T2 B7 Q and a Fdr- Entire Contents- Q for the the Rollout

8/14/2019 T2 B7 Q and a Fdr- Entire Contents- Q for the the Rollout

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/t2-b7-q-and-a-fdr-entire-contents-q-for-the-the-rollout 1/4

Q's for the ROLLOUT

1. Acting DCI John McLaughlin has shot down the idea of

an "intelligence czar who would stand apart from CIA

and oversee all aspects of American intelligence."

Noting that the idea was "first floated in 1955," he

said central control could be asserted "without the

additional layers of command or bureaucracy such a

change would inevitably bring." His solution would

be to recognize that CIA is already "central,"

describing it as the only U.S. intelligence agency

that "integrates all intelligence sources" and is not

part of a larger department, such as Defense or State

or Justice, and therefore "does not create or advocate

policy."

• Aren't you just creating another bureaucratic layer

with an NID and his three deputies?

• Won't an intelligence czar appointed by the

President, serving at his pleasure and acting as his

intelligence advisor be more likely to politicize

intelligence than an independent Director of Central

Intelligence?

2 . At the April hearing before the Commission George

Tenet warned you about separating the DCI job from CIA

saying: "the DCI has to have an operational and

analytical span of control that allows him or her to

inform the President authoritatively about covert

action and other very sensitive activities."

• How does your proposal avoid doing exactly what

George Tenet warned the Commission it shouldn't do?

• Who is going to oversee the conduct of covert action

and ensure it is carried out in a legal, policy

supportive manner?

3. A major feature of these proposals is taking authority

away from the Secretary of Defense to make decisions

about NSA, NGA and NRO. The DCI cautioned you about

changing authorities. He said "in the foreign

intelligence arena, aside from the President, the



DCI's most important relationship is with the

Secretary of Defense. Rather than focus on a zero sum

game of authorities, the focus should be on ensuring

that the DCI and the Secretary of Defense work

together to guide investments tied to mission.

Together, these investments have enormous power when

they are synchronized. This is precisely what Don

Rumsfeld and I have been trying to do." He went on to

say:

"We need to understand the relationship between

the DCI and the secretary of Defense in a very,

very fundamental way. Why? You have an

organizational structure today that basically has

three or four of the major organizations or

combat support organizations. They provide

tactical support to the military as well as

support the national intelligence needs. Andsomehow in the structure that you create he must

be a partner in designing this framework to

ensure that we don't miss or don't crack a seam

that we're trying to build together because he

executes tactical and other programs that, in

effect, add to the power of what the DCI can do.

But we have to wrestle with that in some way."

"All I want to focus on is don't throw the baby

out with the bathwater. Don't miss the

capabilities that have to be grown. Don'tseparate those capabilities from a chain of

command that can only execute them and then

figure out how that mesh works."

• Did you consider Director Tenet's admonitions to

ensure that your proposal doesn't "throw the baby

out with the bathwater?"

• What are the risks with your proposals? On the

one hand you state in your report (page 427)

"Creating a new domestic intelligence agencywould divert attention of the officials most

responsible for current counterterrorism efforts

while the threat remains high. Putting a new

player into the mix of federal agencies with

counterterrorism responsibilities would

exacerbate existing information sharing problems"

while you advocate creation of a National



Counterterrorism Center that shifts terrorism

intelligence, operations and warning functions to

a new entity. Aren't you going to create

confusion and disruption in the war against

terrorism by creating a new organization with new

command and control responsibilities?

4. Director Tenet and Acting DCI John McLaughlin have

said that great change has occurred since the

September 11, 2001 attacks and that those changes need

to be understood before undertaking any structural

changes.

• Did the Commission investigate the changes that

have occurred in the Intelligence Community since

September 11, 2001? How do you judge the

performance and role of the TTIC, the Terrorism

Tracking Center, the new watch-listing procedures,

the expanded intelligence collection priorities of

the FBI, the coordinating and dissemination role of

the Department of Homeland Security?

• Didn't your mandate limit your investigation to

events and activities up to September 20, 2001?

DCI Tenet in his testimony before the Commission said:

"But before we rush to a judgment, don't we want to know

what the world's going to look like? Don't we want to

understand with some precision where you want to end up?

And I think you have to focus on that fusion of

capabilities around mission, first and foremost, and then

decide the rest. It will flow from there. The power of

forcing that collaboration in and of itself breaks down the

walls."

• To what extent did the Commission examine the

current threat or consider how terrorism might have

changed since 9-11? Did you look out 5-10 years to

consider the international context in which

intelligence will have to perform?



You recommend shifting paramilitary covert action from CIA

to DOD.

• What events/incidents relative to the 9-11 attacks led

the commission to make this recommendation?

• Doesn't the conduct of paramilitary operations

secretly overseas (without the consent of a foreign

country) place the military participants at great risk

since such activity is contrary to the Geneva

Convention and thus could result in our military being

treated as spies? Doesn't such a course of action

increase the risk for all US military personnel

overseas?

T2 B7 Q and a Fdr- Entire Contents- Q for the the Rollout

Documents