Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and R. L. … · 2020-03-05 · Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and Polemic Theology Taught In Union Theological Seminary,

SyllabusandNotesoftheCourseofSystematicandPolemicTheologyTaughtInUnionTheological

Seminary,Virginia.

BY

R.L.DABNEY,D.D.,LL.D.

TableofContents:

NoteToTheReader

PrefacetotheSecondEdition

SectionOne—DefendingtheFaith

Chapter1:TheExistenceofGod

Chapter2:Evolution

Chapter3:DivineAttributesofGod

Chapter4:Materialism

Chapter5:ImmortalityoftheSoulandDefectsofNaturalReligion

Chapter6:SourcesofOurThinking

Chapter7:FreeAgencyandtheWill

Chapter8:ResponsibilityandProvinceofReason

Chapter9:ArminianTheoryofRedemption—Part1

Chapter10:ArminianTheoryofRedemption—Part2

Chapter11:Faith

SectionTwo—BasicDoctrinesoftheFaith

Chapter12:RevealedTheology:GodandHisAttributes

Chapter13:TheTrinity

Chapter14:TheDivinityofChrist

Chapter15:TheDivinityoftheHolySpiritandoftheSon

Chapter16:PersonalDistinctionsintheTrinity

Chapter17:TheDecreesofGod

Chapter18:Predestination

Chapter19:Creation

Chapter20:Angels

Chapter21:Providence

Chapter22:EffectualCalling

Chapter23:Justification

Chapter24:Repentance

Chapter25:SanctificationandGoodWorks

Chapter26:PerseveranceoftheSaints

Chapter27:AssuranceofGraceandSalvation

SectionThree—TheConditionofMan

Chapter28:Man'sEstateofHolinessandtheCovenantofWorks

Chapter29:TheFallandOriginalSin

SectionFour—God'sLaw

Chapter30:TheDecalogue,orTenCommandments

Chapter31:TheFirstTableoftheLaw—Commandments1-4

Chapter32:TheSecondTableoftheLaw—Commandments510

SectionFive—God'sRelationshipwithHisPeople

Chapter33:TheCovenantofGrace

Chapter34:MediatoroftheCovenantofGrace

SectionSix—Christ,Man'sHope

Chapter35:TheNatureofChrist'sSacrifice

Chapter36:ResultsofChrist'sSacrifice

Chapter37:Christ'sHumiliationandExultation

Chapter38:UniontoChrist

SectionSeven—ThePracticesoftheChurch

Chapter39:Prayer

Chapter40:TheSacraments

Chapter41:Baptism

Chapter42:TheLord'sSupper

SectionEight—LifeAfterDeathforBelievers

Chapter43:DeathofBelievers

Chapter44:TheResurrection

Chapter45:GeneralJudgmentandEternalLife

Chapter46:NatureandDurationofHellTorments

SectionNine—TheChurchandtheWorldAroundIt

Chapter47:TheCivilMagistrate

Chapter48:ReligiousLibertyandChurchandState

Appendices

AppendixA:

GeologicTheoriesandChronology.

AppendixB:

ApostolicSuccessionandSacramentalGraceShowntobeaBlunder

http://www.pbministries.org/index.html

NotetotheReader

(AccompanyingtheFirstEdition.)

AdLectorem.—OurpreceptorinTheologyhavinggiventotheclassesthecourseof lectureswhich he had delivered to previous ones, to be used by us in anymanner we found most convenient for our assistance in this study, we haveprinted them in this form for private circulation among ourselves and ourpredecessorsand successors in theSeminary.Our reasons fordoing soare thefollowing: We found these lectures useful, so far as we had proceeded, inassisting our comprehension of the textbooks. As Dr. Dabney announced achangeinthemethodofhisinstruction,inwhichhewouldceasetodeliverthelectures orally, from his chair; and placed them in manuscript format at thedisposal of the students, we desired to continue to avail ourselves of theirassistance. To provide ourselves with copies, and to extend their use tosubsequentfellow-students,themostconvenientandobviousmodewastoprintthem.This has beendone at the expense of the students of 1878; and a smallnumberofcopies,beyondourownneed,hasbeenstruckoff.

A few explanationsmay be necessary for the understanding of themethod ofstudy, ofwhich these notes form a part. The system consists of recitations onlessonsfromtextbooks,chieflytheConfessionofFaithandTurrettin'sElencticTheology,oralinstructionsandexplanationsoftheProfessor,thepreparationandreadingofThesesbythestudentsuponthetopicsunderdiscussion,andfinally,reviewrecitationsuponthewhole.Thedesignistocombine,asfarasmaybe,theassistanceofthelivingteacherwiththecultivationofthepowersofmemory,comparison, judgment, reasoning and expression, by the researches of thestudentsthemselves,andtofixtheknowledgeacquiredbyrepeatedviewsofit.Whena"head"ofdivinityisapproached,thefirststepwhichourprofessortakes,istopropoundtous,upontheblack-board,ashort,comprehensivesyllabusofitsdiscussion,intheformofquestions;thewholeprefacedbyasuitablelessoninthetextbook.Ourfirstbusinessistomasterandrecitethislesson.Havinghencegotten, from our standard author, a trustworthy outline of the discussion, weproceed next to investigate the same subject, as time allows, in otherwriters,bothfriendlyandhostile,preliminarytothecompositionofathesis.Itistoguidethisresearch,thatthesyllabus,withitsnumerousreferencestobooks,hasbeengivenus.ThesehavebeencarefullyselectedbytheProfessor,soastodirectto

the ablest andmost thorough accessible authors, who defend and impugn thetruth. The references may, in many cases, be far more numerous than anySeminary student can possibly read, at the time, with the duties of the otherdepartments upon his hands. To guide his selection, therefore, the mostimportant authority is named first, under each question, [it may be from ourtextbookorfromsomeother],thenthenextinvalue,andlast,thoseotherswhichthestudentmayconsultwithprofitathisgreater leisure.Thesyllabuswith itsreferenceswefindoneofthemostvaluablefeaturesofourcourse;itguidesnotonlyourfirstinvestigations,butthoseofsubsequentyears,whentheexigenciesofourpastoralworkmayrequireustoreturnandmakeawiderresearchintothesame subject. It directs our inquiries intelligently, and rescues us from thedrudgeryofwadingthroughmassesofliteraryrubbishtofindtheopinionsofthereallyinfluentialminds,bygivingussomeoftheexperienceofoneolderthanourselves,whosedutyithasbeentoexaminemanybooksupontheologyanditskindredsciences.

After the results of our own research have been presented, it has been Dr.Dabney'susagetodeclarehisownviewofthewholesubject;andtheselecturesformthemassofwhatisprintedbelow.Theytaketheformthereforeofresumesof the discussion already seen in the books; oftentimes, reciting in plainer orfresher shape even the arguments of the textbook itself, when the previousexaminationhas revealed thefact that theclasshavehaddifficulty ingraspingthem, and often reproducing the views to which the other references of thesyllabushadalreadydirectedus.Itneedshardlytobeadded,thattheProfessorof course made no pretense of originality, save in the mode of connecting,harmonizing, or refuting some of the statements passed in review. Indeed, itseemedevertobehisaimtoshowushowtogetforourselves,inadvanceofhishelp, all the things towhich in his final lecture he assisted us. These lectureshenceforth in the hands of the classes, will take the place of a subordinatetextbook, along with the others; and the time formerly devoted to their oraldeliverywillbeappliedtogivingusthefruitsofotherresearchesinadvanceoftheexistingcourse.

It only remains that we indicate the order of subjects. This is chiefly thatobserved in the Confession of Faith. But the course begins with NaturalTheology, which is then followed by a brief review of the doctrines ofpsychologyandethics,whicharemost involved in thestudyof theology.This

beingdone, the lecturesproceedtorevealed theology,assuming,asapostulateestablished by another department in the Seminary, the inspiration andinfallibilityoftheScriptures.

Theforminwhichthelecturesarepresentedtoourcomradesisdictatedbythenecessity of having them issued from the press weekly, in order to meet ourimmediatewantsintheprogressofthecourse.ItneedonlybesaidinconclusionthatthisprintingisdonebyDr.Dabney'sconsent.

COMMITTEEOFPRINTING.

PrefaceTotheSecondEdition.

TheAdLectorem,prefixedbythestudentstothefirsteditionwhichtheyprinted,sufficiently explains the origin and nature of this course of Theology. Theexperienceofseveralyearsinteachingithasdisclosedatonceitsutilityanditsdefects. Much labor has been devoted to the removal of the latter, and toadditional researchuponevery importantpointofdiscussion.Thesyllabushasbeenenrichedwithagreatnumberofreferences.Twohundredandsixtypagesofnewmatterhavebeenadded.ThebookisattendedwithfullTableofContentsandIndex;fittingitforreference.Amultitudeoftypographicalerrorshavebeenremoved; and the larger type and better material, it is trusted, will concur tomakethebooknotonlymoresightly,butmoredurableanduseful.

Themaindesign,nexttotheestablishmentofDivineTruth,hasbeentofurnishstudents indivinity,pastors,andintelligent lay-Christians,aviewof thewholefieldofChristiantheology,withoutswellingtheworktoasizetoounwieldyandcostlyforthepurposesofinstruction.Everyheadofdivinityhasreceivedatleastbrief attention. The discussion is usually compact. The reader is requested tobear inmind, that thework isonlystyled"SyllabusandNotes"ofacourse intheology. The full expansion or exhaustive illustration of topics has not beenpromised.Therefore,unlessthereaderhasalreadyaknowledgeofthesetopicsderived from copious previous study, he should not expect to master thesediscussions by a cursory reading.He is candidly advised thatmany partswillremain but partially appreciated, unless he shall find himselfwilling either toread enough of the authorities referred to in the Syllabus, to place him at theproperpointofview;orelsetopondertheoutlineoftheargumentsbytheeffortsofmature and vigorous thought for himself, and thus fill out the full body ofdiscussion.

TheworkisnowhumblyofferedagaintothepeopleofGod,inthehopethatitmayassisttoestablishthemintheoldandorthodoxdoctrineswhichhavebeenthepowerandgloryoftheReformedChurches.

UnionTheologicalSeminary,Va.,Aug.15th,1878

SectionOne—DefendingtheFaith

Chapter1:TheExistenceofGod

SyllabusforLecture12:

1.WhatisTheology;andwhatitsDivisions?ProvethatthereisaScienceofNaturalTheology.

Turrettin,Loc.i,Qu.2-3.Thornwell,CollectedWorks,Vol.i.LectureI,pp.25-36.

2.WhattwoLinesofArgumenttoprovetheExistenceofaGod?Whattheaprioriarguments?Aretheyvalid?

Stillingfleet,OriginesSacree,book.iii,ch.i.Thornwell,Lectureii,p.51,etc.Dr.SamuelClarke.Discourseof the Being and Attributes of God, c. l-12. Chalmers' Nat. Theol., Lecture iii. Dick. Lecture xvi.Cudworth'sIntellect.System.

3.StatetheArgumentsofClarke.OfHowe.Aretheysound?Aretheyapriori?

Dr. S. Clarke, as above. J. Howe's Living Temple, ch. 2, 9 to end. Locke's Essay on the HumanUnderstanding.book.iv.ch.10.

4.StatetheArgumentofBreckinridge'sTheology.Isitvalid?

"KnowledgeofGodObjective,"book.i,ch5.ReviewofBreck.Theol.inCentralPresbyterian,MarchtoApril,1858.

5.GiveanoutlineoftheArgumentfromDesign.Paley,Nat.Theol.ch.i,2.

Xenophon'sMemorabilia,lib.I,ch.v.CiceroDeNaturaDeorum,lib.iiSect.2-8.Turrettin,Loc.iii,Qu.I.TheologicalTreatisesgenerally.

6.ShowinafewinstanceshowtheArgumentfromDesignisdrawnfromAnimalOrganisms,fromMan'sMentalandEmotionalStructure,andfromtheAdaptationofMattertoourMentalFaculties.

SeePaley,Nat.Theol.book.iv,ch.iii,16.Chalmers'Nat.Theol.book.iv,ch.i,25.

7.CanthebeingofGodbearguedfromtheexistenceofConscience?Turrettin,Loc.iii,Qu.I,Section1415.Hodge,Syst.Theol.parti,ch.ii,asAlexander'sMoralSciencech.xii.Chalmers'Nat.Theol.book.iii,ch.2.CharnockAttributes,Discoursei,Sect.3.Kant,CritiqueofthePracticalReason.Thornwell,Lectureii.

8.WhatthevalueoftheArgumentfromtheConsensusPopulorum?

Turrettin, Loc. iii, Qu. i, Sections 16-18. Dick, Lecture xvii. Cicero de Nat. Deorum lib. i. Charnock,Discoursei,Section1.

9. Refute the evasion of Hume: That theUniverse is a Singular Effect. Alexander'sMoral Science, ch.xxviii.Chalmer'sNat.Theol.book.i,ch.4.Watson'sTheo.Institutes,ptii,ch.i.Hodge,pt.i,ch.ii.Sect.4.ReignofLaw,DukeofArgyle,ch.iii.

10. Can the Universe be accounted for without a Creator, as an infinite series of Temporal Effects?

Alexander'sMoralScience,ch.xxviii.Turrettin,asabove,Sections6-7.Dr.S.Clarke'sDiscourseSection2.Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,1stAntinomy.

11.RefutethePantheisticSchemeoftheUniverse.Thornwell,Lectureix.Alex.MoralScience,ch.xxviii.Dr.S.Clarke'sDiscourse,etc.Section3,7,9,etc.Chalmers'NatTheol.,book.i,ch.v.Hodge,pt.i,ch.iiiSect.5,Thornwell,"PersonalityofGod,"inWorks,vol.i,p.490.

WhatIsTheology?

It is justly said: Every science should begin by defining its terms, in order toshunverbalfallacies.ThewordTheology,(qeoulogo"),hasundergonepeculiarmutationsinthehistoryofscience.TheGreeksoftenuseditfortheirtheoriesoftheogonyandcosmogony.Aristotleusesitinamoregeneralform,asequivalenttoallmetaphysics;dividingtheoreticalphilosophyintophysical,mathematical,andtheological.ManyoftheearlyChristianfathersuseditintherestrictedsenseofthedoctrineofChrist'sdivinity:(SCIL.Iwannh"oqeologo"),Butnowithascome: tobeusedcommonly, todescribe thewholescienceofGod'sbeingandnature,andrelationstothecreature.Thenameisappropriate:"ScienceofGod."Thomas Aquinas: " Theologia a Theo docetur, Deum docet, ad Deum ducit,"Goditsauthor,itssubject,itsend.

ItsDivisions.

ThedistributionofTheologyintodidactic,polemic,andpractical,issufficientlyknown.Now,alldidacticinculcationoftruthisindirectrefutationoftheoppositeerror. Polemic Theology has been defined as direct refutation of error. Theadvantage of this has been supposed to be, that theway for easiest andmostthorough refutation is to systematize the error, with reference to its firstprinciple, or prwton yeudo".But the attempt to form a science of polemics,different from Didactic Theology fails; because error never has true method.Confusion is its characteristic. The system of discussion, formed on its falsemethod,cannotbescientific.Hence,separatetreatisesonpolemicshaveusuallyslidden into the methods of didactics; or they have been confused. Again:Indirectrefutationismoreeffectualthandirect.Thereistherefore,inthiscourse,no separate polemic; but what is said against errors is divided between thehistoricalanddidactic.

IsThereANaturalTheology?

Theology is divided intonatural and revealed, according to the sourcesofourknowledge of it; from natural reason; from revelation. What is science?Knowledge demonstrated and methodized. That there is a science of NaturalTheology,ofatleastsomecertainandconnectedpropositions,althoughlimited,and insufficient for salvation at best, iswell argued fromScripture,e. g., (Ps.

19:1

7.Acts14:15;or17:23.Rom.1:19;2:14,etc.);andfromthefactthatnearlyallheathenshave religious ideasand ritesofworship.Not that religious ideasareinnate:butthecapacitytoestablishsomesuchideas,fromnaturaldata,isinnate.Consider further: Is not this implied in man's capacity to receive a revealedtheology?Does revelation demonstrateGod's existence; or assume it?Does itrestthefirsttruthsonpuredogmatism,oronevidencewhichmanapprehends?The latter; and then man is assumed to have some natural capacity for suchapprehension. But if nature reflects any light concerning God, (as Scriptureasserts),thenmaniscapableofderivingsometheologyfromnature.

WhyDenied?

Some old divines were wont to deny that there was any science of NaturalTheology,andtosaythatwithoutrevelation,manwouldnotnaturally learnitsfirsttruth.Theyattributethegrainsoftruth,mixedwiththevariouspolytheismstotheremnantsoftraditiondescendingfromNoah'sfamily.Theyurgethatsomesecludedtribes,Hottentots,Australians,havenoreligiousideas;thatsomemenare sincere atheists after reflection; and that there is the wildest variety, yeacontradiction,betweenthedifferentschoolsofheathens.Thesedivinesseemtofearlest,bygrantingaNaturalTheology,theyshouldgranttoomuchtonaturalreason; a fear ungrounded and extreme. They are in danger of a worseconsequence; reducingman'scapacity for receivingdivineverities so low, thattherationalscepticwillbeabletoturnuponthemandsay:"Thenbysoineptacreature,theguaranteesofatruerevelationcannotbecertainlyapprehended."

Proofs.

Toreplymoreindetail;Igrantmuchinfluencetoprimevaltraditions,(asubjectofgreatinterestlearnedlydiscussedinTheo.Gale'sCourtoftheGentiles).Butthatsoinconstantacauseisabletoperpetuateinmenthesefixedconvictionsofthe invisible, shows inman a natural religious capacity. That there have beenatheistic persons and tribes, is inconclusive.Some tribesdeduceno scienceofgeometry, statics, or even numbers; but this does not prove man non-logical.Some profess to disbelieve axioms, asHume that of causation; but this is farfrom proving man incapable of a natural science of induction. Besides, theatheismofthesetribesisdoubtful;savagesareshrewd,suspicious,andfondof

befoolinginquisitivestrangersbyassumedstupidity.Andlast:thedifferencesofNaturaltheologyamongpolytheistsareadiversityinunity;allinvolvetheprimetruths;asinglefirstcause,responsibility,guilt,afuturelife,futurerewardsandpunishments.

ExistenceofGod:HowKnown?

2.The first truthof theology is theexistenceofGod.Thefirstquestionwhichmeetsusis:HowmanlearnstheexistenceofGod?Dr.CharlesHodgestatesandarguesthattheknowledgeofitis"innate."Thisassertionheexplainsbysayingthat it is "intuitive." [Systematic Theology, part 1 chapter 1]. It must beunderstood,however,thathealsoemploysthisterminasenseofhisown.Withhim, any truth is intuitive, which is immediately perceived by the mind. Hedissents from the customary definition of philosophers, [as SirW. Hamilton]which requires simplicity, or primariness, as the trait of an intuitive judgment,Heexplainshimselfbysaying,thattoNewton,allthetheoremsofEuclid'sfirstbookwereasimmediatelyseenastheaxioms;andtherefore,tohim,intuitions.Weshallsee, inasubsequentlecture, thedangersofthisview.Ihold,withthecurrentofphilosophers,thatanintuitivetruthis[a]onethatisseentruewithoutany premise, [b] so seen by all minds which comprehend its terms, [c]necessarilyseen.Strictly,itcannotbesaid,thatanyintuitivetruthisinnate.Thepowerofperceivingit is innate.Theexplanationof thecaseofNewtonandofsimiliarones,iseasy:Tohisvigorousmind,thestepfromanintuitivepremisetoanearconclusion,wassopromptandeasyastoattractnoattention.Yet,thestepwastaken.WhenDr.Hodgecallsmen'sknowledgethatthereisaGod"innate,"i. e., "intuitive," his mistake is in confounding a single, short, clear step ofdeduction,madebycommonsense,withanintuition.He,veryproperly,exaltsthe ethical evidence into the chief place. But the amount of it is this: "Thesentiment of responsibility (which is immediate) is intuitive." This implies anObligator.True.Butwhatistheevolutionofthisimplication,save(eshort,easy,andobviousstepof)reasoning?

DivinesandChristianphilosophers,intheattempttoexplainthebeliefinaGod,whichallmenhave, as a rationalprocess,have resolved it into theoneor theotheroftwomodesofargument,theaprioriandaposteriori.ThelatterinfersaGod by reasoning backwards from effects to cause. The former shouldaccordingly mean reasoning downwards from cause to effect; the meaningattachedtothephrasebyAristotleandhisfollowers.Butnowthetermapriori

reasoningisused,inthisconnection,todenoteaconclusiongainedwithouttheaid of experience, from the primary judgments, and especially, the attempt toinferthetruthofanotion,directlyfromitsnatureorconditioninthemind.

APrioriArgument.What,andByWhomUrged?

It appears to be common among recent writers (as Dick, Chalmers' NaturalTheology), to charge Dr. Samuel Clarke as the chief asserter of the a prioriargumentamongEnglishmen.Thisiserroneous.Itmaybemorecorrectlysaidtohave been first intimated by Epicurus (whose atomic theory excluded the aposteriori argument;) as appears from a curious passage in Cicero, de naturaDeorum,Lib.I.c.16.ItwasmoreaccuratelystatedbythecelebratedDesCartesin his meditations; and naturalized to the English mind rather by BishopStillingfleetthanbyDr.Clarke.Thestudentmayfindaverydistinctstatementofit in theOrigines Sacrae of the former, book III, chapter 1, § 14: while Dr.Clarke,§8ofhisDiscourse,expresslysaysthatthepersonalintelligenceofGodmustbeprovedaposteriori,andnotapriori.ButDesCarteshavingfoundedhispsychology on the two positions: 1st.Cogito; ergo sum; and 2nd.TheEgo isspirit, not matter; proceeds to ask: Among all the ideas in the consciousness,howshall the truebedistinguishedfromthefalse,seeingallareobviouslynotconsistent?Astoprimaryideas,hisansweris;bytheclearnesswithwhichtheycommendthemselvestoourconsciousnessasimmediatetruths.Now,amongourideas,nootherissoclearanduniqueasthatofafirstCause,eternalandinfinite.

Hence we may immediately accept it as consciously true. Moreover, that wehavethisideaofaGod,provestheremustbeaGod;becauseweretherenone,theriseofHisideainourthoughtcouldnotbeaccountedfor;justastheideaoftriangles implies theexistenceof some triangle.Now theaprioriargumentofStillingfleetisbutaspecificapplicationofDesCartes'method.Wefind,sayshe,that in thinking of a God we must think Him as eternal, self-existent, andnecessarilyexistent.ButsinceweindisputablydothinkaGod,it is impossiblebutthatGodis.SincenecessaryexistenceisunavoidablyinvolvedinourideaofaGod,thereforeHisexistencemustnecessarilybegranted.

ItsDefect.

Nowsurely thisprocess isnotnecessarily inconclusive,because it isapriori;there are processes, in which we validly determine the truth of a notion by

simpleinspectionofitscontentsandconditions.ButthedefectofStillingfleet'sreasoning is, that it does not give the correct account of our thought. If thestudentwillinspectthetwopropositions,whichformanenthymeme,hewillseethat theconclusiondependson thisassumption, as itsmajorpremise;Thatwecan have no idea in our consciousness, for which there is not an answeringobjectivereality.(Thisis,obviously,theassumedmajor;becausewithoutittheethymemecanonlycontaintheconclusion,thatGod,ifthereisone,necessarilyexists.)Butthatmajorpremiseis,notoriously,notuniversallytrue.

ArgumentofDr.S.Clarke.

Now,insteadofsayingthatDr.Clarke'smethod,intheDiscourseoftheBeing,etc.,ofGod,istheapriori,itismorecorrecttosay(withHamilton'sReid)thatit is an a posteriori argument, or with Kant, Cosmological, inferring theexistenceofGodfromHiseffects;butdisfiguredatoneortwopointsbyuselessCartesianelements.Hisfirstpositionis:Sincesomethingnowexists,somethinghas existed from eternity. This, you will find, is the starting point of theargument, with all reasoners; and it is solid. For, if at any time in the pasteternity, therehadbeenabsolutelynothing, sincenothingcannotbeacauseofexistence,timeandspacemusthaveremainedforeverblankofexistence.Hence,2d., argues Dr. Clarke: there has been, from eternity, some immutable andindependentBeing:becauseaneternalsuccessionofdependentbeings,withoutindependentfirstcause,isimpossible.3d.ThisBeing;asindependenteternally,mustbe self-existent, that is,necessarilyexisting.For its eternal independenceshowsthatthespring,orcausativesourceofitsexistence,couldnotbeoutsideofitself;itisthereforewithinitselfforever.Buttheonlytrueideaofsuchself-existenceis,thattheideaofitsnon-existencewouldbeanexpresscontradiction.And here, Dr. Clarke very needlessly adds: our notion that the existence isnecessary, proves that it cannot but exist.He reasons also: our conceptions ofinfinitetimeandinfinitespacearenecessary:wecannotbutthinkthem.Buttheyare not substance: they are only modes of substance. Unless some substanceexistsofwhichtheyaremodes,theycannotexist,andso,wouldnotbethought.Hence,theremustbeaninfiniteandeternalsubstance.4th.ThesubstanceofthisBeing isnot comprehensiblebyus:but thisdoesnotmake theevidenceof itsexistencelesscertain.For,5th.

Several of its attributes are demonstrable; as that itmust be, 6th, Infinite andomnipresent; 7th, that itmust beOne, and 8th, that itmust be intelligent and

free,etc..TheconclusionisthatthisBeingmustbeCreatorandGod,unlesstheuniverse can itself fulfil the conditions of eternity, necessary self-existence,infinitude,andintelligenceandfreechoice.ThisisPantheism:whichheshowscannotbetrue.

Valid,BecauseAPosteriori.

Hisargumentasawholeismainlyvalid,becauseitisinthemainaposteriori:itappealstotheintuitivejudgmentofcause,toinferfromfiniteeffectsaninfinitefirst cause. The Cartesian features attached to the ad proposition are anexcrescence;butwemayremovethem,andleavethechainadamantine.Wewillprune them away, not for the reasons urged by Dr. Chalmers, which are inseveralparticularsasinvalidasDr.Clarke;butforthereasonalreadyexplainedonpages8and9.Ionlyadd,itseemstoarguethattimeandspacecanonlybeconceived by us as modes of substance; and therefore infinite and eternalsubstance must exist. The truth here is: that we cannot conceive of finitesubstanceorevents,withoutplacingitintimeandspace;adifferentpropositionfromDr.Clarke's.

Howe'sDemonstration.

I thinkwehave themetaphysicalargument for thebeingofaGod, stated inamethodfreefromtheseobjections,bythegreatPuritandivine,JohnHowe.Heflourished about 1650,A.D., andprior toDr.Clarke.See hisLivingTemple,chapter2.Hebeginshence:1.Sincewenowexist,somethinghasexistedfrometernity. 2. Hence, at least, some uncaused Being, for the eternal has nothingprior to it. 3. Hence some independent Being. 4. Hence that Being existsnecessarily; for its independent, eternal, inward spring of existence cannot beconceivedaspossiblyatanytimeinoperative.5.ThisBeingmustbeself-active;active,because, ifotherbeingsdidnotspringfromitsaction, theymustallbeeternal, and so independent, and necessary, which things are impossible forbeingsvariouslyorganizedandchangeable;andself-active,because ineternitynothingwasbeforeHimtopromptHisaction.6.ThisBeingisliving;forself-prompted activity is our very idea of life. 7. He is of boundless intelligence,power,freedom,etc.

WhatNeededToCompleteIt?

This argument is in allpartswellknit.But it isobviouslyaposteriori; for alldependsfromasimplededuction,fromauniverseofeffects,backtotheircause;and in the sameway are inferred the properties of that cause. The only placewheretheargumentneedscompletion,isatthefifthstep.Sofarforth,theproofisperfect, thatsomeeternal,uncaused,necessaryBeingexists.ButhowdoweprovethatthisOnecreatedallotherBeings?Theansweris:theseothersmustallbe either eternal or temporal.May it be, all are eternal and one? then all areuncaused, independent, self-existent, and necessary. This, we shall see, isPantheism. If the rest are temporal, then they were all caused, but by what?Eitherby theoneuncaused,eternalBeing;orbyothersimilar temporalbeingsgeneratingthem.Butthelatteristhetheoryofaninfinite,independentseriesoffinite organisms, each one dependent.When, therefore,we shall have stoppedthesetwobreaches,byrefutingPantheismandthehypothesisofinfiniteseries,thedemonstrationwillbeperfect.

CavilofKant.

Kant has selected this cosmological argument, as one of his "antinomies,"illustratingtheinvalidityoftheapriorireason,whenappliedtoempiricalthings.His objection to its validity seems to amount to this: That the proposition"Nothing can existwithout a causeout of itself," cannot be absolute:For if itwere,thenacausemustbeassignedfortheFirstCausehimself.

Butletusgivetheintuitioninmoreaccurateform:"Nothingcanbegintoexist,withoutacauseoutofitself."Kant'scavilhasnowdisappeared,asamoment'sconsiderationwillshow.Thenecessarystepofthereasonfromthecreatedthingsup to a creator, is now correctly explained. "Every effectmust have a cause."True. An effect is an existence or phenomenonwhich has a beginning. Such,obviously,iseachcreatedthing.Therefore,itmusthaveproceededfromacausewhich had no beginning, i. e., a God.Moreover: I cannot too early utter myprotest againstKant's theory, that our regulative, intuitive principles of reasonaremerelysuggestive,(whileimperative,)andhavenoobjectivevalidity.Werethistrue,ourwholeintelligencewouldbeadelusion.Ontheotherhand,everylawofthoughtisalsoalawofexistenceandofreality.Knowledgeofthisfactisoriginal with everymindwhen it begins to think, is as intuitive as any otherprinciple of theological reason, and is an absolutely necessary conditionof allotherknowledge.Moreover:thewholetrainofman'saposterioriknowledgeisacontinual demonstration of this principle, proving its trustworthiness by the

perfectcorrespondencebetweenoursubjectiveintuitionsandempiricaltruths.

PlatonicScheme.

NowPlatonismheldthatallsubstanceisuncausedandeternalastoitsbeing.Allfinite, rational spirits, said this theology,areemanationsofToON, theeternalintelligence;andallmatterhasbeenfrometernity,asinert,passivechaoticUlh.Platonismreferredallorganization,allfashioning(theonlycreationitadmitted),all change, however either directly or indirectly, to the intelligent FirstCause.Thisschemedoesnotseemveryeasilyrefutedbynaturalreason.LetitbeurgedthattheverynotionoftheFirstCauseimpliesitssingleness;and,moresolidly,that the unity of plan andworking seen in nature, points to only one, single,ultimatecause;PlatocouldreplythathemadeonlyoneFirstCause,ToON,forulh is inert, and only the recipient of causation.Let that rule be urged,whichHamilton calls his "law of parsimony," that hypotheses must include nothingmorethanisnecessarytoaccountforeffects:Platocouldsay:No:thereasonasmuch demands the supposition of a material pre-existing, as of an almightyWorkman;forevenomnipotencecannotwork,withnothingtoworkon.Indeed,sofarasIknow,allhumansystems,Plato's"Enicurus"Zeno's"Pythagoras thePeripatetic" had this common feature; that it is self-evident, substance cannotriseoutofnihilintoesse;thatexnihilonihilfit.Andweshallseehowobstinateis the tendency of philosophy to relapse to this maxim in the instances ofSpinoza's Pantheism, andKant's andHamilton's theory of causation. Indeed itmay be doubtedwhether the humanmind, unaided by revelation, would everhave advanced farther than this. It was from an accurate knowledge of thehistoryofphilosophy, that theapostledeclared,(Hebrews11:3) thedoctrineofanalmightycreationoutofnothingisoneofpurefaith.

CanthePlatonicDoctrineoftheEternityofAllSubstancesBeRefutedByReason?

Dr.Clarkedoesindeedattemptarationalargumentthattheeternityofmatterisimpossible The eternal must be necessary; therefore an eternal cause mustnecessarily be. So, thatwhich can possibly be thought as existing and yet notnecessary,cannotbeeternal.Suchishislogic.Ithinkinspectionwillshowyouadoubledefect.Thefirstenthymemeisnotconclusive;andthesecond,evenifthefirstwere true,wouldbeonly inferring the converse;which is not necessarilyconclusive. Howe states amore plausible argument, at which Dr. Clarke also

glances.Werematter eternal, itmust needs be necessary. But then itmust beubiquitous,homogeneous,immutable,likeGod'ssubstance;becausethisinwardeternalnecessityofbeingcannotbutactalwaysandeverywherealike.Whereas,weseematterdiverse,changingandonlyinpartsofspace.Idoubtwhetherthisissolid;orwhetherfromthemerepostulateofnecessaryexistence,wecaninferanythingmore than Spinoza does: that eternalmatter can possibly exist in nootherorganismsandsequencesofchange,thanthoseinwhichitactuallyexists.Our surest refutation of this feature of Platonism isGod'sword. This heathentheology is certainly nearest of any to the Christian, here, and less repugnantthananyothertothehumanreasonandGod'shonor.

Dr.Breckinridge.

Dr.R. J.Breckinridge, (vol. I, p. 56. etc.) constructswhat he assures us is anargument of his own, for the being of a God. A brief inspection of it willillustrate the subject. 1. Because something now is—at least the mind thatreasons—therefore something eternal is. 2. All known substance is matter orspirit.

3.Henceonlythreepossiblealternatives;either,(a.)somematteriseternal;andthe source of all spirit and all othermatter, Or, (b.) some being composed ofmatterandspiritistheeternalone,andthesourceofallothermatterandspirit.Or,(c.)somespiritiseternal,andproducedallotherspiritandmatter.Thethirdhypothesismustbethetrueone:notthesecondbecausewearematterandspiritcombined,and,consciously,cannotcreate;andmoreoverthefirstCausemustbesingle.Notthefirst,becausematterisinferiortomind;andtheinferiordoesnotproducethesuperior.

ItsDefects.

Theobjectionstothisstructurebeginatthesecondpart,wheretheauthorleavestheestablished formofHoweandClarke.First: theargumentcannotapply, inthe mind of a pure idealist, or of a materialist. Second: it is not rigidlydemonstratedthattherecanbenosubstancebutmatterandspirit;allthatcanbedone is to say, negatively, that no other is known to us. Third: the threealternative propositions do not exhaust the case; the Pantheist and thePeripatetic, of eternal organization, show us that others are conceivable, asobviously does the Platonic. Fourth: that we, combined of matter and spirit,

consciously cannot create, is short of proof that some higher being, henceconstituted,cannot.Christcouldcreate, ifHepleased;Heishenceconstituted.Last: it is unfortunate that an argument, which aims to be so expert mental,should have the analogy of our natural experience somuch against it. Forweonlywitnesshumanspiritsproducingeffects,whenincorporate.Assoonastheyare disembodied, (at death,) they totally cease to be observed causes of anyeffects.

TeleologicalArgument.

TheteleologicalargumentforthebeingandattributesofaGodhasbeensowellstatedbyPaley,inhisNaturalTheology,thatthoughasoldasJobandSocrates,it is usuallymentioned as Paley's argument. I refer you especially to his firstthree chapters.Beginning from the instanceof a peasant finding awatchon acommon, and although not knowing how it came there, concluding that someintelligentagentconstructedit;heappliesthesameargument,withgreatbeautyand power, to show that man and the universe have a Maker. For we seeeverywhere intelligent arrangement; as the eye for seeing, the ear for hearing,etc.Noristhepeasant'sreasoningtoawatchmakerweakened,becauseheneversawoneatwork,orevenheardofone;norbecauseapartofthestructureisnotunderstood;norbecausesomeoftheadjustmentsareseentobeimperfect;nor,ifyoushowedthepeasant, inthewatch,asetofwheelsforreproducingitskind,wouldhebesatisfiedthattherewasnowatchmaker:forhewouldseethatthisreproductive mechanism could not produce the intelligent arrangements. Norwouldhebesatisfiedwitha"lawofnature,"ora"physicalprincipleoforder,"asthesolecause.

AretheTwo,RivalLinesofProof?

It is a fact, somewhat curious, that the metaphysical and the teleologicalarguments have each had their exclusive advocates in modern times. TheapplaudersofPaleyjoinDr.ThomasBrowninscoutingtheformerasshadowyand inconclusive.The supportersof themetaphysicaldivinesdepreciatePaley,as leading us to nothing above a mere Demiurgis. In truth, both lines ofreasoning are valid; and each needs the other. Dr. Brown, for instance, incarryingPaley'sargumenttoitshigherconclusions,musttacitlyborrowsomeofthe very metaphysics which he professes to disdain. Otherwise it remainsincomplete,andleadstonomorethanasort

Artifex Mundi, whose existence runs back merely to a date prior to humanexperience, and whose being, power and wisdom are demonstrated to extendonly as far as man's inquiries have gone. But that He is eternal, immutable,independent,immense,infiniteinpowerorwisdom;itcanneverassureus.True,inviewingtheargument,yourminddidleaptotheconclusionthattheartificesofnature'scontrivancesistheBeingof"eternalpowerandgodhead,"butitwasonly because you passed, almost unconsciously, perhaps, through thatmetaphysicaldeduction,ofwhichHowegivesustheexactdescription.Howe'sis the comprehensive, Paley's the partial (but very lucid) display of the aposteriori argument. Paley's premise; that every contrivance must have anintelligent contriver, is but an instance under themore general one, that everyeffectmusthaveacause.TheinadequacyofPaley'sargumentmaybeillustratedin this: that he seems to think the peasant's discovery of a stone, instead of awatch,couldnothaveledhismindtothesameconclusion,whereasapebbleasreally, thoughnotsoimpressively,suggestsacause,asanorganizedthing.Foreven the pebble should make us think either that it is such as can have thegroundofitsexistenceinitspresentforminitself;andso,canbeeternal,self-existent,andnecessary;orelse, that ithadaProducer,whodoespossess theseattributes.

ItsValue.

But,ontheotherhand,thisargumentfromcontrivancehasgreatvalue,forthesereasons.Itisplainandpopular.Itenablesustoevincetheunityofthefirstcausethroughtheunityofpurposeandconvergenceoftheconsequencesofcreation.Itaidsus in showing thepersonalityofGod, asabeingof intelligenceandwill;anditgreatlystrengthenstheassaultweshallbeenabledtomakeonPantheism,by showing, unless there is a personal and divine first Cause prior to theuniverse,thismustitselfbe,notonlyuncaused,eternal,independent,necessarilyexistent,butenduedwithintelligence.

InstancesofContrivancesToAnEnd.

Asingleinstanceofintelligentcontrivanceintheworksofcreationwouldprovean intelligentCreator.Yet, it iswell tomultiply theseproofs,even largely: fortheygiveusthenawiderfoundationofdeduction,strongerviewsoftheextentofthecreativewisdomandpower;andbetterevidenceofGod'sunity.

FromOrgansofAnimals.

Hence,asinstances,showinghowtheargumentisconstructed:Ifthedesignistoproduce the physical part of the sensation of vision; the eye is obviously anoptical instrument,contrivedwith lenses torefract,expedientsforobtaininganachromatic spectrum, adjustments for distance and quantity of light, andprotection of the eye, by situation, bony socket, brow, lids, lubricating fluids;and in birds, the nictitating membrane. Different creatures also have eyesadaptedtotheirlivesandmediaofvision;asbirds,cats,owls,fishes.So,theearisanauditoryapparatus,withaconchatoconvergethesound-waves,a tube,atympanumto transmitvibration, the threebones(malleus,stipesand incus) ininstableequilibrium,toconveyittothesensorium,etc.

FromSpiritualStructureofMan.

Theworldofspiritisjustasfullofevidentcontrivances.See(e.g.)thelawsofhabit and imitation, exactlyadjusted toeducateand to form thecharacter; andthefacultiesofmemory,association,taste,etc.Theevidencesofcontrivanceare,ifpossible,stillmorebeautifulinouremotionalstructure;e.g.,intheinstinctsofparental love, sympathy, resentment and its natural limits, sexual love, and itsnatural check, modesty; and above all, conscience, with its self-approval andremorse.Alltheseareadjustedtoobviousends.

InCompensatingArrangements.

We see marks of more recondite design, in the natural compensation fornecessary defects. The elephant's short neck is made up by a lithe proboscis.Birds'headscannotcarryteeth:buttheyhaveagizzard.Insectswithfixedheads,have anumberof eyes to see around them.Bruteshave less reason, butmoreinstinct;andsoongoestheargument.

InAdaptations.

The adaptations of one department of nature to another show at oncecontrivance,selectingwillandunityofmind.Hence,themediaand theorgansofsensearemadeforeachother.Theformsandcoloursofnaturalobjectsaresorelated to taste; thedegreeof fertility imparted to theearth, toman'snecessityforlabour;thestabilityofphysicallaw,tothenecessaryjudgmentsofthereason

thereabout.Soallnature,materialandspiritual,animal,vegetable,inorganic,onourplanet,inthestarryskies,arefullofwisecontrivance.

ArgumentFromConscience.

Themoralphenomenaofconsciencepresentatwofoldevidenceforthebeingofa God, worthy of fuller illustration than space allows. This faculty is a mostingeniousspiritualcontrivance,adjustedtoabeneficentend:viz.,thepromotionofvirtuousacts,andrepressionofwicked.Assuch,itprovesacontriver,justasanyorganicadjustmentdoes.Butsecond:weshallfind,laterinthecourse,thatourmoraljudgmentsareintuitive,primitive,andnecessary;themostinevitablefunctions of the reason. Now, the idea of our acts which have rightness isunavoidably attended with the judgment that they are obligatory. Obligationmustimplyanobliger.Thisisnotalwaysanyknowncreature:hence,wearriveattheCreator.Again,ourconscienceofwrong-doingunavoidablysuggestsfearbut fear implies an avenger. The secret sinner, the imperial sinner above allcreature-power,sharesthisdread.Now,onemayobject,thatthisprocessisnotvalid, unless we hold God's mere will the sole source of moral distinctions:whichwedonot teach, sinceanatheist is reasonablycompelled tohold them.Buttheobjectionisnotjust.

The primitive law of the reasonmust be accepted as valid to us,whatever itssource.Forparallel:Theintuitivebelief incausationisfoundoninspection, tocontaintheproposition,"ThereisafirstCause."Butinorderforthevalidityofthis proposition, it is not necessary for us to say that this intuition is God'sarbitrary implantation. It is intrinsically true to the nature of things; and theargumenttoafirstCausethereforeonlythemorevalid.

This moral argument to the being of a God, as it is immediate and strictlylogical, is doubtless far the most practical. Its force is seen in this, thattheoretical atheists, in danger and death, usually at the awakening of remorse,acknowledgeGod.

3.ArgumentFromUniversalConsent.

YoufindtheargumentfromtheConsensusPopulorum,muchelaboratedbyyourauthorities.IconcludethatitgivesastrongprobableevidenceforthebeingofaGod, hence: The truth is abstract; its belief would not have been so nearly

universal, nor so obviously essential toman's social existence, did not a validgroundforitexistinman'slawsofthought.Foritcanbeaccountedforneitherbyfear,policy,norself-interest.

4.ObjectedThatContrivanceBetraysLimitation.

Fromtheaffirmativeargument,wereturntoevasions.Anobjectionisurged,thattheargumentfromdesign,ifvalid,provesonlyacreatureoflimitedpowers.Forcontrivanceistheexpedientofweakness.Forinstance,oneconstructsaderrick,because,unlikeSamson,heistooweaktoliftanimpossibleload.IftheCreatorhaseternalpowerandgodhead,whydidHenotgostraighttoHisends,withoutmeans, as in Ps. 33:9? I answer, design proves a designer, though in partunintelligible. 2nd. It would not be unworthy of the Almighty to choose thismanner ofworking, in order to leaveHis signature on it forman to read. 3d.Chiefly:HadGodemployednomeanstoends,hemusthaveremainedtheonlyagent;therewouldhavebeennoorganizednature;butonlytheonesupernaturalagent.

HumeObjectsThattheWorldIsASingularEffect.

Hume strives to undermine the argument from the creation to a Creator, byurging that, sinceonlyexperience teachesus theuniformityof the tiebetweeneffectandcause,itisunwarrantedtoapplyitfartherthanexperiencegoeswithus.Butnoonehashadanyexperienceofaworld-maker,aswehaveofmakingimplementsinthearts.Theuniverse, ifaneffectatall, isonewhollysingular:the only one anybody has known, and from the earliest human experience,substantially as it is now. Hence the empirical induction to its first Cause isunauthorized.

Dr.Alexander'sAnswer.

Note first: this is from the same mint with his argument against miracles.Creationissimplythefirstmiracle;thesameobjectionisinsubstancebrought;viz:notestimonycanbeweightyenoughtoprove,againstuniversalexperience,that a miracle has occured. Next, Dr. Alexander, to rebut, resorts to anillustration;acountryboywhohadseenonlyploughsandhorse-carts,isshownasteam-frigate;yetheimmediatelyinfersamechanicforit.Thefactwillbeso;butitwillnotgiveusthewholeanalysis.True,thefrigateisgreatlylargerand

more complicated than a horse cart; (as the universe is than any humanmachine). But still, Hume might urge that the boy would see a thousandempiricalmarks,cognizabletohisexperiences,(timberwithmarksoftheplaneon it, as on his plough-beam, the cable as evidently twisted of hemp, as hisplough-lines; the huge anchor with as evident dints of the hammer, as hisploughshare,) which taught him that the wonderful ship was also a producedmechanism. Astonishing as it is to him, compared with the plough, it isexperimentallyseentobenotnatural,liketheuniverse,

Chalmers'Answer.

Chalmers, in a chapter full of contradictions, seems to grant that experiencealoneteachesusthelawofcausation,andassertsthatstilltheuniverseisnot"asingulareffect."Toshowthis,hesupposes,withPaley,thepeasantfromawatchinferringawatchmaker:andthenbyaseriesofabstractions,heshowsthat thelogicalbasisoftheinferenceisnotanythingpeculiartothatwatch,asthatitisagold,orasilver,alarge,asmall,oragoodwatch,oramachinetomeasuretimeatall;butsimplythefactthatitisamanifestcontrivanceforanend.Theeffectthen, isno longersingular;yet the inference tosomeadequateagentholds.Tothis ingenious process, Hume would object that it is experience alone whichguides in making those successive abstractions, by which we separate theaccidental from the essential effect and cause. This,Chalmers himself admits.Hence,aswehavenoexperienceofworld-making,nosuchabstractionishereallowable, to reduce the world to the class of common effects. Besides; hasHumeadmittedthatit isaneffectatall?Infine,hemighturgethisdifference,thattheworldisnative,whilethewatch,theplough,theshipbears,tothemostunsophisticatedobserver,empiricalmarksofbeingmade,andnotnative.

TrueAnswer.

LetusnotthenrefuteHumefromhisownpremises;fortheyarefalse.Itisnotexperience which teaches us that every effect has its cause, but the a priorireason.(ThisChalmersfirstasserts,andthenunwiselysurrenders.)Neitherchildnormanbelieves thatmaxim tobe true in thehundredthcase,becausehehasexperienceditstruthinninety-nine;heinstinctivelybelieveditinthefirstcase.It isnota truecanonof inductive logic, that the tieofcauseandeffectcanbeassertedonlysofarasexperienceprovesitspresence.Ifitwere,wouldinductionever teachusanythingwedidnotknowbefore?Would therebeany inductive

science?Awaywiththenonsense!Grantthattheworldisa"singulareffect."Itisaphenomenon, itcouldnotbewithoutacauseof itsbeing,eitherextrinsic,orintrinsic.And thiswe know, not by experience, but by one of those primitivejudgmentsofthereason,whichalonemakeexperienceintelligibleandvalid.

CanthePresentUniverseBetheResultofInfiniteSeriesofOrganisms?

Butmaynotthisuniversehavethegroundofitsbeinginitself?Thisisanotherevasionoftheatheists.Grant,theysay,thatnothingcannotproducesomething.Theistsgooutside theuniverse to seek its cause; andwhen they suppose theyhave found it in a God, they are unavoidably driven to represent Him asuncausedfromwithout,eternal,self-existent,andnecessary.Nowitisasimplerhypothesis, just to suppose that the universe which we see, is the uncaused,eternal, self-existent, necessary Being.Whymay we not adopt it? Seeing wemustrunbacktothemysteryofsomeuncaused,eternalbeing,whymaywenotaccepttheobviousteachingofnatureandexperienceandconcludethatthisisit?Since the organismswhich adorn this universe are all temporal, and since theearthandotherstarsmoveintemporalcycles,weshallthenhavetosupposethatthe infinite past eternity, throughwhich this self-existent universe has existed,was made up of an infinite succession of these organisms and cycles, eachpreviousoneproducing the. next: as the infinite future eternitywhichwill be.Butwhatisabsurdinsuchahypothesis?

MetaphysicalAnswers.

NowIwillnotreply,withDr.Clarkeandothers,thatiftheuniverseiseternal,itmustbenecessary;andthisnecessitymustmakeitssubstancehomogeneousandunchangeablethroughoutinfinitetimeandspace.Itmightbeplausiblyretorted,that this tendency to regular, finite organisms, which we see, was the verynecessityofnatureinherentinmatter.Nordoesitseemtomesolidtosay,withRobertHall inhissermon,Turrettin,andothers, thataneternalseriesof finitedurations is impossible; because if eachparticular part had a beginning,whiletheserieshadnone,weshouldhavetheseriesexistingbeforeitsfirstmember;thechainstretchingfartherbackthanitsfarthestlink.Theverysuppositionwas,thattheserieshadnofirstmember.Isapasteternityanymoreimpossibletobemade up of the addition of an infinite number of finite parts, than an abstractinfinite future? Surely not. Now there is to be just such an infinite future:namely,yourandmy immortality,which, although itmaynotbemeasuredby

solardaysandyears,willundoubtedlybecomposedofpartsofsuccessivetimeinfinitelymultiplied.But to this future eternity, itwould be exactly parallel toobject, thatwemake each link in it have an end,while thewhole is endless;whichwouldinvolvethesameabsurdity,ofachainextendedforwardafter thelastlinkwasended.Theansweragainis:thataccordingtothesupposition,thereisnolastlink,thenumberthereofbeinginfinite.Inaword,whatmathematiciandoes not know that infinitude may be generated by the addition of finitesrepeatedaninfinitenumberoftimes?

Turretin'sArgumentFromUnequalInfinites.

Turrettin, among many ingenious arguments, advances another which seemsmorerespectableItisinsubstancethis:IfthisuniversehasnoCreator,thenitspastdurationmustbeaproperandabsoluteinfinity.Butcreatedthingsmoveorsucceedeachother in finite times.See, for instance, theheavenlybodies:Thesunrevolvesonitsaxisdaily;arounditsorbit,annually.Ifthisstateofthingshasbeen eternal, there must have been an infinite number of days, and also aninfinitenumberofyears.Butsinceitrequiresthreehundredandsixty-fivedaystoayear,wehaveheretwotemporalinfinities,bothproperandabsolute,yetonethree hundred and sixty-five times as large as the other! Now, themathematicians tell us, that proper infinities may be unequal; that an infiniteplane, for instance, may be conceived as constituted of infinite straight linesinfinitelynumerous;andaninfinitesolid,ofaninfinitenumberofsuchplanes,superposed the one on the other. But it is at least questionable, whether theevasionisvalidagainstTurrettin'sargument.Forthesedifferinginfinitiesareindifferentdimensions.oflength,breadthandthickness.Cantherebe,inthesamedimension,twolines,eachinfiniteinlength,andyettheonethreehundredandsixty-fiveasgreatastheother,inlength?

Turrettinattempts to reply to theanswerdrawn from theeternityapartepost,against themetaphysicalargument.Theatheistasksus:Since(astheistssay)afinite soul is to be immortal, there will be a specimen of a temporal infinityformed of finite times infinitely repeated: Why may there not have been asimilarinfinitedurationaparteante?Because,saysourTextbook:Thatwhichwas, but is past, cannot be fairly comparedwith a futurewhichwill never bepast. Again: a thing destined never to end may have a beginning; but it isimpossible to believe that a thing which actually has ended, never had abeginning.Because,thefactthatthethingcametoanendprovesthatitscause

wasoutsideofitself.Thelastremarkintroducesustoasolidargument,anditissolid, because it brings us out of the shadowy region of infinity to the solidgroundofcausation.Itisbutanotherwayofstatingthegrand,theunanswerablerefutation of this atheistic theory: a series composed only of contingent partsmustbe,asawhole,contingent.Butthecontingentcannotbeeternal,becauseitisnotself-existent.Thisargumentisexplicatedinthefollowingpoints:

(1.) Take any line of generative organisms, for instance: (oak trees bearingacorns,andthoseacornsrearingoaks,e.g.)thebeingofeachindividualintheseriesdemandsanadequatecause.Whenwepushtheinquirybackonestep,andask the causeof theparentwhich (seemingly) caused it,we findprecisely thesamedifficultyunanswered.Whateverdistancewerunbackalongthe line,weclearlyseenoapproachismadetowardsfindingtheadequatecauseoftheseries,or of the earliest individual considered. Hence it is wholly unreasonable tosuppose that the introduction of infinitude into the series helps to give us anadequate cause.We only impose on ourselveswith an undefined idea. Paley'sillustrationhereisasjustasbeautiful.Twostraightparallel linespursued,eversofar,makenoapproximation;theywillnevermeet,thoughinfinitelyextended.

(2.) An adequate cause existing at the time the phenomenon arises, must beassignedforeveryeffect.Foracausenotpresentattheriseoftheeffect,isnocause. Now then; when a given oak was sprouted, all the previous oaks andacornsof its line,saveoneor two,hadperished.Was thisacorn,evenwith itsparent oak, the adequate cause of the whole structure of the young tree,includingtheingeniouscontrivancesthereof?Surelynot.Butthepreviousdeadoaksandacornsarenocause;fortheyarenotthere.Anabsentcauseisnocause.Theoriginalcauseofthisoakisnotintheseriesatall.

(3.)Evenifwepermitourselvestobedazzledwiththenotionthatsomehowtheinfinitudeoftheseriescanaccountforitsself-productivepower;thismaximisobvious: that in a series of transmitted causes, the whole power of the causemust be successively in eachmember of the series. For each one could onlytransmitwhat power it received from its immediate predecessor; and if at anystage,anyportionof thecausativepowerwerelost,allsubsequentstagesmustbe without it. But evidently no one generation of acorns ever had power orintelligence tocreate thesubtlecontrivancesofvegetable life in theirprogeny;andtosupposethatalldid,isbutmultiplyingtheabsurdity.

(4) This question should be treated according to the atheist's point of view,scientifically: Science always accepts testimony in preference to hypothesis.Nowthereisatestimony,thatoftheMosaicScripture,assupportedbyuniversaltradition,whichsaysthatallseriesoforganismsbeganinthecreativeactofanintelligentfirstCause.Theatheistmayobject,thatmen,ascreaturesthemselves,havenorightof theirownknowledge, touttersuch traditionary testimony; fortheycouldnotbepresentbeforetheorganismsexistedtowitnesshowtheywerebrought intoexistence.Theonlypretext for such traditionwouldbe that someprior superhuman Being, who did witness man's production, revealed to himhow he was produced: but whether any such prior Being existed, is the verythingindebate,andsomaynotbetakenforgranted.

True;but theexistenceof the testimonymustbegranted; for it isa fact that itexists,anditmustbeaccountedfor.Andthequestionis,whethertheonlygoodaccount is not, that the universe did have an intelligent Cause, and that thisCausetaughtprimevalmanregardinghisorigination.Otherwise,notonlyistheuniverseleftunaccountedfor,buttheuniversaltradition.

(5)Scienceexaltsexperienceabovehypothesisevenmorethantestimony.Now,the whole state of the world bears the appearance of recency. The recentdiscoveryofnewcontinents,thegreatprogressofnewartssincethehistoricerabegan,andthepartialpopulationoftheearthbyman,allbelietheeternityofthehumanrace.Butstrongerstill,geologyprovesthecreation,intime,ofraceafterrace of animals, and the comparatively recent origin of man, by her fossilrecords. These show the absolute beginning of genera. And the attempt toaccount for them by the development theory (Chambers orDarwin) is utterlyrepudiated by even the better irreligious philosophers; for if there is anythingthat Natural History has established, it is that organic life is separated frominorganicforces,mechanical,chemical,electricalorother,byinexorablebounds;and thatgeneramay begin or end, but never transmute themselves into othergenera.

Pantheism.

AsIpointedout,therearebuttwohypothesesbywhichthedemonstrationofaneternal, intelligent, personal firstCause can be evaded. The one has just beendiscussed; the other is the pantheistic.No separate firstCause of the universeneedbeassigned, itsays,becausetheuniverseisGod.ThefirstCauseandthe

wholecreationaresupposedtobeonesubstance,world-god,possessingalltheattributesofboth.Asextremesoftenmeet,pantheismleadstothesamepracticalresults with atheism. Aristotle, perhaps themost sagacious of pagan thinkers,waswillingtopostulatetheeternity,aparteante,oftheseriesoforganisms.Buthe,nonetheless,taughttheexistenceofaGodwho,thoughinasenseanAnimaMundi,wasyetanintelligentandactiveinfiniteCause.

PeripateticPantheism.

Theancientformofpantheism,probablyAristotelianinitssource,admittedthatmatter, dead, senseless, divisible, cannotbe theproper seatof intelligenceandchoice,whichareindivisible;andthattheuniverseisfullofmarksofintelligentdesign,sothatanAnitaMundi,anintelligentPrinciple,mustbeadmittedintheuniverse. Yes, I reply, it must, and that personal. Because it obviously hasintelligence, choice, andwill; and how can personality be better defined?Norcan it inhabit theuniverseasasoul itsbody,notbeing limited to it in timeorspace, nor bearing that relation to it. Not in time; because, being eternal, itexistedawholepasteternitybefore it; forwehaveproved the latter temporal.Notinspace;forwehaveseenthisIntelligenceeternalagesnotholdingitsubiinspacebymeansofbody;andthereisnotasinglereasonforsupposingthatitisnowlimitedtothepartofspacewhichbodiesoccupy.Itisnotconnectedwithmatter by any tie of animality; because immensely the larger part ofmatter isinanimate.

PantheismofSpinoza.

ModernpantheismappearseitherinthehypothesisofSpinoza,theJew,orinthatofthelaterGermanidealists.Bothseethateventhematerialuniverseteemswithintelligent contrivances: and more, that the nobler part, that known byconsciousness, and so, most immediately known, is a world of thought andfeelinginhumanbreasts.Henceintelligenceandwillmustbeaccountedfor,aswellasmatter.Now,Spinoza'sfirstpositionis:Therecanbenorealsubstance,except it be self-existent, and so, eternal.That is; it is incredible that any truesubstancecanpassfromnihil intoesse.2nd.All theself-existentmustbeone;thisisunavoidablefromtheunityofitscharacteristicattribute.3rd.Theonerealsubstance must therefore be eternal, infinite, and necessarily existent. 4th. allotherseemingbeingsarenotrealsubstance,butmodesofexistenceofthissolebeing.5th.Allpossibleattributes,howeverseeminglydiverse,mustbemodes,

nearer or remote, of thisBeing; and it is necessary therefore to get rid of theprejudice, that modes of thought and will and modes of extension cannot bereferredtothesamesubstance

This is the trueaccountof theuniverse.Allmaterialbodies(socalled)arebutdifferentmodesofextension,inwhichthenecessarysubstanceprojectshimself;andallpersonalspirits(socalled)arebutmodesof thoughtandwill, inwhichthesamebeingpulsates.

Nowyou see that thewhole structure rests on twounprovedandpreposterousassumptions:thatrealsubstancecannotbeexceptitbeself-existent;andthattheself-existent can be but one. The human mind is incapable of demonstratingeither.

PantheismoftheModernIdealist.

Says the modern idealist: Let the mind take nothing for granted, except thedemonstrated; and it will find that it really knows nothing save itsconsciousnesses.Ofwhatisitconscious?Onlyofitsownsubjectivestates.Menfancy that these must be referred to a subject calledmind, spirit, self; as thesubstanceofwhichtheyarestates.Sotheyfancythattheyfindobjectivesourcesfor their sensations, and objective limits to their volitions; but if it fancies itknows either, it is only by a subjective consciousness. These, after all, are itsonly real possessions. Thus, it has no right to assert either substantive self orobjective matter; it only knows, in fact, a series of self-consciousnesses.Therefore, our thinking andwilling constitute our being.Thus, too, thewholeostensiblyapparentandobjectiveworldisonlyevincedfromnon-existenceasitis thoughtbyus.The total residuum then, is an impersonal power of thought,only existing as it exerts its self-consciousness in the various beings of theuniverse, (if there is a universe) and in God. Its subjective consciousnessesconstitutespiritualsubstance(socalled,)self,fellowman,God;anditsobjective,theseemingobjectivematerialbodiesoftheuniverse.

Refutation.1.IntuitionMustBeAcceptedAsValid.

Against both these forms of pantheism, I present the following outline of arefutation.(1.)Ifthemindmaynottrusttheintuitionwhichrefersallattributesand affections to their substances, and which gives real objective sources for

sensations, it may not believe in its intuitive self-consciousness, nor in thatintuitionofcauseforeveryphenomenon,onwhichSpinozafoundsthebeliefinhisOne Substance.Falsus in uno; Falsus in omnibus.There is an end of allthinking.Thattheintuitionsaboveasserted,arenecessaryandprimary,Iprovebythis:thateveryman,includingtheidealist,unavoidablymakesthem.

ConsciousnessImpliesMyPersonality.

(2.)We are each one conscious of our personality.You cannot pronounce thewords"self,"Ego,self-consciousness;butthatyouhaveimpliedit.Hence,ifwethinkaccordingtoourownsubjectivelaw,wecannotthinkanotherintelligenceand will, without imputing to it a personality. Least of all, the supremeintelligenceandwill.TodenythisistoclaimtobemoreperfectthanGod.Butworseyet;ifIamnotaperson,mynatureisalie,andthinkingisatanend.IfIam a person, and as the pantheist says, I amGod, andGod is I, then he is aperson;andthepantheisticsystemisstillself-contradicted.

ExtensionandThoughtCannotBeReferredToACommonSubstance.

(3.)Modesofextensionandmodesof thoughtandwillcannotbeattributesofone substance. Matter is divisible: neither consciousness, nor thought, norfeelingis;thereforethesubstancewhichthinksisindivisible.Matterisextended;hasform;hasrelativebulkandweight.Allthesepropertiesareimpossibletobethought of any function of spirit, as relevant to them.Who can conceive of athoughttrituratedintomanyparts,asastoneintograinsofsand;ofaresentmentsplitintohalves;ofaconceptionwhichissomanyfractionsofaninchlongerorthickerthananother;ofanemotiontriangularorcircular,ofthetopandbottomofavolition?

IfSpinozaTrue,ToPanCannotVary.

(4.)IfthereisbutonesubstanceToPan,theeternal,selfexistent,necessary;thenitmustbehomogeneousand indivisible.This isat leasta justargumentumadhominemforSpinoza.Didhenotinferthenecessaryunityofallrealsubstance,from the force of its one characteristic attribute, self and necessary existence?Now, this immanent necessity,which is so imperative as to exclude plurality;mustitnotalsoexcludediversity;oratleastcontrariety?Howthencanthisone,unchangeable substance exist at the same time in different and even

contradictory states; motion and rest; heat and cold; attraction and repulsion?Howcanit,initsmodesofthoughtandwill,atthesametimeloveinoneman,and hate in another, the same object? How believe and disbelieve the samething?

NoEvilNorGood.

(5.)On this scheme, there can be no responsibility,moral good or evil, guilt,reward, righteous penalty, or moral government of the world. All states offeeling,andallvolitionsarethoseofToPan.Satan'swrongvolitionsarebutGodwilling,andhistransgressions,Godacting.BywhatpretextcantheDivineWillbeheldupasamoralstandard?Anythingwhichacreaturewills,isGod'swill.

Fatalistic.

(6.)Andthisbecause,next,pantheismisaschemeofstarknecessity.Necessityof this kind is inconsistent with responsibility. But again; it contradicts ourconsciousness of free agency. We know, by our consciousness, that in manythingsweact freely,wedowhatwedo,becausewechoose;weareconsciousthatoursoulsdeterminethemselves.ButifPantheismweretrue,everyvolition,aswellaseveryotherevent,wouldberuledbyanironfate.Soavowedstoicism,the pantheism of theOldWorld: so admits Spinoza. And consistently; for ToPan, impersonal,developingitselfaccordingtoan immanent,eternalnecessity,must inevitablypass throughall thosemodificationsof thought andextension,whichthisnecessitydictates,andnoothers;andtheactsofGodareasfatedasours.

GodWouldHaveAllSinandWoe.

(7.)Iretortuponthepantheistthatpicturewhichhesomuchdelightstounfoldin fanciful and glowing guise. Pantheism, says he, by deifying nature, clotheseverythingwhich is sweet or grandwith the immediate glory of divinity, andennoblesusbyplacingusperpetually in literal contactwithGod.Dowe lookwithouton thebeautiesof the landscape?Its loveliness isbutonebeamof themultiformsmileuponHisface.ThegloryofthesunistheflashofHiseye.Theheavings of the restless sea are but the throbs of the divine bosom, and theinnumerable starsarebut thesparklesofHiseternalbrightness.Andwhenwelookwithin us, we recognize in every emotionwhich ennobles orwarms our

breasts, the aspirations, the loves, the gratitudes which bless our being, thepulses of God's own heart beating through us. Nay, but, say I, are themanifestationsoftheuniversalBeing,alllovelyandgood?Ifpantheismistrue,mustwenotequally regardall that isabhorrent innature, therending thunder,andtherushingtornado,thedesolatingearthquakeandvolcanos,thefranticsealashinghelplessnaviesintowreck,asthethroesofdisorderorruininGod?Andwhenwepicturethescenesofsinandwoe,whichdarkenhumanity,theremorseofthevillain'sprivacy,theorgiesofcrimeandcrueltyhiddenbeneaththeveilofnight,thedespairingdeathbeds,thehorrorsofbattlefields,thewailsofnationsgrowingpalebeforethepestilence,thedinofburningandravagedcities,andalltheworldofeternaldespairitself,weseeinthewholebuttheagonyandcrimeof the divine Substance. Would it then be best called Devil or God? Sincesufferingand sinare soprevalent in thisworld,wemaycall itPan-diabolism,with more propriety than pantheism. Nor is it any relief to this abhorrentconclusion,tosaythatpainandevilarenecessitated,andareonlyseemingevils.Consciousnessdeclaresthemreal.

Chapter2:Evolution

SyllabusforLecture3:

1.StatetheEvolutionTheoryofman'sorigin,initsrecentform;andshowitsRelationtotheArgumentforGod'sexistence.

2.ShowtheDefectsinthepretendedArgumentforthisDescentofmanbyEvolution.

DoestheTheoryweakentheTeleologicalArgumentforthe

ExistenceofPersonalGod?See"OriginofSpecies"and"Descentof

Man,"byDr.CharlesDarwin,"LaySermons,"byDr.Thos.Huxley,

"PhysicalBasisofLife,"byDr.Stirling,Lectures(Posthumous)of

Prof.LouisAgassiz,"WhatisDarwinism?"byDr.ChHodge,

"ReignofLaw,"bytheDukeofArgyle.

RelationofEvolutionToTeleologicalArgument.

IN the previous Lecture, I concluded the brief examination of the atheistictheory, accounting for the Universe as an eternal series, with these words:"Generamaybeginorend,butnevertransmutethemselvesintoothergenera."We found the fatal objections to the scheme of a self-existent, infinite seriesuncaused from without, in these facts: That no immediate antecedent wasadequate cause for its immediate successor:And that theprevious links in theseries could not be cause; because totally absent from the rise of the sequenteffect.HenceInthattheutterfallacywasdetected,whichseekstoimposeonourmindsbythevagueinfinitudeoftheseriesasawhole.Weweretaughtthatnoseriesmadeupsolelyofeffects,eachcontingent,

can, as a whole, be self-existent. Thus that evasion of the athiest quicklyperished.Obviously, if there is any expedient for resuscitating it, thismust befoundintheattempttoprovethatthelaw,"LikeproducesLike,"isnotthewholeexplanation of the series. We have demonstrated that, by that law, it isimpossibletheseriescanbeself-existent.ThebesthopeofAtheismis,then,toattempttoprovethattheLikedoesnotproducemerelytheLike;thattheseriescontainswithinitselfapowerofdifferentiatingitseffects,atleastslightly.Hencematerialistsandatheistshavebeenledinourday,eitherbydeliberatedesign,orby a species of logical instinct, to attempt the construction of an "evolutiontheory."TheexaminationofthisattemptbecomesnecessaryinordertocompletetheargumentforGod'sexistence,onthis,thelastconceivablepointofattack.

NoNovelty.

The evolution hypothesis is, indeed, no novelty. It is, after all its pretendedmodernexperiments,buta revivalof the"atomic theory"of theGreekatheist,Democritus, adoptedby theEpicurean school. Its application to thedescentofmanfromsomeloweranimal,hasoftenbeenattempted,asbyLordMonboddo,who almost exactly anticipatedDr. Chas. Darwin's conclusion. In the eyes ofsomemodernPhysicists,however,ithasreceivednewplausibilityfromthemoreintelligent speculations of the Naturalist La Marck, and the "Vestiges ofCreation"ascribedtoMr.RobertChambers.Butitappearsinitsfullestform,intheingeniousworksofDr.Chas.Darwin,"OriginofSpecies,"and"DescentofMan."Ithereforetakethisastheobjectofourinquiry.

NaturalSelectionandSurvival.

This Naturalist thinks that he has found the law of reproduction, in animatednature, that "Like produces Like," modified by the two laws of "naturalselection" and a "survival of the fittest."By the former, nature herself, actingunintelligently, tends in all her reproductive processes, to select thosecopulations which are most adapted to each other by the latter, she ordains,equallywithoutintelligence,thatthefittest,orablestprogenyshallsurviveattheexpenseoftheinferior.Thesesupposedlawsheillustratesbytherace-varieties(certainlyverystriking)whichhavebeenproducedingeneraandspecieswhoseoriginal unity is admittedby all, through the art of thebird-fancier and stock-rearer, in breeding. The result of these laws, modifying the great law ofreproduction,wouldbeaslightdifferentiationofsuccessorsfrompredecessors,in any series in animated nature. This difference at one stepmight be almostinfinitesimal.ThisconatusofNaturetowardsevolution,beingtotallyblind,andmovingathaphazard,mightresultinnothingthroughamyriadofexperiments,orinstances,andonlyevolvesomethinginadvanceoftheantecedents,inthetenthousandthcase;yet, ifwepostulatea timesufficientlyvast,duringwhich thelaw has been blindly working, the result may be the evolution of man, thehighestanimal,fromthelowestformofprotoplasmiclife.

SchemeAtheistic.

1.Thetendencyofthisschemeisatheistic.Someofitsadvocatesmaydisclaimtheconsequence,anddeclare their recognitionofaGodandCreator,wehope,sincerely. But the undoubted tendency of the speculation, will be to lead itscandid adherents, where Dr. Leopold Buchner has placed himself, to blankmaterialismandatheism.FortheschemeisanattempttoevolvewhattheistscallthecreationwithoutaCreator;andasweshallsee,thebearingofthehypothesisis towards an utter obliteration of the teleological argument. 2nd. In assigningman a brute origin, it encourages common men to regard themselves as stillbrutes. Have brutes any religion? 3d. The scheme ignores all substantivedistinctionbetweenspiritandmatter,byevolvingtheformeroutofthefunctionsofmereanimality.Butiftherebenosoulinmanthereis,practically,noreligionforhim.

SelectionImpliesMind.

2.Thefavoritelawof"naturalselection"communicatesasophisticalideainitsmereterminology,andinitsscope.Selectionisanattributeoffreeagency,andimpliestheintelligentchoiceoftheonewhoselects.Yet,"Nature"selectsfortheevolutionist, andNature is a blind force, influenced by the arbitrarywinds ofchance, and has no intelligence. Rather, the evolutionist's "Nature" acts (orworks)inawaycontrarytothedenotativemeaninginherentinthethenotionofselection;natureactswithoutdistinctionordiscernment,haphazardlyasitwere.Now,wheneverweapplytheideaofselection,oranyotherwhichexpressesfreeagency, to such effects: we know that we are speaking inaccurately and by amere trope.Howmuchmorespecious is it toascribe theforceofapermanentandregularlaw,selectingeffects,tothatwhichisbutchance?Thisisbutgivingus metaphor, in place of induction. It is farther noted by Agassiz, that theprinciple of life, or cause in animated nature, notoriously and frequentlyproducesthesameresultsunderdiverseconditionsofaction;anddiverseresultsagain,underthesameconditions.Thesefactsprovethatitisnotthespeciesofvariable cause painted byDarwin, and does not differentiate its effects by hissupposedlawofnaturalselection.

3.Wehaveseen that thevastnessof the timeneededfor theevolutionofmanfrom the lowest animated form, by these laws of natural selection, workingblindlyandeffectingatanyonemovement themostminutedifferentiations, isnot only conceded, but claimed by evolutionists. Then, since the blind causeprobablyhasmadetenthousandnugatoryexperimentsforeveryonethatwasanadvance, thefossil remainsofall theexperiments,of themyriadsofgeneraoffailures,aswellasthefewgenerathatweresuccesses,shouldbefoundinmoreimmensebulk.AndespeciallyfossilNaturalHistoryshouldpresentuswiththefullhistoryofbothsidesoftheblindprocess;withtheremainsofthedegradedgenera,aswellasthe"fittest"and"survivinggenera."Thefossilhistoryoftheformeroughttobetenthousandtimesthefullest!Butinthepresenceofsuchahistory, how preposterous would a theory of evolution appear? For, the veryessenceofthistheoryistheideaofacontinualadvancementandimprovementinnature.

The evolution theory is inconsistent with the wide geographical diffusion ofspecies, and especially of the higher species. If these are the results of the"survivalofthefittest,"underlocalconditionsofexistenceandpropagation,isitnot unaccountable that these, and especially man, the highest species of all,

shouldalwayshavebeenfoundunderthemostdiverseandgeneralconditions,incontrastedclimates?Butifwepasstothelowerspecies,suchasthemoluscsandcrustaceans, thedifficulty isasgreat,because theyhavenoadequatemeansoflocomotion to migrate from the spots where the local conditions of theirdevelopmentexisted.

NoImprovementBySelection,SaveUnderARationalProvidence.

4.Butnext;whereimprovedracevarietieshaveactuallybeendeveloped,itmaywell be questioned whether the selections of the progenitors have ever been"natural," in the sense of the evolutionist. The marked instances of whichDarwinmakessomuchuse,are the resultof thebreeder'sart: (as theDurhamcattle)thatis,ofarationalprovidence.Andwhenwesurrenderanyindividualsof the varieties to the dominion of "nature," the uniform tendency is todegradation.Whatmoremiserablespecimensofcattleandswineareeverseen;whatindividualslesscalculatedfor"survival"inthestruggleforexistence,thanthe neglected progeny of themarvellously developed English livestock, whenleft to take their chances with the indigenous stock of ill-cultivated districts?Again,manyNaturaliststellusthatwhenanyincidentalcausehasbeenappliedtoagivenspecies,producingvariations insome individualsand theirprogeny,thedifferenceislargeratfirst,andbecomesmoreandmoreminuteafterwards.Theinferenceseemsirresistible,thatsuchvariationsmusthavefixedandnarrowlimits. Naturalists are familiar with the tendency of all varieties, artificiallyproducedbytheunionofdifferingprogenitors,torevertbacktothetypeofoneor other of their ancestors. Hence, all breeders of livestock recognize thetendencyoftheirimprovedbreedsto"flytopieces";andtheyknowthatnothingbutthemostartfulvigilanceinselectingparentspreventsthisresult.Withoutthiswatchful control, the peculiarities of one or the other original varietieswouldreappearintheprogeny,soexaggerated,astobreakuptheimprovedtype,andgivetheminstead,aheterogeneouscrowd,theindividualsvaryingviolentlyfromeach other and from the desired type, and probably inferior to either of theoriginalvarietiescompounded.

StrongestDoNotNaturallySurvive.

Is the "survival of the fittest" a "natural" fact? I answer; No. The naturaltendency of the violences of the strongest is on the whole, to increase thehardship of the conditions underwhich thewhole species and each individual

mustgainsubsistence.Whatbetterinstanceofthislawneedstobesought,thaninthehumanspecies;wherewealwaysseethesavageanarchy,producedbytheviolenceofthestronger,reducethewholetribetopovertyanddestitution?Whyelse is it, that savages are poorer andworse provided for than civilizedmen?Couplethislawwithanother:thatthemostpamperedindividualsinanyspecies,arenotthemostprolific;andweshallseethatthenaturaltendencyofanimallifeis,inthegeneral,tothesurvivaloftheinferior.HencetheaveragewildPampahorse,or"mustang"pony,isfarinferiortotheAndalusiansteed,fromwhichheisdescended.WefindanemphaticconfirmationoftheconclusionwhichHughMillerdrewfromthe"testimonyof therocks," that thenatural tendencyof thefossilgenerahasbeentodegradationandnottodevelopment.

Well does Dr. Sterling remark here: "Natural conjecture is always equivocal,insecure and many-sided. It may be said that ancient warfare, for instance,givingvictoryalwaystothepersonallyablestandbravest,musthaveresultedinthe improvement of the race. Or, that the weakest being left at home, theimprovementwasbalancedbydeterioration.Or,thattheablestwerenecessarilymost exposed to danger. And so—according to ingenuity usque ad infinitum.Trustworthyconclusionsarenotpossibletothismethod."

ArgumentFromHybrids.

5. I have not yet seen any reason for surrendering the rule, hitherto held byNaturalists, that in theanimalworld,hybrids, if truehybrids,are infertile.Thefamiliarinstanceisthatofthemule.Thegeneraasinusandequuscanpropagatean offspring, but that mule offspring can propagate nothing. If there are anyexceptionstothislaw,theyarecompletelyconsistentwiththerulethathybridscannot perpetuate their hybrid kind. If they have any progeny, it is eitherabsolutelyinfertile;orithasitselfrevertedbacktooneoftheoriginaltypes.Itisstrange thatDr.Huxley should himself appeal to this as a valid law;when itsvalidity is destructive of his own conclusions. In his "Lay Sermons," p. 295,when it suits his purpose to assert that natural variation has, in a given case,establishedatruespecieswhichisnew,heappealstothefactwhichisclaimed:thatthisnewspeciespropagateditskind;whichproveditatrueandpermanentspecies.Whichistosay,thathybridscannotpropagatetheirkind;foritisbythislaw it is known that they do not form permanent species. But now, if newvarieties really arose from natural selection, to the extent claimed byevolutionists,must they not fall under the hybrid class too decisively, ever to

propagatetheirtypepermanently?

EvolutionCannotAccountForMind.

Thisprocess imaginedbyDr.Darwin, if itexisted,wouldbepurelyananimalone. He makes it a result of physical laws merely. Then, if there were adevelopmentbysuchalaw,itshouldbetheanimalinstinctsandbodilyorgans,whicharedevelopedinthehigherspecies.But it isnotso.Manis thehighest,andwhenheiscomparedwithothermammalia,heisafeeblerbeast.Theyounginfanthasfarlessinstinctandlocomotionthantheyoungfowl.Themanhaslessinstinct,lessanimalcapacity,lessstrength,bluntersenses,thantheeagle,ortheelephant, and less longevity than the goose. That which makes him a noblercreature is his superior intelligence with the adaptation thereto of his inferioranimalinstincts.Herulesotheranimalsandis"LordofCreation"byhismind.

This,then,mustalsobeexplainedbyDr.Darwin,asanevolutionfrominstinctandanimalappetites; justasheaccounts for theevolutionof thehumanhand,fromtheforepawofanape;soallthewondersofconsciousness,intellect,taste,conscience, religious belief, are to be explained as the animal outgrowth ofgregariousinstincts,andhabitudescultivatedthroughthem.Toanyonewhohasthe first correct idea of construing the facts of consciousness, this is simplymonstrous.Itofcoursedeniestheexistenceofanysubstancethatthinks,distinctfromanimatedmatter.It ignoresthedistinctionbetweentheinstinctiveandtherational motive in human actions; hence making free agency, moralresponsibility,andethicalscienceimpossible.Theimpossibilityofthisgenesisispeculiarly plain in this: that it must suppose all these psychological acts andhabitsgraduallysuperinduced.Thereisfirst,insomeearliergenerationofmen,aprotoplasticresponsibility,freeagency,reason,conscience,whicharehalf,oronequarteranimal instinctstill,and therestmental!Whereas,everymanwhoeverinterpretedhisownactsofsoultohimself,knowsintuitively,thatthisisthecharacteristicofthemall;thattheyarecontrastedwiththemerelyanimalacts,inall their stages and in all their degrees of weakness or strength. A feebleconscienceisnonearerappetite,initsintrinsicquality,thantheconscienceofaWashingtonoraLee.

Inaword:Consciousnesshasher facts,as trulyasphysicks.Thesefactsshowthatmanbelongstoacertaingenusspiritually,moreeventhancorporeally.Andthatgenusisconsciouslyseparatedbyagreatgulf,fromallmereanimalnature.

ItcannotbedevelopedHence.

TheoryNotProvedatBest.

8.Theutmostwhichcanpossiblybemadeoftheevolutiontheory,isthatitmaybe a hypothesis possibly true, even after all the arguments of its friends aregrantedtobevalid.Infact,theschemeisfarshortofthis.Thecarefulreaderofthese works will find, amidst extensive knowledge of curious facts, andabundanceoffanciful ingenuity,many,yawningchasmsbetweenassertedfactsandinductions;andmanyasubstitutionofthe"mustbe"forthe"maybe."Butwhen we waive this, we still find the theory unverified, and incapable ofverification. One need desire no juster statement of the necessity of actualverification,inordertomatureahypothesisintoademonstration,thanisgivenand happily illustrated by Dr. Huxley. "Lay Sermons," pp. 85, 6. Until eitheractual experiment or actual observation has verified the expectation of thehypothesis;andverifieditinsuchawayastomakeitcleartothemind,thattheexpectedresultfollowedtheantecedentaspropterhocandnotamereposthoc;that hypothesis, however plausible, and seemingly satisfying, is notdemonstrated.ButhasDr.Darwin'stheorybeenverifiedinanyactualcase?Hasanyoneseenthemarsupialapebreedtheman,infact?Theauthoroftheschemehimself knows that verification is, in the nature of the case, impossible. Thedates at which he supposes the evolutions took place, precede the earliestrational experience of man, according to his own scheme, by vast ages. Thedifferentiationswhich graduallywrought it were, according to him, too slightandgradualtobecontainedinthememoryofonedispensationofman'shistory.The connecting links of the process are forever lost. Hence the utmostwhichthese Naturalists could possibly make of their hypothesis, were all theirassumptions granted, would be the concession that it contained a curiouspossibility.

DangerousToMorals.

These speculations are mischievous in that they present to minds alreadydegraded,andinlovewiththeirowndegradation,apretextfortheirmaterialism,godlessness and sensuality. The scheme can never prevail generally amongmankind. The self-respect, the conscience, and the consciousness ofmenwillusually present a sufficient protest and refutation. The world will notpermanently tolerate the libel and absurdity, that thiswondrous creature,man,

"sonobleinreason,soinfiniteinfaculties,informandmovingsoexpressandadmirable,inactionsolikeanangel,inapprehensionsolikeaGod,"isbutthedescendant,atlongremoves,ofamolluscoratadpole!

CircumstantialEvidenceRefutedByParole.

Theworthlessnessofmereplausibilitiesconcerningtheoriginoftheuniverse,isyetplainerwhensetincontrastwiththatinspiredtestimonyuponthesubject,towhichRevealedTheologywillsoonintroduceus.Hypotheticalevidence,evenatitsbestestate,comesundertheclassofcircumstantialevidence.Judicialscience,stimulatedtoaccuracyandfidelitybytheprimeinterestsofsocietyintherightsand the life of its members, has correctly ascertained the relation betweencircumstantialproofandcompetentparoletestimony.Inordertorebutthewordof such a witness, the circumstantial evidence must be an exclusivedemonstration: it must not only satisfy the reason that the criminal act mighthavebeencommittedinthesupposedway,bythesupposedpersons;butthatitwasimpossible,itcouldhavebeencommittedinanyotherway.Intheabsenceof parole testimony, every enlightened judge would instruct his jury, that thedefenceisentitledtotrythehypothesisoftheaccuserbythistest:Ifanyotherhypothesis can be invented that is even purely imaginary, to which the factsgrantedinthecircumstantialevidencecanbereconciledbythedefence, that isproofofinvalidityintheaccusinghypothesis.Letussupposeacrimecommittedwithout known eyewitnesses. The prosecutors examine every attendantcircumstance minutely, and study them profoundly. They construct of them asupposition that the crimewas committed in secret byA.They show that thissuppositionofhisguilt satisfiesevery fact, so farasknown.Theyreasonwithsuch ingenuity, that everymind tends to the conviction thatA.must be verilyguilty.Butnowtherecomesforwardanhonestman,whodeclares thathewaseyewitnessofthecrime;and,that,ofhiscertainknowledge,itwasdonebyB.,

andnotbyA.Oninquiry,itappearsthatB.was,atthattime,naturallycapableofthe act. Then, unless the prosecutors can attack the credibility of thiswitness,beforehiswordtheircaseutterlybreaksdown.Theingenuity,theplausibilityoftheirargument,isnownaught.Theyhadshownthat,sofarasknownfactshadgone,theactmighthavebeendonebyA.Butthewitnessprovesthatinfactitwas done by B. The plausibility of the hypothesis and the ingenuity of thelawyers are no less: but they are utterly superseded by direct testimony of aneyewitness. I take this pains to illustrate to you this principle of evidence,

becauseitisusuallysoutterlyignoredbyNaturalists,andsoneglectedevenbyTheologians.Iassertthattheanalogyisperfectbetweenthecasesupposedandthepretendedevolutionargument.DoesRevelationbringinthetestimonyofthedivine Eyewitness, because actual Agent, of the genesis of the universe? IsRevelationsustainedasacrediblewitnessby its literary, its internal, itsmoral,its prophetical, its miraculous evidences? Then even though the evolutionhypothesiswere scientifically probable, in the light of all known and physicalfacts and laws, it must yield before this competent witness. Does that theoryclaimthat,naturallyspeaking,organismsmighthavebeenhenceproduced?God,the Agent, tells us that, in point of fact, they were otherwise produced. AsOmnipotence is an agency confessedly competent to any effectwhatsoever, ifthewitnessiscredible,thedebateisended.

IsOurTeleologicalArgumentLost?

IshallconcludethisLecturebyadvertingtoaconsequencewhichmanyofDr.Darwin's followers draw from his scheme;which is really themost importantfeatureconnectedwithit.Dr.Huxleydeclaresthatthe"OriginofSpecies"givesthe death-blow to that great teleological argument for the existence of God,which has commanded the assent of all the common sense and all the truephilosophyofthehumanrace.HequotesProf.Kolliker,ofGermany,assayingthat thoughDarwin retains the teleologicalconception, it is shownbyhisownresearches to be a mistaken one. Says the German savant, "Varieties ariseirrespectivelyofthenotionofpurposeofutility,accordingtothegenerallawsofnature;andmaybeeitherusefulorhurtful,or indifferent."Itmustbeadmittedthesemeninterpretthebearingsoftheevolutiontheoryaright;[andthatitdoesbear against the impregnable evidences of design inGod's creation; is a clearproofofitsfalsehood].Accordingtothisschemephysicalcausationisblind;butithitsaluckyadaptationhereandthere,withoutknowingormeaningit,bymerechance,andinvirtueofsuchaninfinityofhaphazardtrialsthatitisimpossibleto miss all the time. Such is the immediate, though blind, result of Nature'stendencytoceaselessvariationsofstructure.Now,when(rarely)shehappenstohitafavorablevariation,thebetteradaptationofthatorganismtotheconditionsof existence enables it to survive and to propagate its typemore numerously,whereothersperish.Wherenowistheproofofintelligenceanddesigninsuchafortuitous adaptation? Mr. Herbert Spencer argues that it is mere"anthropomorphism,"forustoundertaketointerpretnatureteleologically.When

weadaptanythingtoanend,we,ofcourse,designandcontrive.ButwhenwethereforeassumethattheGreatUnknowableworksbysuchthoughts,weareasabsurd as though the watch [in the well-known illustration of Dr. Paley]becoming somewhat endowed with consciousness, should conclude that theconsciousnessofitsUnknownCausemustconsistofasetoftickingandmotionsof springs and cogs, because such only are its own functions. Some of thesewritersdwellmuchuponthesupposederrorofourmixingthequestionof"finalcauses"withthatofefficientcauses, inourinvestigationofnature.Theyclaimthat Lord Bacon, in his De Augmentis, sustains this condemnation. This iserroneous.Hedoesdisapprovethemixingofthequestionoffinalcausewiththesearch after the physical cause. He points out that the former belongs toMetaphysics, the latter to Physics.Let the question be, for instance: "Whydohairsgrowaround theeyebrows?"Thereare twomeanings in this"Why." If itasksthefinalcause,theansweris:"Fortheprotectionofthepreciousandtenderorganbeneaththebrow."If itasks thephysicalcause,LordBacon'sanswer is:that a follicular structure of that patch of skin "breedeth a pilous growth."Heclearlyasserts,inhisMetaphysic,thatinquiriesafterthefinalcauseareproper;andhewasemphaticallyabelieverintheteleologicalargument,aswasNewton,witheveryothergreatmindofthoseages.

IsOurArgumentSuspiciousBecauseAnthropomorphic?

Letusclearthewayfortheexposureofthesophismsstatedabove,bylookingatSpencer'sobjectiontotheanthropomorphismofourNaturalTheology.Hewouldhaveusbelievethatitisallvicious,becausefoundedonthegroundlesspostulatethatourthoughtandcontrivancearethemodelforthemindofGod.Hewouldillustratethis,aswesaw,bysupposingthewatch,inPaley'sillustration,"tohaveaconsciousness,"etc.Thissimilebetrayshissophistryatonce.Thesuppositionis impossible! If the watch could have a consciousness, it would not be amaterial machine, but a rational spirit: and then there would be no absurditywhatever in its likening its own rational consciousness to that of its rationalcause. When complaint is made that all our Natural Theology is"anthropomorphic,"whatisthisbutacomplaintthatourknowledgeishuman?IfIamtohaveanyknowledge,itmustbemyknowledge:thatis,theknowledgeofme,aman;andso,knowledge,accordingtotheformsofhumanintelligence.Allknowledgemustthenbeanthropomorphic,inordertobehumanknowledge.Tocomplainofanybranchofman'sknowledgeonthisscore,istodemandthathe

shall know nothing! This, indeed, is verified by Mr. Herbert Spencer, whoteaches,ontheaboveground,thatGodisonlytobeconceivedofandhonoredas"TheUnknowable";andwhoforbidsustoascribeanydefiniteattribute,orofferanyspecificservicetoHim,lestweshouldinsultHimbymakingHimaltogethersuch an one as ourselves. I may remark, in passing, that this is equallypreposterousinlogic,andpracticallyatheistic.Themindonlyknowssubstancefromproperties: if theessentiaofanobjectof thoughtbeabsolutelyunknown,itsessewillcertainlybemoreunknown.Andhowcanonebemorecompletely"withoutGodintheworld,"thanhewhoonlyknowsofadivineBeing,towhomhe dares not ascribe any attribute, towards whom he dares not entertain anydefinitefeeling,andt