e
worth considering decentrali)ing control over teachers to local school committees or allowing
parents to choose schools and tying school finance more tightly to their decisions!&C
&C +ince students> placement in secondary school depends on performance on the primaryschool leaving e$am, local
communities and parents would share some of the same incentives to focus on test preparation as teachers ?seeAcemoglu et al!, &''&@! Nonetheless, since teachers transfer schools fairly freFuently, they likely have greaterincentives than parents to focus on the short run!
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-esting in the 3hicago Pu%lic +chools," National 6ureau of /conomics #orking Paper CBDC!
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ockheed, Marlaine /! and Adriaan M! Eerspoor ?<BB<@, +mproving %rim"r )d!c"tion in
9%servations <<J <&&J <&&J <&&C Notes1+tandard errors in parentheses5 regressions include schoollevel random effects! X significant at <'(5 XX significant at (5:or e$it regressions, incentiveRnonincentive refers to the originating school5 for entry regressions incentiveRnon
incentive refers to the destination school! -he unit of o%servation in all regressions is the teacher!
Notes1+tandard errors in parentheses5 regressions include schoollevel random effects!X significant at <'(5 XX significant at (-he dependent varia%le is the percentage of the visits for which the teacher was present, %ased on up to two visits in<BBJ, five visits in <BBC and three visits in <BBB! -he unit of o%servation is the teacher!
9%servations <B<= <DJD &J< =< =&J Notes1+tandard errors in parentheses5 regressions include schoollevel random effects!X significant at <'(5 XX significant at (5
In columns < through each o%servation represents a student asked a%out homework assignment in the previousday5 in columns = and differences across years are calculated at the schoolgrade level!
Notes1+tandard errors in parentheses5 regressions include schoollevel random effects!X significant at <'(5 XX significant at (!/ach o%servation in columns < through represents a classroom5 differences in columns = and are calculated at theschoolgrade level! -here are fewer o%servations in <BBB %ecause only one class per schoolRgrade was o%served thatyear!
9%servations <'' <'' <'' <'' <'' Notes1+tandard errors in parentheses5 regressions include schoollevel random effects! X significant at <'(5 XX significantat (5Preparations are reported at D times during the year for each grade1 vacation terms and three periods during theyear5 each o%servation represents a school grade at a given time during the year! 7ates for given time periods arereported compared to the omitted time period, the April holiday!
9%servations <=< <&DCD <== <&DJ< Notes1+tandard errors in parentheses5 regressions include schoollevel random effects!X significant at <'(5 XX significant at (5
Each observation re%resents an u%%er %ri#ar school student.
Note1 +tandard errors in parentheses5 schoollevel random effects included!X significant at <'(5 XX significant at (5.istrict test data was not availa%le for -eso .istrict in <BBC!I-- methodology employed!/ach o%servation represents an upper primary school pupil in year '5 columns & and are limited to pupils who didnot repeat or drop out in any year!
Table *4 Progra# Effect on Test Scores b Sub@ect ?$istrict E0a#
?<@ ?&@ ?@ ?=@ ?@ ?D@ Dependent
Variable
Test Scores
?Standardied relative to
co#%arison schools
Test Score $ifferences
Test Score program year –
Test Score pre-program year
<ear 1 <ear 2 <ear 3 <ear 1 =
<ear +
<ear 2 =
<ear +
<ear 3 =
<ear +/nglish '!'B
?'!<'J@'!'B=?'!'B=@
'!'<J?'!<<&@
'!'&=?'!'J<@
'!''?'!'CD@
'!'B<?'!<&&@
Math '!'C?'!'CB@
'!'BB?'!'C=@
'!'JJ?'!'CB@
'!'JD?'!'=@
'!<'XX?'!'D=@
'!<'D?'!'CB@
+cience '!'<?'!'B<@
'!<?'!<'&@
'!<&<?'!<<@
'!''?'!'JD@
'!&'DX?'!'B=@
'!<B=?'!<&C@
+wahili '!'&?'!'B@
'!<'?'!'J&@
'!'B<?'!'C=@
'!'&?'!'C@
'!'<B?'!'B=@
'!<=?'!&&<@
G!4!37! '!'B?'!'CB@
'!&'&XX?'!'BJ@
'!'?'!<'@
'!&'X?'!<'J@
'!=<XX?'!<&B@
'!'&<?'!&D&@
A!3!M! '!''J
?'!'BD@
'!'<'
?'!'B&@
'!'=B
?'!<'&@
'!<<D
?'!<&<@
'!<'C
?'!<=@
'!&<C
?'!&=B@4+! 6/! '!'=B
?'!'B&@'!'J?'!<'J@
'!'JB?'!<<@
'!'J?'!<D<@
'!<DJ?'!<BD@
<!&&XX?'!&@
All +u%;ects YGrades
'!'='?'!'JB@
'!<DX?'!'JJ@
'!'CJ?'!'C@
'!'=?'!'=@
'!<BXX?'!'D@
'!''C?'!'C=@
9%servations ',C=& J,D&' <,CB &=,DJJ <,D=< ,'
Note1 +tandard errors in parentheses5 regressions include schoollevel random effects!X significant at <'(5 XX significant at (5Vear < district test results are availa%le only for 6usia/ach row represents a random effects regression of test scores on a dummy varia%le for teacher incentive schoolsand on region and se$ dummy varia%les, %ased on data on the <'' schools in -eso and 6usia .istricts! :or each
gradeRsu%;ect com%ination, test scores were standardi)ed %y su%tracting the mean score and dividing %y the standarddeviation of the test score from the comparison schools!/ach o%servation represents a test score in a particular su%;ect for an upper primary school pupil5 columns & and are limited to pupils who were enrolled in year < and did not repeat or drop out! 3olumns =, , D impose theadditional restriction that a pretest score is availa%le!J,C=C students ?grades = to C@ took at least one district e$am in year <! 9f these, ,J< had pretest scores from a preprogram year, in this case <BBD! In year &, when e$am results are also availa%le for -eso, <',B&J students ?grade= to C@ took at least one e$am and D,D of these students also had pretest scores from the same preprogram year!In the postprogram year, B,D< students ?grade = to C@ took at least one e$am and =,'<D of these had pretest scores!In later years more students have no pretest scores %ecause students who enter the sample ?%y reaching = th grade@after the first year will not have pretest scores! +o, for e$ample, in the postprogram year students in = th and th grade will not have pretest scores!
Table 1+4 Progra# Effect on Test Scores b Sub@ect ?9onIncentive Tests
?<@ ?&@ ?@ ?=@ ?@ ?D@ Dependent
Variable
Test Scores
?Standardied relative to co#%arison
schools
Test Score $ifferences
Test Score program year –
Test Score pre-program year
<ear 1 <ear 2 <ear 3 <ear 1 = <ear
+
<ear 2 =
<ear +
<ear 3 =
<ear +
Panel A
Dependent Variable: IS Sub@ect Test Scores
/nglish '!'JJ?'!'B'@
'!'JJ?'!<C@
'!''<?'!'='@
'!'<?'!'BB@
Math '!'?'!'J=@
'!'DB?'!'J=@
'!'=&?'!'=<@
'!''B?'!'C@
+cience '!<&B?'!'C&@
'!'B<XX?'!'=@
All +u%;ects YGrades
'!'CB?'!'JB@
'!'C?'!'B'@
'!'<J?'!'@
'!'<D?'!'D@
9%servations B,<' <&,BBD &,BB <',<&
Panel Dependent Variable: /PE Test Scores
/nglish '!<<D?'!'B=@
'!<'?'!<&D@
'!''&?'!<&@
'!'=?'!<'@
'!<&'?'!<J@
'!<'?'!<B&@
Math '!<DD?'!<'&@
'!<&'?'!'BB@
'!'==?'!<&=@
'!<&?'!<'@
'!<=?'!<&=@
'!'J<?'!<C@
+cience '!<&?'!'BC@
'!<<?'!<<=@
'!'='?'!<=&@
'!&''X?'!<<=@
'!<CB?'!<=&@
'!<D?'!<B=@
+wahili '!&<&X?'!<&<@
'!&&DXX?'!<<&@
'!<&D?'!<<@
'!<'J?'!<&D@
'!'C<?'!<&@
'!=JX?'!&J'@
G!4! 37 '!<DJX?'!'CC@
'!&JXX?'!<<@
'!''=?'!<&'@
'!<=B?'!<'C@
'!DXX?'!<D@
'!'?'!&@
A!3!M! '!'=
?'!'BC@
'!<DB
?'!<<J@
'!'&J
?'!<@
'!<B
?'!<&<@
'!<DB
?'!<DC@
'!'C
?'!&DJ@
4+! 6/! '!<&?'!'B<@
'!<=?'!<<<@
'!'&?'!<&C@
'!''C?'!<=D@
'!&DC?'!<J@
<!&CX?'!DC@
All +u%;ects YGrades
'!<CX?'!'J=@
'!<DX?'!'B'@
'!''B?'!<'<@
'!<'=?'!'C'@
'!<&?'!'BJ@
'!''D?'!<C@
9%servations <',=' C,=&J =,' J,<& ,&=J <,'
Note1 +tandard errors in parenthesis5 regressions include schoollevel random effects!X significant at <'(5 XX significant at (5Vear I3+ tests were given only in &J schools so scores are not reported5 K3P/ tests are taken %y grade C studentsonly! /ach row represents a random effects regression of test scores on a dummy varia%le for teacher incentiveschools and on region and se$ dummy varia%les, %ased on data on the <'' schools in -eso and 6usia .istricts! :or
each gradeRsu%;ect com%ination, test scores were standardi)ed %y su%tracting the mean score and dividing %y thestandard deviation of the test score from the comparison schools!/ach o%servation represents a test score in a particular su%;ect for an upper primary school pupil5 columns & and are limited to pupils who were enrolled in year < and did not repeat or drop out! 3olumns =, , and D impose theadditional restriction that a pretest score is availa%le!<,B students ?grades = to C@ took at least one su%;ect of the I3+ e$ams in year <! 9f these, <<,&BC had pretestscores from year ', in the form of normali)ed district e$am scores from year '! <,D=J students took at least one I3+e$am in year &, of which C,DC had pretest scores from year '! <,=B' eight graders took at least one K3P/ e$am inyear <, of which <,'&D had pretest scores from year '! <,C= students took at least once K3P/ e$am in year &, of which B== had pretest scores!<,J students took at least one K3P/ e$am in year , of which CB had pretestscores!