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T-110.5110 Computer Networks T-110.5110 Computer Networks II II AAA AAA 12.11.2007 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma
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Page 1: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

T-110.5110 Computer Networks IIT-110.5110 Computer Networks II

AAAAAA

12.11.200712.11.2007

Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma

Page 2: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

ContentsContents

•Introduction

•Security basics

•PAP, CHAP, EAP

•Radius

•Diameter

•Examples

Page 3: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

AAAAAA

•AAA

– Authentication, Authorization, Accounting

– RFC 2903 (Generic AAA Architecture)

– RFC 2904 (AAA Authorization Framework)

•AAAA

– AAA and Auditing

•Accounting and billing

– Accounting is gathering information for billing, balancing, or other purposes

– Billing is a process to generate a bill for customers based on gathered information

Page 4: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Motivation for AAAMotivation for AAA

•Service organizations to host multiple organizations requiring dial-in facilities

•User organizations to outsourcing their dial-in service to one or more 3rd parties

•Agreements can be implemented using a standards based protocol (RADIUS)

•RADIUS allows User organizations or Agents to migrate to other Service Providers.

•An agent, using proxy AAA to change its service without affecting the agreement with its customers

•A service organization to have ultimate authority over its users

Page 5: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Scenarios: Remote Dial-InScenarios: Remote Dial-In

Network Access

Server (NAS)

User

AAA Server

Page 6: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Scenarios: Mobile Dial-InScenarios: Mobile Dial-In

Network Access

Server (NAS)

User

AAA Server AAA Server

Visited ISP Home ISP

Page 7: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Scenarios: IP-TelephonyScenarios: IP-Telephony

SIP Phone

SIP Proxy

AAAserver

SIP Phone

CHx

CHy

AAAserver

AAAserver

SIP Proxy

SIP Proxy

Home domain

AAA brokers

Visited domain

Called domain

Page 8: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

NETWORKACCESS

SERVERS

AAA

AAA

User

User

RADIUS

RADIUS

RADIUS

ISP B

Internet

USER HOME ORGANIZATIONS

NETWORKACCESS

SERVERS AAA

User

User

RADIUS

ISP A

Internet

SERVICE ORGANIZATIONSUSER

AAA

Page 9: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

PolicyDecision

Point

PolicyEnforcement

Point

The point where policy

decisions are made.

The point where the policy

decisions are actually enforced.

RequestDecision

PolicyRepository

GOAL: Allow policy decisions to be made by multiple PDP’s belonging to different administrative domains.

Generic AAA Architecture (RFC2903)Generic AAA Architecture (RFC2903)

Page 10: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Pull sequence

NAS (remote access)RSVP (network QoS)

Agent sequence

Agents, Brokers,Proxy’s.

Push sequence

Tokens, Tickets,AC’s etc.

Service

AAA

User1 2 3

4Service

AAA

User

1

23

4

Service

AAA

User

1

2

3

4

AAA Authorization FrameworkAAA Authorization Framework

Page 11: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

AAAAAAAA

•Authentication

– Are you who you say you are?

•Authorization

– Are you allowed to do what you want to do?

•Accounting

– Keeping track of who is using how much of each resource

•Auditing/Accountability

Page 12: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

AuthenticationAuthentication

•Many authentication methods can be used

– IP address

• Easily forged

• May change

• Does not really identify a single end-host

– User ID and password

• Requires additional security measures to make it work

• One-time pads support strong security

Page 13: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Authentication IIAuthentication II

•Challenge-response

– Require proof of password, ownership, computational capability, perception, ..

•Shared secret

– Symmetric key in cryptography

– Never sent over the network

– Requires a way to derive keys

• Key negotiation protocols– Diffie-Hellman

•Asymmeric keying / public key cryptography

– Can identify individuals

– Encryption and signature

– Hard to break without knowledge of the private key

Page 14: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Authentication IIIAuthentication III

Strong

Weak

HighLowEase of use

Authentication

No username or password

Static username / password

Aging username / password

Secret key (one time pads)

Token cards / soft tokens using one time pads

Page 15: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Digital SignaturesDigital Signatures

MessageDigest

MessageDigest

Message

Private key Public keyAsymmetric Key Pair

SIGN VERIFYSignature Pass/Fail

Need to know the message, digest, and algorithm (f.e.

SHA1)

Page 16: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

EncryptionEncryption

Public key Private keyAsymmetric Key Pair

Encrypt Decrypt

Page 17: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Physical

Link

Network

Transport

Application

Physical

Link

Network

Transport

Application

PAP, CHAP, WEP, ..

IPsec

HIP

HTTPS, S/MIME, PGP,WS-Security, Radius, Diameter, SAML 2.0 ..

TSL, SSH, ..

Page 18: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Attacks against authenticationAttacks against authentication

•Eavesdropping passwords and credentials

•Password guessing / brute force (sniffing)

•Replaying credentials

•Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM)

– Opportunistic protocols are prone

– Solved using mutual authentication

• Authenticated diffie-hellman

•Time synchronization based attacks (if timestamps are used)

•Resource exhaustion

– Any exhaustion attack on resources

– Signature checking, token creation

– Entropy attacks

Page 19: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

AuthorizationAuthorization

•After a user has been authenticated, authorization is used to grant privileges for performing certain actions

•Mapping from user identity and system state to authorized actions is needed

•Many techniques

– Physical presence

– Token-based authorization

– PKI-based authorization

•Current systems rely on assertions

– SAML 2.0

Page 20: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

PAP and CHAPPAP and CHAP• Password Authentication Protocol (PAP)

– Originally described in RFC 1334 for use with the Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)

– Username/passphrase challenge-response protocol

– Authenticator sends a challenge to the client, and the response is validated by the authenticator

• Authentication during initial connection attempt

• CHAP is detailed in RFC 1334 as a more secure alternative to PAP

– Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol

– Periodic challenges during a session

– Protection against replay attacks

– Usernames as clear, passwords as hash values

• Microsoft CHAP version 2

– Mutual authentication by piggybacking a second set of authentication handshakes over the original CHAP packets

Page 21: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

CHAP 3-way handhakeCHAP 3-way handhake

User Server

Link layer connectivity

Challenge (random bitstring)

Hash(password,challenge)

Ack

Page 22: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

EAPEAP•Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is defined in RFC 3748

•Set of guidelines authentication message formats

– Universal authentication framework

•EAP Transport Layer security (EAP-TLS)

– Client-side certificates

– Strong authentication methods through the use of PKI

– Peers exchange certificates and use public key crypto to share keying material

•EAP Tunneled Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS)

– Extends EAP-TLS

•EAP-TTLS provides mutual authentication

– Server authenticated using certificate

– Client is authenticated over secure tunnel

Page 23: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

EAPEAP•EAP parties: EAP peer, EAP server/AAA server,

authenticator

•Basic scenarios

– Peer and authenticator speak some other protocol, authenticator and AAA server speak AAA protocol

• This is basic AAA usage (prior to EAP)

– Peer and authenticator speak EAP; authenticator and EAP server/AAA server speak EAP over AAA

• This is the basic EAP/AAA scenario (e.g. 802.11i)

– Peer and authenticator speak some other protocol, but use keys derived from a previous EAP conversation between the same EAP peer and EAP server

• This is a new application not yet defined.

Page 24: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

PEAPPEAP

•Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP)

•Similar to EAP-TTLS

•Strong mutual authentication

•Inner authentication protocol must be EAP variant

•PEAP is supported by Microsoft and Cisco systems

Page 25: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

IEEE 802.1XIEEE 802.1X

•IEEE standard for port-based Network Access Control

•Authentication to devices attached to a LAN port

•Based on EAP

•Used in closed wireless access points

•Client-only authentication or mutual authentication with EAP-TLS/EAP-TTLS

•Blocking on data link layer, EAP traffic goes through (EAP-request, ..)

Page 26: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

802.1X Security802.1X Security

Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/63/8021X-Overview.png

Page 27: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

RADIUSRADIUS

Page 28: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

RadiusRadius

•Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) is defined in RFC 2865

•Designed to authenticate dial-in-access customers

– Used for dial-in lines and 3G networks

•Idea to have a centralized user database for passwords and other user information

– Cost efficient

– Easy to configure

•Radius is used together with an authentication protocol such as PAP or CHAP

Page 29: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

RadiusRadius

•A client-server protocol

– Network Access Server (NAS) is the client

– Radius Server is a server

•Security based on previously shared secret

•More than one server can serve a single client

•A server can act as a proxy

•Based on UDP on efficiency reasons

•No keep-alive signaling

Page 30: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Parameters for NASParameters for NAS

•The specific IP address to be assigned to the user

•The address pool from which the user's IP should be chosen

•The maximum length that the user may remain connected

•An access list, priority queue or other restrictions on a user's access

•Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) parameters (for VPNs.. )

Page 31: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

AccountingAccounting

•NAS can use RADIUS accounting packets to ntify the RADIUS server of events such as

– The user's session start

– The user's session end

– Total packets transferred during the session

– Volume of data transferred during the session

– Reason for session ending

Page 32: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

RADIUSRADIUS

Client POTS NAS IP Network

Radius server

Radius Server

Page 33: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Radius and CHAPRadius and CHAP

User NAS

Link layer connectivity

Challenge (random bitstring)

Hash(password,challenge)

Ack

Radius server

Hash(password,challenge)

Ack

Page 34: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

StepsSteps

•CHAP authentication challenge to the user

•User responds with a password using a one-way hash function

•NAS wraps the challenge and response in a RADIUS access-request

•RADIUS searches the password corresponding to the user ID and computes hash values corresponding to the password and the challenge

•If a hash value matches the user response, the RADIUS server returns an access-accept message to the NAS

•NAs sends a successful CHAP ack to the user

Page 35: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Radius SignalsRadius Signals

•The RFC defines the following signals:

– 1 Access-Request

– 2 Access-Accept

– 3 Access-Reject

– 4 Accounting-Request

– 5 Accounting-Response

– 11 Access-Challenge

– 12 Status-Server

– 13 Status-Client

– 255 Reserved

Page 36: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Radius LimitationsRadius Limitations•Scalability

– No explicit support for agents, proxies, ..– Manual configuration of shared secrets

•Reliability– UDP not reliable, accounting info may be lost

•Does not define failover mechanisms– Implementation specific

•Mobility support

•Security– Applied usually in trusted network segments or VPNs– Application layer authentication and integrity only for use

with Response packets– No per packet confidentiality

•Diameter addresses some of the security issues

Page 37: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

DIAMETERDIAMETER

Page 38: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

DiameterDiameter•A network protocol for providing AAA services to roaming users

– Replacement for RADIUS, Kerberos, TACACS+

– Open base protocol provides transport, message delivery, and error handling services

•Diameter Base Protocol is defined in RFC 3588

•Defines the following facilities

– Delivery of AVPs (attribute value pairs)

– Capabilities negotiation

– Error notification

– Extensibility through additional new commands and AVPs

– Basic services necessary for applications

• Handling of user sessions, Accounting, ..

Page 39: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

DiameterDiameter

•Uses TCP and SCTP for communications

•Can be secured using IPSEC and TLS

•End-to-end security is recommended but not mandatory

•Based on request-answer signal pairs

•In the Diameter network there can be

– clients, relays, proxies, and redirect and translation agents

Page 40: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Required FeaturesRequired Features

•Diameter protocol to support the following required features:

– Transporting of user authentication information, for the purposes of enabling the Diameter server to authenticate the user.

– Transporting of service specific authorization information, between client and servers, allowing the peers to decide whether a user's access request should be granted.

– Exchanging resource usage information, which MAY be used for accounting purposes, capacity planning, etc.

– Relaying, proxying and redirecting of Diameter messages through a server hierarchy.

Page 41: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

FeaturesFeatures•SCTP replaced UDP

– Reliable transport, congestion avoidance, flow control

•Keep-alive messages implemented

– Diameter can detect local failure of a peer

– Failover

•Peer-to-peer replaces Client-server

– Any node can initiate a request

– Peer discovery and capabilities exchange

•Timestamp support

– Prevents replay attacks

•Support for extensions

•IPsec and TLS support

•End-to-end security support

Page 43: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Applications for DiameterApplications for Diameter

•NASREQ

– Diameter Network Access Server Requirement

– Remote dial-in support

– RFC 2477, RFC 3169

– EAP, PAP, CHAP

•Mobile IPv4

– Diameter AAA servers act as Key Distribution Centers (KDC)

•EAP

– EAP info in AVPs

•Various applications in 3GPP IP Multimedia Subsystem

Page 44: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

DiameterDiameter

Client Relay Server

peer connection A peer connection B

User session XState management MAY be useful for resource limiting, and per user auditing

Page 45: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

DiameterDiameter

NAS DRL HMS

1. Request 2. Request

4. Answer 3. Answer

Diameter Relay (DRL) can insert/remove information

Forwarding based on realm

A relay or proxy MUST include Route-Record AVP to all requests forwarded

Home Diameter Server (HMS)

Page 46: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

DiameterDiameter

NAS DRL HMS

1. Request 4. Request

6. Answer 5. Answer

DRD

2. Request 3. Redirection Notification

Diameter Relay (DRL) can insert/remove information Home Diameter Server (HMS)

Redirect agent (DRD) returns HMS contact information

Page 47: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Translation between RADIUS and Translation between RADIUS and DiameterDiameter

NAS TLS HMS

1. RADIUS Request 2. Diameter Request

4. RADIUS Answer 3. Diameter Answer

Translation Agent (TLS)

Must be stateful and must maintain transaction state

Page 48: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Web services securityWeb services security

Page 49: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Source: http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/dnpag2/html/wssp.asp

Page 50: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Who are specifying the standards?Who are specifying the standards?

• Joint IETF/W3C– XML Signature (www.w3.org/Signature)

• W3C– XML Encryption (www.w3.org/Encryption/2001)– XML Key Management (XKMS) (www.w3.org/2001/XKMS)

• OASIS– WS-Security

• SOAP Message Security specification etc.– SAML: Security Assertion Markup Language– XACML: Extensible Access Control Markup language– Electronic Business XML (ebXML) (with UN/CEFACT)

• Web Services Interoperability Organization (WS-I)– Basic security

Page 51: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

SAML and XACMLSAML and XACML

PEPPolicy Enforcement Point

PEPPolicy Enforcement Point

Web ServiceWeb Service

PDPPolicy Decision Point

PDPPolicy Decision Point

PRPPolicy Retrieval Point

PRPPolicy Retrieval Point

PIPPolicy Information Point

PIPPolicy Information Point

Policy Store(XACML)

Policy Store(XACML)

PAPPolicy Admin. Point

PAPPolicy Admin. Point

WS request (SOAP)

WS request

SAML Authrz. decision query

Reply

XACML Policy request Policy (XACML)

Info request

Attribute assertion

Rules are combined: subjects, resources, and attributes.

Exported into XACML.

PDP queries attributes from PIP (time of day,

value, etc.). PIP returns an attribute assertion.

Once the PDP has all the relevant

information, it evaluates rules and

returns a SAML authoriz. Assertion

Once the SAML authoriz. Has ben made it may be included into the SOAP message and

used by the target WS.

SOAP msg isIntercepted. SAML query is formed, results determine

access. Identity info taken from request. There may be multiple

PEPs.

Page 52: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

SummarySummary

•AAA and AAAA are integral parts of today’s networks

•Policy Decision Points, Policy Enforcement Points

•RADIUS

•Diameter

•PAP, CHAP, EAP

•SAML 2.0

Page 53: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Additional SlidesAdditional Slides

Page 54: T-110.5110 Computer Networks II AAA 12.11.2007 Adj. Prof. Sasu Tarkoma.

Wireless Multi-domain Wireless Multi-domain AuthenticationAuthentication

•Authentication of the end user or terminal by an AAA server in the network before access to the service is allowed each user is assigned a home area

– its authentication credentials are established at a home AAA (H-AAAA) server

•Encryption of the data before it is transmitted on the air interface between the base station and the user terminal.

– when the user roams, the authentication process involves a foreign AAA (F-AAA) server

– to allow setup of roaming agreements, security associations must be maintained between F-AAAs in visited networks and the user’s H-AAA.

•during the authentication process, it must be possible to derive cryptographically strong per-user per-session keys.