SWISS AIR

Failure of SWISSAIR

Learning From Corporate Failures

Final Project Report

Submitted to

Prof. P.D. Jose

Submitted by

ABHILASH KUMAR SETHI (1111323)

RACHANA DONGRE (1111366)

KUNDAN MAL VERMA (1111350)

DANIEL BOCHNITSCHEK (11E6102)

LEELA BHARATH G (1011032)

Dated: 16 January 2013

CONTENTS

Case Summary........................................................................................................................................................................... 2

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................... 3

Swissair (SAirGroup): Company Profile ......................................................................................................................... 3

Chronological Overview........................................................................................................................................................ 5

Evaluation: Reasons of Failure ........................................................................................................................................... 8

Flawed Strategy ................................................................................................................................................................... 8

Conflict Swissair vs. Crossair ......................................................................................................................................... 8

Influence of Publicity and Media .................................................................................................................................. 9

Governance and Personalities ..................................................................................................................................... 10

Bad Execution ..................................................................................................................................................................... 10

Financial Analysis .................................................................................................................................................................. 11

Takeaways and Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................. 12

Appendix ................................................................................................................................................................................... 13

References ................................................................................................................................................................................ 14

Table of Figures:

Table 1: Swissair growth at a glance (1931-2000).................................................................................................... 4 Table 2: Choronology of events ......................................................................................................................................... 7 Table 3: Financials for five years .................................................................................................................................... 11 Table 4: Breakdown of EBIT by business unit ........................................................................................................... 11 Table 5: Sairgroup company structure ......................................................................................................................... 13 Table 6: Swissair's equity stakes in other airlines ................................................................................................... 13

CASE SUMMARY

The failure of Swissair, one of the most renowned national airlines worldwide, was the inevitable

result of an overoptimistic alliance strategy which was executed by a management that was

incapable to realize the point when it was necessary to switch course. This mismanagement over

years combined with the external shock of the 9-11 terror attacks finally led to the grounding of

the entire Swissair fleet in November 2011.

The small Swiss national airline refused to join the large airline alliances which formed in the

industry in the early 1990s as a junior partner and tried to build an alternative model by acquiring

small local airlines across Europe and companies in related business fields such as hospitality

and catering. Even as it became clear that none of the expected network effects became reality

the company stuck to the course. Further, it was not able to effectively coordinate its own

operations with those of Crossair, its regional subsidiary.

Weak governance structures and high turnover on top management level were compounded by a

strong public discussion about the strategic future of the national carrier. Media played a major

role by favoring individual executives and their course and thus making them untouchable for the

supervisory board. Finally the involvement of the Swiss state made decision making from a pure

business perspective more complicated.

INTRODUCTION

2nd October, 2001, a very strange incident happened in the global airline industry. The entire

Swissair fleet was grounded due to lack of liquidity with its parent company, the SAirGroup to

pay to the fuel suppliers. Subsequently, a couple of days later, Swissair along with some of its

subsidiaries filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy seeking protection from their creditors. A month

later, Belgium’s Sabena also has to declare bankruptcy in which SAirGroup had 49.5% stake. To

prevent the permanent closure of the airlines, to prevent the loss of the valuable slots and gates at

Swissair’s Zurich hub and other destinations, to reallocate jobs and assets to a new national

airlines and to keep the connection lines open to and from Switzerland, the Switzerland

government and two of the largest banks of Switzerland, UBS and Credit Suisse had pumped in

around 4.25 billion Swiss Francs(CHF) (600 CHF per person in Switzerland) to replace

SAirGroup with SWISS, country’s new national carrier. SWISS was developed around the most

commercially profitable wing of Swissair and the largest regional airline of Europe, the Crossair.

It began its operations on 31st March 2002.

The Swissair collapse is an exemplar in many ways. It was the very first European flagship

airline to get grounded. More importantly, although the depreciating financials of the company

made its decline pretty obvious, but the speed at which it was grounded was exceptional. For

many decades, before the early 1990s, Swissair had boasted to have one the industry’s strongest

financials due to which the company has earned the reputation and nick name of “Flying Bank”

internationally. However, before its collapse, SAirGroup has completely lost its equity count and

its equity ratio was plummeted to 2.55% in August 2001. In the last financial year of its

existence ending on December 2000, SAirGroup has increased their liabilities because of

incessant borrowing by 40% to 18.86 billion CHF as compared to the previous year and

registered negative PBIT for the first time in their career of the order of 2.59 billion CHF.

Through this paper we would like to elicit the various reasons that had led to the failure of such a

giant organization such as incompetence of both the top management and board which has led

to faulty group’s alliance strategy and internal coordination failures along with various external

factors.

SWISSAIR (SAIRGROUP): COMPANY PROFILE

Schweizerische Luftverkehrs AG, or more famously known as Swissair was formed on 26th

March 1931, from the merger of Zurich based Ad Astra Aero AG and Basler Luftverkehr

(Balair). The company since its formation has won many accolades including the Best Airlines

award in all decades to come due to its high quality strategy stressing on safety, reliability,

passenger comfort and punctuality. Swissair was also considered to be a trendsetter in many

fields of European aviation which included introduction of high speed Lockheed Orion aircrafts

in 1932 and many other aircraft carriers in later years as well like Boeing 747-300 etc. It was

also the first airline in Europe to employ air hostesses on its passenger flights in 1934. Swissair

was considered analogous to premium comfort and pride by its passengers and a brand of

Switzerland. After World War II, Swissair has adopted the path of fast growth and had become

one of the world’s major international airlines both in terms number of passengers carried and

passenger miles available. From its formation till its grounding in 2001, the airline has firmly

secured the rank of 20 among all airlines globally. But the high focus on quality and lack of

competition has given rise to the problem of more manpower, who are highly paid for their work

at Swissair. Manpower costs, at a time reached a peak of 39% of the total operating cost of the

company, which has increased the breakeven load factor for the company.

1931 1946 1970 2000

Size of Fleet 13 16 35 161

Number of

Employees 64 789 13280 71900

Number of

Revenue

Passengers

10282 62378 3.9 million 19.2 million

Number of cities

covered 20 15 75 218

Break Even

Load Factor - - 49% 75%

TABLE 1: SWISSAIR GROWTH AT A GLANCE (1931-2000)

Until early 1990s, Swissair was very risk averse as far as the financials were concerned which

provided Swissair with one of the strongest balance sheets in the industry and an excellent credit

rating. Two factors were mainly responsible for this, one being the company policy of having a

maximum 1.2:1 debt to equity ratio. But Swissair has always maintained a better figure than this

and only once in all its year of operation has it reached close to the figure of 1.2:1. Secondly, a

very conservative depreciation policy helped the company generate a healthy cash flow and

reserves.

However after the formation of European Union, where 50.3% population of Switzerland vetoed

against joining the union, the entire company structure changed for Swissair. Swissair has taken

many steps to maintain its ranking in the European aviation industry. This included diverging

from its core competency and investing into non-aviation activities like maintenance and repair,

ground handling, catering, aircraft leasing, duty-free, hotels etc. (Appendix 1 & 2), all of which

ultimately by 2001 were accountable of half of SAirGroup’s employees and most of its profit.

Swissair was the very first airline to seek close ties with other airlines. The very first alliance was

KSSU group (KLM, SAS and UTA) for joint maintenance activities of wide body aircrafts.

Again the economic pressures created after formation of EU, led Swissair to go for further

alliances such as:

1. European Quality Alliance: Sabena, Austrian Airlines, SAS, Finnair

2. Atlantic Excellence: Delta, Austrian Airlines, Sabena

3. Global Excellence: Delta, Singapore Airlines

However, the failure of the Alcazar project (Swissair, KLM, SAS and Austrian Airlines) to

compete against the big three European airlines, Air France, Lufthansa and British Airways and

when most of the previous partner airlines left the alliance to solicit partnership with other big

players of European market, prompted Swissair to reevaluate its alliance strategy.

CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

Swissair did not fail from one day to the other. It was a series of internal and external events

accompanied by severe management mistakes over a period of several years that brought the

once innovative and stable airline down to bankruptcy in 2001. The following table gives a

chronological overview1 of the main events from 1990 onwards and sets the stage for the

analysis of failure in chapter four.

Year Event Description

1990 Economic

Downturn

High oil prices due to the Gulf war induce an economic

downturn.

1990 2nd

stage of

liberalization of

air traffic in

Europe

In 1990 the so-called second package of liberalisation measures

allow all European airlines to carry passengers to and from their

home countries to other EU Member States (3rd and 4th

freedoms). Also 5th freedom flights, i.e. intra-European flights

with stop-over in a third country and the right to pick-up and

drop-off passengers during the stopover, are allowed to a greater

extent. Fare and capacity restrictions are further abolished. This

results in an overcapacity of air traffic and competition on price.

1992 Switzerland votes

against EEA

membership

The Swiss people vote against a membership in the EEA. As a

consequence Swissair can’t extend its services to Greece or take-

up passengers in Italy.

1992/

1993

ALCAZAR

Alliance fails

Details of a planned fusion between Swissair (30%), KLM

(30%), SAS (30%) and AUA (10%) are revealed to the public.

After a controversial debate on national levels (“Swissair must

stay Swissair”) in all four states, the fusion fails due to national

discrepancies and public pressure.

1993 Strategic decision

to form European

System under

Swissair

leadership

After the failure of ALCAZAR Swissair has three options.

1) Continue operations as a single player (difficult due to

small domestic market)

2) Merge with a large player such as Lufthansa or British

Airways (financially the best option, but emotionally not

applicable after the ALCAZAR attempt)

1 All used sources listed in References.

3) Build a European System / Alliance under Swissair

Leadership

Swissair Executives decide to go for version three. In their

decision they frame risks as challenges, and identify the potential

take-over opportunity of the Sabena Airline as “once-in-a-

lifetime” opportunity.

1995 Swissair acquires

45% stake in

Sabena

Swissair acquires equity stakes in the Belgian airline Sabena

which has little chances to survive on its own in this very

competitive European market and is in a catastrophic financial

state.

1996 Philippe

Bruggisser joins

Swissair as COO

The Swissair board has little confidence in the current CEO and

therefore creates the new position for P. Bruggisser as COO to

manage and implement the growth strategy.

1996/

1997

McKinsey

proposes “Hunter

Strategy”

New senior

management team

joins Swissair

Swissair aims to grow and gain significant European market

share by acquiring small national airlines with a string foothold

in their respective domestic market. Among others Swissair

acquires the German airline LTU which was in severely negative

financial conditions.

A new senior management team joins Swissair.

1998 Formation of the

Qualifier Alliance

Together with Austrian Airlines (AUA) and its subsidiaries

Swissair forms the Qualifier Alliance.

1999 Delta cancels

Swissair

collaboration and

partners with Air-

France

AUA exits

Qualifier Alliance

Along with a leadership and strategy change, Delta Airlines exits

the collaboration with Swissair and partners with Air-France in

order to establish a Europe hub in Paris. Swissair rejects to join

the Delta - Air-France Alliance as a junior partner.

AUA exits the Qualifier Alliance to join Star Alliance under

Lufthansa leadership.

As a consequence Swissair is isolated in its small domestic

market. Nevertheless, management sticks to its course and

neglects the offer to join the One-World alliance under the

leadership of British Airways.

1999/

2000

Increase stake in

Sabena

Before resigning as president of the Swissair Board, Hannes

Goetz signs a contract with the Belgian government increasing

the Swissair stake in Sabena to 85%.

2000 Eric Honegger

becomes new

Eric Honegger becomes president of the Swissair board without

president of the

board

relevant experience in the airline business.

Summ

er

2000

McKinsey’s

“Shield” study

reveals severe

financial situation

A study of McKinsey gives complete transparency on the severe

financial situation of Swissair. Management does not take action

but ends the engagement of McKinsey instead. Further

acquisitions are planned.

Nov

2000

Board stops

further

acquisitions and

CEO Bruggisser

has to leave

The board stops the acquisition course. After discrepancies

between CEO and board, Mr. Bruggisser has to leave the

company. The media praise him as a manager who fought for the

sovereignty of the Swiss national airline.

Moritz Suter (CEO of Crossair, 2nd

largest Swiss airline) takes

over.

Mar

2001

CEO Moritz Suter

as well as the

entire supervisory

board resigns

After discrepancies with the board about the further development

of the Airline Moritz Suter leaves Swissair after a few months.

The entire supervisory board resigns after two independent

consultancy reports document the severe financial situation of the

firm. Mario Corti (Nestle) takes over.

Mid

2001

Restructuring

program “Change

01”

After joining the struggling airline Mario Conti tries to

restructure the airline with his program “Change 01”

Sept

2011

9-11 Terror

Attacks

As a result of the 9-11 terror attacks, air travel declines by 30%.

Major US Airlines lay-off people. Lufthansa grounds 43 of its

300 planes. Also Swissair is affected by drastic decline in

demand. Its financial situation becomes worse.

2nd

Nov

2011

Grounding of all

Swissair planes

and cancellation

of flights

Swissair in unable to pay the required fuel. UBS refuses a credit

increase.

As a consequence, Swissair had to ground all airplanes and

cancel all flights. 39.000 passengers stranded at airports

worldwide, their tickets were not recognised by other airlines.

TABLE 2: CHORONOLOGY OF EVENTS

EVALUATION: REASONS OF FAILURE

FLAWED STRATEGY

Swissair was the first European airlines which tried to collaborate with other regional airlines in

other continents to make its presence felt there. It made partnership agreements with Delta, SAS

and Singapore Airlines etc. to get its hold in other important markets as well. But it failed to

understand the importance of European market for its very survival as it was the firm base from

which it operated.

In 1992, Switzerland declined entry into EEA (European Economic Area). This hit Swissair

badly. Instead of operating freely in key European destinations, it had to go for individual

cooperation treaties with regional airlines of respective countries. It led to cumbersome

renegotiation process which deprived it of its early advantages. To counter this negative impact,

Swissair decided to go ahead with its “Alcazar project”.

Alcazar project (Alone Carriers Zigzag At Random) was a secret negotiation among Swissair,

SAS, Austrian airways and KLM to form an unprecedented alliance. It was to start with a greater

level cooperation where merger of all entities to form a large airline was the ultimate motive. But

there were lot of organizational issues, negative media coverage, ownership problems and

political pressure which finally led to termination of this project. This failure resulted in

significant loss of time and efforts on Swissair’s part.

Insight: Swissair put all its eggs in one basket without worrying about other alternatives. At last,

it could not sustain the ambitions of other partners in the project. The failure of strategy resulted

in time and efforts loss for the management of Swissair and this gave some advantage to rivals.

So an organization should not concentrate all its efforts on one initiative; it should diversify the

risk so that it does not fall flat in case of failure.

CONFLICT SWISSAIR VS. CROSSAIR

Crossair was established in 1978. It started as a regional carrier but slowly it went on expanding

its routes in Europe. Swissair acquired a minority stake in Crossair which it increased to majority

stake later. As Crossair was operating on some of the same routes where Swissair was already

present, it gave Swissair an opportunity to consolidate both airlines on such specific routes to

lower operating costs and increase efficiency. It required cooperation from both airlines. But

Swissair top management never cared for going ahead with such strategy. This led to both

airlines running parallel strategy with same kind of implication. While Swissair was pursuing its

“Hunter strategy”, Crossair was working on its “Eurocross strategy”. This resulted in Crossair

competing with Swissair in its small Swiss market. Cooperation between the two could have

provided them with much large economies of scale and potentially save Swissair from its

collapse.

Insight: In capital intensive industries like airlines, full utilization of resources alone can give

competitive advantage. Cooperation instead of competition should be the moto in such industries

for all the players to be profitable in these kinds of markets.

INFLUENCE OF PUBLICITY AND MEDIA

The fact that Swissair was a national airline raised the attention of the media and publicity

extraordinarily. Swissair executives were constantly under pressure having to comment on the

company’s shape and further development. This short chapter will certainly not argue that this

was a main cause of the company’s failure, but it is worth to recognize the media-induced

pressures executives of large and prominent firms are exposed to whenever there is a crisis and

they are responsible to make the final call. In particular “Der Blick”, a newspaper comparable to

the English yellow press with a high national circulation, went beyond its pure information

function and gave the discussions a clear spin towards national interests and sentiments. Two

examples shall demonstrate this issue.

The first example relates to the plans on forming the ALCAZAR alliance. During the debate, the

newspaper made it hard for the company’s managers to take a free, non-biased decision. In the

article2 “Swissair muss Swissair bleiben” (Swissair must stay Swissair) the chief editor of the

paper stated: “In the planned wedding between the four airlines, Swissair is not just the most

beautiful bride. It is the prey.” Through such comments, a pure business decision is radicalized

and lifted to the level of politics. Supporting the option to join the alliance is framed as treason.

The second example points out how the media (again “Der Blick”) tend to personalize news

coverage. When it became clear that CEO Bruggisser had failed with the Hunter Strategy and the

supervisory board stopped his course and even considered selling the airline, “Der Blick” again

provoked national sentiments by stating: “Philipp Bruggisser fought like a lion. There a too few

people like him… even if he should fail, at least he tried: creatively and persistent. He is a hero, a

management hero.”3

Although the statement is completely unqualified from a business

perspective, it makes it hard for members of the supervisory board to find convincing arguments

supporting the change in strategy.

Both examples demonstrate how big the pressure of public awareness can get and one can image

that sound decision making certainly becomes very difficult if the reaction of publicity and

media always needs to be considered. In the case of Swissair there were many similar incidents.

This shall not count as an explanation why the company failed, but public pressure on individual

managers and management teams certainly limits their freedom in decision making and

contributes to bad management choices.

2 http://chronik.geschichte-schweiz.ch/swissair-debakel-grounding.html 3 http://chronik.geschichte-schweiz.ch/swissair-debakel-grounding.html

GOVERNANCE AND PERSONALITIES

Swissair went for “Hunter strategy” of acquiring small players instead of seeking for alliances.

This strategy stemmed from the need of political control of this organization which represented

Swiss national pride. Many times management took rash decisions which were motivated by

political and social compulsions rather than economical ones. Many political appointees who had

little knowledge of aviation industry spoiled the chances of any growth by making illogical

decisions.

For example, Swissair CEO Phillippe Bruggisser came under attack from outsiders for taking an

acquisition strategy instead of that of making regional alliances since whatever new airlines

Swissair had acquired were having serious financial difficulties and operating in lower market

segments. This significantly degraded Swissair brand name. It was CEO’s decision which even

board members were also not happy with. They thought that Bruggisser was playing power

control game instead of worrying about company’s profitability and image. National symbol and

pride became more important than shareholder’s interests.

Corporate governance of Swissair was also ruined by intervention of Swiss law. The day-to-day

decisions were taken by executives but the real power rested with board which was mostly

appointed by political elites. There was no clear segregation of power between management and

board. Board members were often chosen because of their political or banking connections. This

allowed entry of non-professional into Swissair which led to bad decisions and ultimately its

collapse. Apart from that, system of corporate governance in Switzerland at that time was such

that political and societal norms were given priority over financial and economic norms.

Addition to this, Swiss government had 30% stake in Swissair which allowed it to decide who

the CEO was and how he was to conduct business. This compelled management to work in

congruence of political and societal agenda of Swiss government which ignored economic

implications. At last, this led to failure of organization

Insight: public sector enterprises should give more emphasis on meritocracy within the

organization. Strength of corporate governance decides the effectiveness of checks and balances

in the system. If organization wants to avoid failure, it must push for strong corporate

governance within the organization.

BAD EXECUTION

Bad Execution of Hunter Strategy has led to the failure of Swissair. Swissair in desperate

attempts to capture market share, kept in pouring more money (4.1 billion CHF when the

maximum was set to 300 million CHF), took unnecessary risks of alleviating the financial

condition of the members of the alliance and also targeted some of the bigger players in the

aviation industry (Italy). This has put more pressure on Swissair financials which has ultimately

led to its failure. They should have implemented the strategy at a slower pace with pilot studies

in between to know the effectiveness of the strategy.

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

From the financial data it can be seen that, the EBIT for the company has seen a sudden

depreciation in 2000. Before that, Swissair enjoyed a very strong financial status and is

considered as the flying bank of the world. The huge amount of loss caused in the FY2000 can

be accredited to the widespread equity based alliance forming Hunter Strategy adopted by

Swissair, with an aim to capture 20% of the market share in Europe. The Hunter strategy was

adopted in 1997 and was implemented in 1998 when the Qualifier alliance was created. Till

1999, Swissair spent around 4.1 billion CHF for purchasing significant shares in variety of

airlines. Swissair also was forced to pump in liquidity to keep many of its financially struggling

airlines afloat so that the alliance is maintained. In September 2000, Swissair realized that the

hunter strategy has failed and the board has to strategize the exit scenario of several of its loss

making investments. In fact, majority of the investments made by Swissair during this period

were making huge losses. Even worse for Swissair was that, in all its alliances, the pride of being

the national airlines of Switzerland and the hunger to capture European market share has led

Swissair to take full responsibility for its partner’s financial obligations, which has led to huge

cash outflow from Swissair.

Moreover, the alliance with low cost airlines just to capture market share, led to the dilution of

brand image of Swissair as well as it also eradicated their ability to charge price premium from

their consumers, who had always considered Swissair as a premium airlines. All this factors

along with the terrorist attacks had led to consumers not opting for Swissair which had caused

SAirGroup to see negative EBIT (111 million CHF) for the first time in the FY2000.

In million CHF 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Total Operating Revenue

8212 10556 11297 13002 16229

EBIT 344 658 700 643 (2592)

Net Profit(loss)/year

(497) 324 361 273 (2885)

Liabilities and Shareholder Equity

Liabilities 9708 10191 11181 13673 19055

Shareholder’s Equity

2109 2439 3549 4181 1160

TABLE 3: FINANCIALS FOR FIVE YEARS

EBIT by division (million CHF)

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

SAirLines 264 354 188 35 138 SAirServices 127 145 165 162 (6)

SAirLogistics 43 33 6 99 17

SAirRelations 181 153 269 300 56

SAirGroup 43 15 95 68 (111)

SAirLines Investments - (80) (3256) (137) Total EBIT 658 700 643 (2592) (43)

TABLE 4: BREAKDOWN OF EBIT BY BUSINESS UNIT

TAKEAWAYS AND CONCLUSIONS

The case of Swissair can be considered as an amalgamation of corporate faulty decision making

and a collusion of many external factors as well. There are a lot of things to learn from the case

of Swissair:

1. Managerial Hubris:

Managerial hubris is one of the main reasons of a lot of corporate failures. The pride of

being the national carrier of Switzerland has made the management over confident about

the airlines. That is the reason they did not accepted the alliance with bigger airlines like

Ari France and Lufthansa with the fear that they will be treated as a feeder airlines.

Instead they went in and created alliance with several smaller airlines where they could

be treated as the undisputed leader. But as is the case in front of us, the strategy failed

miserably creating a situation where the airline was not even able to fund refueling of its

fleet.

2. Proper implementation of strategy

As per the Hunter Strategy suggested by the consulting company, Swissair was supposed

to target only the small countries and the maximum investment was set to a maximum of

300 million CHF. But Swissair took the risk and pumped in 4.1 billion CHF into the

Hunter Strategy and also targeted bigger economies like Italy. Thus proper

implementation of strategies is a key driver in success.

3. Proper brand communication and strategizing accordingly

Swissair is positioned as a premium brand in the mind of the consumers. When the

company started forming alliance with low cost struggling airlines, the perception of the

brand changed among consumers. The regular consumers of Swissair, who are the

business class people who generally are ready to pay more money for better services,

started dumping Swissair for other airlines. Thus brand communication and a good brand

image is very much necessary for success.

4. Grab opportunities

When the big airlines approached Swissair for alliance after the formation of EU,

Swissair denied forming the alliance and instead chose to compete against them for

market share, knowing that it is a very small airline considering the liberalization of

European aviation sector where Switzerland is not a member nation. This has led

Swissair to make desperate attempts to gain market share and was grounded completely.

5. Prevent cannibalization

Swissair managers allowed Crossair to set up another hub at Basel and start its operations

independently. It cannibalized the operations of Swissair which had hub in Zurich.

Instead Swiss air should have worked in association with Crossair in developing their

business.

APPENDIX

TABLE 5: SAIRGROUP COMPANY STRUCTURE

TABLE 6: SWISSAIR'S EQUITY STAKES IN OTHER AIRLINES

REFERENCES

BBC News: “Swissair grounds all flights”, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1574658.stm

BBC News: “Thousands stranded in airline crisis”, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1577609.stm

European Commission: “History Market Integration”, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/internal_market/integration_history_en.htm

Jud, Markus: Das Swissair Dabakel, URL: http://chronik.geschichte-schweiz.ch/swissair-debakel-grounding.html (German)

Knorr, A. and Arndt, A.: “Swissair’s Collapse – An Economic Analysis”, Materialien des Wissenschaftsschwerpunktes „Globalisierung der Weltwirtschaft“, Bd. 28, September 2003

Manager Magazin: „Der Absturz der "fliegenden Bank" - eine Chronik“, URL: http://www.manager-magazin.de/unternehmen/artikel/0,2828,160189,00.html (German)

Wikipedia: Alcazar, URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alcazar_(airline)

Nwabueze, U. and Mileski, J.: “The challenge of effective governance: the case of Swiss Air”, in Corporate Governance, Vol. 8, No. 5, 2008