Tactical Changes of the Chosŏn Military in the First Year of the …newcms.kmu.ac.kr/sites/actakoreana2/issue_file/23-2/2... · 2020. 12. 15. · 5 Kenneth Chase, Firearms: A Global

Tactical Changes of the Chosŏn Militaryin the First Year of the East Asian War

ACTA KOREANAVol. 23, No. 2, December 2020: 23–48doi: 10.18399/acta.2020.23.2.002

For the first three months of the East Asian War, Chosŏn commanders learned how fleetly the Japanese armies, equipped with keen swords for close combat and dreadful muskets for long-range shooting, marched due to their adroit maneuvers. This article examines the way the Chosŏn armies made tactical adjustments during the East Asian War, especially from the third quarter of 1592 to the first quarter of 1593, while at the same time avoiding a direct confrontation with the Japanese armies. One focus of this paper is upon how the Chosŏn armies opted for defensive fortifications, depended on infantry-centered operations, and achieved some meaningful victories. The other focus is upon how the tactical changes had a bearing on Sino-Korean military collaboration and the resumption of Sino-Japanese negotiations. This two-tiered approach will place Chosŏn perspectives in line with recent research on the interstate scale of the war, where infantry warfare and firearms became one major strategy of Chosŏn and Ming against “the northern caitiffs (the Mongols/Jurchens) and the southern dwarves (Japan) 北虜南倭” in the sixteenth century and beyond, and illuminate the complex interstate relations among the East Asian countries that couched Ming-centered regional hegemony in terms of their own security.

Keywords: East Asian War, defensive fortifications, firearms, infantry operation, Sino-Korean military cooperation

JEONG-IL LEE ([email protected]) is a research fellow at the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

JEONG-IL LEE

Introduction

Recently, the East Asian War (1592−1598), also known as the Imjin War (壬辰倭亂) in Korean, has received growing attention from Western scholars of East Asian history and international relations in the sense of its relevant implications for the complex geopolitics of contemporary East Asia.1 As regards Korean scholarship, Myung-gi Han explains the way postcolonial Korean scholarship in South Korea from the 1950s to the 1980s came under substantial pressure as a result of the complex centuries-long relationship between Korea and Japan.2 The locus of this trans-historical strain was a victimhood in which national pride and anti-Japanese hatred fed into the nationalist and hero-centered perspectives of Korean scholars. It was in the 1990s, according to Han, that new methodological and thematic orientations arose for a deeper understanding of the context surrounding and behind the war, through which academic interest in regional and international perspectives grew and the study of the domestic situation, including “diverse walks of life of those who experienced the war, and about their memories of it,” gained wider currency.3 In this context, there have been fruitful revisionist studies beyond the established narrative which has tended to romanticize heroic national resistance throughout the war and over-emphasize a victimized image of the Korean nation.4 This new research orientation foregrounds the characteristics and process of the war as an international war by reexamining various topics and facts, including the long duration of negotiations between Ming 明 and Japan from 1593 to 1597.

This reevaluation raises a host of related questions. What pushed the two countries to pursue truce talks or peace talks? Was this measure a form of delay tactics? Were Ming and Japan too strong to compete against each other? Or, did both questions fit the case? At any rate, it can be said that the protracted negotiations signify how the war was difficult for the Ming and Japan to win in a foreign country. To contextualize what challenged them, we need to consider a comprehensive perspective which allows us to explore how Chosŏn 朝鮮, over whose territory the entire war took place, made common cause with the Ming, responded to the negotiations, and strove to finish the war. This correlative approach can lead us to a better

1 Namlin Hur delivers a historiographical snapshot of the approach of contemporary Western scholarship to the war by addressing some aspects of the scholarship that can be improved and mapping out some methodological prospects through which a balance between factual integrity and analytic perceptivity can be ensured. For further reference, see Namlin Hur, “Works in English on the Imjin War and the Challenge of Research,” International Journal of Korean History 18, no. 2 (August 2013): 53-80.

2 Myung-gi Han, “A Study of Research Trends in Korea on the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592 (Imjin War),” International Journal of Korean History 18, no. 2 (August 2013): 3-12.

3 Han, “A Study of Research Trends, 19-20.4 For more references, see Kim Munja, “Imjin waeran’gi ŭi Kanghwa kyosŏp kwa Kadŭng Ch’ŏngjŏng: Chosŏn

wangja ŭi songhwan munje rŭl chungsim ŭro,” Han-Il kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu 42 (August 2012): 383-416; Kim Kyŏngt’ae, “Imjin chŏnjaeng chŏnban’gi Kat’o Kiyomasa ŭi tonghyang – chŏn’gong ŭi wigi wa Kanghwa kyosŏp ŭro ŭi kanŭngsŏng,” Taedong munhwa yŏn’gu 77 (2012): 223-268; Yi Kyehwang, “Imjin waeran kwa Kanghwa kyosŏp – Ssusima-bŏn kwa Konisi Yukinaga rŭl chungsim ŭro,” Tongbuga munhwa yŏn’gu 34 (2013): 85-110; No Yŏnggu, “Imjin waeran oegyosa,” in Han’guk ŭi taeoe kwan’gye wa oegyosa, ed. Tongbuga Yŏksa Chaedan Han’guk Oegyosa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe (Sŏul: Tongbuga Yŏksa Chaedan, 2018), 315-359.

Acta Koreana, Vol. 23, No. 2, December 202024

understanding of what happened on the front lines in a truer sense.This article reexamines Chosŏn military activities during the early stages of the war

from May 1592 and especially during the nine months from August 1592 to May 1593. The consistent tactical pattern of the regular Chosŏn armies and its connection to the (re-)configuration of the battle lines before the Japanese retreat to the southern coastline in May 1593 emerges as a theme. This paper thus further addresses the association of defeats and victories with tactical changes by the Chosŏn army. This focus on the tactical adjustments during this period offers further insights into the relationship between the ongoing fluidity of Chosŏn-Ming military cooperation and the operational structure of Ming-Japan negotiations, while intimating the deep entanglement between Ming-centered regional hegemony and the multilayered relations between Chosŏn, the Ming, and Japan.

Departing from established nationalist narratives, this approach charts the tactical adaptation of the Chosŏn armies from the third quarter of 1592 to the first quarter of 1593 and captures the unforeseeable condition of the front lines. It places Chosŏn perspectives in tandem with recent research on the interstate scale of the war where infantry warfare and firearms took a far more integral role in the military solutions of Chosŏn and the Ming toward “the northern caitiffs (the Mongols/Jurchens) and the southern dwarves (Japan) 北虜南倭” in the sixteenth century and beyond.5 Let us start with the experience of the Japanese armies that first arrived at Pusan 釜山 on the far southeastern edge of Chosŏn in May 1592.

1. June - July 1592

Brilliant Victories in a Foreign Land

For three months from May to July 1592, the Japanese armies made unbelievable progress in Chosŏn, occupying Hansŏng 漢城, present-day Seoul and then capital of Chosŏn, and P’yŏngyang 平壤, one of the most important cities in the north. Unbeatable musketeer squads and impenetrable infantry phalanxes with a tremendous amount of battle experience going back to the Sengoku 戰國 (Warring States) period quickly destroyed the Chosŏn defensive lines. Konishi Yukinaga 小西行長 (1555−1600) won at Ch’ungju 忠州, located at the mouth of the Namhan River (南漢江) where it joins the Han River (漢江) and situated in the inland hub connected all the way down to Pusan, on June 7, a week before Hansŏng fell. Yukinaga’s troops decimated the Chosŏn cavalry under Sin Ip 申砬 (1546−92), who was renowned for his military activities against the Jurchens 女眞 on the northeastern border of Chosŏn. Yukinaga occupied P’yŏngyang on July 22, having already taken Kaesŏng 開城, sitting between Hansŏng and P’yŏngyang, and established a forward base there for a march into China.

While Yukinaga launched military operations in P’yŏngan Province (平安道), where P’yŏngyang lies, the other prominent commander Katō Kiyomasa 加藤清正 (1562−1611)

5 Kenneth Chase, Firearms: A Global History to 1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 154-196.

Lee: Tactical Changes of the Chosŏn Military in the First Year of the East Asian War 25

moved up to Hamgyŏng Province (咸鏡道), standing east of P’yŏngan Province, in the far northeastern area of Chosŏn and took Prince Imhae (臨海君, 1574−1609) and Prince Sunhwa (順和君, 1580−1607) prisoner. Kiyomasa’s troops achieved a safe occupation of P’yŏngyang under Yukinaga by way of delivering side support or rear support from Hamgyŏng Province. Moreover, Wakisaka Yasuharu 脇坂安治 (1554−1626) defeated a large mass of Chosŏn troops four or five times larger than his own contingent at Yongin 龍仁, situated about 32 kilometers south of the Han River, on July 13-14.6 This triumph prevented the Chosŏn armies in the south from attacking the rear of the Japanese armies under Ukita Hideie 宇喜多秀家 (1573−1655) at Hansŏng or those under Yukinaga at P’yŏngyang. In the three months after the first battle at Pusan, the Japanese armies occupied a considerable number of major towns, including Hansŏng and P’yŏngyang, and strategic posts throughout Chosŏn. With Yukinaga in the far northwestern province and Kiyomasa in the far northeastern province, they took a step toward the fulfillment of the dream that Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豐臣秀吉 (1537−98) cherished: the conquest of continental East Asia.

However, these remarkable victories turned out to be the prelude to an unpredictable future. With the Chosŏn armies in disarray, King Sŏnjo (宣祖 r. 1567−1608) had no hesitation leaving the capital behind and fleeing to Ŭiju 義州, a Chosŏn town on the Ming frontier, on July 30.7 Around 100 days after the outbreak of the war, the court moved its general headquarters to this place, located 360 kilometers northwest of Hansŏng and 270 kilometers northwest of P’yŏngyang. This astonishingly swift transference tugged the Japanese armies farther into the interior of Chosŏn and made them create a string of fortresses.8 In the process, the Japanese armies found themselves being considerably localized at the zenith of their success, which not only stretched their supply and communication lines from Pusan to P’yŏngyang, a distance of about 500 kilometers, but also gave more offensive opportunities to Chosŏn troops and local Chosŏn militias, or “Righteous Armies” (ŭibyŏng 義兵).9

Without sufficient logistical support and troop reinforcement from mainland Japan, this limited manner of linear control caused by the colossal overextension of front lines had the potential to drag the Japanese armies into an untenably isolated position. As early as June 1592, Japanese armies assigned eight commanders the responsibility of occupying the eight provinces of Chosŏn.10 They also amassed combat strength at Hansŏng, which links P’yŏngyang in the north and Ch’ungju 忠州 in the south, and built strongholds for a long-term occupation of the provinces of Chosŏn.11

6 Kim Kyŏngt’ae, “Imjin chŏnjaeng ch’ogi Yi Kwang ŭi hwaltong kwa yongin chŏnt’u e taehan chaego,” Sach’ong 89 (2016): 8-17.

7 Sŏnjo sillok, imjin/06/22. 8 Masayuki Nukii, “Righteous Army Activity in the Imjin War,” in The East Asian War, 1592-1598: International

Relations, Violence, and Memory,” ed. James Lewis (London: Routledge, 2015), 144-154.9 For more information on the activities of the local militias, refer to Nukii, “Righteous Army Activity in the

Imjin War,” 141-159.10 Kim Kyŏngt’ae, “Imjin chŏnjaenggi Yi Chŏngam ŭi hwaltong kwa Yŏnan-sŏng chŏnt’u: P’inanmin, chŏnjaeng

yŏngung, ‘chuhwaronja’ sai esŏ,” Han’guk inmulsa yŏn’gu 24 (September 2015): 192-193.11 Yukinaga underlined the defense of P’yŏngyang which functioned as the integral base against a counterattack


By July of 1592, however, the Japanese had not fully secured the Hansŏng-P’yŏngyang line due to the fact that they had left the environs of Hansŏng in surrounding Kyŏnggi Province (京畿道) unoccupied. Moreover, they had not yet achieved complete control over Hwanghae Province (黃海道), located north of Kyŏnggi Province and south of P’yŏngan Province. The Hansŏng-Ch’ungju line was also unstable given that the Japanese armies did not dominate the Han River basin but took over only its eastern half, which meets the Namhan River and opens down to Ch’ungju. The Chosŏn army retained control of the western half of the Han River. This impediment kept the Japanese armies from moving down to Chŏlla Province (全羅道), which constituted the major grain belt of Chosŏn. The resistance of the Chosŏn armies coincidentally worked against Japanese access to the Yellow Sea and its maritime routes up to Ŭiju and the eastern coast of Ming China. The Japanese armies thirsted for a second front.

Turning to Defensive Fortifications

The Battle of Ch’ungju, which took place in June 1592, saw both sides evenly matched in terms of troop numbers.12 Sin Ip, however, chose to fight on even ground suitable for his cavalry and launched a preemptive frontal assault on Yukinaga’s troops who were arrayed for right-flank and left-flank attacks. This head-to-head contest in an open field produced a decisive victory for the Japanese forces. At the Battle of Yongin 龍仁 in July, the Japanese armies, even though outnumbered, defeated the Chosŏn armies by virtue of their more experienced and highly-organized squads armed with formidable swords and destructive muskets.13 These battles took place in field conditions that maximized the combat power of the Japanese forces both for charges with short-range weapons and gun battles with long-range weapons. Thus, the keys to the Japanese victories were muskets, set-piece battles, open fields, and infantry action.14

After their calamitous defeats, the Chosŏn commanders learned that they needed to avoid direct confrontations with the enemy, whose infantry were skilled in set-piece battle and whose fine musketry was dominant in an open field environment, while seeking alternatives to close combat which greatly suited the Japanese swordsmen. As a result of their battlefield experiences, the Choson commanders adopted more defensive tactics (sŏrhŏm 設險), which included ambush and surprise attack.15 According to the Border Defense Command (備邊司),

of the Ming armies. For more information, see Manji Kitajima, “The Imjin Waeran: Contrasting the First and the Second Invasions of Korea,” in The East Asian War, 1592-1598: International Relations, Violence, and Memory,” ed. James Lewis (London: Routledge, 2015), 78. Reading from the Chosŏn materials which describe the situation of the time, however, the Japanese armies seem to have devoted themselves to taking full possession of Hansŏng as the center of the Chosŏn campaign.

12 Yi Sanghun, “Sin Ip ŭi chakchŏn chiyŏk sŏnjŏng kwa T’an’gŭmdae chŏnt’u,” Kunsa 87 (June 2013): 292-300.13 Kim Kyŏngt’ae, “Imjin chŏnjaeng ch’ogi Yi Kwang,” 17-21.14 Chase, Firearms, 189-190. 15 See also Yu Yŏnsŏng, “Imjin waeran’gi Hansŏng chubyŏn chŏnt’u ŭi chŏllyakchŏk ŭiŭi,” Han-Il kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu


Japanese troops tended to build their strongpoints at unobstructed roadsides and avoided high mountains, steep valleys, or rocky slopes.16 Securing areas open in all directions was a pivotal component for a Japanese army requiring ease of movement between its strongholds.

In this respect, Yu Songnyong 柳成龍 (1542-1607), a high ranking official of the time, realized the importance of defensive fortifications as a means of negating the advantages the enemy held in terms of musketry and infantry tactics, both of which would be inhibited by rugged hilly terrain.17 Yu called for a tactical shift by shunning direct clashes with the Japanese armies and instead deploying Chosŏn armies in guerilla-style warfare which would fatigue the Japanese armies and provide opportunities for ambushes and raids. In essence, the compelling weakness of the Chosŏn armies for the first three months resulted in not only the rapid advance of the Japanese armies up to P’yŏngan and Hamgyŏng provinces, but also a grave over-extension of Japanese supply lines. From August, the Chosŏn armies started stepping up their effort to fight militarily against their seemingly invincible enemy.

Map 1. The eight provinces of Chosŏn: Important places and battlefields, May 1592-April 1593Drawn by Dr. Kim Chonggŭn, Northeast Asian History Foundation.

48 (2014): 120-21.16 Sŏnjo sillok, ŭlmi/10/27.17 Sŏnjo sillok, ŭlmi/1/26.


2. August 1592 to January 1593

Toward a Second Front

The Japanese armies failed to make any impressive progress in Chosŏn in the second half of 1592. Despite their victory over the Ming armies at P’yŏngyang in August, Yukinaga’s armies could not recklessly advance northwestward to Ŭiju but stood on guard against a Ming counteroffensive. The Chosŏn armies encircled the lower reaches of the Taedong River (大同江), which runs through P’yŏngyang, and kept the Japanese armies from going ashore to the west of this area.18 Kiyomasa’s armies faced such problems as abrupt counterattacks by Chosŏn troops and militia, a long and disorganized supply line, and harsh winter weather from October 1592.19 Above all, the Japanese navy continued to be beset by the Chosŏn navy under Yi Sunsin (1545−98) in a series of battles throughout the first year of the war. This unexpected containment on the southern coast rendered the Japanese armies bereft of any chance of an immediate joint operation with their own navy as well as vulnerable to inland isolation in the midst of assaults from multiple directions by Chosŏn troops and militia.20

In order to ensure victory in Chosŏn, the Japanese armies opened a second front, and Chŏlla Province was the first target. However, from the beginning of the war through the end of July, the Chosŏn navy under Yi Sunsin secured the southern shore of this province while Chosŏn troops and militias bulwarked its northern extremities. In August 1592, Japanese armies under Kobayakawa Takakage 小早川隆景 (1533−97) invaded Chŏlla Province but failed to conquer the region. Two months later, specifically after the great loss of the Japanese naval force at Pusan in October 1592, the Japanese armies moved inland to Chinju 晋州, one of the closest places to Chŏlla Province. Capturing Chinju would give them access to Kwangyang 光陽 where they could sail on the Sŏmjin River (蟾津江) up to Imsil 任實, a town 40 kilometers east of Chŏngŭp 井邑, the gateway to the delta plains and the western beaches of Chŏlla Province. As such, Chinju was the key strategic point for the Japanese to reach the seashore of Chŏlla and to reinforce their position. The Japanese armies thus attacked Chinju Fortress but retreated in early November 1592.

The second target was the Han River, specifically its lower or western reaches, because occupation of that area could facilitate the complete subjugation of Kyŏnggi Province. Total control of the Han River was also tied to the successful possession of Ch’ungch’ŏng Province

18 In September 1592, the Chosŏn armies gathered for a joint operation to attack P’yŏngyang but did not make any progress. They built up two strongpoints at Sunan 順安, 60 kilometers north of P’yŏngyang, and Chunghwa 中和, 24 kilometers south of P’yŏngyang, and placed several military camps in the west close to the coast of the Yellow Sea. Additionally, the Chosŏn navy anchored off the mouth of the Taedong River. Sŏnjo sujŏng sillok, sŏnjo 25/8/1. In October, the Chosŏn armies seized one entire ship of Japanese troops along with scores of captives. Sŏnjo sillok, imjin 25/9/4. The Chosŏn records tend to describe the Japanese troops at P’yongyang as inanimate or weary, which does not necessarily mean powerless.

19 Kim Kyŏngt’ae, “Imjin Chŏnjaeng chŏnban’gi Kato Kiyomasa ŭi tonghyang,” 230-245.20 Nukii , “Righteous Army Activity in the Imjin War,” 142-159.


(忠淸道) in the south as well as Hwanghae Province in the north. Sitting on the Yellow Sea in the west, the shores of these provinces were an essential lifeline for the Chosŏn court at Ŭiju via the maritime transportation of supplies from the unoccupied areas on the west coast. If the Japanese armies cut off the sea route and attacked along the coast or from the sea, the security of the Chosŏn court would be in jeopardy militarily and economically. Moreover, the Ming court would have to take stronger measures for the defense of their east coast up to the Liaodong Peninsula (遼東) along the Gulf of Bohai (渤海).

However, the western half of the Han River, encompassing Kanghwa Island (江華島) and its neighboring islets, was never to fall into Japanese hands, even during their retreat from Hansŏng in May 1593.21 Reports on reinforcements from Japan, including news concerning the arrival of Hideyoshi himself to overturn the precarious situation and to attack the Ming, were incorrect. After the massive Ming offensive in February 1593, Japanese troops from P’yŏngan, Hwanghae, and Hamgyŏng provinces had to return to Hansŏng. Japanese operations on the northern front under Yukinaga and Kiyomasa ceased to focus on entering Ming-occupied territory. In other words, without sweeping away the Chosŏn forces along the Han River and resolving their logistical problems, the earlier Japanese military successes on the central, western, and northern fronts were for naught; there was to be no march into Beijing.

Out of Miserable Defeat

After the defeat at Yongin in July, two groups of Chosŏn soldiers took up positions the following month alongside Ungch’i Pass (熊峙嶺) between Wŏndŭng Mountain (遠登山 713m) and Mai Mountain (馬耳山 687m) and alongside the Ich’i Pass (梨峙嶺) between Taedun Mountain (大芚山 878m) and Unjang Mountain (雲長山 1126m) to stop the Japanese under Takakage from occupying Chŏlla Province.22 During a three-day battle, the mountainous terrain nullified the superior strength of the Japanese musketeers and they decided to retreat.23 This ground battle exemplified how the Chosŏn armies came to handle their superior enemy on the battlefield.

A month and a half after the battle in Chŏlla Province, Chosŏn forces fought a battle at Yŏnan 延安 against Japanese forces under the command of Kuroda Nagasama 黒田長政 (1568−1623), who was in charge of occupying Hwanghae Province. Yŏnan sits on the western side of the P’yŏngyang-Hansŏng line 38 kilometers north of the Han River and faces southward toward the confluence of the Han River and the Imjin River (臨津江).24 The

21 Sŏnjo sillok, kyesa/6/5. The island was left untouched by the Japanese armies throughout the war.22 Kitajima, “The Imjin Waeran,” 77; Kim Kyŏngt’ae, “Imjin Chŏnjaenggi Yi Chŏngam ŭi hwaltong kwa Yŏnan-

sŏng chŏnt’u,” 193.23 Sŏnjo sujŏng sillok, Sŏnjo 25/7/1.24 The leader of the Chosŏn defenders, Yi Chŏngam (1541-1600), if not a military commander at that time, had

several important central and local appointments before the outbreak of the war and involved himself actively


Japanese troops attacked the fortress for three days from the third to the fifth of October, using siege towers and siege trains before finally giving up.

The defeat at Yŏnan embodied the Japanese two-fold dilemma: the blockade of the Chosŏn west coast and the dominance of the Chosŏn navy under Yi Sunsin along the south coast. By the end of September, the Japanese armies did not thoroughly occupy either Hwanghae or P’yŏngan provinces, but they did control some major strategic points in the eastern areas of these provinces. Chosŏn forces held the lower reaches of the Taedong River, blocking the passage of any Japanese maritime transportation from the coast.25 A gateway to the lower reaches of the Han River and the Imjin River, Yŏnan in southern Hwanghae Province was not far from Kanghwa Island, the largest unoccupied bastion of the Chosŏn armies against the westward advance of the Japanese armies to the Yellow Sea. The resistance of the forces at Yŏnan, coupled with the troops on Kanghwa, played a key role in the Battle of Yŏnan.26

As mentioned in the previous section, the Japanese armies looked for a new path to Chŏlla Province during the last quarter of 1592 and attacked Chinju, one of the major doorways to Chŏlla in the south. They assaulted Chinju Fortress for a week, starting on November 7. The Chosŏn troops under Kim Simin 金時敏 (1554−92) used cannons, explosives, gunpowder, stones, and boiling water to offset the firepower of the musketry and to destroy the siege equipment of the Japanese armies.27 However, they stuck fast to the defense of the fortress and did not venture outside the walls for close combat. At the same time, auxiliary or reserve forces from the neighboring areas stood outside providing logistical support and information, and running several diversionary operations in order to diminish the strike capability of the enemy.28 Cognizant of the prowess of the Japanese armies and the need to avoid a large-scale engagement, Chosŏn forces utilized their defensive fortifications to minimize the effectiveness of the Japanese musketry and to maximize the power of their own firearms. They also deployed other units behind enemy lines to put pressure on the enemy rear and flanks. As a result, the Japanese troops withdrew.

After the victory at Chinju, Chosŏn tactics were characterized by the deployment of defensive mobilization. The Chosŏn armies did not hunker down but moved, when necessary, to form new defensive fortifications and conduct certain diversionary, pressure, or containment operations.29 The Battle of Toksan Fortress (禿山城) at Osan 烏山 in Kyŏnggi

in national defense even after this battle. For more details, refer to Kim Kyŏngt’ae, “Imjin chŏnjaenggi Yi Chŏngam ŭi hwaltong kwa Yŏnan-sŏng chŏnt’u,” 184-190, 199-208.

25 See Footnote 18.26 Kim Kyŏngt’ae, “Imjin chŏnjaenggi Yi Chŏngam ŭi hwaltong kwa Yŏnan-sŏng chŏnt’u,” 191.27 Sŏnjo sujŏng sillok, sŏnjo 25/10/1. Haboush highlights the collaboration between the regular armies and the militia

in Chinju Fortress. See JaHyun Kim Haboush, The Great East Asian War and the Birth of the Korean Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 61-62.

28 Ha T’aegyu, “Chinju-sŏng chŏnt’u e issŏsŏ Kyŏngsang-udo kwanch’alsa Kim Sŏngil ŭi yŏkhal, Nammyŏnghak yŏn’gu 57 (2018): 140-45.

29 Swope aptly points out the limits of defensive fortifications in that fortresses equipped with this tactical measure are overly passive: “If the state evacuated most of its populace to these isolated posts, a determined


Province in the middle of January 1593 exemplifies this development. Kwŏn Yul 權慄 (1537−99) and his Chŏlla troops went northward after the battle at Ich’i 梨峙 in August, and in November they entrenched themselves in Toksan Fortress, one of the gateways to Chŏlla and Ch’ungch’ŏng. On top of its proximity to both Suwŏn 水原, one of the major Chosŏn camps at that time in the north, and Yongin, the largest Japanese stronghold in Kyŏnggi Province, in the northeast, the Osan Stream (烏山川) connected to the estuaries of the Yellow Sea. For these reasons, Toksan Fortress was of strategic importance to both Chosŏn and Japan. Chosŏn forces did not engage in direct combat but some Japanese troops came from Hansŏng under the command of Hideie and some from Yongin mobilized outside of the fort. Kwŏn executed night ambushes in joint operations with Chosŏn troops from neighboring areas, isolating Japanese troops in the harsh winter landscape.30 As in the Battle of Chinju, the Chosŏn armies remained within their defensive fortifications, avoided direct confrontation, and collaborated with other Chosŏn troops outside the fortress to execute raids and ambushes. Once again, the Japanese army retreated.

In brief, after the victories at the Battle of Ungch’i and the Battle of Ich’i in August 1592, Chosŏn commanders saw defensive fortifications, often accompanied by ambushes and raids, as effective in warding off the further advancement of the Japanese army into Chŏlla Province. The Battle of Yŏnan in October again proved their modified method successful. As in the case of the Battle of Yŏnan, Chosŏn armies defended the seashores of Hwanghae and Kyŏnggi provinces to rebut a Japanese approach to the Yellow Sea. The Battle of Chinju in November also prevented Japanese forces from penetrating this province, resolving its supply shortages, and seizing the seaboard for another northward advance. The Battle of Toksan Fortress at Osan in January 1593 became a successful test site in which the Chosŏn armies revamped their mobile defensive-fortification tactics.

3. February to April 1593

Leaving behind the Liaodong Peninsula

After the defeat at P’yŏngyang on August 23, 1592, the Ming armies under Li Rusong 李如松 (1549-98) crossed the Yalu River (鴨綠江) into Chosŏn at the end of January 1593. It took the Ming armies about five months to mobilize their forces and they did so only with difficulty.31 The second operation constituted not only a large force of 45,000 cavalry, also called the Northern Force (Ch. Beibing 北兵), but also 8,500 infantry, or the Southern

invader could simply bypass them and seize more vulnerable cities, which could well be undermanned or even empty.” Kenneth M. Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), 89.

30 Sim Sŭnggu, “Imjin waeran chung Toksan-sŏng chŏnt’u wa kŭ yŏksajŏk ŭiŭi: Chŏnsulchŏk chŏllyakchŏk kach’i rŭl chungsim ŭro,” Han’gukhak nonch’ong 37 (2012): 134-38.

31 Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail, 137-38.


Infantry (Ch. Nanbing 南兵).32 The previous loss at P’yŏngyang spelled out the necessity of infantry divisions, on top of the cavalry, to counter the well-organized Japanese musketeers and swordsmen.33

The Ming court also held ample discussions and heated debates on how to engage and win the war on their terms.34 Military action materialized not only in terms of military assistance to rescue Chosŏn, but also as a self-defense initiative due to the strategic importance of the Liaodong Peninsula, bordering both Chosŏn and Mongolia, for the security of Beijing. From its foundation, Ming had pressured all the powerful local warlords of this region to submit to their authority,35 reorganized the region into a military zone with its front line at the easternmost edges,36 and gained firm control over the Jurchens, especially the Jianzhou Jurchens 建州女眞 who lived east of the Liaodong Peninsula and north of Chosŏn across the Yalu River.37 Leaving the Liaodong military facilities behind and sending a large force to Chosŏn was an unprecedented operation that the Ming could not conduct quickly. Maximum prudence and detailed calculations of each and every scenario were requisite in their military involvement in the war taking place to the far south of Liaodong.38

The Ming court did not respond hastily to the news of the war from Chosŏn but made every effort to secure the latest news on what exactly was taking place. Some officials even suggested the possibility that Chosŏn and Japan were conducting a joint operation against the Ming.39 Following the situation of the war and collecting information on its development, the Ming court held to a wait-and-see policy with regard to the urgent request from the Chosŏn court for military aid, namely the immediate dispatch of Ming troops. However, upon receiving a report of the Japanese arrival at P’yŏngyang in July 1592, where a maritime passage to Lushun 旅順 and Tianjin 天津 via the Yellow Sea was available from the Taedong River, the Ming armies immediately prepared for combat. Troops under Zu

32 Sŏnjo sillok, kyesa/1/11.33 Sŏnjo sillok, kyesa/7/22.34 For more details, refer to Han Myŏnggi, Imjin waeran kwa Han-Chung kwan’gye (Sŏul: Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 1999),

31-42.35 Ki-seung Oh, “Clashes between Liaodong Koreans and the Goryeo Royal House in the 13th to 14th Centuries,”

The Journal of Northeast Asian History 16, no. 2 (July 2020): 23-29.36 Yi Chŏngil, “15-segi huban Chosŏn ŭi sŏbungmyŏn pangŏ wa Myŏng ŭi Yodong chinch’ul,” Yŏksa wa tamnon

87 (2018): 118-32.37 For more details, refer to Hok-Lam Chan, “The Chie-wen, Yung-lo, Hung-hsi, and Hsuan-te Reigns, 1399-

1435,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part I, eds. Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 266-68; Morris Rossabi, “The Ming and Inner Asia,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part I, eds. Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 258-70.

38 Exploring the logistics of the Ming armies from a dual perspective in which the central government and local bureaucrats shouldered the burden separately through the war, Masato Hasegawa accentuates how the operation of sea and inland transportation services for the Ming troops in Chosŏn had an unexpected yet decisive impact on the border security of the Ming, especially in the Liaodong Peninsula. Masato Hasegawa, “War, Supply Lines, and Society in the Sino-Korean Borderland of the Late Sixteenth Century,” Late Imperial China 37, no. 1 (June 2016): 109-152.

39 Han Myŏnggi, Imjin waeran kwa Han-Chung kwan’gye, 34-35.


Chengxun 祖承訓 (fl. 1570−1600) went to P’yŏngyang but suffered a defeat at the hands of the Japanese armies there in August.40 In February 1593, Ming launched a massive counterattack at P’yŏngyang, accompanied by infantry units tailored to crush the infantry-oriented enemy.

In view of the cautious Ming reaction after August 1592, it appears that the strategic behavior of the Ming armies was the result of a reserved attitude and a pragmatic approach to participation in the war. The civil supreme commander Song Yingchang 宋應昌 (1530−1606), as well as the military supreme commander Li Rusong, embodied this dual trait by seeking a complementary balance between involvement and non-involvement in the ultimate interest of Ming security. Hence, military cooperation with the Chosŏn armies was of vital importance, but the degree to which the Ming armies fought with and for Chosŏn was entirely dependent on their perception of the existence of favorable conditions on the battlefield.

On entering the war, Song and Li encountered one crucial issue strikingly similar to the Japanese armies, namely how to feed and supply such a large army. The distance between Ŭiju, where the Chosŏn court had temporally settled, and P’yŏngyang was about 250 kilometers; the distance between P’yŏngyang and Kaesŏng around 170 kilometers; and the distance between Kaesŏng and Hansŏng 55 kilometers. What was Li’s plan for achieving this goal? A mounted maneuver during the winter season is the most crucial factor here. In fact, he employed a cavalry-led blitzkrieg in which the Ming armies stormed and occupied several major places forsaken by the Japanese army, and by the third week of February had set up another base camp at Kaesŏng for the liberation of Hansŏng.41 The cold weather contributed to the brisk movement of their mounts.

The remarkable achievement of reaching Kaesŏng within two weeks of the victory at P’yŏngyang, however, brought into question the issue of how to ensure the supply lines from Ŭiju to Kaesŏng, a distance of approximately 420 kilometers. The problem of the overextended lines of supply and transportation emerged immediately after the victory at P’yŏngyang when Li proclaimed a nonstop march to Hansŏng.42 Song devised a plan in which to form a reserve supply unit with one hundred thousand infirm Ming soldiers, almost one quarter of the whole force sent to Chosŏn, and deploy two hundred men each at every ten li,43 and to furnish food, fodder for horses, and equipment for the Ming troops at the battlefront throughout five hundred li in total.44 The Ming armies knew this was critical to victory.45 Still, they overlooked the fact that their advance to Kaesŏng was much indebted

40 Regarding the first battle between the Ming and Japan, refer to Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail, 123-25.

41 Yi Chŏngil, “Imjin waeran ch’ogi chomyŏng kunsa hyŏmnyŏk ŭi yangsang: Pyŏkchegwan chŏnt’u rŭl chungsim ŭro,” Han’guksa hakpo 75 (May 2019): 89-90.

42 Sadae mun’gwe, wanli 21/1/9.43 One li 里 is roughly 555 meters. For more information, refer to Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail, xxi.44 Sadae mungwe, wanli 21/1.45 Yi Chŏngil, “Imjin waeran ch’ogi chomyŏng kunsa hyŏmnyŏk ŭi yangsang,” 90-91.


to the unhesitatingly rapid withdrawal of the Japanese armies from the areas south of P’yŏngyang down to the northern part of the Imjin River. The area south of the river, next to Hansŏng was a much different story.

Towards Negotiations

The Battle of Pyŏkchegwan 碧蹄館, about 19 kilometers northwest of Hansŏng, on February 27, 1593, disclosed the problems of cavalry-driven offensive tactics, overextended supply lines, and the underestimation of the fighting efficiency of the Japanese army. Crossing the Imjin River, Li Rusong’s elite mounted squad, neither in step with infantry support nor adequate in number, advanced into the operational area of the enemy and was ambushed at Pyŏkchegwan where the Japanese forces under Takakage, Nagasama, and others waited. Ming armies were beset to the point where Li himself was in danger of direct attack but the following Southern Infantry fought off the enemy and saved him.46 Returning to Kaesŏng, Li decided to move his main troops back to P’yŏngyang in early March.47 Leaving the logistics difficulties aside, haphazard cavalry-centered tactics prevented Ming forces from taking Hansŏng quickly after the victory at P’yŏngyang.

Interestingly, even faced with the unabated strength of the Japanese armies, Ming commanders did not seem to accept their own tactical mistakes in the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan. Instead, they blamed the lack of material support from Chosŏn and other situational elements for their difficulties in the battle. Song and Li refused to abandon their sublime mission while exalting the unlimited benevolence of Emperor Wanli (萬曆帝, r. 1572−1620) and pronouncing the regional hegemony of the Ming. For the towering achievement of this grand cause, Song expected Chosŏn to dutifully embrace Ming military methods.48

Still, the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan did testify to the ability of the Japanese to carry out a rapid counteroffensive after their hurried retreat from P’yŏngyang to Hansŏng. Word spread, originally from the interrogation of Japanese captives, that Hideyoshi would personally come to Chosŏn with an army of 200,000 troops, half for defense and the other half for an offensive against Ming forces in April 1593.49 Rumor also had it that reinforcements from Japan would arrive in April 1593, one half for defense and the other half for a coastal offensive50 or that an attack against Ming forces by troops under Kiyomasa would resume after a one-month break.51 These vague rumors caused some anxiety among the Ming commanders who

46 Sŏnjo sillok, kyesa 25/2/19.47 Yi Chŏngil, “Imjin waeran ch’ogi chomyŏng kunsa hyŏmnyŏk ŭi yangsang,” 102-3.48 Sadae mun’gwe, wanli 21/3/20. Chosŏn carefully recorded the intermittent victories of the Chosŏn armies,

including the Battle of Haengju fought around two weeks after the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan, for this very reason. See Yi Chŏngil, “Imjin waeran ch’ogi chomyŏng kunsa hyŏmnyŏk ŭi yangsang,” 90-91.

49 Sadae mun’gwe, wanli 21/3/7.50 Sadae mun’gwe, wanli 21/3/8.51 Sadae mun’gwe, wanli 21/3/5.


pressured the Chosŏn court for proper provisions, integral to the recovery of the Ming armies, and clamored for an alignment of Chosŏn troops in the vanguard in lieu of Ming troops.52

How could the Ming commanders bring an honorable victory to their troops? Song and Li sought a risky yet pragmatic option: the resumption of negotiations with the Japanese.53 The military success of the Ming army seemed to give it leverage in the negotiations. The victory at P’yŏngyang had pushed Yukinaga’s troops – one of the two Japanese vanguards – back to Hansŏng, and the whirlwind mounted dash into Kaesŏng envisaged by the Ming army promised an immediate recapture of Hansŏng. At this juncture, as long as the Japanese armies left Hansŏng and stopped fighting during the negotiations, the Ming army could justify its successful campaign in Chosŏn for the early months of 1593. Ming resumption of negotiations with Yukinaga sought a breakthrough in the stalemate after the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan.54 Participating in a war beyond their easternmost frontier, the Ming armies realized how difficult it was to fight outside of their own territory, even in the land of their close ally Chosŏn.

Meanwhile, the Japanese armies began to seek an exit plan that would enable them to get out of their predicament and rearrange their battle lines. By launching powerful offensives from the beginning of the war, the Japanese had already demonstrated how strong they were. Furthermore, they deployed an effective defense against the Ming army at the Battle of P’yŏngyang in August 1592 and again at the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan in February 1593. After the second battle, the Japanese armies put a definite halt to any further southern advances by the Ming armies beyond the Imjin River and kept Hansŏng in their grip. At this point, one of their best options seemed to be to create a situation in which they could take a step back and fortify their armies along the southern coast, far closer to mainland Japan, as a precursor to redoubling their march against the Ming. A restart of negotiations with Ming seemed the most practical solution for a breakthrough. In May 1593, the Japanese armies finally made a successful move to escape the standoff at Hansŏng and safely retreated to the southern areas of Chosŏn.

With powerful weaponry and excellent tactics, the Japanese armies outmaneuvered and overwhelmed their opponents in Chosŏn at the beginning of the war. They were well equipped with the musket, the unmatchable killing machine in field operations or siege warfare on the one hand, and combat knowledge and experience on the other. Nevertheless, the growing resistance of the Chosŏn armies and the counteroffensive of the Ming armies became immediate challenges. What is worse, the Japanese armies, cut off from their navy,

52 Sadae mun’gwe, wanli 21/3/20. 53 The first negotiations between the Ming and Japanese armies took place in August 1592. See Kitajima, “The

Imjin Waeran,” 79-81; Akiko Sajima, “Hideyoshi’s View of Chosŏn Korea and Japan-Ming Negotiations,” in The East Asian War, 1592-1598: International Relations, Violence, and Memory, ed. James Lewis (London: Routledge, 2015), 95-99.

54 The Chosŏn court had information on a possible reopening of negotiations between the Ming and Japanese armies quite early in April of 1593. On April 3, the Border Defense Command (備邊司) proposed a prudent stance in regard to the Ming move. See Sŏnjo sillok, kyesa/3/2.


needed to defend an over-extended supply line running more than 520 kilometers from Pusan to Hansŏng to P’yŏngyang. Before the war, few samurai had thought how to handle the crucial issues of transporting and distributing the supplies necessary for months or more of campaigning in a foreign land. The Chosŏn campaign was an arduous task far beyond the boundaries of Japan.

An Offensive Turn?

After the victory of the Ming armies at P’yŏngyang in February 1593, Kwŏn Yul moved further up to Haengju Fortress (幸州山城), 50 kilometers north of Toksan Fortress at Osan and 14 kilometers west of Hansŏng, with his seasoned soldiers from Chŏlla.55 His main objective was to keep the Japanese troops from retreating to Hansŏng and preparing a counterattack against the Ming armies. Remarkably, the Japanese did not thwart the movement of Kwŏn’s troops, who numbered more than 3,000, and did not, or could not stop their arrival at Haengju on the northern bank of the Han River. This uninterrupted redeployment illustrates the reality that in March 1593, the Japanese did not fully control the Han River. Most of all, the movement of Kwŏn’s troops to the fortress was a second chance to develop mobile defensive-fortification tactics more actively against their enemy.

Upon hearing of the influx of Chosŏn troops from the south, the large Japanese army under Hideie, Yukinaga, Nagamasa, Takakage, and other high-ranking commanders attacked the fortress on March 14, 1593. Kwŏn applied the tactics employed at Chinju and Toksan. First, he had two rear bases under his direct control, one at Yangch’ŏn 陽川 and the other at Kŭmch’ŏn 衿川, 12 kilometers southeast of Yangch’ŏn, in order to back up the main battle at the fortress. The first base was assigned to Pyŏn Ijung 邊以中 (1546−1611) and the second one to Sŏn Kŏi 宣居怡 (1550−98). Pyŏn and Sŏn had previously participated in several battles in the desperate defense of Chŏlla Province. Pyŏn even manufactured a multiple rocket launcher (火車) capable of firing forty rocket-propelled arrows in concentrated and repeated fire, and provided Kwŏn’s troops with forty of the launchers.56

The Chosŏn troops also took full advantage of the environment by setting up wooden barricades along uneven geographic features, interspersed with the steep-sided rocky terrain, and utilized natural stones for their catapults. At the same time, along with some explosive devices, they arrayed the rocket launchers at key points of the fortress against the large Japanese force of 30,000.57 The combination of terrain, stone, and gunpowder was instrumental in counteracting the power of the Japanese musketry and in hampering the charge of the Japanese infantry.

55 Sŏnjo sillok, kyesa/2 /24.56 Kim P’yŏngwŏn has conducted a detailed study on this weapon. See Kim P’yŏngwŏn, “Haengju-sansŏng

chŏnt’u e sayongdoen pyŏn ijung hwach’a ŭi pogwŏn,” Han’guk kwahaksa hakhoeji 33, no. 3 (2011): 499-503. Ming forces also used this kind of defensive equipment in its infantry units. Refer to Chase, Firearms, 162-65.

57 Haboush, The Great East Asian War and the Birth of the Korean Nation, 90.


The Battle of Haengju occurred about two weeks after the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan. A Japanese victory at Haengju could have placed the Japanese army in a superior position in which to occupy the western part of the Han River, cut off communications and supplies between the Chosŏn court and the southern provinces on sea routes, and secure a bridgehead towards the Yellow Sea in the west. As for Chosŏn, losing the western reaches of the Han River with the fall of Haengju would have thrown open the gate to the Yellow Sea through Hwanghae and P’yŏngan provinces. A Japanese victory at Haengju could have presented a decisive chance to occupy Chŏlla Province.58 It would also have granted the Japanese still greater leverage in negotiations with Ming.

Map 2. The environs of Hansŏng: Important places and battlefields, February to May 1593Drawn by Dr. Kim Chonggŭn, Northeast Asian History Foundation

58 Kiyomasa was one of the most vigorous Japanese commanders in endeavors to attack Chŏlla Province in the spring of 1593 by means of military reinforcements from mainland Japan. Cho Kyŏngnam, Nanjung chamnok imjin/10/10.


At the Battle of Ch’ungju in June 1592, Sin Ip believed that the Japanese troops were mostly composed of infantry, and thus the best tactic was to lure them into an open field for a crushing charge of ironclad cavalry.59 This estimation turned out to be wrong. By the first quarter of 1593, Chosŏn commanders had learned to avoid any large cavalry action and tried to maximize the use of infantry in defensive fortifications. One day before Chinju Fortress was besieged in November 1592, the Chosŏn army saw 1,000 Japanese cavalry approaching their fortress ready for battle. Kim Simin ordered his soldiers to stand fast while refraining from any provocative action.60 At Toksan Fortress in January 1593, Kwŏn carried out limited mounted raids, eschewing any direct confrontation with the Japanese army outside his fortress.61 In March 1593, a hundred cavalry came out in advance of the Japanese vanguard at the Battle of Haengju, in front of which a wide plain unfolded; Kwŏn never offered a direct response through mounted combat.62

Tactically speaking, the victories at Chinju, Toksan, and Haengju pointed to the effectiveness of defensive fortifications in conjunction with the use of gunpowder, joint operations between the Chosŏn armies, ambushes and raids, and the exploitation of environmental resources. Defensive fortifications nullified the Japanese musketry and swordsmen. In addition, Chosŏn commanders debated the deployment of cavalry units on the front for purposes other than surprise attack or pursuit warfare. Moreover, Chosŏn headquarters witnessed inappropriate Ming tactics predicated upon offensive cavalry at the Battle of P’yŏngyang in August 1592 and the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan in February 1593. To destroy an enemy equipped with muskets, skilled at set-piece combat, and trained for infantry engagements, the Chosŏn military realized a more infantry-centered force structure would be necessary for Chosŏn-Ming military cooperation.63 Both in defense and offense, Chosŏn would need to make use of the Southern Infantry, which was composed of shield-men, spearmen, and swordsmen with the support of firearms. In this regard, the battlefield of Chosŏn became a combination of mounted warfare, infantry warfare, and gunpowder warfare.

59 “砬以爲彼步我騎迎入廣野以鐵騎蹙之蔑不濟矣.” Sin Hŭm, Sangch’on’go, 56: 11a4-5.60 Nanjung chamnok, imjin/10/10.61 Sim, “Imjin waeran chung Toksan-sŏng chŏnt’u,” 137.62 Sŏnjo sillok, kyesa/2 /24. Later, some considered this restraint the main reason for the victory. See Sŏnjo sillok,

kyesa/yun 11 /2.63 Yi Chŏngil, “Imjin waeran chŏnban’gi Chosŏn ŭi nambyŏng insik kwa hwaryong pangan,” Han’guksa yŏn’gu

189 (June 2020): 94-105. Lorge has rightly pointed out that “Northern Chinese troops not only found Korea unsuitable for cavalry tactics, they found their armaments left them at a severe disadvantage in fighting the Japanese. Horses, bows, and short swords could not contend with muskets and Japanese long swords. Southern Chinese troops, in contrast, were extremely effective, fighting on foot and using polearms to counter Japanese swords.” See Peter A. Lorge, The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 84-85.


4. Comparative Aspects

Fighting Abroad

Without immediate additional support from Japan, the Japanese armies in Chosŏn had to manage their logistics by themselves within Chosŏn. What mattered, then, was the degree of mobilization of human resources for the procurement of supplies in the areas that they occupied. Coming as occupiers without any additional support from Japan, they found themselves decoupled from their occupied areas. The procurement of military supplies and other resources from the localities, most of which reluctantly yet passively acquiesced to the Japanese occupation, gave rise to another type of expedition geared toward procuring necessary supplies and reduced their military reserves, which were supposed to be used in the event of unpredictable developments in the war.

What made the situation worse was the lack of reliable collaboration, save at some communal levels, throughout Chosŏn and the steady rise of armed resistance. Few of the Chosŏn ruling elite would ally themselves with the Japanese army. Local militia leaders, in control of various rural networks on top of their economic, social and cultural assets, did not collaborate with the Japanese armies to overthrow Chosŏn.64 Instead, they strongly resisted the Japanese occupiers, and despite tension and conflict, worked with the Chosŏn court, which in turn rewarded their defiance with public appointments such as local military commanders or civil officials.

The Japanese struggled to make use of local human resources and to find useful non-military collaborators. It was an unprecedented task for the Japanese army in a foreign country with a different political system, history, language, and worldview. This lack of a long-term vision for occupation or conquest outside of Japan negated the advantages of musket and sword in battle and posed major logistical problems for the Japanese army. In this sense, the Japanese army faced three obstacles: the Chosŏn army, the Ming army, and logistical troubles, all of which were caused by their own victories in the first year of the war.

For their part, the Ming drew on a three-pronged anti-Japanese strategy: 1) strike heavily and remove Japanese troops from P’yŏngyang in February 1593, 2) install defensive lines along the Imjin River in March 1593 after the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan, and 3) return to the negotiating table to discuss the retreat of the Japanese army from Hansŏng and other matters without having to increase their military strength. These steps typify the pragmatic twofold stance of the Ming army – involvement and non-involvement – and account for how they operated the three strategies of offense, defense, and negotiation in sequence, fairly analogous to those of the Japanese armies, whenever needed. Importantly, the adjustment of the balance between involvement and non-involvement was predicated on the reaffirmation of a Ming-centered regional order.

64 James Lewis, “International Relations and the Imjin War,” in The East Asian War, 1592-1598: International Relations, Violence, and Memory, ed. James Lewis (London: Routledge, 2015), 265-66.


What caused the Ming army to adopt a strategy of offense, defense, and negotiation, analogous to their Japanese counterparts? It can be said that warfare intrinsically involves these three elements, so leaders on both sides must have debated how to balance these options. Moreover, the Ming and Japanese armies shared the problem of extended lines of supply and unpredictable troop movements in a foreign country. Despite countrywide support from Chosŏn, which greatly helped the transportation of provisions and supplies, the Ming army was not free from this issue.65 As a result, as of the first quarter of 1593, negotiation emerged as the most practical modus operandi of the Ming and Japanese armies for victory in Chosŏn.

As mentioned, the Ming army received the utmost assistance from the Chosŏn court in human and material resources. The Chosŏn court provided tax rice to implement timely transportation of military supplies to frontlines that were rapidly changing in conjunction with Ming cavalry-centered lightning-war tactics. The court also mobilized local militia into logistical support units and had them carry supplies to Ming posts north of the Imjin River.66 In the process, the Chosŏn court was in constant communication with the Regional Military Commission of Liaodong (遼東都指揮使司) and the commanders of the Ming armies in Chosŏn, as well as the central offices of the Ming court, including the Ministry of Rites (禮部), the Ministry of War (兵部), the Ministry of Revenue (戶部), and the Censorate (都察院), and endeavored expeditiously to deal with critical issues related to Ming military operations and military cooperation between the two countries. The steadfast support of the Chosŏn court for the Ming army was a resource the Japanese army desperately lacked and without which a long-term occupation was simply unviable.

We can thus widen our viewpoint in scrutinizing the linkage between the tactical adjustment of the Chosŏn armies and the realignment of the war fronts, and its connections to Ming security across the Liaodong Peninsula and the untrodden path of Samurai power in an interstate war beyond the Japanese Archipelago. This orientation will enable us to contextualize more deeply the revival of negotiations between the Ming and Japan from the second quarter of 1593 in the context of both the operational effectiveness of the Chosŏn armies and some adversities of the Sino-Japanese combat in the first year of the East Asian War. In this respect, it is possible to make more attempts for a Chosŏn-focused perspective that articulates how the strategies and tactics of the Chosŏn military mattered in Sino-Japanese negotiations as well as in Chosŏn-Ming cooperation during the period.

A Complete Expulsion of the Enemy

The Chosŏn military had started thinking about a decisive thrust against the enemy, but by the end of February 1593, they knew that they could not execute any massive counterattack

65 Hur pinpoints the problem of military rations as the foremost impetus for the diplomatic shift that spurred the restart of the negotiations between the Ming and Japanese armies. Hur, “Works in English on the Imjin War,” 63-64.

66 Sŏnjo sillok , kyesa/1/11; Sŏnjo sillok , kyesa/1/12; Sŏnjo sillok , kyesa/1/23.


by themselves. In March 1593, the Chosŏn army, even armed with multiple-rocket launchers, suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of Japanese troops under Fukushima Masanori 福島正則 (1561-1624) at Chuksan 竹山, 30 kilometers southeast of Yongin. In this somewhat flat area, the Japanese army, in mobile open-field battle formation, destroyed the Chosŏn army and their multiple-rocket launchers.67 This battle reminded Chosŏn of its inability to mount a full-scale war without cooperation with the Ming army.

However, in April 1593, the Chosŏn headquarters got word of the dwindling food supplies and military strength of the Japanese armies. This problem, as Yu Sŏngnyong surmised, posed the challenges of how to make up for the food shortages, how to resolve the growing vulnerability of Japanese forces to Chosŏn attack, and how to procure reinforcements.68 March and April were typically lean months that comprised the season of spring poverty. Japanese foraging teams scoured the eastern part of Kyŏnggi Province north of the Han River as well as its western area south of the Han River in search of food supplies.69 Under these circumstances, the Chosŏn army sought a joint attack, a large-scale infantry action with the Ming army, to deal a fatal blow against the Japanese army at Hansŏng and in the areas surrounding the Han River.70 The optimal partner, they thought, would be the Southern Infantry, which had distinguished itself at Pyŏkchegwan in February 1593.71

Following the Battle of Haengju, the Chosŏn army focused mainly on hit-and-run tactics to fight against the Japanese. Ko Ŏnbaek 高彦伯 (d. 1609), who was in charge of defending the northeastern environs of Hansŏng, achieved some impressive results. As Japanese troops under Kiyomasa carried out a phased withdrawal from Hamgyŏng Province at the end of April 1593, Ko harried the retreating Japanese army with a surprise attack at Ch’ŏrwŏn 鐵原, the major hub for traffic from Kyŏnggi and Hamgyŏng provinces, and other places such as Ŭijŏngbu 議政府 and Changsuwŏn 長水院, adjacent to the northeastern area of Hansŏng and located east of Pukhan Mountain (北漢山, 836m), and kept the Japanese army in Hansŏng from operating freely to the east.72 About ten days later, he was successful again in the steep mountainous area between Pukhan Mountain, with its numerous valleys, and the granite Surak Mountain (水落山 638m), 5 to 6 kilometers east of Pukhan Mountain.73

These victories on the northeast outskirts of Hansŏng between late April and early May 1593 were made possible by the combined effect of hit-and-run tactics on the one hand, and the utilization of the steep mountainous landscape on the other. The Chosŏn army minimized the efficacy of musketry and prevented Japanese units from maneuvering

67 Sŏnjo sujŏng sillok, sŏnjo 26/2/1.68 Yu Sŏngnyong, Sŏaejip, 9:35a5-7.69 For instance, in April 1593, the Japanese army forayed into Yangju 楊州 , P’och’ŏn 抱川, and Kap’yŏng 加平

in the east, and Kŭmch’ŏn 衿川, Ansan 安山, Namyang 南陽, Suwŏn 水原, and Chinwi 振威 in the west. Sadae mun’gwe, wanli 21/3/24.

70 Sadae mun’gwe, wanli 21/3/14.71 Yi Chŏngil, “Imjin waeran chŏnban’gi Chosŏn ŭi nambyŏng insik kwa hwaryong pangan,” 94-105.72 Yi Chŏngil, “Imjin waeran chŏnban’gi chomyŏng kunsa hyŏmnyŏk ŭi iltan ― Hamgyŏng-do Ilbon kun t’oegak

kwa kwallyŏn hayŏ,” Han-Il kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu 66 (2019): 148-50.73 Yu, “Iminjin waeran’gi Hansŏng chubyŏn chŏnt’u ŭi chŏllyakchŏk ŭiŭi,” 110-11.


quickly and efficiently, fighting these battles not only through the use of a modified version of defensive fortifications, consisting of naturally tough terrain, but also in a novel style of infantry engagement. As with defensive fortifications, hit-and-run operations became a key tactic of the Chosŏn army, who had begun adjusting to the warfighting style of the Japanese army in the second half of 1592.74 Still, what was urgently needed was a lethal strike, envisioned as a large-scale infantry action, for a game-changing breakthrough possible only with the help of the Ming Southern Infantry.

Concluding Reflections

The series of defeats during the first three months of the war demonstrated the superiority of the Japanese army in tactics and weaponry. The grave reality of the battlefield showed the Chosŏn commanders how swiftly the Japanese armies, equipped with keen swords for hand-to-hand fighting and muskets for long-range shooting, could deploy with adroit maneuvers. From the second half of 1592, the Chosŏn armies adapted to the Japanese tactics by neither risking mounted combat nor all-out battle on level ground and opted for defensive fortifications dependent on infantry-centered operations and the use of firearms. This tactical change appeared effective in a series of victories led by field commanders who were familiar with the situation of the battlefield. However, these commanders knew that their fighting strength remained insufficient to demolish the Japanese armies by themselves, and as such, they envisioned a large-scale infantry action with the help of the Ming Southern Infantry as the only hope for a breakthrough. Thereupon, the tactical adjustments of the Chosŏn army to a synthesis of infantry action and gunpowder weaponry75 paralleled the active deployment of the Southern Infantry both in offensive and defensive operations. Chosŏn-Ming military cooperation illuminates the historical phenomena of “the northern caitiffs (the Mongols/Jurchens) and the southern dwarves (Japan)” as the urgent security issue in northeast Asia.76

74 Focusing on defensive fortifications from mid-1592 to early 1593, some Korean scholars have underscored the vital recovery of Chosŏn combat capability. For example, Sim Sŭnggu, Yu Yŏnsŏng, and Ha T’aegyu have performed excellent research on the way in which the Chosŏn armies adopted a new set of tactics and won several victories between the third quarter of 1592 and the first quarter of 1593. See Sim, “Imjin waeran chung Toksan-sŏng chŏnt’u,” 131-47; Yu, “Imjin waeran’gi Hansŏng chubyŏn chŏnt’u ŭi chŏllyakchŏk ŭiŭi,” 97-122; Ha, “Chinju-sŏng chŏnt’u,” 129-45. In spite of their intensive inquiry and fastidious research, their treatment still tends to fixate on individual battles and miss what propelled the tactical deployment or change behind these military matters.

75 Tonio Andrade, Hyoek Hweon Kang, and Kirsten Cooper explain how the Chosŏn military developed new infantry tactics, centering on the formation patterns and drilling of musketry squads, during the East Asian war and in late Chosŏn. For more information, see Tonio Andrade, Hyeok Hweon Kang, and Kirsten Cooper, “A Korean Military Revolution?: Parallel Military Innovations in East Asia and Europe,” Journal of World History 25, no.1 (March 2014): 62-76.

76 “The Chinese experience in Korea would have taught them the importance of muskets in battles between large armies of opposing infantry units, but the Chinese had little occasion to apply this lesson once the Japanese armies returned to Japan. Once the Japanese had withdrawn from Korea, the Chinese still had to face the old threat from the Mongols and the new threat from the Manchus.” Chase, Firearms, 192-93. Han Myŏnggi also


This paper has also shown that fighting abroad was interwoven with domestic politics. No matter what the cause might be, the Ming court and the Hideyoshi regime in Japan were accountable for the enormous expenditure and heavy casualties of their countries. As a result, statecraft on the home front constituted another lynchpin securing military supply lines and total success in this war. This interactive perspective on the war, interstate relations, and internal politics will help direct a new focus of research regarding Chosŏn-Ming military cooperation, the longevity of Ming-Japanese negotiations, and the multilevel structure of the interstate relations of East Asian countries at the end of the sixteenth century.

sheds light on these two challenges from the north and the south on the eve of the war. See Han Myŏnggi, “Imjin waeran chikchŏn Tongasia chŏngse,” Han-Il kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu 43 (2012): 189-95.


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Tactical Changes of the Chosŏn Military in the First Year of the …newcms.kmu.ac.kr/sites/actakoreana2/issue_file/23-2/2... · 2020. 12. 15. · 5 Kenneth Chase, Firearms: A Global

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