Tanker Force Structure - Air · PDF fileTanker Force Structure Recapitalization of the KC-135 “The Air Force recognizes the need to begin replacing its large, aging fleet of KC-135s

AIR WAR COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITY

Tanker Force StructureRecapitalization of the KC-135

JUAN C. NARVID

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War CollegeMaxwell Paper No. 32

Air University PressMaxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

August 2004

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Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within aresolely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air Uni-versity, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other USgovernment agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are avail-able electronically at the Air University Research Website http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU PressWeb site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

Foreword

Aerial refueling is key to the nation’s global reach in re-sponse to operations in all parts of the world. As such, aerialrefueling provides the bridge for air, joint, and coalitionforces to deploy anywhere, any time around the world. It isimportant in this era of transformation that the tankerforce and doctrine of aerial refueling also meet the chal-lenges of the Air Force’s task force concept of operations(CONOPS). The highly demanded tanker has the ability toaffect global strike; homeland security; global mobility;space; and command, control, communications, computers,intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR);global response; and nuclear response. The KC-135 air-craft has been an outstanding platform for aerial refueling,and through some enhancements, it has been able toleverage some of its capabilities in airlift and communica-tion. However, the Air Force has the opportunity with itsnext class of tankers to field a new tanker with capabilitiesthat can serve all services in more demanding joint andcoalition warfare of the future.

In Tanker Force Structure: Recapitalization of the KC-135,Lt Col Juan Narvid challenges air mobility warriors to de-velop a tanker force structure that overcomes the thinkingof old to launch new concepts and capabilities for the fu-ture tanker. He argues that the future of warfare will re-quire a tanker that is able to operate as a force enableracross the full spectrum of operations. This research isvery timely with the Boeing 767 being looked at as a re-placement for some of the older KC-135s. In contrast tosome of the 767’s capabilities, he outlines a conceptual tankerthat combines airlift and aerial-refueling capabilities andis able to survive in a combat environment, and he leveragesits ability to act as a platform to enhance network-centricwarfare. He points out that while the “Cadillac” of all tankersmay only be conceived in the minds of Airmen, the tanker ofthe future cannot resemble the single-role tanker of the past.

In this paper, Colonel Narvid examines the chronology ofthe tanker and the role it has played throughout its his-tory. He argues that the next tanker must break from oldcapabilities, tied to a Cold War strategy, and embark on

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new operations and more capabilities that are able to re-spond to future threats. Joint warfare already capitalizeson getting the right information to the decision makers andthe warrior executing the combat mission. Innovative ideaswithin the mobility Air Force (MAF) are providing the linkfor information between the two through roll-on beyond lineof sight (ROBE) systems. To employ these type capabilitiesinto a combat area, tankers may come up against asymmet-ric threats from an enemy willing to blunt any advantagesthe MAF has to offer. Colonel Narvid believes the Boeing767 improves on the capabilities of the KC-135 and thatthe Air Force currently needs to replace some of the olderKC-135s. However, he argues, it will not fit the bill when itcomes to meeting the challenges of the future—instead, atanker designed from the ground up should recapitalize theKC-135 fleet.

As with all Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in thespirit of academic freedom, open debate, and serious con-sideration of the issues. We encourage your responses.

BENTLEY B. RAYBURNMajor General, USAFCommandant, Air War College

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About the Author

Lt Col Juan “Grande” Narvid is a graduate of the Air WarCollege, Class of 2004. His assignments include operationsofficer of the 37th Flight Training Squadron, 14th FlyingTraining Wing, Columbus AFB, Mississippi; and tours atLaughlin AFB, Texas; McGuire AFB, New Jersey; and ScottAFB, Illinois. Colonel Narvid entered the Air Force from theUniversity of Texas–San Antonio. He is a command pilot withmore than 5,300 hours in the KC-10, C-141, C-9, T-37, andT-38. He qualified as an instructor pilot/flight examiner infour separate weapon systems. He served as major commandregional operations director, Tanker Airlift Control Center,and was hand selected as director, Air Mobility OperationsInspections, Headquarters Air Mobility Command InspectorGeneral. He is a distinguished graduate from Squadron Offi-cer School; holds a master of arts in National Security andStrategic Studies from the Naval War College, Newport,Rhode Island; and one in Human Resource Developmentfrom Webster University, Missouri; and is a graduate of theNaval Command and Staff College, Newport, Rhode Island.Following graduation from Air War College, Maxwell AFB,Alabama, Colonel Narvid took command of the 735th AirMobility Squadron, Hickam AFB, Hawaii.

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Tanker Force StructureRecapitalization of the KC-135

“The Air Force recognizes the need to begin replacing its large,aging fleet of KC-135s as soon as possible.”

—Lt Gen Stephen B. Plummer,––10 January 2003

The United States Air Force KC-135 fleet is nearly 50 yearsold; recent studies show that it is time for the recapitalizationof this tanker fleet. The present inventory of aircraft wentthrough many upgrades and modifications, but all are stillthe basic A-model aircraft initially purchased by the AirForce in the late 1950s. The Air Force needs to replace thisaged aircraft by designing a new tanker from the ground up,capable of responding to the threat environment of today andthe future.

Bomber and fighter aircraft dominate Air Force history.Despite the proven capabilities of aerial refueling during thebirth of the Air Force, technology was directed at improvingthe reach of combat aircraft without regard to tankers. How-ever, technology finally reached its limit and required aerialrefueling to propel combat aircraft beyond the shores of theUnited States and the limits of forward bases.

Aerial refueling found its way into Air Force doctrine andbecame an integral part of the national military strategy(NMS). As the NMS reached into more regions of the worldand encompassed more missions of vital national interest,tankers were required to expand the country’s capability intoa global strategy. Funding, importance, and old technologylimited the emerging tanker force structure. However,today’s Air Force concept of operations (CONOPS) challengesAirmen to think differently about the threat of the future andthe force structure required to respond to these threats.

The tanker force structure was built from old bomber sys-tems and off-the-shelf airline technology. It required little re-search and development to build or buy an aircraft that onlyneeded to transfer gas to its receiver. While the mission of oldonly required this simple capability, time quickly outpacedthe legacy systems. Future trends in war fighting require acapabilities-based tanker able to survive in today’s combatenvironment while responding across the full spectrum ofoperations. The long-term reliance on old tanker weapon

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systems patched with rebuilds, refurbishments, or replace-ments will not meet today’s Air Force mission.

The scope of research in this paper does not look intobudget issues associated with the recapitalization or pro-curement of force-structure platforms. It serves as a thinkpiece into the capabilities required for the future replace-ment of the KC-135 fleet. This research challenges thereader to look beyond the platform of the tanker and theupgrades that the Boeing 767 can deliver. The Air Forceneeds a tanker able to deliver the capabilities that the jointenvironment requires to operate across the full spectrumthat the future holds. The tanker can no longer serve onlythe Air Force of the past but must meet the needs of theforces of the future. The capabilities built into a newly de-signed tanker will make it a valuable national asset acrossall services.

The Need for Aerial Refueling

US strategy has undergone massive changes since theend of the Cold War. No longer do we face a single foe in agiven area of the world. Today, surgical strikes by combataircraft may be required to defend the US homeland or de-stroy a terrorist camp in the desert.

National Security Strategy

The US National Security Strategy (NSS) requires the en-durance and flexibility that aerial refueling gives to receiveraircraft in order to operate across the entire spectrum of theNSS operations. Aerial refueling gives the United States theability to respond across the full range of operations, fromcombating global terrorism to humanitarian actions. Aerialrefueling spans the gap between the robust nature of the re-gional commitment of the NSS and the limited bases that areavailable in the en route structure from which this strategymay be executed. Aerial refueling allows the US vision to be-come possible by using distant bases coupled with the globalreach of tankers extending to all regions of the world.

Pres. George W. Bush outlined in the NSS a strategythat required the United States to respond to the higherend of the conflict spectrum, including conflicts stemmingfrom terrorism and attacks against the United States and

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its allies.1 Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan, hasproven to be a considerable challenge for US forces in thefight against terrorism. The mountainous terrain sur-rounding the area of operations is a haven for fleeing ter-rorists, and without tanker support to keep fighter aircraftloitering above the battle area, time-sensitive targets wouldeasily escape. Likewise, intercept aircraft defending theshores of the United States from attacks by rogue nationsor terrorist groups would also be unable to maintain theirconstant vigilance without the extension of fuel receivedfrom orbiting tankers.

Additionally, the NSS must respond to the lower end of thespectrum by addressing conflicts arising from infractions ofhuman dignity.2 Past US leaders have worried over the impli-cations of committing US forces in response to humanitarianactions, particularly in Bosnia and Somalia. Torn betweenthe atrocities being committed in these countries and thepossibility of US soldiers being wounded or killed to preservethe peace, the administration looked to airpower to providethe United States the force needed to maintain credibility inthe international arena while preventing public outrage dueto American casualties.3 Aerial refueling allowed the nationto reach out to these regions by providing fuel for the airlift-ing of supplies and fighter protection.

Finally, the NSS pledges to work with other nations todefuse regional conflicts.4 Each region of the world offers aunique and volatile challenge requiring operations fromairlift to strategic attack. In the poverty-stricken continentof Africa, aerial refueling will play a major role, linking theEuropean en route structure to the vast areas comprisingthe southern countries in Africa. The two closest bases tothe en route structure are Lajes, Azores, and Rota, Spain,which require an air bridge of tankers to respond to the re-gion (fig. 1).5 Additionally, the United States already haslong-term commitments in Korea and Iraq requiring nu-merous aerial-refueling assets to support the operations.The NSS also lays out a willingness to respond to challengesin Israel, Palestine, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the WesternHemisphere, and Latin America. Again, with the concen-tration of the en route structure established along the westcoast of Europe and the east coast of Asia, aerial refueling

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will be a required resource to employ operations through-out the regions.


Figure 1. En route structures. (Adapted from Col Scott Phillips,“DIRMOBFOR,” lecture, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 5December 2002.)

Air Force Doctrine

The Air Force doctrine of aerial refueling is designed tosupport the service’s power-projection capabilities, whichin turn support our national security interests. Air ForceDoctrine Document (AFDD) 2-6.2, Aerial Refueling, pointsout the numerous principles of airpower, such as time,distance, and payload, affected by aerial refueling. AFDD2-6.2 outlines aerial refueling and its ability to increasemass, surprise, economy of force, flexibility, versatility,and maneuverability.6 To execute this doctrine, tankeroperations rely heavily on established airfields with a ro-bust logistical system.

During the past decade, the United States reduced thenumber of overseas bases accessible by heavy aircraftsuch as tankers. During Operation Desert Storm, two ofthe six largest bases provided 58 percent of the airlift ca-pability and access. This was due to their ramp space andrunway length, which were capable of handling the heavy-weight aircraft of Air Mobility Command (AMC).7 The twobases, Torrejon, Spain, and Frankfurt, Germany, have not

been used to their full capacity since Desert Storm. Thisreduction limits the compatible runways for AMC’s largeaircraft and causes aircraft to compete for a smaller poolof available forward operating bases. Reductions likethese, as well as the denial of airfields by host nations, makeaerial refueling vital to the Air Force mission. If reductionsand denials continue, the United States will come to relymore on projecting power from its own shores or be forcedto choose less-than-optimum locations further away fromthe fight than desired. While Central Europe and CentralAsia may grant access to additional airfields, currenttanker operations still require robust logistical support.

Logistical support impacts the ability of aerial refuelingto increase the payload carried by receiver aircraft. Due tolimitations in engine thrust, runway length, or aircraftweight, some aircraft are unable to take off with the maxi-mum amount of payload and carry enough fuel to accom-plish the mission. The sacrifice in payload on supply air-craft means less cargo (supply items) to deployed troops orkinetic weapons that are relied upon to “kill people andbreak things” to win wars. Fighter aircraft may have to sac-rifice fuel or payload, thus reducing either time or lethal im-pact over the target. However, the use of a tanker aircraftcan allow receiver aircraft to maintain high payloads andto extend airtime by in-flight refueling.

Tankers can deliver capabilities beyond AFDD 2-6.2. Re-cently, Gen John P. Jumper, Air Force chief of staff, out-lined how the Air Force will tailor forces and employ themin response to a range of scenarios. In General Jumper’stask force, CONOPS tankers must expand to become thetankers of the future. The next tanker force structure mustleverage its size and loiter time to enable all services a morerobust C4ISR while combining capabilities and doctrine tohelp the airlift community to deliver global mobility andglobal response. Additionally, future tankers need to lever-age the lethality of combat air forces by increasing globalstrike capabilities to linger over the battle area with largerpayloads. The next tanker cannot just be a replacement forthe KC-135. Airmen must think across doctrine, services,platforms, and organizations in fielding the next tanker.

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History of Aerial Refueling

In 1921 the idea of aerial refueling was born in the mindsof daring men willing to brave dangerous aerial demonstra-tions to please watching crowds gathered below. One of thefirst recorded aerial refuelings was such a stunt. A loneman named Dougherty crept across the wings of a LincolnStandard biplane with a five-gallon gasoline can strapped tohis back.8 He stepped out onto the awaiting wing of a JN-4Jenny aircraft and poured the contents of his can into theJenny’s tank; thus, the first historical recording of the firstaerial refueling of an airborne aircraft. During the next cou-ple of years, aerial refueling quickly evolved through trial anderror. New methods of transfer were tested using hoses totransfer fuel instead of wing walkers, and endurance recordswere extended, fuel loads increased, and distance recordswere broken. However, it all came to a halt with the death ofsome Airmen in an aerial demonstration; the refueling hosefrom the tanker wrapped around the prop of the receivingaircraft.9 The idea of aerial refueling seemed to subside in thechapters of airpower history. The fledgling airline industrydid not share the initial interest shown by the military. Com-mercial flights simply did not require the endurance aerialrefueling could provide to domestic flights. It was not until1929 that the Army Air Corps brought back the revolution ofaerial refueling, grabbing the world’s attention. Two youngofficers, Carl Spaatz and Ira Eaker, piloted their monoplanenamed the Question Mark, smashing all air-endurancerecords—the aircraft remained airborne for 150.8 hours.10

This famous demonstration of in-flight endurance made pos-sible by aerial refueling caught the attention of proponents ofairpower throughout the world.

The Early Years

The United States pioneered aerial refueling. However, asUS involvement in World War II began in early 1940, aerialrefueling would take a backseat to the strategic bomber. Thestrategic bomber had the endurance (fuel capacity) requiredto execute its mission when deployed to the region wherebombing was required. However, fighter aircraft were stillwithout the required range to escort bombers or fly long-


range missions within the theater of operations. The UnitedStates failed to build tankers and equip fighters and bomberswith transfer-receiver capability. Aerial refueling became im-portant as World War II ended and the Soviet Union emergedas a foe of the United States. In 1946, to meet the new globalmission to deter the Soviet Union, the Army Air Force con-verted B-29s into tankers. B-29 tankers off-loaded fuel toB-29 bombers via a hose winched from the bomber onto thetanker by a grappling line. By the time the first tanker wasborn, bombers with higher engine thrust were being built,and despite the invention of the more efficient flying boom,the KB-29 was unable to keep up with the faster bombers.The KC-97 tanker-transporter evolved from the KB-29,which had a more efficient boom system and, more impor-tantly, gave the United States a swing capability to carrycargo. The propeller-driven KC-97 soon found itself out-classed by the more powerful bombers. The KC-97 had todescend while refueling or “toboggan,” and the later version,the KC-97L, included an extra engine under each wing toprovide the KC-97 enough thrust to stay ahead of the re-ceiver aircraft. The older technology of the KC-97 was soonreplaced by the “jet”-powered KC-135.

Tankers of Today

In 1957 the first KC-135 was delivered to the Air Forceand became an important part of the Strategic Air Com-mand’s (SAC) strategy. When paired with the B-52 underthe Joint Chief of Staff’s Single Integrated Operations Plan,the team could deliver nuclear weapons to the SovietUnion.11 The KC-135 was strictly tied to the strategicbomber force and not used to refuel Tactical Air Com-mand’s fighter force until the Vietnam War. The KC-135could refuel at higher altitudes and easily keep up with theB-52, enabling them to maintain 24-hour coverage of thesky. The same boom-system design used on the KC-97 wasstill in place on the KC-135. In changing from a strictlySAC asset to refueling TAC aircraft, the KC-135’s missionswould undergo additional changes.

Although the Navy had its own small fleet of tacticaltankers and the KC-135 inventory was quickly increasing,the Navy wanted access to the KC-135 as a viable refueler

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to increase the reach of their fighter force. To refuel Navyand North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft, adrogue or “basket” was adapted to replace the boom tip forNavy or NATO refueling missions.

During the next 25 years, the KC-135 dominated theaerial-refueling arena while undergoing additional evolu-tions and transitions, such as new fuel-efficient and quieterengines, partial wing replacements due to metal fatigue,and engine-strut replacement. The KC-135 was alreadybecoming outdated before the first KC-10 reached the AirForce inventory in 1981. The KC-10 was born under theadvance tanker/cargo aircraft idea.12 Not only would the KC-10 be able to carry nearly twice as much fuel as the KC-135,it could also alternate between boom and drogue refuelingwhile airborne. Moreover, the KC-10 provided the MilitaryAirlift Command (MAC) a tremendous boost in strategic-airlift capability due to its large cargo capacity. One of thebiggest advantages the KC-10 has over the KC-135 is thatthe KC-10 eventually evolved to a dual-drogue system ca-pable of refueling two Navy or NATO fighter aircraft at thesame time from its wings. Eventually, the KC-135 was modi-fied (in limited numbers), allowing it to trail two drogues fromits wing pods. The KC-10 is often used in the “reliabilitytanker role” due to the massive amount of fuel it carries andits ability to refuel different types of aircraft, regardless of therefueling system installed.13 Presently, the Air Force has notreceived a new tanker since the delivery of the KC-10 over 20years ago and has a fleet of KC-135s nearly 50 years old.

Shortfalls

International tanker operations are required for modernUS air campaigns. However, many international areas donot have infrastructure capable of supporting tankerground operations.

En Route Structure

The international “en route structure” in which tankersare required to operate does not provide an endless num-ber of options when it comes to selecting airfields to deployassets. Every country varies in the infrastructure they can


afford to build or maintain. In many cases, nations rely onantiquated airfields designed for World War II–era aircraft.The runway is unable to either handle the weight of large-tanker and cargo aircraft or the length of the runway is in-sufficient. Likewise, countries that do have the capabilityto support tankers may limit access due to disagree-ments over military use of airfields, or their top priority iscommerce-producing commercial aircraft. These limita-tions in the en route structure highlight limitations in theUS tanker force that must be addressed in the develop-ment of the future tanker force structure.

The number of bases available within the en route struc-ture is limited by runway requirements for tanker aircraft.The weight of tankers due to mission requirements for fueloften exceeds the weight capacities of many foreign runways.Additionally, many foreign runways are not long enough toallow a fully loaded tanker to take off. This limits access tobases/airports by all but a few overpowered aircraft. As inthe case of the air operations in Kosovo, US forces had to relyon an old NATO and former Warsaw Pact en route structuredesigned for much lighter fighter aircraft and were unable touse the numerous bases available in the area.14 Maj GenRoger Brady, Air Force deputy chief of staff, noted that “theamount of bases close to combat operations and availableto tankers were [sic] not readily available.”15 Moreover, theUnited States does not control the development or suitabilityof other nation’s airfield infrastructure. The few bases theUnited States does maintain and contribute to the high costof modernizing are not available in numbers large enough toaccommodate the large expeditionary packages dictated bytoday’s Air Force mission requirements. Without a change inforeign airbase operations or increased US funding formodernization of foreign bases in the future, the only run-ways readily available may be in austere locations.

Civilian- versus Military-Designed Aircraft

Civilian airlines rarely operate in austere locations or relyon airfields lacking support and required infrastructure.When they do service these areas, they do so with smalleraircraft capable of operating on limited-length runways.The larger civilian aircraft enjoy the luxury of modern inter-

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national airports fully equipped with all the amenities af-forded the high-commerce demands of airborne transporta-tion and have no incentives to operate on less-than-normalrunway lengths. However, US tankers designed on airlineprototypes or slightly modified versions, such as the KC-135 and KC-10, must gain access to available airfieldsclosest to the fight. The NATO standard 8,000-foot runwayis not adequate for fully loaded KC-135s and KC-10s.The tankers in the Air Force inventory today are built to air-line standards, not to military requirements, which limitsthe runways available. This is just one example where com-mercial off-the-shelf (COTS) aircraft design negates militaryrequirements.

The development of the Boeing 767 seems to address thedisparity between civilian and military specifications onrunway-length capabilities and does allow the aircraft totake off fully loaded on an 8,000-foot runway, which givesaccess to 2,000 additional bases/airfields due to reducedrunway requirements.16 However, it has taken two genera-tions of tankers to meet these requirements. While thisnew capability may fit a strategy linked to NATO allies, itmay not suffice in the future for isolated areas away fromthe mobility en route structure. Tanker operations in thefuture may depend on less-developed runways with somemissions requiring the building of refueling infrastructure(pipelines) to realize full capability.

Even with the new capability, the 767 will not match thecapability to land on austere runways, such as the military-driven requirements of the C-17 or the heavier C-5.17 If giventhese same capabilities, the 767 would have access to addi-tional runways. However, to fully utilize a short-field capa-bility, the tanker force will need to develop a new approachto tanker operations. Tanker forces may require pipelines tobring the fuel from large bases or offshore tankers to thesmaller airfields. The flexibility to operate globally and in less-developed countries will be part of future tanker missions;critical planning is needed now.

Boom-Cycle Time

Boom-cycle time is the rate a tanker can off-load fuel tomultiple receivers. Despite the amount of fuel that tankers


carry, with only one boom, tankers can off-load only a setamount of fuel within a given time. This has been a prob-lem with the tanker force from inception. Single-port refuel-ing reduces the flexibility of the entire operational force. Dur-ing multiple aircraft refueling, the single boom limits theentire aerial-refueling process. The single boom does not pre-sent the same problem when refueling large deploying air-craft or requiring extra fuel to make long flights across theoceans. However, it does affect small fighter aircraft flyinglong distances or loitering for long periods. The limitedamount of fuel carried by smaller aircraft requires most torefuel hourly. With only one boom available, each aircraftmust refuel in turn and burn onboard fuel while waiting itsturn. When combat aircraft operate in packages, the waitingtime is a limiting factor delaying the attack or restricting timeover target. The following excerpt sheds light on the problemof refueling with a single boom.

Three flights of four fighters each are airborne and burning fuel atan average rate of 8,000 pounds per hour (pph) or a total of 96,000pph for the flights. One tanker can transfer fuel at a rate of 60,000pph to these notional flights of fighters, allowing each aircraft tocycle on and off the boom. In this typical example, only 60 percentof the fighters can be refueled and will require an additional tankerto refuel the strike package.18

In the above example, adding an additional boom to KCaircraft allows a two-to-one reduction in tanker require-ments and reduces required airspace. Currently, KC-10salready employ this concept when refueling naval aircraftby extending two hoses from the wings. Navy aircraft con-trol their own refueling—closure to hose, connection toaircraft, positioned on the hose in relation to the tanker,and monitored by the boom operator on the tanker. AirForce use of a duel-boom system would not require an ad-ditional boom operator. Currently, only single-boom oper-ations are allowed because the boom operator flies theboom into the receptacle of the awaiting aircraft. On theolder KC-135, the boom operator monitors the refuelingenvelope and disconnects the refueling aircraft when or iflimits are reached. However, on the KC-10, the boom sys-tem can operate in an autonomous mode with a computermonitoring the rate of closure and boom limits, even exe-cuting “disconnects.” Current technology still requires a

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boom operator to make the contact with receiver aircraft;however, new technological advances in an automatic-boom-operating system can make dual-boom operations apossibility. Employment of the new technology will re-quire new developments in breakaway procedures. TheNavy already uses dual refueling, and the Air Force couldeasily adapt breakaway procedures from lessons learnedby the Navy.

Refueling from a single boom reduces the flexibility offighter aircraft. Current strike packages require the inte-gration of many weapon systems spread among differentfighter aircraft. One strike package may have two or threedifferent types of aircraft providing defensive and offensivecapabilities. If these packages are responding to a set timeover target, the aircraft have a limited amount of time torefuel with the precoordinated tanker support. The prob-lem becomes more pronounced when fighters are reactingto a time-sensitive target. Time-sensitive or pop-up targetsrequire minimal response time and can be negatively af-fected by single-boom operations. If refueling is required,the time to cycle through refueling requirements is cut inhalf with an additional boom. Until additional booms areadded, other tankers will need to deploy and will con-tribute to the already growing airspace issue.

The addition of a boom will most likely require exten-sive aircraft-design engineering, as the current aircraftdesign does not allow a simple bolt-on boom. One of thebiggest unknowns in moving refueling operations fromthe tail of the aircraft to two booms on the wings is withheavy-receiver aircraft. What aerodynamic affect will aheavy aircraft have on the tanker by refueling from thewing? It is obvious that heavy aircraft will not haveenough clearance from the tail of the tanker to refuelfrom the wing on commercial airline designs. It is mostlikely that the body of a dual-boom tanker will have to re-semble a B-2 or have a blended wing where the boom canextend beyond the trailing edge of the aircraft. Designinga dual-boom system into an aircraft during the designphase will reduce drag, improve maintenance, and limitinterference between aircraft systems. This will not bepossible if the Air Force uses a COTS aircraft.


Getting Enough Gas to the Fight

Tankers are gas stations in the sky. As such, tankers mustcarry as much fuel as possible. Mission requirements dictatethe amount of fuel needed, but having additional fuel in-creases mission flexibility and will cover contingencies, ifneeded. To deliver the maximum amount of gas to the fight,tankers leverage three capabilities. First, the more gas atanker departs home station with, the more it will have whenit reaches the planned aerial-refueling route. This is a simpleconcept—the bigger the tanker is, the more fuel it can carry.As mentioned earlier, the KC-135 can carry approximatelyhalf of what a KC-10 can carry. Second, the less fuel a tankerburns en route to the fight, the more it can deliver. The ad-vantage of fuel-efficient engines is one the Air Force has con-tinually pursued in the KC-135. Finally, the faster a tankercan off-load fuel to a receiver, the less time the additional re-ceivers spend burning fuel in the refueling track.

The KC-10 can take the place of about two KC-135s on theground and in the air. On the ground, a KC-10 has a smallerfootprint than two KC-135s. Additionally, one KC-10 requiresless maintenance and support while carrying more cargothan two KC-135s. The disadvantage is when a single KC-10has a maintenance problem; twice the aerial-refueling capa-bility is lost. Additionally, there are penalties involved withthe KC-10 on the ground. Due to its weight and associatedrunway requirements, the en route structure may not havethe required fields to accommodate heavy tankers. In the air,a single heavy tanker burns less fuel than two smallertankers carrying the same amount of fuel as a heavy tanker.Additionally, a single tanker requires less airspace to performaerial refueling and is more maneuverable. The standardspacing for a tanker-refueling cell requires one mile betweeneach tanker. For every additional tanker added to a forma-tion, the formation spreads out an additional mile. A forma-tion of tankers avoiding thunderstorms or adjusting its turnmust take into consideration all tankers in the formation. Asingle tanker or even a two-ship formation does not requireall the airspace and precoordination that a large cell oftankers requires.

The less fuel a tanker burns, the more it delivers to thefighters. One of the most prevalent ways to reduce fuel

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consumption is to develop more fuel-efficient engines. Dueto the limited en route structure, fighters are based closestto the fight, while tankers are expected to make the longhaul to the aerial-refueling tracks. This positioning causestankers to burn additional fuel to reach the refuelingpoint. Technological advances in engine performance havedriven numerous modifications to the KC-135 to increasethe total fuel available for receiver aircraft. Commercialtechnological advances have shown numerous ways to im-prove aircraft efficiency. One of the most ignored is the de-sign of the wing or aircraft. Preliminary analysis of blended-wing bodies, like the B-2, has shown the ability to exceedthe capability of conventional aircraft of the same size.19 Askin-friction reduction innovation, called micro-blowingtechnique, reduces the friction around the nacelle of anaircraft up to 70 percent.20 The reduction in drag reducesthe amount of engine thrust required and the total amountof fuel burned.

The rate fuel is transferred between the tanker and re-ceiver using the boom or drogue must improve to reducethe time receiver aircraft spend awaiting and receivingfuel. Refueling using a boom enables tankers to transferfuel at a maximum 1,100 gallons per minute.21 This capa-bility is reduced on the hose and drogue systems installedon the wings of some KC-10s and KC-135s. Though twohoses would seem to double the capability, a hose is onlyable to off-load fuel at a rate slightly more than half as fastas a boom. Despite having the added hose, two receiver air-craft are still only able to transfer fuel at about the samerate as one boom. The problem is even more prevalentwhen only one drogue is available (usual case) becausethere are not enough dual-hose kits to equip the entireforce. For example, during a KC-10 deployment to AlDhafra, United Arab Emirates, Operation Southern Watch,only one KC-10 was equipped with wing pods. If new ad-vances are made in the transfer rates of fuel from a tanker,the receiver may become a limiting factor. The technologymust be upgraded on the receiver aircraft to handle thehigher transfer rates. With advances in technology to im-prove transfer rates on a drogue system, as well as theboom system, engineering studies must be accomplished


to ensure center-of-gravity problems do not develop on thetanker during rapid-transfer fueling.

Trends

Future US air operations will place tankers in harm’s way.For the tanker to continue to be a force multiplier, it must beable to evade or thwart enemy efforts to shoot it down.

Tankers Are Targets Too!

The United States, without disagreement, has the mostformidable Air Force in the world and the best protection forits aircraft. Technological advances in stealth, early warningdetection, and systems that defeat surface-to-air missiles(SAM) have been protecting the country’s combat air forceswith resounding success for the past decade. Additionally,fighter aircraft can employ tactics such as high-speed, highg-force turns, and steep approaches, which add to theirself-defense. However, tankers are very susceptible due totheir lack of aircraft defensive systems, slow speed, and vul-nerability during takeoff and landings.

A threat definitely exists, and adversaries rely more andmore on asymmetric weapons and tactics to bring downUS airborne assets. First of all, shoulder-launched mis-siles are present in sizeable amounts and available to justabout anyone with a reason to hate the United States.Stinger missiles were provided to the Mujahideen by the Cen-tral Intelligence Agency during Afghanistan’s resistance tothe occupation of their land by the Soviets.22 Of these mis-siles, it is estimated that at least 30 of them are stillavailable and in the hands of Osama bin Laden and histerrorist group, al-Qaeda.23 If it is easy for terrorists to gainaccess to US missiles, how much more access do they haveto Soviet-made missiles provided by nations such as Iran,Syria, or North Korea?

Secondly, the tactics to employ these missiles are simpleto achieve and difficult to defeat. “You can’t protect againstsomebody standing on a building or road and shooting offa missile,” says Clair Brunavs, a spokeswoman for Jane’sHistoric Military Aircraft Recognition Guide.24 Recent eventshave proven the ability of rogue groups to effectively employ

NARVID 15

shoulder-launched missiles, such as the Russian SA-7.Several strategic and tactical airlift aircraft were recentlyfired upon during the landing phase into Baghdad Interna-tional Airport, Iraq. Moreover, an international carrier,comparable in size and weight to a KC-135, was struck byan SA-7 during takeoff.25

Finally, the future does not hold a better outlook fortankers. Smaller groups may not have the technology and in-frastructure to research and develop weapons that cancounter US systems. However, nation states that understandUS capabilities and employment of air assets can develop themeans to defeat US weaknesses while avoiding US strengths.Why should a foe be expected to face US strengths head-on?China is just one example of such a state that may be a peercompetitor in the future and willing to invest funds to attackone of the Achilles’ heels of the United States—a large, slow,less-maneuverable tanker aircraft. Additionally, it is no se-cret to the United States and the world that China is cur-rently developing a new use for its over-the-horizon cruisemissile to specifically attack air-to-air refueling capability.26

China recognizes how reliant the United States is on itstanker force and aerial refueling to enable its bomber andfighter force to reach out and apply deadly force. It is alsohighly possible that other countries desiring protectionagainst the United States will also be willing to either developor purchase technology, allowing them to have an asymmet-ric advantage. Tanker aircraft are vulnerable in the low (take-off) and high structure (in flight). Current technology limi-tations on the SAMs combined with US intelligence allowstankers to avoid known threat areas while in the high struc-ture of flight. However, in the low structure during takeoffand landing, tankers need the capability to identify threatswith warning equipment and to counter them with tech-nology such as chaff and flares that are already installed onmany airlift aircraft. Moreover, laser technology that deflectsthe course of hostile missiles would make tankers an evenmore difficult target to the enemy.

Network-Centric Warfare

With the advent of the Air Operations Center (AOC), theneed for correct information from the battlefield to the


decision maker and the war fighter has become a trendthat is highly dependent on sensor and communicationtechnology. The Committee on Appropriations submittedto the 106th Congress a report explaining a shortage of re-quired assets needed in establishing a network-centric-warfare capability. They reported deficiencies in low-density,high-demand assets such as electronic warfare aircraft,tactical collection and dissemination of assets, secure com-munications, and command and control.27

Tankers can provide the link between decision makers andwar fighters if they are afforded the technology and inte-grated in current doctrine. For years tanker aircraft have al-ways been close to the fight. Tanker fighter-anchor patternsare assigned by AFDD and require the tanker on station asthe gas station in the sky for as long as other aircraft are fly-ing. The Air Force is currently taking advantage of the loiter-ing tanker and integrating it into network-centric warfare.ROBE enhancement is the relay in the smart tanker conceptreceiving information from different locations and transmit-ting it beyond visual range to the right person, at the righttime.28 However, the tanker can go beyond ROBE and itscapability of integrating the joint tactical radio system(JTRS). Recent shoot-downs of friendly helicopters and frat-ricide of friendly ground forces signal a need for identificationof friendly forces. The JTRS has a function allowing a vehiclebeing targeted to transmit a specific signal.29 With ROBEalready onboard, the tanker can quickly transmit this in-formation to the appropriate aircraft to prevent killing offriendly forces. Tankers are capable of combining capabilitiesof other battle-management aircraft.

Likewise, the decision loop, in the execution of combatforces, relies intensely on information from numerous sen-sors in, on, and around the battlefield. Optical sensors onunmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), air-to-air radar sensorson E-3 airborne warning and control systems, and air-to-ground radar sensors on E-8C joint surveillance targetattack radar systems (JSTARS) provide battle-spaceawareness to decision makers and targeting information towar fighters in high fidelity. The capability of sensors andthe advent of new ways to employ them have created asensor race between services and major commands withinthe services. Although the many sensors can be linked by

NARVID 17

systems and share the information, the information sentor received is limited by the lack of equipment on groundunits or airborne aircraft. Additionally, because some ofthese systems are service parochialisms, many services can-not receive the information simply because they were notplanned as a customer of the information (i.e., the Air Forcemay not be able to receive Army information or the Army re-ceive Air Force information). The outcome of the need for sen-sors and the lack of a centralized command for sensor pro-duction have created numerous platforms.

The tanker can provide the capability to act as the plat-form with the sensors needed to service the battle area. First,tankers have the capability to loiter while serving as refuel-ing points for fighter aircraft. Anytime a fighter is patrollingthe sky, the air tasking order contains an anchor point or areliability tanker for emergency refueling. Second, tankershave ample space within the aircraft to house communica-tion as well as sensor equipment. Finally, tankers have largesurface areas outside the aircraft and the capability to mountaerodynamic components that can serve as sensor devices.

More Airlift

The National Military Strategy has moved away from fight-ing two major theater wars to a 1-4-2-1 defense strategy. Thefour parts of the strategy are (1) defend the United States(homeland defense), (2) deter aggression and coercion infour critical regions, (3) swiftly defeat aggression in twooverlapping major conflicts, and (4) upon presidential direc-tion, win decisively against one of the two major conflicts.A new force structure to support the airlift of this strategywould require 302 C-17s and 52 C-5s and the call-up ofthe Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Stage III.30 AMC’s 2004 planningfactors uses a primary mission aircraft inventory (PMAI) of94 C-17s, 96 C-5s, and 42 C-141s strategic-airlift aircraftin the active duty and reserve.31 According to Air Force factsheets, a C-17 can carry approximately 170,900 pounds ofcargo,32 a C-5 can carry approximately 270,000 pounds ofcargo,33 and a C-141 can carry 687,000 pounds of cargo.34

Given the requirements of the new strategy and the cur-rent inventory, it is obvious that the nation is unable tomeet the new requirements of a 1-4-2-1 defense strategy


when one considers the total amount of cargo that is re-quired by the strategy versus the total amount of cargothat is capable of being airlifted by military aircraft (fig. 2).

NARVID 19

70,000,000

60,000,000

50,000,000

40,000,000

30,000,000

20,000,000

10,000,000

0

CurrentCapability

C-17 C-5 C-141 Total

1-4-2-1 DefenseStrategy

Figure 2. Current cargo capability versus required capabili-ties in 1-4-2-1 defense strategy.

Tankers, while limited in carrying outsized and oversizedcargo, have the capability to carry more cargo than a C-141and as much cargo as a C-17. According to Air Force factsheet, KC-10 Extender, a KC-10 is capable of carrying170,000 pounds of cargo, roughly equivalent to a C-17.35

Likewise, according to Air Force fact sheets, the KC-135 iscapable of carrying 83,000 pounds of cargo, which is morethan a C-141 and almost half of what a C-17 can carry.36

With 472 KC-135s and 54 KC-10s in AMC’s PMAI, this givesthe Air Force an additional 48-million pounds of cargo-lift ca-pability. However, it is impossible to use the entire tanker-cargo airlift capability because of the tanker’s requirementsto fulfill aerial refueling for combat support and deploymentmissions. One of the lessons learned from Kosovo was notthat the number of tankers was inappropriate but that plan-ning and efficient use of tankers stretched aerial-refuelingoperations.37 Tankers can be used more effectively to aug-ment the strategic-airlift mission if planning is more efficientor planning models are used more effectively. Additionally,the total amount of cargo capability is somewhat differentwhen operationally using the capability of a tanker as an air-

lifter. Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 10-1403, Air Mobility Plan-ning Factors, realistically states that a KC-135 can carry36,000 pounds of cargo on a 3,200-nautical-mile leg becauseit is limited by the smaller number of pallets it can carry.38

Tankers of the future must have better airlift capability toprovide more options to the supported commanders. Airliftoperations require access to shorter runways to deliver cargocloser to the end user. C-17s are designed to land on shorterrunways, giving them access to thousands more runwaysthan tankers. Given the number of tankers in the Air Forceinventory and the need for airlift, a tanker capable of deliver-ing cargo anywhere would enhance the airlift mission andthe flexibility of combatant commanders. However, tankerswould need the capability to survive the hostile threats fac-ing airlift aircraft.

Tankers can also give the combatant commander the air-lift capability normally received from AMC. Usually, the onlyairlift the joint forces commander has control of is throughthe joint forces air and space component commander(JFACC) and the AOC is tactical airlift using the C-130 force.On specific occasions, the tactical control of strategic-airliftaircraft changed to the theater. A temporary change of con-trol over C-17s was done in the Kosovo crisis to move TaskForce Hawk from Germany and was considered a “tremen-dous success story” according to Gen Charles T. “Tony”Robertson Jr., former commander of AMC.39 It was such asuccess that General Robertson said, “It’s something we’regoing to have to go back and write into the doctrine as to howthat’s done.”40 Tankers are assigned to an expeditionary air-refueling squadron and are under the control of JFACC,through the Air Mobility Division (AMD), within the AOC.Tankers are available in numbers to provide the theaterairlift the joint force commander requires. However, thecurrent tanker force is unable to act as a theater airlifterdue to the risk of threats and the short runways. To usetanker assets to their fullest, JFACCs must develop thesame understanding as that of the director of mobility forces(DIRMOBFOR), and the AMD must include in the planning ofaerial-fueling capabilities the airlift capability of tanker air-craft. Moreover, a tanker with the airlift capability of a C-17would give the JFACC the ability to control his or her tankerforce in the role of an airlifter.


The recapitalization of the KC-135 is an issue of major im-portance for the Air Force, AMC, and the Air Force global-reach capability. One proposed solution has brought a lot ofdiscussion and controversy—the leasing of the Boeing KC-767. Much of this controversy has been over the politics in-volved in the process of leasing the newly proposed tankerwith little discussion over its capability. While leasing or pur-chasing the KC-767 will add many needed capabilities in theshort term, a better solution is to design and build a newtanker: KC-XX, capable of multiple roles across the full spec-trum of operations, able to survive in the demanding environ-ment of the future, and based on capabilities, not platforms.A newly designed KC-XX is the better choice to fill the needsof the Air Force. Though the KC-XX may not be appealing be-cause of the price, it may stand as an innovation to challengethe mind-set of Airmen.

An additional solution proposed by analysts and not con-sidered a viable alternative in this paper was to again re-engine the aging KC-135. Whereas this would provide addi-tional capability for takeoff payloads and fuel-burningefficiency, it would not address many problems with the ageof the aircraft. Corrosion is one of the most pressing issueswith the KC-135, and new engines will not fix it. The cor-rosion of the airframe remains one of the elusive problemswith the tanker. It is difficult to predict when and wherecorrosion will appear and what impact it will have on theaircraft. A catastrophic failure due to corrosion would re-sult in fleetwide grounding, crippling the nation’s ability toproject airpower due to the reliance on the KC-135 to pro-vide the majority of the aerial-refueling capability. Despitea solution for the corrosion problem, the KC-135 is alreadyover 40 years old and suffers from structural fatigue thatcannot be overcome with modifications, short of a completeaircraft rebuild. The problem of age will simply get worseas time goes on, and to re-engine the aircraft will fail to ad-dress the sustainability of the aircraft as a future platform.

Full Spectrum of Operations

Future tankers must have the ability to operate across thefull spectrum of operations. Tankers must have full access toairfields around the world and provide combat aircraft the

NARVID 21

fuel required in an expeditious manner. Future tankers can-not be tied to a Cold War strategy and an en route structurelimited by runway weight or length restrictions. Futuretankers must have the ability to respond to the mission dic-tates of fighter aircraft, such as quick response to targets orloitering over war zones.

An 8,000-foot NATO-standard runway may no longersuffice for conflicts in the future. The United States’ deci-sion to “go it alone” during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)is evidence that the United States cannot expect access toanother country’s bases and runways. Even with formerSoviet bloc countries joining NATO, allowing former inac-cessible airfields to now be available, the lessons of OIFpoints to a world where tankers with the capability ofshort-field takeoff and landing like the C-17 will be missioncritical. At the very least, the next tanker must be able totake off with full loads on smaller runways to open up iso-lated areas of the world to tanker operations. The KC-767will allow access to more runways than the current inven-tory of KC-135s and KC-10s and with full fuel loads. How-ever, will new capabilities built on old standards meet fu-ture mission requirements?

The global war on terrorism requires combat aircraft tobe available at all times, defending the US homeland fromterrorist attracts, such as those launched on 11 Septem-ber 2001 (9/11) and meeting mission requirements suchas the air war over Kosovo. Future tankers must delivermore fuel at a faster rate to ensure mission success.

Today’s combat missions require information gathering,early warning, and communication-laden aircraft in andaround the fight, limiting the availability of airspace. Largetanker formations add to the problems of confined air-space. Confined airspace requires fewer tankers deliveringmore fuel. A KC-10 currently delivers as much fuel as twoKC-135 tankers. The proposed replacement, the KC-767,can carry roughly the same amount of fuel as a KC-135.While Boeing touts better fuel efficiency and maximumtakeoff weight to deliver more fuel to the fight, it requires twoKC-767s to do the work of one KC-10. The use of the KC-767will increase the number of tankers in critical airspace.Additionally, there are no provisions to add a multiple-boomcapability to the KC-767. The concept tanker would employ


multiple booms providing fuel to multiple aircraft as the KC-10 currently does.

There are COTS aircraft available in the civilian commu-nity that are able to deliver large amounts of fuel. However,little has been done to increase the rate of transfer or boom-cycle time. If chosen, a civilian aircraft would immediatelyrequire modifications to add multiple booms. Engineeringstudies have not been accomplished on a COTS aircraft;therefore, it is unknown whether the aerodynamics of aCOTS aircraft would allow advances in boom-cycle time.Design studies and engineering of a new tanker could buildthe use of multiple booms or other modifications into the de-sign of the aircraft. A large tanker with two booms equals twoKC-767s using current boom technology. The advantagesgained from new engineering would result not only in capa-bility but also would limit the number of tankers and theirtime exposed to enemy attacks.

Survivability

Tankers of the future must be able to survive in all envi-ronments. Of critical importance is the capability to identifyand protect the asset during the takeoff and landing phasesof flight. Of additional importance is the need to limit theexposure of tankers to attacks by limiting the amount oftankers in a formation. Large deployments to one base orlarge tanker formations are two examples of putting toomany tankers together at one time. Extending the US globalreach by using tankers could become an Achilles’ heel, onethe enemy would be willing to attack to defeat US forces.

Developments in OIF show the enemy has the ability andis willing to attack large susceptible AMC assets. A C-17 wasunable to defend itself against SAMs and was hit duringtakeoff. Gen Richard Myers, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,recounted the “harrowing experience” at the Reserve OfficersAssociation, Mid-Winter Conference, Washington, D.C.41 In aseparate incident, a C-5 was forced to land after being struckby a missile on takeoff.42 The current aircraft defensive sys-tems (chaff/flares) used to protect airlift aircraft are designedto defeat older enemy technology and do not actively engageincoming missiles. Even though both aircraft were able toland without incident and the attack did not deter further

NARVID 23

operations, valuable ramp space was required by the battle-damaged jets, which limited ramp operations. Moreover,had the jets been shot down, operations may have ceasedcompletely.

If COTS aircraft (KC-767) are used to replace the currenttanker fleet, a bolt-on defensive system of flares or chaffshould be added. This system would add weight, createdrag, and decrease fuel efficiencies while arguably allowingthe aircraft to be susceptible to enemy shoulder-launchedmissiles. A KC-XX would be able to capitalize on stealthtechnology and designs used in fighter and bomber aircraftproven successful in limiting heat signatures. Moreover,directed-energy technology that offensively takes actionand redirects missiles could be built into the aerodynamicdesign of a KC-XX. Additionally, the KC-XX could incorpo-rate fuel-cell technology used in AMC’s airlift aircraft toincrease survivability. Current COTS aircraft are not engi-neered to survive in combat and utilize wet-wing tech-nology, making them a target for a lone rifleman on theoutskirts of an airbase. However, the Federal AviationAdministration recently issued a requirement for “newlymanufactured” aircraft to have a system to prevent fuel-tank explosions.43 Without new technology, lone tankersare a prime target and become a more inviting target forenemy forces when bunched together.

The tanker’s large footprint is further amplified whenmultiple aircraft cells are launched or when large packagesare deployed to areas of hostility. The KC-767 is more fuel-efficient than a KC-135. However, the fuel savings are notenough to reduce the number of tankers required in the airor to reduce the ramp space required. The KC-767 prom-ises a 20 percent increase in off-load fuel when comparedto the KC-135E.44 The KC-XX could be designed to carrytwice the fuel of a KC-767. Even though a larger aircraftcreates a larger footprint than a smaller tanker, a singleKC-XX that is able to do the work of two KC-767s wouldmake a smaller signature in the air and on the ground. Alarge cell requiring six KC-767s would only require threeKC-XXs. The new KC-XX would result in savings by limit-ing the vulnerability to enemy attacks while reducing re-quired airspace and ground requirements in and aroundthe area of operations.


Capabilities Based

The tanker’s primary mission is that of being a platformto provide fuel to aircraft. However, a KC-XX designed fromthe ground up to include joint war-fighting capabilitiescould provide more than fuel to the battlespace. The KC-767 is a better platform than its predecessor, the KC-135E,but it adds little to the current capabilities needed by thejoint war fighter. Tankers can remain airborne on stationfor long periods. Normally, this capability is used to posi-tion a tanker in an orbit to await receivers. The KC-767 candepart with about the same amount of fuel as a KC-135,and through greater fuel efficiency, the KC-767 can arriveat the orbit with more fuel and thus remain on stationlonger. However, the KC-767 does little beyond providingpower sources for add-on capability while in orbit. The KC-XX could leverage the increased orbit time to provide capa-bilities to the joint war fighter. Due to the long loiter times atanker is able to sustain, there are capabilities in commandand control, sensor, and communication that would makethe KC-XX multimission capable. Instead of a modification toadd these capabilities to an existing system, the new require-ments could be designed into the KC-XX and avoid potentialengineering problems. One example of a potential engineer-ing problem was the KC-135’s global air traffic management(GATM) upgrade. Newly modified aircraft experienced prob-lems with interfering electrons from existing wiring and sys-tems which caused a delay in fielding the upgraded aircraft.Adding planned zones to the design of the KC-XX wouldavoid compatibility problems. Additionally, planned zonescan optimize the design of the aircraft for field maintenanceand increase cargo handling and capacity.

The tanker’s primary mission is to get gas to the receiveraircraft. In its new multimission role, the KC-XX wouldhave increased cargo handling and capacity. The COTS air-craft currently used as tankers are limited in the oversize andoutsize cargo carried and are not designed to speedily off-load cargo in combat environments. They require special-ized cargo-handling equipment to reach the high-deckheights of their load. This extra equipment creates a longerlogistics tail and the possibility of increased maintenanceproblems. A KC-XX designed with low-loading heights like

NARVID 25

the C-17 and combat off-loading through the aft end of theaircraft would not require as much support equipment.This capability would give theater commanders the abilityto operationally control the KC-XX strategic-lift-capabletankers without having to work through the prioritizationprocess used to schedule airlift. Additionally, this newstrategic-airlift capability would offset the large require-ments of a 1-4-2-1 strategy.

Build or Buy?

The final decision for the procurement of a tanker willcome down to whether the Air Force should build a tankerfrom the ground up or buy a COTS aircraft and modify itfor military use. While it is natural to propose that the bestsolution to the tanker recapitalization is to build one, thetanker of the future must meet the current Air Force’s fis-cal constraints. Additionally, it will take decades to designand replace the current inventory of tankers.

Before considering any solution, Airmen should concep-tually think through the capabilities required of a newtanker. The next phase would be to design the tanker in-cluding the capabilities and future requirements for a multi-mission, state-of-the-art aircraft. The design would serveas a baseline for a comparison between a COTS tanker andthe KC-XX. Additionally, the design would convey to aircraftcontractors the requirements and desires of the Air Force.

If operational needs and mission effectiveness is the crite-ria for building or buying the next tanker, it is more likelythat an extra robust tanker meeting all requirements can bebuilt rather than purchased. A COTS aircraft could be a goodplatform while still not meeting all performance require-ments of the Air Force. However, if the capabilities outlinedin this paper were to be included, a COTS aircraft would re-quire major modifications and design changes to meet futuretanker requirements. While COTS aircraft may be requiredas an immediate solution to the current tanker problem, thefuture of tanker operations will require a different solution.The airlift mission proposed in the KC-XX can serve as an ex-ample of how much more effective weapon systems can bewhen designed from the ground up. Nearly every strategic


airlifter from the C-17 back into airlift history has beenfielded in this manner.

Conclusion

It is hardly fair to compare the KC-767 to a notional KC-XX. The KC-XX is not constrained by a history and mind-set of purchasing existing airline platforms to fulfill therole of aerial refueler. Since the advent of refueling, the roleof the tanker has been to be present and off-load as muchfuel as possible. The KC-767 only looks to continue thissingle role, whereas the KC-XX can be multimission whilecompleting its primary mission. When one thinks of an air-craft combat package, only fighters or bombers come tomind. Yet, many times the tanker is called to fly intoenemy territory to rescue its receiver when a crisis has de-veloped, and the receiver has burned more fuel than wasplanned for the strike. This reliance on the tanker has madeit an easy target of opportunity in asymmetric warfare. So, isit unfair to dream of a stealthy KC-XX equipped with offen-sive and defensive systems to combat a direct enemy attack?The KC-767 just cannot compete with such lofty ideas. Whileat it, why not invent a supertanker with short-field takeoffcapability, able to deliver hundreds of thousands of poundsof cargo and carry a standoff-precision-attack capabilityused to target the enemy using its own sensor-array system.The idea of the supertanker encroaches on other platformsand is unattainable or is it?

While the next tanker may not be the KC-XX describedin this paper, the future force structure must take advan-tage of a capabilities-designed tanker. The next tankershould be a national asset that can correct some long-standing shortfalls. Strike aircraft need gas, a lot of it, andthey do not want to hover wasting time to get it. Strappinga boom or drogue to a COTS aircraft will not provide thiscapability. The next tanker must take advantage of futuretrends of warfare and bring to the war fighter multimissioncapabilities that use the orbit time and cargo haulingspace of the tanker.

The Air Force must take the first step and design thetanker needed to provide the capabilities that the joint

NARVID 27

environment needs. While it may not seem feasible to buildthe “Cadillac” of all tankers, can the United States weatheranother 50 years of a single-role tanker, continually need-ing modifications to meet the requirements of the future?The Air Force cannot afford the risks of not having atanker designed for the future.

The future holds a place for the tanker. The tanker of thefuture will not look like the tanker of the past. AMC pioneersneed to take advantage of trends in warfare and look beyondthe gas customer of yesteryear. Decision makers across allservices can benefit from the capabilities a tanker can bringto command and control, communication, and sensors,thus linking the war fighter on the ground, in the air, and onthe sea to the decision makers in the theater of operations.The next tanker will be a joint-force asset with a prominentrole in the battlespace. The future tanker will fill the role ofgas passer, but today’s air warriors will need to decide if thismuch-unused enabler will take a multimission role in tomor-row’s battle space.

Notes

1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, sec. 3.2. Ibid., sec. 2.3. Western, “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information,

and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia,” 112–42.4. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, sec. 4.5. Phillips, “DIRMOBFOR,” 5 December 2002.6. AFDD 2-6.2, 5.7. Narvid, “Strategic Airlift: A Force Structure for the Challenging Fu-

ture,” 5.8. Sunderman, Early Air Pioneers, 176–78.9. Latner-Needham, Refueling in Flight, 3–4.10. Smith, “Seventy-Five Years of Inflight Refueling: Highlights, 1923–

1998,” 52.11. Monday, The Official Pictorial History of the USAF, 23.12. Tankers, Military Analysis Network.13. Burnett, “Control of Mobility Air Forces: Should the Director of

Mobility Forces Command?” 6514. Brady, “Building and Commanding Expeditionary Units: Lessons

from Kosovo,” 12–21.15. Ibid.16. “AMC Plans and Programs, KC-767A: The Aircraft to Begin Our

Tanker Recapitalization,” 3.17. Polek, “Tanker Version of 767 Ready for Refit Program.”18. Callens, Tankers—The Weak Link?, 43.


19. “Affordable Air Travel,” SAT Annual Progress Report.20. Ibid.21. Fact Sheet, KC-10 Extender, October 2003.22. Isenson and Lindsey, “Kenya Rocket Attack: Is Europe Next?”23. Ibid.24. Ibid.25. “DAHL Plane Hit by Missile in Iraq,” Airwise News, 22 November

2003.26. Wortzel, “China’s Strategic Intentions and Goals.” 27. House, 106-244 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2000.28. KAL Gopaul, “Smart Tankers.”29. Miller, Dominate Logistics: Extreme JTRS-A Combat Data Infrastruc-

ture, 4 April 2003.30. “AMC Plans and Programs, Air Mobility Requirements for the Fu-

ture.”31. AFPAM10-1403, 15.32. Fact Sheet, C-17 Globemaster, January 2004.33. Fact Sheet, C-5 Galaxy, August 2003.34. Fact Sheet, C-141 Starlifter, March 2004.35. Fact Sheet, KC-10.36. Fact Sheet, KC-135 Stratotanker, April 2004.37. Garamone, “DoD Studies Kosovo Lessons Learned.”38. AFPAM10-1403, 12.39. Schatz, “Theater Airlift Lessons from Kosovo.”40. Ibid.41. Garamone, “Chairman Calls Reserves a National Treasure.” 42. Mathews, “Robins Maintainers Team to Return C-5 to Airlift Rota-

tion.”43. Koch and Lewandowski, “FAA Orders Fuel Tank Safety Systems

on Jets.” 44. Boeing Company, “Boeing’s 767 Tanker Aircraft Delivers More of

Everything,” news release, 23 April 2004.

NARVID 29

Bibliography

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