Nationa l Intelligence Reforms Background: Th e attacks on the United States on September 11,2001 exposed severe shortcomings in our intelligence capabilities. We did not have effective access in countries where we have no official presence; we were unable to penetrate hard targets like terrorist organizations operating abroad or cells established in the United States. Our investigations have confirmed grave dysfunctions in our national security intelligence establishment. They are of two kinds, structural and cultural. The structural problems are the simplest to understand and their remedies straightforward. Th e government agencies charged with foreign an d domestic intelligence are the creatures of a different age with laws, regulations and organization fashioned for external domestic activities was desired. That legacy of nation-state focus, legislated walls an d compartmentalized information cannot deal with the kinds of transnational threats operating seamlessly at home and abroad with speed and agility. Our most senior intelligence officials do not have authorities, acces s and accountability to do what is expected of them. No r do they have the power to make the great organizational changes necessary to correct these problems. The Commission therefor e recommends specific sweeping organizational changes. More important than organizati onal reform is dealing with the second category of dysfunction we have broadly defined as cultural; process over output; bureaucratic careerism; groupmink; a law enforcement rather than preventive mindset; deep avers ion to covert operations; fear of abusive litigation. These problems cannot be solved by organizational changes however bold. They can be changed only by appointing, confirming and supporting proven leaders of talent and experience to the top positions of the intelligence establishment. It is they who must swee p away the irrational security, classification and career path obstacles to create a new , agile innovative career environment in which excellence not mediocrity will flourish. To accomplish such change these leaders must have ne w community wide authorities over personnel policies, certain budgets and appropriations, and security classifications and clearances. Some of these chang es can be done by executive order, many will require legislation, and to succeed all will require major change s in Congressio nal ove rsight. We are making specific recommendations fo r congressional oversight reform. To implement its recommendations, th e Commission believes the President should establish, through Executive Order, a six-month Intelligence Transition Task Force to: 1) help develop legislatio n to implemen t the reforms; 2) dev elop a strategy for implementing the reforms; and 3) report to the board on the status of the implementation. This Task Force would report to a board consisting of the White House Chief of Staff, the
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8/14/2019 T2 B2 10-14-03 Hearing- Intelligence Background 2 of 3 Fdr- Tab 2- Undated Briefing Paper- National Intelligence R…
Background: The attacks on the United States on September 11,2001 exposed severe
shortcomings in our intelligence capabilities. We did not have effective access in
countries where we have no official presence; we were unable to penetrate hard targets
like terrorist organizations operating abroad or cells established in the United States.
Our investigations have confirmed grave dysfunctions in our national security
intelligence establishment. They are of two kinds, structural and cultural.
The structural problems are the simplest to understand and their remedies
straightforward. The government agencies charged with foreign and domestic intelligence
are the creatures of a different age with laws, regulations and organization fashioned for
external wars and internal threats of the last century where strict separation of foreign and
domestic activities was desired.
That legacy of nation-state focus, legislated walls and compartmentalized information
cannot deal with the kinds of transnational threats operating seamlessly at home and
abroad with speed and agility. Our most senior intelligence officials do not have
authorities, access and accountability to do what is expected of them. Nor do they have
the power to make the great organizational changes necessary to correct these problems.
The Commission therefore recommends specific sweeping organizational changes.
More important than organizational reform is dealing with the second category of
dysfunction we have broadly defined as cultural; process over output; bureaucratic
careerism; groupmink; a law enforcement rather than preventive mindset; deep aversion
to covert operations; fear of abusive litigation. These problems cannot be solved by
organizational changes however bold. They can be changed only by appointing,confirming and supporting proven leaders of talent and experience to the top positions of
the intelligence establishment. It is they who must sweep away the irrational security,
classification and career path obstacles to create a new, agile innovative career
environment in which excellence not mediocrity will flourish.
To accomplish such change these leaders must have new community wide authorities
over personnel policies, certain budgets and appropriations, and security classifications
and clearances.
Some of these changes can be done by executive order, many will require legislation, and
to succeed all will require major changes in Congressional oversight. We are makingspecific recommendations for congressional oversight reform.
To implement its recommendations, the Commission believes the President should
establish, through Executive Order, a six-month Intelligence Transition Task Force to: 1)
help develop legislation to implement the reforms; 2) develop a strategy for
implementing the reforms; and 3) report to the board on the status of the implementation.
This Task Force would report to a board consisting of the White House Chief of Staff, the
8/14/2019 T2 B2 10-14-03 Hearing- Intelligence Background 2 of 3 Fdr- Tab 2- Undated Briefing Paper- National Intelligence R…
d) The CFO would allocate resources to the national intelligence agencies inaccordance with OMB apportionment guidelines, the DNI's direction, and theauthorization and appropriations acts.
8/14/2019 T2 B2 10-14-03 Hearing- Intelligence Background 2 of 3 Fdr- Tab 2- Undated Briefing Paper- National Intelligence R…