(1) BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE,Respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis
petition for review1assails the Decision2promulgated on 29 May 2007
as well as the Resolution3promulgated on 12 February 2008 by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 63640. The CA reversed the
Decision4of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), dated 12 February 2001,
and reinstated Assessment No. FAS-5-85-89-000988 requiring
petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) to pay the amount
of Pl,259,884.50 as deficiency documentary stamp tax (DST) for the
taxable year 1985, inclusive of the compromise penalty.The
FactsBPI, successor-in-interest of Citytrust Banking Corporation,
is a commercial banking corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines.On 19 May 1989, the Bureau ofInternal
Revenue (BIR) issued Assessment No. FAS-5-85-89-0009885finding BPI
liable for deficiency DST on its sales of foreign bills of exchange
to the Central Bank, computed as follows:1985 Deficiency
Documentary Stamp Tax
Foreign Bills of Exchange..................................P
839,723,000.00
Tax Due Thereon:P 839,723,000.00x P0.30 (Sec. 182
NIRC)..P200.00P 1,259,584.50
Add: Suggested compromise penalty.300.00
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE....................................P
1,259,884.50
On 16 June 1989, BPI received the assessment notice and demand
letter from the BIR.On 23 June 1989, BPI, through itscounsel, filed
a protest letter6requesting for the reinvestigation and/or
reconsideration of the assessment for lack of legal and factual
bases. The BPI alleged that it should not be liable for the
assessed DST because: (1) based on recognized business practice
incorporated in the Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP)
Foreign Exchange Trading Center Rule 2(e), DST was for the account
of the buyer; (2) BIR Ruling No. 135-87stated that neither the
tax-exempt entity nor the other party shall be liable for the
payment of DST before the effectivity of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1994 on 1 January 1986; (3) since the then law left the tax to
be paid indifferently by either party and the party liable was
exempt, the document was exempt from DST; and (4) the assessed DST
was the same assessment made by the BIR for DST swap transaction
covering taxable years 1982-1986.In a letter dated 4 August
1998,7then Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) Beethoven L.
Rualo denied the "request for reconsideration." The CIR held that
BPIs arguments were legally untenable. The CIR cited BIR Unnumbered
Ruling dated 30 May 1977 and BIR Ruling No. 144-84 dated 3
September 1984, where the liability to pay DST was shifted to the
other party, who was notexempt from the tax. As for being taxed
twice, the CIR found that such allegation was unsubstantiated by
BPI.On 4 January 1999, BPI filed a petition for review before the
CTA. On 23 February 1999, the CIR filed his answer with a demand
for BPI to pay the assessed DST.The CTA RulingIn a Decision dated
12 February 2001,8the CTA ordered the cancellation of the assessed
DST on BPI. The CTA ruled that neither BPI nor Central Bank, which
was tax-exempt, could be liable for the payment of the assessed
DST. The CTA reasoned out that before PD 1994 took effect in 1986,
there was no law that shifted the liability to the other party, in
case the party liable to pay the DST was tax exempt.The dispositive
portion of the CTA decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Court finds the instant Petition for Review
MERITORIOUS. Respondent is hereby ORDERED to CANCEL the 1985
deficiency documentary stamp tax assessment issued to Bank of the
Philippine Islands (as successor-ininterest of Citytrust [B]anking
Corporation) in the amount ofP1,259,884.50 covered by Assessment
No. FAS-5-85-89-000988.SO ORDERED.9Hence, the CIR appealed to the
CA.The CA RulingIn a Decision dated 29 May 2007,10the CA reversed
the CTA decision, and adopted the arguments of the CIR and CTA
Associate Justice Ramon O. De Veyra, in his dissent.The CA held
that BIR Unnumbered Ruling dated 30 May 1977 was more in accord
with the general principles of law and the intent for the enactment
of the provisions on DST. According to the CA, BPI further failed
to justify its claim for exemption from tax.Thus, the dispositive
portion ofthe CA decision states:WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing,
the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals in C. T. A. Case No. 5711, dated February 12, 2001, which
[cancelled] the 1985 deficiency documentary stamp tax issued to the
Bank of the Philippine Islands (as successor-in-interest of
Citytrust Banking Corporation) in the amount ofP1,259,884.50
covered by Assessment No. FAS-5-85-89-000988 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Assessment No. FAS-5-85-89-000988 is hereby ordered
reinstated. Bank of the Philippine Islands is ordered to pay the
amount ofP1,259,884.50 plus 20% annual interest from the date
prescribed for its payment until fully paid pursuant to Section 249
(cc) (3) of the Tax Code.SO ORDERED.11On 12 February 2008, the CA
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by BPI. Hence, BPI
filed a petition for review before the Court.In a Resolution dated
5 August 2013,12the Court, through the Third Division, found that
the assailed tax assessment may be invalidated because the statute
of limitations on the collection of the alleged deficiency DST had
already expired, conformably with Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court and the Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue13decision. However, to afford due process, the
Court required both BPI and CIR to submit their respective comments
on the issue of prescription.Only the CIR filed his comment on 9
December 2013. In his Comment,14the CIR argues that the issue of
prescription can not be raised for the first time on appeal. The
CIR further alleges that even assuming that the issue of
prescription can be raised, the protest letter interrupted the
prescriptive period to collect the assessed DST, unlike in the Bank
of the Philippine Islands case.15The IssueThe issue boils down to
whether or not BIR has a right to collect the assessed DST from
BPI.The Ruling of the CourtWe deny the right of the BIR tocollect
the assessed DST on the ground of prescription.Section 1, Rule 9 of
the Rules ofCourt expressly provides that:Section 1. Defenses and
objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that the court has nojurisdiction over the subject matter,
that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or that the action is barred by prior judgment or
by the statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)If the pleadings or the
evidence on record show that the claim is barred by prescription,
the court is mandated to dismiss the claim even if prescription is
not raised as a defense. In Heirs of Valientes v. Ramas,16we ruled
that the CA may motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of
prescription despite failure to raise this ground on appeal. The
court is imbued with sufficient discretion to review matters, not
otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just
resolution of the case.17More so, when the provisions on
prescription were enacted to benefit and protect taxpayers from
investigation after a reasonable period of time.18Thus, we proceed
to determine whether the period to collect the assessed DST for the
year 1985 has prescribed.1wphi1To determine prescription, what is
essential only is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the
prescriptive period were sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent
on the record either in the allegations of the plaintiffs
complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.19Under the
then applicable Section 319(c) [now, 222(c)]20of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1977, as amended, any internal
revenue tax which has been assessed within the period of limitation
may be collected by distraint or levy, and/or court proceeding
within three years21following the assessment of the tax. The
assessment of the tax is deemed made and the three-year period for
collection of the assessed tax begins torun on the date the
assessment notice had been released, mailed or sent by the BIR to
the taxpayer.22In the present case, although there was no
allegation as to when the assessment notice had been released,
mailed or sent to BPI, still, the latest date that the BIR could
have released, mailed or sent the assessment notice was on the date
BPI received the same on 16 June 1989. Counting the threeyear
prescriptive period from 16 June1989, the BIR had until 15 June
1992 to collect the assessed DST. But despite the lapse of 15 June
1992, the evidence established that there was no warrant of
distraint or levy served on BPIs properties, or any judicial
proceedings initiated by the BIR.The earliest attempt of the BIR to
collect the tax was when it filed its answer in the CTA on 23
February 1999, which was several years beyond the three-year
prescriptive period. However, the BIRs answer in the CTA was not
the collection casecontemplated by the law. Before 2004 or the year
Republic Act No. 9282 took effect, the judicial action to collect
internal revenue taxes fell under the jurisdiction of the regular
trial courts, and not the CTA. Evidently, prescription has set in
to bar the collection of the assessed DST.The BIR nevertheless
insists thatthe running of the prescriptive period to collect the
tax was suspended by BPIs filing of a request for the
reinvestigation and/or reconsideration on 23 June 1989. In the
similar case of Bank of the Philippine Islands,23we already ruled
on the matter as follows:Of particular importance to the present
case is one of the circumstances enumerated in Section [320 (now,
223)] of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, wherein the runningof
the statute of limitations on assessment and collection of taxes is
considered suspended "when the taxpayer requests for a
reinvestigation which is granted by the Commissioner."This Court
gives credence to the argument of petitioner BPI that there is a
distinction between a request for reconsideration and a request for
reinvestigation. Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 12-85, issued on 27
November 1985 by the Secretary of Finance, upon the recommendation
of the BIR Commissioner, governs the procedure for protesting an
assessment and distinguishes between the two types of protest, as
followsx x x x(a) Request for reconsideration. refers to a plea for
a re-evaluation of an assessment on the basis of existing
recordswithout need of additional evidence. It may involve both a
question of fact or of law or both.(b) Request for reinvestigation.
refers to a plea for re-evaluation of an assessment on the basis of
newly-discovered or additional evidencethat a taxpayer intends to
present in the reinvestigation. It may also involve a question of
fact or law or both.x x x Undoubtedly, a reinvestigation,which
entails the reception and evaluation of additional evidence, will
take more time than a reconsideration of a tax assessment, which
will be limited to the evidence already at hand; this justifies why
the former can suspend the running of the statute of limitations on
collectionof the assessed tax, while the latter can not.x x x A
close review of the contents thereof would reveal, however, that it
protested Assessment No. FAS-5-85-89-002054 based on a question of
law, in particular, whether or not petitioner BPI was liable for
DST on its sales of foreign currency to the Central Bank in taxable
year 1985. The same protest letter did not raise any question of
fact; neither did it offer to present any new evidence. In its own
letter to petitioner BPI, dated 10 September 1992, the BIR itself
referred to the protest of petitioner BPI as a request for
reconsideration. These considerations would lead this Court to
deduce that the protest letter of petitioner BPI was in the nature
of a request for reconsideration, rather than a request for
reinvestigation and, consequently, Section 224 of the Tax Code of
1977, as amended, on the suspension of the running of the statute
of limitations should not apply.Even if, for the sake of argument,
this Court glosses over the distinction between a request for
reconsideration and a request for reinvestigation, and considers
the protest of petitioner BPI as a request for reinvestigation, the
filing thereof could not have suspended at once the running of the
statute oflimitations. Article 224 of the Tax Code of 1977, as
amended, very plainly requires that the request for reinvestigation
had been granted by the BIR Commissioner to suspend the running of
the prescriptive periods for assessment and collection. (Emphasis
supplied)In the present case, the protest letter of BPI essentially
raises the same question of law, that is whether BPI was liable for
DST on its sales of foreign bills of exchange to the Central Bank
in the taxable year 1985. Although it raised the issue of being
taxed twice, the BIR admitted that BPI did not present any new or
additional evidence to substantiate its allegations.24In its letter
dated 4 August 1998,25the BIR itself referred to the protest of BPI
as a request for reconsideration, found the arguments in it legally
untenable, and denied the request. Hence, we find that the protest
letter of BPI was a request for reconsideration, which did not
suspend the running of the prescriptive period to collect.Even
considering that BPIs protest was a request for reinvestigation,
there was nothing in the records which showed that the BIR granted
such request. On the other hand, the BIR only responded to BPI on 4
August 1998 or after nine years from the protest letter of BPI. In
the Bank of the Philippine Islands case,26we clarified and
qualified our ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wyeth
Suaco Laboratories, Inc.,27such that the request for
reinvestigation in that case was granted by the BIR. Thus, unlike
in the present case, there was a proper ground for suspension of
the prescriptive period in Wyeth Suaco.28Considering that the
dismissal of the present case due to prescription is imperative,
there is no more need to determine the validity of the
assessment.WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63640, dated 29 May 2007, which
reinstated Assessment No. FAS-5-85-89-000988 requiring petitioner
BPI to pay the amount ofP1,259,884.50 as deficiency documentary
stamp tax for the taxable year 1985, inclusive of the compromise
penalty, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Assessment No. F
AS-5-85-89-000988 is hereby ordered CANCELLED.SO ORDERED.G.R. No.
L-22734 September 15, 1967COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,petitioner,vs.MANUEL B. PINEDA, as one of the heirs of
deceased ATANASIO PINEDA,respondent.Office of the Solicitor General
for petitioner.Manuel B. Pineda for and in his own behalf as
respondent.BENGZON, J.P.,J.:On May 23, 1945 Atanasio Pineda died,
survived by his wife, Felicisima Bagtas, and 15 children, the
eldest of whom is Manuel B. Pineda, a lawyer. Estate proceedings
were had in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Case No. 71129)
wherein the surviving widow was appointed administratrix. The
estate was divided among and awarded to the heirs and the
proceedings terminated on June 8, 1948. Manuel B. Pineda's share
amounted to about P2,500.00.After the estate proceedings were
closed, the Bureau of Internal Revenue investigated the income tax
liability of the estate for the years 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948 and
it found that the corresponding income tax returns were not filed.
Thereupon, the representative of the Collector of Internal Revenue
filed said returns for the estate on the basis of information and
data obtained from the aforesaid estate proceedings and issued an
assessment for the following:1.Deficiency income tax
1945P135.83
1946436.95
19471,206.91P1,779.69
Add: 5% surcharge88.98
1% monthly interest from November 30, 1953 to April 15,
1957720.77
Compromise for late filing80.00
Compromise for late payment40.00
Total amount dueP2,707.44===========
2.Additional residence tax for 1945P14.50===========
3.Real Estate dealer's tax for the fourth quarter of 1946 and
the whole year of 1947P207.50===========
Manuel B. Pineda, who received the assessment, contested the
same. Subsequently, he appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals
alleging that he was appealing "only that proportionate part or
portion pertaining to him as one of the heirs."After hearing the
parties, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment reversing the
decision of the Commissioner on the ground that his right to assess
and collect the tax has prescribed. The Commissioner appealed and
this Court affirmed the findings of the Tax Court in respect to the
assessment for income tax for the year 1947 but held that the right
to assess and collect the taxes for 1945 and 1946 has not
prescribed. For 1945 and 1946 the returns were filed on August 24,
1953; assessments for both taxable years were made within five
years therefrom or on October 19, 1953; and the action to collect
the tax was filed within five years from the latter date, on August
7, 1957. For taxable year 1947, however, the return was filed on
March 1, 1948; the assessment was made on October 19, 1953, more
than five years from the date the return was filed; hence, the
right to assess income tax for 1947 had prescribed. Accordingly, We
remanded the case to the Tax Court for further appropriate
proceedings.1In the Tax Court, the parties submitted the case for
decision without additional evidence.On November 29, 1963 the Court
of Tax Appeals rendered judgment holding Manuel B. Pineda liable
for the payment corresponding to his share of the following
taxes:Deficiency income tax1945P135.83
1946436.95
Real estate dealer's fixed tax 4th quarter of 1946 and whole
year of 1947P187.50
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has appealed to Us and has
proposed to hold Manuel B. Pineda liable for the payment of all the
taxes found by the Tax Court to be due from the estate in the total
amount of P760.28 instead of only for the amount of taxes
corresponding to his share in the estate.1awphl.ntManuel B. Pineda
opposes the proposition on the ground that as an heir he is liable
for unpaid income tax due the estate only up to the extent of and
in proportion to any share he received. He relies onGovernment of
the Philippine Islands v. Pamintuan2where We held that "after the
partition of an estate, heirs and distributees are liable
individually for the payment of all lawful outstanding claims
against the estate in proportion to the amount or value of the
property they have respectively received from the estate."We hold
that the Government can require Manuel B. Pineda to pay the full
amount of the taxes assessed.Pineda is liable for the assessment as
an heir and as a holder-transferee of property belonging to the
estate/taxpayer. As an heir he is individually answerable for the
part of the tax proportionate to the share he received from the
inheritance.3His liability, however, cannot exceed the amount of
his share.4As a holder of property belonging to the estate, Pineda
is liable for he tax up to the amount of the property in his
possession. The reason is that the Government has a lien on the
P2,500.00 received by him from the estate as his share in the
inheritance, for unpaid income taxes4afor which said estate is
liable, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 315 of the Tax
Code, which we quote hereunder:If any person, corporation,
partnership, joint-account (cuenta en participacion), association,
or insurance company liable to pay the income tax, neglects or
refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount shall be a lien in
favor of the Government of the Philippines from the time when the
assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until
paid with interest, penalties, and costs that may accrue in
addition thereto upon all property and rights to property belonging
to the taxpayer: . . .By virtue of such lien, the Government has
the right to subject the property in Pineda's possession, i.e., the
P2,500.00, to satisfy the income tax assessment in the sum of
P760.28. After such payment, Pineda will have a right of
contribution from his co-heirs,5to achieve an adjustment of the
proper share of each heir in the distributable estate.All told, the
Government has two ways of collecting the tax in question. One, by
going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the
amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. This
remedy was adopted inGovernment of the Philippine Islands v.
Pamintuan,supra. In said case, the Government filed an action
against all the heirs for the collection of the tax. This action
rests on the concept that hereditary property consists only of that
part which remains after the settlement of all lawful claims
against the estate, for the settlement of which the entire estate
is first liable.6The reason why in case suit is filed against all
the heirs the tax due from the estate is levied proportionately
against them is to achieve thereby two results: first, payment of
the tax; and second, adjustment of the shares of each heir in the
distributed estate aslessened by the tax.Another remedy, pursuant
to the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all
property and rights to property belonging to the taxpayer for
unpaid income tax, is by subjecting said property of the estate
which is in the hands of an heir or transferee to the payment of
the tax due, the estate. This second remedy is the very avenue the
Government took in this case to collect the tax. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue should be given, in instances like the case at
bar, the necessary discretion to avail itself of the most
expeditious way to collect the tax as may be envisioned in the
particular provision of the Tax Code above quoted, because taxes
are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain
availability is an imperious need.7And as afore-stated in this case
the suit seeks to achieve only one objective: payment of the tax.
The adjustment of the respective shares due to the heirs from the
inheritance, as lessened by the tax, is left to await the suit for
contribution by the heir from whom the Government recovered said
tax.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified. Manuel B.
Pineda is hereby ordered to pay to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue the sum of P760.28 as deficiency income tax for 1945 and
1946, and real estate dealer's fixed tax for the fourth quarter of
1946 and for the whole year 1947, without prejudice to his right of
contribution for his co-heirs. No costs. So ordered.Concepcion,
C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.G.R. No. L-22734 September 15,
1967COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,petitioner,vs.MANUEL B.
PINEDA, as one of the heirs of deceased ATANASIO
PINEDA,respondent.Office of the Solicitor General for
petitioner.Manuel B. Pineda for and in his own behalf as
respondent.BENGZON, J.P.,J.:On May 23, 1945 Atanasio Pineda died,
survived by his wife, Felicisima Bagtas, and 15 children, the
eldest of whom is Manuel B. Pineda, a lawyer. Estate proceedings
were had in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Case No. 71129)
wherein the surviving widow was appointed administratrix. The
estate was divided among and awarded to the heirs and the
proceedings terminated on June 8, 1948. Manuel B. Pineda's share
amounted to about P2,500.00.After the estate proceedings were
closed, the Bureau of Internal Revenue investigated the income tax
liability of the estate for the years 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948 and
it found that the corresponding income tax returns were not filed.
Thereupon, the representative of the Collector of Internal Revenue
filed said returns for the estate on the basis of information and
data obtained from the aforesaid estate proceedings and issued an
assessment for the following:1.Deficiency income tax
1945P135.83
1946436.95
19471,206.91P1,779.69
Add: 5% surcharge88.98
1% monthly interest from November 30, 1953 to April 15,
1957720.77
Compromise for late filing80.00
Compromise for late payment40.00
Total amount dueP2,707.44===========
2.Additional residence tax for 1945P14.50===========
3.Real Estate dealer's tax for the fourth quarter of 1946 and
the whole year of 1947P207.50===========
Manuel B. Pineda, who received the assessment, contested the
same. Subsequently, he appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals
alleging that he was appealing "only that proportionate part or
portion pertaining to him as one of the heirs."After hearing the
parties, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment reversing the
decision of the Commissioner on the ground that his right to assess
and collect the tax has prescribed. The Commissioner appealed and
this Court affirmed the findings of the Tax Court in respect to the
assessment for income tax for the year 1947 but held that the right
to assess and collect the taxes for 1945 and 1946 has not
prescribed. For 1945 and 1946 the returns were filed on August 24,
1953; assessments for both taxable years were made within five
years therefrom or on October 19, 1953; and the action to collect
the tax was filed within five years from the latter date, on August
7, 1957. For taxable year 1947, however, the return was filed on
March 1, 1948; the assessment was made on October 19, 1953, more
than five years from the date the return was filed; hence, the
right to assess income tax for 1947 had prescribed. Accordingly, We
remanded the case to the Tax Court for further appropriate
proceedings.1In the Tax Court, the parties submitted the case for
decision without additional evidence.On November 29, 1963 the Court
of Tax Appeals rendered judgment holding Manuel B. Pineda liable
for the payment corresponding to his share of the following
taxes:Deficiency income tax1945P135.83
1946436.95
Real estate dealer's fixed tax 4th quarter of 1946 and whole
year of 1947P187.50
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has appealed to Us and has
proposed to hold Manuel B. Pineda liable for the payment of all the
taxes found by the Tax Court to be due from the estate in the total
amount of P760.28 instead of only for the amount of taxes
corresponding to his share in the estate.1awphl.ntManuel B. Pineda
opposes the proposition on the ground that as an heir he is liable
for unpaid income tax due the estate only up to the extent of and
in proportion to any share he received. He relies onGovernment of
the Philippine Islands v. Pamintuan2where We held that "after the
partition of an estate, heirs and distributees are liable
individually for the payment of all lawful outstanding claims
against the estate in proportion to the amount or value of the
property they have respectively received from the estate."We hold
that the Government can require Manuel B. Pineda to pay the full
amount of the taxes assessed.Pineda is liable for the assessment as
an heir and as a holder-transferee of property belonging to the
estate/taxpayer. As an heir he is individually answerable for the
part of the tax proportionate to the share he received from the
inheritance.3His liability, however, cannot exceed the amount of
his share.4As a holder of property belonging to the estate, Pineda
is liable for he tax up to the amount of the property in his
possession. The reason is that the Government has a lien on the
P2,500.00 received by him from the estate as his share in the
inheritance, for unpaid income taxes4afor which said estate is
liable, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 315 of the Tax
Code, which we quote hereunder:If any person, corporation,
partnership, joint-account (cuenta en participacion), association,
or insurance company liable to pay the income tax, neglects or
refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount shall be a lien in
favor of the Government of the Philippines from the time when the
assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until
paid with interest, penalties, and costs that may accrue in
addition thereto upon all property and rights to property belonging
to the taxpayer: . . .By virtue of such lien, the Government has
the right to subject the property in Pineda's possession, i.e., the
P2,500.00, to satisfy the income tax assessment in the sum of
P760.28. After such payment, Pineda will have a right of
contribution from his co-heirs,5to achieve an adjustment of the
proper share of each heir in the distributable estate.All told, the
Government has two ways of collecting the tax in question. One, by
going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the
amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. This
remedy was adopted inGovernment of the Philippine Islands v.
Pamintuan,supra. In said case, the Government filed an action
against all the heirs for the collection of the tax. This action
rests on the concept that hereditary property consists only of that
part which remains after the settlement of all lawful claims
against the estate, for the settlement of which the entire estate
is first liable.6The reason why in case suit is filed against all
the heirs the tax due from the estate is levied proportionately
against them is to achieve thereby two results: first, payment of
the tax; and second, adjustment of the shares of each heir in the
distributed estate aslessened by the tax.Another remedy, pursuant
to the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all
property and rights to property belonging to the taxpayer for
unpaid income tax, is by subjecting said property of the estate
which is in the hands of an heir or transferee to the payment of
the tax due, the estate. This second remedy is the very avenue the
Government took in this case to collect the tax. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue should be given, in instances like the case at
bar, the necessary discretion to avail itself of the most
expeditious way to collect the tax as may be envisioned in the
particular provision of the Tax Code above quoted, because taxes
are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain
availability is an imperious need.7And as afore-stated in this case
the suit seeks to achieve only one objective: payment of the tax.
The adjustment of the respective shares due to the heirs from the
inheritance, as lessened by the tax, is left to await the suit for
contribution by the heir from whom the Government recovered said
tax.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified. Manuel B.
Pineda is hereby ordered to pay to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue the sum of P760.28 as deficiency income tax for 1945 and
1946, and real estate dealer's fixed tax for the fourth quarter of
1946 and for the whole year 1947, without prejudice to his right of
contribution for his co-heirs. No costs. So ordered.Concepcion,
C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.(3)G.R. No. L-31364March 30,
1979
MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and JAIME
ARANETA, as Regional Director, Revenue Region No. 14, Bureau of
Internal Revenue, petitioners, vs.HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, and
FRANCIS A. TONGOY, Administrator of the Estate of the late LUIS D.
TONGOY respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Appeal from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch V in Special Proceedings No. 7794, entitled:
"Intestate Estate of Luis D. Tongoy," the first dated July 29, 1969
dismissing the Motion for Allowance of Claim and for an Order of
Payment of Taxes by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines against the Estate of the late Luis D. Tongoy, for
deficiency income taxes for the years 1963 and 1964 of the decedent
in the total amount of P3,254.80, inclusive 5% surcharge, 1%
monthly interest and compromise penalties, and the second, dated
October 7, 1969, denying the Motion for reconsideration of the
Order of dismissal.
The Motion for allowance of claim and for payment of taxes dated
May 28, 1969 was filed on June 3, 1969 in the abovementioned
special proceedings, (par. 3, Annex A, Petition, pp. 1920, Rollo).
The claim represents the indebtedness to the Government of the late
Luis D. Tongoy for deficiency income taxes in the total sum of
P3,254.80 as above stated, covered by Assessment Notices Nos.
11-50-29-1-11061-21-63 and 11-50-291-1 10875-64, to which motion
was attached Proof of Claim (Annex B, Petition, pp. 21-22, Rollo).
The Administrator opposed the motion solely on the ground that the
claim was barred under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
(par. 4, Opposition to Motion for Allowance of Claim, pp. 23-24,
Rollo). Finding the opposition well-founded, the respondent Judge,
Jose F. Fernandez, dismissed the motion for allowance of claim
filed by herein petitioner, Regional Director of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, in an order dated July 29, 1969 (Annex D,
Petition, p. 26, Rollo). On September 18, 1969, a motion for
reconsideration was filed, of the order of July 29, 1969, but was
denied in an Order dated October 7, 1969.
Hence, this appeal on certiorari, petitioner assigning the
following errors:
1.The lower court erred in holding that the claim for taxes by
the government against the estate of Luis D. Tongoy was filed
beyond the period provided in Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
2.The lower court erred in holding that the claim for taxes of
the government was already barred under Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.
which raise the sole issue of whether or not the statute of
non-claims Section 5, Rule 86 of the New Rule of Court, bars claim
of the government for unpaid taxes, still within the period of
limitation prescribed in Section 331 and 332 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Section 5, Rule 86, as invoked by the respondent Administrator
in hid Oppositions to the Motion for Allowance of Claim, etc. of
the petitioners reads as follows:
All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contracts, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the
last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the
decedent, must be filed within the time limited in they notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set
forth as counter claims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. Where the executor
or administrator commence an action, or prosecutes an action
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may
set forth may answer the claims he has against the decedents,
instead of presenting them independently to the court has herein
provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in
such action; and in final judgment is rendered in favored of the
decedent, the amount to determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim has been presented
directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims
not yet due, or contingent may be approved at their present
value.
A perusal of the aforequoted provisions shows that it makes no
mention of claims for monetary obligation of the decedent created
by law, such as taxes which is entirely of different character from
the claims expressly enumerated therein, such as: "all claims for
money against the decedent arising from contract, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due or contingent, all claim
for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent and judgment for money against the decedent." Under the
familiar rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion
of another thing not mentioned. Thus, if a statute enumerates the
things upon which it is to operate, everything else must
necessarily, and by implication be excluded from its operation and
effect (Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 334-335).
In the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Ilagan
Electric & Ice Plant, et al., G.R. No. L-23081, December 30,
1969, it was held that the assessment, collection and recovery of
taxes, as well as the matter of prescription thereof are governed
by the provisions of the National Internal revenue Code,
particularly Sections 331 and 332 thereof, and not by other
provisions of law. (See also Lim Tio, Dy Heng and Dee Jue vs. Court
of Tax Appeals & Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
L-10681, March 29, 1958). Even without being specifically
mentioned, the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court may reasonably be presumed to have been also in the mind of
the Court as not affecting the aforecited Section of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
In the case of Pineda vs. CFI of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, it was
even more pointedly held that "taxes assessed against the estate of
a deceased person ... need not be submitted to the committee on
claims in the ordinary course of administration. In the exercise of
its control over the administrator, the court may direct the
payment of such taxes upon motion showing that the taxes have been
assessed against the estate." The abolition of the Committee on
Claims does not alter the basic ruling laid down giving exception
to the claim for taxes from being filed as the other claims
mentioned in the Rule should be filed before the Court. Claims for
taxes may be collected even after the distribution of the
decedent's estate among his heirs who shall be liable therefor in
proportion of their share in the inheritance. (Government of the
Philippines vs. Pamintuan, 55 Phil. 13).
The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes
against a decedent's estate in the form of exception from the
application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find.
Taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and
certain availability are imperious need. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue vs. Pineda, G. R. No. L-22734, September 15, 1967, 21 SCRA
105). Upon taxation depends the Government ability to serve the
people for whose benefit taxes are collected. To safeguard such
interest, neglect or omission of government officials entrusted
with the collection of taxes should not be allowed to bring harm or
detriment to the people, in the same manner as private persons may
be made to suffer individually on account of his own negligence,
the presumption being that they take good care of their personal
affairs. This should not hold true to government officials with
respect to matters not of their own personal concern. This is the
philosophy behind the government's exception, as a general rule,
from the operation of the principle of estoppel. (Republic vs.
Caballero, L-27437, September 30, 1977, 79 SCRA 177; Manila Lodge
No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, L-41001, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 162; Sy vs.
Central Bank of the Philippines, L-41480, April 30,1976, 70 SCRA
571; Balmaceda vs. Corominas & Co., Inc., 66 SCRA 553; Auyong
Hian vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110; Republic vs. Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 66 SCRA 553; Republic vs. Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, L-18841, January 27, 1969, 26 SCRA 620;
Zamora vs. Court of Tax Appeals, L-23272, November 26, 1970, 36
SCRA 77; E. Rodriguez, Inc. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, L-
23041, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 119.) As already shown, taxes may be
collected even after the distribution of the estate of the decedent
among his heirs (Government of the Philippines vs. Pamintuan,
supra; Pineda vs. CFI of Tayabas, supra Clara Diluangco Palanca vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G. R. No. L-16661, January 31,
1962).
Furthermore, as held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Pineda, supra, citing the last paragraph of Section 315 of the Tax
Code payment of income tax shall be a lien in favor of the
Government of the Philippines from the time the assessment was made
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests,
penalties, etc. By virtue of such lien, this court held that the
property of the estate already in the hands of an heir or
transferee may be subject to the payment of the tax due the estate.
A fortiori before the inheritance has passed to the heirs, the
unpaid taxes due the decedent may be collected, even without its
having been presented under Section 2 of Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court. It may truly be said that until the property of the estate
of the decedent has vested in the heirs, the decedent, represented
by his estate, continues as if he were still alive, subject to the
payment of such taxes as would be collectible from the estate even
after his death. Thus in the case above cited, the income taxes
sought to be collected were due from the estate, for the three
years 1946, 1947 and 1948 following his death in May, 1945.
Even assuming arguendo that claims for taxes have to be filed
within the time prescribed in Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, the claim in question may be filed even after the expiration
of the time originally fixed therein, as may be gleaned from the
italicized portion of the Rule herein cited which reads:
Section 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. - In the
notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the
time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not
be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the
date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time
before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a
creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time
previously limited the court may, for cause shown and on such terms
as are equitable, allow such claim to be flied within a time not
exceeding one (1) month. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, petitioners filed an application (Motion
for Allowance of Claim and for an Order of Payment of Taxes) which,
though filed after the expiration of the time previously limited
but before an order of the distribution is entered, should have
been granted by the respondent court, in the absence of any valid
ground, as none was shown, justifying denial of the motion,
specially considering that it was for allowance Of claim for taxes
due from the estate, which in effect represents a claim of the
people at large, the only reason given for the denial that the
claim was filed out of the previously limited period, sustaining
thereby private respondents' contention, erroneously as has been
demonstrated.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reverse. Since the Tax
Commissioner's assessment in the total amount of P3,254.80 with 5 %
surcharge and 1 % monthly interest as provided in the Tax Code is a
final one and the respondent estate's sole defense of prescription
has been herein overruled, the Motion for Allowance of Claim is
herein granted and respondent estate is ordered to pay and
discharge the same, subject only to the limitation of the interest
collectible thereon as provided by the Tax Code. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.(4) G.R. No. 86785 November 21, 1991COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ATLAS
CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,respondents.Redentor G. Guyala for private
respondent.M.L. Gadioma Law Office collaborating counsel for
private respondent.REGALADO,J.:pWith commendable zeal, petitioner,
through the Solicitor General, assails the decision in CA-G.R. No.
15429 of the Court of Appeals,1promulgated on January 20, 1989,
affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case
No. 2778 which granted a tax credit of P170,476.64 representingad
valoremtaxes paid by private respondent for the period from the
first quarter of 1974 to the third quarter of 1975.The findings of
fact of the Court of Tax Appeals, which were adopted by the Court
of Appeals, are not disputed by petitioner and are hereunder
reproduced:1. Petitioner is a mining corporation duly organized and
existing under and virtue of the laws of the Philippines, having
its offices at A. Soriano Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. It is
engaged primarily in the mining of copper ore from its mines
property and concessions in a barrio called Don Andres Soriano,
Toledo, Province of Cebu, and reputedly the biggest copper mine in
Asia (t.s.n., pp. 6, 18-19, hearing 10/1/82.)2. Petitioner used the
open pit method digging away the copper ore deposits. This consists
of removing all surface and top materials of limestone, soil and
rocks to reach into the copper ore deposits found below. (t.s.n.,
pp. 19-21, 10/1/82; pp. 16-17, 2/17/83.)3. Petitioner is the owner
of the land or surface rights of the Biga Lime Quarry located on
Toledo City containing limestone. (Exhs. G-1, H, H-1 to H-17, K;
t.s.n., pp. 18, 22, 24, 31-32, 10/1/82) And as such owner,
petitioner is not required, during the years covered in this case
(1973-1975), to secure a government permit to dig out the
limestone. (Sec. 67, P.D. 463; Sec. 63, Consolidated Mines
Administrative Order; t.s.n., pp. 21-24, 10/1/82.)4. Beneath the
surface of the Biga Lime Quarry are deposits of copper ore, and to
mine these copper deposits, petitioner had to remove and dig out
the surface materials of limestone soil and rocks. Apparently, most
of the limestone was left in the mine site as waste, although a
small portion thereof was utilized by petitioner as a flotation
agent in the conversion of the copper rocks into concentrates. On
the basis of the evidence, the limestone was first processed by
petitioner into lime; and the lime became a cleansing reagent, by
chemical reaction with water, in the conversion of the copper ore
into copper concentrate. The effect of the lime mixed with water
was to cause the copper mineral powder to float and caused the
unwanted waste like lime and other materials to sink. This waste at
the bottom of the conveyor was thrown away as tailings while the
floating copper powder was accumulated and dried, known as copper
concentrate. This was the mineral ore that was exported to Japan
for processing into copper cathodes and rods. Evidently, the lime
does not become part of the concentrate. (Exhs. I; J; t.s.n., p.
16, 5/4/81; pp. 16-17, 20-27, 10/1/82.)5. As shown from the
records, the limestone processed into lime and used as flotation
agent was never removed from the mines concession of petitioner.
Even the tailings, topsoil waste and rocks, were left in the mines
site as waste. (t.s.n., pp. 21-27, 10/1/ 82; p. 6. 5/14/81.)6. The
processing by petitioner of the limestone was done completely
inside the concession. (t.s.n., pp. 8, 10/29/83; pp. 28, 31,
10/1/82; pp. 21-22, 10/1/83.) And nobody purchased the limestone or
the lime manufactured from it. (t.s.n., p. 29, 10/1/83/.)
Seemingly, neither the limestone not the processed "lime" possessed
market value. (t.s.n., pp. 5-7, 9/29/83; pp. 7-8, 13-14, 5/14/81;
Exhs. D, D-11.)7. The evidence presented shows that for cost
accounting and internal management control, petitioner assigned
"cost estimates" to each and every identifiable activity or process
involved in the mining of copper from blasting and digging and
hauling to loading for export. Invariably, cost was assigned to the
process of digging out the copper rocks, crushing and pulverizing
them, and converting the mineral into exportable copper concentrate
to exporting the concentrate. It was from this assignment of cost
estimate to the process of producing lime from the limestone, that
petitioner established that the "production cost" of lime, during
the period involved in this case, was P72,096.25. (Exhs. A-d, D-1,
F-1 to F-3; t.s.n., pp. 7-14, 5/14/81; pp. 3-4, 8-9, 13-17,
2/17/83; pp. 5-8, 9/29/83.)8. It was this production cost of "lime"
that petitioner used in computing thead valoremtax of P181,925.25
representing tax on thelime, . . .2On December 22, 1975, petitioner
filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue its claim for tax
credit of the aforesaid sum of P181,925.25 which it paid asad
valoremtax. On February 18, 1976, since no action was seasonably
taken by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the claim,
petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax
Appeals.On February 16, 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered
judgment in favor of private respondent ordering therein respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "to grant a tax credit to
petitioner Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation
in the amount of P170,476.64 representing erroneously paidad
valoremtax for the period from the 1st quarter of 1974 to the 3rd
quarter of 1975."3Not satisfied therewith, petitioner filed with
this Court a petition for review oncertiorari, which petition was
referred to the Court of Appeals and re-docketed therein as CA-G.R.
SP No. 15429. On January 20, 1989, respondent Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.4Before us, petitioner raises the sole
issue of whether limestone dug out and processed into lime used in
the production of copper concentrates is subject toad valoremtax
imposed by Section 243 of the then applicable National Internal
Revenue Code (Section 255 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as
amended). It is petitioner's submission that the aforementionedad
valoremtax is a severance tax and is due and payable upon removal
of the mineral from its bed or mine.The petition cannot
prosper.Thead valoremtax under Section 243 of the old Tax Code is a
tax not on the minerals but upon the taxpayer's privilege of
severing or extracting minerals or mineral products from the earth,
the Government's right to exact said imposed springing from the
Regalian theory of State ownership of its natural resources.5The
pertinent provisions of the old Tax Code read as follows:Sec. 243.
Ad valorem taxes on output of mineral lands not covered by leases.
There is hereby imposed on the actual market value of the annual
gross output of the minerals or mineral product extracted or
produced from all mineral lands not covered by lease, anad
valoremtax in the amount of twoper centumof the value of the
output, except gold which shall pay one and one-halfper
centum.Before the minerals or mineral products are removed from the
mines, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his representatives
shall first be notified of such removal on a form prescribed for
the purpose. (As amended by Sec. 21, Republic Act No. 909, and Sec.
48, Republic Act No. 6110).Sec. 245. Time and manner of payment of
royalties or ad valorem taxes. The royalties orad valoremtaxes, as
the case may be, shall be due and payable upon the removal of the
mineral products from the locality where mined. . . . .Under the
aforementioned provisions, although all minerals and mineral
products extracted from the mineral lands are subject toad
valoremtax, however, the said tax becomes due and payable only upon
removal of the same from the locality where mined. In the case at
bar, the limestone were admittedly never removed from the mine site
nor did they become component parts of the copper concentrates.
Moreover, it should be noted that said tax is imposed only on the
actual market value of mineral products extracted or produced.6This
is confirmed by the second paragraph of said Section 243 which
requires prior notification to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
or his representative before the minerals or mineral products are
removed from the mines. Such requirements is obviously intended to
enable him to assess and collect the properad valoremtaxes, which
necessarily presupposes that such minerals or mineral product have
an actual market value.As found by both lower courts, in the case
of private respondent the evidence shows that the limestone removed
from its mineral lands, together with other surface materials, had
no actual market value. The Court of Tax Appeals ramified that the
utilization of waste limestone by herein private respondent, which
is engaged in mining copper ore, by converting such waste into lime
as a cleansing reagent in the conversion of copper into copper
concentrate, was merely incidental to its mining copper ore
operation for which it is adequately taxed.7It is not engaged i the
district business of extracting limestone in order to serve other
persons or commercial entities therewith.Thus, respondent Court of
Appeals oppositely declares:It is clear from the above provision
that thead valoremtax charged therein is assessed and collected on
"actual market value" of the annual gross output of the minerals
extracted or the mineral products produced from the mineral lands
of the taxpayer. But "to extract" as pointed out by respondent
Atlas, means "to separate an ore or mineral from a deposit" (p.
80,Rollo), so that the word "extract" used in the above Sec. 243,
when applied to the case of Atlas, means that its taxable operation
is its business or activity of extracting copper minerals or ore
from the deposit in its mining lands. The presence of limestone
together with other surface materials as soil and rocks on its
mineral lands is, however, only an accident; in the words of
respondent Atlas, "in fact, as obstruction blocking the separation
of the copper sought" by it from said lands (id). Hence, the
removal of these obstructions, like the removal of other surface
materials like soil and rocks, from the mineral lands where the
copper ore is buried, cannot be the "extraction" contemplated by
Sec. 243.The process by which respondent Atlas extracts copper
mineral or ore from its mineral lands in the course of which it
digs away and removes all the surface top materials thereon
including limestone, is very well described in the decision of the
respondent CTA as follows:1. Petitioner (Atlas Consolidated) had to
dig away and remove all the surface top materials consisting of
limestone, top soil and rocks to reach into the copper ore deposits
found below. As a matter of fact, as stated above, petitioner as
owner of the surface right was not even required to secure a
government permit to dig out the limestone.2. Most of the limestone
was left in the mine site as waste, although a small portion
thereof was utilized by petitioner as a flotation agent in the
conversion of the copper rocks into concentrates. The limestone was
first processed by petitioner into lime, and by chemical reaction
with water, the lime became a cleansing reagent in the conversion
of the copper ore into copper concentrate. It appears that the
effect of the lime, mixed with water, was to cause the copper
mineral powder to float and caused the unwanted waste like lime and
other materials to sink which were thrown away as tailings. The
floating copper powder was accumulated and dried, known as copper
concentrate which was the mineral exported to Japan for processing
into copper cathodes and rods. The lime did not become part of the
concentrate.3. The limestone processed into lime and used as
flotation agent was never removed from the mine concession of
petitioner. And the record reveals that neither the limestone not
the processed lime possessed market value.8On the promise,
therefore, that the extraction or removal by private respondent of
limestone from its mineral lands is a mere incident in its copper
ore mining operations for which it is already taxed, both courts
held that to impose another set of tax on said limestone which has
no commercial value would be tantamount to double taxation. Such an
imposition, avers respondent court, has been repeatedly proscribed
in our decisional pronouncements to the effect that where a
taxpayer is engaged in a distinct business and, as a feature
thereof, in an activity merely incidental which serves no other
person or business, the incidental activity should not be
separately or additionally taxed.9Petitioner takes vigorous
exception thereto, stigmatizing the reliance on said cases as
erroneous and misplaced since what is involved in the case at bar
is a mining tax while the cited cases deal with privilege taxes.We
agree, for purposes of the issue involve in the present case, with
the ratiocination of respondent court in holding that, under the
factual situation obtaining herein, there is no substantial
difference between privilege taxes and mining taxes, specifically
thead valoremtax imposed in Section 243 of the old Tax Code,
insofar as the prohibition against double taxation is concerned. It
calls our attention to petitioner's own admission that saidad
valoremtax is really a tax on the privilege of extracting or
producing minerals or mineral products from the earth, a principle
taken from theRepublic Cement Corporationcase,supra. Respondent
court plausibly concludes therefrom that thead valoremtax in
question is really in the nature of a privilege tax, hence, the
aforesaid rulings in the cited cases, involving privilege taxes and
the forbiddance against the imposition of another tax on an
activity incidental to the principal business, should apply to the
instant case.Generally, statutes levying taxes or duties are to be
construed strongly against the Government and in favor of the
subject or citizens, because burdens are not to be imposed or
presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly and clearly
declare.10No person or property is subject to taxation unless they
fall within the terms or plain import of a taxing
statute.11Moreover, it has been the long standing policy and
practice of this Court to respect the conclusions of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the Court of Tax Appeals which, by the nature of
its functions, is dedicated exclusively to the study and
consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an
expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or
improvident exercise of its authority.12Therefore, finding no such
abuse or improvident exercise of authority or discretion, the
decision of respondent court, affirming that of the Court of Tax
Appeals, must consequently by upheld.ON THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the petition at bar is DENIED and the judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.SO
ORDERED.Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.Padilla, J., took
no part.(5)G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE,petitioner,vs.ALGUE, INC., and THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS,respondents.CRUZ,J.:Taxes are the lifeblood of the
government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance
On the other hand, such collection should be made in accordance
with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for
government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the
apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and the
taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the
promotion of the common good, may be achieved.The main issue in
this case is whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue
correctly disallowed the P75,000.00 deduction claimed by private
respondent Algue as legitimate business expenses in its income tax
returns. The corollary issue is whether or not the appeal of the
private respondent from the decision of the Collector of Internal
Revenue was made on time and in accordance with law.We deal first
with the procedural question.The record shows that on January 14,
1965, the private respondent, a domestic corporation engaged in
engineering, construction and other allied activities, received a
letter from the petitioner assessing it in the total amount of
P83,183.85 as delinquency income taxes for the years 1958 and
1959.1On January 18, 1965, Algue flied a letter of protest or
request for reconsideration, which letter was stamp received on the
same day in the office of the petitioner.2On March 12, 1965, a
warrant of distraint and levy was presented to the private
respondent, through its counsel, Atty. Alberto Guevara, Jr., who
refused to receive it on the ground of the pending protest.3A
search of the protest in the dockets of the case proved fruitless.
Atty. Guevara produced his file copy and gave a photostat to BIR
agent Ramon Reyes, who deferred service of the warrant.4On April 7,
1965, Atty. Guevara was finally informed that the BIR was not
taking any action on the protest and it was only then that he
accepted the warrant of distraint and levy earlier sought to be
served.5Sixteen days later, on April 23, 1965, Algue filed a
petition for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue with the Court of Tax Appeals.6The above chronology shows
that the petition was filed seasonably. According to Rep. Act No.
1125, the appeal may be made within thirty days after receipt of
the decision or ruling challenged.7It is true that as a rule the
warrant of distraint and levy is "proof of the finality of the
assessment"8and renders hopeless a request for
reconsideration,"9being "tantamount to an outright denial thereof
and makes the said request deemed rejected."10But there is a
special circumstance in the case at bar that prevents application
of this accepted doctrine.The proven fact is that four days after
the private respondent received the petitioner's notice of
assessment, it filed its letter of protest. This was apparently not
taken into account before the warrant of distraint and levy was
issued; indeed, such protest could not be located in the office of
the petitioner. It was only after Atty. Guevara gave the BIR a copy
of the protest that it was, if at all, considered by the tax
authorities. During the intervening period, the warrant was
premature and could therefore not be served.As the Court of Tax
Appeals correctly noted,"11the protest filed by private respondent
was notpro formaand was based on strong legal considerations. It
thus had the effect of suspending on January 18, 1965, when it was
filed, the reglementary period which started on the date the
assessment was received, viz., January 14, 1965. The period started
running again only on April 7, 1965, when the private respondent
was definitely informed of the implied rejection of the said
protest and the warrant was finally served on it. Hence, when the
appeal was filed on April 23, 1965, only 20 days of the
reglementary period had been consumed.Now for the substantive
question.The petitioner contends that the claimed deduction of
P75,000.00 was properly disallowed because it was not an ordinary
reasonable or necessary business expense. The Court of Tax Appeals
had seen it differently. Agreeing with Algue, it held that the said
amount had been legitimately paid by the private respondent for
actual services rendered. The payment was in the form of
promotional fees. These were collected by the Payees for their work
in the creation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation of the
Philippines and its subsequent purchase of the properties of the
Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company.Parenthetically, it may
be observed that the petitioner had Originally claimed these
promotional fees to be personal holding company income12but later
conformed to the decision of the respondent court rejecting this
assertion.13In fact, as the said court found, the amount was earned
through the joint efforts of the persons among whom it was
distributed It has been established that the Philippine Sugar
Estate Development Company had earlier appointed Algue as its
agent, authorizing it to sell its land, factories and oil
manufacturing process. Pursuant to such authority, Alberto Guevara,
Jr., Eduardo Guevara, Isabel Guevara, Edith, O'Farell, and Pablo
Sanchez, worked for the formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment
Corporation, inducing other persons to invest in it.14Ultimately,
after its incorporation largely through the promotion of the said
persons, this new corporation purchased the PSEDC properties.15For
this sale, Algue received as agent a commission of P126,000.00, and
it was from this commission that the P75,000.00 promotional fees
were paid to the aforenamed individuals.16There is no dispute that
the payees duly reported their respective shares of the fees in
their income tax returns and paid the corresponding taxes
thereon.17The Court of Tax Appeals also found, after examining the
evidence, that no distribution of dividends was involved.18The
petitioner claims that these payments are fictitious because most
of the payees are members of the same family in control of Algue.
It is argued that no indication was made as to how such payments
were made, whether by check or in cash, and there is not enough
substantiation of such payments. In short, the petitioner suggests
a tax dodge, an attempt to evade a legitimate assessment by
involving an imaginary deduction.We find that these suspicions were
adequately met by the private respondent when its President,
Alberto Guevara, and the accountant, Cecilia V. de Jesus, testified
that the payments were not made in one lump sum but periodically
and in different amounts as each payee's need arose.19It should be
remembered that this was a family corporation where strict business
procedures were not applied and immediate issuance of receipts was
not required. Even so, at the end of the year, when the books were
to be closed, each payee made an accounting of all of the fees
received by him or her, to make up the total of
P75,000.00.20Admittedly, everything seemed to be informal. This
arrangement was understandable, however, in view of the close
relationship among the persons in the family corporation.We agree
with the respondent court that the amount of the promotional fees
was not excessive. The total commission paid by the Philippine
Sugar Estate Development Co. to the private respondent was
P125,000.00.21After deducting the said fees, Algue still had a
balance of P50,000.00 as clear profit from the transaction. The
amount of P75,000.00 was 60% of the total commission. This was a
reasonable proportion, considering that it was the payees who did
practically everything, from the formation of the Vegetable Oil
Investment Corporation to the actual purchase by it of the Sugar
Estate properties. This finding of the respondent court is in
accord with the following provision of the Tax Code:SEC.
30.Deductions from gross income.--In computing net income there
shall be allowed as deductions (a) Expenses:(1) In general.--All
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a
reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for
personal services actually rendered; ...22and Revenue Regulations
No. 2, Section 70 (1), reading as follows:SEC. 70.Compensation for
personal services.--Among the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred in carrying on any trade or business may be included a
reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for
personal services actually rendered. The test of deductibility in
the case of compensation payments is whether they are reasonable
and are, in fact, payments purely for service. This test and
deductibility in the case of compensation payments is whether they
are reasonable and are, in fact, payments purely for service. This
test and its practical application may be further stated and
illustrated as follows:Any amount paid in the form of compensation,
but not in fact as the purchase price of services, is not
deductible. (a) An ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a
distribution of a dividend on stock. This is likely to occur in the
case of a corporation having few stockholders, Practically all of
whom draw salaries. If in such a case the salaries are in excess of
those ordinarily paid for similar services, and the excessive
payment correspond or bear a close relationship to the
stockholdings of the officers of employees, it would seem likely
that the salaries are not paid wholly for services rendered, but
the excessive payments are a distribution of earnings upon the
stock. . . . (Promulgated Feb. 11, 1931, 30 O.G. No. 18, 325.)It is
worth noting at this point that most of the payees were not in the
regular employ of Algue nor were they its controlling
stockholders.23The Solicitor General is correct when he says that
the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of the claimed
deduction. In the present case, however, we find that the onus has
been discharged satisfactorily. The private respondent has proved
that the payment of the fees was necessary and reasonable in the
light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors
and prominent businessmen to venture in an experimental enterprise
and involve themselves in a new business requiring millions of
pesos. This was no mean feat and should be, as it was, sufficiently
recompensed.It is said that taxes are what we pay for civilization
society. Without taxes, the government would be paralyzed for lack
of the motive power to activate and operate it. Hence, despite the
natural reluctance to surrender part of one's hard earned income to
the taxing authorities, every person who is able to must contribute
his share in the running of the government. The government for its
part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible
benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance
their moral and material values. This symbiotic relationship is the
rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that
it is an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of
power.But even as we concede the inevitability and indispensability
of taxation, it is a requirement in all democratic regimes that it
be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. If it is not, then the taxpayer has a right to complain
and the courts will then come to his succor. For all the awesome
power of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks
if the taxpayer can demonstrate, as it has here, that the law has
not been observed.We hold that the appeal of the private respondent
from the decision of the petitioner was filed on time with the
respondent court in accordance with Rep. Act No. 1125. And we also
find that the claimed deduction by the private respondent was
permitted under the Internal Revenue Code and should therefore not
have been disallowed by the petitioner.ACCORDINGLY, the appealed
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMEDin toto,without
costs.SO ORDERED.Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and
Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.(6)G.R. No. 124043 October 14,
1998COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,petitioner,vs.COURT OF
APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,respondents.PANGANIBAN,J.:Is the income
derived from rentals of real property owned by the Young Men's
Christian Association of the Philippines, Inc. (YMCA) established
as "a welfare, educational and charitable non-profit corporation"
subject to income tax under the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) and the Constitution?The CaseThis is the main question
raised before us in this petition for review
oncertiorarichallenging two Resolutions issued by the Court of
Appeals1on September 28, 19952and February 29, 19963in CA-GR SP No.
32007. Both Resolutions affirmed the Decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) allowing the YMCA to claim tax exemption on the
latter's income from the lease of its real property.The FactsThe
facts are undisputed.4Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock,
non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and
activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young
people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable
objectives.In 1980, private respondent earned, among others, an
income of P676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its premises to
small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators, and
P44,259.00 from parking fees collected from non-members. On July 2,
1984, the commissioner of internal revenue (CIR) issued an
assessment to private respondent, in the total amount of
P415,615.01 including surcharge and interest, for deficiency income
tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and
professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. Private
respondent formally protested the assessment and, as a supplement
to its basic protest, filed a letter dated October 8, 1985. In
reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA.Contesting the denial of
its protest, the YMCA filed a petition for review at the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 14, 1989. In due course, the CTA issued
this ruling in favor of the YMCA:. . . [T]he leasing of [private
respondent's] facilities to small shop owners, to restaurant and
canteen operators and the operation of the parking lot are
reasonably incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the objectives of the [private respondents]. It
appears from the testimonies of the witnesses for the [private
respondent] particularly Mr. James C. Delote, former accountant of
YMCA, that these facilities were leased to members and that they
have to service the needs of its members and their guests. The
rentals were minimal as for example, the barbershop was only
charged P300 per month. He also testified that there was actually
no lot devoted for parking space but the parking was done at the
sides of the building. The parking was primarily for members with
stickers on the windshields of their cars and they charged P.50 for
non-members. The rentals and parking fees were just enough to cover
the costs of operation and maintenance only. The earning[s] from
these rentals and parking charges including those from lodging and
other charges for the use of the recreational facilities constitute
[the] bulk of its income which [is] channeled to support its many
activities and attainment of its objectives. As pointed out
earlier, the membership dues are very insufficient to support its
program. We find it reasonably necessary therefore for [private
respondent] to make [the] most out [of] its existing facilities to
earn some income. It would have been different if under the
circumstances, [private respondent] will purchase a lot and convert
it to a parking lot to cater to the needs of the general public for
a fee, or construct a building and lease it out to the highest
bidder or at the market rate for commercial purposes, or should it
invest its funds in the buy and sell of properties, real or
personal. Under these circumstances, we could conclude that the
activities are already profit oriented, not incidental and
reasonably necessary to the pursuit of the objectives of the
association and therefore, will fall under the last paragraph of
Section 27 of the Tax Code and any income derived therefrom shall
be taxable.Considering our findings that [private respondent] was
not engaged in the business of operating or contracting [a] parking
lot, we find no legal basis also for the imposition of [a]
deficiency fixed tax and [a] contractor's tax in the amount[s] of
P353.15 and P3,129.73, respectively.xxx xxx xxxWHEREFORE, in view
of all the foregoing, the following assessments are hereby
dismissed for lack of merit:1980 Deficiency Fixed Tax P353,15;1980
Deficiency Contractor's Tax P3,129.23;1980 Deficiency Income Tax
P372,578.20.While the following assessments are hereby
sustained:1980 Deficiency Expanded Withholding Tax P1,798.93;1980
Deficiency Withholding Tax on Wages P33,058.82plus 10% surcharge
and 20% interest per annum from July 2, 1984 until fully paid but
not to exceed three (3) years pursuant to Section 51(e)(2) &
(3) of the National Internal Revenue Code effective as of
1984.5Dissatisfied with the CTA ruling, the CIR elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision of February 16, 1994,
the CA6initially decided in favor of the CIR and disposed of the
appeal in the following manner:Following the ruling in the
afore-cited cases ofProvince of Abra vs. HernandoandAbra Valley
College Inc. vs. Aquino, the ruling of the respondent Court of Tax
Appeals that "the leasing of petitioner's (herein respondent's)
facilities to small shop owners, to restaurant and canteen
operators and the operation of the parking lot are reasonably
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the objectives of the petitioners, and the income derived therefrom
are tax exempt, must be reversed.WHEREFORE, the appealed decision
is hereby REVERSED in so far as it dismissed the assessment
for:1980 Deficiency Income Tax P 353.151980 Deficiency Contractor's
Tax P 3,129.23, &1980 Deficiency Income Tax P 372,578.20but the
same is AFFIRMED in all other respect.7Aggrieved, the YMCA asked
for reconsideration based on the following grounds:IThe findings of
facts of the Public Respondent Court of Tax Appeals being supported
by substantial evidence [are] final and conclusive.IIThe
conclusions of law of [p]ublic [r]espondent exempting [p]rivate
[r]espondent from the income on rentals of small shops and parking
fees [are] in accord with the applicable law and
jurisprudence.8Finding merit in the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the YMCA, the CA reversed itself and promulgated on
September 28, 1995 its first assailed Resolution which, in part,
reads:The Court cannot depart from the CTA's findings of fact, as
they are supported by evidence beyond what is considered as
substantial.xxx xxx xxxThe second ground raised is that the
respondent CTA did not err in saying that the rental from small
shops and parking fees do not result in the loss of the exemption.
Not even the petitioner would hazard the suggestion that YMCA is
designed for profit. Consequently, the little income from small
shops and parking fees help[s] to keep its head above the water, so
to speak, and allow it to continue with its laudable work.The
Court, therefore, finds the second ground of the motion to be
meritorious and in accord with law and jurisprudence.WHEREFORE, the
motion for reconsideration is GRANTED; the respondent CTA's
decision is AFFIRMEDin toto.9The internal revenue commissioner's
own Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Respondent Court in
its second assailed Resolution of February 29, 1996. Hence, this
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.10The
IssuesBefore us, petitioner imputes to the Court of Appeals the
following errors:IIn holding that it had departed from the findings
of fact of Respondent Court of Tax Appeals when it rendered its
Decision dated February 16, 1994; andIIIn affirming the conclusion
of Respondent Court of Tax Appeals that the income of private
respondent from rentals of small shops and parking fees [is] exempt
from taxation.11This Court's RulingThe petition is
meritorious.First Issue:Factual Findings of the CTAPrivate
respondent contends that the February 16, 1994 CA Decision reversed
the factual findings of the CTA. On the other hand, petitioner
argues that the CA merely reversed the "rulingof the CTA that the
leasing of private respondent's facilities to small shop owners, to
restaurant and canteen operators and the operation of parking lots
are reasonably incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the objectives of the private respondent and that
the income derived therefrom are tax exempt."12Petitioner insists
that what the appellate court reversed was the legal conclusion,not
the factual finding, of the CTA.13The commissioner has a
point.Indeed, it is a basic rule in taxation that the factual
findings of the CTA, when supported by substantial evidence, will
be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the said court
committed gross error in the appreciation of facts.14In the present
case, this Court finds that the February 16, 1994 Decision of the
CA did not deviate from this rule. The latter merely applied the
law to the facts as found by the CTA and ruled on the issue raised
by the CIR: "Whether or not the collection or earnings of rental
income from the lease of certain premises and income earned from
parking fees shall fall under the last paragraph of Section 27 of
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended."15Clearly,
the CA did not alter any fact or evidence. It merely resolved the
aforementioned issue, as indeed it was expected to. That it did so
in a manner different from that of the CTA did not necessarily
imply a reversal of factual findings.The distinction between a
question of law and a question of fact is clear-cut. It has been
held that "[t]here is a question of law in a given case when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts."16In the
present case, the CA did not doubt, much less change, the facts
narrated by the CTA. It merely applied the law to the facts. That
its interpretation or conclusion is different from that of the CTA
is not irregular or abnormal.Second Issue:Is the Rental Income of
the YMCA Taxable?We now come to the crucial issue: Is the rental
income of the YMCA from its real estate subject to tax? At the
outset, we set forth the relevant provision of the NIRC:Sec. 27.
Exemptions from tax on corporations. The following organizations
shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to income received
by them as such xxx xxx xxx(g) Civic league or organization not
organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of
social welfare;(h) Club organized and operated exclusively for
pleasure, recreation, and other non-profitable purposes, no part of
the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private
stockholder or member;xxx xxx xxxNotwithstanding the provisions in
the preceding paragraphs, the income of whatever kind and character
of the foregoing organizations from any of their properties, real
or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit,
regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject
to the tax imposed under this Code. (as amended by Pres. Decree No.
1457)Petitioner argues that while the income received by the
organizations enumerated in Section 27 (now Section 26) of the NIRC
is, as a rule, exempted from the payment of tax "in respect to
income received by them as such," the exemption does not apply to
income derived ". . . from any of their properties, real or
personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit,
regardless of the disposition made of such income . . .
."Petitioner adds that "rental income derived by a tax-exempt
organization from the lease of its properties, real or personal,
[is] not, therefore, exempt from income taxation, even if such
income [is] exclusively used for the accomplishment of its
objectives."17We agree with the commissioner.Because taxes are the
lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied the doctrine
of strict in interpretation in construing tax
exemptions.18Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from
taxation should be manifest. and unmistakable from the language of
the law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed exemption "must
expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to
be mistaken."19In the instant case, the exemption claimed by the
YMCA is expressly disallowed by the very wording of the last
paragraph of then Section 27 of the NIRC which mandates that the
income of exempt organizations (such as the YMCA) from any of their
properties, real or personal, be subject to the tax imposed by the
same Code. Because the last paragraph of said section unequivocally
subjects to tax the rent income of the YMCA from its real
property,20the Court is duty-bound to abide strictly by its literal
meaning and to refrain from resorting to any convoluted attempt at
construction.It is axiomatic that where the language of the law is
clear and unambiguous, its express terms must be
applied.21Parenthetically, a consideration of the question of
construction must not even begin, particularly when such question
is on whether to apply a strict construction or a liberal one on
statutes that grant tax exemptions to "religious, charitable and
educational propert[ies] or institutions."22The last paragraph of
Section 27, the YMCA argues, should be "subject to the
qualification that the income from the properties must arise from
activities 'conducted for profit' before it may be considered
taxable."23This argument is erroneous. As previously stated, a
reading of said paragraph ineludibly shows that the income from any
property of exempt organizations, as well as that arising from any
activity it conducts for profit, is taxable. The phrase "any of
their activities conducted for profit" does not qualify the word
"properties." This makes from the property of the organization
taxable, regardless of how that income is used whether for profit
or for lofty non-profit purposes.Verba legis non est recedendum.
Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error when
it allowed, on reconsideration, the tax exemption claimed by YMCA
on income it derived from renting out its real property, on the
solitary but unconvincing ground that the said income is not
collected for profit but is merely incidental to its operation. The
law does not make a distinction. The rental income is taxable
regardless of whence such income is derived and how it is used or
disposed of. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should
we.Constitutional ProvisionsOn TaxationInvoking not only the NIRC
but also the fundamental law, private respondent submits that
Article VI, Section 28 of par. 3 of the 1987 Constitution,24exempts
"charitable institutions" from the payment not only of property
taxes but also of income tax from any source.25In support of its
novel theory, it compares the use of the words "charitable
institutions," "actually" and "directly" in the 1973 and the 1987
Constitutions, on the one hand; and in Article VI, Section 22, par.
3 of the 1935 Constitution, on the other hand.26Private respondent
enunciates three points.First, the present provision is divisible
into two categories: (1) "[c]haritable institutions, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques and non-profit
cemeteries," the incomes of which are, from whatever source, all
tax-exempt;27and (2) "[a]ll lands, buildings and improvements
actually and directly used for religious, charitable or educational
purposes," which are exempt only from property taxes.28Second,
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,29which limited the
exemption only to the payment of property taxes, referred to the
provision of the 1935 Constitution and not to its counterparts in
the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions.30Third, the phrase "actually,
directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes" refers not only to "all lands, buildings and
improvements," but also to the above-quoted first category which
includes charitable institutions like the private respondent.31The
Court is not persuaded. The debates, interpellations and
expressions of opinion of the framers of the Constitution reveal
their intent which, in turn, may have guided the people in
ratifying the Charter.32Such intent must be
effectuated.Accordingly, Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., a former
constitutional commissioner, who is now a member of this Court,
stressed during the Concom debates that ". . . what is exempted is
not the institution itself . . .; those exempted from real estate
taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and
exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educationalpurposes."33Father Joaquin G. Bernas, an eminent
authority on the Constitution and also a member of the Concom,
adhered to the same view that the exemption created by said
provision pertained only to property taxes.34In his treatise on
taxation, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug concurs, stating that "[t]he
tax exemption coverspropertytaxes only."35Indeed, the income tax
exemption claimed by private respondent finds no basis in Article
VI, Section 26, par. 3 of the Constitution.Private respondent also
invokes Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Character,36claiming
that the YMCA "is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution
whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on
its properties and income."37We reiterate that private respondent
is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on
the rentals from its property. The bare allegation alone that it is
a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to
justify its exemption from the payment of income tax.As previously
discussed, laws allowing tax exemption are construedstrictissimi
juris. Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims
under the aforecited provision, it must prove with substantial
evidence that (1) it falls under the classificationnon-stock,
non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to
be exempted from taxation is usedactually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes. However, the Court notes that
not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by private respondent to
prove that it met the said requisites.Is the YMCA
aneducationalinstitution within the purview of Article XIV, Section
4, par. 3 of the Constitution? We rule that it is not. The term
"educational institution" o