Taiwanese Lobbying in Europe in Times of Soaring Trade Regionalism in East Asia

Bertram Lang, College of Europe

TAIWANESE LOBBYING IN EUROPE IN TIMES OF SOARING TRADE

REGIONALISM IN EAST ASIA

Abstract

The European Union's Taiwan policy has mostly been analysed and explained either as a by-productof EU-China relations or with reference to the general lack of a geopolitical approach towards EastAsia. Without denying the merits of such international relations scholarship, this study provides newinsights into the functioning of EU-Taiwan relations, by adopting a lobbying approach which focusseson Taiwan's different 'channels of influence' within the complex European foreign policy system inBrussels.

Based on semi-guided interviews with Taiwanese and European actors from different institutionsand civil society, as well as content analysis of Taiwan's representation in the European media andacademic debates, this research discusses the extent to which Taiwanese lobbying in Brussels today isprepared to meet the challenges arising from the overwhelming Chinese competition and the chan-ging geopolitical context due to soaring trade regionalism in East Asia. The EU, having recentlyclimbed on the bandwagon of Regional Trade Agreements in East Asia, would be an important tradingpartner for Taiwan to break out of its growing diplomatic and commercial isolation, but has so far re-fused to open negotiations on any kind of formal EU-Taiwan agreement, despite active Taiwaneselobbying at the community level.

Particular attention is given to the implications of the radical change in Taiwanese diplomacyfrom the assertive and identity-based diplomacy of the DPP to the Kuomintang's new pragmatic for-eign policy relying on the promises of intensified cross-Strait integration. The analysis shows thatwhile the Kuomintang's accommodating and low-key lobbying style is highly appreciated by mostEuropean decision-makers, it also has great disadvantages, notably a benign neglect of the 'Taiwanquestion' by both the European public and foreign policy-makers. Most importantly, the 2010 'Eco-nomic Cooperation Framework Agreement' has neither softened Chinese opposition to any potentialincrease of Taiwan's international space, nor sufficiently raised European interest in Taiwan as a po-tential hub for accessing the Chinese market.

Thus, Taiwanese lobbying, although very active and skilful in entertaining direct 'channels of in-fluence' within all European institutions, is not salient enough to affect the EU's liberalisation agenda,and despite Taiwan's considerable economic potential has failed so far to persuade the Commissionto open politically delicate free trade negotiations in parallel to DG Trade's number one priority, theTransatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

Keywords

EU-Taiwan relations, Regional Trade Agreements, Taiwanese diplomacy, One-China policy, Lobbying

Table of contents

1 Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 1

2 Changing parameters for EU-Taiwan relations in the 21st century..................................7

2.1 Taiwan's international status under pressure.....................................................................................7

2.2 The EU and the Taiwan question: Drifting into a 'China impasse'?..........................................10

3 Taiwan's struggle for influence within the EU's 'multi-location' foreignpolicy system.................................................................................................................................... 13

3.1 The growing relevance of the community level for Taiwan.........................................................13

3.2 Reaching institutional foreign policy actors......................................................................................153.2.1 Taiwan's relevance for EU member states and Council positions..............................................153.2.2 Worlds apart: The European Commission/EEAS and the European Parliament

on Taiwan.........................................................................................................................................................17

3.3 Marginalised in public discourse: The problem of Taiwan's weak presence in the media and civil society........................................................................................................................ 21

3.4 Academic discourse and think tanks as a more promising 'channel of influence'?...........25

3.5 Taiwan's 'channels of influence' in Europe: An overall assessment.........................................28

4 Main issues of Taiwanese lobbying in Europe in the Chen and Ma era.........................29

4.1 Taiwanese representation in international organisations and the EU's tepid support....30

4.2 Cross-Strait rapprochement and its implications for EU-Taiwan relations..........................31

4.3 The development of closer economic ties: Keeping politics out?..............................................34

5 An EU-Taiwan trade agreement as a pathway to an actual 'Taiwan policy'?...............35

5.1 Acknowledging the geopolitical relevance of trade agreements...............................................36

5.2 The 'China factor' and the future of EU-Taiwan trade relations................................................37

5.3 Taiwan's channels of influence in Europe: strong enough and adapted to the challenges ahead?................................................................................................................................. 39

6 Conclusions............................................................................................................................................ 42

Acronyms and abbreviations.......................................................................................................... 44

List of interviews................................................................................................................................. 45

Bibliography.......................................................................................................................................... 45

Table of Figures

Figure 1: US and EU member states' arms sales to Taiwan........................................................11

Figure 2: Articles on Taiwan in major European newspapers.................................................22

1 Introduction

Both the European Union (EU) and Taiwan can be regarded as 'special cases' in International Rela -

tions (IR), with debates and uncertainty over their recognition and actorness, albeit for very differ-

ent reasons. Taiwan, having progressively lost international recognition over the last decades and

faced with an ever more powerful People's Republic of China (PRC) which prevents it from (re)es-

tablishing official diplomatic relations, has been compelled to find alternative ways to seek support

from, and influence, European foreign policy actors. As Chen has pointed out, Taiwan's situation is

difficult to grasp in mainstream IR theories, because “Taiwan's predicament belongs to a category

of its own” and “its strategy to break diplomatic isolation is also unique, defying the norms of the

'usual' policies studied in the international relations.“1 Albeit differently, the EU has equally chal-

lenged traditional, sovereignty-based conceptions of international relations. While being signific-

antly different from the sum of its member states' national foreign policies, EU foreign policy is

“neither exclusive nor all-encompassing”2 and also defies realist conceptions of state behaviour in

many other regards. Although “[b]oth the EU and Taiwan have issues with the notion of statehood,

[..] they certainly are independent actors.“3

Main issues in the EU-Taiwan relationship

The conventional wisdom about EU-Taiwan relations is that they are mainly economic in nature,4

while “political extensions” remain purely functional and subordinated to the maximisation of trade

benefits.5 Laursen has claimed that while the Taiwanese side is always asking for an upgrading of

political relations, the EU has come to be the “main demandeur” on economic and trade issues, try -

ing to boost European exports and investment by reducing what is perceived as Taiwanese protec-

tionism.6 In recent years, the EU's increasingly proactive stance on regional trade agreements (RTA)

has also brought about a growing literature on the pros and cons of a potential Free Trade Agree-

ment (FTA) or Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA) with Taiwan.7 This question is of particular

1 J. Chen, Foreign policy of the New Taiwan. Pragmatic diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Cheltenham, Edward El-gar, 2002, p. 8.2 S. Keukeleire & T. Delreux, The foreign policy of the European Union, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p.14.3 S. Winkler, A Question of Sovereignty? The EU’s Policy on Taiwan’s Participation in International Organiza-tions, PhD Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, July 2011, p. 5.4 C. Dent & D. Johnson, “Taiwan-EU Economic Relations. A European Perspective”, EurAmerica, vol. 30, no. 1,2000, pp. 109–157.5 F. Mengin, “A Functional Relationship: Political Extensions to Europe-Taiwan Economic Ties”, The ChinaQuarterly, vol. 169, 2002, pp. 136–153.6 F. Laursen, The Politics and Economics of EU-China/Taiwan Relations. A European Perspective , DalhousieUniversity, EUCE Occasional Paper, no. 1, 2006, p. 3.7 F. Erixon, M. Krol & N. Macyra, After Cross-Strait Rapprochement. A conceptual analysis of potential gains toEurope from China-Taiwan economic cooperation, European Centre for International Political Economy, ECIPEOccasional Paper, no. 3, 2012; Y. Tseng, Challenges and Opportunities of a EU-Taiwan ECA. A Review of Polit -ical-Economic Perspectives, Center for Asian Studies, Asie Visions, no. 56, November 2012.

1

relevance as Taiwan faces the risk of growing isolation in light of the soaring trade regionalism in

East Asia.8

Since the late 1990s, scholars have started to criticise the EU's progressive abandonment of a

normative and actively engaged approach to the 'Taiwan question', while at the same time discuss-

ing scenarios for a “new European Taiwan policy”9. Naturally, the EU's Taiwan policy can not be

treated in isolation from its China policy, as the latter is a far more prominent issue in EU foreign

policy and any deviation from the status quo in EU-Taiwan relations must be expected to draw im-

mediate reactions from the PRC. While much research effort has been devoted to exploring the role

of value-based politics in the EU's dealings with China,10 it must be conceded that due to China's

overwhelming economic importance, “relative power considerations, state sovereignty and con-

crete material interests still dominate EU-China relations.”11 Moreover, the question of Europe's

stance towards Taiwan's participation in international organisations has attracted increasing atten-

tion lately.12

Another fundamental question is whether Taiwan's transformation from authoritarianism to

liberal democracy has turned out to be a diplomatic advantage, bringing it much closer to the val -

ues (supposedly) promoted in European foreign policy. Rawnsley points out that democracy “has

been both a blessing and a curse” for Taiwanese diplomacy as ideological cleavages and electoral

volatility “restrain[] the communication to international audiences of more compelling themes and

narratives”.13 Nonetheless, facing the PRC's overwhelming hard power resources, showcasing its

democratic achievements and values may still represent Taiwan’s “greatest soft power asset”.14

Concerning Taiwan's European policy, it is generally accepted that, whereas the United States

(US) remains the number one foreign policy priority for Taipei, intensifying relations with the EU has

become an important strategic goal of Taiwanese diplomacy.15 Taiwan's strategy to achieve this,

8 M. Magcamit & A. Tan, “Crouching tiger, lurking dragon: understanding Taiwan's sovereignty and trade link-ages in the twenty-first century”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 15, no. 1, 2014, pp. 2-4.9 G. Schubert, “Towards a new European Taiwan policy? Some preliminary reflexions”, Asia Europe Journal,vol. 1, 2003, pp. 263–280; see also G. Schucher, “Old Hat, New Rhetoric: The EU's Policy toward Taiwan afterthe Fifth Enlargement”, Issues & Studies, vol. 43, no. 3, 2007, pp. 1–51.10 See for example, J. Men, “Between Human Rights and Sovereignty-An Examination of EU-China PoliticalRelations”, European Law Journal, vol. 17, no. 4, 2011, pp. 534-550.11 M. Mattlin, “A Normative EU Policy Towards China. Mission Impossible?”, Finnish Institute of InternationalAffairs, FIIA Occasional Paper, no. 67, 2010, p. 6.12 Winkler, A Question of..., op.cit; J. Sehntilkowi & O. Kucera, “Taiwan's Participation in International Organ-izations: Obstacles, Strategies, Patterns?”, in J. Damm & P. Lim (eds.), European perspectives on Taiwan, Wies-baden, Springer VS, 2012, pp. 147–169.13 G. Rawnsley, “Taiwan’s Soft Power and Public Diplomacy”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, no. 3, 2014,p. 162.14 Ibid., p. 168.15 H. Su, “Taiwan’s Strategy towards the EU: From Hallstein Doctrine to Workable Diplomacy”, in H. Su (ed.),Asian Countries’ Strategies towards the European Union in an Inter-regionalist Context , Taipei, NationalTaiwan University Press, 2015, pp. 94-98.

2

however, has only been analysed through historiographical methods aimed at distinguishing differ-

ent phases and types of diplomacy.16 Many others have highlighted the strategic relevance of EU

support for Taiwan and discussed different options for achieving it.17 But much of the existing em-

pirical literature on EU-Taiwan relations still suffers from certain methodological shortcomings.

Firstly, in academic discussions of the strategic issues in EU-China relations, the 'Taiwan issue' is of-

ten almost ignored or its analysis strictly limited to the scant official statements relating to the

'One-China policy'.18 Secondly, the scarcity of insightful official documents also afflicts a number of

empirical studies specifically dedicated to the Taiwan question in EU foreign policy. Detailed exam-

inations of the changing EU discourse on the 'Taiwan question'19 are useful for understanding differ-

ent EU institutions' positions, but they provide neither insights into Taiwanese strategies nor struc-

tural explanations. Another important strand of research analyses the 'Taiwan question' only as a

sub-issue of EU-China relations.20

The present study therefore sets out to fill the gap between the theoretical discussions of the

EU's potential role in EU-Taiwan relations and empirical IR scholarship explaining the lack of actual

EU engagement through structural constraints,21 notably by adopting a lobbying approach to

Taiwanese representation in Brussels, which is sensitive not only to the relevant issues and struc-

tural context of EU-Taiwan relations, but also to the specific ways in which Taiwanese interests are

articulated and promoted vis-à-vis European foreign-policy-makers.

16 Tubilewicz, for instance, discusses the importance of concepts such as 'flexible diplomacy' and 'economicdiplomacy' (C. Tubilewicz, “Europe in Taiwan's Post–Cold War Foreign Relations”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol.18, no. 2, 2007, pp. 415–443.); Su confronts different 'grand strategies' used by Taiwanese governments un-der Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou (Su, Taiwan’s Strategy towards..., op.-cit.).17 See for example, Y. Zhang & J. Lu, “Taiwan kaikuo guoji guanxi de ling yitiao daolu. Yi Ou meng wei li”, 台灣

開拓國際關係的另一條道路。以歐盟為例 [“A new way for Taiwan to expand its international relations.The EU as an example”], Taiwan New Century Foundation, New Century Forum, no. 24, December 2003; D.Yang & G. Xu, “Oumeng: Taiwan dui wai guanxi de xin fangxiang”, 欧盟:台湾对外关系的新方向 [“The EU: Anew direction for Taiwan's foreign relations”], Ouzhou yanjiu [Europe research], vol. 6, 2004, pp. 122–136.18 For a critical assessment, cf. N. Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der EU zu China und Taiwan. Hintergründe undPerzeptionen, Hamburg, Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2008., pp. 12-13.19 S. Tang, “Die Taiwanpolitik der EU - Beschränkungen und Chancen”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 49,2006, pp. 35–38; S. Tang, “The European Union and the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait (1996-2009). A Con-tent Analysis”, Issues & Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, 2010, pp. 55–87; Y. Lan, “The European Parliament and theChina–Taiwan Issue: An Empirical Approach”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 9, 2004, pp. 115–140.20 P. Lim, “The European Union's Economic Ties with The Republic of China (Taiwan)”, in G. Wiessala, J.Wilson & P. Taneja (eds.), The European Union and China. Interests and dilemmas, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2009,pp. 187–206; Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der..., op.cit.21 S. Hu, “Structural Constraints on the EU's Role in Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations”, European Journal of EastAsian Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, 2011, pp. 37–58; J. Cabestan, “The Taiwan issue in Europe-China relations. An ir -ritant more than leverage”, in D. Shambaugh, E. Sandschneider & H. Zhou (eds.), China-Europe relations. Per-ceptions, policies, and prospects, London, Routledge, 2007, pp. 84–101.

3

Research questions

The main goal of this research is thus to assess the different 'channels of influence' through which

Taiwan exerts, or tries to exert, influence on the European foreign policy system, and to answer the

question in how far Taiwanese lobbying in Brussels today is prepared to meet the challenges arising

from an ever more important “China factor”22 in IR and the changing parameters of the interna-

tional trading system in East Asia. In doing so, Taiwan's unofficial diplomatic relations with different

European actors – notably the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Commission

and the European Parliament (EP) – as well as alternative 'channels of influence', i.e. the mass me -

dia, civil society and academic discourse, will be examined.

Second, the Kuomintang's (KMT) return to power in 2008, which followed an eight year Demo-

cratic Progressive Party (DPP) interlude, ushered in a significant shift in Taiwan's foreign policy, not

only vis-à-vis China. Without aspiring at a full-fledged diachronic comparison of lobbying strategies

and effects before and after 2008, this study will examine how the KMT's China-friendly policy and

new “workable diplomacy”23 has influenced Taiwanese lobbying in Brussels, both regarding direct

strategies and institutional contacts and to the wider context of the EU-Taiwan relationship.

Finally, the relevance of diplomatic alternation also points to another important aspect of EU-

Taiwan relations: Taiwan's supposed normative proximity to core values of European foreign policy,

such as democracy, freedom of speech, or human rights. I will examine both whether Taiwan's lob-

bying strategy is aimed at exploiting this important “soft power capacity”24 and in how far such

normative proximity is actually a relevant asset in dealing with Europe, especially in the context of

the EU's relations with a normatively more distant yet far more important 'great power' like China.

Thereby, this thesis will also contribute to a broader discussion about the possibilities of a norms-

based EU foreign policy vis-à-vis China.

Definition of core concepts

The examination of 'channels of influence' is a central endeavour of this study. This does not

primarily mean to measure the amount of influence, but to understand the mechanisms by which

one political actor A tries to persuade or incentivise another actor B to make declarations or take

decisions closer to A's preferences. One possible indicator of 'success' may be the evolution of

European actors' positions between Taiwanese and Chinese demands over time. To understand the

workings of such mechanisms of influence, it is crucial to trace the different pathways through

which information is disseminated, positions are coordinated, or pressure is exerted between two

broader entities. Such 'channels of influence' can include forums of institutionalised exchange, per-

22 R. Solomon (ed.), The China factor. Sino-American relations and the global scene, Englewood Cliffs, Pren-tice-Hall, 1981.23 Su, Taiwan’s Strategy towards..., op.cit., p. 105.24 Rawnsley, Taiwan’s Soft Power..., op.cit., p. 166.

4

sonal relations between individual actors, or media contacts useful for influencing domestic dis-

courses which in turn can be expected to have an impact on policies.25

A distinction has to be made between official diplomacy, following codified rules and where

symbols play an essential role, and other means of influencing political decision-making, generally

referred to as 'lobbying'.26 While the conduct of EU-Taiwan relations certainly includes many ele-

ments that could be described as 'diplomacy', they are not officially characterised as such and tend

to avoid all appearances of formal diplomatic conduct. Given that formal diplomatic recognition for

Taiwanese representatives is not even on the agenda of EU-Taiwan relations, the debate over

Taiwan's judicial status in IR is only of marginal importance for this study,27 which is why I refer to all

activities geared towards promoting Taiwanese views and interests in Europe as 'lobbying'.28

Finally, 'actors' in IR may refer to both individuals and formal organisations able to adopt

strategies and take decisions of their own, and which are perceived as such by others. Actors relev-

ant to this study include 'statist' or institutional actors (European institutions, representative offices

and their diplomatic staff), semi-official actors (such as Chambers of Commerce and 'second-track'

diplomats) and unofficial actors (civil society, businesses, academics, or journalists). The 'multi-loca-

tion' nature of EU foreign policy29 implies a complicated set of (foreign policy) actors and recalls that

analysis of this foreign policy system has to take account of a both horizontally and vertically diver-

sified range of actors. While one important early step of European decision-making takes place in

member state capitals, this study focusses on decision-making in Brussels, thus treating member

states' positions as articulated within the Council as an exogenous input into the system.

Investigating EU-Taiwan relations in Brussels: methodological considerations

As stated above, this study is dedicated to assessing Taiwanese influence on EU foreign-policy-mak-

ing beyond official statements and policy documents. Naturally, conducting field research into the

less formalised aspects of EU-Taiwan relations in Brussels brings about its own hurdles: Generally

speaking, the large gap between official parlance and day-to-day practices makes EU-Taiwan rela-

tions a very sensitive topic to discuss frankly for both politicians and civil servants, especially be-

25 C. Mahoney, “Lobbying success in the United States and the European Union”, Journal of Public Policy, vol.27, 2007.26 J. Melissen, The new public diplomacy. Soft power in international relations, Basingstoke, New York, Pal-grave Macmillan, 2005, p. 15; 95.27 For a more detailed discussion of this issue as well as the concept of Taiwan's 'functional sovereignty' andthe EU's politics of (non-)recognition, cf. Winkler, A Question of..., op.cit., pp. 55-63.28 It is worth noting that other states also combine diplomatic and non-diplomatic 'lobbying' activities tomaximise influence on their counterparts' policies, as the intense lobbying activities of the US Chamber ofCommerce in Brussels, or the importance of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue for EU foreign policy, demon-strate.29 H. Wallace, “An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy Modes”, in H. Wallace et al. (Eds), Policy-Making inthe European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 78.

5

cause, as one parliamentary assistant put it, “no one wants to get their fingers burnt”30 with what is

perceived as an issue where little can be gained and much can be lost due to the omnipresent

threat of Chinese reprisals. The resulting research challenge of finding out who actually deals with

Taiwan issues on the European side was resolved by relying on the snowball method, i.e. asking in-

terviewees to recommend further contacts. This worked well for the EP and the Taipei Representat-

ive Office (TRO), but showed clear limitations within the Commission and the Council. The sensit-

iveness of the 'Taiwan issue' also meant that most interviewees preferred to stay anonymous,

which is why only their functions are revealed in the following. Moreover, as the main purpose of

the research interviews was to obtain inside information which would not have been accessible by

other means, I chose not to record most interviews so as to allow interviewees to give up diplo-

matic restraint. Nonetheless, the problem of getting beyond official diplomatic parlance proved dif-

ficult to overcome especially at the TRO, where both interviewees were ostensibly careful not to

disclose any sensitive information and had even required to send most questions in advance. At

least the possibility to ask spontaneous questions was offered in the end, and sometimes the inter-

pretation of non-answers or particular ways of evading questions was as informative as the actual

content of answers. On the other hand, the interviews with parliamentary assistants proved much

more revealing in many regards. In view of these problems, the overall methodological challenge

has been to assemble the pieces of partial information from different sides and combine them with

structural analysis of the EU-Taiwan relationship based on existing research and publicly available

information.

Thesis Outline

Based on the existing research on EU-Taiwan relations, Taiwanese foreign policy and trade regional-

ism in East Asia, as well as original research carried out in Brussels between January and April 2015,

this study will first discuss the changing context of EU-Taiwan relations due to soaring trade region-

alism in East Asia, before turning to a detailed analysis of Taiwan's different 'channels of influence'

in the EU foreign policy system. Then, an analysis of the main issues of Taiwanese lobbying in

Europe will highlight the impact of these channels and of different lobbying strategies of sub-

sequent Taiwanese governments. Finally, the pre-eminent question of a possible ECA will reveal the

potential and limitations of both the EU's current Taiwan policy and the low-key diplomatic strategy

employed by the incumbent Taiwanese government vis-à-vis Europe.

30 Interview with a parliamentary assistant, European Parliament (INTA committee), via telephone, 27 March2015; my translation.

6

2 Changing parameters for EU-Taiwan relations in the 21st century

Before turning to Taiwanese lobbying strategies in Brussels, it is necessary to put contemporary EU-

Taiwan relations into context. The two most relevant aspects in this regard are Taiwan's overall in-

ternational status, comprising both diplomatic and commercial difficulties, and the EU's current

stance on the 'Taiwan question', which looms over all its dealings with Taipei due to Beijing's suspi-

cious observation of respect for the One-China policy.

2.1 Taiwan's international status under pressure

Since its expulsion from the United Nations (UN) in 1971, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan's

international status has been in constant decline. Early on, it was the authoritarian KMT govern-

ment's ideological pursuit of a 'Hallstein doctrine' which made any arrangement for the recognition

of two Chinese governments in international institutions impossible,31 but the PRC's subsequent

economic take-off soon made it clear that Taiwan's loss of status would be permanent and unstop-

pable. One constant in the PRC's 'grand strategy' since Deng Xiaoping has been to downplay the

political implications of its rise to power and subordinate its overall foreign policy to the primary

goal of enabling smooth and continuous economic development, while on the other hand firmly re-

pudiating anything that Beijing interprets as interference into China's internal affairs – including the

'Taiwan question'.32

The idea of dual recognition – endorsed by the Taiwanese side since 1991 as part of its new

'flexible diplomacy' approach – thus remains completely unacceptable and is even seen as a threat

to China's core interests and national security by Beijing.33 China's offensive counter-strategy

against this 'flexible diplomacy' effectively combines diplomatic with 'hard power' instruments: 1)

the conclusion of “strategic partnerships” to strengthen its own diplomatic influence on partner

countries' foreign policy and ensure effective implementation of the One-China Policy; 2) generous

economic and financial offers to third countries, in particular Taiwan's remaining diplomatic allies;

3) a resolute blockade of Taiwan's every effort to improve its status in international organisations

(cf. Chapter 4.1).34

Unable to keep pace with the rapid Chinese expansion, Taipei risks the progressive loss of its

last formal diplomatic allies. Even in Latin America, home to 12 out of Taiwan's remaining 22 diplo -

matic allies worldwide, the Chinese advance seems inexorable. The PRC's recent announcement of

31 Su, Taiwan’s Strategy towards..., op.cit., pp. 89-91.32 C. Chang, Die Taiwan-Frage im Kontext der strategischen Beziehungen zwischen China und den USA nachdem Kalten Krieg, Freiburg, dissertation.de, 2009, p. 183; 190.33 C. Tubilewicz, Taiwan and Post-Communist Europe. Shopping for allies, London, Routledge, 2007, p. 9.34 Chang, Die Taiwan-Frage im..., op.cit., pp. 184-190.

7

a massive investment plan of 250 billion dollar35 shows that Taiwan's international standing is in-

creasingly being squeezed by the sheer economic weight of its main diplomatic adversary.

While these severe diplomatic limitations may symbolically hurt Taiwan's international stand-

ing, developments in the international economic and trading system are even more daunting:

Shorty after the major diplomatic achievement of becoming a full member of the World Trade Or-

ganisation (WTO) – albeit under the PRC-imposed name of 'Chinese Taipei' – in 2002, the prolifera-

tion of RTAs, allowed as exceptions to the universal most-favoured nation treatment under GATT

Art. XXIV and GATS Art. V, started to debase Taiwan's position in the international trading system.

As a high-end manufacturing economy with little natural resources of its own, Taiwan is highly de -

pendent on international trade and finds itself in direct competition with other East Asian 'tigers'

(notably South Korea and Singapore) as well as Japan and increasingly China. The recent thriving of

'competitive liberalisation' with a number of parallel and competing initiatives for bi- and plurilat -

eral preferential or free trade agreements particularly in the Asia-Pacific region36 thus poses a defin-

itive challenge to Taiwan both as an economic and diplomatic entity, considering that keeping

Taiwan at bay is an integral part of China's political 'grand strategy' with regard to these agree -

ments:

“None of these agreements includes Chinese Taipei, and in fact they all discriminate against ChineseTaipei. The US-Republic of Korea FTA will likely cause significant trade diversion away from Chinese Taipeiexports [...] That may not be a big economic problem for everyone else, bu t does raise important politicalquestions.”37

The “important political questions” that are left implicit here notably concern those actors having a

stake in Taiwan's prospering and enduring political autonomy from the PRC: The US, obviously, not

only has the largest geopolitical interest in keeping the highly strategic island aloof from PRC inter-

ference, but is also the only power actually able to stand up to China in this regard. Even if security

remains the dominating issue in the strained triangular relationship between the US, China and

Taiwan, economic influence and trade policy should by no means be underestimated as power

factors in the Asia-Pacific. It is therefore no wonder that “lobbying for a U.S.-Taiwan FTA” has be-

come one of the main priorities of Taiwan's foreign policy.38 The biggest challenge to Taiwanese

trade diplomacy, however, are the plurilateral negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

With the TPP nearing conclusion without consideration for Taiwan's 2013 membership bid, numer-

35 Le Monde, “La Chine promet d'investir 250 milliards de dollars en Amérique latine”, 8 January 2015.36 M. Kawai & G. Wignaraja, "Multilateralizing regional trade arrangements in Asia", in R. Baldwin & P. Low(eds.), Multilateralizing regionalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 501.37 G. Hufbauer & J. Schott, “Fitting Asia-Pacific agreements into the WTO system”, in Baldwin & Low, Multi-lateralizing regionalism, op.cit., p. 622.38 D. Huang, “Lobbying for a 'U.S.-Taiwan FTA' in the U.S. Congress: Which 'Fast Track'? What Target?”, in C.Lin & D. Roy (eds.), The Future of United States, China, and Taiwan Relations, New York, Palgrave Macmillan,2011, p. 102.

8

ous critics in the US, spurred by a very active pro-Taiwan lobby,39 are now brandishing the looming

picture of an internationally isolated Taiwan left with no other choice but to turn further towards

China for economic rescue, or simply underlining the economic benefits of letting Taiwan particip-

ate in TPP.40 The only case where Taiwan is one step ahead of China are the plurilateral negotiations

for a Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), theoretically open to all WTO members. While the US

have been suspected of using TiSA as a way of keeping China at large,41 the EU has already pro-

nounced itself in favour of the PRC's participation,42 thereby indicating its unwillingness to give any

privileges to Taiwan vis-à-vis China.

Besides, Taiwan has concluded in 2013 bilateral FTAs with New Zealand and Singapore (its first

FTAs ever outside the Caribbean), which can be considered strategic 'stepping stone agreements' to

increase its chances of joining TPP.43 That Taiwan is under immense pressure to conclude such

agreements is openly acknowledged – and even strategically used by President Ma Ying-jeou to re-

duce domestic opposition: “We are seriously lagging relative to our trade competitors, including

South Korea, Singapore, and Japan, [we] must act fast to catch up with the regional trend.” 44

Moreover, that the Taiwan-Singapore FTA is expected to disproportionately benefit Singaporean

businesses45 shows how far the KMT government is ready to go economically to prevent diplomatic

isolation through commercial policy. The paradox is obvious here: While growing trade regionalism

in the Asia Pacific has become a major diplomatic threat for Taiwan, it must be all the more active

in promoting trade regionalism of its own, thereby accepting its complete lack of bargaining power

on substantive commercial issues.46 The seemingly inevitable trend of growing power imbalance in

China's favour has even sparked international debates over a possible 'finlandisation' of Taiwan, as

a consequence of the possible sacrifice of Taiwan in the great powers' game between China and the

US.47

39 See for example the Taiwan International TPP Network (http://taiwaninternationaltpp.com/).40 R. Bush & J. Meltzer, “Taiwan and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Preparing the Way”, Brookings, East AsiaPolicy Paper, no. 3, January 2014.41 S. Donnan, “China in push to join US-led $4tn services trade talks”, Financial Times, 23 September 2013.42 European External Action Service, “EU backs China joining talks on TiSA”, 31 March 2014.43 J. Hsu, & A. Poon, “Taiwan, Singapore Sign Free-Trade Pact. Island Seeks to Lessen Its Dependence onChina”, Wall Street Journal, 7 November 2013; A. Fensom, “Taiwan-Singapore FTA”, The Diplomat, 8 Novem-ber 2013.44 Ma Ying-jeou, quoted in C. Wang, “China Thaw Lets Taiwan Expand Trade Deals to Add Singapore”,Bloomberg, 7 November 2013.45 Fensom, Taiwan-Singapore FTA, op.cit.46 In essence, this may well boil down to Taiwan being obliged to substantially liberalise not only its industry,but also agriculture and service markets (Bush & Meltzer, Taiwan and the..., op.cit., p. 11), which in turn mayspark massive domestic protests and harm the pro-liberalisation KMT government.47 For a critical appraisal of this concept, cf. J. Cabestan, “The New Détente in the Taiwan Strait and Its Impacton Taiwan’s Security and Future. More Questions than Answers”, China Perspectives, vol. 3, 2010, p. 31.

9

2.2 The EU and the Taiwan question: Drifting into a 'China impasse'?

Regarding the European position with regard to the 'Taiwan question', it has always been subjected

to the quest for good relations with China, and the EU's diplomatic recognition of the PRC has not

raised any serious doubt since the establishment of EC-China diplomatic relations in 1975.48 Non-

etheless, the Chinese side insisted on further clarifications as a precondition of the EU-China 'com-

prehensive strategic partnership', initiated at the Sixth China-EU summit in 2003. The mutually ac-

cepted compromise formula, which has since served as a mould for official diplomatic statements

on the 'Taiwan question', reads as follows: “The EU side reaffirmed that it continues to adhere to

the one China policy and expressed its hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question

through constructive dialogue.”49 From the Chinese side however, this position has been further

hardened in the first Chinese EU strategy published in 2003, where even narrower limits are set for

the EU's relations with Taiwan.50

In a meticulous exercise of reading between the lines, scholars like Tang Shao-cheng have nev-

ertheless identified a slight improvement of Europe's diplomatic treatment of Taiwan in official

statements and on governmental websites following the establishment of a European Economic

and Trade Office (EETO) in Taipei in 2003: In official EU parlance, Taiwan's limited recognition as “a

separate customs territory” was upgraded to “solid relations with Taiwan in non-political areas,

such as economic relations, science, research, education and culture.”51 However, these subtle dip-

lomatic advances were more than offset by the tensions during the late phase of Chen Shui-bian's

second term between 2006 and 2008. The European exasperation over Taiwan's provocativeness,

together with a “positive reevaluation of the sino-European partnership” and a “demystification of

the Taiwanese model”52 due to high-level domestic corruption scandals, explains why the Commis-

sion has ceased to take sides on cross-Strait issues and now follows an overall policy of “two-sided

admonition”,53 while limiting itself to opposition to any “unilateral change of the status quo”, “en-

couragement of pragmatic solutions” and “support for dialogue between all parties”.54 Another in-

teresting observation made by Tang is that the EU's official position has been lagging behind those

of member states in a process of continuous adaptation,55 which supports Cabestan's 'lowest com-

mon denominator' hypothesis, i.e. that the European position is unable to exceed the intersecting

48 Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der..., op.cit., p.11.49 Council of the European Union, “Sixth China-EU Summit, Beijing, 30 October 2003, Joint Press Statement”,13424/03, Brussels, 30 October 2003.50 Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der..., op.cit., p. 12.51 Tang, Die Taiwanpolitik der..., op.cit., p. 35.52 Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der..., op.cit., p. 72.53 Ibid.54 European Commission, “EU-China: closer partners, growing responsibilities”, COM(2006)631, 24 October2006, p. 11.55 Tang, Die Taiwanpolitik der..., op.cit., p. 36.

10

set of all member states' interests regarding the 'Taiwan question', thus making it easy for China to

undermine any EU stance by bullying individual member states into opposing it.56

Concerning Taiwan's number one foreign policy goal of safeguarding its national security vis-à-

vis the 'China threat', Europe is – to say the least – not the most relevant partner. Not only does the

EU itself have no security strategy or even noteworthy military presence in East Asia, but European

states have also all but abandoned any major arms deals with Taiwan out of a fear of vexing China. 57

This means that the US remain the only relevant partner on security issues for Taiwan.58 As figure 1

shows, European arms exports are not only dwarfed by the US, but have almost completely dried

up in the 2000s, with the exception of a minor German helicopter deal in 2010.

It is also worth noting that France, a major supplier of arms to Taiwan in the 1990s, was also at the

forefront of an EU initiative to lift the arms embargo on the PRC in 200359 – the only security issue

that put a real strain on the EU-Taiwan relationship. This episode illustrated the severe limits of

Taiwanese influence in 'high politics', as the eventual maintenance of the embargo must be attrib-

uted more to US intervention and China's provocative Anti-Secession Law than to efficient

Taiwanese lobbying.60 But it also portrays the EU as a re-actor rather than an actor, laying bare a

general absence of any broader strategic approach to the Taiwan issue:

“As opposed to the US, whose Taiwan policy is actually aimed at China (means to an end), the EU has […]limited itself much more to its commercial interests in Taiwan (end in itself). Preconditions for this arepeace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”61

56 Cabestan, The Taiwan issue..., op.cit., pp. 96-97.57 O. Bräuner, “How Europe Shies from Taiwan”, The Diplomat, 20 March 2012.58 Chen, Foreign Policy of..., op.cit., pp. 9-11.59 Cabestan, The Taiwan issue..., op.cit., pp. 93-95.60 Su, Taiwan's Strategy towards..., op.cit., p. 103.

11

Figure 1: US and EU member states' arms sales to Taiwan

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

US and EU member states' arms sales to Taiwan, 1990-2014

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

France

Germany (FRG)

Italy

Netherlands

United States

US

$ m

. (co

ns

tan

t 19

90

pri

ces

)

Nevertheless, the above-mentioned “important political questions” raised by trade regionalism in

East Asia also concern the EU which, even without any discernible geopolitical approach to East

Asia, must be assumed to prefer a self-determined, pro-Western Taiwan to the perspective of an-

other Beijing-controlled 'Special Administrative Region' like Hong Kong. Generally speaking, the

EU's relationship with trade regionalism has long been an uneasy one: The traditional, value-based

European commitment to multilateralism was upheld even against the aggressive US strategy of

'competitive liberalisation' through the 'Lamy doctrine' until 2006, when the European Commis-

sion's new 'Global Europe' strategy controversially initiated a much more offensive RTA policy. This

fundamental strategic shift to bilateralism, however, was inspired by purely economic fears of losing

out against American or Chinese competitors rather than by a coherent geopolitical approach to

trade policy.62 Since then, the EU has indeed become a very active player in trade regionalism, vis-

ibly trying to catch up with the US, including in East Asia. In doing so, the EU has started formal ne-

gotiations with virtually all of Taiwan's fiercest economic competitors in the region. Most import-

antly, the EU and South Korea have concluded in 2011 the “most comprehensive free trade agree-

ment ever negotiated by the EU”63 covering both trade and services, which is meant to abolish

98,7% of all import tariffs by July 2016.64 A second FTA has been initialled with Singapore in 2013.

Taiwan's exclusion from the deals (so far) has not only negative economic consequences such

as trade diversion towards its direct competitors, but also important political implications. One

quite obvious and momentous, yet often overlooked political implication of the spreading trade re-

gionalism in East Asia is the conclusion of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)

between Taipei and Beijing in 2010. The ECFA, which has already spawned a substantial intensifica -

tion of cross-Strait economic relations (and dependency), is often superficially attributed to the re-

turning KMT government's generally China-friendly positions. Looking at it from the Chinese side,

however, it is but one step in a much broader strategy of bringing the 'renegade province' of Taiwan

under Beijing's influence in a peaceful and incremental manner. China's “RTA shopping spree”, 65 ini-

tiated in 2001, which has already resulted in privileged economic relations with many of Taiwan's

former allies (such as ASEAN nations), together with the quite generous concessions offered to

Hong Kong and Macao in similar agreements can be seen as clever moves by Beijing “to lure

Chinese Taipei into the game”66. The proliferation of RTAs among its partners and adversaries during

61 Tang, Die Taiwanpolitik der..., op.cit., p. 38; my translation.62 K. Heydon & S. Woolcock, The rise of bilateralism. Comparing American, European, and Asian approachesto preferential trade agreements, Tokyo, UNUP, 2009, p. 161.63 European Commission, Directorate-General Trade, The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in practice, Luxem-bourg, EU Publications Office, 2011, p.1.64 Ibid.65 H. Gao, “The RTA Strategy of China: A Critical Visit”, in R. Buckley et al. (eds.), Challenges To MultilateralTrade: The Impact of Bilateral, Preferential and Regional Agreements, Kluwer Law International, 2008, p. 56.66 Ibid., p. 59.

12

the 2000s thus pressurised Taiwan into moving much closer towards Beijing, a political and eco-

nomic development that even a potential new DPP government would have great trouble to roll

back after the 2016 elections.

These recent developments have made it more difficult for the EU to formulate a distinctive

Taiwan policy, not only because of direct Chinese opposition to any treatment of the question in

public, but also because of structural factors. Europeans themselves have made China their number

one priority in East Asia – for obvious economic reasons – and thereby accept that all other, even

purely commercial, initiatives in the region have to conform with EU-China relations. That the EU

welcomes closer cross-Strait relations is almost a choice by default from this perspective. The next

chapter will show how Taiwan struggles to remain relevant in Brussels despite these structural lim -

itations.

3 Taiwan's struggle for influence within the EU's 'multi-location' foreign policy system

The conceptual reliance on 'channels of influence' in this analysis is based on the assumption that

decision-making in EU foreign-policy is highly decentralised and takes place as an aggregating pro-

cess of opinions at different stages and levels,67 which is why a number of different 'entry points'

are necessary to obtain significant results. Accordingly, this chapter sets out to examine Taiwan's re-

lations with institutional actors as well as potential alternative 'channels of influence' via the media

and academia. To a large extent, the following analysis relies on semi-guided interviews with actors

from both sides, the results of which have been cross-examined based on secondary literature

about Taiwan's relations with single institutions.

3.1 The growing relevance of the community level for Taiwan

In the market-driven process of European integration, a 'European foreign policy' has long been un-

thinkable. However, despite persistent institutional shortcomings, the community-level has signific-

antly gained in relevance since the 1990s and both China and Taiwan started to develop specific

'Europe strategies' to intensify institutional links and obtain Brussels' support on vital questions in

East Asia.68 After the 2004 enlargement, when several relatively Taiwan-friendly countries joined

the Union, Brussels became an even more important lobbying target for Taiwanese representat-

ives.69

67 Keukeleire & Delreux, The foreign policy..., op.cit., p. 18; Wallace, An Institutional Anatomy..., op.cit.68 Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der..., op.cit., pp. 57-60; 137.69 Tubilewicz, Europe in Taiwan's..., op.cit., pp. 423-426.

13

The tendency of a Europeanisation of foreign policy regarding the 'Taiwan question' is also

confirmed by the formulation of the Council's 'Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in

East Asia'70 in 2007, which for the first time listed the “dispute across the Taiwan Strait” as one of

three major “threats to regional security [having] a direct bearing on the interests of the EU” in East

Asia and affirmed that “[t]he EU supports all measures to deepen economic and people-to-people

contacts between Taiwan and the mainland”.71 This diplomatic position was exactly maintained in a

2012 update, notwithstanding a more optimistic assessment of cross-Strait relations (cf. Chapter

4.2).72

Concerning institutional factors, the creation of the EETO in Taipei has undoubtedly contrib-

uted to strengthening the relevance of the community level in Europe-Taiwan relations, both by

raising the EU's profile among Taiwanese foreign-policy-makers and by providing EU decision-

makers with much more comprehensive information about Taiwan.73 Relations between the EETO

and EEAS headquarters in Brussels can in fact be assimilated to those of other, formalised EU deleg-

ations abroad, including regular coordination on political and diplomatic issues74 despite the ab-

sence of these issues from official EETO organigrams.

As for the reasons of such a Europeanization, it could be argued that moving the sensitive

Taiwan issue mainly to the community level helps national governments to rid themselves of a po -

tential irritant in their bilateral relations with China. As for human rights and other 'taboo issues',

any public mentioning of Taiwan that is not completely in line with official Chinese parlance may

represent a major irritant in diplomatic relations, which shows that what is officially treated as a

non-issue is in reality “of such an immense relevance to the Chinese side that an independent ana-

lysis of the 'Taiwan question' and any distinct European 'Taiwan policy' shall be prevented at any

price.”75 Nevertheless, the EU does have a 'Taiwan policy' and considerable bilateral relations with

Taiwanese actors, even if they are often not officially assumed.

The Taiwanese lobbying system in Europe corresponds largely with the exigencies of the EU's

'multi-location' foreign policy system.76 One EP parliamentary assistant highlighted the admiringly

good coordination between the TRO in Brussels and national-level TROs in major European capitals,

recalling for instance that Taiwanese diplomats in Brussels were perfectly informed of European

70 Council of the European Union, “Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia”, 20December 2007, Brussels.71 Ibid., p.2.72 Council of the European Union, “Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asi a”, Ref.11492/12, 15 June 2012, Brussels, p.5.73 Winkler, A Question of..., op.cit., p.2.74 Interview with an EEAS official, European External Action Service, Brussels, 27 March 2015.75 Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der..., op.cit., p.13; my translation.76 Wallace, An Institutional Anatomy...,, op.cit., p.78.

14

parliamentarians' (MEPs) former engagements with Taiwan at the national level.77 The staffing of

different TROs in Europe equally reflects the predominant importance of the community level for

Taiwan today, with the TRO in Brussels being significantly larger78 than representations in national

capitals and, importantly, staffed with seasoned diplomats and important figures of Taiwanese

politics.79 This latter fact contrasts notably with the Chinese mission to the EU which is staffed with

many junior diplomats, reflecting the more limited importance attributed to supranational institu-

tions in European foreign policy-making by the PRC. More generally, Taiwanese lobbying in Brussels

is described by European actors and observers as very active and more adapted to European cul-

tural susceptibility than mainland Chinese diplomacy:

“Taiwanese have used their representation here in Brussels to the European Union, and I imagine in mem -ber countries, quite effectively, they seem to have a capacity for reaching out, explaining, getting theirmessage across in very effective ways […] which to me is quite...remarkable, for an entity that has thiskind of an ambiguous status and recognition.”80

“Taiwan is very open, they have a different mentality than the Chinese, we see them as closer to usEuropeans […] the Taiwanese are also very, very active, they are one of the most active embassies in theParliament, they are everywhere all the time...it's definitely not an ambassador who stays at home in hisbeautiful residence all day.”81

After this general assessment of Taipei's adaptation to the progressive Europeanisation of foreign

policy, we will now turn to the analysis of individual 'channels of influence' in Brussels.

3.2 Reaching institutional foreign policy actors

3.2.1 Taiwan's relevance for EU member states and Council positions

The above-mentioned 'Europeanisation' does not mean that member states are somehow losing

control of the EU's foreign policy. However, facing the balance of power in the early 21 st century, it

has become clear that no single European country is powerful enough to even cautiously stand up

to Beijing on a question as sensitive as the Taiwan issue:

“[A] new German Taiwan policy concerning the political sovereignty of the ROC is only possible if theEuropean Union takes a new stand on the 'Taiwan question'. Such a readjustment could therefore only bepart of a new European China policy that transcends the parochial perspectives (or national interests) ofits member states and at the same time makes it impossible for the Beijing government to play the 'bar-barians' against each other. Bluntly spoken: No political upgrading of German-Taiwanese relations withouta strong European backing.”82

77 Interview with a parliamentary assistant, European Parliament, via telephone, 20 April 2015.78 About 35 Taiwanese diplomats and 15 local staff, according to unconfirmed insider information (cf. Inter -view 7).79 The best example for this is David Lin (林永樂), who was ROC representative to the EU from 2010 beforebeing directly promoted to the office of foreign minister in 2012.80 Interview with an EIAS Taiwan expert, European Institute for Asian Studies, Brussels, 13 March 2015.81 Parliamentary assistant INTA (Interview 4); my translation.82 G. Schubert, “The European Dimension of German-Taiwanese Relations. A Critical Assessment”, China ak-tuell, vol. 30, no.9, 2011, p.989.

15

This statement, made in 2001, is all the more true today, with the 'China factor' being more relev-

ant than ever in IR and Taiwan's international standing in progressive decline.83 In view of these new

realities, lobbying individual member states on issues of high politics as such has ceased to be a

promising strategy for the Taiwanese government. European capitals do however remain important

lobbying sites both because of the relevance of lower-level commercial dealings, and – more im-

portantly – because their positions are key to community-level decision-making in the Council.84

As mentioned before, analysing Taiwanese lobbying in national capitals would require to tell

28 different stories, which is not the goal of this research. Given that national attitudes towards

Taiwan are closely correlated with the state of bilateral relations with China, it is no wonder that

the PRC's overwhelming economic importance for all European countries has flattened out intra-

European differences as even formerly Taiwan-friendly countries such as the Czech Republic, Latvia

or the Netherlands have aligned their positions with Beijing's demands.85 While the One-China

policy is universally accepted, controversies remain only as to whether the 'Taiwan question' as a

potential irritant in EU-China relations should be dealt with at all.86 Such differences, however, only

come to the fore on rare occasions, for instance when France and Cyprus were the last countries to

oppose the EU-Taiwan visa waiver agreement in 2010.87 An awkward competition for a 'special rela-

tionship' with China has also repeatedly driven France and Germany to play particularly hard on

Taiwan, including France's “cynical” attitude on military cooperation with China.88 As in other as-

pects of EU-China relations, supranational actors can do little against such national attempts to

please the Chinese juggernaut, which is why such issues do not tend to play an important role in

Brussels.

Contrary to individual member states' initiatives, meetings in the Council are secret and China

should in principle not be able to attribute consensus-based foreign policy decisions to one or sev -

eral countries. Nevertheless, the Council's position on Taiwan has remained a very prudent one. In

contrast to the late 1990s, when the Council still condemned Chinese meddling with Taiwanese

elections89 and thereby stood up at least rhetorically in defence of Taiwan's democracy, the intensi -

fication of EU-China relations in the 2000s has pulled the Council's attitude towards Beijing and re -

duced member states' tolerance towards the provocative moves simultaneously undertaken by the

83 Magcamit & Tan, Crouching tiger, lurking..., op.cit., pp. 81-84.84 Potentially, the European Council could also play an important role in case of a strategic reorientation ofthe EU's China or Taiwan policy, yet there is no compelling empirical evidence to this point in recent years.85 E. Sandschneider, “China’s Diplomatic Relations with the States of Europe”, The China Quarterly, vol.169,2002, p.34; Tubilewicz, Taiwan and Post-Communist..., op.cit., p.22; 76.86 Cabestan, The Taiwan issue..., op.cit., pp. 93-96. 87 Su, Taiwan’s Strategy towards..., p.108.88 Mattlin, A normative EU..., op.cit., p.11.89 Tang, The European Union..., op.cit., p.64.

16

DPP government. In an obvious attempt to avoid Beijing's wrath, the Council even reached a tacit

agreement in 2001 that no member state would issue a visa to high-ranking Taiwanese politicians.90

The European mantra of the “peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive

dialogue”91 has certainly obliged the Council to issue some perfunctory criticism of China's un-

abashed threats to use military force in the Taiwan strait, as expressed in the Anti-Secession Law of

March 2005, but even such expressions of worries over a growing Chinese military supremacy92

have abated over recent years. As the financial crisis has reinforced many European countries' eco-

nomic dependency on China, member states representatives in the Council have become extremely

wary of any mentioning of Taiwan, so that even cautious initiatives by the Commission or EEAS are

met with suspicion.93

In any case, the Council itself can not be regarded as a primary 'channel of influence' for

Taiwan, given that any official relations at minister level are precluded and the Council is generally

not considered a worthwhile target for direct lobbying efforts even at lower levels. Whereas ap-

proaching permanent representatives in Brussels may be a winning strategy for business lobbyists

on more technical issues, the political sensitivity of most Taiwanese demands also excludes this al-

ternative pathway. Due to the Council's decision-making rules in foreign policy, every single mem-

ber state remains an important target of Taiwanese lobbying for any substantial policy change, and

the above-mentioned close coordination of lobbying efforts in Brussels and all European capitals is

thus Taiwan's only chance to achieve anything. Although Taiwanese lobbying tends to focus on the

other institutions first and the Council only comes in at a later stage, it can indeed be the highest

hurdle to take, as the above-mentioned obstinate opposition of two countries to the visa waiver

agreement has shown.

3.2.2 Worlds apart: The European Commission/EEAS and the European Parliament on Taiwan

Commission/EEAS

While being “largely sidelined in the CFSP and CSDP”, the European Commission still has a critical

role to play in EU foreign policy, notably in “defining, defending, promoting and representing the

common interests in the EU’s external action”.94 Out of the four Directorates-General (DG) directly

involved in European foreign policy today,95 DG Enlargement is irrelevant for Taiwan for obvious

reasons, DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO) is only marginally involved in one

project aiming towards the abolition of the death penalty and improvement of Taiwan's judicial sys -

90 H. Su, “The EU's Taiwan Policy in a New Context”, Issues & Studies, vol.46, no.1, 2010, p.10.91 See for example Council, Sixth China-EU..., op.cit., p.3.92 Cabestan, The New Détente..., op.cit., pp. 30-32.93 EEAS official (Interview 3).94 Keukeleire & Delreux, The foreign policy..., op.cit., p. 72.95 Ibid., pp. 73-74.

17

tem, and DG Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (ECHO) mainly deals with Taiwan on a technical

level, in case of typhoons for instance, or through Taiwan's most important humanitarian donor or-

ganisation, the Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation, which is actively involved in transnational disaster re-

lief and thus can be seen as a well-established Taiwanese 'second-track' diplomacy tool. The by far

most relevant role, however, is played by DG Trade, which is also the DG enjoying most leeway in

foreign policy vis-à-vis member states. In a sense, the official conduct of trade relations with the EU

is by itself an important achievement of Taiwanese lobbying, which was only made possible by

Taiwan's WTO accession in 2001.96 Besides however, the Commission has scrupulously stuck to the

official European diplomatic line (cf. Chapter 2.2) and made little effort to upgrade relations with

Taiwan any further. Since its establishment in 2010, the EEAS has stayed in line with its predecessor

DG External Relations' (RELEX) take on EU-Taiwan relations. The EEAS and DG Trade work hand in

hand as “two legs of cooperation on the European side”,97 which means that despite being two

formally separated institutions they continue to follow rather a division by topic (trade vs. all other

issues) than pursuing any substantially different approaches. Moreover, Taiwanese diplomats make

no real distinction between the two institutions, as the TRO is generally organised by policy fields –

with the noteworthy exception of the 'European Parliament division' where three diplomats focus

solely on lobbying parliamentarians and assistants.98

An EEAS official describes Taiwanese lobbying in the Commission/EEAS as “very sophisticated”

yet “very pushy”, including almost daily phone calls from the TRO and regular “invitations to lunch,

dinner, small gifts, all these sorts of things”.99 Taiwanese lobbying also includes regular invitations

for Commission/EEAS officials to visit Taiwan. This 'invitation diplomacy' is mainly aimed at raising

Taiwan's general profile and appreciation of its cultural and political distinctiveness among

European policy-makers, rather than being directly related to the promotion of specific issues.

Given that meetings at the political level are excluded, high-level officials' (up to the EEAS Secretary

General) meetings with Taiwanese representatives are of particular importance.

In sum, working relations between the Commission/EEAS and Taiwanese diplomats are well-

established, although the Taiwanese remain clearly on the demanding side and are confronted with

a favourably disposed yet relatively passive European administration, that does not seem inclined

to take any pro-Taiwan initiatives in the continuing “absence of significant pressure from domestic

constituencies or external allies.”100 Also, Schucher's bottom line that “Brussels has taken a hands-

96 Lim, The European Union's..., op.cit., p. 203.97 EEAS official (Interview 3).98 This information is based on own investigations at the TRO in Brussels as well as different interviews.99 EEAS official (Interview 3).100 Lan, The European Parliament..., op.cit., p.127.

18

off approach to the questions of stability and security in the Taiwan Strait […] and is still just talking

business”101 still holds true in most regards.

European Parliament

In stark contrast to the other European institutions' extremely cautious stance on the 'Taiwan ques-

tion', the European Parliament has long been playing the role of Taiwan's 'best friend' in Europe.

Starting with the 1985 “Resolution on Trade with Taiwan”, the Parliament has adopted numerous

Taiwan-friendly resolutions over the last three decades.102 Without questioning the EU's One-China

policy, MEPs are thus trying to fully exploit the wiggle room that this policy allows for, notably by

consistently taking sides with Taiwan over Chinese military threats and worrying armament in the

Taiwan Strait.103

An obvious downside to this well-established 'channel of influence' is the non-binding nature

of EP resolutions in foreign policy. Lan Yuchun, despite quipping that substantially, the “EP’s resolu-

tions have no effect other than upsetting Beijing”104, still identifies some secondary effects, namely

asserting the EU's moral position in international politics against other institutions' realpolitik, for-

mulating potential alternatives to the “official EU policy” and functioning as a “multiplier of public

opinion” which he supposes to be in favour of Taiwan's cause.105 And whereas institutionally, “the

Council routinely ignored the EP's resolutions on Taiwan”,106 the “main advantage of the EP is to

have direct and informal contacts with the Commission […] and parliamentarians can also raise

Taiwan's profile through written questions […] and the right to obtain an answer from the Commis -

sion.”107

While it can certainly be objected that parliaments with limited foreign policy competences

can far more easily ignore economic exigencies and show their commitment to democracy and hu -

man rights by supporting Taiwan, the European Parliament's unflinching support significantly ex-

ceeds that of other national parliaments across Europe, which makes it the most functional channel

of Taiwanese influence on the whole continent. One explanation for the EP's continuous pro-Taiwan

activism is the existence of a powerful Taiwan lobby among MEPs, the so-called EP-Taiwan Friend-

ship group founded by Vivianne Reding and other MEPs in 1991. Lan has shown that the Friendship

group has been a driving force behind most of the EP's seminal initiatives to expand quasi-political

relations with Taiwan during the late 1990s and early 2000s.108 Despite this impressive past record,

101 Schucher, Old Hat, New..., op.cit., p.41.102 Tubilewicz, Europe in Taiwan's..., op.cit., p.428.103 European Parliament, Resolution of 14 March 2013 on EU-China relations (2012/2137(INI)),P7_TA(2013)0097, Brussels, Art.36-38.104 Lan, The European Parliament..., op.cit., p.138.105 Ibid.106 Tubilewicz, Europe in Taiwan's..., op.cit., p.428.107 Parliamentary assistant INTA (Interview 4); my translation.108 Lan, The European Parliament..., op.cit., pp. 135-137.

19

the EP-Taiwan Friendship group's activeness and degree of organisation should not be over-estim-

ated:

“Yes, there is interest in Taiwan...but the Taiwan issue politically really is nothing to write home about, it ismore of a hobby for parliamentarians, which is also why MEPs restrict themselves...we see the importanceof the topic on principle, so yes, when the Taiwanese approach us, fine, but in general there is no own ini -tiative from the [friendship] group...but the group is large, you shouldn't underestimate this, the Chineseas well are looking very closely at this.”109

Most importantly, membership of the group is very informal and not even the MEPs in leading posi -

tions publicly declare their membership in the group on their own websites.110 The fact that finding

out the names of even the most active MEPs in the group required sedulous research and personal

contacts within the Parliament speaks volumes about the nature of the Taiwan lobby in the EP.

Asked about the specific implications of adhering to the group, a TRO diplomat in Brussels mainly

referred to invitations to social events organised by the Taiwanese delegation, as well as the possib -

ility of regular delegation visits to Taiwan.111 While such visits are also common for other partner

countries, Taiwan's 'invitation diplomacy' beats all records, with up to three trips to Taiwan per

year112 and the generous extension of invitations to parliamentary assistants.113 The latter are, in

fact, rightly considered another important lobbying target by Taiwanese officials, both through their

important agenda-setting function for MEPs and because they often ensure continuity between le-

gislatures, by 'hopping' from one MEP to the other within political groups and thus increasing and

solidifying the pro-Taiwan network.114

The large number of group members (over 200 MEPs during the last legislature, according to

the TRO) also suggests that the wider circle of members is hardly more than a mailing list with par -

liamentarians potentially sympathetic to Taiwan's interests. When it comes down to major lobbying

interests such as the drafting of EP reports and resolutions, or even the quest for an economic

agreement, MEPs will be targeted no matter whether they are members of the group or not. Con-

versely, an actual, close cooperation or confidentiality relationship is impossible within such a large

and loose group, and seems to rely much more on individual personal contacts and good relation-

ships with individual assistants.115

As the main value of the European Parliament for Taiwan resides in its symbolic support, the

main permanent goal of Taiwanese lobbying is indeed to build good personal relationships at all

levels: “Taiwan's priority is keeping the contacts, always keep channels open for dialogue...anyway

109 Parliamentary assistant (Interview 7); my translation.110 This informality is not only due to Chinese pressure, but also has the advantage of liberating EP-Taiwanrelations from the formal constraints of the One-China policy and allowing for informal contacts at all levels(cf. Interview 7).111 Interview with a Taiwanese diplomat, TRO, European Parliament division, Brussels, 20 April 2015.112 Ibid.113 Parliamentary assistant INTA (Interview 4); Parliamentary assistant (Interview 7).114 As in the case of one assistant I interviewed (cf. Interview 7).115 Parliamentary assistant INTA (Interview 4); Parliamentary assistant (Interview 7).

20

you get nowhere with aggressive lobbying in the Parliament.”116 Nevertheless, supportive EP resolu-

tions remain important diplomatic victories for Taiwan at each time, and TRO officials themselves,

when asked about the general improvement or worsening of Taiwan's standing in EU foreign policy-

making, spontaneously referred to the number of resolutions passed by the EP over time.117 How-

ever, if this is to be made a gauge for Taiwan's lobbying success, the prospects seem bleak. In fact,

the number of resolutions dedicated to Taiwan has been in decline since the early 2000s, when the

EP had made it a sport to express its support for the democratising Taiwan and denounce Chinese

provocations.118 Even a TRO diplomat acknowledged that

“it has become hard for the European Parliament in recent years to pass resolutions with special referenceto Taiwan. There are too many other issues, of course. So our main goal is now to include...references toTaiwan...in other resolutions and see to it that, for example, the cross-Strait chapter in resolutions onChina or East Asia is more...friendly to our position.”119

In how far the TRO will be able to compensate the loss of many important Taiwan supporters

among MEPs (through either retirement or election losses in 2014) remains to be seen, but so far

no resolutions with specific reference to Taiwan have been passed in the new legislature.

3.3 Marginalised in public discourse: The problem of Taiwan's weak presence in the media and civil society

Apart from direct institutional channels of influence, advocacy and lobbying also need to take pub-

lic pressure on political decision-makers into account. As the vast academic literature on 'outside

lobbying' has shown, raising the political salience of issues by attracting widespread media atten-

tion is an important factor of lobbying success, not only in the EU. 120 Attracting the attention of the

European mass media on a regular basis is, of course, a difficult endeavour for most small-sized

countries. But it is an even more arduous task for Taiwan, which desperately needs international at-

tention for its cause yet is increasingly overshadowed by the 'China hype' in Western public dis-

course.121

The problem of being marginalised in European public discourse is certainly not new for

Taiwan. In 2004, Lan noted that the “European media is quite indifferent to EU–Taiwan relations,

where some important events do not even attract their attention.“122 But while the restrictive

European policies towards Taiwan, such as repeated refusals by EU member states to grant visa

even to Taiwanese politicians invited by the EP in the early 2000s123 may have passed largely un-

116 Parliamentary assistant (Interview 7); my translation.117 Taiwanese diplomat, EP division (Interview 6).118 Tang, Die Taiwanpolitik der..., op.cit., p.36.119 Taiwanese diplomat, EP division (Interview 6).120 See among others Mahoney, Lobbying success in..., op.cit., p.43.121 Rawnsley, Taiwan's Soft Power..., op.cit., p.164.122 Lan, The European Parliament..., op.cit., p.136.123 Tubilewicz, Europe in Taiwan's..., op.cit., pp. 424-425.

21

noticed, the 'Taiwan question' at least remained on the public agenda as an important international

flashpoint due to the repeated public trial of strength between Taipei and Beijing. In order to illus-

trate Taiwan's more recent role in European public discourse, an analysis of news coverage in the

most important quality newspapers of four major European countries over the last 12 months is

presented in figure 2 below.124

While the results are not representative of overall European media coverage, they clearly point to

the blatant lack of attention to the 'Taiwan question' in major European newspapers. First, the over-

all coverage of Taiwan is similarly low in all outlets, ranging from 28 (Süddeutsche Zeitung) to 47 (Le

Monde) articles in one year. More importantly, most of these articles deal with natural disasters

and plane crashes (28%), or relate to Taiwanese companies or society trends (24%), without even

mentioning political issues. If political aspets are covered, then mostly from a mainland Chinese

perspective, often relating to territorial disputes in the South China Sea (25%). The umbrella move -

ment in Hong Kong in autumn 2014 has also spawned some comparisons with the situation in

Taiwan (10%). Finally, Taiwan's domestic politics, notably the Taipei mayoral elections in November

2014 made up 7% of total coverage, whereas Taiwan's foreign and cross-Strait relations accounted

for less than 6%.

This brief analysis shows that serious discussions of the 'Taiwan question' are virtually absent

from European media reports. The starkest contrast became obvious last year between the extens-

ive coverage of Hong Kong's 'Occupy Central' movement spawned by fears of increased PRC inter-

124 The analysis is based on the author's own research in the publicly accessible online archives of Le Monde(France), Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany), The Telegraph (United Kingdom) and El País (Spain). From all newsarticles mentioning the keyword “Taiwan*”, those dealing directly with Taiwan-related issues (rather thansimply mentioning Taiwan in an enumeration, etc.) were selected and grouped in six topics.

22

Figure 2: Articles on Taiwan in major European newspapers

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Articles on Taiwan in major European newspapers, April 2014-March 2015

Source: Own archive research

Foreign politics and cross-Strait relations

Taiwanese domestic politics

Economy and society

Disasters (plane crash, taifun, etc.)

Taiwan mentioned in articles on China

Taiwan mentioned in articles on Hong Kong

ference and control, while Taiwan's anti-ECFA 'Sunflower movement', which brought much larger

crowds to the streets over similar worries, was only marginally noticed by the European public. 125

Nevertheless, Taiwanese students' most radical actions, such as the temporary occupation of the

Legislative Yuan in mid-March 2014, attracted at least some attention and triggered limited discus -

sions over Taiwan's situation after the ECFA, notably in Le Monde. Thus, Taiwan's pro-independence

student movement still managed to attract significantly more European attention to Taiwanese

politics within one month than the Taiwanese government and diplomatic apparatus in a whole

year.

In addition to the neglect of political issues in European media, Taiwan is also confronted with

the problem of a weak expatriate community in Europe, depriving it of strong civil society links. 126

This contrasts sharply with the US, where there is a well-organised Taiwanese expatriate com-

munity, with active civil society lobbying organisations such as the American Citizens for Taiwan, an

organisation that “strives for a U.S. Government position on Taiwan that is fully supportive of

Taiwan's right to self-determination via referendum by all Taiwanese without external threat or in-

terference.”127 Generally speaking, the use of civil society actors' transnational links has emerged as

an important flank of Taiwan's 'total diplomacy' which, starting from the 1990s, was designed to

reap “the fruits of social and political liberalization”.128 More recently, as China's boycott of

Taiwanese access to most international forums continued despite Ma's détente policy, an “active

push for enthusiastic engagement in international activities through non-governmental organiza-

tions (NGOs) has surged as an alternative approach to the expansion of Taiwan’s international

space.“129

In Europe however, Taiwanese NGOs are barely represented and neither Taiwanese diplomats

nor their different European counterparts were able to name any politically relevant civil society

actors in personal interviews. The only 'NGO' mentioned by an interviewee at the TRO was the Fo-

Guang Shan Buddhist organisation which indeed is represented and active across Europe, with

temples and representative offices in nine EU countries.130 But as the diplomat conceded himself,

“this is more of a general nature, it's about the improvement of Taiwan's cultural image...they are

not a lobby organisation.”131 The same goes for the above-mentioned Tzu Chi Foundation, which en-

125 D. Pilling, “Taiwan resolves to resist China's embrace”, Financial Times, 5 November 2014.126 Cabestan, The Taiwan issue..., op.cit., pp. 97-99.127 American Citizens for Taiwan, “We are ACT”, http://americancitizensfortaiwan.org.128 Chen, Foreign policy of..., op.cit., p.223.129 W. Lee, Diplomatic Impetus and Altruistic Impulse: NGOs and the Expansion of Taiwan’s InternationalSpace, Brookings, Taiwan-U.S. Quarterly Analysis, 2012.130 Cf. Fo Guang Shan Monastery, “Worldwide/Europe”, https://www.fgs.org.tw/en/worldwide/Europe/.131 Interview with a Taiwanese diplomat, TRO, political division, Brussels, 20 April 2015.

23

sures at least some Taiwanese representation in international humanitarian cooperation (including

with the EU), albeit on a merely technical level.

This quasi-absence of Taiwan from the political civil society across Europe has been confirmed

by further research. Indeed, the only pro-Taiwan civil society organisation that is able to attract at

least some public attention is the Danish NGO Taiwan Corner, which is run by a relatively influential

Danish politician and unites European and Taiwanese activists. Its missions are to “defend Taiwan's

democracy” (including severe criticism of the incumbent government), support Taiwan's “member-

ship of all international organisations” as well as its “right to self-determination”.132 Whereas

Taiwan Corner can boast good contacts within the European Parliament and promotes Taiwanese

interests through Europe-wide conferences and opinion articles, it can hardly be seen as a 'second-

track' tool of KMT diplomacy, considering largely divergent views on how to represent Taiwan

abroad and the lack of any formal exchange with TROs in Brussels or elsewhere. As other pro-

Taiwan actors, however, it is also confronted with the extreme difficulty of attracting the European

media's attention to Taiwan-related issues.133

In addition to civil society, business communities and existing lobbying organisations, both

European and Taiwanese, do play a limited role as well: Both the Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce

in Europe, with sub-organisations in several EU countries, and the European Chamber of Commerce

in Taiwan (ECCT) are considered important and regular interlocutors by the TRO, who also coordin-

ate and organise activities such as conferences and delegation visits jointly with Taiwan's Foreign

Affairs Ministry and the TRO.134 Concerning the quest for improved EU-Taiwan commercial and in-

vestment ties, and in particular a Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIA), the European corporate

lobby group Business Europe is another partner with excellent connections in all European institu-

tions, from which the Taiwanese side can, to some extent, 'borrow influence'. The effectiveness of

this additional channel may, however, be hampered by a Taiwanese lack of understanding for the

specific business structures in many European countries: As the example of lobbying for an ECA

shows, mainly large companies are targeted, in an approach that mirrors lobbying in the US but

may lead Taiwanese diplomats to grossly neglect the fundamental importance of small and me-

dium-sized European companies, which are mostly unaware of Taiwan's potential but could be an

important untapped source of influence.

132 Cf. Taiwan Corner, “About Us”, http://taiwancorner.org/?page_id=92.133 Interview with Michael Danielsen, Head of Taiwan Corner, via video call, 15 March 2015.134 Taiwanese diplomat, political division (Interview 5).

24

3.4 Academic discourse and think tanks as a more promising 'channel of influence'?

Besides the mass media and NGO activism, the production of favourable 'expertise' is another po-

tentially important 'channel of influence' through which relevant decision-makers can be indirectly

convinced of – or at least their attention attracted to – a specific political cause. The particular rel-

evance of expertise-based lobbying for decision-making at the European level135 makes the follow-

ing examination of both academic and think tank research on EU-Taiwan relations all the more im -

portant for understanding Taiwanese lobbying in Europe.

EU research in Taiwan

Before turning towards Taiwan-related research in Brussels, it is worth taking a look at EU research

in Taiwan, which can be expected to inform Taiwanese diplomacy and lobbying vis-à-vis the EU.136

Yet international relations scholarship in Taiwan has long followed Taipei's foreign policy focus on

the Asia-Pacific region and even very recently, the EU specialist Hungdah Su claimed – probably

somewhat exaggeratedly – that “no academic work has ever contributed to Taiwan's EU policy”. 137

There has, however, been growing interest for the EU both as a foreign policy actor and as an integ-

ration model since the early 2000s138 and the thriving EU-China cooperation has prompted several

Taiwanese scholars to urgently emphasise the relevance of Europe as a “new direction for Taiwan's

foreign relations”.139

The EU has itself launched some 'second-track' diplomatic initiatives with regard to Taiwan. In

light of the scant academic research on the EU's functioning and policies at Taiwanese universit-

ies,140 the 'European Union Centre in Taiwan' was established in 2009. Being part of a network of

now 35 European Union Centres worldwide, this initiative is meant to function as a platform for ex-

changes and cooperation and to foster EU Studies within the host country. Indeed, a growing num -

ber of academic publications on EU politics can be observed in Taiwan since the establishment of

the Centre.141 Having a better understanding of actual EU foreign policy-making beyond a superficial

analysis of official statements may, in time, also help to inform and improve Taiwan's grand diplo-

matic strategy towards Europe. For now, Taiwanese lobbying in Brussels still appears to rely on the

personal experience of a few seasoned diplomats,142 whereas the understanding of European

policy-making in both DPP and KMT circles seems to be worthy of improvement.

135 C. Robert & A. Vauchez, “L’Académie européenne. Savoirs, experts et savants dans le gouvernement del’Europe”, Politix, vol.23, no.89, 2010, pp. 9–34.136 Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der..., op.cit., pp. 28-31.137 Su, Taiwan’s Strategy towards..., op.cit., p.85.138 Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der..., op.cit., p.137.139 Yang & Xu, Oumeng: Taiwan dui..., op.cit.140 Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der..., op.cit., pp.30-31.141 See for example the recent edited volume by Su, Asian Countries’ Strategies..., op.cit.142 EIAS Taiwan expert (Interview 1).

25

Taiwan-based research on the EU's Asia policy also has the advantage of highlighting Taiwan's

relevance as a strategic actor in East Asia – in opposition to other edited volumes on EU-Asia rela -

tions, which increasingly tend to neglect Taiwan altogether or (even worse for Taipei?) treat it solely

as a sub-issue of EU-China relations.143 Their influence on European decision-makers, however, re-

mains very limited and could only be exerted indirectly via the EETO or member states' representat-

ive offices in Taipei. Research and policy papers published in Europe or disseminated directly in

Brussels thus stand a greater chance of being noticed at a political level.

Research on Taiwan in Europe

Despite the foundation of a European Association for Taiwan Studies (EATS) in 2004 and a couple of

Taiwan research centres in London, Tübingen and Vienna, European Taiwan research still lags far

behind the prolific academic expertise on the island in the US. While the same may long have held

true for China-related expertise, the relative European academic silence on Taiwan contrasts even

more sharply with an array of engaged US research underlining the Taiwan issue's importance for

US foreign policy and urging the world to take a more active stance in the matter. For instance, a

plea comparable to Shelley Rigger's “Why Taiwan matters” could hardly be imagined in the context

of European academia:

“Taiwan matters, to China, to the United States, to the world – and above all, to its own people. It is notan object of others' destiny, but the subject of its own history; it is not a means to others' ends, but an endin itself. Regarding Taiwan in this way […] does call on others to support outcomes that affirm and upholdTaiwan's dignity and democracy.”144

In the absence of a similarly well-established Taiwan-friendly epistemic community, financial and

political support for academic exchange and Taiwan-related research has become a constant fea-

ture of Taiwanese 'second-track' diplomacy in Europe. Formally non-governmental foundations

such as the Chiang Ching-kuo foundation (in 1989) or the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (in

2003) have been set up by successive governments to generously fund academic activities and re-

search institutes abroad. However, as in the infernal race for development aid in Africa and Latin

America, Taiwanese funding is increasingly insignificant compared to a gargantuan Chinese 'soft

power crusade', including the very generous – but not unconditional – funding for Confucius Insti-

tutes to be established at European universities. In fact, the implicit political conditions and taboos

imposed on foreign universities wishing to host Confucius institutes – notably the avoidance of the

infamous 'Three T's', Taiwan, Tibet and Tian'anmen – have sparked fierce political controversies in

the US,145 while going relatively unnoticed in Europe. But as Shambaugh has demonstrated, the

143 Shambaugh, Sandschneider & Zhou (eds.), China-Europe relations, op.cit.; Wiessala, Wilson & Taneja(eds.), The European Union..., op.cit.144 S. Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters. Small Island, Global Powerhouse, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2011,p.197.145 House of Representatives, “The Price of Public Diplomacy with China”, Hearing before the Subcommitteeon Oversight and Investigations, 28 March 2012.

26

Confucius Institutes are part of a larger Chinese foreign policy bureaucracy bound to the goals of

“countering Taiwan independence proclivities” and “propagating China’s foreign policy”.146 That this

translates not only into the suppression of critical debates over the 'Taiwan question' as such, but

also into an aggressive strategy to force back Taiwanese influence in Europe, has only recently been

criticised by the European Association for Chinese Studies, which denounced Chinese interference

with, and censorship of content provided for an academic conference by the Chiang Ching-kuo

foundation in Portugal.147 Michael Danielsen also reported that it was almost impossible to find a

Danish university willing to host an annual conference of the (much smaller) EATS due to Chinese

pressure and conditional funding arrangements.148

Faced with this growing threat of being completely absorbed by China's embrace of Europe,

the Taiwanese government has launched a counter-offensive in 'academic soft diplomacy' by found-

ing the so-called Taiwan academy in 2011, intended as a “tool to promote Taiwanese-flavored Man-

darin and traditional Chinese characters, and also sponsor research on Taiwan-related topics.” 149

While the activities organised by the Taiwan academy's 'contact points' at European universities re-

main mostly in line with the KMT's apolitical 'cultural diplomacy' strategy, the emphasis on Taiwan's

linguistic, cultural and political distinctiveness – traditionally an exclusive DPP domain – is an un-

equivocal signal that even the conciliatory KMT government has taken up the gauntlet and entered

into the game of 'soft power competition' for the hearts and minds of Europeans.

Concerning the research activities (and outcomes) of Brussels-based think tanks, it is difficult

to assess the actual degree of Taiwanese interference or 'stimulus'. In any case, however, the in-

crease in studies and policy papers defending the economic importance and feasibility of an EU-

Taiwan ECA has been remarkable in recent years.150 Generally, these reports focus on expected eco-

nomic gains of an ECA for both sides and, more recently, highlight the additional chances for

European businesses created by the ECFA, thus amplifying the Taiwanese government's narrative

portraying Taiwan as a promising hub notably for the Chinese market.151 Financial support for such

studies may not only come from Taiwanese para-governmental foundations, but also from the EETO

146 D. Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy”, The China Journal, vol.57, 2007, pp. 48-49.147 European Association for Chinese Studies, “Letter of Protest at Interference in EACS Conference in Por-tugal, July 2014”, 1 August 2014.148 Michael Danielsen (Interview 2).149 A. Poon, “Soft Power Smackdown! Confucius Institute vs. Taiwan Academy”, Wall Street Journal, 12 Au-gust 2011.150 See among others, Erixon, Krol & Macyra, After Cross-Strait Rapprochement..., op.cit.; Tseng, Challengesand Opportunities..., op.cit.; P. Messerlin, The EU Preferential Trade Agreements: Defining Priorities for aDebt-Ridden, Growth-Starving EU, Sciences Po, Groupe d'Économie Mondiale, GEM Working Paper, January2012; M. Armanovica, “Taiwan. The risk of marginalisation. Economic situation and trade relations with theEU”, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Policy Briefing, October2013.151 See for example, Tseng, Challenges and Opportunities..., op.cit., pp. 14-15.

27

and the ECCT, which have long been in favour of intensified EU-Taiwan trade relations. Conversely,

the TRO in Brussels tends to rely on a more reactive and targeted approach, by establishing closer

relationships with authors having already published articles sympathetic to Taiwan's cause.152

Although the increasingly audible (para-)academic calls for an ambitious EU-Taiwan trade

agreement have not (yet?) had any tangible impact on the Commission's position, they certainly re-

inforce the standing of pro-Taiwan actors in Brussels. It is also important to note that the EP's own

research services constitute another connecting link through which these reports are made access-

ible to MEPs,153 and bureaucrats in the Commission/EEAS are equally aware of these arguments.154

3.5 Taiwan's 'channels of influence' in Europe: An overall assessment

In sum, the larger picture of Taiwan's influence at different points of Europe's 'multi-location' for-

eign policy system has not radically changed over the last years, following the handover of power

from the independence-leaning DPP to the pro-integration KMT in 2008. The KMT's positive atti-

tude towards better cross-Strait relations is warmly welcomed by most European policy-makers:

While maintaining due diplomatic restraint, an EEAS interviewee left no doubt that EU policy-

makers are relieved about the abatement of open cross-Strait friction which used to oblige Europe

to take sides, and affirmed that “better cross-Strait relations help us to have better relations with

Taiwan, otherwise it would be impossible”.155 This positive attitude is also echoed by an EIAS expert

privy to the EU's East Asia diplomacy circles.156 However, closer ties with China have not unambigu-

ously helped the Taiwanese government to improve its standing abroad,157 as Beijing's diplomatic

vice has remained unrelenting and European policy-makers have so far shown no willingness to re-

ward Taiwan's accommodating spirit with an upgrade of bilateral relations. The conclusion of the

EU-Taiwan visa waiver agreement in 2010 can be seen as the only major success story and example

of how comprehensive Taiwanese lobbying can work in the EU. As Su's case study on the issue has

shown, a concerted Taiwanese effort, starting with pro-Taiwanese MEPs in the friendship group and

then simultaneously involving Commission officials and member states' China desk officers was ne-

cessary to obtain this seminal diplomatic concession.158 The current lobbying efforts for an ECA or

BIA show how Taiwan is trying to build on this with a concerted effort at both the community and

member state level, that is closely coordinated by the TRO in Brussels.

152 Interview with an official, European Parliament, via video call, 26 April 2015.153 Cf. M. Latek, “EU-Taiwan Trade Relations”, European Parliament, Library Briefing, 3 October 2013; Arman-ovica, Taiwan, op.cit.154 EEAS official (Interview 3).155 Ibid.156 EIAS Taiwan expert (Interview 1).157 Rawnsley, Taiwan's Soft Power..., op.cit., p.161.158 Su, Taiwan’s Strategy towards..., op.cit., p.108.

28

'Invitation diplomacy' plays a crucial role in Taiwanese lobbying among Commission/EEAS offi-

cials and even more with MEPs, with the quite moderate ambition of raising generic interest for its

peculiar situation, based on a diffuse hope that better knowledge of Taiwan alone will boost its 'soft

power' and influence abroad. The KMT's turn away from the identity-based foreign policy of the

Chen Shui-bian era159 makes these low-key lobbying strategies all the more important.

Taiwan's relations with Europe thus remain precarious in many regards, with the Council, Com-

mission and EEAS strictly avoiding any potential infringement of the One-China policy and the

European media showing no particular attention to Taiwan's international position. The EP can still

be accurately described as Taiwan's best friend and ally in Europe, despite the EP-Taiwan Friendship

Group being less active today than ten years ago. A cursory examination of both national govern-

ments' official stances and negotiating positions in Brussels equally points towards relative continu-

ity, apart from the overall tendency of crisis-stricken European countries to become even more sus-

ceptible to China's political requests.160 The positive attitudes of several European think tanks to-

wards an EU-Taiwan FTA suggest that building a more integrated and favourable epistemic com-

munity around EU-Taiwan relations is one of the more functional elements of Taiwanese 'second-

track' diplomacy, although Chinese competition and interference also extend more and more to the

academic sphere.

4 Main issues of Taiwanese lobbying in Europe in the Chen and Ma era

As an EEAS official has pointed out, “the scope of discussion with Taiwan is much more limited than

with other partners, so we mainly focus on trade issues....restrictions etc....maybe a BIT, on cross-

Strait relations, and the question of international organisations.”161 While there is no denying that

other, political issues do also play a role in EU-Taiwan relations below the official radar, it is true

that these are currently the main issues of mutual concern, keeping in mind that the

Commission/EEAS tend to insist on technical economic issues and Taiwan emphasises formal co-

operation and questions of its international status. Based on previous research, the following dis-

cussion aims to examine these issues from a specific angle: the impact of the structural modifica -

tions of Taiwan's international positions brought about by East Asian trade regionalism (including

the 2006 change in EU strategy) and by the Ma government's more compromising stance on co-

operation with China after 2008.

159 Ibid., pp. 98-101.160 J. Fox & F. Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations, London, ECFR, 2009, pp. 19-31.161 EEAS official (Interview 3).

29

To understand why European decision-makers appreciate the incumbent KMT party's prag-

matic and low-key diplomatic style, it is worth reminding that the first years of Chen Shui-bian's

reign (2000-2008) were indeed a difficult period for Europe's Taiwan and China policy. Although

Chen's political acrimony rapidly softened down and the DPP's loss of a parliamentary majority in

2004 significantly diminished the 'risk' of any unilateral Taiwanese moves towards independence,162

the PRC's anxious hostility vis-à-vis a DPP-led Taiwan caused a permanent diplomatic containment

battle, which was further exacerbated in 2006 by Chen's desperate diplomatic strategy to change

the Taiwanese constitution and apply for full membership even in those international organisations

requiring full statehood.163 By renouncing such offensive claims, Su argues, the KMT's détente policy

after 2008 managed to liberate EU-Taiwan relations from the large shadow of EU-China relations as

Beijing became less nervous about Taiwanese contacts abroad than before.164 In the following sec-

tions, Taiwan's representation in international organisations, the EU's position on cross-Strait rela-

tions as well as the development of EU-Taiwan economic relations will be examined in light of these

supposedly positive effects of the KMT's accommodating strategy on EU-Taiwan relations.

4.1 Taiwanese representation in international organisations and the EU's tepid support

One topic of continuous prominence in diplomatic practice and academic literature is Taiwan's po-

tential participation – in one form or another – in different international organisations. Whereas

Taiwan's overarching diplomatic interest in being represented in as many organisations as possible

is evident, the substantive importance varies depending on the nature of each organisation.

Taiwan's main achievement in the early 21st century was its accession to the WTO (together with

the PRC), which has not only allowed for further institutionalisation of EU-Taiwan trade relations,

but also represented an important platform for Taiwan to promote further accessions.165 Whereas

Taiwan's repeated bids for UN membership or participation have not even been considered by the

General Assembly (nor supported by the EU), its demands for participation in the World Health Or-

ganisation (WHO) – backed up with technical arguments about epidemics control – were more suc-

cessful and backed up not only by the European Parliament, but also by the Council presidency in

2008.166 After the new Ma Ying-jeou administration stopped insisting on the labelling as 'Taiwan',

pragmatic participation without membership status in the WHO and as an observer in the World

Health Assembly (WHA) became possible.167 Taiwan's new WHA status, however, is criticised by civil

162 Tang, Die Taiwanpolitik der..., op.cit., p.37.163 Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der..., op.cit., p.72.164 Su, Taiwan's Strategy towards..., op.cit., p.109.165 C. Huang, “Bilateralism and Multilateralism: Taiwan's Trade Liberalization Trajectory”, The Hague Journalof Diplomacy, vol.4, no.1, 2009, pp. 54-55.166 Sehntilkowi & Kucera, Taiwan's Participation in..., op.cit., pp. 161-166.167 Winkler, A Question of..., op.cit., pp. 298-311.

30

society organisations as more precarious than before: “The current situation is deceiving for

Taiwan, with a yearly Chinese veto over its observer status...before 2008, the EU and US ensured in-

formal representation of Taiwan, which was more successful than now...”168

Although the EU could potentially provide important support for Taiwan due to the substantial

number of member states and its capacity to garner support from around 70 countries in interna-

tional forums like the UN, its role remains very limited mainly for two reasons: First, it is in most

cases not a full member itself and continues to struggle for an upgrade of its own status in most in-

ternational organisations. Second, China's staunch opposition to any improvement of Taiwan's in-

ternational status even in the most technical organisations – which has visibly hardened since the

1990s, when Taiwan's 'flexible diplomacy' was rewarded with pragmatic participation in the Asian

Development Bank (ADB) or the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)169 – makes this a highly

sensitive political issue without much to gain for the European side. An EEAS official admits to this

very reluctant attitude:

“Taiwan's participation in International Organisations is the main issue where they seek the EU'ssupport...well, mostly we say no, but if it makes sense, okay...the problem is that the Taiwanese reallywant to get everywhere, but sometimes it does simply not make sense that they should participate...”170

This illustrates that whereas the KMT government's far more lenient attitude may have helped to

find some common ground with the EU on Taiwan's “meaningful participation” rather than mem-

bership, it has not succeeded in shifting the EU's attitude in Taiwan's favour. In the current situ-

ation, other major diplomatic achievements are not on the horizon, as Taiwan's main attention has

moved to the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and TRO diplomats themselves ex-

pressed little hope for government-level participation at important upcoming events like the 2015

UN Climate Change Conference.171 It is worth noting that in this sense, the Taiwanese government

has even become less demanding than the EP, which has consistently demonstrated active support

for “Taiwan's meaningful participation […] including [in] the UN Framework Convention on Climate

Change”.172

4.2 Cross-Strait rapprochement and its implications for EU-Taiwan relations

Regarding the significant intensification of contacts between Taipei and Beijing since 2008, the

question most relevant to this study concerns the consequences of increased cross-Strait stability

168 Michael Danielsen (Interview 2).169 Chang, Die Taiwan-Frage im..., op.cit., p.189.170 EEAS official (Interview 3).171 Taiwanese diplomat, political division (Interview 5).172 European Parliament, Resolution of 24 October 2013 on the Annual Report from the Council to theEuropean Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (2013/2081(INI)), P7_TA(2013)0453, Brus-sels, Art.82.

31

for Taiwan's standing vis-à-vis the EU. On the surface, good cross-Strait relations are regarded by

European decision-makers as a precondition for more fruitful and less complicated trade (and

other) relations with Taiwan (cf. Chapter 2.2/3.2). In its updated 2012 East Asia policy guidelines,

the Council praised the “considerable improvement of relations between Taiwan and mainland

China” as a positive development for East Asian security and stability.173 Even the European Parlia-

ment has stated in 2013 that it “welcomes the increasing contacts between the PRC and Taiwan” 174

and “[s]alutes the strong and flourishing cross-Strait economic ties”,175, although with the much

more critical reminder that “they are still being seriously undermined by Chinese missiles aimed at

Taiwan and by China’s international isolation of Taiwan”176. This supports the underlying Taiwanese

rationale for intensifying and formalising its commercial ties with the PRC. The ECFA and follow-up

agreements with China are seen by President Ma as a necessary step towards future trade deals

with other countries:

“We managed to sign the ECFA with mainland China four years ago, which made it possible for us to signan investment arrangement with Japan and economic co-operation agreements (ECA) with New Zealandand Singapore. Our international space has begun to expand.”177

On the other hand, by apparently reducing the risk of a new Cold-War-style stand-off in the Taiwan

Strait, the Taiwanese government also reduces its own geopolitical relevance to other powers.

Taiwan thus pays its appeasement strategy with a decrease of de facto sovereignty:

“Taiwanese leaders are being forced to preserve the island’s quasi-independent statehood over fears oflosing its remaining de facto autonomy over domestic and foreign affairs. In essence, Taiwan chooses to bede facto free by remaining de jure unfree.”178

The growing influence of Chinese businesses in Taiwan's economy and even politics shows that

even this de facto autonomy may be endangered in the long term.179 While here again, the geostra-

tegic implications may be most relevant for the US, the above observation that Taiwan has fallen to

a lower level of attention on the European foreign policy radar may also be explained by the fact

that contentious issues are less palpable and Europe has become too comfortable with the scenario

of a smooth, incremental cross-Strait integration. That “Taiwan is, mistakenly, no longer considered

a dangerous flashpoint”180 may also explain the blissful neglect of the Sunflower movement's geo-

political implications across the world. But increased economic exchange alone provides no guaran-

173 Council, Guidelines on the..., doc.cit., p.5.174 European Parliament, Resolution of 14 March 2013, doc.cit., Art.36.175 Ibid., Art.38.176 Ibid., Art.36.177 Ma Ying-jeou, quoted in The Economist, “Straight from Mr Ma's mouth. Interview with Taiwan's presid -ent”, 28 March 2014.178 Magcamit & Tan, Crouching tiger, lurking..., op.cit., p.81.179 A. Beckershoff, “Hegemony, Symbolic Power, and Governmentality – Critical approaches to the study ofcross-Strait integration”, Paper presented at the Workshop 'Cross-Strait Relations in an Era of TechnologicalChange', University of Oxford, 5 March 2013.180 Pilling, Taiwan resolves to..., art.cit.

32

tee for lasting stability under conditions of a “highly militarised détente“.181 Instead, this spectacular

episode in Taiwanese domestic politics points to a broader problem of KMT-style lobbying in

Europe: its failure to represent and harness the full range of Taiwan's pluralistic society as a 'soft

power' advantage abroad. Due to the scarcity of alternative, non-governmental 'channels of influ-

ence', European decision-makers' understanding of Taiwan is heavily influenced by the TRO's 'offi -

cial' representation, which did everything to downplay the importance of the student movement. 182

But the growing popular resistance to cross-Strait rapprochement in Taiwan also challenges the

Commission/EEAS strategy to insist on better cross-Strait relations as a precondition for improved

EU-Taiwan relations.183 Through the Commission's economist lens, problematic aspects of trade lib-

eralisation, and in particular the ECFA's negative effects on social inequality or political autonomy in

Taiwan – as denounced by the Sunflower movement – are indeed difficult to comprehend.

While the EU's role as an actor in this security issue is and will remain marginal, its relative im-

partiality precisely due to its lack of military involvement or security interests in the region has in -

spired several observers to consider the possibilities of the EU turning into a mediator in the PRC-

ROC conflict. Describing geographical distance as a “special political asset” for the EU, Schubert has

argued that for an actor like the EU, willing to raise its international profile as a mediator and dia-

logue partner in international security issues, any responsible policy towards the Taiwan conflict im-

plies increased engagement which in turn “can only mean to bring in new initiatives to revitalize the

dialogue between Taibei and Beijing”.184 From a Taiwanese perspective, Yang & Xu showed optim-

ism about an increasing EU role in cross-Strait relations and also described an “active participation

in Asian affairs” as the only way for Europe to “ensure a beneficial future of Asian-European eco-

nomic and trade relations”.185 This eventuality however, although maybe strategically desirable from

a European perspective, seems further away than ever today, as an EEAS official's resignation about

the (theoretical) possibility for the EU to balance interests between Taipei and Beijing, demon-

strates: “Absolutely not...no, there is no possibility...Beijing completely refuses any trilateral con-

tact...personally dealing with both Taiwan and China issues is not a problem for me, but the two

have to be completely separated.”186 This confirms Cabestan's observation that the Taiwan issue

represents “an irritant more than leverage”187 in EU-China relations, at least for now.

A second perspective from which the EU's potential influence on cross-Strait relations has

been discussed is through the model role of the European integration process for cross-Strait integ-

181 Cabestan, The New Détente..., op.cit., p.25.182 Michael Danielsen (Interview 2).183 EIAS Taiwan expert (Interview 1).184 Schubert, The European Dimension..., op.cit., pp. 991-992.185 Yang & Xu, Oumeng: Taiwan dui..., op.cit., p.133; my translation.186 EEAS official (Interview 3).187 Cabestan, The Taiwan issue..., op.cit., pp. 84–101.

33

ration. Scholars in Taiwan, China and Europe have hailed the merits of applying lessons from

European integration, notably the combination of supranational institutions with the maintenance

of national sovereignty and the concept of “value-based integration” to Greater China.188 This schol-

arly initiative, however, has not been taken up as a real issue in Taiwanese lobbying, and the EU has

never attempted to actively promote its own integration model as a solution to cross-Strait rela-

tions – contrary to many other world regions, notably Sub-Sahara Africa.

4.3 The development of closer economic ties: Keeping politics out?

After an over-politicisation of EU-Taiwan relations especially during the last two years of Chen Shui-

bian's presidency, the new KMT government under president Ma clearly emphasised the import-

ance of a new pragmatic diplomacy, relying on a new EU policy that “aims to use détente in the

Strait to strengthen Taiwan's functional relations with the EU and promote Taiwan's economic in-

terests without raising any political issues.”189 To be sure, the KMT could not keep political aspects

completely out of its relations with the EU and especially the visa waiver agreement – already initi -

ated in the DPP era – was a priority issue for Taiwanese lobbying in the first years of Ma' presidency.

Today, however, the main focus has shifted towards intensified trade and investment relations.

Within the context of East Asian trade regionalism discussed in chapter 2, the Taiwanese interest in

getting as close as possible to an FTA with the EU is obvious190 and would probably have been per-

ceived by any Taiwanese government. The way in which Taiwan is pursuing this interest in Brussels,

however, is quite symptomatic for the Ma-style 'workable diplomacy'. First, the initial goal of an FTA

was soon abandoned as unrealistic and replaced by the more flexible terminus 'Economic Coopera-

tion Agreement'. Even this ambition seems to have been (unofficially) given up by Taiwan's diplo-

mats more recently:

“Taiwan's initial ambition was to have a comprehensive FTA or Economic Cooperation Agreement, but theEU responded that this would be a very long process and only a Bilateral Investment Agreement might bepossible... Taiwan therefore regards the BIA as a stepping stone to an FTA.”191

In a policy based on incrementalism, Taiwan has started to rely on what its government call s a

“block-building strategy”.192 According to a lobbying paper of the Ministry of Economic Affairs,

“working groups on issues such as [..] IPR [intellectual property], pharmaceuticals, and sanitary and

phytosanitary (SPS) measures”193 will help to intensify contacts with the European side through reg-

ular video conferences. This is apparently based on the hope that the technical 'building blocks' will

188 For an overview, cf. S. Fleischauer, “Cross-Strait Relations and the Way Forward: Observations from aEuropean Integration Perspective”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, vol.41, no.3, 2012, pp. 117–142.189 Su, Taiwan’s Strategy towards..., op.cit., p. 108.190 Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan, “Progress in launching and signing of FTAs between Taiwan and itsprimary trading partners”, Strategy paper, 7 January 2013.191 Taiwanese diplomat, political division (Interview 5).192 Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan, Progress in launching..., op.cit.193 Ibid., p.6.

34

eventually convince European bureaucrats that Taiwan is a partner to be trusted with a more com -

prehensive ECA.

That the arguments put forward by the Taiwanese side in favour of an ECA are purely eco-

nomic in nature194 can of course be seen as an adaptation to the Commission's criteria for opening

FTA negotiations, and the expected economic gains do actually support the Taiwanese bid.195 The

most important idea advanced by the Ma administration in this regard was to portray Taiwan as a

promising regional hub for European trade and investment in East Asia, and particularly as an ac-

cess point to the Chinese market.196 In this sense, another KMT rationale behind concluding the

ECFA with China in 2010 was to make Taiwan economically relevant again – an argument that has

been echoed by pro-Taiwanese forces in Europe, especially in the European Parliament:

“[E]conomic integration with mainland China, in the framework of the ECFA, would offer preferential ac-cess to the Chinese market to EU producers in Taiwan. This could be seen as an alternative to a direct EUFTA with China, which is not seen as a likely prospect in the short or medium term.”197

Similar arguments by European think tanks have been discussed in chapter 3.4. However, due to the

significant improvement of EU-China bilateral relations, as well as China's own substantial reforms

within the WTO system, doubts are being cast on Taiwan's relevance as an 'access point' to China

for Europe. Even a parliamentary official sympathetic to Taiwan described its 'hub function' as far

less pertinent than before,198 and Commission officials even tend to be somewhat exasperated

about this “Taiwanese mantra”.199 This European scepticism makes it clear that improving cross-

Strait relations and down-tuning potentially annoying demands for recognition does not automatic-

ally increase the effectiveness of Taiwanese lobbying in the commercial domain. The last chapter

will examine in more detail what form a possible EU-Taiwan trade agreement might take and to

what extent the current Taiwanese lobbying strategy is conducive to an upgrade of the EU's Taiwan

policy in this regard.

5 An EU-Taiwan trade agreement as a pathway to an actual 'Taiwan policy'?

As stated above, economic relations have long been the fundamental pillar of relations between

the EU and Taiwan. However, in light of the fundamental changes to the East Asian trading system

discussed in chapter 2, the informal and ad hoc conduct of EU-Taiwan trade relations is showing its

194 This reliance on purely economic and trade-related arguments goes beyond official discourse, as personalinterviews at the TRO and the EEAS confirmed.195 Armanovica, Taiwan, op.cit., pp. 18-19.196 M. Okano-Heijmans, S. Wit & F. van der Putten, Cross-Strait Relations and Trade Diplomacy in East Asia.Towards Greater EU-Taiwan Economic Cooperation?, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clin-gendael, Clingendael Report, 2015, pp. 41-42.197 Latek, EU-Taiwan Trade..., op.cit., p.1; emphasis added.198 EP official (Interview 8).199 Okano-Heijmans et al., Cross-Strait relations..., op.cit., p.49.

35

limitations and threatens not only to increase Taiwan's diplomatic isolation, but also its economic

standing vis-à-vis other regional trading powers. After examining the geopolitical implications of

both the conclusion and non-conclusion of a formal EU-Taiwan trade agreement, the role of the

'China factor' and China's possible reactions to an EU-Taiwan deal will be discussed. Eventually, the

last section will address the question in how far the Taiwanese lobbying system in Europe is pre-

pared to meet the challenges ahead and persuade the European side to upgrade bilateral relations.

5.1 Acknowledging the geopolitical relevance of trade agreements

Apart from the general fact that commercial policy is the main source of Commission power in for -

eign relations,200 focussing on bilateral trade in relations with Taiwan has had other obvious advant-

ages for the European side: First, the main EU interests vis-à-vis Taiwan concern technical barriers

to trade and other commercial issues, including the European wish that Taiwan “eliminate overreg-

ulation”, “comply with WTO commitments” and “accelerate the development of the service in-

dustry”.201 More broadly, the EU's self-perceived interests in East Asia are of a mainly economic

nature, which is why European actors can't see their way to risking a black eye by touching upon

any sensitive geopolitical issues. Under these circumstances, bilateral trade has been a practical

tool for maintaining relatively close relations with Taiwan without the requirement of formal diplo-

matic ties.

However, separating international commerce and geopolitics has always been tricky in reality.

At the beginning of the 21st century, partly due to what has been dubbed the “new bilateralism” 202

or plurilateralism in global trade policy, this artificial separation is rapidly becoming even more fra-

gile. In fact, the multilateral framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and

even more so the binding dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO have made it possible to de-

politicise bilateral trade relations between members to a significant extent. Instead of inevitably

leading to power-based bargaining or 'hard' conflicts between the concerned governments, most

trade disputes relating to specific industrial sectors can now be dealt with through the institutional-

ised process of the WTO. However, hopes that future state-to-state negotiations about further

trade concessions and new standards and rules of international commerce may equally be conduc-

ted primarily in a consensus-based multilateral framework in order to find generally agreeable rules

and – most importantly – achieve similar access conditions to the world market for everyone have

been buried on the heap of successive inconclusive Doha round summits.203

200 Keukeleire & Delreux, The foreign policy..., op.cit., p.73.201 Laursen, The Politics and..., op.cit., p.22.202 J. Ravenhill, “The new bilateralism in the Asia Pacific”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2, 2003, pp.299–317.203 For further discussion, cf. R. Buckley, I. Vai & L. Boulle (eds.), Challenges To Multilateral Trade: The Impactof Bilateral, Preferential and Regional Agreements, Kluwer Law International, 2008.

36

The discussion in chapter 2 has shown how the concurrent race for 'competitive liberalisation',

which the EU has officially joined in 2006, has been aptly used by the PRC to further isolate Taiwan

and eventually make cross-Strait integration the only viable option. However, as a full member of

the WTO, there is no compelling reason why Taiwan, albeit as 'Chinese Taipei', should not be

equally entitled to conclude RTAs under WTO law similarly to its neighbours. Economic reasons for

its failure to do so – beyond the FTAs with Singapore and New Zealand – can be ruled out as

Taiwan's standards for investment protection or government procurement are far more advanced

than in many competing economies.204 By refusing to even open negotiations with Chinese Taipei,

other WTO members including the EU thus clearly display an obedience to Chinese pressure that

goes beyond the requirements of the One-China policy.

But despite the Council's and even the Commission's and EEAS's reluctance to discuss it

openly, the 'Taiwan question' is not secondary by default, but by a European political decision to ig -

nore it out of a fear of provoking Chinese wrath. However, Noesselt's claim that the aggressive

Chinese position may actually be explained by Beijing's self-perceived vulnerability in this regard 205

should not go unnoticed, as it raises the question whether Europeans are not giving away the stra-

tegic potential of this issue too easily by even allowing Beijing to virtually ban it from the diplomatic

agenda.

5.2 The 'China factor' and the future of EU-Taiwan trade relations

Given that an alone-standing EU Taiwan policy without consideration for China is unthinkable, act-

ors from both the European and Taiwanese side will have to reflect upon the chances of obtaining

China's consent to, or at least sullen acceptance of, a potential upgrade of EU-Taiwan trade rela-

tions. As Europe-China relations have been intensified and institutionalised over the last decade, it

might be expected that the Chinese attitude would also become more lenient in this regard. How-

ever, the opposite is true, judging by the most recent Chinese policy paper on the EU. Under point

5, “Abiding by the One-China principle”, the Chinese government recalls that the “Taiwan question

concerns China's core interests”, which is followed by an unambiguous formulation of Chinese de-

mands:

“- Exchanges between the EU and its member states and Taiwan should be strictly limited to nonofficialand people-to-people activities. Political figures of Taiwan should not be allowed to visit the EU or itsmember states under any pretext, and the EU and its member states should refrain from having any formof official exchanges or signing any official agreements with the Taiwan authorities.

- China asks the EU and its member states not to support Taiwan's accession to any international organiza-tion whose membership requires statehood.”206

204 Erixon et al., After Cross-Strait Rapprochement..., op.cit., p.5.205 Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der...,op.cit., p.13.206 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “China's Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen the China-EU Compre-hensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation”, 2 April 2014; emphasis added.

37

Apart from the very harsh, commanding tone of this paragraph, which stands in stark contrast to

the honeyed win-win rhetoric that dominates the rest of the policy paper, the 'prohibition' of any

official agreement with Taiwan – not yet expressed in the original 2003 version of the paper – is

particularly surprising in light of China's seemingly complaisant acceptance of Taiwan's FTAs with

New Zealand and Singapore.207

Why then has China even hardened its stance vis-à-vis the EU, despite the significant improve-

ment of cross-Strait relations compared to 2003? For one, the relative lenience in other cases may

be explained by the fact that both New Zealand and Singapore already had concluded previous FTAs

with China, so that Taiwan did not get any preferential treatment in comparison. The EU may also

be seen as symbolically more important, especially after its visa waiver agreement with Taiwan –

which at the time passed without major opposition from Beijing – provoked a remarkable domino

effect across the globe.208 But the harsh wording also reflects the growing Chinese assertiveness in

world affairs that goes in pair with new Chinese nationalism and the opposition not only to Western

interference, but to Western values and politics in general under the new leadership. Finally, the

Chinese side also appears to have understood that the EU's normative foreign policy approach can

be effectively curtailed by a tough and menacing stance combined with carrots and sticks for indi-

vidual member states, as the successful strategy against official Dalai Lama visits to Europe has

shown.

As for now, the problem with the EU's apathy regarding the Taiwan question seems to be that

any support for Taiwan as a 'like-minded' democracy – although in accordance with the EU's value-

based foreign policy approach – would be seen as part of an 'offensive normative approach' with

regard to China, similarly to human rights criticism or interference with the Tibet or Xinjiang ques-

tions. This kind of normative approach, however, has lost any effectiveness vis-à-vis China due to

the “loss of moral high ground, conflicting EU interests and lack of leverage”. 209 However, if the EU

does not want to drop its value-based foreign policy in East Asia altogether, alternatives to such 'in-

terference' need to be found. Mattlin's proposal for a “defensive normative approach” towards

China may have important implications for a European Taiwan policy:

“[W]hile we should not impose our version of political democracy on China, neither can China decree, forexample, who European leaders meet on their home turf or how we should organize our internal affairs.[Such a] more realist-tinged normative policy would be far more understandable to Beijing.”210

207 For instance: “Commenting on the Taiwan-Singapore pact, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman saidBeijing had “no questions on foreign countries undertaking economic, trade and cultural relations withTaiwan.” (Fensom, Taiwan-Singapore FTA, art.cit.).208 Su, Taiwan’s Strategy towards..., op.cit., p.110.209 Mattlin, A normative EU..., op.cit., p.9.210 Ibid., p.21.

38

As regards the 'Taiwan question', such a normative approach might include not only formalised

preferential trade relations within the WTO framework, but also more openly assumed contacts

with Taiwan's government and opposition. While Beijing would probably not take kindly to such an

EU approach either, it is clear that possible diplomatic pressure or even the threat of sanctions is far

more difficult for China as long as such initiatives remain limited to the sole community level with

only tacit support from the Council. As long as the One-China policy is not formally infringed, the

EU as a whole is a too important partner for China to risk open confrontation. In return, closer eco-

nomic relations with Taiwan may even turn out to be an additional bargaining chip in the EU's

hands when negotiating future commercial agreements with China. Thus, contrary to Hu's argu-

ment that the EU's role in the 'Taiwan question' is inexorably limited by “structural constraints”,211

many of the constraints weighing upon the EU's Taiwan policy must be seen as self-imposed.

Nevertheless, there is a clear sentiment, even in pro-Taiwan leaning circles, that an ECA

between the EU and Taiwan would not just be like any other preferential trade agreement and that

the particular political status of Taiwan calls for cautiousness. China's actual and potential role is

obviously of crucial importance here: Even if Taiwan is still seen as a valuable entry point to the

Chinese market (cf. Chapter 4.3), it could also be used conversely by China to circumvent entry bar -

riers to the European market. While the same economic risk exists with other countries in the re -

gion (notably ASEAN members), in the Taiwanese case China may be suspected to have an addi-

tional political motivation to find and exploit loopholes in order to discredit Taiwan as an alone-

standing commercial partner.212 This risk would have to be weighed against the above-mentioned

potential benefits of improving European companies' access to the Chinese market:

“Taiwan has a problem and an advantage. The advantage is that Taiwan represents an entry door to theChinese market, but at the same time also an entry door for the Chinese in Europe […] China looms in theregion like an economic monster that might use any possible entry point into the European market […]Taiwan obviously would also have every interest in avoiding secret loopholes for the Chinese...as far asthey can still influence it.”213

To sum up, the constraints imposed on EU-Taiwan relations by the 'China factor', important as they

may be, do not per se preclude an upgrade of Taiwan's partnership with the EU, as long as it re-

mains formally non-political. The question, however, arises as to whether Taiwan's 'channels of in-

fluence' in Europe are strong enough to make use of this theoretical potential in the near future.

5.3 Taiwan's channels of influence in Europe: strong enough and adapted to the challenges ahead?

The analysis so far has shown that the main challenge facing Taiwanese lobbying vis-à-vis Europe

will be to stay economically relevant by concluding the most ambitious commercial agreement pos-

211 Hu, Structural Constraints on..., op.cit., pp. 37–58.212 Parliamentary assistant INTA (Interview 4).213 Ibid.

39

sible. Taiwan's initial wish for a comprehensive FTA, similar to the EU-Korean or EU-Singapore FTA,

has been flatly rejected by all EU actors, which shows that none of Taiwan's 'channels of influence'

is strong enough to make up for its particular diplomatic predicament.

Regarding the less ambitious option of an Economic Cooperation Agreement,214 the EP has

shown its support for Taiwan on several occasions, demonstrating that the EP-Taiwan Friendship

Group is still a viable 'channel of influence'.215 On the other hand, any agreement that would priv-

ilege the EU's relations with Taiwan over EU-China relations hardly enjoys any support beyond the

EP, which is why the TRO has backpedaled towards a much more limited 'Bilateral Investment

Agreement' in lockstep with the proposed EU-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Nonetheless,

the Commission and the EEAS, while struggling to find any substantial reasons against concluding at

least a BIA with Taiwan, continue to play for time: “We would support the idea of it, but negoti-

ations have not been opened so far...this is not an issue that will be resolved very soon.”216

At the current stage, even observers in the EP acknowledge that the main problem for the

Commission is not fear of Chinese reprisals but different priority-setting, particularly in light of the

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).217 The same is true for the EP's International

Trade (INTA) committee, where “Taiwan is not often mentioned now...priorities lie elsewhere”.218

The TTIP, however, is also a perfect example of how important domestic constituencies have be-

come in international trade negotiations. Whereas civil society activism regarding TTIP is generally

very hostile, transatlantic business lobbies are playing a major and decisive role in pushing for a far-

reaching EU-US FTA.219 In contrast, the pro-Taiwan business lobby in Europe is simply too weak and

the Taiwanese seem unable to strengthen this 'channel of influence' which would be vital in convin-

cing the Commission of the merits of a trade agreement.

Taiwan's lack of lobbying success despite some convincing economic arguments also shows

that the KMT's pragmatic strategy (cf. Chapter 4.3) may have fallen into the trap of taking the Com -

mission's economised discourse on trade agreements too seriously, thereby neglecting other, unar-

ticulated constraints. Rawnsley has recently criticised that by relying purely on benign themes such

as culture and mutual economic benefit, Taiwan is giving up the soft power potential of “more ap-

214 Despite being more flexible in nature than an FTA, such an agreement would still need to be comprehens-ive enough to comply with WTO rules for RTA.215 European Parliament, Resolution of 9 October 2013 on EU-Taiwan trade relations (2013/2675(RSP)),P7_TA(2013)0412, Brussels.216 EEAS official (Interview 3).217 EP official (Interview 8); Parliamentary assistant INTA (Interview 4).218 Parliamentary assistant INTA (Interview 4).219 A. Dür & L. Lechner, “Business Interests and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership”, in J.Morin (ed.), The politics of transatlantic trade negotiations. TTIP in a globalized world , Farnham, Ashgate,2014, pp. 69–80.

40

pealing but also more incendiary themes such as democracy”.220 While 'defending Taiwan's demo-

cracy' may never have been an important concern for the Commission, it definitely was for the EP in

the early 2000s. But even here, normative issues play a minor role today: “Today, democracy...val-

ues...are not seen as an important argument for intensifying trade.”221 The weakness of external

pressure on the Commission to treat Taiwan at least as favourably as other, less democratic coun-

tries with similar expected liberalisation benefits in its global RTA strategy turns out to be a massive

problem for Taiwan and confirms that even within the supposedly expertise-based European bur-

eaucracy, politics cannot be kept apart from trade relations.

What, then, are the perspectives for Taiwanese lobbying success in Europe over the next

years? In light of China's overwhelming influence, no single European member state will dare any

policy change in Taiwan's favour any longer. Thus, Taiwan's only hope for improving its standing in

Europe rests upon decisions at the community level. A further Europeanisation of foreign policy in

general might therefore play out in Taiwan's favour, in particular insofar as it implies an increased

role for the Taiwan-friendly EP. Whereas Taiwanese diplomats themselves don't see the Lisbon

treaty as having brought about any significant changes,222 the EP's role has in reality been substan-

tially upgraded through the expansion of its co-decision power to the conclusion of international

agreements. In this sense, the EP could theoretically even make the conclusion of an EU-China BIT

conditional upon a similar or more far-reaching agreement with Taiwan. For now, however, the

Taiwanese diplomatic apparatus does not seem to have grasped the full potential of these new

powers of its closest ally in Europe.

Another, albeit still hypothetical, development in Taiwan's favour may be a further European-

isation of security policies. A “Europe of defence”, as recently proposed by Commission president

Jean-Claude Juncker with French, German and Polish support,223 would certainly increase the likeli-

hood of “a common attitude [towards arms sales to Taiwan] at the European level in order to pre-

vent Beijing playing one country against another”,224 which Mengin already highlighted as a neces-

sity in 2002.

220 Rawnsley, Taiwan's Soft Power..., op.cit., p.165.221 EP official (Interview 8).222 Taiwanese diplomat, EP division (Interview 6).223 Euractiv, “Berlin, Paris und Warschau fordern 'Europa der Verteidigung'”, 31 March 2015.224 Mengin, A Functional Relationship..., op.cit., p.153.

41

6 Conclusions

In sum, this study has shown both the professionalism and activeness with which Taiwanese diplo-

mats, despite being grossly outnumbered by their Chinese colleagues, manage to maintain various

functional 'channels of influence' in Brussels, and the shortcomings of the accommodating and low-

key strategy that currently characterises Taipei's foreign policy and lobbying in Europe when it

comes to keeping the European public and decision-makers aware of Taiwan's needs and problems.

Previous findings singling out the European Parliament as Taiwan's strongest 'channel of influ -

ence' in Brussels and revealing the Commission's market-based approach to the 'Taiwan question'

have been confirmed in this study, although with the nuance that even the EP's support and in -

terest for Taiwan have dwindled over recent year, despite the EP-Taiwan Friendship Group's still re-

markable outreach. Whether the institutional separation of the EEAS from the Commission will in

the future favour a more independent (quasi-)political approach to the Taiwan question remains to

be seen. One limitation of this research has been that member states' positions on such a sensitive

topic are extremely hard to investigate in Brussels. A systematic case study relying tracing the whole

process of one concrete Taiwanese lobbying issue both in Brussels and several national capitals

would be needed to get a more comprehensive picture here.

The discussion of a potential EU-Taiwan trade agreement has demonstrated that the EU would

have the potential to go beyond the 'lowest common denominator' of member states' positions,

because community-level decisions on Taiwan would be far less susceptible to Chinese pressure

than national policies. However, despite very active Taiwanese lobbying vis-à-vis all relevant actors

in Brussels, and notwithstanding the EP's and numerous experts' repeated calls for an EU-Taiwan

ECA, no initiative has been taken in this respect by the Commission. Interestingly enough, this

passivity cannot simply be attributed to daunting threats from Beijing, but is explained, even from

within the Parliament, by “other priorities” for DG Trade – notably TTIP. The challenge for Taiwan,

thus, is not simply one of convincing through technical arguments or of competing with Chinese

lobbying, but one of agenda-setting, i.e. redefining European priorities in Taiwan's favour. In this re-

gard, however, the complete lack of public attention to Taiwan's political predicament caused by

the proliferation of regional trade agreements in its environs is disastrous.

The DPP may have been difficult to deal with for European policy-makers and certainly des-

troyed a lot of political capital even among Taiwan's closest friends in the EP though its aggressive

strategy from 2006 to 2008, but it did manage to keep the 'Taiwan question' on the European for-

eign policy radar. Ironically, the conciliatory strategy subsequently adopted by the KMT, while being

welcomed by European foreign-policy-makers and especially the Commission, may have reduced

Taiwan's leverage in other ways, notably by giving the – highly questionable – impression that the

42

Taiwan Strait is no longer a dangerous flashpoint to worry about and thus exposing Taiwan to a sort

of benign neglect from the European side.

This also highlights the often under-estimated relevance of extra-institutional lobbying chan-

nels: In fact, both the simmering attention given to Taiwanese politics by the European media and

the lack of any solid civil society network which might help to articulate and advocate Taiwan's in-

terests in Europe are important limitations to the success of Taiwanese lobbying, all the more as its

particular diplomatic quagmire makes these alternative tracks of diplomacy more crucial for Taiwan

than for any other, sovereign nation. In this sense, the KMT foreign policy is confronted with the

double problem of having to abstain from public advocacy of highly political issues itself – as this

would contravene the conciliatory approach of 'workable diplomacy' – and of being unable to har-

ness civil society support to obtain more visibility and leverage, given that civil society mobilisations

in Taiwan today are predominantly directed against the KMT's core foreign policy strategy of deep-

ening ties with China.

But even if the current government may be unable to benefit from its potential attractiveness

for European actors, the Sunflower movement is far from irrelevant for the prospects of Taiwanese

representation abroad. Regarding the implications and perspectives of further cross-Strait rap-

prochement, Pilling recently noted that “Beijing’s plan to lure Taiwan into its embrace risks backfir-

ing”225 because of increasingly hostile popular sentiments against the seamy side of economic integ-

ration with China. In fact, it is not unlikely that the KMT may be ousted in early 2016 precisely for

being too conciliatory towards the PRC, despite the benefits of improved cultural ties and new eco -

nomic opportunities for Taiwanese companies on the mainland. Although the current DPP leader

Tsai Ing-wen cannot be expected to return to the provocative diplomacy style of the Chen era,

Taiwanese lobbying in Europe may be expected to change, possibly making it more difficult for the

EU to maintain its 'hands-off approach' to the Taiwan question and eventually forcing it to develop

a distinctively European approach to cross-Strait relations – be it normative or purely interest-

based.

225 Pilling, Taiwan resolves to..., art.cit.

43

Acronyms and abbreviations

ADB Asian Development BankAPEC Asia-Pacific Economic CooperationASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsBIA Bilateral Investment AgreementBIT Bilateral Investment TreatyCFSP Common Foreign and Security PolicyCSDP Common Security and Defence PolicyDG Directorate-General (of the European Commission)DG DEVCO Directorate-General Development and Cooperation – EuropeAidDG ECHO Directorate-General Humanitarian Aid & Civil ProtectionDG RELEX Directorate-General for the External Relations DPP Democratic Progressive Party (minjindang) (Independence-leaning party, Taiwan)EATS European Association for Taiwan StudiesECA Economic Cooperation AgreementECCT European Chamber of Commerce TaipeiEEAS European External Action ServiceEETO European Economic and Trade Office (in Taipei)EP European ParliamentFTA Free-Trade AgreementGATT General Agreement on Tariffs and TradeGATS General Agreement on Trade in ServicesICAO International Civil Aviation OrganisationINTA International Trade committee of the European ParliamentIR International RelationsKMT Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, Taiwan)MEP Member of the European ParliamentMFN Most-favoured nation treatment (under WTO law)MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (of the ROC)NGO Non-governmental organisationPRC People's Republic of ChinaROC Republic of China on TaiwanRTA Regional Trade Agreement (under WTO law)TiSA Trade in Services AgreementTPP Trans-Pacific PartnershipTTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment PartnershipTRO Taipei Representative OfficeWTO World Trade Organisation

44

List of interviews

1) Interview with a Taiwan expert, European Institute for Asian Studies, Brussels, 13 March 2015.2) Interview with Head of 'Taiwan Corner', via video call, 15 March 2015.3) Interview with an EEAS official, European External Action Service, Brussels, 27 March 2015.4) Interview with a parliamentary assistant, European Parliament (INTA committee), via telephone, 27 March 2015.5) Interview with a Taiwanese diplomat, TRO, political division, Brussels, 20 April 2015.6) Interview with a Taiwanese diplomat, TRO, European Parliament division, Brussels, 20 April 2015.7) Interview with a parliamentary assistant, European Parliament, via telephone, 20 April 2015.8) Interview with an EP official, European Parliament, via video call, 26 April 2015.

Questions and answers via mail from officials of different European institutions and MEPs are notdirectly quoted but have informed the analysis throughout this study.

Bibliography

American Citizens for Taiwan, “We are ACT”, retrieved 28 April 2015, http://americancitizensfor-taiwan.org.

Armanovica, Marika, "Taiwan. The risk of marginalisation. Economic situation and trade relationswith the EU", European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union,Policy Briefing, October 2013.

Baldwin, Richard E. & Patrick Low (eds.), Multilateralizing regionalism, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 2009.

Beckershoff, André, “Hegemony, Symbolic Power, and Governmentality – Critical approaches to thestudy of cross-Strait integration”, Paper presented at the Workshop 'Cross-Strait Relations inan Era of Technological Change', University of Oxford, 5 March 2013.

Bräuner, Oliver, “How Europe Shies from Taiwan”, The Diplomat, 20 March 2012, retrieved 27 April2015, http://thediplomat.com/2012/03/how-europe-shies-from-taiwan/.

Buckley, Ross, Vai Io Lo & Laurence Boulle (eds.), Challenges To Multilateral Trade: The Impact of Bi-lateral, Preferential and Regional Agreements, Kluwer Law International, 2008.

Bush, Richard C. & Joshua Meltzer, "Taiwan and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Preparing the Way",Brookings, East Asia Policy Paper, no. 3, 2014, retrieved 20 April 2015, http://www.brooking-s.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/10/taiwan-transpacific-partnership-bush-meltzer/taiwan-transpacific-partnership-bush-meltzer-final.pdf.

Cabestan, Jean-Pierre, "The New Détente in the Taiwan Strait and Its Impact on Taiwan’s Securityand Future. More Questions than Answers", China Perspectives, vol. 3, 2010, pp. 22–33.

Cabestan, Jean-Pierre, "The Taiwan issue in Europe-China relations. An irritant more than leverage",in David L. Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider & Hong Zhou (eds.), China-Europe rela-tions. Perceptions, policies, and prospects, London, New York, Routledge, 2007, pp. 84–101.

Chang, Cheng, Die Taiwan-Frage im Kontext der strategischen Beziehungen zwischen China und denUSA nach dem Kalten Krieg [The Taiwan question in the context of the strategic relationsbetween China and the US after the Cold War], Freiburg, dissertation.de, 2009.

Chen, Jie, Foreign policy of the New Taiwan. Pragmatic diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Cheltenham,Edward Elgar, 2002.

Council of the European Union, “Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia”, 20December 2007, Brussels, retrieved 19 April, 2015, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ue-

45

docs/cms_data /docs/pressdata/en/misc/97842.pdf.Council of the European Union, “Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia”,

Ref. 11492/12, 15 June 2012, Brussels, retrieved 19 April 2015,http://eeas.europa.eu/asia/docs/guidelines_eu_foreign_sec_pol_east_asia_en.pdf.

Council of the European Union, “Sixth China-EU Summit, Beijing, 30 October 2003, Joint PressStatement”, 13424/03, Brussels, 30 October 2003, retrieved 20 April 2015, https://www.con-silium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/77802.pdf.

Donnan, Shawn, “China in push to join US-led $4tn services trade talks”, Financial Times, 23September 2013, retrieved 24 April 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/864744ec-21eb-11e3-bb64-00144feab7de.html.

Dent, Christopher M. & Debra Johnson, "Taiwan-EU Economic Relations. A European Perspective",EurAmerica, vol. 30, no. 1, 2000, pp. 109–157.

Dür, Andreas & Lisa Lechner, "Business Interests and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-nership", in Jean-Frédéric Morin (ed.), The politics of transatlantic trade negotiations. TTIPin a globalized world, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014, pp. 69–80.

Erixon, Fredrik, Michal Krol & Natalia Macyra, "After Cross-Strait Rapprochement. A conceptual ana-lysis of potential gains to Europe from China-Taiwan economic cooperation", EuropeanCentre for International Political Economy, ECIPE Occasional Paper, no. 3, 2012, retrieved 12April 2015, http://www.ecipe.org/media/publication_pdfs/OCC32012.pdf.

Euractiv, “Berlin, Paris und Warschau fordern 'Europa der Verteidigung'” [Berlin, Paris and Warsawdemand 'Europe of defence'], 31 March 2015, retrieved 28 April 2015, http://www.euract-iv.de/sections/eu-aussenpolitik/berlin-paris-und-warschau-fordern-europa-der-verteidigung.

European Association for Chinese Studies, “Letter of Protest at Interference in EACS Conference inPortugal, July 2014”, 1 August 2014, retrieved 27 April 2015,http://www.chinesestudies.eu/index.php/433-letter-of-protest-at-interference-in-eacs-con-ference-in-portugal-july-2014.

European Commission, “EU-China: closer partners, growing responsibilities”, COM (2006) 631, 24October 2006, retrieved 10 April 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0631&from=EN.

European Commission, Directorate-General Trade, The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in practice,Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011, retrieved 22 April 2015,http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/october/tradoc_148303.pdf.

European External Action Service, “EU backs China joining talks on TiSA”, 31 March 2014, retrieved28 April 2015,http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/wto/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20143103_tisa_press_release_en.htm.

European Parliament, Resolution of 14 March 2013 on EU-China relations (2012/2137(INI)),P7_TA(2013)0097, Brussels.

European Parliament, Resolution of 9 October 2013 on EU-Taiwan trade relations (2013/2675(RSP)),P7_TA(2013)0412, Brussels.

European Parliament, Resolution of 24 October 2013 on the Annual Report from the Council to theEuropean Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (2013/2081(INI)) ,P7_TA(2013)0453, Brussels.

Fensom, Anthony, “Taiwan-Singapore FTA”, The Diplomat, 8 November 2013, retrieved 18 April2015, http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/taiwan-singapore-fta/.

46

Fleischauer, Stefan, "Cross-Strait Relations and the Way Forward: Observations from a European In-tegration Perspective", Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, vol. 41, no. 3, 2012, pp. 117–142.

Fo Guang Shan Monastery, “Worldwide/Europe”, retrieved 28 April 2015,https://www.fgs.org.tw/en/worldwide/Europe/.

Fox, John & François Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations, London, ECFR, 2009, pp. 19-31.

Gao, Henry, “The RTA Strategy of China: A Critical Visit”, in Ross Buckley, Vai Io Lo & Laurence Boulle(eds.), Challenges To Multilateral Trade: The Impact of Bilateral, Preferential and RegionalAgreements, Kluwer Law International, 2008, pp. 55-66.

Heydon, Kenneth & Stephen Woolcock, The rise of bilateralism. Comparing American, European,and Asian approaches to preferential trade agreements, Tokyo, United Nations UniversityPress, 2009.

House of Representatives, “The Price of Public Diplomacy with China”, Hearing before the Subcom-mittee on Oversight and Investigations, 28 March 2012, retrieved 26 April 2015,http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/73537.pdf.

Hsu, Jenny W. & Aries Poon, “Taiwan, Singapore Sign Free-Trade Pact. Island Seeks to Lessen Its De-pendence on China”, Wall Street Journal, 7 November 2013, retrieved 18 April 2015,http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303309504579182900090244112.

Hu, Shaohua, "Structural Constraints on the EU's Role in Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations", EuropeanJournal of East Asian Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, 2011, pp. 37–58.

Huang, Chen-wei, "Bilateralism and Multilateralism: Taiwan's Trade Liberalization Trajectory", TheHague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 1, 2009, pp. 37–59.

Huang, David W., "Lobbying for a “U.S.-Taiwan FTA” in the U.S. Congress: Which “Fast Track”? WhatTarget?", in Cheng-yi Lin & Denny Roy (eds.), The Future of United States, China, and TaiwanRelations, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 101–120.

Hufbauer, Gary & Jeffrey Schott, "Fitting Asia-Pacific agreements into the WTO system", in RichardE. Baldwin & Patrick Low (eds.), Multilateralizing regionalism, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 2009, pp. 554–635.

Ikegami, Masako, "The European Union's Progressive Foreign Policy and Role in Preventing Cross-Strait Conflict", in Steve Y.-S. Tsang (ed.), Taiwan and the international community, Oxford,Peter Lang, 2008, pp. 133–152.

Kawai, Masahiro & Ganeshan Wignaraja, "Multilateralizing regional trade arrangements in Asia", inRichard E. Baldwin & Patrick Low (eds.), Multilateralizing regionalism, Cambridge, Cam-bridge University Press, 2009, pp. 495–549.

Keukeleire, Stephan & Tom Delreux, The foreign policy of the European Union, New York, PalgraveMacmillan, 2014.

Lan, Yuchun, "The European Parliament and the China–Taiwan Issue: An Empirical Approach",European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 9, 2004, pp. 115–140.

Latek, Marta, “EU-Taiwan Trade Relations”, European Parliament, Library Briefing, 3 October 2013,retrieved 22 April 2015,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130636/ LDM_BRI%282013%29130636_REV1_EN.pdf.

Laursen, Finn, "The Politics and Economics of EU-China/Taiwan Relations. A European Perspective",Dalhousie University, EUCE Occasional Paper, no. 1, 2006.

Lee, Wei-chin, Diplomatic Impetus and Altruistic Impulse: NGOs and the Expansion of Taiwan’s In-ternational Space, Brookings, Taiwan-U.S. Quarterly Analysis, 2012, retrieved 25 October2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/16-taiwan-ngo-lee.

Le Monde, “La Chine promet d'investir 250 milliards de dollars en Amérique latine”, 8 January 2015,

47

retrieved 15 April 2015, http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2015/01/08/la-chine-promet-d-investir-250-milliards-de-dollars-en-amerique-latine_4551349_3216.html?xtmc=taiwan&xtcr=28.

Lim, Paul J., "The European Union's Economic Ties with The Republic of China (Taiwan)", in GeorgWiessala, J. F. Wilson & Pradeep Taneja (eds.), The European Union and China. Interests anddilemmas, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2009, pp. 187–206.

Magcamit, M. I. & Alex C. Tan, "Crouching tiger, lurking dragon: understanding Taiwan's sovereigntyand trade linkages in the twenty-first century", International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,vol. 15, no. 1, 2014, pp. 81–112.

Mahoney, Christine, “Lobbying success in the United States and the European Union”, Journal ofPublic Policy, vol. 27, 2007, pp. 35-56.

Mattlin, Mikael, "A Normative EU Policy Towards China. Mission Impossible?". Mission Impossible?,Finnish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA Occasional Paper, no. 67, 2010.

Melissen, Jan, The new public diplomacy. Soft power in international relations, Basingstoke, NewYork, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Men, Jing, “Between Human Rights and Sovereignty-An Examination of EU-China Political Rela-tions”, European Law Journal, vol. 17, no. 4, 2011, pp. 534-550.

Mengin, Françoise, "A Functional Relationship: Political Extensions to Europe-Taiwan EconomicTies", The China Quarterly, vol. 169, 2002, pp. 136–153.

Messerlin, Patrick A., "The EU Preferential Trade Agreements: Defining Priorities for a Debt-Ridden,Growth-Starving EU", Sciences Po, Groupe d'Économie Mondiale, GEM Working Paper, Janu-ary 2012, retrieved 5 April 2015, http://gem.sciences-po.fr/content/publications/pdf/Messerlin_EU-PTAs30012012.pdf.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “China's Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen the China-EU Com-prehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation”, 2 April 2014,retrieved 17 April 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzcs/t1143406.shtml.

Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan, “Progress in launching and signing of FTAs between Taiwanand its primary trading partners”, Strategy paper, 7 January 2013, retrieved 5 March 2015,http://www.moea.gov.tw/mns/otn_e/content/wHandMenuFile.ashx?menu_id=6201.

Noesselt, Nele, Die Beziehungen der EU zu China und Taiwan. Hintergründe und Perzeptionen [TheEU's relations with China and Taiwan. Background and Perceptions], Hamburg, Verlag Dr. Ko-vac, 2008.

Okano-Heijmans, Maaike & Roy Chun Lee, “EU should tango with Taiwanese tiger and Chinesedragon”, Euractiv, 09 January 2015, retrieved 29 March 2015, http://www.euractiv.com/sec-tions/global-europe/eu-should-tango-taiwanese-tiger-and-chinese-dragon-311147.

Okano-Heijmans, Maaike, Sander Wit & van der Putten, Frans-Paul, "Cross-Strait Relations andTrade Diplomacy in East Asia. Towards Greater EU-Taiwan Economic Cooperation?", Nether-lands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Clingendael Report, March 2015, re-trieved 5 April 2015, http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/2015%20-%20Towards%20Greater%20EU-Taiwan%20Economic%20C%20ooperation%20-%20Clingendael%20Re-port%20%28FINAL%29.pdf.

Pilling, David, “Taiwan resolves to resist China's embrace”, Financial Times, 5 November 2014, re-trieved 20 April 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9652d026-6412-11e4-8ade-00144fe-abdc0.html.

Poon, Aries, “Soft Power Smackdown! Confucius Institute vs. Taiwan Academy”, Wall Street Journal,12 August 2011, retrieved 27 April 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/08/12/soft-power-smackdown-confucius-institute-vs-taiwan-academy/.

48

Ravenhill, John, "The new bilateralism in the Asia Pacific", Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2,2003, pp. 299–317.

Rawnsley, Gary D., "Taiwan’s Soft Power and Public Diplomacy", Journal of Current Chinese Affairs,no. 3, 2014, pp. 161–174.

Rigger, Shelley, Why Taiwan Matters. Small Island, Global Powerhouse, Lanham, Rowman & Little-field, 2011.

Robert, Cécile & Antoine Vauchez, “L’Académie européenne. Savoirs, experts et savants dans legouvernement de l’Europe”, Politix, vol. 23, no. 89, 2010, pp. 9–34.

Sandschneider, Eberhard, “China’s Diplomatic Relations with the States of Europe”, The ChinaQuarterly, vol. 169, 2002, pp. 33-44.

Schubert, Gunter, "The European Dimension of German-Taiwanese Relations. A Critical Assess-ment", China aktuell, vol. 30, no. 9, 2001, pp. 987–993.

Schubert, Gunter, "Towards a new European Taiwan policy? Some preliminary reflexions", AsiaEurope Journal, vol. 1, 2003, pp. 263–280.

Schucher, Günter, "Old Hat, New Rhetoric: The EU's Policy toward Taiwan after the Fifth Enlarge-ment", Issues & Studies, vol. 43, no. 3, 2007, pp. 1–51.

Sehntilkowi, Jana & Ondfej Kucera, "Taiwan's Participation in International Organizations: Obstacles,Strategies, Patterns?", in Jens Damm & Paul Lim (eds.), European perspectives on Taiwan,Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2012, pp. 147–169.

Shambaugh, David, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy”, The ChinaJournal, vol. 57, 2007, pp. 25-58,

Shambaugh, David L., Eberhard Sandschneider & Hong Zhou (eds.), China-Europe relations. Percep-tions, policies, and prospects, London, Routledge, 2007.

Solomon, Richard H. (ed.), The China factor. Sino-American relations and the global scene, Engle-wood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1981.

Su, Hungdah, "The EU's Taiwan Policy in a New Context", Issues & Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, 2010, pp.1–53.

Su, Hungdah (ed.), Asian Countries’ Strategies towards the European Union in an Inter-regionalistContext, Taipei, National Taiwan University Press, 2015.

Su, Hungdah, "Taiwan’s Strategy towards the EU: From Hallstein Doctrine to Workable Diplomacy",in Hungdah Su (ed.), Asian Countries’ Strategies towards the European Union in an Inter-re-gionalist Context, Taipei, National Taiwan University Press, 2015, pp. 85–126.

Taiwan Corner, “About Us”, retrieved 25 April 2015, http://taiwancorner.org/?page_id=92.Taiwan International TPP Network, Website visited on 28 April 2015, http://taiwaninternationaltp-

p.com/.Tang, Shaocheng, "Die Taiwanpolitik der EU - Beschränkungen und Chancen", Aus Politik und Zeit-

geschichte, no. 49, 2006, pp. 35–38.Tang, Shaocheng, "The European Union and the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait (1996-2009). A Con-

tent Analysis", Issues & Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, 2010, pp. 55–87.The Economist, “Straight from Mr Ma's mouth. Interview with Taiwan's president”, 28 March 2014,

retrieved 21 April 2015, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/03/interview-taiwans-president.

Tsang, Steve Y.-S. (ed.), Taiwan and the international community, Oxford, New York, Peter Lang,2008.

Tseng, Yea J., "Challenges and Opportunities of a EU-Taiwan ECA. A Review of Political-EconomicPerspectives", Center for Asian Studies, Asie Visions, no. 56, November 2012, retrieved 12April 2015, http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/asievisions56tseng.pdf.

49

Tubilewicz, Czeslaw, "Europe in Taiwan's Post–Cold War Foreign Relations", Diplomacy & Statecraft,vol. 18, no. 2, 2007, pp. 415–443.

Tubilewicz, Czeslaw, Taiwan and Post-Communist Europe. Shopping for allies, London, Routledge,2007.

Wallace, Hellen, “An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy Modes”, in Hellen Wallace, William Wal-lace & Mark A. Pollack (Eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress, 2005, pp. 49-90.

Wang, Cindy, “China Thaw Lets Taiwan Expand Trade Deals to Add Singapore”, Bloomberg, 7November 2013, retrieved 22 April 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-07/china-thaw-allows-taiwan-to-expand-trade-deals-to-add-singapore.

Wiessala, Georg, J. F. Wilson & Pradeep Taneja (eds.), The European Union and China. Interests anddilemmas, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2009.

Winkler, Sigrid, A Question of Sovereignty? The EU’s Policy on Taiwan’s Participation in InternationalOrganizations, PhD Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, July 2011.

Yang, Danwei & Guoli Xu, “Oumeng: Taiwan dui wai guanxi de xin fangxiang”, 欧盟:台湾对外关系的

新方向 [“The EU: A new direction for Taiwan's foreign relations”], Ouzhou yanjiu [Europe re-search], vol. 6, 2004, pp. 122–136.

Zhang, Yunwei & Jingyi Lu, “Taiwan kaikuo guoji guanxi de ling yitiao daolu. Yi Oumeng wei li”, 台灣

開拓國際關係的另一條道路。以歐盟為例 [“A new way for Taiwan to expand its internationalrelations. The EU as an example”], Taiwan New Century Foundation, New Century Forum,no. 24, December 2003.

50