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Table of Contents – Bush v. Gore Enhanced Case Summary

Notable Case Analysis: Editorial reasoning why this case is important and what the court added or changed about the law Enhanced Procedural Posture: The underlying procedural posture discussed in greater detail Explanation of Parties: Sets out plaintiffs and defendants and describes roles and relationships of parties Parties’ Arguments: Includes a description of the arguments regarding significant issues Quick Holding Bullets: Short statements of the court’s holdings in this case Enhanced Overview: Detailed overview of facts, rationale, and holdings in bulleted, topical breakdown Dissenting/Concurring Opinion Overview: Summary of any concurring or dissenting opinions

Expanded Headnote Coverage LexisNexis Headnotes: Existing headnotes provided for ease of comparison with Interpretive Headnotes Interpretive Headnotes: Additional headnotes requiring editorial refinement to provide concise statements of legal points

Jurisprudential Analysis Status of the Case: Discussion of prior and subsequent opinions involving the case Comparative Case Content: Topical research and information about cases that have major holdings in the relevant area of law

Legal Analysis Related Law Review Articles: Summary of several prominent law review articles related to the case or its subject matter Related Bar Association & Journal Articles: Summary of prominent bar association journal articles related to the case or its subject matter Other Legal Articles: Legal articles written by attorneys/law firms related to the case or its subject matter Related Statutory Annotations: List of most related annotations, providing the most relevant cases interpreting the applicable statutes

News Recent News Coverage of the Case: Excerpts from several articles about the case Recent News Coverage of the Issue: Excerpts from several articles covering the issues Recent News Coverage of the Parties: Excerpts from several articles covering the parties

Links to Related LexisNexis™ Content Briefs and Other Filings Related to This Case CourtLink Court Records Corporate Party Links

Case Text

Case in Brief Page 1

Case in Brief: Bush v. Gore Enhanced Case Summary

Notable Case Analysis

This case stated that the Florida Supreme Court erred in determining that a manual recount in various counties was authorized under state law in order to determine the intent of the voters. Although the 2000 Presidential Election brought to light the fact that a small percentage of votes were improperly counted or not counted by ballot machines, the Florida Supreme Court erred in ordering a manual recount in the counties where there were ballots that had not been fully punched because there was no method established to ensure that each person’s vote would be treated the same by each manual counter. The case had the ultimate political importance because it effectively decided that petitioners, George W. Bush and Richard Cheney, had won the bid for presidency. The decision did not declare Bush the winner, but it stated that manual recounts could not have been done before the safe-harbor date set by 5 U.S.C.S. § 3 Shepardize , which was the same day as the opinion was issued. By effectively cutting off the date for recounting of the votes, the opinion determined that the declared winner would stand. For all its political importance, the case had little legal significance because the Court did not appear to stand on any existing precedent for reviewing a state court’s interpretation of its state election laws.

Enhanced Procedural Posture

After the 2000 Presidential election between petitioner republican candidate George W. Bush and respondent democratic candidate Albert Gore, Jr., a dispute arose over ballots cast in Florida, and Gore requested recount in four counties. Two counties, a canvassing board, the Florida Democratic party, and respondent Gore brought an action wherein a Florida circuit court ruled that a deadline for filing returns was mandatory. Respondent Florida Secretary of State determined that no extensions were warranted, and on appeal, the Florida’s First District Court of Appeal certified the issue to the Florida Supreme Court, which enjoined the Secretary and Florida commission from certifying results. That court then ordered a manual recount. The United States Supreme Court reviewed that decision and vacated it, remanding as to issues of state law. The Florida Circuit Court of Leon County then denied the parties relief from certification, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed and reversed in part that order, and effectively ordered the manual recount of “undervotes” which had not properly been counted by voting machines. The United States Supreme Court ordered a stay of that order and granted certiorari to review the matter. In an expedited decision, the Supreme Court ordered oral arguments immediately, and rendered a decision four days after the Florida Supreme Court decision.

Explanation of Parties

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Petitioner George W. Bush

Petitioner Bush was the sitting Governor of Texas and the Republican Presidential candidate in the 2000 election.

Petitioner Richard Cheney

Petitioner Cheney was the Vice-Presidential candidate in the 2000 election.

Respondent Albert Gore, Jr.

Respondent Gore was the sitting Vice-President and Democratic Presidential candidate in the 2000 election.

Respondent Joseph Lieberman

Respondent Lieberman was the Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate in the 2000 election. Respondent Katherine Harris

Respondent election officer was the Florida Secretary of State and Chief Elections Officer at the time. Although she was named as a respondent, she argued for petitioners.

Respondent Palm Beach Canvassing Board Respondent canvassing board also argued against manual counting, although it was named respondent.

Parties’ Arguments

I. New Standards for resolving Presidential Elections Contests

It appears that petitioners argued that new standards established for resolving Presidential election contests were violative of U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Link P. Arg.

Respondents argued that the purpose of vindicating the right to vote justified the recount procedures established by the Florida Supreme Court. Link P. Arg.

Holding: The court held that the recount mechanisms implemented in response to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision could not have been considered non-arbitrary treatment of voters, but a uniform standard to determine the intent of the voters was necessary for all votes before any recount could have occurred. Link P. Arg.

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II. Equal Protection

The Court fashioned the argument as whether the standardless manual recounts violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Untied States Constitution. Link P. Arg.

Holding: The Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court judgment ordering a recount, finding that no recount could be held that counted each vote fairly before the deadline for submitting the votes. Link P. Arg.

Quick Holding Bullets

• The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court did not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right. The order of obtaining the intent of the vote was unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and a starting principle, but objectionable in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application. The formulation of uniform rules to determine intent based on these recurring circumstances was found to be practicable and necessary. Link Quick Holding

• The recount process, as established by the counties, was inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the

fundamental right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single state judicial officer. Link Quick Holding

• Because 3 U.S.C.S. § 5 Shepardize required a conclusive selection of electors to be completed by December 12, 2000 (the date

the opinion was issued), and there was no recount procedure in place that comported with minimal constitutional standards, the mandate of recount could not proceed. Link Quick Holding

Enhanced Overview

I. Procedural Background On November 8, 2000, a Presidential election was held wherein the primary candidates were petitioner George W. Bush and respondent Albert Gore, Jr. Because the Florida division of elections reported a small margin, a recount was mandatory. Gore then submitted a request for a manual recount in four of the counties, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 102.166 Shepardize (2000), and an action was brought by one of the counties against the manual recount. A Florida Circuit Court left the discretion in respondent Florida Secretary of State to include amended returns in her certification of election results. The Secretary found that extension was not warranted, but the appellate court found that the Secretary had abused her discretion and certified the matter to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court directed the Secretary to accept manual recounts.

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The United States Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded. Before remand, the Florida commission certified results showing that Bush had a small margin of victory, and a circuit court denied the parties relief from certification. The Florida Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and found that votes found during a partial recount should not have been excluded in the certification, votes that had not been considered should have been examined, and the court ordered the manual recount of the those votes, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 102.168 Shepardize (8). The United States Supreme Court stayed that mandate and granted certiorari to settle the dispute. The Court set an expedited schedule for review.

II. Factual History

The majority of the dispute regarding the ballots arose in Miami-Dade, wherein in was claimed by Gore that 9,000 ballots had failed to detect a vote for President. Specifically, the issue involved the ballot cards, which contained a perforated stylus that had to be punched or perforated in order for the machine to count the vote. In some of the cards, a piece of the card – a chad – remained hanging, and a chad was not read by the machine at all. Respondents, Gore and Vice Presidential candidate Joseph Lieberman, argued that a manually count of those ballots was necessary. There were numerous counties affected by the chad problem. After the issue of chads came to light, the Court also took note of the fact that it had been estimated 2 percent of ballots did not cast a vote for President, either by conscious choice or by mis-marking the ballot. Because of the unusual circumstances involved, the Court granted a writ of certiorari, heard oral argument, and issued its decision four days after the Florida Supreme Court mandated a manual recount of the votes. The Court also interpreted 3 U.S.C.S. § 5 Shepardize to require that a conclusive determination of contests or controversies had to be made 6 days prior to the meeting of the electors. For the purposes of the Presidential election, this date was on December 12, 2000, which was the date that the Court issued its opinion.

III. Manual Recount Method

In a per curiam decision, the Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court order mandating manual counting of the ballots. Although the Florida court’s order that the intent of the voter be discerned was found to be proper, the Court held that it was simply impractical. The Court held that the manual recounting methods employed could not satisfy the requirement that such recounting be non-arbitrary because there was no uniform standard by which the counters could determine intent based on the chads or lack of chads. The Court also held that the Florida court order could not stand because it also failed to indicate who would do the manual counting, causing an ad hoc team of people who had never been trained in counting ballots.

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IV. Equal Protection

The Court examined the history of voting rights and found that although citizens did not have a constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States, that right had been granted by the legislature. Once having acquired the right to vote, the Court found that it was subject to equal protection, and a state could not treat one vote differently than another vote. The Court held that the order of the Florida Supreme Court violated the Equal Protection of Florida voters because it allowed for some votes to be counted differently than other votes. The Court noted that any recount would have to be conducted with standards that allowed for procedural safeguards, but because the so called “safe harbor” provision of 3 U.S.C.S. § 5 Shepardize ended on December 12, 2000, it was not possible that any standards and recounts could be conducted before midnight.

Dissenting/Concurring Opinion Overview

Link Concur▼ Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, with Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joining, wherein the Chief Justice expressed that the Florida Supreme Court order was in violation of U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 because although generally the Florida Supreme Court could give little or great deference to its executives, when the issue involved a Presidential election, the Florida Supreme Court could not infringe on its given legislative authority. The Chief Justice examined Florida election statutes and argued that the Florida Supreme court’s order regarding extension of certification periods, manual counting of votes, and what was considered a legal vote were a depart from the applicable statutes. Link Dissent▼ Dissenting Opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, wherein Justice Stevens argued that the Florida Supreme Court did not violate any law requiring judicial intervention because the standard applied in Florida standards was consistent with the standards applied in numerous states, namely the “intent of the voter” standard. Justice Stevens noted that although the sub-standards used by the counties for determining intent could be problematic, but that problem could be addressed by one magistrate reviewing all of the objections, and the imposed deadline by the majority was not a true deadline under 3 U.S.C.S. § 5. Shepardize Additionally, Justice Stevens argued that there was no substantive change made in Florida electoral law by either of the Florida Supreme Court decisions, and it was error for the Court to review the state court interpretation of state law. Link Dissent▼ Dissenting opinion of Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg (joining as to all but part B), expressed the opinion that (A) the Court should not have reviewed the action or issued a stay, that there was no requirement to conform to § 5, or if so it was for the legislature to determine, and basically that there was no substantial question raised under U.S. Const. Art. II. (B) The dissenting opinion argued that even if an Equal Protection violation was found, an extension should have been provided so that standards for a uniform counting of votes could have been had. Link Dissent▼ Dissenting Opinion of Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, and joined as to part A by Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, expressed the view (A) that although federal review of state court application of state law was sometimes necessary, there was no such situation in this case. (B) Justice Ginsburg also argued that even if an equal protection violation

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were found, the deadlines imposed by the majority were not required, and there could have been a more rational and legitimate remedy fashioned to address the votes prior to the electoral college vote. Link Dissent▼ Dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter to part A, and by Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg as to all except A1, expressed the view that (A)(1) because of the unique and important decision to be made, Florida should have been asked to adopt a more uniform standard to adopt the problem beyond mere intent of the voter. (B) Justice Breyer additionally argued that the concurrence reached the wrong conclusion because the Court could not second-guess the manner in which the Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict in the language of its own statute, and the concurrence argument failed because there could be no “impermissible” distortion of state statute.

Expanded Headnote Coverage

LexisNexis Headnotes

[HN1] The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral College. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. [HN2] The state legislature's power to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary; it may, if it so chooses, select the electors itself. [HN3] When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President of the United States in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter. The state, of course, after granting the franchise in the special context of U.S. Const. art. II, can take back the power to appoint electors. [HN4] The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise to choose electors for the President of the United States. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the state may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another. It must be remembered that the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise. [HN5] A state supreme court's command to consider the intent of the voter in counting legally cast votes is unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and a starting principle. The problem inheres when there is an absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application. The formulation of uniform rules to determine intent based on recurring circumstances is practicable and necessary. [HN6] A desire for speed is not a general excuse for ignoring equal protection guarantees.

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[HN7] When a court orders a statewide remedy, such as a statewide recount, there must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied. [HN8] 3 U.S.C.S. § 5 Shepardize requires that any controversy or contest that is designed to lead to a conclusive selection of electors for President of the United States be completed by December 12.

Interpretive Headnotes

[IHN1] Link Int. HN The law does not refrain from searching for the intent of the actor in a multitude of circumstances; and in some cases the general command to ascertain intent is not susceptible to much further refinement. When deciding the intent of a vote, however, the question is not whether to believe a witness but how to interpret the marks or holes or scratches on an inanimate object, a piece of cardboard or paper which, it is said, might not have registered as a vote during the machine count. The factfinder confronts a thing, not a person. The search for intent can be confined by specific rules designed to ensure uniform treatment. [IHN2] Link Int. HN The idea that one group can be granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our representative government. [IHN3] Link Int. HN Use of any equipment for the purpose of tabulating under or over votes, and any new software developed for it, would have to be evaluated for accuracy by the Secretary of State, as required by Fla. Stat. § 101.015 Shepardize (2000). [IHN4] Link Int. HN The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended the State's electors to participate fully in the federal electoral process, as provided in 3 U.S.C.S. § 5. Shepardize

Jurisprudential Analysis

Status of the Case

Prior History Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize (Fla. 2000)

In a dispute following the Presidential election of 2000, two trial court orders were certified to the Florida Supreme Court regarding whether the Secretary of the State of Florida was not required to accept amended presidential election returns. The court reversed those orders, holding that manual recounts were authorized and had to be accepted, but that the Secretary could ignore returns only if their inclusion would have precluded voters from fully participating in the process.

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Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize (U.S. 2000)

The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari to presidential candidate George W. Bush regarding the Florida Supreme Court’s decision regarding manual votes and the process to be employed in counting votes. The Court remanded to the Florida Supreme Court for consideration of the safe harbor provision of 3 U.S.C.S. § 5 Shepardize and the legislature’s authority under U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 Shepardize (U.S. 2000)

The Court granted a stay from the mandate of the Florida Supreme Court for the tallying of votes manually. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1048 Shepardize (U.S. 2000)

The motion for a divided argument was granted.

Related Proceedings Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 Shepardize (Fla. 2000)

A trial court judgment denied relief to appellants, presidential and vice presidential candidates Albert Gore, Jr. and Joseph Lieberman, in their contest against appellee Secretary of State to the certification of election results declaring George W. Bush as the winner. The court reversed and remanded the trial court judgment and ordered calculations to be made by tallying votes manually.

Harris v. Florida Elections Canvassing Comm'n, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1317 Shepardize (D. Fla. 2000)

In a related proceeding, electors sued state officials, claiming that it was error to count overseas absentee ballots received late. The court held that the electors were not entitled to relief because statutes and administrative rules allowing an extension were enacted to prevent the disenfranchisement of overseas voters and to bring the state in line with federal mandates.

Harris v. Florida Elections Comm'n, 235 F.3d 578 Shepardize (11th Cir. 2000)

The court affirmed the lower court judgment in the related proceeding, allowing for the counting of absentee ballots, even though they were received late.

Harris v. Florida Elections Canvassing Comm'n, 531 U.S. 1060 Shepardize (U.S. 2000)

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The motion to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari is denied. Harris v. Fla. Elections Canvassing Comm'n, 531 U.S. 1062 Shepardize (U.S. 2001)

The Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize (Fla. 2000)

In a corrected opinion, issued after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 Shepardize (2000), the court examined the remand from the United States Supreme Court and reversed two trial court orders because the Secretary abused her discretion by announcing that she would refuse to accept amended returns.

Subsequent History Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1060 Shepardize (U.S. 2000)

The Court directed the clerk to issue a mandate as set forth in the opinion. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 Shepardize (Fla. 2000)

The court held, upon remand from the United States Supreme Court, that because no standards could be set for manual recount which would be consistent with constitutional requirements, no relief could be granted.

Gore v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 270 Shepardize (Fla. 2000)

Based on the Supreme Court’s remand, the court determined that the Florida Election Code did not provide the elements necessary for resolution of the issues so to comply with constitutional requirements. The court ordered the case dismissed and did not allow for rehearing.

Comparative Case Content

Topic: Speedy Review in the Supreme Court Cases where the Supreme Court deemed certain political cases were in need of expedited review. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 Shepardize (U.S. 1981)

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OVERVIEW: Executive orders having the effect of nullifying a company's claims against Iran were authorized by the Trade With the Enemy Act. The President was authorized to suspend pending claims against Iran because Congress consented.

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 Shepardize (U.S. 1974) (superseded by statute)

OVERVIEW: Executive Privilege did not protect President from complying with third-party subpoena duces tecum because generalized privilege was asserted; prosecution showed specific need for recordings and documents of meeting with persons charged with crimes.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 Shepardize (U.S. 1952)

OVERVIEW: The President's military and executive powers did not give the President constitutional authority to issue an order directing the seizure of the nation's steel mills; the seizure could not stand because the President did not have lawmaking power. Quick Holding Bullets

• Whether the issuance of Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952), under which respondent Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) ordered the seizure of steel mills owned by petitioner steel companies, exceeded the power of the President under the Constitution of the United States, was ripe for determination after the order was issued because it was doubtful that the steel companies had an adequate legal remedy available to them and the record sufficed for ascertaining the propriety of issuing an injunction.

• Exec. Order No. 10,340, under which the Secretary seized and began operation of steel mills owned by

the steel companies, could not stand because the issuance of the order was a legislative act that exceeded the power of the President under the Constitution.

Topic: Equal Protection Voting Violations

Holding that plaintiffs had shown that there was an equal protection violation in the voting method. Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 Shepardize (D. Ill. 2002)

OVERVIEW: Voters had stated a claim under Voting Rights Act of 1965 because they identified an electoral practice and alleged that because of that practice they had less opportunity than other members of electorate to participate in the political process.

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Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 Shepardize (U.S. 1977)

OVERVIEW: A reapportionment plan adopted by a federal district court for the Mississippi legislature was constitutionally invalid because the districts were of uneven populations, thus violating the Equal Protection standard of one person, one vote.

ACLU v. Santillanes, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17087 Shepardize (D.N.M. 2007)

OVERVIEW: District court found that a provision of the Albuquerque (New Mexico) City Charter, which required voters to show a current ID that had their photograph when they voted at a polling place in municipal elections, violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it was not adequately tailored to meet City's interest in preventing voter impersonation fraud.

Holding that voting method violated the voter’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106 Shepardize (D. Cal. 2001)

OVERVIEW: Motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied because voters had alleged facts that Secretary of state's permission to counties to adopt either punch-card voting procedures or more reliable voting procedures was unreasonable and discriminatory.

Holding that there was no Equal Protection violation in the voting method imposed. Walker v. Exeter Region Coop. Sch. Dist., 2001 DNH 153 Shepardize (D.N.H. 2001)

OVERVIEW: It was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for a state to impose different voting requirements for bond issues upon different school districts using different voting procedures.

Holding that there was no Equal Protection violation of proposed ballot method. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 Shepardize (9th Cir. 2003)

OVERVIEW: District court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs would suffer no hardship that outweighed the stake that California and its citizens had in going forward with an election as planned and as required by the state Constitution.

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Holding that Secretary of Labor had to more clearly state why she chose not to file suit after an allegation of improper vote tallying. Ellis v. Chao, 336 F.3d 114 Shepardize (2d Cir. 2003)

OVERVIEW: In a candidate's LMRDA action alleging union election violations, the Secretary of Labor's statement of reasons not to initiate suit was insufficient to determine whether or not her decision was arbitrary and capricious.

Holding that manual recount of touchless voting system did not violate Equal Protection or Due Process rights. Wexler v. Lepore, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1097 Shepardize (D. Fla. 2004)

OVERVIEW: State election rules regarding recount procedures and regarding what constituted a valid ballot choice complied with equal protection requirements where the rules prescribed uniform, nondifferential standards for legal vote counting and recounting.

Legal Analysis

Related Law Review Articles

Michael Herz, The Supreme Court in Real Time: Haste, Waste, and Bush v. Gore, 35 Akron L. Rev. 185 Shepardize (2002).

The author discussed the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 Shepardize (2000), and argued that the unprecedented speed at which it accepted certiorari, provided for arguments, and issued its decision produced a hasty and unsound legal opinion that appeared to be based on politics rather than law.

Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045 Shepardize (Oct. 2001).

The authors discussed the Bush v. Gore decision, its failure to address black voter disenfranchisement, and the constitutional “coup” that occurred by the Supreme Court taking on the election issue. The author suggested that unlike other constitutional issues tackled by the Court in the last ten years, Bush v. Gore was the first decision that appeared to be based on partisan politics rather than legal doctrine.

Aviam Soifer, Symposium: Federal Courts and Electoral Politics: Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U.L. Rev. 699 Shepardize (June 2002).

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The author discussed the Bush v. Gore decision and opined that it was not as unique as it had been called, but rather that it showed the continued decision-making of the United States Supreme Court that felt free to decide issues of federalism and state sovereignty without any true grounding in constitutional law.

Richard Briffault, Symposium: The Law of Presidential Elections: Issues in the Wake of Florida 2000: Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection Case, 29 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 325 Shepardize (2001). Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 Am. U.L. Rev. 1 Shepardize (Oct. 2003). Alison E. Hickey, Environmental Law's Path through the 4th Estate: Environmental Law and the Media; Note: Shifting the Burden: Potential Applicability of Bush v.. Gore to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 661 Shepardize (2006). Sanford Levinson, Symposium, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century: Identifying "Independence", 86 B.U.L. Rev. 1297 Shepardize (Dec. 2006). Jessica L. Post, Note, Uniform Voting Machines Protect the Principle of "One-Person, One-Vote", 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 551 Shepardize (Summer 2003). Peter Gabel, What It Really Means to Say "Law Is Politics": Political History and Legal Argument in Bush v. Gore, 67 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1141 (Summer 2002). Steven L. Winter, When Self-Governance is a Game, 67 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1171 (Summer 2002). Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 Buffalo L. Rev. 393 (Winter 2002). Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn't Count: The 2000 Election and the Failure of the Rule of Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1361 Shepardize (May 2001). Spencer Overton, Symposium: The Law of Presidential Elections: Issues in the Wake of Florida 2000: A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore through the Lens of Race, 29 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 469 Shepardize (2001). Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1721 (Dec. 2001). For more results on the following topics:

Standard to determine intent of voters before recount

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Additional Content Review of a state court's interpretation of state election laws Additional Content

Related Bar Association & Journal Articles

John A. Zadrozny, The Myth of Discretion: Why Presidential Electors Do Not Receive First Amendment Protection, 1 CommLaw Conspectus 165 (2003).

The article discussed the idea of one-person one-vote and how procedures, policies, and laws in place affect or modify that seemingly fundamental right.

Nelson Lund, "Equal Protection, My Ass!"? Bush v. Gore and Laurence Tribe's Hall of Mirrors, 19 Const. Commentary 543 Shepardize (Winter 2002).

The article discussed an article written by Laurence Tribe and his critique of the Court’s decision, noting that Professor Tribe relied on assumptions and legal grandstanding rather than facts, but that his criticism of the Court’s decision was misplaced.

Jesse H. Choper, Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential Election of 2000, 18 Const. Commentary 335 Shepardize (Summer 2001).

The article discussed the intersection of political and judicial decision-making and opined that although it was clear that the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore was political, it would likely not suffer fallout because of its decision in light of the public’s need for a final arbiter and for a decision regarding the nation’s leader.

Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions Into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville's Thesis Revisited, 21 Const. Commentary 485 Shepardize (Summer 2004). Jason C. Glahn, Bush v. Gore from Behind a Veil of Ignorance: Why the Result of Election 2000 was Ethical (and Legal Too), 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 615 (Summer 2004). Susan A. MacManus, Symposium: Election Reform: Voter Education: The Key to Election Reform Success Lessons from Florida, 36 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 517 Shepardize (Spring 2003).

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Kingshuk K. Roy, Note, Sleeping Watchdogs of Personal Liberty: State Laws Disenfranchising the Elderly, 11 Elder L.J. 109 Shepardize (2003). Brian K. LaFratta & Jamie Lake, Inside the Voting Booth: Ensuring the Intent of the Elderly Voter, 9 Elder L.J. 141 Shepardize (2001). Joseph Kanefield, Recount Redux: Could Florida's Election Hurricane Happen in Arizona?, 37 AZ Attorney 22 Shepardize (Mar, 2001). Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary between Law and Politics, 110 Yale L.J. 1407 Shepardize (June 2001). Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 375 Shepardize (Spring 2003). Steven J. Mulroy, Lemonade From Lemons: Can Advocates Convert Bush v. Gore into a Vehicle for Reform?, 9 Geo. J. Poverty Law & Pol'y 357 Shepardize (Summer 2002). Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudence of Oprah!, 90 Geo. L.J. 2087 Shepardize (June 2002). Linda Greenhouse, Learning to Live with Bush v. Gore, 4 Green Bag 2d 381 (Summer 2001). Evan Tsen Lee, Essay: The Politics of Bush v. Gore, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 461, 462 Shepardize (Fall 2001). For more results on the following topics:

Standard to determine intent of voters before recount Additional Content Additional Content Review of a state court's interpretation of state election laws Additional Content

Other Legal Articles

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Gary Knapp , Annotation, Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment as Affecting Appointment, Nomination, or Election to State Office--Supreme Court Cases, ,148 L. Ed. 2d 1101 Shepardize (2006)

This annotation discussed United States Supreme Court decisions involving election of officers and whether there were constitutional implications involved. The annotation covered numerous cases involving a wide range of voting and election issues, from ballot counting, procedures for voting, signing of petitions, and party affiliations.

Martin M. Heit, Annotation, Supreme Court's Construction and Application of Federal Constitutional Provisions(Art II, § 1, Cl 2, 4; Amendments 12, 23) Concerning Appointment of, or Voting by, Presidential Electors, 148 L. Ed. 2d 1087 Shepardize (2006).

The annotation discussed the general right of citizens to vote, how that right was applied by states and courts, the selection of delegates, and voter fraud. The annotation also discussed the holding in Bush v. Gore that voters did not have a right to vote for the President unless the states provided a method for voting.

Statewide Manual Recount of "Undervotes" In Presidential Election Is Unconstitutional: Bush v. Gore, No. 00-949 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2000, Municipal Litigation Reporter, Jan. 2001, at 16.

The article discussed the Supreme Court’s holding in Bush v. Gore and its ultimate finding that the ordered recount was unconstitutional because there was no method to ensure that each vote would be counted the same way.

Local Governments Should Be Given Discretion to Choose Best Voter Equipment; Daniel Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1711 Shepardize (2005), Municipal Litigation Reporter, Apr. 15, 2006, at 27.

The article discussed the enactment of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 and the dispute that has arisen regarding what type of voting method would be deemed constitutional and not violative of any potential voter’s rights.

New Administration Delay Should not Harm Presidential Transition Process, 7 Federal Human Resources Week 31, Nov. 27, 2000. State High Court Orders Statewide Count of "Undervotes” in Presidential Election; Gore v. Harris, No. SC00-2431 (Fla. Dec. 8, 2000, Municipal Litigation Reporter, Jan. 2001, at 25. Supreme Court Remands Presidential Election Manual Recount Case for Clarification; Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., No. 00-836 (U.S.Dec. 4, 2000), Municipal Litigation Reporter, Jan. 2001, at 15. Florida County Settles 2000 Presidential Election Suit, Municipal Litigation Reporter, June 2002, at 6.

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Daniel S. Goldman, The Modern-Day Literacy Test?: Felon Disenfranchisement and Race Discrimination, 2 Stanford Law Review 57 , Nov. 1, 2004, at 67. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Imperial Judges Could Pick the President – Again, The National Journal, 41 Oct. 9, 2004. Erwin Chemerinsky, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism as the United States Enters the 21st Century, 67 Law and Contemporary Problems 3, June 22, 2004, at 53(10) Robert M. Jarvis, Bush v. Gore. Implications for Future Federal Court Practice, 76 Florida Bar Journal 10, Nov. 1, 2002, at 36. For more results on the following topics:

Standard to determine intent of voters before recount Additional Content Review of a state court's interpretation of state election laws Additional Content Additional Content

Related Statutory Annotations

USCS Const. Amend. 14, § 5

Elections Generally

Where discrimination is sufficiently shown, right to relief under equal protection clause is not diminished by fact that discrimination relates to political rights; but necessity of showing of purposeful discrimination is no less in case involving political rights than in any other. Snowden v Hughes (1944) 321 US 1 Shepardize , 88 L Ed 497 Shepardize , 64 S Ct 397 Shepardize , reh den (1944) 321 US 804 Shepardize , 88 L Ed 1090 Shepardize , 64 S Ct 778 Shepardize ; Baker v Carr (1962) 369 US 186 Shepardize , 7 L Ed 2d 663 Shepardize , 82 S Ct 691 Shepardize . Equal protection clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races. Reynolds v Sims (1964) 377 US 533 Shepardize , 12 L Ed 2d 506 Shepardize , 84 S Ct 1362

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Shepardize , reh den (1964) 379 US 870 Shepardize , 13 L Ed 2d 76 Shepardize , 85 S Ct 12 Shepardize and reh den (1964) 379 US 871 Shepardize , 13 L Ed 2d 76 Shepardize , 85 S Ct 13 Shepardize and reh den (1964) 379 US 871 Shepardize , 13 L Ed 2d 77 Shepardize , 85 S Ct 13 Shepardize . Occupation affords no permissible basis for distinguishing between qualified voters within state. Carrington v Rash (1965) 380 US 89 Shepardize , 13 L Ed 2d 675 Shepardize , 85 S Ct 775 Shepardize . State violates equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes affluence of voter or payment of any fee electoral standard, voter qualifications having no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying poll or any other tax. Harper v Virginia State Bd. of Elections (1966) 383 US 663 Shepardize , 16 L Ed 2d 169 Shepardize , 86 S Ct 1079 Shepardize . If challenged state statute grants right to vote in limited-purpose election to some otherwise qualified voters and denies it to others, United States Supreme Court, in deciding whether statute violates equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment, must determine whether exclusions are necessary to promote compelling state interest; no less showing that exclusions are necessary to promote compelling state interest is required merely because questions scheduled for election need not have been submitted to voters. Cipriano v Houma (1969) 395 US 701 Shepardize , 23 L Ed 2d 647 Shepardize , 89 S Ct 1897 Shepardize . Citizen has constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on equal basis with other citizens in jurisdiction; while this equal right to vote is not absolute, and states have power to impose voter qualifications and to regulate access to franchise in other ways, purpose of restriction and assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny before right to vote can be restricted. Dunn v Blumstein (1972) 405 US 330 Shepardize , 31 L Ed 2d 274 Shepardize , 92 S Ct 995 Shepardize (criticized in Van Wie v Pataki (2001, CA2 NY) 267 F3d 109 Shepardize ). While state action with respect to qualifications of its officers, and particularly in regard to voter qualifications, is not wholly immune from scrutiny under equal protection clause, Supreme Court's scrutiny is not so demanding as to matters resting firmly within state's constitutional prerogatives. Sugarman v Dougall (1973) 413 US 634 Shepardize , 37 L Ed 2d 853 Shepardize , 93 S Ct 2842, Shepardize 5 BNA FEP Cas 1152, 6 CCH EPD P 8682 Shepardize . Equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive right to participate on equal basis with other qualified voters whenever state has adopted electoral process for determining who will represent any segment of state's population. Lubin v Panish (1974) 415 US 709 Shepardize , 39 L Ed 2d 702 Shepardize , 94 S Ct 1315 Shepardize . Although substantial burdens on right to vote or to associate for political purposes are constitutionally suspect and invalid under First and Fourteenth Amendments and under equal protection clause unless essential to serve compelling state interest, nevertheless such rule does not automatically invalidate every substantial restriction on right to vote or to associate; rule is not self-executing, but requires consideration of facts and circumstances behind law, interest which state claims to be protecting, and interest of those who are disadvantaged by classification. Storer v Brown (1974) 415 US 724

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Shepardize , 39 L Ed 2d 714 Shepardize , 94 S Ct 1274 Shepardize , reh den (1974) 417 US 926 Shepardize , 41 L Ed 2d 230 Shepardize , 94 S Ct 2635 Shepardize and (criticized in Van Wie v Pataki (2001, CA2 NY) 267 F3d 109 Shepardize ). For purposes of equal protection under Fourteenth Amendment, when such vital individual rights as fundamental right of individuals to associate for advancement of political beliefs, and fundamental right of qualified voters to cast their votes effectively are at stake, state must establish that its classification is necessary to serve compelling interest; even when pursuing legitimate interest, state may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty, and particularly where restrictions on access to ballot are involved, states must adopt least drastic means to achieve their ends. Illinois State Board of Elections v Socialist Workers Party (1979) 440 US 173 Shepardize , 59 L Ed 2d 230 Shepardize , 99 S Ct 983 Shepardize . Voting rights of Puerto Rico citizens are constitutionally protected to same extent as those of all other citizens of United States. Rodriguez v Popular Democratic Party (1982) 457 US 1 Shepardize , 72 L Ed 2d 628 Shepardize , 102 S Ct 2194 Shepardize . In resolving constitutional challenges to specific provisions of state's election laws, court must first consider character and magnitude of asserted injury to rights protected by First and Fourteenth Amendments that plaintiff seeks to vindicate; court then must identify and evaluate precise interests put forward by state as justification for burden imposed by its rule; in passing judgment, court must not only determine legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden plaintiff's rights; only after weighing all these factors is reviewing court in position to decide whether challenged provision is unconstitutional. Anderson v Celebrezze (1983) 460 US 780 Shepardize , 75 L Ed 2d 547 Shepardize , 103 S Ct 1564 Shepardize . In dispute concerning state's results in Presidential election--after machine recount decreased margin of victory, but did not change overall result--there is violation of equal protection clause of Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment with respect to state court's judgment ordering manual recount, because regardless of whether court has authority, under state's legislative scheme for resolving election disputes, to define what legal vote is and to mandate manual recount implementing that definition, court's recount mechanisms do not satisfy minimum requirements for the non-arbitrary treatment of voters that are necessary to secure fundamental right to vote as state's legislature has prescribed. Bush v Gore (2000) 531 US 98 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 388 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 525, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9879, 2000 Colo J C A R 6606 Shepardize , 14 FLW Fed S 26, on remand, dismd (2000, Fla) 779 So 2d 270 Shepardize . When state's legislature, acting under Article II, § 1 of Federal Constitution, vests right to vote for Presidential electors in state's people, one source of th fundamental nature of right to vote as legislature has prescribed lies in equal weight accorded to each vote and equal dignity owed to each voter; pursuant to equal protection clause of Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, right to vote is protected in more than initial allocation of franchise, for (1) equal protection applies as well to manner of exercise of franchise, and (2) state, having once granted right to vote on equal terms, may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another; right of suffrage can be denied by debasement or dilution of weight of citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting free exercise of

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franchise. Bush v Gore (2000) 531 US 98 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 388 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 525, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9879, 2000 Colo J C A R 6606 Shepardize , 14 FLW Fed S 26, on remand, dismd (2000, Fla) 779 So 2d 270 Shepardize . Under Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, desire for speed is not general excuse for ignoring equal protection guarantees. Bush v Gore (2000) 531 US 98 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 388 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 525, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9879, 2000 Colo J C A R 6606 Shepardize , 14 FLW Fed S 26, on remand, dismd (2000, Fla) 779 So 2d 270 Shepardize . While it may be that Constitution provides right to vote only in federal elections and that right to vote in purely state elections must derive from state constitutions or laws, it is clear that, where states provide for election of officers, that right is protected against dilution under equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment. United States v Anderson (1973, CA4 W Va) 481 F2d 685 Shepardize , affd (1974) 417 US 211 Shepardize , 41 L Ed 2d 20 Shepardize , 94 S Ct 2253 Shepardize . Right to regulate elections and prescribe qualifications for statewide political offices is reserved to states under Tenth Amendment of United States Constitution, but states may not regulate in manner that violates equal protection. Bullock v Minnesota (1979, CA8 Minn) 611 F2d 258 Shepardize . Results oriented test of Voting Rights Act (42 USCS § 1973) Shepardize is intended to provide less stringent standard than that imposed by Fourteenth Amendment. McMillan v Escambia County (1984, CA5 Fla) 748 F2d 1037 Shepardize . One-man, one-vote cases under equal protection clause do not control cases brought under the Voting Rights Act (42 USCS § 1973). Shepardize Mallory v Eyrich (1988, CA6 Ohio) 839 F2d 275 Shepardize . Injunctive relief in voting rights dispute was remanded on Rooker-Feldman grounds with instructions to grant appellee voters opportunity to clarify that they sought to have all disputed ballots counted to demonstrate that they were not in privity with dismissed candidate plaintiffs and thus Rooker-Feldman did not bar their suit. Hoblock v Albany County Bd. of Elections (2005, CA2 NY) 422 F3d 77 Shepardize . State constitutional requirement that prefix "Miss" or "Mrs." appear before woman's name on her voter registration affidavit so as to reflect her current or past marital status violates equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment, since there is no comparable requirement for men and since it is without rational or reasonable basis, but is simply arbitrary requirement inserted into state's constitution for no apparent reason. Walker v Jackson (1975, ED Ark) 391 F Supp 1395 Shepardize . Nothing in Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state from creating different kinds of political subdivisions and providing different process for selecting and removing officials in those subdivisions; states have wide discretion in deciding whether law should operate statewide or only in certain counties. Smith v Abercrombie (1975) 235 Ga 741 Shepardize , 221 SE2d 802 Shepardize .

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Equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated by statute that purports only to modify power of endorsement. Gosz v Quattrocchi (1982, RI) 448 A2d 135 Shepardize .

Elections Generally

While state's basic command for count of legally cast votes--to consider intent of the voter--is unobjectionable as abstract proposition and starting principle, formulation of uniform rules to determine voter's intent is practicable and necessary in this instance, where question is not whether to believe witness, but how to interpret marks or holes or scratches on inanimate ballot card; piece of cardboard or paper which might not have registered as vote during machine count; want of those rules has led to unequal evaluation of ballots, state court has ratified this uneven treatment, votes certified by court include partial total from first county, thus giving no assurance that recounts included in final certification must be complete; while this accommodation may result from truncated contest period which court has established at other candidate's urging, press of time does not diminish constitutional concern; court's order does not specify who will recount ballots; accordingly, recount process, is inconsistent with minimum procedures necessary, in case at hand's special instance of statewide recount under authority of single state judicial officer, to protect fundamental right of each voter; and asserted concern as to "overvotes" statewide has not been addressed. Bush v Gore (2000) 531 US 98 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 388 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 525, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9879, 2000 Colo J C A R 6606 Shepardize , 14 FLW Fed S 26, on remand, dismd (2000, Fla) 779 So 2d 270 Shepardize . When state's legislature, acting under Article II, § 1 of Federal Constitution, vests right to vote for Presidential electors in state's people, one source of the fundamental nature of right to vote as legislature has prescribed lies in equal weight accorded to each vote and equal dignity owed to each voter; pursuant to equal protection clause of Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, right to vote is protected in more than initial allocation of franchise, for (1) equal protection applies as well to manner of exercise of franchise, and (2) state, having once granted right to vote on equal terms, may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another; right of suffrage can be denied by debasement or dilution of weight of citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting free exercise of franchise. Bush v Gore (2000) 531 US 98 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 388 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 525, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9879, 2000 Colo J C A R 6606 Shepardize , 14 FLW Fed S 26, on remand, dismd (2000, Fla) 779 So 2d 270 Shepardize . Subjection of plaintiff city's site-plan ordinance to referendum process, regardless of whether that ordinance reflected administrative or legislative decision, was not per se arbitrary government conduct in violation of due process. City of Cuyahoga Falls v Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. (2003) 538 US 188 Shepardize , 155 L Ed 2d 349 Shepardize , 123 S Ct 1389, Shepardize 2003 CDOS 2598, 16 FLW Fed S 167. Fourteenth Amendment offers no guaranty against errors in administration of election. Powell v Power (1970, CA2) 436 F2d 84 Shepardize .

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Right to vote, as intended to be protected by Fourteenth Amendment, refers to right to vote as established by laws and constitution of state, which has broad powers to determine conditions under which such right of suffrage may be exercised. Maddox v Fortson (1970) 226 Ga 71 Shepardize , 172 SE2d 595 Shepardize , cert den (1970) 397 US 149 Shepardize , 25 L Ed 2d 183 Shepardize , 90 S Ct 999 Shepardize .

3 USCS § 5 Shepardize

On certiorari to review decision by state's highest court concerning state's results for Presidential election, Supreme Court will vacate judgment of state's highest court and will remand case for further proceedings because there is considerable uncertainty as to precise grounds for decision by state's highest court, and this is sufficient reason for Supreme Court to decline to review federal questions asserted to be present, in that decision by state's highest court effectively extended a 7-day deadline set by state statutory provision for filing election returns--assuming that deadline would have applied--by 12 days and directed state official accept manual recounts submitted prior to extended deadline. Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. (2000) 531 US 70 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 366 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 471, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9599, 14 FLW Fed S 19. On certiorari to review decision by state's highest court concerning state's results for Presidential election, Supreme Court will vacate judgment of state's highest court and will remand case for further proceedings because Supreme Court is unclear as to consideration which state's highest court accorded to 3 USCS § 5 Shepardize , where parties before Supreme Court agree that whatever else may be effect of § 5, it creates "safe harbor" for state insofar as congressional consideration of state's electoral votes is concerned, by providing that if state legislature has provided for final determination of contests or controversies by law made prior to election day, then that determination shall be conclusive if made at least 6 days prior to time of meeting of electors. Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. (2000) 531 US 70 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 366 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 471, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9599, 14 FLW Fed S 19. On certiorari in dispute concerning state's results for 2000 Presidential election--after machine recount decreased the margin of victory, but did not change the overall result, United States Supreme Court, reversed judgment by state's highest court that ordered manual recount to proceed, remanded case for further proceedings because (1) state's highest court said that state's legislature intended state's electors to participate fully in federal electoral process, as provided in 3 USCS § 5 Shepardize ; (2) that statute, in turn, provides "safe harbor," to effect that for this election, controversy or contest that is designed to lead to conclusive selection of electors must be completed by December 12; (3) there is no recount procedure in place, under judgment of state's highest court, that comports with minimal standards required under Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment; (4) any recount seeking to meet December 12 date will be unconstitutional, for upon due consideration of difficulties identified to this point, recount cannot be conducted in compliance with Fourteenth Amendment's requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work; and (5) because state's highest court has said that state's legislature intended to obtain safe-harbor benefits of 3 USCS § 5 Shepardize , proposed alternative remedy--remanding to state's highest court for its ordering of constitutionally proper contest until

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December 18--(a) contemplates action in violation of state's election code, and (b) hence, cannot be part of "appropriate" order authorized by state statutory provision. Bush v Gore (2000) 531 US 98 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 388 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 525, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9879, 2000 Colo J C A R 6606 Shepardize , 14 FLW Fed S 26, on remand, dismd (2000, Fla) 779 So 2d 270 Shepardize . Voters were not entitled to temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to enjoin manual ballot recounts or certifying results of Presidential election which contained any manual recounts, since both Constitution and 3 USCS § 5 Shepardize indicate that states have primary authority to determine manner of appointing Presidential electors and to resolve most controversies concerning their appointment, and state procedures had been invoked and were in process of being implemented. Touchston v McDermott (2000, CA11 Fla) 234 F3d 1130, Shepardize 14 FLW Fed C 151.

Fla. Stat. § 102.166 Shepardize

4. In contested presidential election of 2000, Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 (5) provided that if a manual recount of ballots indicated that an error in the vote tabulation affected the outcome of the election, the county canvassing board was required to correct the error and referred to an error in the vote tabulation rather than the vote tabulation system because, on its face, the statute did not include words of limitation. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2395 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly S 26 Shepardize (Fla. 2000). 5. Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 (5) required that the manual recount of ballots, as applied to the contested presidential election of 2000, was to be completed in a reasonable time, and what was a reasonable time required for completion depended on whether the election was for a statewide office, or federal office, or, if for presidential electors, reasonableness was circumscribed by 3 U.S.C.S. § 5. Shepardize Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2395 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly S 26 Shepardize (Fla. 2000). 6. Where plaintiffs alleged that state officials violated equal protection and due process rights of voters in touchscreen counties by certifying touchscreen voting systems, Florida's manual recount procedures under Fla. Admin. Code Ann. R. 1S-2.031 did not violate equal protection or due process because the procedures and burdens on the voters were justified by the State's important regulatory interests. Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226 Shepardize , 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15080 Shepardize , 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 683 Shepardize (11th Cir. Fla. 2006), writ of certiorari denied by 127 S. Ct. 934 Shepardize , 166 L. Ed. 2d 703 Shepardize , 2007 U.S. LEXIS 54 Shepardize , 75 U.S.L.W. 3350 Shepardize (U.S. 2007). 7. Rules prescribing what constituted a clear indication on a ballot that the voter had made a definite choice, as well the rules prescribing additional recount procedures for each certified voting system promulgated pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 complied with equal protection requirements where the rules prescribed uniform, nondifferential standards for what constituted a legal vote under each certified voting system, as well as procedures for conducting a manual recount of overvotes and undervotes in an entire geographic jurisdiction. Wexler v. Lepore, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1097 Shepardize , 2004 U.S.

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Dist. LEXIS 21344 Shepardize , 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1173 Shepardize (S.D. Fla. 2004), affirmed by 452 F.3d 1226 Shepardize , 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15080 Shepardize , 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 683 Shepardize (11th Cir. Fla. 2006). 9. Election protestor submitted a protest of a primary election result to a circuit court judge after the courthouse had closed, and the judge opened the courthouse and the clerk's office so that the protest could be time-stamped on that day; the trial court dismissed the protest. The court held that the election protestor's protest had been timely filed pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (2)(a)(1979), and that the trial court erred in dismissing it. In re Protest of Election Returns to Circuit Judge Finno, 546 So. 2d 805 Shepardize , 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4349 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1818 Shepardize (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1989). 10. Trial court improperly taxed attorney's fees and costs against the election protester, who filed a protest pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (2) and alleged that the election returns for the city municipal elections were fraudulent, because even though the trial court properly determined that there was a complete absence of fraud in the election returns, there was no statutory provision or any agreement to support the awards of fees and costs. In re Protest of Election Returns Under Section 102.166(2) Fs, 447 So. 2d 1046 Shepardize , 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 12625 Shepardize (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1984). 11. Rules prescribing what constituted a clear indication on a ballot that the voter had made a definite choice, as well the rules prescribing additional recount procedures for each certified voting system promulgated pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize complied with equal protection requirements where the rules prescribed uniform, nondifferential standards for what constituted a legal vote under each certified voting system, as well as procedures for conducting a manual recount of overvotes and undervotes in an entire geographic jurisdiction. Wexler v. Lepore, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1097 Shepardize , 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21344 Shepardize , 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1173 Shepardize (S.D. Fla. 2004), affirmed by 452 F.3d 1226 Shepardize , 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15080 Shepardize , 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 683 Shepardize (11th Cir. Fla. 2006). 12. In contested presidential election of 2000, Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (5) provided that if a manual recount of ballots indicated that an error in the vote tabluation affected the outcome of the election, the county canvassing board was required to correct the error and referred to an error in the vote tabulation rather than the vote tabulation system because, on its face, the statute did not include words of limitation. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2395 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly S 26 Shepardize (Fla. 2000).

13. In contested presidential election of 2000, the state manual recount provisions pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (5) served important governmental interests and were intended to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process by providing a structural means of correcting tabulating errors in the counting of election ballots where the plain language of the statute evidenced a central purpose to remedy an error in the vote tabulaton that affected the outcome of the election. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2395 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly S 26 Shepardize (Fla. 2000).

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14. Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (5) required that the manual recount of ballots, as applied to the contested presidential election of 2000, was to be completed in a reasonable time, and what was a reasonable time required for completion depended on whether the election was for a statewide office, or federal office, or, if for presidential electors, reasonableness was circumscribed by 3 U.S.C.S. § 5. Shepardize Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2395 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly S 26 Shepardize (Fla. 2000). 15. Manual recount provision of Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize permitted the recounts in a presidential election; pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.112 Shepardize , late returns could be ignored. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2395 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly S 26 Shepardize (Fla. 2000). 16. Taken together, Fla. Stat. ch. 101.5614 Shepardize suggested that error in the vote tabulation found in Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize included errors in the failure of the voting machinery to read a ballot and not simply errors resulting from the voting machinery. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2395 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly S 26 Shepardize (Fla. 2000). 17. Error in the vote tabulation under Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize included a discrepancy between the number of votes determined by a vote tabulation system and the number of voters determined by a manual count of a sampling of precincts. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2395 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly S 26 Shepardize (Fla. 2000). 18. On its face, the manual recount provision of Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize does not limit candidates' access to the ballot or interfere with voters' right to associate or vote. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2395 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly S 26 Shepardize (Fla. 2000). 19. Under Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize , a candidate can request a manual recount at any point prior to certification by the county canvassing board and such action can lead to a full recount of all the votes in the county. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2395 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly S 26 Shepardize (Fla. 2000).

20. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize , a candidate who appears on a ballot, a political committee that supports or opposes an issue that appears on a ballot, or a political party whose candidate's name appeared on the ballot may file a written request with the county canvassing board for a manual recount. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2395 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly S 26 Shepardize (Fla. 2000). 21. County canvassing board could not be compelled, pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (5), to continue the manual recount of ballots in the 2000 presidential election after an error was noted potentially affecting the outcome of the election; where a complete manual recount could not be accomplished within the time frame set by the Florida Supreme Court, mandamus was inappropriate. Miami-Dade County Democratic Party v. Miami-Dade County Canvassing Bd., 773

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So. 2d 1179 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 15384 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly D 2723 Shepardize (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2000). 22. While discretionary in its application, the manual recount provision of Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize is not wholly standardless. Rather, the central purpose of the scheme, as evidenced by its plain language, is to remedy an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the election. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2311 Shepardize , 2000 D.A.R. 12457 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1062 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1085 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), vacated by 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 471 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 366 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8087 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4020 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 19 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9599 Shepardize (2000). 23. County canvassing board "may" authorize a manual recount, Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (4)(c), and such a recount must include at least three precincts and at least one percent of the total votes cast for the candidate. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2311 Shepardize , 2000 D.A.R. 12457 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1062 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1085 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), vacated by 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 471 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 366 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8087 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4020 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 19 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9599 Shepardize (2000). 24. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (4)(a) (2000), a candidate who appears on a ballot, a political committee that supports or opposes an issue that appears on a ballot, or a political party whose candidate's name appeared on the ballot may file a written request with the county canvassing board for a manual recount. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2311 Shepardize , 2000 D.A.R. 12457 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1062 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1085 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), vacated by 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 471 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 366 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8087 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4020 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 19 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9599 Shepardize (2000). 25. Plain language of Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (5) refers to an error in the vote tabulation rather than the vote tabulation system and on its face, the statute does not include any words of limitation; rather, it provides a remedy for any type of mistake made in tabulating ballots. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2311 Shepardize , 2000 D.A.R. 12457 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1062 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1085 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), vacated by 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 471 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 366 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8087 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4020 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 19 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9599 Shepardize (2000). 26. Taken together, Fla. Stat. ch. 101.5614 Shepardize (5), (6), suggest that the phrase error in the vote tabulation found in Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (5) includes errors in the failure of the voting machinery to read a ballot and not simply errors resulting from the voting machinery. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2311 Shepardize , 2000 D.A.R. 12457 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1062 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1085

Case in Brief Page 27

Shepardize (Fla. 2000), vacated by 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 471 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 366 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8087 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4020 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 19 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9599 Shepardize (2000). 27. Error in the vote tabulation includes a discrepancy between the number of votes determined by a voter tabulation system and the number of voters determined by a manual count of a sampling of precincts pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (4). Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2311 Shepardize , 2000 D.A.R. 12457 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1062 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1085 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), vacated by 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 471 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 366 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8087 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4020 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 19 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9599 Shepardize (2000). 28. While discretionary in its application, the manual recount provision of Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize is not wholly standardless; rather, the central purpose of the scheme, as evidenced by its plain language, is to remedy an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the election. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2311 Shepardize , 2000 D.A.R. 12457 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1062 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1085 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), vacated by 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 471 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 366 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8087 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4020 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 19 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9599 Shepardize (2000). 29. County canvassing board "may" authorize a manual recount under a previous version of Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize

(4)(c), and such a recount must include at least three precincts and at least one percent of the total votes cast for the candidate. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2311 Shepardize , 2000 D.A.R. 12457 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1062 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1085 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), vacated by 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 471 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 366 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8087 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4020 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 19 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9599 Shepardize (2000). 30. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize , a candidate who appears on a ballot, a political committee that supports or opposes an issue that appears on a ballot, or a political party whose candidate's name appeared on the ballot, may file a written request with the county canvassing board for a manual recount. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2311 Shepardize , 2000 D.A.R. 12457 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1062 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1085 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), vacated by 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 471 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 366 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8087 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4020 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 19 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9599 Shepardize (2000). 31. Plain language of an earlier version of Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (5) refers to an error in the vote tabulation rather than the vote tabulation system, and on its face, the statute does not include any words of limitation; rather, it provides a remedy for any type of mistake made in tabulating ballots. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2311 Shepardize , 2000 D.A.R. 12457 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1062 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L.

Case in Brief Page 28

Weekly S 1085 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), vacated by 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 471 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 366 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8087 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4020 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 19 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9599 Shepardize (2000). 32. Taken together, Fla. Stat. ch. 101.5614 Shepardize (5) and (6), suggest that the phrase "error in the vote tabulation" found in an earlier version of Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166 Shepardize (5) includes errors in the failure of the voting machinery to read a ballot and not simply errors resulting from the voting machinery. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2311 Shepardize , 2000 D.A.R. 12457 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1062 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1085 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), vacated by 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 471 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 366 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8087 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4020 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 19 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9599 Shepardize (2000). 33. Error in the vote tabulation includes a discrepancy between the number of votes determined by a voter tabulation system and the number of voters determined by a manual count of a sampling of precincts pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166. Shepardize Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2311 Shepardize

, 2000 D.A.R. 12457 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1062 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1085 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), vacated by 531 U.S. 70 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 471 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 366 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8087 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4020 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 19 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9599 Shepardize (2000). Citation

Fla. Stat. § 102.168 Shepardize

2. Trial court erred in dismissing appellant candidate's election contest because even though appellant failed to present a prima facie case of fraud and gross negligence in the election process and the negligence in the election was not so pervasive that it thwarted the will of the people, the trial court erred (1) by not considering other evidence regarding whether the 25 absentee ballots constituted legal ballots where these ballots, rejected as illegal, were sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election, (2) by refusing to consider 14 additional undervotes in its manual recount where the trial court prevented any effort to identify any undervotes in the sheriff's race, and (3) by not counting three ballots from a certain precinct, which were mistakenly spoiled by a poll worker. Braxton v. Holmes County Election Canvassing Bd., 870 So. 2d 958 Shepardize , 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 1962 Shepardize , 29 Fla. L. Weekly D 481 Shepardize (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2004). 3. Under Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168 Shepardize (2), when the canvassing board certified the results of a particular election following a protest, the contestant had only 5 days within which to file his contest if that occured later than the 10 days from the original certification; and this did not preclude the contestant from using the 10-day period from the certification of the results of the election being contested even though the contestant had also previously filed a protest. Miller v. City of Belle Glade Canvassing Bd., 790 So. 2d 511 Shepardize , 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 8778 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly D 1617 Shepardize (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2001).

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4. Candidate who lost a municipal election for mayor and commissioner properly filed a timely petition to challenge the election results 10 days after results were certified because under Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168 Shepardize (2), the mere fact that the candidates had filed a protest did not automatically limit them to a five day period in which to file the contest, and he was free to use the 10 day period from the date of certification provided in the statute. Miller v. City of Belle Glade Canvassing Bd., 790 So. 2d 511 Shepardize , 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 8778 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly D 1617 Shepardize (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2001). 5. Candidate who lost election could file a protest with the county canvassing board addressing the validity of the vote returns, seeking a manual recount, and could also file a complaint with the circuit court addressing the validity of the election itself; the two remedies were not mutually exclusive. Miller v. City of Belle Glade Canvassing Bd., 790 So. 2d 511 Shepardize , 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 8778 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly D 1617 Shepardize (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2001). 6. The court's responsibility in an election contest was to determine whether legal votes were rejected sufficient to change or place in doubt the results of the election; by failing to examine or investigate the ballots that the machine failed to register as a vote and by failing to examine the specifically identified group of uncounted ballots claimed to contain the rejected legal votes, the court failed to address the issue presented. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2373 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1113 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1133 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), reversed by 531 U.S. 98 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 525 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 388 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8430 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4029 Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 26 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9879 Shepardize , 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 6606 Shepardize (2000). 7. In an election contest brought pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168 Shepardize , a trial court can sustain a certified election result after the court has found substantial unintentional noncompliance with the election statutes if the court can also find that the results reflected the will of the people despite the substantial noncompliance. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 Shepardize , 1998 Fla. LEXIS 449 Shepardize , 23 Fla. L. Weekly S 149 Shepardize (Fla. 1998). 8. If a trial court in an election contest brought pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168 Shepardize finds substantial noncompliance with statutory election procedures and also makes a factual determination that reasonable doubt exists as to whether a certified election expressed the will of the voters, then the trial court shall void the election even in the absence of fraud or intentional wrongdoing. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 Shepardize , 1998 Fla. LEXIS 449 Shepardize , 23 Fla. L. Weekly S 149 Shepardize (Fla. 1998). 9. County's process of re-marking absentee ballots that could not be read by the scanning equipment was not in substantial compliance with Fla. Stat. ch. 101.5614 Shepardize (5), notwithstanding the fact that the process was widely used, recommended by the manufacturer's representatives and approved by the state Division of Election. Trial court was within its sound discretion to conclude that the election was a full and fair expression of the will of the people where no fraud was

Case in Brief Page 30

found because there was no factual basis for requiring that the election be set aside. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 Shepardize , 1998 Fla. LEXIS 449 Shepardize , 23 Fla. L. Weekly S 149 Shepardize (Fla. 1998). 10. The kind and degree of negligence that will warrant judicial intervention, absent fraud, in an election contest brought pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168 Shepardize , would be gross negligence which, in the context of election officials actions, means negligence that is so pervasive that it thwarts the will of the people. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 Shepardize , 1998 Fla. LEXIS 449 Shepardize , 23 Fla. L. Weekly S 149 Shepardize (Fla. 1998). 11. Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168 Shepardize granted a candidate the right to contest an election result, but did not remove the discretion of the canvassing board to hold a manual recount, as provided by Fla. Stat. ch. 102.166. Shepardize Broward County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508 Shepardize , 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 11920 Shepardize , 17 Fla. L. Weekly D 2542 Shepardize (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1992). 12. Before all absentee ballots cast in a single-county election could be declared invalid, the trial court had to make a specific finding of invalidity as to a number of absentee ballots that was sufficient to change the result of the election. Potter v. Bolden, 416 So. 2d 6 Shepardize , 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 20214 Shepardize (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1982), quashed by 452 So. 2d 564 Shepardize , 1984 Fla. LEXIS 3471 Shepardize (Fla. 1984). 13. Challenge to election result in contest for school superintendent was dismissed because candidate failed to show, as required under Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168 Shepardize , that, but for irregularities in the balloting and counting process, the result of the election would have been different. Smith v. Tynes, 412 So. 2d 925 Shepardize , 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 19771 Shepardize (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1982). 16. Political party's failure to include space for absentee voter applicants to place voter registration identification numbers did not affect the integrity of the absentee ballot request itself or the subsequent ballot or the election, when substantial other identifying information such as voter applicant's name, address, signature, and last four digits of voter's social security was included in the request form; thus, trial court did not err by refusing to invalidate those absentee ballots that were corrected by the political party to include the missing voter registration information where there was no evidence of fraud, gross negligence, or intentional wrongdoing. Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 519 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2404 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1123 Shepardize , 26 Fla. L. Weekly S 6 Shepardize (Fla. 2000). 17. The court's responsibility in an election contest was to determine whether legal votes were rejected sufficient to change or place in doubt the results of the election; by failing to examine or investigate the ballots that the machine failed to register as a vote and by failing to examine the specifically identified group of uncounted ballots claimed to contain the rejected legal votes, the court failed to address the issue presented. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 Shepardize , 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2373 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1113 Shepardize , 25 Fla. L. Weekly S 1133 Shepardize (Fla. 2000), reversed by 531 U.S. 98 Shepardize , 121 S. Ct. 525 Shepardize , 148 L. Ed. 2d 388 Shepardize , 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8430 Shepardize , 69 U.S.L.W. 4029

Case in Brief Page 31

Shepardize , 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 26 Shepardize , 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9879 Shepardize , 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 6606 Shepardize (2000). 18. In an election contest brought pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168 Shepardize , a trial court can sustain a certified election result after the court has found substantial unintentional noncompliance with the election statutes if the court can also find that the results reflected the will of the people despite the substantial noncompliance. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 Shepardize , 1998 Fla. LEXIS 449 Shepardize , 23 Fla. L. Weekly S 149 Shepardize (Fla. 1998). 19. If a trial court in an election contest brought pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168 Shepardize finds substantial noncompliance with statutory election procedures and also makes a factual determination that reasonable doubt exists as to whether a certified election expressed the will of the voters, then the trial court shall void the election even in the absence of fraud or intentional wrongdoing. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 Shepardize , 1998 Fla. LEXIS 449 Shepardize , 23 Fla. L. Weekly S 149 Shepardize (Fla. 1998). 20. County's process of re-marking absentee ballots that could not be read by the scanning equipment was not in substantial compliance with Fla. Stat. ch. 101.5614 Shepardize (5), notwithstanding the fact that the process was widely used, recommended by the manufacturer's representatives and approved by the state Division of Election. Trial court was within its sound discretion to conclude that the election was a full and fair expression of the will of the people where no fraud was found because there was no factual basis for requiring that the election be set aside. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 Shepardize , 1998 Fla. LEXIS 449 Shepardize , 23 Fla. L. Weekly S 149 Shepardize (Fla. 1998). 21. The kind and degree of negligence that will warrant judicial intervention, absent fraud, in an election contest brought pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168 Shepardize , would be gross negligence which, in the context of election officials actions, means negligence that is so pervasive that it thwarts the will of the people. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 Shepardize , 1998 Fla. LEXIS 449 Shepardize , 23 Fla. L. Weekly S 149 Shepardize (Fla. 1998). 22. Trial court lacked authority to order a new election upon a finding that there was extensive absentee voter fraud in favor of one candidate; the trial court held that the proper remedy was to void all the absentee votes and determine the election based on the machine ballots. In re Protest of Election Returns & Absentee Ballots in the November 4, 1997 Election, 707 So. 2d 1170 Shepardize , 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 2408 Shepardize , 23 Fla. L. Weekly D 1188 Shepardize (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1998), review denied by 725 So. 2d 1108 Shepardize , 1998 Fla. LEXIS 1939 Shepardize (Fla. 1998). 23. County canvassing board was not a proper party defendant to a suit brought under Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168 Shepardize by a citizen's group attacking the results of a local sales tax referendum on the basis of the conduct of the county and city commissioners in allegedly campaigning for passage of a local option tax. People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. Leon County Canvassing Bd., 573 So. 2d 31 Shepardize , 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 9659 Shepardize , 16 Fla. L. Weekly D 44 Shepardize (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1990).

Case in Brief Page 32

24. Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168 Shepardize did not authorize judicial intervention in a State Representative election where the losing candidate claimed that the winner, who had already taken office, filed a false candidate oath that misled voters in their election choice; the statutory right of intervention was limited to contesting the certification of election. McPherson v. Flynn, 397 So. 2d 665 Shepardize , 1981 Fla. LEXIS 2653 Shepardize (Fla. 1981). 25. Final decree rendered in a primary-election-contest proceeding instituted pursuant to former Fla. Stat. ch. 99.192 Shepardize (now Fla. Stat. ch. 102.168) Shepardize was sustained on appeal where the trial court, inter alia, refused to permit a count of the ballots cast in a particular precinct for the purpose of impeaching the return made by the election managers; the evidence failed to sustain the allegation that the integrity of the ballot boxes had been preserved. Burke v. Beasley, 75 So. 2d 7 Shepardize , 1954 Fla. LEXIS 1769 Shepardize , 46 A.L.R.2d 1381 Shepardize (Fla. 1954).

USCS Const. Art. II, § 1, Cl 2

Generally Electors for President and Vice President are state officers, and state may punish all fraudulent voting for such electors. In re Green (1890) 134 US 377 Shepardize , 33 L Ed 951 Shepardize , 10 S Ct 586 Shepardize . Where state law is applicable not only to elections of state officials but also to the selection of Presidential electors, legislature is not acting solely under authority given to legislature by citizens of state but by virtue of direct grant of authority under Article II, § 5, clause 2 of Federal Constitution which provides for each state to appoint "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct" specified number of electors. Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. (2000) 531 US 70 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 366 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 471, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9599, 14 FLW Fed S 19. On certiorari to review decision by state's highest court concerning state's results for Presidential election, Supreme Court will vacate judgment of state's highest court and will remand case for further proceedings because there is considerable uncertainty as to precise grounds for decision by state's highest court, and this is sufficient reason for Supreme Court to decline to review federal questions asserted to be present, in that decision by state's highest court effectively extended a 7-day deadline set by state statutory provision for filing election returns--assuming that deadline would have applied--by 12 days and directed state official accept manual recounts submitted prior to extended deadline. Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. (2000) 531 US 70 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 366 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 471, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9599, 14 FLW Fed S 19. In case of law enacted by state legislature that is applicable not only to elections to state offices, but also to selection of Presidential electors, legislature is not acting solely under authority given to legislature by people of state, but by virtue of direct grant of authority made under Art II, § 1, cl 2 of Constitution, which provides that each state shall appoint, "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," a specified number of electors. Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. (2000) 531 US 70 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 366 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 471, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9599, 14 FLW Fed S 19.

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Under Article II, § 1 of Federal Constitution, in particular state, individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for President of United States unless and until state legislature chooses statewide election as means to implement legislature's power to appoint members of electoral college; also, state, after granting franchise in special context of Article II, can take back power to appoint electors. Bush v Gore (2000) 531 US 98 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 388 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 525, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9879, 2000 Colo J C A R 6606 Shepardize , 14 FLW Fed S 26, on remand, dismd (2000, Fla) 779 So 2d 270 Shepardize . When state's legislature, acting under Article II, § 1 of Federal Constitution, vests right to vote for Presidential electors in state's people, right to vote as legislature has prescribed is fundamental. Bush v Gore (2000) 531 US 98 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 388 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 525, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9879, 2000 Colo J C A R 6606 Shepardize , 14 FLW Fed S 26, on remand, dismd (2000, Fla) 779 So 2d 270 Shepardize . When state's legislature, acting under Article II, § 1 of Federal Constitution, vests right to vote for Presidential electors in state's people, one source of the fundamental nature of right to vote as legislature has prescribed lies in equal weight accorded to each vote and equal dignity owed to each voter; pursuant to equal protection clause of Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, right to vote is protected in more than initial allocation of franchise, for (1) equal protection applies as well to manner of exercise of franchise, and (2) state, having once granted right to vote on equal terms, may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another; right of suffrage can be denied by debasement or dilution of weight of citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting free exercise of franchise. Bush v Gore (2000) 531 US 98 Shepardize , 148 L Ed 2d 388 Shepardize , 121 S Ct 525, Shepardize 2000 CDOS 9879, 2000 Colo J C A R 6606 Shepardize , 14 FLW Fed S 26, on remand, dismd (2000, Fla) 779 So 2d 270 Shepardize . Presidential electors are officers of state and not federal officers. Walker v United States (1937, CA8 Mo) 93 F2d 383 Shepardize , cert den (1938) 303 US 644 Shepardize , 82 L Ed 1103 Shepardize , 58 S Ct 642 Shepardize , reh den (1938) 303 US 668 Shepardize , 82 L Ed 1124 Shepardize , 58 S Ct 755 Shepardize . Right to vote in presidential elections was fundamentally political right, pursuant to U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, and could not be implemented as to Puerto Rican voters by courts in absence of statehood or amendment to Constitution, pursuant to U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; U.S. Const. art. V. Igartua-de la Rosa v United States (2005, CA1 Puerto Rico) 417 F3d 145 Shepardize . When legislature has provided for appointment of electors, its powers and functions have ended; if and when it attempts to go further and to dictate to electors the choice which they must make for President and Vice President, it has invaded field set apart to electors by Federal Constitution. Opinion of Justices (1948) 250 Ala 399 Shepardize , 34 So 2d 598 Shepardize . With respect to selection of presidential electors, federal and state laws must be read together. Maddox v Board of State Canvassers (1944) 116 Mont 217 Shepardize , 149 P2d 112 Shepardize .

Case in Brief Page 34

"Appoint" was manifestly used as conveying broadest power of determination; legislature has exclusive power to define method of appointing electors; words "in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct" operate as limitation on state in respect of any attempt to circumscribe legislature's power to define method of appointing electors. State ex rel. Beeson v Marsh (1948) 150 Neb 233 Shepardize , 34 NW2d 279 Shepardize . Validity of particular state laws State law providing for election of presidential electors by congressional districts instead of by people of state at large, does not violate Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. McPherson v Blacker (1892) 146 US 1 Shepardize , 36 L Ed 869 Shepardize , 13 S Ct 3 Shepardize . Ohio election laws which place greater burden on small or new parties than upon two major parties in order to win place on presidential ballot and which impose certain requirements on party organization violate equal protection and First Amendment right of association; and constitutional provision giving states power to appoint presidential electors in manner chosen by legislatures does not give Ohio absolute power to place any burdens it pleases on selection of electors without regard to other provisions of Constitution, in absence of some compelling interest which justifies burdens. Williams v Rhodes (1968) 393 US 23 Shepardize , 21 L Ed 2d 24 Shepardize , 89 S Ct 5, Shepardize 45 Ohio Ops 2d 236. Ohio statute, directing that names of candidates for presidential electors shall not be printed on ballots, but that names of candidates for President and Vice President shall be printed with statement that vote for such candidates shall be vote for electors of their party, was constitutional. State ex rel. Hawke v Myers (1936) 132 Ohio St 18, Shepardize 7 Ohio Ops 10, 4 NE2d 397 Shepardize , reh den. Provision of Texas statute that no names of candidates of certain parties shall appear on general election ballot unless nominated by primary election does not apply to presidential electors. Stanford v Butler (1944) 142 Tex 692 Shepardize , 181 SW2d 269 Shepardize .

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Recent News Coverage of the Case

Adam Cohen, Has Bush v. Gore Become the Case that Must Not Be Named?, N.Y. Times, Aug 15, 2006, at 18.

The author discussed the fact that the Justices and legal scholars didn’t often discuss Bush v. Gore because it was fact based and could not be used as precedent, but the author argued that it should be used for precedent for Equal Protection in voter disenfranchisement actions.

Case in Brief Page 35

Thomas Roeser, How Radicals in Robes Seized the Judiciary; At Certain Times (Including Our Own), The U.S. Supreme Court Has Been a Disruptive Bully, Chi. Sun-Times, July 2, 2005, at 17.

The author discussed the Supreme Court and Men in Black: How the Supreme Court Is Destroying America by Mark Levin (Regnery, 2005), which charged the Justices as being radicals who decided cases politically, particularly Bush v. Gore.

George Will, Bush v. Gore, Ticking Bomb, Newsweek Oct. 25, 2004 (U.S. Ed.) at 114.

The author discussed the implications that the Bush v. Gore decision could have on the 2004 election, and equal protection challenges that both parties should be prepared to fight.

Robyn E. Blumner, How Five Voted for Millions, St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 26, 2004, at 1P. Peter Berkowitz, Bush v.Gore Comes Back, N.Y. Sun, Sept. 23, 2004, at 9. Adam Kirsch, Still Disputed, N.Y. Sun, Mar. 10, 2004, at 17. D.J. Ticee, To Reduce Cynicism about Courts, Reconsider Bush v. Gore, Saint Paul Pioneer Press, Sept. 24, 2003, at A14. Gerard J. Fitzpatrick, Bush v. Gore: Popular Sovereignty, Fundamental Law, and the Post-Election Battle for the Presidency, 35 Polity 1, Sept. 22, 2002, at 153. Supreme Court's Bush Ruling Begs Questions, Asbury Park Press, Jan.18, 2001, at 11A. Robert J. Spitzer, The Supreme Court, Bush, and the Election of the Century, Post-Standard, Dec. 18, 2000, at A9. Donald Lambro, Why Court Ruled as It Did, Wash. Times, Dec. 18, 2000, at A19. Dennis J. Hutchinson, Law and Politics in the U.S. Supreme Court, Chi. Trib., Dec. 17, 2000, at 21. Bush vs. Gore Legal Experts Dissect Supreme Court Decision and Its Long- Term Effects, Denver Rocky Mountain News, Dec.17, 2000, at 1B. Inside the 5-4 Decision, Chi. Sun-Times, Dec. 14, 2000, at 7. High Court Clumsily Applies the Brakes, Dallas Morning News, Dec.14, 2000.

Case in Brief Page 36

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Mark Sherman, U.S. Supreme Court Justices Defend Decision that Made Bush President, Ended Gore's Chances, Associated Press Worldstream, Jan. 24, 2007.

Seven years after the Bush v. Gore decision, three of the justices who made the decision remarked that they had no choice but to take the case and decide it as they did, although Justice O’Connor admitted the opinion was written in haste.

The 5-4 Vote, Times Union, (republished) Dec. 25, 2006, at A8.

The article discussed the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore and the effect that the vote may have on the public and their confidence in a bipartisan Supreme Court.

Rep. Wexler Files Appeal With Supreme Court over Touch-Screening Voting Machines, US Fed News, Sept. 25, 2006.

The article discussed an appeal filed by Representative Wexler to touch-screen voting machines, wherein he claimed that because they failed to provide for any record, there could be no recounting. The argument he made was that the machine would not provide for Equal Protection, as required by Bush v. Gore.

Dan Sewell, Appellate Court Rules Punch-Cards Violated Voters' Rights, Associated Press St. & Loc.Wire, Apr. 21, 2006. Jay Weaver, Court Reviewing Dispute Over State's System of Voting; Three Judges Heard Arguments in Whether the State's Current System of Voting and Recounting Ballots Violates the Constitution, Miami Herald, Dec. 8, 2005, at 1. William Fisher, Politics-Us: Chief Justice Led Supreme Court to the Right, IPS-Inter Press Service, Sept. 7, 2005. Bill Sloat, Democrats Take up Fight over Ballots, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Nov. 18, 2004, at A1. Electoral System Needs Improvement—Again, Miami Herald, Nov.1, 2004. David Westphal, Voting Changes Loom in Election Both Sides Prepare Unprecedented Challenges of Procedures that Could Test Integrity of American Ballot Box, Fresno Bee, Oct. 21, 2004, at A3.

Case in Brief Page 37

Darrel Rowland, Punch Cards May Hurt Blacks; More Votes Went Uncounted in Black Areas in 2000, Columbus Dispatch, Oct. 17, 2004, at 1A. Henry Hamman, US Election Stirs Debate on Ruling that Favoured Bush, Fin. Times (London, England), Oct. 4, 2004, at 2. Elizabeth M. Yang & Kristi Gaines, Voting Technology and the Law: from Chads to Fads and Somewhere in Between; Looking at the Law, 6 Social Education 68, Oct. 1, 2004, at 401. Jerome R. Stockfisch, 4 Years On, Voting Uncertainty Lingers, Tampa Trib., Aug. 8, 2004, at 1. Steve Leff, U.S. Courts Stepped Into Elections, Sun-Sentinel, June 4, 2004, at 18A. Brad Smith, Push to End Manual Vote Recounts Resisted, Tampa Trib., Apr. 9, 2004, at 1. For more results:

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Kingsley Guy, Whining Won't Win, Sun-Sentinel, Oct. 4, 2006, at 23A.

The article discussed the grudge that appeared to be held by Democrats against Katherine Harris, who served as the chief elections officer during the 2000 Florida election dispute.

William March, Was Harris Right? Depends Whom You Ask, Tampa Trib., Nov. 27, 2005 at 6.

The article discussed Katherine Harris’ bid for U.S. Senate and despite all the issues that were relevant, she continued to be asked about the 2000 election. The article left open the question of whether Harris was an active participant for one side or whether she was a victim of the media circus.

Who Are the Activists Now?; Republicans Like Judicial Activism When It Suits Them, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nov. 20, 2004, at A15.

The author was critical of President Bush and his search for judges that would not show any activism, arguing that the President was a recipient of activism in his favor during the Bush v. Gore decision.

Sidney Zion, Never Mind Roe vs. Wade; What about Bush vs. Gore?, Biloxi Sun Herald, July 24, 2005, at 8.

Case in Brief Page 38

Kevin White, Debunking Liberal Myths, University Wire, Sept. 29, 2004. Jay Ambrose, Gore's Back, Scripps Howard News Service, July 25, 2002. Joel Engelhardt & Scott McCabe, Ballot Review Shows Gore Would Have Led Bush in Florida, Cox News Service, Mar. 10, 2001. Barrister Harun ur Rashid, Decision of US Supreme Court: Is Presidency of Bush Tainted?, The Independent (Emerging Markets Datafile), Dec.18, 2000. Bill Rankin, Move to Right Seems Certain; Expect Backlash if any Bush Nominees are Seen as Too Conservative; The President-Elect: The Supreme Court, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Dec. 17, 2000, at 6G. Gore Concedes; Bush Assumes Mantle of President-Elect, Bulletin's Frontrunner, Dec.14, 2000. Charles M. Madigan & James Warren, Bush Accepts Presidency as Gore Concedes Defeat; Both Urge Nation to Set Aside Rancor, Chi. Trib., Dec. 14, 2000, at N1. Bush's Challenge: 'People Skills' Will Help New President, Daily Oklahoman, Dec. 14, 2000. Andy Lines, America's Judges Decide: I Concede.. And This Time I Won't Call George Back; Defeated Gore Slams Court Verdict, The Mirror, Dec.14, 2000, at 4, 5. Charles W. Holmes, How Gore's Strategy Did Him In, Plain Dealer, Dec. 14, 2000, at 1A. Bush and Gore Deliver Positive Healing Message, Post and Courier (Charleston, S.C.), Dec. 14, 2000, at 18. For more results:

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Case Text Page 1

Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98 Shepardize

GEORGE W. BUSH AND RICHARD CHENEY, PETITIONERS v. ALBERT GORE, JR., ET AL.

No. 00-949

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

531 U.S. 98 Shepardize ; 121 S. Ct. 525 Shepardize ; 148 L. Ed. 2d 388 Shepardize ; 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8430 Shepardize ; 69 U.S.L.W. 4029 Shepardize ; 2000 Cal. Daily

Op. Service 9879 Shepardize ; 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 6606 Shepardize ; 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 26 Shepardize

December 12, 2000, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT. DISPOSITION: Judgment reversed and case remanded for further proceedings because recount procedures adopted by lower court were inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single state judicial officer. DECISION: Violation of equal protection clause of Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment held to have occurred with respect to Florida Supreme Court's ordering manual recount of state's results in 2000 Presidential election. COUNSEL: Theodore B. Olson argued the cause for petitioners. Joseph P. Klock, Jr. argued the cause for respondents Katherine Harris, et al. in support of petitioners. David Boies argued the cause for respondents Albert Gore, Jr., et al.

JUDGES: CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG AND JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting. OPINION: PER CURIAM. I On December 8, 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida ordered that the Circuit Court of Leon County tabulate by hand 9,000 ballots in Miami-Dade County. It also ordered the inclusion in the certified vote totals of 215 votes identified in Palm Beach County and 168 votes identified in Miami-Dade County for Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., and Senator Joseph Lieberman, Democratic Candidates for President and Vice President. The Supreme Court noted that petitioner, Governor George W. Bush asserted that the net gain for Vice President Gore in Palm Beach County was 176 votes, and directed the Circuit Court to resolve that dispute on remand. 772 So. 2d, at 1243 Shepardize (slip op., at 4, n. 6). The court further held that relief would require manual recounts in all Florida counties where so-called "undervotes" had not been subject to manual tabulation. The court ordered all manual recounts to begin at

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once. Governor Bush and Richard Cheney, Republican Candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency, filed an emergency application for a stay of this mandate. On December 9, we granted the application, treated the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari, and granted certiorari. Post, p. . The proceedings leading to the present controversy are discussed in some detail in our opinion in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., ante, p. (per curiam) (Bush I). On November 8, 2000, the day following the Presidential election, the Florida Division of Elections reported that petitioner, Governor Bush, had received 2,909,135 votes, and respondent, Vice President Gore, had received 2,907,351 votes, a margin of 1,784 for Governor Bush. Because Governor Bush's margin of victory was less than "one-half of a percent . . . of the votes cast," an automatic machine recount was conducted under § 102.141(4) of the election code, the results of which showed Governor Bush still winning the race but by a diminished margin. Vice President Gore then sought manual recounts in Volusia, Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade Counties, pursuant to Florida's election protest provisions. Fla. Stat. § 102.166 Shepardize (2000). A dispute arose concerning the deadline for local county canvassing boards to submit their returns to the Secretary of State (Secretary). The Secretary declined to waive the November 14 deadline imposed by statute. §§ 102.111, 102.112. The Florida Supreme Court, however, set the deadline at November 26. We granted certiorari and vacated the Florida Supreme Court's decision, finding considerable uncertainty as to the grounds on which it was based. Bush I, ante, at - (slip. op., at 6-7). On December 11, the Florida Supreme Court issued a decision on remand reinstating that date. 772 So. 2d 1243 Shepardize , (slip op. at 30-31). On November 26, the Florida Elections Canvassing Commission certified the results of the election and declared Governor Bush the winner of Florida's 25 electoral votes. On November 27, Vice President Gore, pursuant to Florida's contest provisions, filed a complaint in Leon County Circuit Court contesting the certification. Fla. Stat. § 102.168 Shepardize (2000). He sought relief pursuant to § 102.168(3)(c), which provides that "receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of

the election" shall be grounds for a contest. The Circuit Court denied relief, stating that Vice President Gore failed to meet his burden of proof. He appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, which certified the matter to the Florida Supreme Court. Accepting jurisdiction, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Gore v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 270 Shepardize (2000). The court held that the Circuit Court had been correct to reject Vice President Gore's challenge to the results certified in Nassau County and his challenge to the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board's determination that 3,300 ballots cast in that county were not, in the statutory phrase, "legal votes." The Supreme Court held that Vice President Gore had satisfied his burden of proof under § 102.168(3)(c) with respect to his challenge to Miami-Dade County's failure to tabulate, by manual count, 9,000 ballots on which the machines had failed to detect a vote for President ("undervotes"). 779 So. 2d at 271 Shepardize (slip. op., at 22-23). Noting the closeness of the election, the Court explained that "on this record, there can be no question that there are legal votes within the 9,000 uncounted votes sufficient to place the results of this election in doubt." Id. at (slip. op., at 35). A "legal vote," as determined by the Supreme Court, is "one in which there is a 'clear indication of the intent of the voter. '" Id. at (slip op., at 25). The court therefore ordered a hand recount of the 9,000 ballots in Miami-Dade County. Observing that the contest provisions vest broad discretion in the circuit judge to "provide any relief appropriate under such circumstances," Fla. Stat. § 102.168 Shepardize (8) (2000), the Supreme Court further held that the Circuit Court could order "the Supervisor of Elections and the Canvassing Boards, as well as the necessary public officials, in all counties that have not conducted a manual recount or tabulation of the undervotes . . . to do so forthwith, said tabulation to take place in the individual counties where the ballots are located." 779 So. 2d at 270 Shepardize (slip. op., at 38). The Supreme Court also determined that both Palm Beach County and Miami-Dade County, in their earlier manual recounts, had identified a net gain of 215 and 168 legal votes for Vice President Gore. Id. at (slip.

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op., at 33-34). Rejecting the Circuit Court's conclusion that Palm Beach County lacked the authority to include the 215 net votes submitted past the November 26 deadline, the Supreme Court explained that the deadline was not intended to exclude votes identified after that date through ongoing manual recounts. As to Miami-Dade County, the Court concluded that although the 168 votes identified were the result of a partial recount, they were "legal votes [that] could change the outcome of the election." Id., at (slip op., at 34). The Supreme Court therefore directed the Circuit Court to include those totals in the certified results, subject to resolution of the actual vote total from the Miami-Dade partial recount. Link P. Arg. The petition presents the following questions: whether the Florida Supreme Court established new standards for resolving Presidential election contests, thereby violating Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and failing to comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5 Shepardize , and Link P. Arg. whether the use of standardless manual recounts violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. With respect to the equal protection question, we find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. II A The closeness of this election, and the multitude of legal challenges which have followed in its wake, have brought into sharp focus a common, if heretofore unnoticed, phenomenon. Nationwide statistics reveal that an estimated 2% of ballots cast do not register a vote for President for whatever reason, including deliberately choosing no candidate at all or some voter error, such as voting for two candidates or insufficiently marking a ballot. See Ho, More Than 2M Ballots Uncounted, AP Online (Nov. 28, 2000); Kelley, Balloting Problems Not Rare But Only In A Very Close Election Do Mistakes And Mismarking Make A Difference, Omaha World-Herald (Nov. 15, 2000). In certifying election results, the votes eligible for inclusion in the certification are the votes meeting the properly established legal requirements.

This case has shown that punch card balloting machines can produce an unfortunate number of ballots which are not punched in a clean, complete way by the voter. After the current counting, it is likely legislative bodies nationwide will examine ways to improve the mechanisms and machinery for voting. B The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral College. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1. This is the source for the statement in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 Shepardize , 36 L. Ed. 869 Shepardize , 13 S. Ct. 3 Shepardize (1892), that the State legislature's power to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary; it may, if it so chooses, select the electors itself, which indeed was the manner used by State legislatures in several States for many years after the Framing of our Constitution. Id. at 28-33. History has now favored the voter, and in each of the several States the citizens themselves vote for Presidential electors. When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter. The State, of course, after granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint electors. See id., at 35 ("There is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated") (quoting S. Rep. No. 395, 43d Cong., 1st Sess.). The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 Shepardize , 16 L. Ed. 2d 169 Shepardize , 86 S. Ct. 1079 Shepardize (1966) ("Once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the

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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). It must be remembered that "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 Shepardize , 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 Shepardize , 84 S. Ct. 1362 Shepardize (1964). There is no difference between the two sides of the present controversy on these basic propositions. Link P. Arg. Respondents say that the very purpose of vindicating the right to vote justifies the recount procedures now at issue. The question before us, however, is whether the recount procedures the Florida Supreme Court has adopted are consistent with its obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its electorate. Much of the controversy seems to revolve around ballot cards designed to be perforated by a stylus but which, either through error or deliberate omission, have not been perforated with sufficient precision for a machine to count them. In some cases a piece of the card -- a chad -- is hanging, say by two corners. In other cases there is no separation at all, just an indentation. The Florida Supreme Court has ordered that the intent of the voter be discerned from such ballots . For purposes of resolving the equal protection challenge, it is not necessary to decide whether the Florida Supreme Court had the authority under the legislative scheme for resolving election disputes to define what a legal vote is and to mandate a manual recount implementing that definition. Link P. Arg. Link Quick Holding The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right. Florida's basic command for the count of legally cast votes is to consider the "intent of the voter." Gore v. Harris, 779 So. 2d at 270 Shepardize (slip op., at 39). This is unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and a starting principle. The problem inheres in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application. The formulation of uniform rules to determine intent based on these recurring circumstances is practicable and, we

conclude, necessary. Link Int. HN The law does not refrain from searching for the intent of the actor in a multitude of circumstances; and in some cases the general command to ascertain intent is not susceptible to much further refinement. In this instance, however, the question is not whether to believe a witness but how to interpret the marks or holes or scratches on an inanimate object, a piece of cardboard or paper which, it is said, might not have registered as a vote during the machine count. The factfinder confronts a thing, not a person. The search for intent can be confined by specific rules designed to ensure uniform treatment. The want of those rules here has led to unequal evaluation of ballots in various respects. See Gore v. Harris, 779 So. 2d at 270 Shepardize (slip op., at 51) (Wells, J., dissenting) ("Should a county canvassing board count or not count a 'dimpled chad' where the voter is able to successfully dislodge the chad in every other contest on that ballot? Here, the county canvassing boards disagree"). As seems to have been acknowledged at oral argument, the standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from county to county but indeed within a single county from one recount team to another. The record provides some examples. A monitor in Miami-Dade County testified at trial that he observed that three members of the county canvassing board applied different standards in defining a legal vote. 3 Tr. 497, 499 (Dec. 3, 2000). And testimony at trial also revealed that at least one county changed its evaluative standards during the counting process. Palm Beach County, for example, began the process with a 1990 guideline which precluded counting completely attached chads, switched to a rule that considered a vote to be legal if any light could be seen through a chad, changed back to the 1990 rule, and then abandoned any pretense of a per se rule, only to have a court order that the county consider dimpled chads legal. This is not a process with sufficient guarantees of equal treatment. An early case in our one person, one vote jurisprudence arose when a State accorded arbitrary and disparate treatment to voters in its different counties. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 Shepardize , 9 L. Ed. 2d

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821 Shepardize , 83 S. Ct. 801 Shepardize (1963). The Court found a constitutional violation. We relied on these principles in the context of the Presidential selection process in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 Shepardize , 23 L. Ed. 2d 1 Shepardize , 89 S. Ct. 1493 Shepardize (1969), where we invalidated a county-based procedure that diluted the influence of citizens in larger counties in the nominating process. There we observed that Link Int. HN "the idea that one group can be granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our representative government." 394 U.S. at 819. The State Supreme Court ratified this uneven treatment. It mandated that the recount totals from two counties, Miami-Dade and Palm Beach, be included in the certified total. The court also appeared to hold sub silentio that the recount totals from Broward County, which were not completed until after the original November 14 certification by the Secretary of State, were to be considered part of the new certified vote totals even though the county certification was not contested by Vice President Gore. Yet each of the counties used varying standards to determine what was a legal vote. Broward County used a more forgiving standard than Palm Beach County, and uncovered almost three times as many new votes, a result markedly disproportionate to the difference in population between the counties. In addition, the recounts in these three counties were not limited to so-called undervotes but extended to all of the ballots. The distinction has real consequences. A manual recount of all ballots identifies not only those ballots which show no vote but also those which contain more than one, the so-called overvotes. Neither category will be counted by the machine. This is not a trivial concern. At oral argument, respondents estimated there are as many as 110,000 overvotes statewide. As a result, the citizen whose ballot was not read by a machine because he failed to vote for a candidate in a way readable by a machine may still have his vote counted in a manual recount; on the other hand, the citizen who marks two candidates in a way discernable by the machine will not have the same opportunity to have his vote count, even if a manual examination of the ballot would reveal the requisite indicia of intent. Furthermore, the citizen who marks two candidates, only one of which is discernable by the machine, will have

his vote counted even though it should have been read as an invalid ballot. The State Supreme Court's inclusion of vote counts based on these variant standards exemplifies concerns with the remedial processes that were under way. That brings the analysis to yet a further equal protection problem. The votes certified by the court included a partial total from one county, Miami-Dade. The Florida Supreme Court's decision thus gives no assurance that the recounts included in a final certification must be complete. Indeed, it is respondent's submission that it would be consistent with the rules of the recount procedures to include whatever partial counts are done by the time of final certification, and we interpret the Florida Supreme Court's decision to permit this. See 779 So. 2d at 270, n. 21 Shepardize (slip op., at 37, n. 21) (noting "practical difficulties" may control outcome of election, but certifying partial Miami-Dade total nonetheless). This accommodation no doubt results from the truncated contest period established by the Florida Supreme Court in Bush I, at respondents' own urging. The press of time does not diminish the constitutional concern. A desire for speed is not a general excuse for ignoring equal protection guarantees. In addition to these difficulties the actual process by which the votes were to be counted under the Florida Supreme Court's decision raises further concerns. That order did not specify who would recount the ballots. The county canvassing boards were forced to pull together ad hoc teams comprised of judges from various Circuits who had no previous training in handling and interpreting ballots. Furthermore, while others were permitted to observe, they were prohibited from objecting during the recount. Link Quick Holding The recount process, in its features here described, is inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single state judicial officer. Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.

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The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections. Instead, we are presented with a situation where a state court with the power to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards. When a court orders a statewide remedy, there must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied. Given the Court's assessment that the recount process underway was probably being conducted in an unconstitutional manner, the Court stayed the order directing the recount so it could hear this case and render an expedited decision. The contest provision, as it was mandated by the State Supreme Court, is not well calculated to sustain the confidence that all citizens must have in the outcome of elections. The State has not shown that its procedures include the necessary safeguards. The problem, for instance, of the estimated 110,000 overvotes has not been addressed, although Chief Justice Wells called attention to the concern in his dissenting opinion. See 779 So. 2d at 270, n. 26 Shepardize (slip op., at 45, n. 26). Link P. Arg. Upon due consideration of the difficulties identified to this point, it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work. It would require not only the adoption (after opportunity for argument) of adequate statewide standards for determining what is a legal vote, and practicable procedures to implement them, but also orderly judicial review of any disputed matters that might arise. In addition, the Secretary of State has advised that the recount of only a portion of the ballots requires that the vote tabulation equipment be used to screen out undervotes, a function for which the machines were not designed. If a recount of overvotes were also required, perhaps even a second screening would be necessary. Link Int. HN Use of the equipment for this purpose, and any new software developed for it, would have to be evaluated for accuracy by the Secretary of State, as required by Fla. Stat. § 101.015 Shepardize (2000).

Link Int. HN The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended the State's electors to "participate fully in the federal electoral process," as provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5. 779 So. 2d at 270 Shepardize (slip op. at 27); see also Palm Beach Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 WL 1725434, *13 (Fla. 2000). Link Quick Holding That statute, in turn, requires that any controversy or contest that is designed to lead to a conclusive selection of electors be completed by December 12. That date is upon us, and there is no recount procedure in place under the State Supreme Court's order that comports with minimal constitutional standards. Because it is evident that any recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will be unconstitutional for the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida ordering a recount to proceed. Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that demand a remedy. See post, at 6 (SOUTER, J., dissenting); post, at 2, 15 (BREYER, J., dissenting). The only disagreement is as to the remedy. Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5 Shepardize , JUSTICE BREYER's proposed remedy -- remanding to the Florida Supreme Court for its ordering of a constitutionally proper contest until December 18-contemplates action in violation of the Florida election code, and hence could not be part of an "appropriate" order authorized by Fla. Stat. § 102.168 Shepardize (8) (2000). * * * None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the Constitution's design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their legislatures, and to the political sphere. When contending parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed, and the

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case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Pursuant to this Court's Rule 45.2, the Clerk is directed to issue the mandate in this case forthwith. It is so ordered. CONCUR BY: REHNQUIST CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring. Link Concur▲ We join the per curiam opinion. We write separately because we believe there are additional grounds that require us to reverse the Florida Supreme Court's decision. I We deal here not with an ordinary election, but with an election for the President of the United States. In Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 Shepardize , 78 L. Ed. 484 Shepardize , 54 S. Ct. 287 Shepardize (1934), we said: "While presidential electors are not officers or agents of the federal government ( In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 Shepardize , 33 L. Ed. 951 Shepardize , 10 S. Ct. 586 Shepardize ), they exercise federal functions under, and discharge duties in virtue of authority conferred by, the Constitution of the United States. The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The importance of his election and the vital character of its relationship to and effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be too strongly stated." Likewise, in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794-795 Shepardize , 75 L. Ed. 2d 547 Shepardize , 103 S. Ct. 1564 Shepardize (1983) (footnote omitted), we said: "In the context of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest. For the President and the Vice President of the United States are the

only elected officials who represent all the voters in the Nation." In most cases, comity and respect for federalism compel us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law. That practice reflects our understanding that the decisions of state courts are definitive pronouncements of the will of the States as sovereigns. Cf. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 Shepardize , 82 L. Ed. 1188 Shepardize , 58 S. Ct. 817 Shepardize (1938). Of course, in ordinary cases, the distribution of powers among the branches of a State's government raises no questions of federal constitutional law, subject to the requirement that the government be republican in character. See U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 4. But there are a few exceptional cases in which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power on a particular branch of a State's government. This is one of them. Article II, § 1, cl. 2, provides that "each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," electors for President and Vice President. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the text of the election law itself, and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on independent significance. In McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 Shepardize , 36 L. Ed. 869 Shepardize , 13 S. Ct. 3 Shepardize (1892), we explained that Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, "conveys the broadest power of determination" and "leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method" of appointment. Id., at 27. A significant departure from the legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors presents a federal conts autional question. 3 U.S.C. § 5 Shepardize informs our application of Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, to the Florida statutory scheme, which, as the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged, took that statute into account. Section 5 provides that the State's selection of electors "shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes" if the electors are chosen under laws enacted prior to election day, and if the selection process is completed six days prior to the meeting of the electoral college. As we noted in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1050 Shepardize , ante, at 6. "Since § 5 contains a principle of federal law that would assure finality

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of the State's determination if made pursuant to a state law in effect before the election, a legislative wish to take advantage of the 'safe harbor' would counsel against any construction of the Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law." If we are to respect the legislature's Article II powers, therefore, we must ensure that postelection state-court actions do not frustrate the legislative desire to attain the "safe harbor" provided by § 5. In Florida, the legislature has chosen to hold statewide elections to appoint the State's 25 electors. Importantly, the legislature has delegated the authority to run the elections and to oversee election disputes to the Secretary of State (Secretary), Fla. Stat. § 97.012 Shepardize (1) (2000), and to state circuit courts, §§ 102.168(1), 102.168(8). Isolated sections of the code may well admit of more than one interpretation, but the general coherence of the legislative scheme may not be altered by judicial interpretation so as to wholly change the statutorily provided apportionment of responsibility among these various bodies. In any election but a Presidential election, the Florida Supreme Court can give as little or as much deference to Florida's executives as it chooses, so far as Article II is concerned, and this Court will have no cause to question the court's actions. But, with respect to a Presidential election, the court must be both mindful of the legislature's role under Article II in choosing the manner of appointing electors and deferential to those bodies expressly empowered by the legislature to carry out its constitutional mandate. In order to determine whether a state court has infringed upon the legislature's authority, we necessarily must examine the law of the State as it existed prior to the action of the court. Though we generally defer to state courts on the interpretation of state law -- see, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 Shepardize , 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 Shepardize , 95 S. Ct. 1881 Shepardize (1975) -- there are of course areas in which the Constitution requires this Court to undertake an independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law. For example, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 Shepardize , 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 Shepardize , 78 S. Ct. 1163 Shepardize (1958), it

was argued that we were without jurisdiction because the petitioner had not pursued the correct appellate remedy in Alabama's state courts. Petitioners had sought a state-law writ of certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court when a writ of mandamus, according to that court, was proper. We found this state-law ground inadequate to defeat our jurisdiction because we were "unable to reconcile the procedural holding of the Alabama Supreme Court" with prior Alabama precedent. 357 U.S. at 456 Shepardize . The purported state-law ground was so novel, in our independent estimation, that "petitioner could not fairly be deemed to have been apprised of its existence." 357 U.S. at 457. Six years later we decided Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 Shepardize , 12 L. Ed. 2d 894 Shepardize , 84 S. Ct. 1697 Shepardize (1964), in which the state court had held, contrary to precedent, that the state trespass law applied to black sit-in demonstrators who had consent to enter private property but were then asked to leave. Relying upon NAACP, we concluded that the South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of a state penal statute had impermissibly broadened the scope of that statute beyond what a fair reading provided, in violation of due process. See 378 U.S. at 361-362 Shepardize . What we would do in the present case is precisely parallel: Hold that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the Florida election laws impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair reading required, in violation of Article II. n1 n1 n1 Similarly, our jurisprudence requires us to analyze the "background principles" of state property law to determine whether there has been a taking of property in violation of the Takings Clause. That constitutional guarantee would, of course, afford no protection against state power if our inquiry could be concluded by a state supreme court holding that state property law accorded the plaintiff no rights. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 Shepardize , 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 Shepardize , 112 S. Ct. 2886 Shepardize (1992). In one of our oldest cases, we similarly made an independent evaluation of state law in order to protect federal treaty guarantees. In Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603 Shepardize , 7 Cranch 603 Shepardize , 3 L. Ed. 453

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Shepardize (1813), we disagreed with the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia that a 1782 state law had extinguished the property interests of one Denny Fairfax, so that a 1789 ejectment order against Fairfax supported by a 1785 state law did not constitute a future confiscation under the 1783 peace treaty with Great Britain. See 11 U.S. at 623 Shepardize ; Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee, 15 Va. 218 Shepardize , 1 Munf. 218 Shepardize (Va. 1809). This inquiry does not imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures. To attach definitive weight to the pronouncement of a state court, when the very question at issue is whether the court has actually departed from the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce the explicit requirements of Article II. II Acting pursuant to its constitutional grant of authority, the Florida Legislature has created a detailed, if not perfectly crafted, statutory scheme that provides for appointment of Presidential electors by direct election. Fla. Stat. § 103.011 Shepardize (2000). Under the statute, "votes cast for the actual candidates for President and Vice President shall be counted as votes cast for the presidential electors supporting such candidates." Ibid. The legislature has designated the Secretary of State as the "chief election officer," with the responsibility to "obtain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation of the election laws." § 97.012. The state legislature has delegated to county canvassing boards the duties of administering elections. § 102.141. Those boards are responsible for providing results to the state Elections Canvassing Commission, comprising the Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Division of Elections. § 102.111. Cf. Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 268, n. 5 Shepardize (1975) ("The election process . . . is committed to the executive branch of government through duly designated officials all charged with specific duties . . . . [The] judgments [of these officials] are entitled to be regarded by the courts as presumptively correct . . . "). After the election has taken place, the canvassing boards receive

returns from precincts, count the votes, and in the event that a candidate was defeated by .5% or less, conduct a mandatory recount. Fla. Stat. § 102.141 Shepardize (4) (2000). The county canvassing boards must file certified election returns with the Department of State by 5 p.m. on the seventh day following the election. § 102.112(1). The Elections Canvassing Commission must then certify the results of the election. § 102.111(1). The state legislature has also provided mechanisms both for protesting election returns and for contesting certified election results. Section 102.166 governs protests. Any protest must be filed prior to the certification of election results by the county canvassing board. § 102.166(4)(b). Once a protest has been filed, "the county canvassing board may authorize a manual recount." § 102.166(4)(c). If a sample recount conducted pursuant to § 102.166(5) "indicates an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the election," the county canvassing board is instructed to: "(a) Correct the error and recount the remaining precincts with the vote tabulation system; (b) Request the Department of State to verify the tabulation software; or (c) Manually recount all ballots," § 102.166(5). In the event a canvassing board chooses to conduct a manual recount of all ballots, § 102.166(7) prescribes procedures for such a recount. Contests to the certification of an election, on the other hand, are controlled by § 102.168. The grounds for contesting an election include "receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election." § 102.168(3)(c). Any contest must be filed in the appropriate Florida circuit court, Fla. Stat. § 102.168 Shepardize (1), and the canvassing board or election board is the proper party defendant, § 102.168(4). Section 102.168(8) provides that "the circuit judge to whom the contest is presented may fashion such orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate under such circumstances." In Presidential elections, the contest period necessarily terminates on the date set by 3 U.S.C. § 5 Shepardize for concluding the State's "final determination" of election controversies."

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In its first decision, Palm Beach Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d. 1273 Shepardize (Nov. 21, 2000) (Harris I), the Florida Supreme Court extended the 7-day statutory certification deadline established by the legislature. n2 This modification of the code, by lengthening the protest period, necessarily shortened the contest period for Presidential elections. Underlying the extension of the certification deadline and the shortchanging of the contest period was, presumably, the clear implication that certification was a matter of significance: The certified winner would enjoy presumptive validity, making a contest proceeding by the losing candidate an uphill battle. In its latest opinion, however, the court empties certification of virtually all legal consequence during the contest, and in doing so departs from the provisions enacted by the Florida Legislature. n2 n2 We vacated that decision and remanded that case; the Florida Supreme Court reissued the same judgment with a new opinion on December 11, 2000, 323 So. 2d 259. The court determined that canvassing boards' decisions regarding whether to recount ballots past the certification deadline (even the certification deadline established by Harris I) are to be reviewed de novo, although the election code clearly vests discretion whether to recount in the boards, and sets strict deadlines subject to the Secretary's rejection of late tallies and monetary fines for tardiness. See Fla. Stat. § 102.112 Shepardize (2000). Moreover, the Florida court held that all late vote tallies arriving during the contest period should be automatically included in the certification regardless of the certification deadline (even the certification deadline established by Harris I), thus virtually eliminating both the deadline and the Secretary's discretion to disregard recounts that violate it. n3 n3 n3 Specifically, the Florida Supreme Court ordered the Circuit Court to include in the certified vote totals those votes identified for Vice

President Gore in Palm Beach County and Miami-Dade County. Moreover, the court's interpretation of "legal vote," and hence its decision to order a contest-period recount, plainly departed from the legislative scheme. Florida statutory law cannot reasonably be thought to require the counting of improperly marked ballots. Each Florida precinct before election day provides instructions on how properly to cast a vote, § 101.46; each polling place on election day contains a working model of the voting machine it uses, § 101.5611; and each voting booth contains a sample ballot, § 101.46. In precincts using punch-card ballots, voters are instructed to punch out the ballot cleanly: AFTER VOTING, CHECK YOUR BALLOT CARD TO BE SURE YOUR VOTING SELECTIONS ARE CLEARLY AND CLEANLY PUNCHED AND THERE ARE NO CHIPS LEFT HANGING ON THE BACK OF THE CARD. Instructions to Voters, quoted in Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1161 Shepardize , 2000 WL 1781942, *6 & n. 19 (CA11) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). No reasonable person would call it "an error in the vote tabulation," FLA. STAT. § 102.166 Shepardize (5), or a "rejection of legal votes," FLA. STAT. § 102.168 Shepardize (3)(c), n4 when electronic or electromechanical equipment performs precisely in the manner designed, and fails to count those ballots that are not marked in the manner that these voting instructions explicitly and prominently specify. The scheme that the Florida Supreme Court's opinion attributes to the legislature is one in which machines are required to be "capable of correctly counting votes," § 101.5606(4), but which nonetheless regularly produces elections in which legal votes are predictably not tabulated, so that in close elections manual recounts are regularly required. This is of course absurd. The Secretary of State, who is authorized by law to issue binding interpretations of the election code, §§ 97.012, 106.23, rejected this peculiar reading of the statutes. See DE 00-13 (opinion of the Division of Elections). The Florida Supreme Court, although it must defer to the Secretary's interpretations, see Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Committee, 625 So. 2d 840, 844 Shepardize (Fla. 1993), rejected her reasonable interpretation and embraced the peculiar one. See Palm Beach County Canvassing

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Board v. Harris, No. SC00-2346 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Harris III). n4 n4 It is inconceivable that what constitutes a vote that must be counted under the "error in the vote tabulation" language of the protest phase is different from what constitutes a vote that must be counted under the "legal votes" language of the contest phase. But as we indicated in our remand of the earlier case, in a Presidential election the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must prevail. And there is no basis for reading the Florida statutes as requiring the counting of improperly marked ballots, as an examination of the Florida Supreme Court's textual analysis shows. We will not parse that analysis here, except to note that the principal provision of the election code on which it relied, § 101.5614(5), was, as the Chief Justice pointed out in his dissent from Harris II, entirely irrelevant. See Gore v. Harris, No. SC00-2431, slip op., at 50 (Dec. 8, 2000). The State's Attorney General (who was supporting the Gore challenge) confirmed in oral argument here that never before the present election had a manual recount been conducted on the basis of the contention that "undervotes" should have been examined to determine voter intent. Tr. of Oral Arg. in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 39-40 (Dec. 1, 2000); cf. Broward County Canvassing Board v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508, 509 Shepardize (Fla. Ct. App. 1992) (denial of recount for failure to count ballots with "hanging paper chads"). For the court to step away from this established practice, prescribed by the Secretary of State, the state official charged by the legislature with "responsibility to . . . obtain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation of the election laws," § 97.012(1), was to depart from the legislative scheme. III The scope and nature of the remedy ordered by the Florida Supreme Court jeopardizes the "legislative wish" to take advantage of the safe harbor provided by 3 U.S.C. § 5. Shepardize Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., ante, at 6. December 12, 2000, is the last date for a

final determination of the Florida electors that will satisfy § 5. Yet in the late afternoon of December 8th -- four days before this deadline -- the Supreme Court of Florida ordered recounts of tens of thousands of so-called "undervotes" spread through 64 of the State's 67 counties. This was done in a search for elusive -- perhaps delusive -- certainty as to the exact count of 6 million votes. But no one claims that these ballots have not previously been tabulated; they were initially read by voting machines at the time of the election, and thereafter reread by virtue of Florida's automatic recount provision. No one claims there was any fraud in the election. The Supreme Court of Florida ordered this additional recount under the provision of the election code giving the circuit judge the authority to provide relief that is "appropriate under such circumstances." Fla. Stat. § 102.168 Shepardize (8) (2000). Surely when the Florida Legislature empowered the courts of the State to grant "appropriate" relief, it must have meant relief that would have become final by the cut-off date of 3 U.S.C. § 5. Shepardize In light of the inevitable legal challenges and ensuing appeals to the Supreme Court of Florida and petitions for certiorari to this Court, the entire recounting process could not possibly be completed by that date. Whereas the majority in the Supreme Court of Florida stated its confidence that "the remaining undervotes in these counties can be [counted] within the required time frame," 607 So. 2d at 509, n. 22 Shepardize (slip op., at 38, n. 22), it made no assertion that the seemingly inevitable appeals could be disposed of in that time. Although the Florida Supreme Court has on occasion taken over a year to resolve disputes over local elections, see, e.g., Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 Shepardize (1998) (resolving contest of sheriff's race 16 months after the election), it has heard and decided the appeals in the present case with great promptness. But the federal deadlines for the Presidential election simply do not permit even such a shortened process. As the dissent noted: "In [the four days remaining], all questionable ballots must be reviewed by the judicial officer appointed to discern the intent of the voter in a process open to the public. Fairness dictates that a provision be made for either party to object to how a particular ballot is counted.

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Additionally, this short time period must allow for judicial review. I respectfully submit this cannot be completed without taking Florida's presidential electors outside the safe harbor provision, creating the very real possibility of disenfranchising those nearly 6 million voters who are able to correctly cast their ballots on election day." 707 So. 2d at 720 Shepardize (slip op., at 55) (Wells, C. J., dissenting). The other dissenters echoed this concern: "The majority is departing from the essential requirements of the law by providing a remedy which is impossible to achieve and which will ultimately lead to chaos." Id. at (slip op., at 67 (Harding, J., dissenting, Shaw, J. concurring). Given all these factors, and in light of the legislative intent identified by the Florida Supreme Court to bring Florida within the "safe harbor" provision of 3 U.S.C. § 5 Shepardize , the remedy prescribed by the Supreme Court of Florida cannot be deemed an "appropriate" one as of December 8. It significantly departed from the statutory framework in place on November 7, and authorized open-ended further proceedings which could not be completed by December 12, thereby preventing a final determination by that date. For these reasons, in addition to those given in the per curiam, we would reverse. STEVENS; SOUTER; GINSBURG; BREYER JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG AND JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting. Link Dissent▲ The Constitution assigns to the States the primary responsibility for determining the manner of selecting the Presidential electors. See Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. When questions arise about the meaning of state laws, including election laws, it is our settled practice to accept the opinions of the highest courts of the States as providing the final answers. On rare occasions, however, either federal statutes or the Federal Constitution may require federal judicial intervention in state elections. This is not such an occasion.

The federal questions that ultimately emerged in this case are not substantial. Article II provides that "each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors." Ibid. (emphasis added). It does not create state legislatures out of whole cloth, but rather takes them as they come -- as creatures born of, and constrained by, their state constitutions. Lest there be any doubt, we stated over 100 years ago in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 Shepardize , 36 L. Ed. 869 Shepardize , 13 S. Ct. 3 Shepardize (1892), that "what is forbidden or required to be done by a State" in the Article II context "is forbidden or required of the legislative power under state constitutions as they exist." In the same vein, we also observed that "the [State's] legislative power is the supreme authority except as limited by the constitution of the State." Ibid.; cf. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367 Shepardize , 76 L. Ed. 795 Shepardize , 52 S. Ct. 397 Shepardize (1932). n1 The legislative power in Florida is subject to judicial review pursuant to Article V of the Florida Constitution, and nothing in Article II of the Federal Constitution frees the state legislature from the constraints in the state constitution that created it. Moreover, the Florida Legislature's own decision to employ a unitary code for all elections indicates that it intended the Florida Supreme Court to play the same role in Presidential elections that it has historically played in resolving electoral disputes. The Florida Supreme Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction therefore was wholly consistent with, and indeed contemplated by, the grant of authority in Article II. n1 n1 "Wherever the term 'legislature' is used in the Constitution it is necessary to consider the nature of the particular action in view." 285 U.S. at 367 Shepardize . It is perfectly clear that the meaning of the words "Manner" and "Legislature" as used in Article II, § 1, parallels the usage in Article I, § 4, rather than the language in Article V. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 Shepardize , 131 L. Ed. 2d 881 Shepardize

, 115 S. Ct. 1842 Shepardize (1995). Article I, § 4, and Article II, § 1, both call upon legislatures to act in a lawmaking capacity whereas Article V simply calls on the legislative body to deliberate upon a binary decision. As a result, petitioners' reliance on Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 Shepardize , 66 L. Ed. 505 Shepardize , 42 S. Ct. 217 Shepardize (1922), and

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Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253 U.S. 221 Shepardize , 64 L. Ed. 871 Shepardize , 40 S. Ct. 495 Shepardize (1920), is misplaced. It hardly needs stating that Congress, pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 5 Shepardize , did not impose any affirmative duties upon the States that their governmental branches could "violate." Rather, § 5 provides a safe harbor for States to select electors in contested elections "by judicial or other methods" established by laws prior to the election day. Section 5, like Article II, assumes the involvement of the state judiciary in interpreting state election laws and resolving election disputes under those laws. Neither § 5 nor Article II grants federal judges any special authority to substitute their views for those of the state judiciary on matters of state law. Nor are petitioners correct in asserting that the failure of the Florida Supreme Court to specify in detail the precise manner in which the "intent of the voter," Fla. Stat. § 101.5614 Shepardize (5) (Supp. 2001), is to be determined rises to the level of a constitutional violation. n2 We found such a violation when individual votes within the same State were weighted unequally, see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 Shepardize , 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 Shepardize , 84 S. Ct. 1362 Shepardize (1964), but we have never before called into question the substantive standard by which a State determines that a vote has been legally cast. And there is no reason to think that the guidance provided to the factfinders, specifically the various canvassing boards, by the "intent of the voter" standard is any less sufficient -- or will lead to results any less uniform -- than, for example, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard employed everyday by ordinary citizens in courtrooms across this country. n3 n2 n2 The Florida statutory standard is consistent with the practice of the majority of States, which apply either an "intent of the voter" standard or an "impossible to determine the elector's choice" standard in ballot recounts. The following States use an "intent of the voter" standard: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-645 Shepardize (A) (Supp. 2000) (standard for canvassing write-in votes); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-150a Shepardize (j) (1999)

(standard for absentee ballots, including three conclusive presumptions); Ind. Code § 3-12-1-1 Shepardize (1992); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21-A, § 1 (13) (1993); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 33, § 11-302(d) (2000 Supp.) (standard for absentee ballots); Mass. Gen. Laws § 70E (1991) (applying standard to Presidential primaries); Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.799a Shepardize (3) (Supp. 2000); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.453 Shepardize

(3) (Cum. Supp. 1998) (looking to voter's intent where there is substantial compliance with statutory requirements); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 65.009 Shepardize (c) (1986); Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-104 Shepardize

(5)(b) (Supp. 2000) (standard for write-in votes), § 20A-4-105(6)(a) (standard for mechanical ballots); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2587 Shepardize

(a) (1982); Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-644 Shepardize (A) (2000); Wash. Rev. Code § 29.62.180 Shepardize (1) (Supp. 2001) (standard for write-in votes); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-14-104 Shepardize (1999). The following States employ a standard in which a vote is counted unless it is "impossible to determine the elector's [or voter's] choice": Ala. Code § 11-46-44 Shepardize (c) (1992), Ala. Code § 17-13-2 Shepardize (1995); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-610 Shepardize (1996) (standard for rejecting ballot); Cal. Elec. Code Ann. § 15154(c) (West Supp. 2000); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-7-309 Shepardize (1) (1999) (standard for paper ballots), § 1-7-508(2) (standard for electronic ballots); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 15, § 4972 Shepardize

(4) (1999); Idaho Code § 34-1203 Shepardize (1981); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 10, § 5/7-51 (1993) (standard for primaries), id., ch. 10, § 5/17-16 (1993) (standard for general elections); Iowa Code § 49.98 Shepardize (1999); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21-A §§ 696 (2)(B), (4) (Supp. 2000); Minn. Stat. § 204C.22(1) (1992); Mont. Code Ann. § 13-15-202 Shepardize (1997) (not counting votes if "elector's choice cannot be determined"); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.367 Shepardize (d) (1995); N. Y. Elec. Law § 9-112 Shepardize (6) (McKinney 1998); N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 163-169 (b), 163-170 (1999); N. D. Cent. Code § 16.1-15-01 Shepardize (1) (Supp. 1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3505.28 Shepardize (1994); 26 Okla. Stat., Tit. 26, § 7-127(6) (1997); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 254.505 (1) (1991); S. C. Code Ann. § 7-13-1120 Shepardize (1977); S. D. Codified Laws § 12-20-7 Shepardize (1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-7-133 Shepardize (b) (1994); W. Va. Code § 3-6-5 Shepardize (g) (1999). n3

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n3 Cf. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 Shepardize , 127 L. Ed. 2d 583 Shepardize , 114 S. Ct. 1239 Shepardize (1994) ("The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so"). Admittedly, the use of differing substandards for determining voter intent in different counties employing similar voting systems may raise serious concerns. Those concerns are alleviated -- if not eliminated -- by the fact that a single impartial magistrate will ultimately adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process. Of course, as a general matter, "the interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal. We must remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints." Bain Peanut Co. of Tex. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 Shepardize , 75 L. Ed. 482 Shepardize , 51 S. Ct. 228 Shepardize (1931) (Holmes, J.). If it were otherwise, Florida's decision to leave to each county the determination of what balloting system to employ -- despite enormous differences in accuracy n4 -- might run afoul of equal protection. So, too, might the similar decisions of the vast majority of state legislatures to delegate to local authorities certain decisions with respect to voting systems and ballot design. n4 n4 The percentage of nonvotes in this election in counties using a punch-card system was 3.92%; in contrast, the rate of error under the more modern optical-scan systems was only 1.43%. Siegel v. LePore, No. 00-15981, 234 F.3d 1218 Shepardize , 2000 WL 1781946, *31, *32, *43 (charts C and F) (CA11, Dec. 6, 2000). Put in other terms, for every 10,000 votes cast, punch-card systems result in 250 more nonvotes than optical-scan systems. A total of 3,718,305 votes were cast under punch-card systems, and 2,353,811 votes were cast under optical-scan systems. Ibid. Even assuming that aspects of the remedial scheme might ultimately be found to violate the Equal Protection Clause, I could not subscribe to the majority's disposition of the case. As the majority explicitly holds, once a state legislature determines to select electors through a popular

vote, the right to have one's vote counted is of constitutional stature. As the majority further acknowledges, Florida law holds that all ballots that reveal the intent of the voter constitute valid votes. Recognizing these principles, the majority nonetheless orders the termination of the contest proceeding before all such votes have been tabulated. Under their own reasoning, the appropriate course of action would be to remand to allow more specific procedures for implementing the legislature's uniform general standard to be established. In the interest of finality, however, the majority effectively orders the disenfranchisement of an unknown number of voters whose ballots reveal their intent -- and are therefore legal votes under state law -- but were for some reason rejected by ballot-counting machines. It does so on the basis of the deadlines set forth in Title 3 of the United States Code. Ante, at 11. But, as I have already noted, those provisions merely provide rules of decision for Congress to follow when selecting among conflicting slates of electors. Supra, at 2. They do not prohibit a State from counting what the majority concedes to be legal votes until a bona fide winner is determined. Indeed, in 1960, Hawaii appointed two slates of electors and Congress chose to count the one appointed on January 4, 1961, well after the Title 3 deadlines. See Josephson & Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. Legis. 145, 166, n. 154 (1996). n5 Thus, nothing prevents the majority, even if it properly found an equal protection violation, from ordering relief appropriate to remedy that violation without depriving Florida voters of their right to have their votes counted. As the majority notes, "[a] desire for speed is not a general excuse for ignoring equal protection guarantees." Ante, at 10. n5 n5 Republican electors were certified by the Acting Governor on November 28, 1960. A recount was ordered to begin on December 13, 1960. Both Democratic and Republican electors met on the appointed day to cast their votes. On January 4, 1961, the newly elected Governor certified the Democratic electors. The certification was received by Congress on January 6, the day the electoral votes were counted. Josephson & Ross, 22 J. Legis., at 166, n. 154.

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Finally, neither in this case, nor in its earlier opinion in Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , 2000 WL 1725434 (Fla., Nov. 21, 2000), did the Florida Supreme Court make any substantive change in Florida electoral law. n6 Its decisions were rooted in long-established precedent and were consistent with the relevant statutory provisions, taken as a whole. It did what courts do n7 -- it decided the case before it in light of the legislature's intent to leave no legally cast vote uncounted. In so doing, it relied on the sufficiency of the general "intent of the voter" standard articulated by the state legislature, coupled with a procedure for ultimate review by an impartial judge, to resolve the concern about disparate evaluations of contested ballots. If we assume -- as I do -- that the members of that court and the judges who would have carried out its mandate are impartial, its decision does not even raise a colorable federal question. n6 n6 When, for example, it resolved the previously unanswered question whether the word "shall" in Fla. Stat. § 102.111 Shepardize or the word "may" in § 102.112 governs the scope of the Secretary of State's authority to ignore untimely election returns, it did not "change the law." Like any other judicial interpretation of a statute, its opinion was an authoritative interpretation of what the statute's relevant provisions have meant since they were enacted. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-313 Shepardize , 128 L. Ed. 2d 274 Shepardize , 114 S. Ct. 1510 Shepardize (1994). n7 n7 "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison., 5 U.S. 137 Shepardize , 1 Cranch 137, 177 Shepardize , 2 L. Ed. 60 Shepardize (1803). What must underlie petitioners' entire federal assault on the Florida election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to proceed. Otherwise, their position is wholly without merit. The endorsement of that position by the majority of this

Court can only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land. It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law. Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence that will be inflicted by today's decision. One thing, however, is certain. Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law. I respectfully dissent. JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins and with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE GINSBURG join with regard to all but Part C, dissenting. Link Dissent▲ The Court should not have reviewed either Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., ante, p. (per curiam), or this case, and should not have stopped Florida's attempt to recount all undervote ballots, see ante at , by issuing a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's orders during the period of this review, see Bush v. Gore, post at (slip op., at 1). If this Court had allowed the State to follow the course indicated by the opinions of its own Supreme Court, it is entirely possible that there would ultimately have been no issue requiring our review, and political tension could have worked itself out in the Congress following the procedure provided in 3 U.S.C. § 15. Shepardize The case being before us, however, its resolution by the majority is another erroneous decision. As will be clear, I am in substantial agreement with the dissenting opinions of JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE BREYER. I write separately only to say how straightforward the issues before us really are. There are three issues: whether the State Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute providing for a contest of the state election results somehow violates 3 U.S.C. § 5 Shepardize ; whether that court's construction of the state statutory provisions governing contests

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impermissibly changes a state law from what the State's legislature has provided, in violation of Article II, § 1, cl. 2, of the national Constitution; and whether the manner of interpreting markings on disputed ballots failing to cause machines to register votes for President (the undervote ballots) violates the equal protection or due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. None of these issues is difficult to describe or to resolve. I The 3 U.S.C. § 5 Shepardize issue is not serious. That provision sets certain conditions for treating a State's certification of Presidential electors as conclusive in the event that a dispute over recognizing those electors must be resolved in the Congress under 3 U.S.C. § 15. Shepardize Conclusiveness requires selection under a legal scheme in place before the election, with results determined at least six days before the date set for casting electoral votes. But no State is required to conform to § 5 if it cannot do that (for whatever reason); the sanction for failing to satisfy the conditions of § 5 is simply loss of what has been called its "safe harbor." And even that determination is to be made, if made anywhere, in the Congress. II The second matter here goes to the State Supreme Court's interpretation of certain terms in the state statute governing election "contests," Fla. Stat. § 102.168 Shepardize (2000); there is no question here about the state court's interpretation of the related provisions dealing with the antecedent process of "protesting" particular vote counts, § 102.166, which was involved in the previous case, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board. The issue is whether the judgment of the state supreme court has displaced the state legislature's provisions for election contests: is the law as declared by the court different from the provisions made by the legislature, to which the national Constitution commits responsibility for determining how each State's Presidential electors are chosen? See U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Bush does not, of course, claim that any judicial act interpreting a statute of uncertain meaning is enough to displace the

legislative provision and violate Article II; statutes require interpretation, which does not without more affect the legislative character of a statute within the meaning of the Constitution. Brief for Petitioners 48, n. 22, in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., et al., 531 U.S. 1050 Shepardize (2000). What Bush does argue, as I understand the contention, is that the interpretation of § 102.168 was so unreasonable as to transcend the accepted bounds of statutory interpretation, to the point of being a nonjudicial act and producing new law untethered to the legislative act in question. The starting point for evaluating the claim that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation effectively re-wrote § 102.168 must be the language of the provision on which Gore relies to show his right to raise this contest: that the previously certified result in Bush's favor was produced by "rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election." Fla. Stat. § 102.168 Shepardize

(3)(c) (2000). None of the state court's interpretations is unreasonable to the point of displacing the legislative enactment quoted. As I will note below, other interpretations were of course possible, and some might have been better than those adopted by the Florida court's majority; the two dissents from the majority opinion of that court and various briefs submitted to us set out alternatives. But the majority view is in each instance within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, and the law as declared is consistent with Article II. 1. The statute does not define a "legal vote," the rejection of which may affect the election. The State Supreme Court was therefore required to define it, and in doing that the court looked to another election statute, § 101.5614(5), dealing with damaged or defective ballots, which contains a provision that no vote shall be disregarded "if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined by a canvassing board." The court read that objective of looking to the voter's intent as indicating that the legislature probably meant "legal vote" to mean a vote recorded on a ballot indicating what the voter intended. Gore v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 270 (slip op., at 23-25) (Dec. 8, 2000). It is perfectly true that the majority might have chosen a different reading. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Harris et al. 10 (defining "legal votes" as "votes properly executed in accordance with the instructions provided to all

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registered voters in advance of the election and in the polling places"). But even so, there is no constitutional violation in following the majority view; Article II is unconcerned with mere disagreements about interpretive merits. 2. The Florida court next interpreted "rejection" to determine what act in the counting process may be attacked in a contest. Again, the statute does not define the term. The court majority read the word to mean simply a failure to count. 779 So. 2d at 270 Shepardize (slip op., at 26-27). That reading is certainly within the bounds of common sense, given the objective to give effect to a voter's intent if that can be determined. A different reading, of course, is possible. The majority might have concluded that "rejection" should refer to machine malfunction, or that a ballot should not be treated as "rejected" in the absence of wrongdoing by election officials, lest contests be so easy to claim that every election will end up in one. Cf. id., at (slip op., at 48) (Wells, C. J., dissenting). There is, however, nothing nonjudicial in the Florida majority's more hospitable reading. 3. The same is true about the court majority's understanding of the phrase "votes sufficient to change or place in doubt" the result of the election in Florida. The court held that if the uncounted ballots were so numerous that it was reasonably possible that they contained enough "legal" votes to swing the election, this contest would be authorized by the statute. n1 While the majority might have thought (as the trial judge did) that a probability, not a possibility, should be necessary to justify a contest, that reading is not required by the statute's text, which says nothing about probability. Whatever people of good will and good sense may argue about the merits of the Florida court's reading, there is no warrant for saying that it transcends the limits of reasonable statutory interpretation to the point of supplanting the statute enacted by the "legislature" within the meaning of Article II. n1 n1 When the Florida court ruled, the totals for Bush and Gore were then less than 1,000 votes apart. One dissent pegged the number of uncounted votes in question at 170,000. Gore v. Harris, supra,779 So.

2d 270 Shepardize ,(slip op., at 66) (opinion of Harding, J.). Gore's counsel represented to us that the relevant figure is approximately 60,000, Tr. of Oral Arg. 62, the number of ballots in which no vote for President was recorded by the machines. In sum, the interpretations by the Florida court raise no substantial question under Article II. That court engaged in permissible construction in determining that Gore had instituted a contest authorized by the state statute, and it proceeded to direct the trial judge to deal with that contest in the exercise of the discretionary powers generously conferred by Fla. Stat. § 102.168 Shepardize (8) (2000), to "fashion such orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate under such circumstances." As JUSTICE GINSBURG has persuasively explained in her own dissenting opinion, our customary respect for state interpretations of state law counsels against rejection of the Florida court's determinations in this case. III It is only on the third issue before us that there is a meritorious argument for relief, as this Court's Per Curiam opinion recognizes. It is an issue that might well have been dealt with adequately by the Florida courts if the state proceedings had not been interrupted, and if not disposed of at the state level it could have been considered by the Congress in any electoral vote dispute. But because the course of state proceedings has been interrupted, time is short, and the issue is before us, I think it sensible for the Court to address it. Petitioners have raised an equal protection claim (or, alternatively, a due process claim, see generally Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 Shepardize , 71 L. Ed. 2d 265 Shepardize , 102 S. Ct. 1148 Shepardize (1982)), in the charge that unjustifiably disparate standards are applied in different electoral jurisdictions to otherwise identical facts. It is true that the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid the use of a variety of voting mechanisms within a jurisdiction, even though different mechanisms will have different levels of effectiveness in recording

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voters' intentions; local variety can be justified by concerns about cost, the potential value of innovation, and so on. But evidence in the record here suggests that a different order of disparity obtains under rules for determining a voter's intent that have been applied (and could continue to be applied) to identical types of ballots used in identical brands of machines and exhibiting identical physical characteristics (such as "hanging" or "dimpled" chads). See, e.g., Tr., at 238-242 (Dec. 2-3, 2000) (testimony of Palm Beach County Canvassing Board Chairman Judge Charles Burton describing varying standards applied to imperfectly punched ballots in Palm Beach County during precertification manual recount); id. at 497-500 (similarly describing varying standards applied in Miami-Dade County); Tr. of Hearing 8-10 (Dec. 8, 2000) (soliciting from county canvassing boards proposed protocols for determining voters' intent but declining to provide a precise, uniform standard). I can conceive of no legitimate state interest served by these differing treatments of the expressions of voters' fundamental rights. The differences appear wholly arbitrary. In deciding what to do about this, we should take account of the fact that electoral votes are due to be cast in six days. I would therefore remand the case to the courts of Florida with instructions to establish uniform standards for evaluating the several types of ballots that have prompted differing treatments, to be applied within and among counties when passing on such identical ballots in any further recounting (or successive recounting) that the courts might order. Unlike the majority, I see no warrant for this Court to assume that Florida could not possibly comply with this requirement before the date set for the meeting of electors, December 18. Although one of the dissenting justices of the State Supreme Court estimated that disparate standards potentially affected 170,000 votes, Gore v. Harris, supra, 779 So. 2d at 270 Shepardize (slip op., at 66), the number at issue is significantly smaller. The 170,000 figure apparently represents all uncounted votes, both undervotes (those for which no Presidential choice was recorded by a machine) and overvotes (those rejected because of votes for more than one candidate). Tr. of Oral Arg. 61-62. But as JUSTICE BREYER has pointed out, no showing has been made of legal overvotes uncounted, and counsel for Gore made an

uncontradicted representation to the Court that the statewide total of undervotes is about 60,000. Id. at 62. To recount these manually would be a tall order, but before this Court stayed the effort to do that the courts of Florida were ready to do their best to get that job done. There is no justification for denying the State the opportunity to try to count all disputed ballots now. I respectfully dissent. JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, and with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE BREYER join as to Part I, dissenting. I Link Dissent▲ The CHIEF JUSTICE acknowledges that provisions of Florida's Election Code "may well admit of more than one interpretation." Ante, at 3. But instead of respecting the state high court's province to say what the State's Election Code means, THE CHIEF JUSTICE maintains that Florida's Supreme Court has veered so far from the ordinary practice of judicial review that what it did cannot properly be called judging. My colleagues have offered a reasonable construction of Florida's law. Their construction coincides with the view of one of Florida's seven Supreme Court justices. Gore v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 270 Shepardize , (Fla. 2000) (slip op., at 45-55) (Wells, C. J., dissenting); Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 Shepardize , (Fla. 2000) (slip op., at 34) (on remand) (confirming, 6-1, the construction of Florida law advanced in Gore). I might join THE CHIEF JUSTICE were it my commission to interpret Florida law. But disagreement with the Florida court's interpretation of its own State's law does not warrant the conclusion that the justices of that court have legislated. There is no cause here to believe that the members of Florida's high court have done less than "their mortal best to discharge their oath of office," Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 Shepardize , 66 L. Ed. 2d 722 Shepardize , 101 S. Ct. 764 Shepardize (1981), and no cause to upset their reasoned interpretation of Florida law. This Court more than occasionally affirms statutory, and even

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constitutional, interpretations with which it disagrees. For example, when reviewing challenges to administrative agencies' interpretations of laws they implement, we defer to the agencies unless their interpretation violates "the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 Shepardize , 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 Shepardize , 104 S. Ct. 2778 Shepardize (1984). We do so in the face of the declaration in Article I of the United States Constitution that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." Surely the Constitution does not call upon us to pay more respect to a federal administrative agency's construction of federal law than to a state high court's interpretation of its own state's law. And not uncommonly, we let stand state-court interpretations of federal law with which we might disagree. Notably, in the habeas context, the Court adheres to the view that "there is 'no intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to [federal law] than his neighbor in the state courthouse.'" Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, n. 35 Shepardize , 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 Shepardize , 96 S. Ct. 3037 Shepardize (1976) (quoting Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 509 (1963)); see O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 Shepardize , 138 L. Ed. 2d 351 Shepardize , 117 S. Ct. 1969 Shepardize (1997) ("The Teague doctrine validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.") (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 Shepardize , 108 L. Ed. 2d 347 Shepardize , 110 S. Ct. 1212 Shepardize (1990)); O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 801, 813 (1981) ("There is no reason to assume that state court judges cannot and will not provide a 'hospitable forum' in litigating federal constitutional questions."). No doubt there are cases in which the proper application of federal law may hinge on interpretations of state law. Unavoidably, this Court must sometimes examine state law in order to protect federal rights. But we have dealt with such cases ever mindful of the full measure of respect we owe to interpretations of state law by a State's highest court. In the Contract Clause case, General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181

Shepardize , 117 L. Ed. 2d 328 Shepardize , 112 S. Ct. 1105 Shepardize (1992), for example, we said that although "ultimately we are bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made," the Court "accords respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the State's highest court." Id., at 187 (citation omitted). And in Central Union Telephone Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190 Shepardize , 70 L. Ed. 229 Shepardize , 46 S. Ct. 90 Shepardize (1925), we upheld the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of a state waiver rule, even though that interpretation resulted in the forfeiture of federal constitutional rights. Refusing to supplant Illinois law with a federal definition of waiver, we explained that the state court's declaration "should bind us unless so unfair or unreasonable in its application to those asserting a federal right as to obstruct it." Id., at 195. n1 n1 n1 See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032, n. 18 Shepardize , 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 Shepardize , 112 S. Ct. 2886 Shepardize (1992) (South Carolina could defend a regulatory taking "if an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents [by its courts] would exclude . . . beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is presently found"); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-345 Shepardize , 48 L. Ed. 2d 684 Shepardize , 96 S. Ct. 2074 Shepardize (1976) (deciding whether North Carolina had created a property interest cognizable under the Due Process Clause by reference to state law as interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court). Similarly, in Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200 Shepardize , 44 L. Ed. 2d 110 Shepardize , 95 S. Ct. 1605 Shepardize (1975), a gasoline retailer claimed that due process entitled him to deduct a state gasoline excise tax in computing the amount of his sales subject to a state sales tax, on the grounds that the legal incidence of the excise tax fell on his customers and that he acted merely as a collector of the tax. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the legal incidence of the excise tax fell on petitioner. Observing that "a State's highest court is the final judicial arbiter of the meaning of state statutes," we said that "when a state court has made its own definitive determination as to the operating incidence, . . . we give this finding great weight in determining the natural effect of a statute, and if it is consistent with the statute's reasonable interpretation it will be

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deemed conclusive." Id., at 208. In deferring to state courts on matters of state law, we appropriately recognize that this Court acts as an "'outsider' lacking the common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the jurisdiction." Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 Shepardize , 40 L. Ed. 2d 215 Shepardize , 94 S. Ct. 1741 Shepardize (1974). That recognition has sometimes prompted us to resolve doubts about the meaning of state law by certifying issues to a State's highest court, even when federal rights are at stake. Cf. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 Shepardize , 137 L. Ed. 2d 170 Shepardize , 117 S. Ct. 1055 Shepardize (1997) ("Warnings against premature adjudication of constitutional questions bear heightened attention when a federal court is asked to invalidate a State's law, for the federal tribunal risks friction-generating error when it endeavors to construe a novel state Act not yet reviewed by the State's highest court."). Notwithstanding our authority to decide issues of state law underlying federal claims, we have used the certification devise to afford state high courts an opportunity to inform us on matters of their own State's law because such restraint "helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." Lehman Brothers, 416 U.S. at 391 Shepardize . Just last Term, in Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23 Shepardize , 145 L. Ed. 2d 353 Shepardize , 120 S. Ct. 469 Shepardize (1999), we took advantage of Pennsylvania's certification procedure. In that case, a state prisoner brought a federal habeas action claiming that the State had failed to prove an essential element of his charged offense in violation of the Due Process Clause. 528 U.S. at 25-26 Shepardize . Instead of resolving the state-law question on which the federal claim depended, we certified the question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for that court to "help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised." Id., at 29; id. at 28 (asking the Pennsylvania Supreme Court whether its recent interpretation of the statute under which Fiore was convicted "was always the statute's meaning, even at the time of Fiore's trial"). THE CHIEF JUSTICE's willingness to reverse the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of Florida law in this case is at least in tension with our reluctance in Fiore even to interpret Pennsylvania law before seeking

instruction from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. I would have thought the "cautious approach" we counsel when federal courts address matters of state law, Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 77 Shepardize , and our commitment to "building cooperative judicial federalism," Lehman Brothers, 416 U.S. at 391 Shepardize , demanded greater restraint. Rarely has this Court rejected outright an interpretation of state law by a state high court. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603 Shepardize , 7 Cranch 603 Shepardize , 3 L. Ed. 453 Shepardize (1813), NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 Shepardize , 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 Shepardize , 78 S. Ct. 1163 Shepardize (1958), and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 Shepardize , 12 L. Ed. 2d 894 Shepardize , 84 S. Ct. 1697 Shepardize (1964), cited by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, are three such rare instances. See ante, at 4, 5, and n. 2. But those cases are embedded in historical contexts hardly comparable to the situation here. Fairfax's Devisee, which held that the Virginia Court of Appeals had misconstrued its own forfeiture laws to deprive a British subject of lands secured to him by federal treaties, occurred amidst vociferous States' rights attacks on the Marshall Court. G. Gunther & K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 61-62 (13th ed. 1997). The Virginia court refused to obey this Court's Fairfax's Devisee mandate to enter judgment for the British subject's successor in interest. That refusal led to the Court's pathmarking decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 Shepardize

, 1 Wheat. 304 Shepardize , 4 L. Ed. 97 Shepardize (1816). Patterson, a case decided three months after Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 Shepardize , 3 L. Ed. 2d 5 Shepardize , 78 S. Ct. 1401, 79 Shepardize Ohio Law Abs. 452 (1958), in the face of Southern resistance to the civil rights movement, held that the Alabama Supreme Court had irregularly applied its own procedural rules to deny review of a contempt order against the NAACP arising from its refusal to disclose membership lists. We said that "our jurisdiction is not defeated if the nonfederal ground relied on by the state court is without any fair or substantial support." 357 U.S. at 455 Shepardize . Bouie, stemming from a lunch counter "sit-in" at the height of the civil rights movement, held that the South Carolina Supreme Court's construction of its trespass laws -- criminalizing conduct not covered by the text of an otherwise clear statute -- was "unforeseeable" and thus violated due process when applied retroactively to the petitioners. 378 U.S. at 350, 354.

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THE CHIEF JUSTICE's casual citation of these cases might lead one to believe they are part of a larger collection of cases in which we said that the Constitution impelled us to train a skeptical eye on a state court's portrayal of state law. But one would be hard pressed, I think, to find additional cases that fit the mold. As JUSTICE BREYER convincingly explains, see post, at 5-9 (dissenting opinion), this case involves nothing close to the kind of recalcitrance by a state high court that warrants extraordinary action by this Court. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that counting every legal vote was the overriding concern of the Florida Legislature when it enacted the State's Election Code. The court surely should not be bracketed with state high courts of the Jim Crow South. THE CHIEF JUSTICE says that Article II, by providing that state legislatures shall direct the manner of appointing electors, authorizes federal superintendence over the relationship between state courts and state legislatures, and licenses a departure from the usual deference we give to state court interpretations of state law. Ante, at 5 ("To attach definitive weight to the pronouncement of a state court, when the very question at issue is whether the court has actually departed from the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce the explicit requirements of Article II."). The Framers of our Constitution, however, understood that in a republican government, the judiciary would construe the legislature's enactments. See U.S. Const., Art. III; The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton). In light of the constitutional guarantee to States of a "Republican Form of Government," U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 4, Article II can hardly be read to invite this Court to disrupt a State's republican regime. Yet THE CHIEF JUSTICE today would reach out to do just that. By holding that Article II requires our revision of a state court's construction of state laws in order to protect one organ of the State from another, THE CHIEF JUSTICE contradicts the basic principle that a State may organize itself as it sees fit. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 Shepardize , 115 L. Ed. 2d 410 Shepardize , 111 S. Ct. 2395 Shepardize (1991) ("Through the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign."); Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 Shepardize , 81 L. Ed. 835 Shepardize , 57 S.

Ct. 549 Shepardize (1937) ("How power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a question for the state itself."). n2 Article II does not call for the scrutiny undertaken by this Court. n2 n2 Even in the rare case in which a State's "manner" of making and construing laws might implicate a structural constraint, Congress, not this Court, is likely the proper governmental entity to enforce that constraint. See U.S. CONST., amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-15; cf. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 Shepardize , 60 L. Ed. 1172 Shepardize , 36 S. Ct. 708 Shepardize (1916) (treating as a nonjusticiable political question whether use of a referendum to override a congressional districting plan enacted by the state legislature violates Art. I, § 4); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 Shepardize , 7 HOW 1, 42 Shepardize , 12 L. Ed. 581 Shepardize (1849). The extraordinary setting of this case has obscured the ordinary principle that dictates its proper resolution: Federal courts defer to state high courts' interpretations of their state's own law. This principle reflects the core of federalism, on which all agree. "The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504, n. 17 Shepardize , 143 L. Ed. 2d 689 Shepardize , 119 S. Ct. 1518 Shepardize (1999) (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 Shepardize , 131 L. Ed. 2d 881 Shepardize , 115 S. Ct. 1842 Shepardize (1995) (KENNEDY, J., concurring)). THE CHIEF JUSTICE's solicitude for the Florida Legislature comes at the expense of the more fundamental solicitude we owe to the legislature's sovereign. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," the electors for President and Vice President) (emphasis added); ante, at 1-2 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). n3 Were the other members of this Court as mindful as they generally are of our system of dual sovereignty, they would affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.

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n3 n3 "Because the Framers recognized that state power and identity were essential parts of the federal balance, see The Federalist No. 39, the Constitution is solicitous of the prerogatives of the States, even in an otherwise sovereign federal province. The Constitution . . . grants States certain powers over the times, places, and manner of federal elections (subject to congressional revision), Art. I, § 4, cl. 1 . . .,and allows States to appoint electors for the President, Art. II, § 1, cl. 2." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 841-842 Shepardize , 131 L. Ed. 2d 881 Shepardize , 115 S. Ct. 1842 Shepardize (1995) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). II I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that petitioners have not presented a substantial equal protection claim. Ideally, perfection would be the appropriate standard for judging the recount. But we live in an imperfect world, one in which thousands of votes have not been counted. I cannot agree that the recount adopted by the Florida court, flawed as it may be, would yield a result any less fair or precise than the certification that preceded that recount. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807 Shepardize , 22 L. Ed. 2d 739 Shepardize , 89 S. Ct. 1404 Shepardize (1969) (even in the context of the right to vote, the state is permitted to reform "'one step at a time'") (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 Shepardize , 99 L. Ed. 563 Shepardize , 75 S. Ct. 461 Shepardize (1955)). Even if there were an equal protection violation, I would agree with JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE BREYER that the Court's concern about "the December 12 deadline," ante, at 12, is misplaced. Time is short in part because of the Court's entry of a stay on December 9, several hours after an able circuit judge in Leon County had begun to superintend the recount process. More fundamentally, the Court's reluctance to let the recount go forward -- despite its suggestion that "the search for intent can be confined by specific rules designed to ensure uniform treatment," ante, at 8 -- ultimately turns on its own judgment about the practical realities of

implementing a recount, not the judgment of those much closer to the process. Equally important, as JUSTICE BREYER explains, post, at 12 (dissenting opinion), the December 12 "deadline" for bringing Florida's electoral votes into 3 U.S.C. § 5's safe harbor lacks the significance the Court assigns it. Were that date to pass, Florida would still be entitled to deliver electoral votes Congress must count unless both Houses find that the votes "had not been . . . regularly given." 3 U.S.C. § 15. Shepardize The statute identifies other significant dates. See, e.g., § 7 (specifying December 18 as the date electors "shall meet and give their votes"); § 12 (specifying "the fourth Wednesday in December" -- this year, December 27 -- as the date on which Congress, if it has not received a State's electoral votes, shall request the state secretary of state to send a certified return immediately). But none of these dates has ultimate significance in light of Congress' detailed provisions for determining, on "the sixth day of January," the validity of electoral votes. § 15. The Court assumes that time will not permit "orderly judicial review of any disputed matters that might arise." Ante, at 12. But no one has doubted the good faith and diligence with which Florida election officials, attorneys for all sides of this controversy, and the courts of law have performed their duties. Notably, the Florida Supreme Court has produced two substantial opinions within 29 hours of oral argument. In sum, the Court's conclusion that a constitutionally adequate recount is impractical is a prophecy the Court's own judgment will not allow to be tested. Such an untested prophecy should not decide the Presidency of the United States. I dissent. JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE GINSBURG join except as to Part I-A-1, and with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins as to Part I, dissenting. Link Dissent▲ The Court was wrong to take this case. It was wrong to grant a stay. It should now vacate that stay and permit the Florida Supreme Court to decide whether the recount should resume.

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I The political implications of this case for the country are momentous. But the federal legal questions presented, with one exception, are insubstantial. A 1 The majority raises three Equal Protection problems with the Florida Supreme Court's recount order: first, the failure to include overvotes in the manual recount; second, the fact that all ballots, rather than simply the undervotes, were recounted in some, but not all, counties; and third, the absence of a uniform, specific standard to guide the recounts. As far as the first issue is concerned, petitioners presented no evidence, to this Court or to any Florida court, that a manual recount of overvotes would identify additional legal votes. The same is true of the second, and, in addition, the majority's reasoning would seem to invalidate any state provision for a manual recount of individual counties in a statewide election. The majority's third concern does implicate principles of fundamental fairness. The majority concludes that the Equal Protection Clause requires that a manual recount be governed not only by the uniform general standard of the "clear intent of the voter," but also by uniform subsidiary standards (for example, a uniform determination whether indented, but not perforated, "undervotes" should count). The opinion points out that the Florida Supreme Court ordered the inclusion of Broward County's undercounted "legal votes" even though those votes included ballots that were not perforated but simply "dimpled," while newly recounted ballots from other counties will likely include only votes determined to be "legal" on the basis of a stricter standard. In light of our previous remand, the Florida Supreme Court may have been reluctant to adopt a more specific standard than that provided for by the legislature for fear of exceeding its authority under Article II. However, since the use of different standards could favor one or the other of the

candidates, since time was, and is, too short to permit the lower courts to iron out significant differences through ordinary judicial review, and since the relevant distinction was embodied in the order of the State's highest court, I agree that, in these very special circumstances, basic principles of fairness may well have counseled the adoption of a uniform standard to address the problem. In light of the majority's disposition, I need not decide whether, or the extent to which, as a remedial matter, the Constitution would place limits upon the content of the uniform standard. 2 Nonetheless, there is no justification for the majority's remedy, which is simply to reverse the lower court and halt the recount entirely. An appropriate remedy would be, instead, to remand this case with instructions that, even at this late date, would permit the Florida Supreme Court to require recounting all undercounted votes in Florida, including those from Broward, Volusia, Palm Beach, and Miami-Dade Counties, whether or not previously recounted prior to the end of the protest period, and to do so in accordance with a single-uniform substandard. The majority justifies stopping the recount entirely on the ground that there is no more time. In particular, the majority relies on the lack of time for the Secretary to review and approve equipment needed to separate undervotes. But the majority reaches this conclusion in the absence of any record evidence that the recount could not have been completed in the time allowed by the Florida Supreme Court. The majority finds facts outside of the record on matters that state courts are in a far better position to address. Of course, it is too late for any such recount to take place by December 12, the date by which election disputes must be decided if a State is to take advantage of the safe harbor provisions of 3 U.S.C. § 5. Shepardize Whether there is time to conduct a recount prior to December 18, when the electors are scheduled to meet, is a matter for the state courts to determine. And whether, under Florida law, Florida could or could not take further action is obviously a matter for Florida courts, not this Court, to decide. See ante, at 13 (per curiam).

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By halting the manual recount, and thus ensuring that the uncounted legal votes will not be counted under any standard, this Court crafts a remedy out of proportion to the asserted harm. And that remedy harms the very fairness interests the Court is attempting to protect. The manual recount would itself redress a problem of unequal treatment of ballots. As JUSTICE STEVENS points out, see ante, at 4 and n. 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting opinion), the ballots of voters in counties that use punch-card systems are more likely to be disqualified than those in counties using optical-scanning systems. According to recent news reports, variations in the undervote rate are even more pronounced. See Fessenden, No-Vote Rates Higher in Punch Card Count, N. Y. Times, Dec. 1, 2000, p. A29 (reporting that 0.3% of ballots cast in 30 Florida counties using optical-scanning systems registered no Presidential vote, in comparison to 1.53% in the 15 counties using Votomatic punch card ballots). Thus, in a system that allows counties to use different types of voting systems, voters already arrive at the polls with an unequal chance that their votes will be counted. I do not see how the fact that this results from counties' selection of different voting machines rather than a court order makes the outcome any more fair. Nor do I understand why the Florida Supreme Court's recount order, which helps to redress this inequity, must be entirely prohibited based on a deficiency that could easily be remedied. B The remainder of petitioners' claims, which are the focus of the CHIEF JUSTICE's concurrence, raise no significant federal questions. I cannot agree that the CHIEF JUSTICE's unusual review of state law in this case, see ante, at 5-8 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting opinion), is justified by reference either to Art. II, § 1, or to 3 U.S.C. § 5. Shepardize Moreover, even were such review proper, the conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court's decision contravenes federal law is untenable. While conceding that, in most cases, "comity and respect for federalism compel us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law," the concurrence relies on some combination of Art. II, § 1, and 3 U.S.C. § 5 Shepardize to justify the majority's conclusion that this case is

one of the few in which we may lay that fundamental principle aside. Ante, at 2 (Opinion of REHNQUIST, C. J. The concurrence's primary foundation for this conclusion rests on an appeal to plain text: Art. II, § 1's grant of the power to appoint Presidential electors to the State "Legislature." Ibid. But neither the text of Article II itself nor the only case the concurrence cites that interprets Article II, McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 Shepardize , 36 L. Ed. 869 Shepardize , 13 S. Ct. 3 Shepardize (1892), leads to the conclusion that Article II grants unlimited power to the legislature, devoid of any state constitutional limitations, to select the manner of appointing electors. See id., at 41 (specifically referring to state constitutional provision in upholding state law regarding selection of electors). Nor, as JUSTICE STEVENS points out, have we interpreted the Federal constitutional provision most analogous to Art. II, § 1 -- Art. I, § 4 -- in the strained manner put forth in the concurrence. Ante, at 1-2 and n. 1 (dissenting opinion). The concurrence's treatment of § 5 as "informing" its interpretation of Article II, § 1, cl. 2, ante, at 3 (REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring), is no more convincing. The CHIEF JUSTICE contends that our opinion in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., ante, p. , (per curiam) (Bush I), in which we stated that "a legislative wish to take advantage of [§ 5] would counsel against" a construction of Florida law that Congress might deem to be a change in law, id., (slip op. at 6), now means that this Court "must ensure that post-election state court actions do not frustrate the legislative desire to attain the 'safe harbor' provided by § 5." Ante, at 3. However, § 5 is part of the rules that govern Congress' recognition of slates of electors. Nowhere in Bush I did we establish that this Court had the authority to enforce § 5. Nor did we suggest that the permissive "counsel against" could be transformed into the mandatory "must ensure." And nowhere did we intimate, as the concurrence does here, that a state court decision that threatens the safe harbor provision of § 5 does so in violation of Article II. The concurrence's logic turns the presumption that legislatures would wish to take advantage of § 5's "safe harbor" provision into a mandate that trumps other statutory provisions and overrides the intent that the legislature did express. But, in any event, the concurrence, having conducted its review, now

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reaches the wrong conclusion. It says that "the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the Florida election laws impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair reading required, in violation of Article II." Ante, at 4-5 (REHNQUIST, C. J, concurring). But what precisely is the distortion? Apparently, it has three elements. First, the Florida court, in its earlier opinion, changed the election certification date from November 14 to November 26. Second, the Florida court ordered a manual recount of "undercounted" ballots that could not have been fully completed by the December 12 "safe harbor" deadline. Third, the Florida court, in the opinion now under review, failed to give adequate deference to the determinations of canvassing boards and the Secretary. To characterize the first element as a "distortion," however, requires the concurrence to second-guess the way in which the state court resolved a plain conflict in the language of different statutes. Compare Fla. Stat. § 102.166 Shepardize (2001) (foreseeing manual recounts during the protest period) with § 102.111 (setting what is arguably too short a deadline for manual recounts to be conducted); compare § 102.112(1) (stating that the Secretary "may" ignore late returns) with § 102.111(1) (stating that the Secretary "shall" ignore late returns). In any event, that issue no longer has any practical importance and cannot justify the reversal of the different Florida court decision before us now. To characterize the second element as a "distortion" requires the concurrence to overlook the fact that the inability of the Florida courts to conduct the recount on time is, in significant part, a problem of the Court's own making. The Florida Supreme Court thought that the recount could be completed on time, and, within hours, the Florida Circuit Court was moving in an orderly fashion to meet the deadline. This Court improvidently entered a stay. As a result, we will never know whether the recount could have been completed. Nor can one characterize the third element as "impermissible distorting" once one understands that there are two sides to the opinion's argument that the Florida Supreme Court "virtually eliminated the Secretary's discretion." Ante, at 9 (REHNQUIST, C. J, concurring). The Florida statute in question was amended in 1999 to provide that the

"grounds for contesting an election" include the "rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to . . . place in doubt the result of the election." Fla. Stat. §§ 102.168 Shepardize (3), (3)(c) (2000). And the parties have argued about the proper meaning of the statute's term "legal vote." The Secretary has claimed that a "legal vote" is a vote "properly executed in accordance with the instructions provided to all registered voters." Brief for Respondent Harris et al. 10. On that interpretation, punchcard ballots for which the machines cannot register a vote are not "legal" votes. Id., at 14. The Florida Supreme Court did not accept her definition. But it had a reason. Its reason was that a different provision of Florida election laws (a provision that addresses damaged or defective ballots) says that no vote shall be disregarded "if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined by the canvassing board" (adding that ballots should not be counted "if it is impossible to determine the elector's choice"). Fla. Stat. § 101.5614 Shepardize (5) (2000). Given this statutory language, certain roughly analogous judicial precedent, e.g., Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough, 73 Fla. 922 Shepardize , 75 So. 411 Shepardize (Fla. 1917) (per curiam), and somewhat similar determinations by courts throughout the Nation, see cases cited infra, at 9, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the term "legal vote" means a vote recorded on a ballot that clearly reflects what the voter intended. Gore v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 270 Shepardize , (2000) (slip op., at 19). That conclusion differs from the conclusion of the Secretary. But nothing in Florida law requires the Florida Supreme Court to accept as determinative the Secretary's view on such a matter. Nor can one say that the Court's ultimate determination is so unreasonable as to amount to a constitutionally "impermissible distortion" of Florida law. The Florida Supreme Court, applying this definition, decided, on the basis of the record, that respondents had shown that the ballots undercounted by the voting machines contained enough "legal votes" to place "the results" of the election "in doubt." Since only a few hundred votes separated the candidates, and since the "undercounted" ballots numbered tens of thousands, it is difficult to see how anyone could find this conclusion unreasonable-however strict the standard used to measure the voter's "clear intent." Nor did this conclusion "strip" canvassing boards of their discretion. The boards retain their traditional

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discretionary authority during the protest period. And during the contest period, as the court stated, "the Canvassing Board's actions [during the protest period] may constitute evidence that a ballot does or does not qualify as a legal vote." Id. at *13. Whether a local county canvassing board's discretionary judgment during the protest period not to conduct a manual recount will be set aside during a contest period depends upon whether a candidate provides additional evidence that the rejected votes contain enough "legal votes" to place the outcome of the race in doubt. To limit the local canvassing board's discretion in this way is not to eliminate that discretion. At the least, one could reasonably so believe. The statute goes on to provide the Florida circuit judge with authority to "fashion such orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation . . . is investigated, examined, or checked, . . . and to provide any relief appropriate." Fla. Stat. § 102.168 Shepardize (8) (2000) (emphasis added). The Florida Supreme Court did just that. One might reasonably disagree with the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of these, or other, words in the statute. But I do not see how one could call its plain language interpretation of a 1999 statutory change so misguided as no longer to qualify as judicial interpretation or as a usurpation of the authority of the State legislature. Indeed, other state courts have interpreted roughly similar state statutes in similar ways. See, e.g., In re Election of U.S. Representative for Second Congressional Dist., 231 Conn. 602, 621 Shepardize , 653 A.2d 79, 90-91 Shepardize (1994) ("Whatever the process used to vote and to count votes, differences in technology should not furnish a basis for disregarding the bedrock principle that the purpose of the voting process is to ascertain the intent of the voters"); Brown v. Carr, 130 W. Va. 455, 460 Shepardize , 43 S.E.2d 401, 404-405 Shepardize (1947) ("Whether a ballot shall be counted . . . depends on the intent of the voter . . . . Courts decry any resort to technical rules in reaching a conclusion as to the intent of the voter"). I repeat, where is the "impermissible" distortion? II

Despite the reminder that this case involves "an election for the President of the United States," ante, at 1 (REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring), no preeminent legal concern, or practical concern related to legal questions, required this Court to hear this case, let alone to issue a stay that stopped Florida's recount process in its tracks. With one exception, petitioners' claims do not ask us to vindicate a constitutional provision designed to protect a basic human right. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 Shepardize , 98 L. Ed. 873 Shepardize , 74 S. Ct. 686 Shepardize (1954). Petitioners invoke fundamental fairness, namely, the need for procedural fairness, including finality. But with the one "equal protection" exception, they rely upon law that focuses, not upon that basic need, but upon the constitutional allocation of power. Respondents invoke a competing fundamental consideration -- the need to determine the voter's true intent. But they look to state law, not to federal constitutional law, to protect that interest. Neither side claims electoral fraud, dishonesty, or the like. And the more fundamental equal protection claim might have been left to the state court to resolve if and when it was discovered to have mattered. It could still be resolved through a remand conditioned upon issuance of a uniform standard; it does not require reversing the Florida Supreme Court. Of course, the selection of the President is of fundamental national importance. But that importance is political, not legal. And this Court should resist the temptation unnecessarily to resolve tangential legal disputes, where doing so threatens to determine the outcome of the election. The Constitution and federal statutes themselves make clear that restraint is appropriate. They set forth a road map of how to resolve disputes about electors, even after an election as close as this one. That road map foresees resolution of electoral disputes by state courts. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 Shepardize (providing that, where a "State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to [election day], for its final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of . . . electors . . . by judicial or other methods," the subsequently chosen electors enter a safe harbor free from congressional challenge). But it nowhere provides for involvement by

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the United States Supreme Court. To the contrary, the Twelfth Amendment commits to Congress the authority and responsibility to count electoral votes. A federal statute, the Electoral Count Act, enacted after the close 1876 Hayes-Tilden Presidential election, specifies that, after States have tried to resolve disputes (through "judicial" or other means), Congress is the body primarily authorized to resolve remaining disputes. See Electoral Count Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 373, 3 U.S.C. §§ 5 Shepardize , 6, and 15. The legislative history of the Act makes clear its intent to commit the power to resolve such disputes to Congress, rather than the courts: "The two Houses are, by the Constitution, authorized to make the count of electoral votes. They can only count legal votes, and in doing so must determine, from the best evidence to be had, what are legal votes …. The power to determine rests with the two Houses, and there is no other constitutional tribunal." H. Rep. No. 1638, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1886) (report submitted by Rep. Caldwell, Select Committee on the Election of President and Vice-President). The Member of Congress who introduced the Act added: "The power to judge of the legality of the votes is a necessary consequent of the power to count. The existence of this power is of absolute necessity to the preservation of the Government. The interests of all the States in their relations to each other in the Federal Union demand that the ultimate tribunal to decide upon the election of President should be a constituent body, in which the States in their federal relationships and the people in their sovereign capacity should be represented." 18 Cong. Rec. 30 (1886). "Under the Constitution who else could decide? Who is nearer to the State in determining a question of vital importance to the whole union of States than the constituent body upon whom the Constitution has devolved the duty to count the vote?" Id., at 31. The Act goes on to set out rules for the congressional determination of

disputes about those votes. If, for example, a state submits a single slate of electors, Congress must count those votes unless both Houses agree that the votes "have not been . . . regularly given." 3 U.S.C. § 15. Shepardize If, as occurred in 1876, one or more states submits two sets of electors, then Congress must determine whether a slate has entered the safe harbor of § 5, in which case its votes will have "conclusive" effect. Ibid. If, as also occurred in 1876, there is controversy about "which of two or more of such State authorities . . . is the lawful tribunal" authorized to appoint electors, then each House shall determine separately which votes are "supported by the decision of such State so authorized by its law." Ibid. If the two Houses of Congress agree, the votes they have approved will be counted. If they disagree, then "the votes of the electors whose appointment shall have been certified by the executive of the State, under the seal thereof, shall be counted." Ibid. Given this detailed, comprehensive scheme for counting electoral votes, there is no reason to believe that federal law either foresees or requires resolution of such a political issue by this Court. Nor, for that matter, is there any reason to that think the Constitution's Framers would have reached a different conclusion. Madison, at least, believed that allowing the judiciary to choose the presidential electors "was out of the question." Madison, July 25, 1787 (reprinted in 5 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 363 (2d ed. 1876)). The decision by both the Constitution's Framers and the 1886 Congress to minimize this Court's role in resolving close federal presidential elections is as wise as it is clear. However awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to resolve difficult electoral disputes, Congress, being a political body, expresses the people's will far more accurately than does an unelected Court. And the people's will is what elections are about. Moreover, Congress was fully aware of the danger that would arise should it ask judges, unarmed with appropriate legal standards, to resolve a hotly contested Presidential election contest. Just after the 1876 Presidential election, Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana each sent two slates of electors to Washington. Without these States, Tilden,

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the Democrat, had 184 electoral votes, one short of the number required to win the Presidency. With those States, Hayes, his Republican opponent, would have had 185. In order to choose between the two slates of electors, Congress decided to appoint an electoral commission composed of five Senators, five Representatives, and five Supreme Court Justices. Initially the Commission was to be evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats, with Justice David Davis, an Independent, to possess the decisive vote. However, when at the last minute the Illinois Legislature elected Justice Davis to the United States Senate, the final position on the Commission was filled by Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley. The Commission divided along partisan lines, and the responsibility to cast the deciding vote fell to Justice Bradley. He decided to accept the votes by the Republican electors, and thereby awarded the Presidency to Hayes. Justice Bradley immediately became the subject of vociferous attacks. Bradley was accused of accepting bribes, of being captured by railroad interests, and of an eleventh-hour change in position after a night in which his house "was surrounded by the carriages" of Republican partisans and railroad officials. C. Woodward, Reunion and Reaction 159-160 (1966). Many years later, Professor Bickel concluded that Bradley was honest and impartial. He thought that "'the great question' for Bradley was, in fact, whether Congress was entitled to go behind election returns or had to accept them as certified by state authorities," an "issue of principle." The Least Dangerous Branch 185 (1962). Nonetheless, Bickel points out, the legal question upon which Justice Bradley's decision turned was not very important in the contemporaneous political context. He says that "in the circumstances the issue of principle was trivial, it was overwhelmed by all that hung in the balance, and it should not have been decisive." Ibid. For present purposes, the relevance of this history lies in the fact that the participation in the work of the electoral commission by five Justices, including Justice Bradley, did not lend that process legitimacy. Nor did it assure the public that the process had worked fairly, guided by the law. Rather, it simply embroiled Members of the Court in

partisan conflict, thereby undermining respect for the judicial process. And the Congress that later enacted the Electoral Count Act knew it. This history may help to explain why I think it not only legally wrong, but also most unfortunate, for the Court simply to have terminated the Florida recount. Those who caution judicial restraint in resolving political disputes have described the quintessential case for that restraint as a case marked, among other things, by the "strangeness of the issue," its "intractability to principled resolution," its "sheer momentousness, . . . which tends to unbalance judicial judgment," and "the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from." Bickel, supra, at 184. Those characteristics mark this case. At the same time, as I have said, the Court is not acting to vindicate a fundamental constitutional principle, such as the need to protect a basic human liberty. No other strong reason to act is present. Congressional statutes tend to obviate the need. And, above all, in this highly politicized matter, the appearance of a split decision runs the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the Court itself. That confidence is a public treasure. It has been built slowly over many years, some of which were marked by a Civil War and the tragedy of segregation. It is a vitally necessary ingredient of any successful effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself. We run no risk of returning to the days when a President (responding to this Court's efforts to protect the Cherokee Indians) might have said, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!" Loth, Chief Justice John Marshall and The Growth of the American Republic 365 (1948). But we do risk a self-inflicted wound -- a wound that may harm not just the Court, but the Nation. I fear that in order to bring this agonizingly long election process to a definitive conclusion, we have not adequately attended to that necessary "check upon our own exercise of power," "our own sense of self-restraint." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 Shepardize , 80 L. Ed. 477 Shepardize , 56 S. Ct. 312 Shepardize (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis once said of the Court, "The most important thing we do is not doing." Bickel, supra, at 71. What it does today, the Court

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should have left undone. I would repair the damage done as best we now can, by permitting the Florida recount to continue under uniform standards. I respectfully dissent. Return To Full Text Opinion Go to Supreme Court Brief(s) Go to Oral Argument Transcript 5 Am Jur 2d, Appellate Review 594, 777, 805; 16B Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law 883, 886, 888, 889; 25 Am Jur 2d, Elections 3, 5; 77 Am Jur 2d, United States 19 USCS, Constitution, Amendment 14 Annotation References: Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause as affecting nomination or election to state office--federal cases. 59 L Ed 2d 852. Fourteenth Amendment as affecting nomination or election to state office--federal cases. 11 L Ed 2d 1057 Shepardize , 23 L Ed 2d 782 Shepardize