Taste and Art

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

1/13

ritishJournal o f

Aesthetics,

Vol 28, No 2, Spring ig88

ARCHIBALD ALISON: AESTHETIC

E X P E R I E N C E A N D E M O T I O N

Dabney Townsend

ARCHIBALD ALISON'SEssays on theNatureand Principles ofTaste have an intrinsic

interest and merit which has probably been underestimated by philosophers

concerned with aesthetics. In addition, there are two good reasons for finding

Alison's essays important to an understanding of the history of aesthetics.

First, Alison published the essays in 1790, the same year as Kant's Third

Critique. While Kant 's aesthetic should be understood in the l ight of the first

tw o Critiqu es and thus be longs to a unique epistemological tradition, Alison is

w or kin g in a direct line of de velo pm ent from the earlier British theories of taste.

He cites, in particular, H utch eson , B urke , Ho ga rth, and Th om as Reid. Alison is

not unique in this. He is part of the Scottish Enlightenment. His work on

aesthetics is dedicated to Dug ald S tewart Alison ow es major deb ts to Reid for

the basic ideas of expression and the importance of mental qualities, and to

Hartley for the fundamentals of associationism. However, Alison gives an

interesting and innovative development to these key ideas. Apparently

independently of Kant, Alison develops many of the same theoretical terms.

Imagination, expression, and the importance of a common nature are central

theoretical concep ts for him . His theo ry of association, h ow eve r, rema ins m uch

m ore closely related to the epistem olog y of Locke and H u m e as it is mo dified by

Hartley than is Kant 's transcendental idealism. Thus Alison shows us one

possible outcome of the eighteenth-century theories as they are reshaped into

nineteenth-century romanticism.

Secon d, Alison is an early p rop on en t of a theo ry of aesthetics as 'exp ress ion ', a

concept which continues to find defenders in contemporary discussions. While

Alison und ou bte dly ow es m uch to Reid in this area, his dev elop m ent of a theory

of expression is mo re clearly in l ine with the proble ms set out by H utche son and

Hume. Alison's theory of expression is also significantly different from Kant's,

and it is not based fundamentally upon 'disinterestedness'. This claim is

con trovers ial, of course . Je ro m e Stolnitz finds disinterestedn ess to be

fundamental to Alison.

1

I wo uld not claim that Alison never makes use of som e

form of disinterested ness, bu t I will argue that it is not the basis for his theo ry of

expression Th e centrahty of expression, even m ore than the theories of

association for which he is most widely known, marks Alison's work as

different from the theories of taste and beauty to which he continues to refer.

But since 'exp ression ' and 'association' are in som e w ays a direct consequen ce of

O xf o rd University Press 1988 132

byguestonS

eptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

2/13

DABNEY TOWNSEND 133

trying

to

meet difficulties which those earlier theories encountered, Alison's

innovations help us to understand the history of modern aesthetics. Thus Alison

is

of

interest both

as an

independent, non-Kantian source

for

a quasi-romantic

theory

of

art

and

also

as a

transitional figure

who

helps

us to

understand

the

development

of

more recent aesthetic theory.

My interest in Alison inthis paper is historical, therefore;but itisahistorical

interest which

is

less concerned with

the

actual influences

and

connections

which shaped Alison's thought than with the logic of the ideas and problems to

which Alison is responding. 'Aesthetics' as such isunknow n to the seventeenth-

and eighteenth-century writersontaste and art.Itemerges as a fully developed

concept only with Kant.

But it is

widely acknowledged that

it is in the

seventeenthandeighteenth centuries, particularlyinBritain, that the key ideas

were taking shape.

The

development

of

empiricist epistemology raises

fundamental problems

for

ethics

and for the

appreciation

and

valuation

of

the

arts. A

complex

of

related theories develops

in

response

to the

challenge

presented

by

Locke

and

Hobbes

It is

one thing

to try to

disentangle

the

actual

historical relations of those theories. It

is

another to try to understand the logical

progression which forces modifications

and

reformulations.

It is in

this latter

sense that Alison, standing

in

temporal proximity

to

Kant as he does, seems

to

me of particular interest. The positions to which Alisonisforced seem to me the

clear exemplification

of

the

outcome

of

trying

to

meet

the

problems raised

by

eighteenth-century theories

of

taste

Alison's

own

avowed purpose

is to

show that taste

is a

complex emotion

which depends on association and imagination. Hesets out to refute two

competing theories: first, that taste

is the

product

of an

internal sense;

and

second, that the emotion of taste isasimple emotion based on a single principle

of mind such

as

utility, order,

etc. The

former position Alison ascribes

to

Hogarth, Abbe Winkelmann, andReynoldson thegrounds that they lookfor

objects which

the

arts

of

tastepainting, sculpture, architecture,

and

musiccan imitate in order to stimulate the sense. We might add to Alison's list

Francis Hutcheson

and

Alexander Gerard, who explicitly defend

the

existence

of such

a

sense (though

the

extent

to

which Gerard

is a

sense-theorist needs

qualification).

The

alternativea common

law of

mindAlison ascribes

to

Diderot and Hume. Edmund Burke, whose ideas ofsize,delicacy,

or

greatness

appeal

to a

principle

of

emotional magnitude, might also

fit

this category,

although Alison seem

to be

thinking here primarily

of

moral

or

teleological

principles.

2

Thealternativeforwhich Alison argues requires thatfora simple

emotion

to

become

an

emotion

of

taste,

it

must

be

part

of

acomplex which

is

formed bypowers of the mindassociation and imaginationwhich make the

complex expressive

of

qualities

of

mind.

So,

rather than

a

single sense which

responds to the imitation of objects or asingle principle of mind which can act in

all cases, Alison

has a

theory which allows many complicated interactions.

Alison has two typical ways of arguing against the positions he opposes. First,

byguestonS

eptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

3/13

134 ARCHIBALD ALISON AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND EM OTION

there is a line of argument to show that beauty does not arise from any single

source. It goes like this: (i) If beauty were the product of

an

internal sense (or a

single principle), then it would be found whenever the quality or principle was

presen t to the m ind . (2) But this is not th e case. If the associations wh ich conn ect

the individual mind to that quality or principle are destroyed, the emotional

response disappears. Therefore, Alison con cludes, beauty is not an imm ediate

product. This argument can be mounted either against a sense or a principle

since, Alison reasons, either w ou ld a utom atically p rodu ce the emotion of taste if

it w ere bo th the necessary and sufficient con dition for beauty . For exa m ple, o ne

can sho w that it is no t the sound itself wh ich is sublim e by this line of argu m en t:

If any sounds were in themselves Sublime, or fitted by the constitution of our nature

to produ ce this Em otion , inde pend ently of all Association, it wou ld seem that there

could be no change of our Emotion, and that these sounds would as permanently

produce their correspondent Emotion, as the objects of every other Sense produce

their correspondent ideas

In all cases, however, where these associations are either accidental or temporary,

and n ot, as in the former case, perm an en t in their natu re, it will be found that so und s

are sublime only, when they are expressive of qualities capable of producing some

powerful Emotion, and that in all other cases, the same sounds are simply

indifferent. . Th eir Sub limity therefore can only be attribu ted to the qualities

which they signify (p 42)

Throughout the two essays, Alison returns again and again to this form of

ar gu m en t, adjusting it in each case to the exam ple and the specific claim th at he

seeks to refute.

The second line of argument which Alison sets up appeals to the kind of

description which is given of the emotion of taste. Alison's argument may be

redu ced to the follow ing. (1) If bea uty w ere a simple perceptual form , it wo uld

be sufficient to describe that form. That is, if beauty were simply the product of

a sensuous l ine, then whenever we wanted to refer to beauty, i t would be

en ou gh to describe a sensuou s line. 'Sen suo us line' wo uld m ean 'beautiful' . (2)

B ut th at is no t the case. O ur de scription s of the em otio n of taste typically re qu ire

som e emotion al term such as gay or m elanch oly, lovely or great. The refore, no

single term or principle is sufficient to describe what the emotion of taste

involves Again, Alison repeats this arg um ent thro ug ho ut the essays with

app rop riate adjustmen ts to the particular case under discussion. For exam ple, if

the claim is that certain sound s appeal to a sense of beau ty directly th rou gh their

perception, Alison replies as follows:

If

the

Beauty of

Music

arose from any of those qualities, either of

Sound,

or of

the

Composition of Sounds, which are immediately perceivable bythe Ear,itisobvious

that this would be expressed in Language, and that the terms by which such Music

was characterized, would be significant of

some

quality or qualities discernible by

the Ear: If, on the contrary, this Beauty arises from the interesting or affecting

byguestonS

eptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

4/13

DABNEY TOWNSEND US

qualities of w hich itisexpressive to us, such qualities, in the same manner, ought, in

common language, to be assigned as the causes of thisEm otion; and the terms by

which such M usicischaracterized ought to be significant of such qualities. That the

last is the case, I think there can be no dispute The terms Plaintive, Tender,

Cheerful, Gay, Elevating, Solemn, etc are not only constantly appliedtoevery kind

of

Music

that is either Sublime or Beautiful; but it is in fact by such terms only that

men ever characterize the Compositions from which they receive such Emo-

tions. . . If the Beauty or Sublimity of Music arose from the laws of its

Composition, the very reverse of all this would obviously be the case (p 52).

In all the version s of this argu m en t, Aliso n's claim seems to be that the necessity

ofa multiplicity of what we would call aesthetic predicates indicates that there

cannot be a purely sensuous account of beauty and that no single principle can

account for the multiplicity of emotional descriptions. He concludes that there

must always be some synthetic operation of the mind for which the aesthetic

predicates are evidence

Th is arg um en t differs from the first in its appeal to the langu age w hic h we use

to describe the emotion of taste. This appeal to ordinary language has a

particularly mo de rn ring Alth oug h Alison does no t seem to have any particular

thesis about the centrahty of language in the operation of the mind that he is

describing, he does see language as the manifestation of that operation. (Alison

does claim that language, particularly poetry, is one of the principal ways that

expressive associations are formed. See the discussion o f Buc hana n's po em on

p. 15, for exa m ple.) In this respect, A lison's use of ima gina tion and expre ssion

anticipate m or e recent theories which link those terms to sym bolic activity and

language

Alison continues a century of theorizing about ' taste ' in Britain. From

Shaftesbury at the end of the seventeenth century through Hume's essay, 'Of

the Standa rd of Tas te' , to Alison, the dev elop m ent and evaluation of taste is a

central conc ern (A similar claim mig ht be ma de for con tinental w riters .

Shaftesbury and Hutch eson were influential in G erm any

3

, an d 'tas te' is certainly

a central term for Diderot and others in France. However, the differences

between British and continental theories of'taste' as such fall outside the scope

of this pap er.) Fo r Shaftesbury , the form ation of taste is an essential part of the

mo ral education of a you ng no blem an. For H um e, the subjectivity of taste poses

acutely the problems to which his scepticism leads him. Alison takes up the

whole tradition of trying to define and provide a guide for the formation of

taste. A w or ris om e pro ble m for Alison is the variability to which taste is subject;

one object of his essays is to stabilize taste. For example, he worries that:

They who are most liable to the seduction of Fashion, are people on whose minds the

slighter associations have a strong effect. A plain man is incapable of such

associations, a man of sense is above them But the young and the frivolous, whose

principles of Taste are either unformed, or w hose m inds are unable to maintain any

settled opinions, are apt to lose sight of every other quality in such objects but their

byguestonSeptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

5/13

136 ARCHIBALD ALISON AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND EMOTION

relation to the practice of the great, and of course,

to

suffer their sentiments of beauty

to vary with the caprice of this practice (p 27)

Shaftesbury at the beginning of the century shared the same concerns. The

co m m on them e thro ug ho ut is that taste is founded upon an em otion of taste.

Th at is no t the same as saying tha t taste is an em otio n It means on ly that there is

an emotional basis to which one can refer. Alison identifies three specific

emotions as aesthetic beauty, sublimity, and grace. Beauty and sublimity

co rre sp on d to qualities of m ind Grace differs from be auty b ut is allied to it. It is

'never observed without affecting us with emotions of peculiar delight' (p. 118).

Like Kant, Alison distinguishes the emotions of taste from other kinds of

pleasure as a form of delight. But for Alison, this distinction arises because the

simple emotions require 'no additional train of thought ' while for emotions of

taste 'it seems evident that this exercise of mind is necessary, and that unless this

train of th ou gh t is pro du ced , these em otion s are unfelt ' (p 35). Th us A lison

makes the same emotional distinction that we find in Kant but he locates it on

the opposite end of the logical scale, so to speak. Kant locates the delight in the

beautiful as prior to the more complex pleasures which involve desire and

concepts; Alison places i t subsequent to the complex operation of the mind.

Aesthetic emotion is thus a consequent for Alison. Alison shares with most

earlier writers a distrust for ' intere sted ' judg em ents Shaftesbury, for exam ple,

seeks to separate the public interest from private interest, and H u m e specifically

identifies the need to set aside prejudice as a cond ition for a true ju dg e. Bu t

disinterestedness is a m atter of crit ical jud ge m en t. For exam ple, H um e

mentions the need to set aside friendship or enmity with the author.

4

T h e

formation of the associations which produce the aesthetic emotion is not itself

disinterested For Alison, in particular, if there were no associations and a train

of tho ug ht, the com plex em otion necessary for beauty or sublim ity could not be

present. One would have only indifferent perception. For example, Alison

argues.

Such sounds are beautiful or sublime, only as they express Passions or Affections

which excite our sympathy There areagreat variety oftonesin the human voice,

yetallthese tones are not beautiful. Ifweinquire whatarethe particular Tones which

areso,it will universally be found, that they are such as are expressive of pleasing or

interesting affections. . This coincidence of the Beauty and Sublimity of the

Tones of the human Voice, with those qualities of mind that are interesting or

affecting to us, if it is notaformalproof,is yetastrong presum ption, that it is from

the expression of

such

qualities that these sounds derive their Sublimity or Beauty

(P 46)

This is one reason for thinking that disinterestedness plays a circumscribed role

in Alison's aesthetic theory. For Kant, disinterestedness is a condition for the

production of the fundamental aesthetic intuition. For Alison, it is only one

mean s of sorting ae sthctic judg em ents. Tho se which are interested in one sense

byguestonS

eptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

6/13

DABNEY TOW NSEND 137

will be unreliable; but w itho ut a fundamental interest, no em otion w ou ld be

possible in the first place. This is obviously a different sense of'interest ' , but it

limits 'disintereste dn ess' in a wa y wh ich is consistent w ith Shaftesbury and

Hume and quite different from Kant

Alison's acceptance of the traditional link between taste and emotion presents

him with a problem which did not exist earlier, however (and one which does

not exist for Kant because of where he locates the delight in beauty). If there

were a specific emotion or principle of mind which one could identify with

beauty, then whatever problems arose in specifying it , there would be no

further problems in claiming for it the associated emotional quality. We might

call this the aesthetic experience thesis: aesthetic experience rests upon its own

im m ediate ex perience with i ts ow n e mo tional qualit ies. It is accepted by m ost of

the eighteenth-century writers on aesthetics, including Hume. The presence of

this form of experience is the basis for ju dg em en ts of taste. Bu t Alison rejects

sense theory and simple emotions. The emotion he refers to is a complex

emotion which requires imagination and association and which must be

expressive of mind. On Alison's theory, anything can be the basis for the

em oti on of taste as long as it is capable of bec om ing 'significant or expressive to

us of ve ry different, and far mo re interes ting qu alities than th ose it possesses

itse lf (p. 39). Th e distinction from simple em otio n rests on an exercise of min d,

and the 'mo re interesting q ualities ' are those wh ich are expressive of mind Bu t

such qualities bec om e interesting and expressive of m ind ju st because they are

the produ ct of imaginat ion. T he onlyemotionaldistinction involved is that there

seem s to be a peculiar kind of deligh t or pleasure in the aesthetic, b ut this deligh t

is the complex result of imagination- 'The pleasure, therefore, which

accom panies the Em otio ns of Taste, may be considered not as a simple, bu t as a

complex pleasure; and as arising not from any separate and peculiar Sense, but

from the union of the pleasure ofSIMPLE EMOTION, with that which is annexed,

by the constitution o f the hu m an mind , to the Exercise of

IMAGINATION'

(p. 37).

O th er s before Alison m aintaine d that the ideas of taste are com plex If

A liso n's p ositio n is different, and tha t is op en to qu estio n, it is beca use he is

concerned with a complex em otion . In Locke, for examp le, the idea of beau ty is

a complex idea, but the pleasure which accompanies it is itself simple. Peter

Kivy argues that Francis Hutcheson departs from Locke at this point because

'that there is a sense of beauty implies that the idea of beauty is a simple idea'.

5

Kivy ack now ledges that H utche son mig ht postulate a sense only because the

pleasure wh ich accom panies the idea of beauty is simple, tho ug h he thinks this

'an awk w ard and left-footed reading of Hu tche son ' . (I wo nd er if i t is any m ore

aw kw ard than trying to make uniform ity amidst variety a simple idea.) At any

rate,

A lison, w h o is arg uin g against sense theories, has no such need. B ut A lison

also distinguishes the resulting emotion from the process which produces it.

Th e co m plex ity wh ich A lison requires is prim arily in the process. It is a

com plexity due to association and im agination, which Alison takes to be a

byguestonS

eptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

7/13

138 ARCHIBALD ALISON AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND EMOTION

faculty similar to but independent of reason. The resultant process is thus a

unique ly m ental on e, and the em otion is really a response to this mental train o f

ideas. Th is is w hat m akes the original qualities expressive of mind H ere too

Alison is obv iously influenced b y Reid and by the long tradition wh ich finds in

the mind signs of the Platonic w orld o f ideas. Bu t note the differences. W hen

these mental qualities appear in Shaftesbury, they clearly echo neo-Platonic

lang uag e, at least For Alison, the m ind is intere sting because it is sym pa the tic

and human. Without the human qualities, we find perception indifferent; with

them, we experience an emotion of pleasure. Neither the emotion nor the

qualities are as important as the mind which they come to mirror.

6

T he uniqu eness of the em otion of taste wh ich was a central part of the earlier

theories plays no real role for Alison. For him, the mind, by working upon the

material qualities and simple emotions, builds up associations and connections

which make of the original quality a sign of the mind's own imaginative

operation. 'It requires some pains to separate this connexion, and to prevent us

from attributing to the Sign, that effect which is produced alone by the Quality

signified' (p. 39). Alison seems confident that such a separation can be made, but

it is by no m eans clear ho w that is to be do ne. O ne canno t appeal directly to the

quality b ecause it is not un ique, it is the pr od uc t of ima gination and association

which will vary from individual to individual. And to say that it is the quality

'expressive of mind' is obviously circular since we are trying to separate just

those qu alities. O ne suspects here that the idea of an em otio n is a survival of the

tradition that Alison is mo difying 'Im ag inatio n' and 'expre ssion ' do not, in

fact, require the idea of a different kind of emotion at all as Alison develops

them, though he will continue to speak as if taste were a matter of a feeling or

emotion of some complex but dist inctive kind.

Viewed in this way, Alison's identification of the emotions of taste becomes

quite em pty . It is based on a com plex circle of definitions and theoretical term s.

At bo tto m , Alison appeals to a kind of intuitive grou nd Th is is prov ided by the

aesthetic predicates which appear frequently throughout the essays. Beauty,

sublimity and grace are made more explicit by particular adjectives: 'In those

trains [ofthough t ] , . . wh ich are suggested by objects of Sub limity or Bea uty,

how ever sl ight the connexion between individual th ou gh t m ay be, I believe it

will be found, that there is always some general principle of connexion which

pervad es the w ho le, and gives them so m e certain or definite character Th ey are

either gay, or pathetic, or melancholy, or awful, or elevating, etc., according to

the natu re of the em otio n w hich is first exc ited' (p. 23). Each of these predicates

identifies som e character of em otion for Alison Bu t since there is no single

emotion of beauty or sublimity, there is no self-evident reason why 'awfulness'

should be an emotion of sublimity but 'nauseating' should not. Wejust know

that some predicates are aesthetic and others are not.

Alison does try to specify what produces aesthetic emotions, however. A

major part of that answe r is the faculty of im agina tion Alison does not go as far

byguestonS

eptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

8/13

DABNEY TOWNSEND 139

as Coleridge

in

making imaginat ion

a

creative faculty.

Nor

does Alison

distinguish imagination and fancy, and their operation is subsequent to the

presentation ofany objectto themind (p. 11). Butimagination transforms the

objects

of

beauty

or

sublimity into emotionally productive objects:

The landscapesof Claude Lorraine, themusicofHandel , thepoetry of Mil ton,

excite feeble emotions

in our

minds w hen

our

attention

is

confined

to the

qualities

they present

to our

senses,

or

w h en

it

is

to

such qualities of their comp osition that

we

turn

our

regard.

It

is then, o nly,

we

feel the sub lim ity

or

beauty of their prod uctions ,

w h enourimaginations are kindledbytheir powe r, when we lose ourselves amidthe

num ber of images that pass before

our

minds ,

and

when

we

waken

at

last from this

play

of

fancy,

as

from

the

charm

of

a romant ic dream

(p 11)

W e

can say,

then, that

the

aesthetic predicates which characterize

the

specific

emot ions of taste are those which are the product of imaginat ion. But for

Alison,

an

independent 'faculty'

is no

real solution.

He

holds that

all

aesthetic

predicates

are

expressive

of

qualities

of

mind,

and he

attributes them

to

imag ination which is 'the indulgence of a train of thou gh t ' (p. 22). Th at does not

succeed in identifying them .

Even

the

appeal

to

imagination

is too

broad, ho wev er.

It is by no

means true

that suchanexerciseofimagination isnecessarily accom panied w ith pleasure;

for these conceptions notonlymay be, but very often are of a kind extremely

indifferent,

and

sometimes also simply painful'

(p 22).

Th us imaginat ion

is at

m ost a necessary condition for the emot ion of sublimity or beauty. Alison

appeals to the uniqueness of the emot ions of beauty and sublimity here to

distinguish

one

result

of

imagination from anothe r.

But in

that case one cann ot

use

the

presence

of

imagination

as the

identifying characteristic

for the

emotions. Alison vacillates between his traditional acceptance of the unique

em ot ionofbeautyand hisneedtofindam or e p recise specification of it onc ehe

gives

up the

simplicity

of

sense

or

principle.

At

most, imagination

can be a

necessary condition

for

some object producing

an

em otion properly described

byone of the aesthetic predicates

The incipient circularity which is at work throughout is, perhaps, mo st

evident here. There are objects which are 'simply indifferent, or at leastare

regarded

as

indifferent

in our

common hours ei ther

of

occupation

or

am usem ent ' (p. 22). And there are objects w hich pro duc e some aesthetic

emot ion. 'Thus the ideas suggested by the scenery of Spring, are ideas

productive

of

emot ions

of

Cheerfulness,

of

G ladness,

and of

Tenderness '

(p.

22).

So,

Alison

can

hold , simp ly being

an

'idea

of

emot ion '

is

itself

a

necessary

condit ion. Butsincetheobjectsdo notnecessarily pro duce such emo tionsand

the imagination

can

also

be

'indifferent' neither

by

itself is sufficient. Jointly,

each

is

defined

in

terms of the other. Imag ination,

in

and of

itself,

does

not

break

the circle, and 'ideas ofem ot ion ' arenoth ing other than theclassofaesthetic

predicates, so onecannot define m em bersh ip in theclass w itho ut circularity

byguestonSe

ptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.o

xfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

9/13

140 ARCHIBALD ALISON AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND EMOTION

except by specifying all the specific emotions. Alison does not pretend to do

that, and it is for an alternative that we are looking.

Alison tries to break out of the circle by appealing to a principle of

com position - un ity of character 'It is true, that [if?] those trains of tho ug ht

which attend the Emotions of Taste, are uniformly distinguished by some

general principle of connexion, i t ought to be found, that no Composition of

Objects or qualities in fact produces such emotions, in which this Unity of

character or of emotion is not preserved' (p. 28). By this unity of character,

Alison seems to mean that one cannot mix gaiety and sadness, for example,

w ithou t destroy ing the emotion of taste that either wo uld pro duce by

itself.

T he

great positive example of unity is found in landscape gardening where the artist

has a po w er 'to re m ov e from his landscapes wh atev er is hostile to its effect, or

unsuited to its character, and, by selecting only such circumstances as accord

w ith the general expression of the scene, to aw aken an emo tion m ore full, m or e

simple, and more harmonious than any we can receive from the scenes of

N atu re itself (p. 29) As such, how ev er, u nity of character is only a limitin g

con dition It can tell us w hy a landscape fails to excite the em otio ns o ne m igh t

expect, but it cannot tell us why a Spring scene is beautiful in the first place.

One part of the answer to this last question comes from Alison's use of the

theory of association, of course . A Spring scene provid es associations w hich are

of the same character as it itself

is,

and the complex emotions which result are

cxprcssivejust because they provide a regular train of associations which recur

wh enev er a similar object appears. By them selves, qualities of ma tter prod uce

no emotion; 'yet it is obvious that they may produce this effect, from their

association w ith o ther q ualities' (p. 38). Also, Alison is quite clear that wh en one

breaks the associations, then the emotion disappears. But the theory of

association is limited in w ha t it can tell us Alison pre sen ts it this wa y

It should seem, therefore, that a very simple, and a very obvious principle is

sufficient to guide our investigation in to the source of

the

sublimity and beauty of

the qualities of Matter If these qualities are in themselves fitted to produce the

Em otions of Sublimity or Beauty (or, in other w ords, are in themselves beautiful or

sublime), I think it is obvious that they must produce these Emotions,

independently of any association If, on the contrary, it is found that these qualities

only produce such Emotions when they are associated with interesting or affecting

qualities, and that w hen such associations arc destroyed, they no longer produce the

same emotions,Ithink it must alsobeallowed that their Beauty or Sublimityisto be

ascribed, not to the material, but to the associated qualities (p 39)

Alison clearly maintains that the latter is the case. But association does not

explain the nature of the associated qualities. It only accounts for how it is that

one thing, a Spring scene, for example, can have a set of associated qualities,

tende rness, for exam ple, wh ich it does not itself sup ply. It is the exercise of the

imagination which provides associations which are emotionally qualified as

emotions of taste and which distinguishes them from other associations which

byguestonSe

ptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.o

xfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

10/13

DABNEY TOW NSEND 141

we would characterize as non-aesthetic. Association, byitself, cannot supply

the nature of

the

ideas themselves It can only give us the source of the ideas.

The distinction between simple pleasures of emotion and the complex delight

which we feel in an emotion of taste rests upon what Alison calls 'the production

of

a

regular or consistent train of ideas of em otion' (p. 35). This begins as a

re-statement of

a

necessary condition'

T he acco unt w hich I have now given of this effect, may perh aps serve to point o ut

an important distinction between the Emotions of Taste, and all our different

Em otio ns of Simple Pleasure In the case of these last em otion s, no additional train

of thoug ht is necessary. T he pleasurable feeling follows im med iately the presence of

the object or quality, and has no dependence upon anything for its perfection, but

the sound state of the sense by which it is received.

In the case of the Emo tion s of Taste, on the other hand, it seems evident that this

exercise of min d is necessary, and th at unless this train of tho ug ht is pro duc ed, these

em otio ns are unfelt (p 35)

But the production of

a

regular or consistent train of ideas of emotion is not

simply the imagination . Alison is in fact proposing

a

new condition He takes it

to be equivalent to the exercise of imagination, but the difference is evident:

imagination produces a kind of emotion; a regular and consistent train of ideas

of emotion requires only a kind of associative link. Alison comes very close to

turning this into a sufficient condition- 'Whenever . . this train of thought, or

this exercise of imagination is produced, we are conscious of

an

emotion of

a

higher and m ore pleasing kind; and which, though it

is

impossible to describe in

language, we yet distinguish by the name of the Emotion of Taste' (p. 35).

This

exercise ofthe imagination, one which produces the 'higher emotion', is what

Alison has been seeking to distinguish. In spite of admitting that it cannot be

described by language, he gives it a name' 'delight' (p 37).

Once he

has

established that 'the constant connexion we discover between the

sign and the thing signified, between the material quality and the quality

productive of Emotion, renders at last the one expressive to us of the other' (p.

38),Alison turns in the second essay to an examination of the particular simple

qualitiessound, sight, form, motion, colour, attitude and gesture. He does

not develop the distinction between imagination and connection which I have

suggested above In any event, the subtle move to constant connection and a

consistent train of ideas would still be too broad. Just as in the case of

imagination, Alison cannot consistently hold that every instance of

a

consistent

train of ideas is productive of the emotion of taste.

The schema at which Alison arrives for distinguishing emotions of taste from

simple emotions now looks something like

this:

Material qualities need produce

no em otion at all; they can be simply indifferent. But objects are suited to

produce simple emotions. Spring and babies both produce an emotion of

tenderness, for exam ple. Association links those objects so that the same simple

byguestonSeptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

11/13

i

4

2 ARCHIBALD ALISON AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND EM OTIO N

em otion belongs no t to one thing but a wh ole consistent train of ideas. T he

faculty of imagination extends the associations and unifies the simple emotion

throughout an occasion. When that happens, a special emotion of taste results,

and this can be called beauty or sublimity or grace depending on the simple

emotions involved. The special form of pleasure which accompanies this special

emotion of taste is given the name 'delight '

The difficulties which this schema leaves are obvious. Of course, the word

'aesthetic' was not in use in Britain in the eighteenth century. However, the

whole enterprise of identifying the emotions of taste on the basis of empirical

rather than rational principles required that the em otio n be un ique If it was n ot

the result of

a

separate sense, then some other grounds had to be supplied for

judgements that some object or scene inspired beauty, sublimity, or grace

Alison has taken up this problem as a matter of course. However, his solution

leaves this difficulty: if the simple emotions are characterized by aesthetic

predicates (e.g., ' tenderness'), then no non-circular account is given of how the

complex emotion of beauty is aesthetic. If simple emotions such as tenderness

are not yet emotions of taste, then no account is given of how those which lead

to bea uty are to be distinguish ed. In either case, Alison is left w itho ut an acco unt

of imagination and expression which does not presume the kind of distinctions

which he is using imagination and expression to explain.

That he is left with an unresolved problem does not detract from Alison's

achievem ent, h ow eve r. H e has mo ved a considerable distance beyo nd the

eighteenth-century positions which he inherits. Alison's development of the

theory that em otion s of taste are com plex em otions de pend ent on the operation

of the mind retains the fundamental empiricism of Hume and the Scottish

Enlightenm ent w ithou t com mit t ing him to a further fragmentat ion of

expe rience. In this, he follows a path similar to K an t's. Bo th see the op eration of

the min d an d its ability to give a form to the perce ptua l data of the senses as a

necessary condition for complex ideas. Alison lacks Kant's transcendental a

priori categories, however. He tries to make association and imagination do the

jo b by them selves. In the process, he develops much m ore sophisticated theories

of imagination and of the expressive power of objects than anything earlier.

That his theories retain links with the earlier writers is not surprising and

perhaps adds to their importance.

What has happened, I think, is that Alison continues to think of beauty as an

emotion with unique qualities. But he sees that it cannot be a simple emotion. It

is too diverse, and it involves too many different aesthetic predicates. His real

opponents , acknowledged or not , are Hutcheson, Hogarth, and Burke.

Hutcheson postulated an internal sense as the mechanism by which aesthetic

perception op erated. This sense could then respond to comp lex formal features

in the objectuniformity amidst variety. Hogarth and Burke, in different

ways, respond to the psychological difficulties in Hutcheson's position and shift

to a m ore formal description sensuous l ine or m agn itude and delicacy H um e

byguestonS

eptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

12/13

DABNEY TOWNSEND U3

also makes this shift but rather than try to locate the formal principles in the

object, h e exam ines the delicacy and scope of the ju dg e. T hese alternatives

exem plify the principal eigh teen th-ce ntu ry optio ns in aesthetic theo ry B oth

lines retain an essentially Lockean ideational form, ho w eve r T ha t is, the

emotion in question is the result of

a

perceptual or quasi-perceptual capacity

which is immediate and which requires only a passive capacity of the mind.

Beauty, sublimity, and their subjective counterpart, taste, are thus the

im m ed iate and uniq ue result of the experience of the perceiver Th at is at once

the guarantee of their empirical status and the source of their subjectivity, as

H um e saw O ne answ ers the question wh at is beauty (or wh at is the source of

go od taste) by p ointin g to a range of ideas wh ich belon g to the experience of the

individu al, ju st as on e answers the ques tion w ha t is colour by po inting to arange

of colour perceptions and the laws gov erning such perceptions Bu t w here

physical laws com e into play as a check on the subjectivity of colou r p erce ption ,

no such laws seem to govern taste.

Alison approaches this prob lem directly Th e range of experience with wh ich

taste is concerned is produced only by a subjective operation of the mind. The

laws which will govern it are the laws which govern association and which a

faculty psychology (including imagination) make plausible. What Alison does

not notice is that this shift makes the language of an emotion of taste

anachronist ic Because he has m ove d away from the Lockean p resupp osit ions

w hich go vern ed the earlier theories which he contests, he no long er has a

theoretical need for the uniqueness which gave empirical status to the emotions

of taste T he presence of this aesthetic em otion no w pro ves a theoretical

embarrassment because Alison has no way to identify it . He is still carrying

along the baggage of unique aesthetic modes of experience when he has shifted

the gro un d fundam entally.

O f course Alison is not alon e in retaining aesthetic experience in a schem a in

which it no longer has a place. In fact, he shares it with the whole romantic

tradition of 'expression' theories of aesthetic experience. Nor is it clear that

without the earlier aesthetic-experience thesis Alison would be any better off

H e com es rather close, as it is, to m akin g aesthetic predicates simp ly taste term s

wh ich can only be identified b y a kind of 'lo o k and see' claim It seems to m e

highly unlikely that Alison would have felt comfortable with the relativism that

results from this had he formulated it clearly. The implicit consequences of

Alison's turn to the complex operations of the mind are too involved to trace

here, however. He suggests romantic themes without abandoning the older

neo-classical terminology, and the way that he does clarifies the transition.

Dabney Townsend, Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Arlington,

P.O . Box 19527, Arlington, Texas 76019, U S A .

byguestonS

eptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom

8/10/2019 Taste and Art

13/13

ARCHIBALD ALISON AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND EM OTIO N

REFERENCES

1

Jerome Stolnitz, 'O n the Origins of Aesth e-

tic Disinterestedness ' ,

Journal of Aesthetics

and Art Criticism,

X X (Win ter, 1961), pp

131-43 and 'Th e Aesthetic At titu de in the

Rise of Modern Aesthetics ',

Journ al of Aesthe-

tics and Art Criticism,

XXX VI ( Summe r ,

1978), pp 409-22 Geo rge Dickie has argued

that Alison should not be considered an

attitud e theorist in a stro ng sense (See

Art

and

the Aesthetic An Institutional Analysis (Ithaca

Corn ell U P , 1974) Th e debate betw een

Dickie and Stolnitz has been re-engaged

recentlysee George Dickie, 'Stolnitz ' Atti-

tude Taste and Perception ' and Jero m e Stol-

nitz, 'The Aesthetic Attitude in the Rise of

Modern AestheticsAgain ' ,

The Journal of

Aesthetics and Art Criticism

XLIII, 2 (Winter,

1984), pp 193208 ) T he prob lem w ith t heir

way of arguing is that it puts too much

emphasis on classifying someone like Alison

w ho is a com plex , transitional figure I think

that Dickie is right that Alison is not an

attitude theorist in the way that some later

nineteenth-century figures are However, Ali-

son's way of developing the complexity of the

emo tion of taste mo ves him aw ay from earlier

theories of taste in a decisive way Th us

Stolnitz is also correct to insist that Alison

should be seen as breaking with the earlier

theories of taste Th ere is no need, how ever,

to place Alison in one box or the other

2

Archibald Alison,

Essays on the Nature and

Principles of Taste (London Ingram, Cook e,

and C o , 1853), p 8 T he Essayswe re first

publishe d in 1790 in Edinb urgh and w ent

th ro ug h at least six editio ns by 1825 Th e 1853

edition in 'The Universal Library' is a reprint

o ft h e sec ond edition of 1810 It differs only in

providing translations for Alison's frequent

citations of Latin and French examples T w o

sets of page numbers occur, one for the essay

and a second for the volum e as a wh ole M y

references are to the volume numbers at the

bottom of the page Subsequent parenthetical

references in my text are to the 1853 edition

3

See for example, Bernard Peach in the intro-

duction to his edition of Hutcheson's

Illustra-

tions on the Moral Sense

(Cambridge, Massa-

chu sett s H arv ard U P , 1971), pp 1114

4

David Hume, 'Of The Standard of Taste ' , in

Hume s Ethical W ritings,

ed Alasdair Mac -

Intyre (London Colh er-M acm illan, 1965),

pp 286-7

5

Peter Kivy, The Seventh Sense (New York

Bu rt Franklin, 1976), p 47

6

For a discussion o f Alison's understanding of

'co m ple x' and his relation to other writers, see

Kivy , The Seventh Sense, Chapter XI

byguestonSeptember11,2014

http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloadedfrom