Survival.docx

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy

Volume 35, Issue 1, 1993Special Issue:

Outside intervention in ethnic conflicts

Robert Cooper & Mats Berdal

pages 118-142

Saudari Anisah yang dikasihi, sikap saudari yang ingin memastikan ketepatan

amalan amat dipuji. Agama ini bukan diikuti tanpa dipastikan kesahihan, atau

diikuti tanpa faham. Agama berpaksikan dalil yang diiktiraf. Sesuatu yang tidak

berasaskan sumber yang sah iaitu al-Quran dan hadis-hadis yang sabit

(authentic) tidak boleh disandarkan kepada Islam. Dalam masa yang sama,

tidaklah pula kita mudah menafikan sesuatu perkara dengan menyatakan ia

bukan dari ajaran Islam, sebelum kita benar-benar pasti memang tidak wujud dalil

dalam hal tersebut. Mengenai soalan saudari, saya jawab berdasarkan perkara-

perkara berikut;

1. Hadis-hadis yang berhubung kelebihan atau amalan pada Bulan Syaaban, ada

yang sabit dan ada yang tidak. Bahkan terdapat juga amalan-amalan Bulan

Syaaban yang diamalkan oleh sesetengah masyarakat itu, hanya ikutan yang

tidak mempunyai apa-apa sumber. Ini seperti amalan sesetengah masyarakat

yang membuat juadah khas Bulan Sya’ban dan seumpamanya. Banyak buku-

buku yang dijual tentang kelebihan Rejab dan Syaaban itu tidak berasaskan

hadis-hadis yang sahih.

2. Dalam sejarah ilmu hadis, ramai pemalsu hadis memang gemar membuat

hadis-hadis palsu yang berkaitan dengan fadilat-fadilat. Ini seperti mereka

mengada-adakan fadilat-fadilat bulan tertentu, surah tertentu dan seumpamanya.

Mereka akan mengaitkannya pula dengan amalan tertentu seperti solat khusus,

doa khusus, puasa khusus pada hari atau bulan yang dikaitkan dengan fadilat itu.

Sebab itulah al-Imam Ibn al-Salah ( meninggal 643H) menyebut:

“Ada beberapa golongan yang membuat hadis palsu, yang paling bahaya ialah

puak yang menyandarkan diri mereka kepada zuhud (golongan sufi). Mereka ini

membuat hadis palsu dengan dakwaan untuk mendapatkan pahala. Maka orang

ramai pun menerima pendustaan mereka atas thiqah (kepercayaan) dan

kecenderungan kepada mereka. Kemudian bangkitlah tokoh-tokoh hadis

mendedahkan keburukan mereka ini dan menghapuskannya. AlhamdulilLah”.( Ibn

al-Salah, Ùlum al-Hadis, m.s. 99, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-Muàsir).

3. Antara hadis palsu yang direka mengenai bulan-bulan:

“Rejab bulan Allah, Syaaban bulanku dan Ramadhan bulan umatku”. Ini adalah

http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/tsur20/35/1

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsur20?open=35#vol_35

hadis palsu yang direka oleh Ibn Jahdam (meninggal 414H) (lihat: Ibn Qayyim al-

Jauziyyah, al-Manar al-Munif fi al-Sahih wa al-Dhaìf, m.s. 95, Halab: Maktab al-

Matbuàt al-Islamiyyah).

Beliau adalah seorang guru sufi di Mekah. Dia juga dituduh membuat hadis palsu

mengenai solat Raghaib iaitu solat pada jumaat pertama bulan Rejab( lihat: al-

Imam al-Zahabi, Mizan al-Ìtidal fi Naqd al-Rijal,. 5/173, Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-

Ìlmiyyah).

Kata al-Imam Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah (wafat 751H):

“Hadis-hadis mengenai solat Raghaib pada jumaat pertama bulan Rejab

kesemuanya itu adalah palsu dan dusta ke atas Rasulullah s.a.w. Begitu juga

semua hadis mengenai puasa bulan Rejab dan solat pada malam-malam tertentu

adalah dusta ke atas Nabi s.a.w. Demikian juga hadis-hadis mengenai solat pada

malam Nisfu Syaaban (kesemuanya adalah palsu). Solat-solat ini direka selepas

empat ratus tahun munculnya Islam”. (Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Manar al-Munif, m.s. 95-

98).

4. Namun tidak boleh dinafikan bahawa di sana juga terdapat hadis-hadis yang

sahih mengenai kelebihan Bulan Sya’ban. Antaranya apabila bertanya Usamah

bin Zaid Nabi s.a.w mengapa baginda banyak berpuasa pada Bulan Syaaban,

Nabi s.a.w menjawab:

“Syaaban antara Rejab dan Ramadan, manusia lalai mengenainya. Padanya

(Bulan Syaaban) diangkat amalan hamba-hamba Allah. Aku suka tidak diangkat

amalanku, melainkan aku dalam keadaan berpuasa” (Riwayat al-Nasai, dinilai

hasan oleh al-Albani dalam Silsilah al-Sahihah 4/522).

Aisyah r.aha juga menyebut:

“Aku tidak pernah melihat Rasulullah s.a.w berpuasa dalam bulan lain lebih

daripada puasa Syaaban. Baginda pernah berpuasa Syaaban sepenuhnya,

kecuali hanya beberapa hari (tidak puasa)” (Riwayat al-Bukhari dan Muslim).

5. Hadis-hadis yang disebut di atas dan riwayat-riwayat yang lain menunjukkan

kita amat digalakkan berpuasa sunat pada Bulan Syaaban. Perbuatan berpuasa

pada Bulan Syaaban adalah sunnah yang sabit daripada Nabi s.a.w. Amalan

sebahagian masyarakat yang suka berpuasa pada Bulan Syaaban adalah amalan

soleh.

6. Adapun Nisfu Syaaban, atau pertengahan Syaaban (15 haribulan), terdapat

hadis yang sahih tentang kelebihannya di samping banyak hadis palsu

mengenainya. Juga tidak terdapat hadis yang sabit mengenai amalan khusus

seperti solat khas pada malam tersebut. Kata al-Imam al-Nawawi (meninggal

676H) dalam kitabnya yang masyhur al-Majmu’ Syarh al-Muhazzab:

“Solat yang dikenali dengan solat al-Raghaib iaitu dua belas rakaat ditunaikan

antara Maghrib dan Isyak pada Jumaat pertama Bulan Rejab, juga Solat Malam

Nisfu Syaaban sebanyak seratus rakaat; kedua-dua solat ini bidah lagi mungkar

yang jelek. Jangan kamu terpengaruh disebabkan keduanya disebut dalam Kitab

Qut al-Qulub dan Ihya ‘Ulum al-Din. Jangan juga terpengaruh dengan hadis yang

disebut dalam dua kitab berkenaan kerana kesemuanya palsu. Jangan kamu

terpengaruh dengan sesetengah imam yang keliru mengenai kedudukan hadis-

hadis kedua solat berkenaan” (4/56. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr).

Al-Imam al-Syaukani (meninggal 1250H) menyebut dalam al-Fawaid al-Majmu’ah

fi al-Ahadith al-Maudu’ah:

“Telah diriwayatkan mengenai solat malam Nisfu Syaaban dari pelbagai riwayat,

kesemuanya batil lagi palsu” (ms 72. Mekah: Maktabah Mustafa Baz).

7. Pun begitu tidak dinafikan ada hadis yang sahih Nabi s.a.w menyebut:

“Allah melihat kepada hamba-hambaNya pada malam nisfu Syaaban, maka Dia

ampuni semua hamba-hambaNya kecuali musyrik (orang yang syirik) dan yang

bermusuh (orang benci membenci) (Riwayat Ibn Hibban, al-Bazzar dan lain-lain.

Al-Albani menilai sahih dalam Silsilah al-Ahadith al-Sahihah 3/135).

Maka, sewajarnya apabila hal ini diberitahu oleh Nabi s.a.w, maka kita melakukan

amalan-amalan yang soleh pada malam berkenaan dan mengelakkan apa yang

Allah benci. Syirik dan permusuhan antara muslim adalah sebab seseorang itu

tidak diampunkan. Selain itu dua dosa tersebut, mudah-mudahan kita semua

diampunkan.

8. Dr Yusuf al-Qaradawi ada mengulas tentang amalan malam Nisfu Syaaban

dengan katanya:

“Tidak pernah diriwayatkan daripada Nabi s.a.w. dan para sahabat bahawa

mereka berhimpun di masjid untuk menghidupkan malam nisfu Syaaban,

membaca doa tertentu dan solat tertentu seperti yang kita lihat pada sebahagian

negeri orang Islam. Bahkan di sebahagian negeri, orang ramai berhimpun pada

malam tersebut selepas maghrib di masjid. Mereka membaca surah Yasin dan

solat dua rakaàt dengan niat panjang umur, dua rakaat yang lain pula dengan

niat tidak bergantung kepada manusia, kemudian mereka membaca doà yang

tidak pernah dipetik dari golongan salaf (para sahabah, tabiìn dan tabi’ tabiìn).

Ianya satu doa yang panjang, yang menyanggahi nas-nas (al-Quran dan Sunnah)

serta bercanggahan dan bertentangan pula isi kandungannya…perhimpunan

(malam nisfu Syaaban) seperti yang kita lihat dan dengar yang berlaku di

sebahagian negeri orang Islam adalah bidah dan diada-adakan. Sepatutnya kita

melakukan ibadat sekadar yang dinyatakan dalam nas. Segala kebaikan itu ialah

mengikut salaf, segala keburukan itu ialah bidah golongan selepas mereka, dan

setiap yang diadakan-adakan itu bidah, dan setiap yang bidah itu sesat dan setiap

yang sesat itu dalam neraka” (Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fatawa Muàsarah, 1/382-

383, Beirut: Dar Uli al-Nuha, Beirut).

9. Namun begitu, janganlah kita terlalu cepat menghukum. Apa yang disebut oleh

Dr al-Qaradawi itu adalah kaedah umum. Sesuatu masyarakat atau seseorang

individu mungkin mempunyai keuzuran yang tersendiri. Kemungkinan mereka

tidak tahu, atau mereka dihalang ilmu untuk sampai kepada mereka dan

seumpamanya. Kemungkinan besar jika mereka tahu, mereka tidak akan

melakukan hal yang demikian. Tujuan mereka baik, cuma cara sahaja yang wajar

dibaiki. Galakan berdoa dan memohon keampunan pada malam Nisfu Syaaban

ada asasnya. Penentuan cara sedemikian itu, tidak ditunjukkan oleh nas yang

sahih.

F Saya menganggap Bandar Oxford ini jauh lebih indah dari kebanyakan bandar

lain di UK dan Eropah, termasuk London. Bahkan tiada bandar yang

seumpamanya di dunia muslim kita. Ia sebuah bandar ilmu. Kebanyakan mereka

yang sibuk berjalan pantas di jalan-jalan Oxford ini ialah pelajar, pengajar dan

pengkaji.

Lebih empat puluh kolej ilmu bersejarah lagi berprestij di bandar ini. Penuh

sejarah, penuh sumbangan melahirkan tokoh-tokoh besar. Bandar ini penuh

dengan aktiviti ilmu di sana-sini setiap hari; seminar, diskusi, forum dan pelbagai.

Dalam pelbagai perkara dan bidang, yang mungkin sebahagiannya terlarang

dalam negara kita disebabkan unsur ke’jais’an kita. Amat rugi jika ada sesiapa

yang datang ke sini tetapi tidak mengambil peduli tentang aktiviti ilmu yang pesat.

Dari bangunan-bangunan bersejarah yang memenuhi bandar ini, kita dapat tahu

bahawa di sini asalnya tempat pengajian Kristian. Sejak kurun ke-12, Oxford

berkembang menjadi bandar ilmu. Ini terutama selepas tahun 1167 apabila Henry

II melarang pelajar Inggeris melawat universiti di Paris. Pada kurun ke-13 bandar

ini mula pesat dengan para penuntut ilmu. Antara tahun 1249 dan 1280 diasaskan

universiti kolej yang tertua di sini; Merton dan Balliol. Ertinya bandar ini telah

berkembang menjadi bandar ilmu sejak 800 tahun yang lalu.

Dalam tempoh yang panjang itu, Oxford melalui pelbagai sejarah. Agama Kristian

yang menjadi teras pegangan dan pembinaan pusat pengajian di sini telah

terbabit dalam pelbagai konflik politik dan agama. Permusuhan dan pembunuhan

berlaku dengan dahsyat sepanjang tersebut. Sehingga amalan kristianiti pun

luntur di sini.

Dibakar Hidup-Hidup

Latimer, Ridley and Foxe burning.

Saya tinggal bersendirian di Broad Street. Di hadapan kediaman saya, di atas

jalan ada tanda yang dibuat mengenang ‘shuhada’ Oxford atau Oxford

Martyrs yang dibakar hidup-hidup. Tomas Cranmer, Nicholas Ridley dan Hugh

Latimer. Mereka semua merupakan tiga orang paderi dan ilmuwan Kristian yang

hebat pada kurun yang ke-16. Mereka telah mengkritik ajaran-ajaran Kristian yang

dibawa oleh gereja Katholik yang dianggap tiada asas dalil yang sah dalam Bible.

Terpengaruh dengan Martin Luther pengasas Protestan, mereka juga telah

menulis pelbagai buku mengkritik amalan dan penghayatan agama yang

diamalkan oleh pihak gereja Katholik. Seperti Luther, mereka berusaha agar

agama Kristian tiada menjadi agama eksklusif untuk para paderi sahaja. Mereka

menulis dan membahaskan pelbagai isu dalam ajaran Katholik yang mereka

anggap tidak berasas.

Walaupun mereka berkelulusan tinggi dari pusat-pusat pengajian theology,

diangkat memegang pelbagai kedudukan tinggi dalam ranking gereja

seperti archbishop dan bishop, namun atas sikap anti-pembaharuan dan enggan

mendengar pandangan lain yang berbeza, pihak mahkamah agama Katholik telah

menghukum mereka sebagai heresy (murtad) dan derhaka (treason) kepada

Queen. Mereka dibakar hidup-hidup di khalayak ramai di Oxford pada tahun 1555

dan 1556.

Penulis di tempat bekas tokoh-tokoh pembaharuan Kristian dibakar hidup-hidup.

Sebenarnya, dalam sejarah gereja Katholik, begitu ramai yang dibakar oleh pihak

gereja atas tuduhan murtad dan derhaka. Pihak gereja akan menggunakan nama

Tuhan dan istana atas tuduhan murtad dan derhaka untuk menghukum para

penentang mereka. Pihak Katholik juga ada privy council atau badan rahsia yang

boleh menjadi kata putus. Pihak istana dalam usaha menjaga kepentingan dan

kuasa mereka, maka akur atas segala tuduhan dan keputusan yang dibuat oleh

pihak gereja terhadap musuh-musuh mereka. Golongan pembaharuan dalam

Kristian terpaksa melalui pengorbanan yang terlalu hebat. Hukuman yang selalu

mereka pakai kepada orang murtad ialah dibakar hidup-hidup cara pembakaran

yang menyakitkan dan kejam.

Benarkah Murtad?

Persoalannya, benarkah murtad, ataupun murtad itu hanya menurut ukuran

mereka yang jumud dan mempunyai kepentingan sendiri?! Semua tokoh-tokoh

yang dibakar hidup-hidup itu tetap memanggil Tuhan sehingga ke akhir hayat.

Cumanya, mereka enggan mengakui beberapa kepercayaan dan amalan Katholik

yang mereka anggap tidak bersumberkan Bible.

Pihak penentang pembaharuan sering menggunakan nama Jesus dan istana.

Padahal mereka bukan mempertahankan istana atau Jesus, mereka

mempertahankan kedudukan istimewa mereka sebagai golongan agama. Mereka

menentang usaha pembaharuan menterjemahkan Bible yang berbahasa Latin ke

dalam bahasa Inggeris. Mereka bimbang orang lain dapat menilai dan menembusi

maklumat agama yang akhir menyebabkan mereka dipersoalkan.

Dikenang

Hari ini Oxford terus wujud. Namun, mereka yang dibakar dan dituduh murtad itu

dikenang sebagai wira dan syahid oleh generasi kemudian. Demikianlah penilaian

terhadap fakta sejarah selalu berubah dengan berubahnya cara fikir manusia.

Wira boleh menjadi derhaka, derhaka pula boleh juga menjadi wira. Seseorang

yang dihukum pada suatu masa, mungkin dihargai pada masa yang lain.

Kemungkinan juga seseorang yang dihargai kini, akan dihukum pada masa yang

akan datang. Sebab itu setiap kita hendaklah berpegang kepada asas-asas

kebenaran yang disepakati oleh ad-din dan manusia sejagat. Bukan berpegang

kepada sesuatu yang bersifat politik dan isu semata.

Walaupun begitu dahsyat dan kejam pihak gereja Katholik berusaha mengekang

pembaharuan, namun hari ini segala yang mereka takuti telah pun menjelma

dalam rupa yang lebih ‘ganas’. Mereka cuba menentang kritikan terhadap amalan

mereka, hari ini di Barat, bukan sekadar amalan mereka, bahkan Tuhan pun

dinafikan kewujudannya.

Pada era 1880, ahli falsafah Jerman Friedrich Nietzche telah mengistiharkan

bahawa ‘God was dead’ (Tuhan telah mati). Walaupun 120 tahun kemudian

agama terus hidup di dunia ini dan Tuhan terus dipuja, namun

golongan atheist dan agnostic turut berkembang.

Usaha menolak kewujudan Tuhan terus berjalan dan mendapat sambutan yang

besar di seluruh dunia. Richard Dawkins umpamanya, pada 2007 menerbitkan

buku God Delusion atau Penipuan Tuhan, buku yang menggambarkan bahawa

tiada siapa yang boleh memberikan gambaran lengkap tentang agama yang

sebenar. Tulisannya ini menggalakkan golongan anti-agama dan bukunya

mendapat sambutan yang hebat. Di Oxford yang dipenuhi dengan gereja dan

segala kesan sejarah perkembangan Kristian, turut menjualnya.

Tuduh Murtad

Menjadi masalah besar apabila nama Tuhan sering digunakan untuk kepentingan

kuasa dan diri sendiri. Orang lain dihukum atas nama Tuhan, padahal Tuhan

kesalahan itu tidak membabitkan ajaran Tuhan. Akhirnya, Tuhan disalah ertikan

dan agama dibenci. Di Oxford, walaupun bangunan dan bayangan gereja

mengelilinginya, amalan kehidupan agama sudah tipis. Pengajian dijalankan

tanpa berkait lagi dengan nama Tuhan melainkan sedikit. Ataupun, Tuhan itu

difahami dalam pelbagai versi yang tersendiri.

Menuduh orang murtad sebenarnya memerlukan penelitian dan bukti yang kukuh

tanpa kepentingan dan fanatik. Menghalang orang lain memberikan pandangan

dan pendapat atas nama Tuhan adalah perbuatan yang menjauhkan manusia dari

agama. Itu bukan usaha menguatkan agama.

Islam adalah agama dialog dan hujah. Ia bukan agama perhimpunan untuk

membantah orang lain bersuara. Itu perbuatan gereja yang telah menghasilkan

natijah yang buruk dan melahirkan sikap anti-agama. Menjerit di jalanan kerana

kononnya ada orang murtad adalah tindakan yang tidak bijak. Padahal Allah telah

memberikan panduan agar Islam ditegakkan atas hujah dan dialog. Firman Allah

(maksudnya):

“Serulah ke jalan Tuhanmu (wahai Muhammad) dengan hikmah dan mauizah

hasanah (nasihat yang baik), dan berbahaslah dengan mereka dengan cara yang

lebih baik; sesungguhnya Tuhanmu Dia lah jua yang lebih mengetahui siapa yang

sesat dari jalanNya, dan Dia lah jua yang lebih mengetahui akan orang-orang

yang mendapat hidayah petunjuk (Surah al-Nahl: 125).

Menuduh orang lain murtad juga secara semberono hanya mengulangi apa yang

dilakukan oleh gereja Katholik. Natijahnya, lenyap kekuatan istana yang

dipergunakan dan lenyap juga keyakinan manusia kepada agama itu sendiri.

Apakah kita ingin mengulanginya?

Prof. Abdullah menyarakankan kepada saya sepanjang-panjang perbincang itu berlaku bahawa amat perlu kita, golongan ilmuan mengkaji secara tekun kitab Sulālat al-Salāṭīn atau lebih dikenali sebagai Sejarah Melayu yang ditulis oleh Tun Sri Lanang dalam kerangka yang lebih ilmiah.

Ini kerana mengikut beliau, banyak karya-karya agung Melayu dikaji oleh golongan yang berpucuk dari aliran sastera. Sudah tentu golongan ini seperti kata Prof. Zakaria yang masih banyak mengendong faham yang dijaja Orientalis Inggeris terbesar Alam Melayu – Sir Richard Olaf Winstedt (1878-1966) yang mengatakan bahawa banyak karya-karya besar Melayu ini sarat dengan Mitos, Lagenda dan Cerita Dongeng. Tidak dinafikan walaupun sudah banyak golongan sarjana ini menyumbang kepada penjenamaan semula karya-karya agung ke dalam bentuk yang lebih moden khususnya dalam tulisan Melayu rumi, masih terdapat banyak ruang-ruang kosong yang tidak mampu diisi (atau sengaja disempitkan) oleh mereka.

Mendengar hujah ini kelibat ingatan saya kembali ligat cuba menilik latar hujah tersebut dengan memuatkan pengalaman penting mahaguru saya, Prof. Syed Naquib Al-Attas. Bagi yang sudah membaca karya-karya awal beliau seperti Origin of Malay Shaʿir atau paling tidak pun sharahan pengukuhan pelantikan jawatan Profesor Bahasa dan Kesusasteraan Melayu UKM yang bertajuk Islam dalam Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu: Suatu Mukaddimah mengenai Peranan Islam dalam Perabadan Sejarah Melayu-Indonesia, dan kesannya dalam sejarah pemikiran, bahasa, dan kesusasteraan Melayu (1972), pasti pembaca akan terhimbau betapa lantang dan berani Prof. Al-Attas radd ke atas sekalian Orientalis yang menyemai shakk dan ẓann dalam kajian mereka berkenaan turāth dan karya-karya agung Melayu.

Saya juga terhimbau akan kesungguhan Prof. Al-Attas yang kemudiannya dipikul dengan berani dan lantang oleh Tn. Haji Affandi Hassan yang terkenal sebagai pendokong Gagasan Persuratan Baru betapa sebenarnya penerbitan faham kesusasteraan dan pembedaannya dengan persuratan sekitar pertengahan abad ke-20 adalah satu kesilapan yang berbahaya dan merugikan umat Melayu. Golongan sastera seperti yang dikritik Prof. Al-Attas dan Tn. Hj Affandi Hassan telah

mengesampingkan kedudukan sebenar persuratan Melayu yang didasari dengan faham ilmu yang betul dan sebaliknya diangkat faham kesusasteraan moden yang bercorak daya khayali yang poros ilmu yang mana sebenarnya banyak daripada golongan sasterawan ini asal usul mereka hanyalah sebagai pengarang (rujuk asal usul ASAS 50). Dikotomi ini akhirnya semakin menebal dengan pengwujudan gelar Sasterawan Negara yang dinobat sekadar menepati syarat-syarat yang ditunjangi faham kesusasteraan moden khayali yang banyak dari Barat.

Kesan daripada ini telah membentuk pandangan alam masyarakat Melayu moden yang hanya mampu secara kasar menanggap yang Bahasa Melayu moden mutaʾakhir hanya berdaya maju dengan karya-karya sastera contra persuratan. Sikap ini yang tertanam dan subur secara separa sedar telah meneggelamkan faham persuratan Melayu yang sebenar dan tidak mustahil oleh sebab yang sedemikian cara pandang sarjana Melayu khasnya dan orang kebanyakkan amnya melihat sebarang hikayat-hikayat besar seputar karya sastera agung, seolah-olah kontang isi ilmiah yang bersifat thabit adanya. Boleh ditelusuri perbahasan ini dengan membaca tulisan Tn. Hj Affandi Hassan dalam karyanya “Medan-Medan Dalam Sistem Persuratan Melayu: Sanggahan Terhadap Syarahan Perdana Prof. Dr. Muhammad Hj. Salleh” (Penerbit Tiga Puteri, 1994).

Ada banyak yang kami bicara dan untuk menjimat masa, izinkan saja saya menulisnya dalam bentuk beberapa butiran penting: Selain Raja Ali Haji, kata Prof. Zakaria, perlu juga ditelaah Misa Melayukarangan Raja Chulan. Saya pasti ramai anak muda hanya kenal Raja Chulan sebagai salah satu nama stesen monorail.

Ada beza antara “titah” dan “ucapan” seorang Raja/Sultan. Mengikut Prof. Zakaria bilamana Sultan bertitah ianya adalah suatu arahan yang wajib diikuti. Daulat Sultan yang ʿadil pasti berasaskan tuntutan Shariat. Kalau titah Sultan tidak diikuti dan dilanggar maka jatuh sudah Daulat Sultan sekadar menjadi ucapan. Peribahasa Melayu menjelaskan “Raja yang ʿAdil disembah, Raja yang Zalim disanggah”. Saya secara peribadi melihat konsep Daulat Sultan ini jikalau ditimbang mengikut mizan Pandangan ʿAlam Islam tidak jauh beda dengan konsep al-walāʾ wa al-baraʾ. Dan kita semua maʿlum bahawa kitab ketatanegaraan atau Mirror for Princes yang dikarang para ulamaʾ amat menekankan perihal mentaati pemimpin yang ʿadil itu sebahagian daripada pegangan ʿaqidah seperti yang termuat dalam ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafī yang tersebar luas dan disharah panjang oleh ʿulamaʾ di Alam Melayu. Sama juga Daulat Sultan itu yangʿAdil itu bertepatan jika dihubung jalinkan dengan

konsep al-walāʾ wa al-baraʾ tidak akan menimbulkan sebarang kekeliruan dan kedangkalan dalam memahami bagaimana orang Melayu zaman silam memahami perlambangan Ẓillul-Lah fiʾl-ʿālam – “Raja sebagai Bayangan Tuhan di muka bumi”.

Dalam Undang-Undang Tubuh Terengganu juga ada konsep “Kata Pengikat dan Pemutus” yang dizahirkan dalam bentuk Dewan Diraja yang dahulunya sebelum kedatangan penjajah dianggotai oleh Mufti yang diberi gelar Datuk Bentara Guru. Dikatakan ʿalim besar Tok Ku Paloh juga pernah duduk dalam Dewan ini. Kalau diteliti ini bukan konsep asing sebaliknya teras kepada sistem shura yang sebenar berdasarkan konsep Ahl’l-Hal wa’l-Aqad. Konsep ini tidak lagi difahami kerana bahana faham demokrasi yang mencairkan susun atur mereka yang sebenar-benar layak memberi nasihat kepada para Sultan antaranya ialah para ʿulamāʾ yang berwibawa.

Pengarang karya-karya besar Melayu bukan orang biasa. Banyak mereka ialah orang bangsawan yang terdidik (learned man) dan dalam banyak penulisan mereka kata Prof. Zakaria ianya ditulis dengan banyak perlambangan yang perlu ditafsir secara halus. Ini kerana zaman tersebut di mana Daulat Sultan masih kuat sebarang kritikan dan sanggahan harus dibuat secara halus bagi tujuan mendidik dan mengelak sebarang pergolakan yang lebih besar. Maka sudah tentu cerita-cerita berbentuk Puter Gunung Ledang dan Singapura dilanggar todak menjadi taruhan buat pengarang Melayu ini menyampaikan nasihat dan sanggahan dengan cara yang halus tetapi berbekas di benak hati para pemimpin dan masyarakat.

Banyak orang-orang persendirian di Alam Melayu yang masih berusaha secara kecil-kecilan menyimpan dan mengurus khazanah ilmiah berupa manuskrip. Ini kadangkala mengundang masalah kerana ketiadaan kepakaran tertentu yang akhirnya mengakibatkan manuskrip tersebut mudah rosak dimamah masa. Kata Prof. Zakaria, perlu ada usaha yang lebih khusus dalam membantu kumpulan-kumpulan kecil ini agar warisan kita tidak luput ditelan zaman.

Yayasan Karyawan sedang usaha menerbitkan semula karya-karya agung Melayu dan kata Prof. Zakaria, terpulang kepada anak muda masani untuk mengkajinya dengan lebih ilmiah. Jangan sekadar harapkan sarjana sastera saja yang mengangkat teks sedemikian rupa.

Perbincangan dengan beliau walaupun kadang kala saya diusik dengan beberapa kritikan terhadap Prof. Al-Attas, tidak mengundang rasa tidak hormat Prof. Zakaria akan kejayaan Prof. Al-Attas mewujudkan “school of thought” beliau yang menjadi bualan ramai dikalangan para sarjana sehinggalah hari ini. Saya

selaku anak murid kepada anak murid Prof. Al-Attas, tumpang sefikrah dengan mereka dan Insha-Allah semua ini akan mendorong saya untuk bekerja lebih kuat bagi memakmurkan kembali karya dan turāth cendekiawan Melayu lampau.

Inferiority Complex untuk menyantuni sejarah bangsa saya bak terhapus sudah dari kamus pemikiran saya malah membuatkan saya berasa lebih tawaduʾ kepada orang-orang terdahulu yang sememangnya hebat belaka berbanding kita pada masani yang jahil bangat tentang apa dan siapa itu Bangsa Melayu."Dalam sanggahan ini juga saya menekankan peri pentingnya dibezakan antara persoalan puitika dan retorika. Saya telah cuba menjelaskan perbezaan ini dalam tulisan ini, dan cuba juga menunjukkan kesa-kesannya dalam persuratan dan penelitian tentang "sastera". Hal ini menjadi semakin penting diberi perhatian kerana terdapatnya sejenis kegilaan kepada istilah-istilah baru atau konsep-konsep baru yang sedang giat diperkenalkan di Barat pada waktu itu. Jika kita membaca tulisan-tulisan mengenai "sastera" dan ukuran-ukuran yang dipakai untuk menilai hasil "sastera", kita akan menemui sejumlah istilah yang sering disebut-sebut, yang dijadikan ciri karya yang baik. Misalnya antara yang sering disebut ialah istilah-istilah pasca-modenisme, avant-garde,surrealisme, realisme magis, deconstruction, dialogic imagination, teori resepsi, dan banyak lagi. Terdapat sejenis keghairahan memperaga dengan sombongnya kejahilan akademik dengan bertopengkan nama-nama dan istilah-istilah itu. Hampir semua tulisan yang memperagakan kejahilan ini, yang saya baca, penuh dengan kekaburan dan kekacauan yang sungguh mengherankan, kerana semua ini datangnya daripada orang-orang yang menggelarkan diri mereka sarjana dan tokoh akademik. Yang paling ketara ialah mereka tidak sedar sedikit pun bahawa mereka sedang berusaha membawa fikiran dan pengaruh karut dalam "sastera" Melayu/Malaysia moden. Mereka tidak sedikit pun cuba menjelaskan makna dan implikasi konsep-konsep dan istilah-istilah itu dari segiworldview yang tersirat di dalamnya. Mereka begitu boros menggunakan istilah-istilah itu "out of context" untuk mencirikan karya-karya yang baik, menurut pandangan mereka. Hasilnya mereka dengan angkuh dan sombong menjulang karya-karya yang sebenarnya tidak bermutu, malah ada yang menyesatkan. Karya-karya yang sedangkal ini menjadi kelihatan hebat di dalam tangan ahli akademik dan pengkriitk sastera yang keliru konsep ilmunya ini. Sebagai bukti, silalah lihat bagaimana mereka menganalisis dan menilai karya-karya yang mereka anggap baik itu melalui laporan sebagai ahli panel

berbagai peraduan atau dalam ulasan-ulasan buku yang mereka buat. Hampir semua mereka menyatakan mereka gemarkan pembaharuan, tetapi apa yang disebut sebagai pembaharuan itu tidak lebih daripad peniruan keada model-model yang telah sedia ada di Barat. Mereka pada hakikatnya melihat pembaharuan dari kecetakan pengalaman ilmiah dan keterbatasan citra rasa mereka sendiri. Jelasnya mereka menghargai pembaharuan jika apa yang disebut pembaharuan itu dapat dihuraikan dengan menggunakan istilah-istilah dan konsep-konsep yang mereka gemari dan yang dicedok bulat-bulat tanpa pemahaman yang mendalam, yang tidak mereka mengerti implikasinya terhadap ilmu. Kita sebenarnya tidak saja mempunyai penulis picisan dan karya picisan, malah kini lebih ramai lagi sarjana dan pengkritik picisan - yang melahirkan esei dan kritik picisan. Mereka ini akhirnya membuat peniliaian picisan pula! Dalam keadaan beginilah Prof. Dr;. Muhammad Hj Salleh melontarkan syarahan perdananya, yang segera ditelan bulat-bulat oleh murid-muridnya dan para sarjana yang malas berfikir dan yang picisan tadi. Maka itulah perlunya sanggahan ini." Mohd. Affandi hassan.4 Oktober 1994.

-Dipetik daripada "Medan-Medan dalam Sistem Persuratan Melayu: Sanggahan terhadap Syarahan Perdana Prof. Dr. Muhammad Hj. Salleh (Sarjana dan Sasterawan Negara)" oleh Tn. Hj. Mohd. Affandi Hassan, ms. x-xi Dalam kitab ʿAqidah Ahl Sunnah yang amat masyhur - diguna diseluruh dunia Islam ratusan tahun sudah, karangan Imām Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī, dijelaskan dalam matn-nya:

"Wa lā yanaʿzilu al-imām bi'l-fisqi wa'l-jaūri wa yajaūzu as-ṣalātu ḥalfa kulli birrin wa fājirin wa yuṣalli ʿalā kulli birrin wa fājirin"

Ya'ni diterjemahkan ke dalam Bahasa Melayu tahun 1590 M sebagai:

"Dan tiada maʿzul (yaʿnī dipachchat) raja-raja itu sebab fāsiq dan daruhaka dan harus sembahyang dibelakang segala ṣāliḥ dan fāsiq: dan sembahyang kita atas segala ṣaliḥ dan fāsiq (yaʿnī mayyit ṣāliḥ dan mayyit fāsiq)"

(rujukan - Al-Attas, Syed Muhammad Naquib, The Oldest Known Malay Manuscript: A 16th century Malay translation of the ʿAqāid of al-Nasafī, 1988)

Sedikit renungan:

Pada hemat saya tatkala menghibau kekacauan yang berlaku dalam kaum Muslimin, matn ʿaqidah ini sebenarnya menegah secara keras bibit-bibit awal mahupun terkemudian yang membuka ruang kepada "realpolitik" dalam kancah krisis kepimpinan Kaum Muslimin. Bukan disuruh kita meredhai sebarang kesalahan itu tetapi ditegah keras membuka ruang kepada fasad yang lebih berbahaya daripada kezaliman pemimin fāsiq Muslim itu.

Persoalannya: Benar dan pastikah sebarang ʿamal jamaʾie politik pakatan - baik BN dan PR - tidak ditusuk sebarang anasir realpolitik dari dalam hatta dari luar?

Malaysia dan Turki, ini sahaja negara Muslim yang berfungsi dan tidak bermuara di daerah "failed states". Sudah nampakkah burung-burung nasar (vulture) yang bertenggek dari luar menunggu masa untuk memamah bangkai kita?

Mungkin kerana inilah Imam al-Ghazali dan Badiuzzaman Said Nursi cuba sedaya upaya untuk menjauhi dan menumpukan islah pada landasan yang paling asas - ʿilmu. Dan mereka berdua terang lagi bersuruh telah berjaya dunia-akhirat mengislahkan ummah yang jauh lebih jelek daripada UMNO dan sekalian isinya.

Perubahan yang didambakan kaum Muslimin tidak harus diselit pada roda

Sedikit bingkisan berkenaan ulamaʾ haraki/siasah dan faham perubahan yang didakyah mereka

Gelaran atau klasifikasi ulamaʾ haraki/siasah ini tidak pernah ada dalam sejarah Islam. Seperti yang dijelaskan olem Imām ʿAbd Qāhir al-Baghdādī dalam al-Farq bayna’l-Firaq[1], tidak disebut pun "Ulama Haraki/Siasah" sebagai salah satu kumpulan yang tergolong dalam Ahl Sunnah seperti yang lainnya ya’ni Sufiyyah (Sufis),Mutakallimun (Theologian), Fuqahaʾ (Jurists), Muhaddithun (Prophetic Traditionists), Mufassirun (Exegetes).

Adapun ulama' yang terlibat dan bercakap dengan hal-hal siasah itu pada masa lalu sebenarnya adalah para Fuqahaʾ par excellence seperti al-Māwardī, al-Ghazālī. Harus diingat disini yang berjuang menentang penjajah seperti Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī[2], al-Sanusi[3] itu bukanlah ulama haraki/siasah kerana mereka berjuang dan berjihad bukan sebagai politikus. Pendek kata mereka tak bercakap sebagai seorang politikus apatah lagi mencalonkan diri untuk menjadi penguasa.

http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1809145102142440849#_ftn3



http://rausyanfikir.com/2012/05/sedikit-bingkisan-berkenaan-ulama.html



http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/493161/realpolitik

Pada hemat saya Ulamaʾ Haraki/Siasah seperti yang dicanang hebat kini – khusus dari kalangan golongan ilmuan agama yang terjun dalam parti-parti politik (harakah Islamiyyah) merupakan satu perkara baharu yang agak terkeluar daripada pengklasifikasian tradisi keilmuan Islam. Ianya timbul daripada cabaran dan kesan zaman moden, bukan warisan sejarah dan tradisi kita.

Saya terfikir dan berusaha mencari jawapan apakah pengklasifikasian sebegini sesuatu yang baik atau sebaliknya? Ini kerana kalaulah ribuan tahun sudah berlalu sejarah kaum Muslimin tetapi tiada pula dikalangan ulamaʾ kita yang mengelaskan diri atau sebahagian daripada mereka sebagai “ahl-haraki/siasah”, masakan tidak kita yang baru ini memberanikan diri mewujudkan serta mengabsahkan (crystallization) klasifikasi sebegini?

Ingin saya tekankan di sini bahawa ulamaʾ kita yang terdahulu – seperti dijelaskan dan dipertahankan oleh Prof. Syed Naquib Al-Attas, bukan calang-calang insan. Mereka amat berhati-hati dalam menamakan sesebuah disiplin ilmu apatah lagi sesuatu hakikat kerana sifat Pengislaman itu memang amat menitik beratkan adab terhadap sesuatu. Ini amat kena dengan ayat 31 dalam sūrah al-Baqarah bahawa “Allah mengajar Nabi Adam kesemua nama” (ʿallama ʾĀdama al-āsmāʾa kullahā) – dan nama itu senantiasa merujuk kepada hakikat, bukan sekadar nama. Sesuatu taʿrīf itu merujuk kepada ilmu bukan sekadar penamaan dan pendefinisian yang tiada asas dan batas.

Saya bukan ingin memberi penilaian berbentuk fiqhiyyah terhadap perkara ini cuma ingin benar-benar menilai apakah wajar klasifikasi sebegitu diperteguhkan dan menjadi sebahagian daripada “kumpulan” ulamaʾ yang tersegam atur dalam penjelasan-penjelasan oleh ulamaʾ terdahulu sepertinya Imām ʿAbd Qāhir al-Baghdādī.

Tidak cukupkah golongan fuqahaʾ, mutakallimun, sufi, muhaddithun, mufassirun itu untuk diangkat sebagai kumpulan-kumpulan ulamaʾ tanpa perlu mewujudkan lagi satu “label” baru tersebut? Bukankah pada hakikatnya seperti yang dijelaskan tadi bahawa yang memperjuangkan keadilan Islam dalam lapangan siasah sebenarnya adalah fuqahaʾ?

Antara perkara yang saya amat musykil ialah mengapa ribuan tahun lamanya para ulamaʾ kita, semacam mana teruk dan kegentingan keadaan umat Islam dalam berhadapan dengan penguasa yang zalim tidak pernah mendambakan diri mereka untuk menggantikan penguasa tersebut.

Ya, mereka menentang penguasa dan sebarang bentuk kezaliman tetapi tiada sesekali mereka menjadi ahl-haraki/siasah seperti yang ada pada hari ini – ya’ni golongan ulamaʾ yang mencalonkan diri mereka untuk bertanding menjadi pemimpin (umarāʾ).

Saya hairan hatta Shāh Walī Allāh yang hebat itu pun tidak pernah mengaku atau melabel diri beliau sebagai ahl-haraki/siasah. Walhal karyanya Hujjat Allāh al-Bāligha[4] yang menjelaskan kerangka islāh siasah-akhlaqiah-ʿilmiyyah itu luar biasa sekali khusus berhubung teori irtifāqat-nya[5].

Dan saya tertanya-tanya, mengapa mereka-mereka yang mengabsahkan diri mereka sebagai ulamaʾ haraki/siasah ini tidak mengangkat gagasan yang ditinggalkan ulamaʾ yang tidak menamakan mereka sendiri sebagai ulamaʾ haraki/siasi – seperti Shāh Walī Allāh, untuk diperjuangkan dilapangan siasah? Apa yang melayakkan mereka mendapat gelaran ulamaʾ haraki/siasah? Apa yang membezakan mereka dengan Shāh Walī Allāh yang serba unggul dalam pelbagai bidang agama hatta ilmu siasah yang sangat hebat hujjah dan huraian secara sistemik itu?

Saya bukan mempersoalkan kewibawaan mereka yang digolongkan atau mereka yang cuba mewujudkan seterusnya mengabsahkan satu lagi kelompok ulamaʾ dalam Ahl Sunnah yaʾni sebagai ulamaʾ haraki/siasah dari segi keilmuan tetapi saya benar-benar ingin tahu apakah amat-amat diperlukan untuk kita mewujudkan satu klasifikasi baru seperti itu yang dimana ulamaʾ terdahulu yang lebih hebat seperti Shāh Walī Allāh sendiri tidak mendambakan gelaran sebegitu walaupun beliau lebih layak untuk memiliki gelaran tersebut jika benar-benar boleh diwujudkan dan diabasahkan. Pasti ada sebab dan hujjah mengapa ulamaʾ dahulu tidak langsung mewujudkan dan mengabsahkan satu kelompok ulamaʾ yang digelar dan diklasifikasikan sebagai ulamaʾ haraki/siasah.

Mungkin ulamaʾ dulu sedar bahawa tugas mendapatkan kuasa sebenarnya membuka fitnah kepada “institutsi ulamaʾ”. Walaupun mereka kalau dikira kelayakkan ilmu dan pengalaman secara sebenar-benarnya sudah tentu terlebih layak daripada umaraʾ zaman mereka itu, tiada pula didambakan kekuasaan dalam apa bentuk alasan, hujjah sekalipun untuk mereka meletakkan diri mereka pada jalan perebutan kuasa daripada pemimpin-pemimpin yang bermasalah itu.

Harus difahami institusi ulamaʾ yang saya maksudkan ini jangan langsung disamakan dan disalah erti dengan peranan golongan Ayahanda (Fathers) dalam struktur Kegerejaan/Kerahiban (The Church) atau Kebrahaminan (Brahmin). Struktur ini yang menimbulkan fitnah kepada sekalian agama seperti pengalaman pahit-getir Gereja Katolik yang menatijahkan Reformasi dan mazhab Protestantisme dalam agama Kristian yang mana golongan agama menjadi pemerintah menghasilkan theocracy yang sama sekali tiada dalam Islam. Baca sajalah asal usul perpecahan agama Kristian dan kesannya dalam melahirkan faham sekularisme di dunia Barat ternyata anda akan memahami mengapa saya kritikal dengan ulamaʾ yang menuntut ingin jadi penguasa.



Saya katakan fitnah kerana peranan “institusi ulamaʾ” itu senantiasa berada di “atas” lapangan siasah. Dari segi kuasa memang Sultan, Wazir dan segala macam jawatan pemerintahan itu melebihi kuasa ulamaʾ dalam lapangan siasah tetapi hakikatnya ulamaʾ lebih tinggi daripada mereka semua kerana kemulian jawatan ulamaʾ itu tiada mampu diukur oleh harta dan kedudukan – apatah lagi masani dimana lapangan siasah demokrasi itu lebih membawa kepada perpecahan tanpa ada pihak yang mengemudi setiap perubahan yang sepatutnya ditunjangi oleh institusi ulamaʾ. Dengan mencampuri urusan siasah melebihi had yang sepatutnya, kecenderungan untuk berat sebelah dan campur aduk peranan, sama ada ulamaʾ itu bercakap sebagai seorang ʿalim atau sebagai seorang ahl-siasah itu akan senantiasa timbul.

Saya amat terhimbau dengan kisah Said Bediuzzaman Nursi yang amat terkenal dengan ungkapan istiʿādhah “aku berlindung daripada Syaitan dan politik”. Setakat yang telah saya telaah kisah hidup beliau ternyata ada benarnya apa yang didoakan tersebut. Said Bediuzzaman Nursi ceritakan bilamana sistem khilafah sudah tumbang dan demokrasi di Turki mula berpucuk, banyak ulamaʾ yang mula menganggotai parti-parti politik dan bersaing sesama mereka secara sengit.[6]

Sifir (atau lebih tepas calculus) di lapangan siasah apatah lagi dalam latar demokrasi moden ini senantiasa mewujudkan kecenderungan setiap perwakilan yang bertanding untuk saling menjatuhkan antara satu-sama lain. Said Nursi ketika itu melihat ulamaʾ yang dahulunya amat waraq dan berakhlaq telah bertukar menjadi “political animal” ketika di pentas politik seperti memburuk-burukkan pesaing/lawannya antara satu sama lain yang juga ulamaʾ!

Perkara seperti ini seolah-olah tidak dapat dielakkan kerana kerusi kekuasaan itu hanya satu dan tiada mampu dikongsi maka mereka harus berusaha untuk mendapatkan kerusi tersebut at all cost!

Atas alasan apa semua ini dilakukan? Sudah tentu untuk tegakkan agama, bangsa dan negara tetapi bila keadaanya sudah teruk begitu apakah mungkin niat mereka benar-benar tulus murni seperti awalnya atau benar-benar sudah menjadi satu “political animal”?

Dan kalau kita kaji latar persejarahan timbulnya arus ulamaʾ menyertai medan siasah ini sebagai ahl siasah atau politikus, banyak timbul selepas era wujudnya gerakan Pan-Islamisme seperti yang dibawa Shaykh Muhammad ʿAbduh dan al-Afghani. Golongan ini sering melaungkan slogan pembaharuan dalam pelbagai rupa dan agenda. Saya lihat golongan yang mempertahankan pembaharuan (bidʿah) ini, atau lebih tepat golongan Maqsadiyyun – golongan yang sering mengangkat hujjah maqāṣid al-sharīʿahsebagai yang termutlak dengan memborong semua perkara seolah-olah boleh diperturunkan


(reductionist) kepada juzuk itu – semata-mata ingin memenuhi dan menuntut penyesuaian kepada perubahan zaman.

Walhal mereka tiada sedar yang arus perubahan yang dibawa ini sebenarnya, seperti kata Prof. Al-Attas bersifat ketamadunan[7], tiada ianya bebas nilai dan harus benar-benar cermat memahami dan membanding beza apa yang sebenarnya milik kita atau tiada mampu dimiliki kita[8] kerana perbezaan dasari yang amat luas malah bertentangan pula dengan pandangan alam Islam.

Golongan ini seperti yang ditempelak oleh Prof. Al-Attas sering memberi alasan dan mengambil enteng para ulamaʾ dan Imam terdahulu[9] yang disangka huraian mereka itu sudah tidak “relevan” kerana konteks berbeda dan hujjah-hujjah yang sewaktu dengannya. Golongan ini pada hemat saya tidak mempunyai pandangan alam Islam yang teguh khusus dalam memahami zeitgeist zaman moden dari pucuk akarnya yaʿni Ketamadunan Barat seterusnya bertindak “menyalahkan” sejarah lampau – menyalahkan taṣawwuf, menyalahkan pintu ijtihād telah tertutup, walaupun tidak dinafikan ada beberapa hal yang betul berkenaan dakwaan ini tetapi telah dianjalkan ke peringkat paling ekstrim yang kononnya menatijahkan kemunduran umat Islam masani.

Seolah-olah slogan “hum rijāl wa nahnu rijāl aiḍān” (they are men and we are men too) boleh dijadikan alasan untuk menyama ratakan ulamaʾ terdahulu ke tahap mereka kini yang sudah tentu lebih rendah daripada maqamat ulamaʾ terdahulu. Ini adalah maʿna kehilangan adab yang dihujjah panjang oleh Prof. Al-Attas.[10] Maka slogan “perubahan” itu sering didendangkan tetapi mereka ini tiada memahami benar apa itu perubahan pada hakikatnya.

Adakah dakwaan saya ini kosong tanpa bukti? Tidak, kerana saya sedang merenung secara mendalam memahami setiap tokoh-tokoh besar dikalangan ulamaʾ dan aktivis daʾwah yang mengaku sebagai pembawa perubahan (reformist) tatkala fajar modenisasi milik Barat baru menyinsing di dunia Islam bermula pertengahan abad ke-19 hinggalah awal abad ke-20 Masihi.

Saya sedang menelaah kisah Ibn ʿĀshūr[11] dalam makalah yang dikarang oleh Basheer M. Nafi, juga beberapa buah buku yang mengkaji pertembungan budaya antara kaum Muslimin ketika bermulanya arus modenisasi secara besar-besaran di dunia Islam seperti karyanya Rifāʻa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī,[12], Khayr al-Dīn Pasha al-Tūnisī[13], Ibrahim Abu-Lughod[14], juga tesis MA Dr. Bazlie Shafie tentang Muhammad Abduh[15].

Dapatan awal bagi saya setakat ini memang amat menarik dan benar-benar mengabsahkan kritikan Prof. Al-Attas terhadap golongan modenis ini. Cukup sekadar ini dan harap para pembaca dapat fikir-fikirkan.

Wan Ahmad Fayhsal










16 Mei 2012, 6.00pm

[1] Baghdādī, ʻAbd-al-Qāhi. al- Farq baina 'l-Firaq wa-Bayān al-Firqa al-Nājiyah minhum. (Bairūt: Dār al-Āfāq al-Ǧadīda, 1973) terj. Kate C. Seelye. Moslem Schisms and Sects: (al-fark Bain Al-Firak) Being the History of the Various Philosophic Systems Developed in Islam. (New York: AMS Press, 1966)

[2] Murād, Barakāt M. Al-Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir Al-Jazāʼirī: Al-Mujāhid Al-Ṣūfī. Madīnat Naṣr [Cairo: al-Ṣadr li-Khidmāt al-Ṭibāʻah, 1990)

[3] Bayyūmī, Muḥammad A. Sanusiyyah: A Sociological Study of an Islamic Movement. (Beirut: Dar An-Nahda Al-Arabiya, 1981), rujuk juga El-Horeir, Abdulmola S. Social and Economic Transformations in the Libyan Hinterland During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Role of Sayyid Aḥmad Al-Sharīf Al-Sanūsī. (PhD Dissert. 1981), juga Vikør, Knut S. Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge: Muḥammad B. ʻalī Al-Sanūsī and His Brotherhood. (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1995)

[4] Walī, Allāh, and Marcia K. Hermansen. The Conclusive Argument from God: Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi's Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996) rujuk juga Muhammad, Ghazali. The Socio-Political Thought of Shāh Walī Allāh. (Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2001)

[5] Aislahi, Abdul A. Stages of Socio-Economic Development: Shah Wali-Allah's Concept of Al-Irtifaqat. , 1989. http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29628/1/MPRA_paper_29628.pdf

[6] Rujuk Şükran, Vahide, dan Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʻ. Islam in Modern Turkey: An Intellectual Biography of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), juga Turner, Colin. “I seek refuge in God from Satan and politics..."- A Nursian perspective on the role of religion in state and society.http://nursistudies.com/teblig.php?tno=447, juga Zeynep Akbulut Kuru, Ahmet T. Kuru. Apolitical Interpretation of Islam: Said Nursi's Faith-Based Activism in Comparison with Political Islamism and Sufism, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations Vol. 19, Iss. 1, 2008

[7] “Prof. Al-Attas alluded to this shift of semantics happening due to us – the Muslims – are flowing in the same stream that ‘another civilization’ has created, swimming in the fast current of change. This ‘another civilization’ that is dominating in the world today is none other than Western civilization that made freedom as a ‘belief’ in itself. The human rights itself is the result of deification of Man – where man himself is the measure of all things.” rujuk Wan Ahmad Fayhsal, Revisiting “Meaning and Experience of Happiness in Islām” http://hakim.org.my/blog/?p=248

http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1809145102142440849#_ftnref7







http://hakim.org.my/blog/?p=248

http://hakim.org.my/blog/?p=248

http://nursistudies.com/teblig.php?tno=447

http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29628/1/MPRA_paper_29628.pdf

http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29628/1/MPRA_paper_29628.pdf

[8] Rujuk Goody, Jack. The Theft of History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) yang menceritakan bagaimana ilmuan Barat khususnya Orientalis mendakyahkan faham kebenaran dan hakikat ke atas ilmu-ilmu dari tamadun lain seperti pendakyahan faham masa dan ruang dalam persejarahan ketamadunan dunia.

[9] Rujuk temubual Hamza Yusuf dengan Prof. Al-Attas di Youtube minit 8:02 http://youtu.be/L5pyXqZq4E0?t=8m22s

[10] Rujuk kritikan tajam Prof. Al-Attas dalam Risalah Untuk Kaum Muslimin (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 2001) ms. 144-167; sebahagian daripadanya boleh dirujuk dalam nukilan blog saya ini: http://rausyanfikir.com/2011/08/keseluruhan-penjelasan-ini-dipetik.html, juga rujuk Islām and Secularism (Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, 1978) ms. 123-126.

[11] Basheer M. Nafi, Ṭāhir ibn ʿĀshūr: The Career and Thought of a Modern Reformist ʿālim, with Special Reference to His Work of tafsīr, Journal of Qur'anic Studies Vol. 7, No.1 (Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2005), ms. 1-32 boleh dibaca di sini: http://abdullahhasan.net/?p=130

[12] al-Ṭahṭāwī, Rifāʻa Rāfiʿ, Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz fī Talkhīṣ Bārīz aw al-Dīwān al-Nafīs bi-īwān Bārīs terjemahan Daniel L. Newman. An Imam in Paris: Account of a Stay in France by an Egyptian Cleric (1826-1831). (London: Saqi, 2004)

[13] Khayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī, Aqwām al-masālik fi maʿrifat aḥwāl al-mamālīk (Tunis: Official Press, 1867). Rujuk juga terjemahan L C. Brown. The Surest Path: The Political Treatise of a Nineteenth-Century Muslim Statesman : a Translation of the Introduction to the Surest Path to Knowledge Concerning the Condition of Countries. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1967) dan laman Saudi Aramco World “On The Surest Path”http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/201103/on.the.surest.path.htm

[14] Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim A. Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963)

[15] Ahmad Bazli Shafie, “The Educational Philosophy of Shaykh Muhammad Abduh”, (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC-IIUM, 2004)

Satu huraian, cerakinan, dan perincian ringkas terhadap kekusutan yang timbul dalam memahami tujuan dan maʿna sebenar perbahasan “Tiada diperlukan pengabsahan-pembezaan









http://rausyanfikir.com/2012/05/satu-huraian-cerakinan-dan-perincian.html


http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/201103/on.the.surest.path.htm

http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/201103/on.the.surest.path.htm

http://abdullahhasan.net/?p=130

http://rausyanfikir.com/2011/08/keseluruhan-penjelasan-ini-dipetik.html

http://rausyanfikir.com/2011/08/keseluruhan-penjelasan-ini-dipetik.html

http://youtu.be/L5pyXqZq4E0?t=8m22s

(taṣdīq wa fāriq) kelas-kelas ulamaʾ Ahl Sunnah wa’l Jamaah kepada ulamaʾ haraki/siasah dalam pengkategorian sumber autoriti Faham Ilmu (epistemologi) Ahl Sunnah Wa’l Jamaah” berserta kaitan intim perbahasan ini dengan Cabaran Ketamadunan Barat.

Pemudah bicara (prelude)…

Kes 1:“Baca buku apa tu?”“Oh ni ha buku Islām and Secularism.”“Eh, siapa yang tulis? Dia ulamaʾ haraki ke?”“Aish, kenapa tanya macam tu? Kau hanya baca kalau ulamaʾ haraki tulis saja ke?”“Ye la, kan kita ada banyak buku-buku DPF tak habis baca lagi. Buat apa baca buku-buku yang tak memperkuatkan fikrah kita sebagai ahli gerakan Islam”

Kes 2:“Akhi, boleh tak kita jemput Ustaz A bagi syarahan dalam multaqaʾ nuqabaʾ kita?”“Dia itu siapa? Dari mana? Dia “orang kita” ke?“Apa maksud enta akhi? Dia bukan orang Jemaah kita. Tapi dia sangat pakar dalam menjelaskan sejarah Ketamadunan Barat yang ana fikir dapat bantu memperbetulkan salah faham ahli-ahli kita terhadap Barat, Sekularisme”“Ish, tak bolehla akhi. Kita boleh jemput ustaz-ustaz yang memang dalam harakah kita cukuplah. Nanti campur aduk dan tak selari fikrah boleh futur ahli!”

Kes 3:“Best-lah buku Islām and Secularism ni. Kau tak nak baca ke?”“Aku tak fahamlah. Tinggi sangat. Aku baca sikit dah tahu yang apa dia cakap dalam buku tu bukan praktikal pun. Kita sebagai ahli haraki kena hadam buku-buku yang membantu kita mencapai matlamat secara praktikal, bukan buku-buku yang banyak teori macam buku Islām and Secularism tu.”

Kes 4:“Kenapa nak tegakkan negara Islam?”“La, kau tak ingat ke Ustaz tu cakap yang prinsip usul fiqh apa yang membawa kepada wajib ianya wajib”“Habis apa yang wajib?”“Kuasa politiklah”“Kau tak rasa kita ada masalah lebih mendasar ke? Macam



masalah kesalah fahaman dan kekeliruan ilmu. Sebab kata Ustaz Syed Naquib Al-Attas, masalah itu yang melahirkan kebobrokan dalam masyarakat kita sebab mereka yang keliru akan mengangkat pemimpin yang keliru”“Alah kau ni, ikut sangat cakap ustaz yang tak bersifat haraki tu. Aku tahu dia tu jenis teori melangit je. Tak membumi dalam nak selesaikan masalah ummah. Kita ikut jelah ulamaʾ haraki sebab mereka lebih masak dalam hal-hal nak tegakkan hukum hakam sampai jadikan Malaysia ni negara Islam”.

Kes 5:“Eh, kenapa silibus usrah kita ni tak didedahkan dengan karya-karya ulamaʾ silam ek? Kenapa tak ada sesi baca Kitab al-Ilm dalam Ihyaʾ Imam al-Ghazali?”“La, kau ni tak faham lagi ke, kitab tu kan tassawuf sangat. Rumit pula.”“Jemputlah penceramah yang faham kitab tu dan bagi syarahan secara jelas cabaran ilmu yang Imam al-Ghazali tulis”“Tak boleh. Jemaah kita hanya bagi jemput ulamaʾ haraki. Yang tak haraki ini risiko tinggi takut-takut mengelirukan fikrah anak-anak usrah kita. Kita hadam buku-buku DPF kan dah cukup.”

Kes 6:“Kau tak rasa ke orang Melayu kita yang sebenarnya bersaudara satu aqidah iaitu Islam boleh berpecah sangat teruk berbanding orang Cina yang walaupun tidak seaqidah (ada Kristian, Buddha) dan berbeda faham politik masih boleh bersatu?”“Kau ni, kan kerajaan tu taghut. Kena tumbangkanlah. Ini antara haqq dan batil!”“Ok aku faham, kita memang nak hapuskan kezaliman dalam apa jua cara cuma aku rasa macam cara kita ni tidak berapa menguntungkan umat pada masa mendatang…”“Kenapa kau kata macam tu?”“Sebab aku tengok kaum lain berpolitik tak adalah sampai berlaku zalim sesama mereka sampai nak tebang Pohon Perpaduan yang mereka bina sekian lama. Kaum lain kalau parti lawan buat benda baik mereka akan bagi kredit yang sewajarnya kepada parti tersebut walaupun pada hakikatnya mereka adalah lawan dan pesaing sengit. Kita pula jarang buat begitu antara satu sama lain. Yang ada mesti hanya kritikan dan cemuhan tanpa henti, tak pernah salah satu pihak memberi penghargaan terhadap sumbangan masing-masing. Ini bagi aku, tak akan mampu mengangkat dan mengubah pemikiran orang Melayu untuk bermuafakat membaiki antara satu sama lain – apatah lagi bila golongan ulamaʾ yang sepatutnya duduk lebih tinggi selaku “power broker” sebenar dalam percaturan kekuasan ummah kini telah mengambil tempatnya tersendiri yang tiada menyumbang ke arah perpaduan ummah.”“Kau nak tahu sebab apa jadi macam ni? Sebabnya mereka tak jalankan hukum Allah. Malaysia ni bukan negara Islam, tapi sekular. Sebab tu kita kena dapatkan kuasa ke Putrajaya baru dapat kita betulkan semua ni.”“Aku faham, tapi tak ada ke cara lain yang lebih selamat dan stabil seperti apa yang Said Nursi buat dengan Atarturk, Gulen buat dengan generasi pemimpin Sekularis Turki tegar dulu. Aku

risau macam kes kerajaan-kerajaan Islam kecil (petty kingdoms) yang bersekongkol dengan Kerajaan Kristian dibawah Isabella untuk hancurkan Khilafah Islam yang lebih besar atas nama menegakkan keadilan dan akhirnya semua kerajaan Islam jatuh ditikam belakang oleh Isabella.”

Kes 7:“Kau setuju tak kalau aku kata Jemaah kita ni sebenarnya sangat menjunjung tinggi satu faham (ideology) yang dipanggil political Islam. Ianya sesuatu yang amat baharu dan tidak sama dengan apa yang wujud dalam seperti contoh gerakan al-Sanusiyyah, gerakan Uthman Don Fodio di Hausaland, mahupun al-Muwwahidun yang dipimpin Ibn Tumart. Kita ada sistem tarbiyah kita sendiri, ulamaʾ kita sendiri, semuanya dikategorikan sebagai bersifat haraki. Tengoklah surah pertama yang kita kena faham dalam usrah ialah surah As-Saff. Terus cakap fasal berjemaah yang bersifat tanzim, bukan sangat bicara Jemaah dalam erti kata Ahl Sunnah Wal Jamaah – banding beza Sunni, Shi’ie, Wahhabi, Liberal dan lain-lain. Kita memandang sepi sumber-sumberselain dan di luar Jemaah. Entahlah aku rasa kalau ikutnya surah As-Saff tu bukannya yang paling awlaʾ untuk kita fahamkan anak-anak usrah kita. Patutnya kita kena kupas tafsir ayat Perjanjian di alam al-Mithaq tu sebab aku rasa itu lagi asasi untuk Pandangan Alam Islam. Kita kena kenal diri insani kita dalam erti kata yang sebenar sebelum bercita-cita lebih besar ke tahap negara Islam. Kau tak rasa macam tu ke?”“Kan aku dah cakap, jangan baca buku-buku yang bukan haraki, dan dengar ceramah dengan ulamaʾ bukan haraki. Tengok betapa kelirunya fikrah kau sekarang!

(sekadar selingan untuk sediakan sedikit konteks “bunga rampai” yang paling mudah untuk difahami walaupun tidak menjelaskan kedalaman sebenar apa yang akan saya jelaskan di bawah)

**********

Alhamdulillah banyak pandangan dan kritikan yang diutarakan terhadap penulisan saya tempoh hari yang bertajuk “Sedikit bingkisan berkenaan ulamaʾharaki/siasah dan faham perubahan yang didakyah mereka”. Ini satu wacana sihat. Suka saya jelaskan dalam banyak-banyak komen yang dilontarkan, hanya ada beberapa sahabat saya yang berjaya memahami apa dan ke mana sebenarnya yang ingin saya bawa dan sampaikan. Adapun jawap balas akhi Marwan Bukhari itu sangatlah baik cuma pada hemat saya tiada menusuk kepada persoalan sebenar yang saya telah dan sedang bangkitkan.

Ketahuilah tulisan tersebut seperti saya ketengahkan dengan jelas di dalamnya bukanberkisar pada mawduʿ fiqhiyyah. Apa yang saya cuba bangkitkan seperti sebenarnya berkisar berkenaan mawduʿ ruang bicaranya "epistemic" - asas-asas dan faham ilmu yang menjadi hujjah kepada pengabsahan satu bentuk kelompok ulamaʾ yang baharu itu, yang tiada pernah




timbul jua dalam sejarah kaum Muslimin sebelumnya.

Hendaknya makalah pertama tadi itu, kalau dibaca tanpa jua membaca beberapa pautan yang dimuatkan di dalam nota kakinya khususnya berkenaan Said Bediuzzaman Nursi, tiada mampu tersingkap maʾna yang tersirat disebalik penghujjahan tersebut.

Di peringkat mawduʿ Siasah Syarʿiyyah seperti yang dipertahan hebat oleh akhi Marwan dan akhi Rauf al-Azhari, ana langsung tiada masalah. Kita iʿtiraf peranan ulamaʾ yang mendokong perjuangan tersebut cuma yang ana persoalkan apakah batas-batas seseorang itu tatkala terlibat secara aktif dalam percaturan politik kepartian yaʾni merangkap sebagai seorang politikus yang mana dengan peranan ini telah berlaku satu simbiosis baru ulamaʾ-umaraʾ dalam satu identiti.

Pada hemat ana, perkara ini sangat berpotensi (seperti yang disaksikan di Iran, dimana faham Vilayet Faqih Imam Khomeini itu telah disalah guna hingga terbentuknya satu lapisan penguasa yang menjadikan agama sebagai alat mengekalkan kuasa mereka di pentas politik) menimbulkan konflik tatkala sedang berfungsi di pentas politik kepartian.

Bagi ana, adalah amat sukar untuk seseorang alim itu dapat berlaku adil terhadap dirinya serta latar perjuangannya di pentas politik selaku seorang politikus par excellence yang kadang kala tergelincir daripada menjadi alim tanpa sedar menjadi khutabaʾ par excellence. Dan risiko ini menjadi lebih besar bila terabsah kelompok ulamaʾ haraki/siasah yang sebenarnya bagi ana satu "misnomer in Islamic epistemology".

Ini kerana Siasah Syarʾiyyah itu tiada pernah tertogel dan terpisah dan terasing dan terhumban keluar dari sibghah epistemic Fiqhiyyah dan AUTORITI yaʾni ULIL AMRI dalam hal ini tiada lain tiada bukan Fuqahaʾ dan Usuliyyun. Cukup sudah dengan kategori itu untuk kita angkat menjadi wakil dan jurubicara di medan siasah sebab golongan ini "well-rounded enough" untuk istinbat hukum etc. dalam mengatur cara perjalanan siasah syar'iyyah umat yang sebenarnya salah satu juzuk daripada perana ulamaʾ masani.

Dan disinilah penjelasan Ustaz Raja Mukhlis itu lebih terang dan jelas bilamana beliau telah meleburkan kelewahan label ulamaʾ harakah/siasah itu ke tempat yang sepatutnya iatu harakah Islamiyyah dalam erti kata yang lebih syumul - bukan sekadar tiang seri partai politik berlabelkan Islam.

Kita takut label ulamaʾ haraki/siasah itu tiada lain tiada bukan sebenarnya membuka kepada pintu untuk mengabsahkan ulamaʾ yang pseudo, yang sekadar handal bersiasah tetapi tidak kemas Pandangan Alamnya.

Kalau kita lihat hari ini, tanda-tanda ke arah itu sudah semakin membesar jikalau kalian benar-benar meneliti perkembangan

politik dalam kelompok yang mengangkat dan berselindung disebalik bendera Islam.

Dan semua ini ada kaitan dengan arus modenisasi yang dilayari oleh bahtera gerakan pan-Islamisme bermula awal abad ke-20 yang kini semakin hilang arah ditiup angin Perubahan Ketamadunan Barat - tiada pasti hakikat kemajuan yang dicari dalam mengurus tadbir diri dan Umat.

In short: We do not need to label our good, waraʾ Muslim politicians with sanctified labels of ulamaʾ haraki/siasah as it will create a precedent of another kind of AUTHORITY that has never been created before due to in the past, such AUTHORITIES were already sufficient in the shape of Sufiyyah, Mutakallimun, Fuqahaʾ, Mufassirun, and Muhaddithun. Epistemic problem will abound to rise when legitimacy of such a strange term being co-opted into our luminaries of ulamaʾ which is A VERY IMPORTANT EPISTEMOLOGICAL INSTITUTION THAT BIND US AS A GROUP CALLED AHL-SUNNAH WA'L JAMAAH.

I stress again Ulamaʾ Haraki/Siasah has no place within our Epistemological Authorities due to the sufficient nature of the the type of ulamaʾ we already had in the past and we do not need unnecessary innovation on such terms to be co-opted into our tradition.

17 Mei 2012, 10.40 pm****

Berhubung pertukaran pandangan dengan sahabat-sahabat dari al-Azhar dan Jordan berkenaan isu ulamaʾ haraki/siasah, sebenarnya antara kita lebih banyak persamaan daripada perbedaan. Dari segi akidah, mazhab fiqhiyyah, tassawuf semua sama menerima keautoritian ulamaʾ muhaqqiqin zaman-berzaman. Kita bukan Wahhabi dan jelas dari segi kerangka epistemologi banyak sekali yang sama.

Adapun 'perbezaan' yang timbul itu sebenarnya bukan juga tanda perpecahan atau konflik sebaliknya satu rahmat kerana dengan adanya perbezaan pandangan itulah kedua-dua pihak saling dapat belajar antara satu sama lain. Tapi melihat komen-komen dan jawap balas yang ditujukan kepada saya, seolah-olah penghuraian saya itu ditafsir sebagai satu "serangan" walhal tiada sama sekali melainkan untuk menyelak satu sudut yang mungkin terlepas pandang dan jarang difikirkan secara holistik.

Pengalaman berbahas dengan sahabat-sahabat dari al-Azhar dan Jordan memberitahu saya bahawa kerangka penafsiran permasalahan yang amat bersangkut paut dengan cara "memandang alam" itulah yang membedakan kita.

Mudahnya saya sebenarnya mahu bergerak dari

A --> C

tapi sahabat-sahabat al-Azhari dan Jordan mahu singgah di

A --> B dan B++ --> C

Saya bicara isu tersebut dalam kerangka Ketamadunan dan Faham Ilmu tetapi sahabat-sahabat dari al-Azhar dan Jordan bicara dalam kerangka Fiqhiyyah dan Siyasah Shar’iyyah.

Saya bicara isu tersebut untuk membuka jalan membina Ketamadunan Islam manakala sahabat-sahabat dari al-Azhar dan Jordan mahu singgah ke mukim Negara Islam sebentar walaupun diakhirnya mahu menuju ke tempat yang saya ingin tuju jua.

Kedua-duanya pada hemat saya betul dan menuju ke matlamat yang samaberdasarkan titik bertolak yang sama kerana kita mentasdiqkan kerangka epistemologi yang sama ya’ni berdasarkan manhaj Ahl Sunnah wa’l-Jamaah yang tulen – (bukan Wahhabi, Shi’ie, Liberalisme etc.)

Apa yang membezakan ialah CARA mengenal pasti, menyantuni dan mengemukakan penyelesaian terhadap ranjau dan duri yang bertebaran di atas jalan daʾwah yang kita sama-sama telusuri atau secara teknikalnya dalam Bahasa Inggeris boleh dijelaskan sebagai:

1) Identification of problems, problematization of the problems; 2) Concretizing the identified problems by sifting through the real from pseudo-problems as well as its symptoms, and finally 3) Promulgating and devising the necessary action plan towards engaging such problems in the view to unravel the real, long-lasting solutions rather than intermediary, short-term solutions.

Apakahnya ranjau dan duri yang saya maksudkan tersebut?

Bagi sahabat-sahabat al-Azhar dan Jordan, onak dan duri itu mungkin lebih tampaknya dari segi yang zahir berupa kezaliman pemerintah, kepincangan sistem, ketirisan wang negara, royalti tak dibayar , Malaysia bukan negara Islam, dan banyak lagi yang semuanya saya tanpa sedikit pun berasa shakk dan menidakkan kesemua permasalahan tersebut.

Bagi saya pula ranjau dan duri tersebut berupa serangan bertubi-tubi secara halus oleh golongan bukan Ahl Sunnah Wal Jamaah terhadap kerangka epistemologi dan ontologi kita, serangan sekularisasi sebagai satu program falsafah, mainan realpolitik licik yang berselindung disebalik kebersamaan menentang kezaliman, masalah kehilangan adab dalam sistem pendidikan, kejahilan kaum Muslimin khusus umat Melayu terhadap sejarah ketamadunannya, penyempitan tradisi keilmuan Islam, kegagalan memahami sifat dan rupa-cita asasi Ketamadunan Barat, penyama rataan (leveling) ulamaʾ zaman terdahulu dengan zaman ini dengan mengecil-ngecillan kewibawaan mereka – secara sedar atau tidak, mempolitikkan

perkara yang tak sepatutnya dipolitikkan dan banyak lagi yang jarang sekali diketengahkan oleh para du’at dalam harakah Islamiyyah moden khususnya yang cenderung dan tegar ke arah politik – yang mana kesemua ini menyumbang kepada masalah sebenar kebobrokan yang berlaku dalam masyakarat dalam setiap institusi penting baik politik serta agama.

Perbezaan ini seperti saya jelaskan di atas bukan perbezaan yang memecahkan kita sebaliknya perbezaan yang menuntut kita untuk lebih mengenali dan memahami antara satu sama lain kerana takut-takut apa yang kita tahu dan faham rupanya ada lagi sudut-sudut dan sisi-sisi pandang yang tiada dicerap kerana ketidakmampuan dan ketiadaan pengalaman memahami autoriti yang maʿruf dan faqih benar terhadap cabaran masani juga masa lalu.

Dan pada hemat saya, apa yang saya jelaskan disini sebenarnya bukan hasil tilikan akali tanpa asas sebaliknya adalah saduran daripada kajian dan telaah saya terhadap hujjah dan manhaj tajdid yang digagas oleh al-Ustaz Said Bediuzzaman Nursi dan al-Ustaz Syed Naquib al-Attas.

Perbezaan yang berlaku ini sebenarnya dan sepatutnya memperkayakan kita dan dengan hanya menyedari kekurangan diri kita baru dapat kita belajar antara satu sama lain.

Perbezaan yang kita sedang dan telah saksikan mutakhir ini menuntut kita berfikir lebih dalam “mengapa, mengapa dan mengapa si fulan ini dan si fulan itu berkata dan berhujjah begitu?”

Sukacitanya saya dalam banyak hal khusus yang sudah qatʿi (kita tak pernah tiada bersetuju soal aqidah) sudah selesai. Apa yang ingin saya bangkitkan dan ajak sahabat-sahabat yang menuntu ilmu di Dunia Arab bertitik tolak daripada perbahasan yang sangat menarik ini ialah untuk kita sama-sama memperkasakan Pandangan Alam Islam kita dalam menilai cabaran semasa Kaum Muslimin di peringkat KETAMADUNAN juga KEBANGSAAN.

Saya lihat secara jujur, perbezaan pandangan yang ada dalam mawduʿ ini timbul kerana kita tidak bertemu dan menganalisanya/cerakinkannya menggunakan kerangka yang sama.

Kerangka yang saya maksudkan disini bukan kerangka yang sudah qatʿi itu sebaliknya kerangka yang bersifat tambahan, fard kifayah ya’ni juzuk pemerkasaan pemahaman terhadap cabaran semasa dalam satu bentuk gergasi yang dipanggil Ketamadunan Barat.

Cara untuk memahami Ketamadunan Barat ini sesuatu yang cukup sukar jikalau kita tiada kemampuan mengenalinya terlebih dahulu dalam bentuknya yang paling halus dan yang

paling berbahaya ya’ni Pandangan Alam Ketamadunan Barat itu sendiri. Ianya lebih sukar masani kerana Pandangan Alam Ketamadunan Barat itu telah didakyahkan kepada Kaum Muslimin berserta seluruh kaum-kaum ʿalami (dunia) lain bahawa mereka merupakan Penamat Sejarah (rujuk Francis Fukuyama), satu kesempurnaan palsu yang bersifat sejagat tiada mampu terelak lagi oleh semua kaum yang wujud masani.

Masalah ini bertambah runcing bilamana kita kaum Muslimin sudah tidak kenal lagi siapa diri kita yang sebenarnya baik dari segi persejarahan kuliyyat (universal) mahupun juz’iyyat (bahagian Ketamadunan Islam yang nan pelbagai rupa cita dalam kes kita ialah Ketamadunan Melayu Islam/ Jawi).

Lebih parah Ketamadunan Barat itu bukan lagi tertakluk kepada batas-batas watani mereka sendiri sebaliknya hidup segar-bugar di dalam wilayah asing kita jua. Pendek kata, Ketamadunan Barat itu telah tiba di setiap ceruk dunia malah dalam sanubari kita jua! The West is not ‘there’ it is ‘here’ and ‘now’!

Saya amat sukacita untuk membantu sahabat-sahabat yang sedang tafaqquh fi al-dindi Dunia Arab khusus dari al-Azhar dan Jordan untuk kita sama-sama belajar dan memperkasakan Pandangan Alam Islam dan lawan-lawannya dalam usaha merangka satu sistem penyelesaian yang benar terhadap permasalahan yang benar berbading permasalahan yang palsu-palsu atau sekadar tanda-tanda luaran semata (symptoms).

Apakah dengan belajar di Dunia Arab di pusat-pusat pengajian Islam tersohor lagi bersejarah masih perlu lagi kepada pemerkasaan Pandangan Alam Islam contraPandangan Alam Ketamadunan Barat?

Secara asasi memang tiada diperlukan kalau mana sudah tertanam dan tersemai asas fard ʿayn yang kuat tetapi untuk berinteraksi dengan cabaran masani seperti yang saya jelaskan di atas, amat perlu sekali kita lakukan seperti istilahnya dalam Bahasa Inggeris – “augmentation” ya’ni menjadikan Pandangan Alam Islam kita lebih perkasa untuk mengenal pasti dan memahami permasalahan yang ada kerana banyak daripada asatizah kita tiada upaya mengenal pasti dan memahami permasalahan yang saya ketengahkan di atas – ya’ni Cabaran Ketamadunan Barat secara jelas dan sistemetikberserta keperluan menghurai pertindihan-pertindihan halus yang telah didakyahkan oleh mereka-mereka yang terpasung dalam gelang Modenisme, Neo-Modenisme seperti Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Abduh, al-Afghani dan banyak lagi – menjerat juzuk-juzuk ilmu fard ʿayn dan yang lebih parah ilmu fard kifayah.

Dan Insha-Allah, kesemua cabaran ini sedikit sebanyak dapat difahami dan diatasi dengan memahami kerangka yang diketengahkan oleh al-Ustaz Syed Naquib Al-Attas yang telah

kami di pihak Himpunan Keilmuan Muslim (HAKIM) olah pada peringkat asas dalam Worldview of Islam Discourse Series (WISE). Ada beberapa teman-teman saya dari Indonesia bekas graduan al-Azhar yang telah mengikuti kursus selama setahun ini telah menyatakan rasa penghargaan yang sangat tinggi kerana kursus intensif ini telah memperkayakan dan memberi kerangka yang sangat dinamik untuk berinteraksi dengan khazanah tradisi keilmuan Islam serta tradisi keilmuan Barat tanpa berasa ragu-ragu dan rendah diri. Kata mereka kini sedikit sebanyak telah mampu “connect the dots” dan membuatkan mereka lihat khazanah turāth khususnya sebagai sesuatu yang hidup untuk berhadapan Cabaran Ketamadunan Barat.

Untuk lebih memahami kupasan saya ini, dijemput untuk membaca beberapa potongan perenggan dalam makalah yang ditulis oleh Dr. Joseph Lumbard, "The Decline of Knowledge and the Rise of Ideology in Muslim World" yang termuat dalam bukunya Islam, Fundamentalism and the Betrayal of Tradition (Indiana: World Wisdom, 2009)

Oleh Wan Ahmad Fayhsal19 Mei 2012, 2.30pm.

Some excerpts from the book:

"Not only have many Muslim thinkers demonstrated a shallow understanding of non-Islamic elements, they have also distorted the religion itself. In attempting to reconstruct and reinterpret the Islamic tradition in light of the perceived achievements of the times, modernist thinkers of the past, such as Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Jamāl al-Dīn Afghānī abandoned the rigorous intellectual discernment of traditional Islamic intellectuality - the first outright, the others with more subtlety. They lost sight of their intellectual traditions and unwittingly surrendered the ground of intelligence to a secular humanist tradition, whose ideologies they tried to foist upon other by reading them into their own traditions or simply by adding the adjective "Islamic".

...

Though each has different players with different shades of emphasis, both stringentreformism and liberal modernism constitute artificial limitations of traditional Islamic knowledge inspired by the influence of secular ideologies. This has led to the inversion of Islamic thought and the destruction of Islamic civilization. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr writes, "In trying to render back to Islam its power on the stage of history, many of these movements have disfigured the nature of Islam itself."

...

Liberal modernist Muslim thinkers and radical reformist activists are two sides of the same coin. Whereas medieval thinkers like Ghazālī were able to analyze and utilize tools from outside influences, radical reformists reject them outwardly while submitting inwardly, and modernists attempt to patch them onto the fabric of Islam, some claiming that they have been a part of that fabric all along. Both movements represent a subversion of traditional values and teachings from within the Islamic tradition. In an effort to transform Islamic civilization, each has in fact hastened the onset of the very illnesses they sought to ameliorate. Rather than contemplating and evaluating Western civilization through the Islamic intellectual tradition, modernists have embraced many tenets of Western though out of a deep sense of inferiority - a sense which results from mistaking the power of Western nations for the truth of Western ideologies. Finding these movements within their midst, the reformists have retreated to fanatical adherence and pietistic sentimentalism. The modernists fail to offer solutions because they only provide intermediate solutions which are fideistic and voluntaristic at best. But such a response cannot provide lastings solutions to the challenges posed by the West, because these are at root intellectual challenges which demand an intellectual response.

...

The choice of great thinkers from whom one seeks guidance is not limited to a narrow definition of "orthodoxy", but extends to all those Islamic thinkers, Sunnī and Shīʿī, who have tried to lend clarity to the understanding of reality enjoined by the Qurʾān and ḥadīth. Those intellectuals who have been chosen for this essay are but few luminaries from an extensive tradition one which continues into our own day and is now showing signs of new life. In order for the malaise of the Islamic world to be fully addressed and the radical reform movements to be brought back into the fold of the Islamic tradition, the iḥsānī intellectual tradition needs to be accorded its proper place in a way of life that is fully and truly Islamic. In applying the principles of Islam to the modern world, while avoiding the passionate rhetorical battles which rage around them, the representatives of this tradition exemplify this saying of Abū Saʿīd b. Abī 'l-Khayr:

"A [true] man is one who sits and rises among others, sleeps and eats, and interacts with others in the bazaar, buying and selling, who mixes with people, yet for one moment is not forgetful of God in his heart."

But such a path is not achieved by focusing upon reform of the world, of Islam, or of one's nation. It is first and foremost a reform of one's self."

____________________________________________________________________

For preview:http://books.google.com.my/booksid=uTUnWkJ4kmMC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

Short comments:Same points as raised by Prof. Al-Attas although Prof. Al-Attas have more gravitas in explaining those in his seminal works such as Risalah Untuk Kaum Muslimin and Islam and Secularism.

For further explication of such topics can be attained in WISE of HAKIM:http://www.hakim.org.my/wise/course-module

1st SemesterModule 1: The Worldview of Islam: A Brief OverviewModule 2: The Place and Role of the Holy Qur'an and SunnahModule 3: The Nature and Reality of ManModule 4: The Cosmos as the Created BookModule 5: The Nature and Purpose of KnowledgeModule 6: The Meaning and Experience of Happiness

2nd SemesterModule 7: The External Problems of the Muslims: The Challenges of Western CultureModule 8: The Threats of Secularization towards the Natural World, Politics and ValuesModule 9: The Internal Problems of the Muslims: The Corruption of Knowledge, the Loss of Adab and the Rise of False LeadersModule 10: The Islamization of Contemporary Knowledge and the Dewesternization of Thought and LanguageModule 11: Ta'dib as the Concept of Education in IslamModule 12: The Advent of Islam in the Histories of the Western and Malay Worlds

3rd SemesterModule 13: EpistemologyModule 14: Islamic PyschologyModule 15: Islamic TheologyModule 16: The Study of Religion: Its History and PhilosophyModule 17: Philosophy and Ethical TheoryModule 18: The Philosophy of ScienceModule 19: Tafsir, Ta'wil and HermeneuticsModule 20: Usul Al-Fiqh: Siyasah Shar'iyyahModule 21: Usul Al-Fiqh: Maqasid Al-Shari'iyyahModule 22: Ethics and LeadershipModule 23: The Study of Malay Civilization: Its Philosophy and The Role of IslamModule 24: Contemporary Islamic Thought

Sufism

http://www.hakim.org.my/wise/course-module

http://books.google.com.my/booksid=uTUnWkJ4kmMC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

http://books.google.com.my/booksid=uTUnWkJ4kmMC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

The EssentialsMark Sedgwick

New paperback edition

For more than a millennium, Sufism has been the core of the spiritual experience of countless Muslims. As the chief mystical tradition of Islam, it has helped to shape the history of Islamic societies. Although it is the Sufi face of Islam that has often appealed to Westerners, Sufis and Sufism remain mysterious to many in the West, and are still widely misunderstood. In this new, redesigned paperback edition of this bestselling book, a scholar with long experience of Sufism in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe succinctly presents the essentials of Sufism and shows how Sufis live and worship, and why. As well as what Sufism is and where it comes from, the book discusses Sufi orders not only in the Islamic world but also in the West. The political, social, and economic significance of Sufism are outlined, and the question of how and why Sufism has become one of the more controversial aspects of contemporary Islamic religious life is addressed. This book assumes no prior knowledge of the subject. It is a penetrating and concise introduction for everyone interested in Islam

and Islamic societies. Mark Sedgwick took his doctorate from the University of Bergen, Norway, in Islamic history. He has been teaching at the American University in Cairo, working on and with Sufis, for more than ten

years.

Muhammad Abduh A BiographyMark Sedgwick

A new biography of the influential Islamic thinker

In Egypt, Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) is now generally remembered as a great scholar and a patriot, a great renewer of Islam, one of those who awakened the nation—though the details of this greatness have grown somewhat fuzzy with time. Among scholars, in the Muslim world and the west, he is known as Islam’s leading modernist. For some, his modernism consisted of creating a synthesis of Islam and modern thought; for others, it consisted of the bridge he built between the old world and the new. Some see him as having revived true Islam, some as having proposed an alternative to true Islam. One question that this new biography addresses, then, is quite what his modernism consisted of. Another question is where his modernism came from. And a final question is what happened to it

after his death. Mark Sedgwick is associate professor of Arab history, culture, and society at Aarhus University, and previously taught for many years at The American University in Cairo. His other books include Sufism: The

Essentials (AUC Press, 2003). English edition

Nov 2009

160 pp.

Paperback

15X23 cm

$24.95

LE 120.00

ISBN

978 977 416 331 9

For sale only in the Middle EastAda dua sayap sikap saleh: Saleh kepada Tuhan dan saleh kepada sesama manusia tanpa mesti rikuh karena perbedaan agama, etnis, dan identitas

Makkah: One Hundred Years Ago [Hardcover]Angelo Pesce (Author)

Or c. snouck hurgronje ‘s remarkable albums, edited with a new introduction, by angelo pesce

Hardcover: 128 pages

Publisher: Intl Specialized Book Service Inc (December 1987)

Language: English

Tanah Gayo dan penduduknya (Seri INIS) by C. Snouck Hurgronje (1996)Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century: Daily Life, Customs and Learning. The Moslims of the East-Indian Archipelago (Brill Classics in Islam) by C. Snouck Hurgronje (Nov 2006)

Formats Pric

e

New

Used

The Achehnese: V. 1 by C. Snouck Hurgronje (Apr 27, 2009)Formats Price

Paperback Order in the next 3 hours to get it by Thursday, May 24 . Eligible for FREE Super Saver Shipping.

$29.99

Hardcover

Other Formats: Unknown Binding

The Achehnese by C. Snouck Hurgronje, A. W. S. O'Sullivan and R. J. Wilkinson (Apr 30, 2008)Formats Price

Hardcover Order in the next 8 hours to get it by Thursday, May 24 . $150.0

$140.00

http://www.amazon.com/Achehnese-C-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/B002K692G0/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_2_title_1_har?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-2

http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/157898663X/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_3_np_1_main_olp?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-3&condition=new

http://www.amazon.com/The-Achehnese-C-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/157898663X/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_3_bnp_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-3

http://www.amazon.com/The-Achehnese-C-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/157898663X/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_3_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-3


http://www.amazon.com/The-Achehnese-C-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/157898663X/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_3?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-3

http://www.amazon.com/Achehnese-C-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/0404158218/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_2_title_2_unk?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-2

http://www.amazon.com/The-Achehnese-C-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/B002K2R75W/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_2_bnp_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-2

http://www.amazon.com/The-Achehnese-C-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/B002K2R75W/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_2_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-2

http://www.amazon.com/The-Achehnese-C-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/B002K2R75W/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_2_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-2

http://www.amazon.com/The-Achehnese-C-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/B002K2R75W/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-2

http://www.amazon.com/Mekka-Latter-Part-19th-Century/dp/9004154493/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-1



http://www.amazon.com/Tanah-Gayo-penduduknya-Seri-INIS/dp/9798116453/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_13?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781723&sr=1-13

Only 1 left in stock - order soon.

Eligible for FREE Super Saver Shipping and 1 more promotion

0

Katalog der malaiischen Handschriften der Koniglichen Bibliothek in Berlin (Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland) (German Edition) by C. Snouck Hurgronje (1989)Formats Price New

Hardcover $142.15

Kumpulan karangan Snouck Hurgronje (Seri INIS) by C. Snouck Hurgronje (1993)Formats Price New

Unknown Binding

Minor German correspondences of C. Snouck Hurgronje: From libraries in France, Germany, Sweden, and The Netherlands (Abdoel-Ghaffaar) (German Edition) by C. Snouck Hurgronje (1987)Formats Price New

Paperback

Mohammedanism: Lectures in Its Origin, Its Religious and Political Growth and Its Present State by C. Snouck Hurgronje (Jun 1981)Formats Price New

Hardcover

Aceh: Rakyat dan adat istiadatnya (Seri INIS) by C. Snouck Hurgronje(1996)Formats Price New

Unknown Binding Out of Print--Limited Availability

Makkah: One Hundred Years Ago by C. Snouck Hurgronje (Dec 1987)Formats Price New

Hardcover Out of Print--Limited Availability

Nasihat-nasihat C. Snouck Hurgronje semasa kepegawaiannya kepada pemerintah Hindia Belanda, 1889-

http://www.amazon.com/Mohammedanism-Lectures-Religious-Political-Present/dp/0830500383/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_7_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-7

http://www.amazon.com/Minor-German-correspondences-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/9071220044/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_6_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-6

http://www.amazon.com/Kumpulan-karangan-Snouck-Hurgronje-Seri/dp/9798116178/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_5_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-5

http://www.amazon.com/malaiischen-Handschriften-Koniglichen-Verzeichnis-orientalischen/dp/3515051449/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_4_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-4

http://www.amazon.com/Nasihat-nasihat-Hurgronje-kepegawaiannya-pemerintah-1889-1936/dp/9798116054/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_10?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-10


http://www.amazon.com/Makkah-One-Hundred-Years-Ago/dp/0907151361/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_9_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-9

http://www.amazon.com/Makkah-One-Hundred-Years-Ago/dp/0907151361/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_9?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-9

http://www.amazon.com/Aceh-Rakyat-adat-istiadatnya-Seri/dp/9798116488/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_8_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-8

http://www.amazon.com/Aceh-Rakyat-adat-istiadatnya-Seri/dp/9798116488/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_8_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-8

http://www.amazon.com/Aceh-Rakyat-adat-istiadatnya-Seri/dp/9798116488/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_8?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-8

http://www.amazon.com/Mohammedanism-Lectures-Religious-Political-Present/dp/0830500383/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_7?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-7

http://www.amazon.com/Mohammedanism-Lectures-Religious-Political-Present/dp/0830500383/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_7?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-7

http://www.amazon.com/Minor-German-correspondences-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/9071220044/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_6?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-6



http://www.amazon.com/Kumpulan-karangan-Snouck-Hurgronje-Seri/dp/9798116178/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_5?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-5

http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/3515051449/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_4_np_1_main_olp?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-4&condition=new

http://www.amazon.com/malaiischen-Handschriften-Koniglichen-Verzeichnis-orientalischen/dp/3515051449/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_4?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-4



http://www.amazon.com/The-Achehnese-C-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/157898663X/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_3_bnp_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-3

http://www.amazon.com/The-Achehnese-C-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/157898663X/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_3_det?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-3#productPromotions

http://www.amazon.com/The-Achehnese-C-Snouck-Hurgronje/dp/157898663X/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_3_det?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-3#productPromotions


1936 (Seri khusus INIS) by C. Snouck Hurgronje (1990)Formats Price New

Unknown Binding Out of Print--Limited Availability

Orientalism and Islam: The letters of C. Snouck Hurgronje to Th. Noldeke from the Tubingen University Library (Abdoel-Ghaffaar) (Dutch Edition) by C. Snouck Hurgronje (1985)Formats Price New

Paperback Out of Print--Limited Availability

Scholarship and friendship in early Islamwissenschaft: The letters of C. Snouck Hurgronje to I. Goldziher from the Oriental Collection of the Library ... Budapest (Abdoel-Ghaffaar) (German Edition) by C. Snouck Hurgronje (1985)

Merajut Maut: Membaca Antologi Berjalan Ke Utara

(Mengenang Moh. Wan Anwar)Oleh Wahyu Arya

Ada banyak tema yang menjadi rahim bagi lahirnya sebuah puisi. Keberagaman fenomena pada peristiwa sehari-hari, setidaknya menjadi sumur tanpa dasar (pinjam istilah Arifin C. Noer) yang tidak pernah kering digali oleh para pencari kata-kata. Tema cinta, kesunyian, kritik sosial, kecemasan eksistensial hingga kematian—sekadar menyebut beberapa contoh—telah banyak digumuli hingga melahirkan puisi dengan beragam gaya pengucapan.

Kematian sebagai salah satu tema yang terus mengilhami lahirnya puisi pada dasarnya adalah peristiwa keseharian yang sudah akrab dengan manusia. Pada sebuah puisi, maut menjadi sesuatu yang bervariasi dan terus dimaknai terutama oleh para penyair. Kematian yang sudah merupakan hal yang terberi (given) ternyata tidak selesai pada traktat filsafat, eskatologi kitab suci, dan ilmu medis. Penyair terus menerobos pada wilayah pemaknaan ulang mengenai kematian. Apabila yang pertama mencoba menekan respon subjek diri dengan merumuskan konsep-konsep ajeg dengan pikiran, iman dan reduksi ilmu pengetahuan, maka yang kedua (sengaja?) membiarkannya tetap pada posisinya yang berjarak dari subjek. Pada titik ini bahasa puitik bisa menjadi alternatif yang mungkin dapat

http://www.amazon.com/Scholarship-friendship-early-Islamwissenschaft-Abdoel-Ghaffaar/dp/9071220036/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_12?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-12



http://www.amazon.com/Orientalism-Islam-Hurgronje-University-Abdoel-Ghaffaar/dp/907122001X/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_11_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-11

http://www.amazon.com/Orientalism-Islam-Hurgronje-University-Abdoel-Ghaffaar/dp/907122001X/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_11?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-11



http://www.amazon.com/Nasihat-nasihat-Hurgronje-kepegawaiannya-pemerintah-1889-1936/dp/9798116054/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_10_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-10

http://www.amazon.com/Nasihat-nasihat-Hurgronje-kepegawaiannya-pemerintah-1889-1936/dp/9798116054/ref=la_B001JO69CO_1_10_title_0_main?ie=UTF8&qid=1337781642&sr=1-10


mendekatinya dengan alegori dan metafora karena acuan (referen) pada tingkat denotasi selalu timbul dan tenggelam dalam ranah konseptual.Pada tulisan ini kematian menjadi sesuatu yang ambivelen atara fenomena di satu sisi dan sebagai tema pada sebuah puisi di sisi lain. Sebagai fenomena kematian telah menjadi natureyang telah terberi dari sononya. Kehadirannya telah mengukuhkan dualisme hidup dan mati pada kesadaran manusia. Sedang pada tema, kematian menjadi culture yang dekat dengan pemaknaan terus-menerus dengan pengucapan yang baru (pada puisi). Hal yang kedua dimungkinkan karena karya sastra selalu menghadirkan perspektif dengan cara berbeda. Perbedaan tersebut mungkin sekait dengan seberapa jauh intensitas penyair bergumul di dalamnya. Kematian yang merenggut nyawa pada peristiwa tsunami di Aceh misalnya, memiliki kesan yang berbeda dengan korban kecelakaan lalu lintas di tengah kota. Walaupun pada keduanya bertemu pada peristiwa kematian, namun keterlibatan subjek(tivitas) di dalamnya membuat peristiwa yang sama menjadi dua “pengalaman” yang berbeda.

Sebagai contoh Chairil pernah menulis sajak berjudul “Nisan”. Pada sajak tersebut Chairil menumpahkan kesedihannya karena sosok nenek yang sangat dicintainya meninggal dunia.

Bukan kematian benar menusuk kalbuKeridlaanmu menerima segala tibaTak kutahu setinggi itu atas debudan duka maha tuanbertahta[1]

Oktober, 1942

Ada suasana hikmat dalam puisi tersebut dan pedihnya perpisahan si aku lirik dengan kau lirik di dalamnya. Dengan gaya tutur yang menohok pada pokok persoalan Chairil telah menunjukkan betapa kematian yang sudah menjadi hal yang niscaya dari kehidupan tetap saja menggoreskan duka yang mendalam bagi orang yang ditinggalkan. Larik duka yang maha tuan bertahta mungkin tidak akan ada seandainya hubungannya dengan sang nenek tidak begitu dekat seperti hubungannya dengan sang ayah misalnya. Hubungan kedekatan Chairil dengan sang nenek mungkin karena setelah kedua orang tuanya bercerai ia menemukan kasih sayang tulus luar biasa dari nenek dan terutama ibunya.

Apabila Chairil melihat kematian sebagai penyerahan yang tinggi atas debu dan keihlasan luar biasa lain halnya


dengan Paul Celan. Penyair berdarah Yahudi yang terkenal dengan sajaknya yang berjudul “Fuga Maut” (Todesfuge) ini sangat lekat dengan sajak yang gelap pekat. Kematian dalam puisi Celan tidak hanya menimpa kedua orang tuanya karena kebiadaban tentara Jerman tetapi sudah merenggut Kemanusiaan (degan K besar) pada jamannya. Pada kepedihan itulah Celan menulis maut sebagai susu hitam dini hari/ kami reguk saat senja/ kami reguk siang dan pagi kami reguk malam/ kami reguk dan reguk/ kami gali kuburan di udara di sana orang berbaring tak berdesakkan//. Kemudian Celan menambahkan /ia menghardik ayo mainkan maut lebih merdu/ maut adalah maestro dari Jerman/ ia menghardik ayo gesek biola lebih kelam/.[2]

Kematian yang dirasakan Chairil sungguh berbeda dengan Celan yang terkondisikan oleh kerasnya kamp konsentrasi, pembunuhan masal, dan tipisnya harapan hidup di tengah kecamuk kesewenang-wenangan penguasa. Setelah bertahun-tahun dalam pelarian, kehidupan bagi Celan tak lebih dari sekadar “Fuga” atau dalam bahasa Latin berarti “pelarian” yang tak ke mana pun selain pada akhirnya menyongsong kematian itu sendiri. Putus asa yang luar biasa dari pengejaran satu ke pengejaran lain semakin memperkokoh warna kehidupan yang melulu gelap (susu hitam).

***Membaca antologi puisi Berjalan Ke Utara (Antologi

Puisi Mengenang Moh. Wan Anwar), kematian baik sebagai tema maupun fenomena menjadi sumber pemaknaan bagi 76 puisi yang terhimpun di dalamnya. Wan Anwar (selanjutnya MWA) dan karya-karyanya yang tidak sedikit berbicara soal kematian tidak ubahnya seperti rajutan “teks” yang terus diurai kembali oleh ke 76 penyair ke dalam bentuk pengucapannya masing-masing. Dalam proses mengurai tersebut sebagian penyair ada yang mampu menarik benang-benangnya dengan baik untuk merajut menjadi rajutan baru khas miliknya namun ada juga yang malah membuat kusut dan jatuh sebagai common sense.

Perbedaan rajutan baru para penyair di dalam antologi ini mungkin dipengaruhi oleh latar belakang masing-masing penyair. Latar belakang tersebut bisa sebagai kondisi sosial yang mempengaruhi cara memandang dunia yang terepresentasikan ke dalam bentuk pengucapan.[3] Kematian dalam hal ini telah mengalami perluasan makna sedemikian rupa ke dalam pencarian bentuk estetik yang unik. Maka wajar kiranya apabila mayoritas penyair dalam antologi ini



berlomba-lomba dalam merengkuh unikum tadi. Sebagian sudah dapat merengkuhnya namun sebagian lagi malah terjebak pada gaya penuturan biasa.

Ada beberapa puisi yang menurut saya sudah mengurai dan merajut dirinya sebagai teks baru yang khas. Puisi Budi Setyawan yang berjudul “Bulan Sabit di Serang” telah menjadikan puisi sebagai medium silaturahmi kepada puisi yang ditulis penyair lain. Komunikasi tersebut sangat khas dan personal karena makna tertunda oleh idiom dan simbol yang dibangun. kumengeja sajakmu yang tegar menembus kabutdi tubir musim, di kamar pengantinsegolak laut yang mengejar angindi mana karang, di mana sarang

Puisi ini sebagai respons aku lirik terhadap puisi lain yang berkisah tentang laut. Digambarkan bagaimana lautan yang bergolak oleh badai ternyata tidak lebih dari teduh kamar pengantin. Dalam gejolak yang berkecamuk itu bukan malah rasa gentar terhadap bahaya yang menunggu tetapi pencarian (karang—sarang) rupanya lebih menggoda untuk terus bertahan sebelum dapat menemukan.

dedaun kisah berguguran, menyusutmalam menjelma selembut maut

Jika kematian menjadi hal yang tidak bisa dihindari, maka harapan seolah menjadi jalan bagi hilangnya sesuatu yang berharga pada waktu kini. Harapan sebagai simplisitas waktu yang akan terjadi (future) setelah waktu kini menjadikannya sebagai titik terakhir untuk tidak jatuh pada krisis. Harapan menjadi cahaya—walau tidak sepenuh purnama—tetapi justru pada sisa sabit akan terus berhamburan kidung yang menderas bagai sungai (gambaran pribadi MWA?) yang tidak pernah letih mencari jati-diri tidak sebagai orang Cianjur atau orang Serang. Tetapi sebagai diri yang kokoh dalam kediriannya.

ya di Serang,bulan sabit masih akan terus melafalkan barzanji cahayabuat sungai sungai yang tekun mencari

Bekasi, 2010

Kematian sudah kadung dianggap sebagai sebuah perjalanan. Melalui kitab suci kita mengenal alam barzah,

negeri akhirat, surga, neraka, dan sebagainya. Pada sebuah puisi tempat perhentian itu mungkin menjadi hal yang nisbi karena bisa jadi keberangkatan pada perjalanan pertama menjadi kedatangan di tempat lain begitu seterusnya. Jika saja salah satu tempat di atas dipastikan menjadi tujuan dari sebuah perjalanan maka puisi tidak lagi menghadirkan ruang bagi pembaca untuk berpartisipasi di dalamnya. Sebaliknya pemberangkatan dari tempat yang pasti (riil) menuju ke arah entah justru memungkinkan teks pada pemaknaan selanjutnya. Pembaca akan mencari sesuatu yang tidak hadir pada teks tapi terasa ada (absen) pada dirinya. Puisi Delvi Yandra dengan judul “Kereta Terakhir” telah mencoba memasuki wilayah kemungkinan itu. dari cianjur, kereta melaju ke utara jauh, jauh sekalitetapi kedatanganmu seperti desau anginmelesat dan berkitaran di sepanjang peron …………………………………………kini, rindu tak ada batasnyaserupa kasidah yang kau tuliskandi stasiun yang kau tinggalkan

Padang, 2010

MWA yang dilahirkan di Cianjur pada 5 Maret 1970 menjadi semacam acuan awal dalam sajak ini. Tetapi acuan awal itu segera dibatalkan karena perkara ruang menjadi kabur karena kematian memicu ambivalensi yang nyata dan yang maya. Akibat dari tak terumuskannya ruang tadi rindu pun menjadi tak terbatas pada seseorang. Rindu justru bergantung pada apa pun yang ditinggalkan kau lirik pada aku lirik. Idiom kasidah, sebagai medium untuk mengenang kau lirik dalam puisi di atas, MWA pernah menulis puisi masih dengan tema maut dengan judul ”Kasidah Banten"

karena aku telah datangkuterima cintamu di ujung

pedangkarena kau telah menjemputkuterima hatimu semurni

maut...........................................(Kompas, 2005)

Persentuhan penyair dengan fenomena kematian dalam sebuah puisi tidak melahirkan definisi mengenai apa dan bagaimana kematian itu terjadi. Persentuhan itu bersifat spontan dan tanpa pretensi. Maka yang terjadi dari persentuhan demikian bukan lagi berangkat dari ide tentang kematian tetapi getar gamang mengenainya. Usaha penangkapan makna yang berulang kali luput namun terus menggoda penyair untuk meresponsnya.

Pada sajak yang lain, Sulaiman Djaya dengan puisi ”Terbanglah Mautku, Terbangkan Hidupku” menghadirkan kematian sebagai ”ruang” pada nol referensi. Ruang tersebut pada akhirnya lesap dalam semesta yang [ke]hilang[an] nama. ”Kehilangan” tentu berbeda dengan ”tidak ber-”. Proses lebelisasi melalui nama sudah terjadi namun ketika maut memutus diri dengan dunia lebelisasi tersebut gugur karena ruang menjadi tidak terbatas dan melampaui representasi ”nama” tadi. Negeri pada puisi ini merupakan representasi maut yang telah mendorong diri pada kondisi liminalitas ruang liyan secara total.

Terbanglah mautku, terbangkan aku ke negeri terujung,negeri yang sama-sama tak kita kenal, negeri resahkudi semesta hilang nama. Negeri kata-kataku yang kau curiantara larik dan spasi. Negeri putih yang telah sekian lamakuraba dengan sepasang mata yang kau cintai ini.

Selain ruang yang mengalami surplus pemaknaan selanjunya adalah waktu. A. Teeuw pernah melakukan pembacaan pada tiga sajak Sapardi Djoko Damono yang berjudul: “Saat Sebelum Berangkat”, “Berjalan di Belakang Jenazah”, dan “Sehabis Mengantar Jenazah”.[4]Pada esai yang berjudul “Tritunggal Tentang Waktu” tersebut Teeuw menemukan waktu pada ketiga sajak tersebut merupakan representasi dari maut. Pada antologi ini terdapat dua puisi yang secara eksplisit bersentuhan dengan perkara waktu. Keduanya menggunakan waktu dalam bentuk yang lampau dengan penambahan anaphora: itu. Puisi pertama berjudul “Kepada Penyair yang Telah Pindah Rumah” karya Dian Hardiana.

Waktu itu, partere tidak setenang ini


sesedih ini. Ikan-ikan bersisik merah, bermata birumenggambar lingkaran pada kolam dan ingatan.

Waktu pada bait di atas merupakan penegasan dari dua momen yang berbeda. Lampau dan kini. Ketika waktu itu diujarkan, maka kasadaran pada yang telah lewat menjadi hadir kembali pada saat ini. Jika pembacaan Teeuw pada esai “Tritunggal Tentang Waktu” kita amini maka waktu yang eksplisit pada puisi ini boleh jadi berkelindan dengan perkara maut juga. Hanya saja maut yang absen pada puisi ini tidak menjadi peristiwa sakral dalam bentuk upacara tetapi hanya terjadi pada taraf kesadaran aku lirik ketika telah berlalunya peristiwa atau perginya seseorang dalam kehidupan. Akibatnya perasaan kosong sepi menjadikan aku lirik gamang dalam kehilangan. …………………………………………Lalu kepada kota dan hujan ini mesti kutitipkanjantung berhenti dan cinta begitu matisedang aku selalu takut ditinggalkan di saat-saat seperti ini.siapa

Pada puisi lain yang berjudul “Ingatan” karya Dian Hartati, penghayatan kepada waktu lebih terasa kuat. Bentuk pengulangan yang efektif menjadikan penghayatan terhadap waktu begitu intens. Waktu bukan hanya memungkinkan terjadinya peristiwa dalam ruang tetapi waktu menjadi berarti justru karena pada ruang itu peristiwa yang hadir mendorong aku lirik menandai waktu. Dari seluruh usia seseorang tentu tidak semua peristiwa yang datang menjadi kenangan yang berkesan. Ada saat tertentu saja ketika kesadaran tersentuh oleh peristiwa kemudian mengendap dalam kesadaran untuk kemudian hadir kembali di waktu yang akan datang. Maut bisa saja menjadi salah satu yang dapat membangkitkan kembali ingatan tersebut entah pada seseorang yang telah tiada atau pada peristiwa yang menyertai kehadirnya. waktu itu, aku sedang jatuh cinta pada lautkau tahu, kekasihku berasal dari lautdan aku pun menandai waktu

Waktu pada titik tertentu dapat menjadi jalan bagi maut. Keduanya tidak dapat dipisahkan. Jika maut hanya mungkin karena adanya waktu yang membilang usia, maka waktu jugalah yang memungkinkan maut menjemput seseorang. Jika hidup dimulai dari lahirnya seseorang ke dunia maka waktu hadir bagi seseorang saat hembusan

nafas pertama.

setelah waktu dapat hadirkau berkata:waktu terus beringsutberlayarlah dengan perahu kayuseperti maut*lain waktu,ketika aku mengelilingi pulaupulau di nusantarakau hanya memandanglantang berujarkau akan tahu darat dan laut kau akan tahu darat kau akan tahu laut darat dan laut*

SudutBumi, Mei 2010

Pada bait kedua sajak ini, penyair menyisipkan puisi MWA yang bejudul ”Berjalan Ke Utara”. Pada sajak tersebut MWA seperti mengingatkan kembali bahwa kita tidak mungkin lari dari kematian. Tidak hanya pada sajak ini MWA berbicara tentang kematian. Antologi puisinya yang berjudul Sebelum Senja Selesai (2002) dan kumpulan cerpennya yang berjudul Sepasang Maut (2004) seperti ingin berpesan kepada kita bahwa perjalanan hidup kita tidak akan ke mana pun selain dari dan akan selalu menuju maut. Tetapi kesadaran terhadap datangnya maut tersebut ternyata tidak malah jatuh pada skap fatalistik. Bahwa sebelum senja selesai harus ada yang dikerjakan; harus ada yang ditinggalkan. Pada dua kumpulan karya MWA tersebut maut bergema pada 76 penyair dalam antologi Berjalan Ke Utara ini.

Selain selalu digambarkan sebagai sesuatu yang murung kelam, maut rupanya tidak bisa lepas dari hal yang paradoks antara pemakluman dan ketakmengetian akan dunia dibaliknya. Memang benar bahwa hidup hanya menunda kekalahan, tetapi kekalahan itu ternyata bukanlah final yang memasung untuk merenungkan bagaimana perjumpaan adalah detik dimana perpisahan segera dimulai setelahnya. Sampai di sini, kenanangan semacam pemantik bagaimana renungan itu hadir pada seseorang. Rozi Kembara melalui ”Doa Pengantar Tidur” seperti menegaskan kembali bahwa: benar kamu tertidur, matamu begitu dalam sedalam duka/ yang meruncing di sekujur tubuh kami. tubuhmu dingin, sedingin/ perasaan kami yang

mempertanyakan kembali bahasa gaib yang berjalinan/ dalam setiap pertemuan dan perpisahan.

Demikianlah maut ternyata menjadi semacam titik di mana telah menjadi tempat silaturahmi para penyair dalam antologi ini. Sebagai ucapan selamat jalan atas perpisahan kepada almarhum Moh. Wan Anwar, penyair Ahmadun Yosi Herfanda menghadirkan kematian sebagai jalan panjang tempat pengembaraan baru aku lirik dengan Sang Kekasih.

Karena cinta, Tuhan mencegatLangkah lelaki tegar ituTuhan ingin langkah sang lelakiHanya menuju padaNya:maka damailah ia di pangkuanNya

Tangerang, 2010 (”Lelaki Tegar”)[5]

Kini, telah sempurnalah apa yang ditulis MWA dalam puisi-puisinya. Ia telah menyatu dengan karyanya menjadi teks yang utuh. Menjadi rajutan maut yang kini diurai kembali dan dirajut dengan bentuk yang bervariasi oleh penyair dalam antologi Berjalan Ke Utara ini. Tabik!

Sumber tulisan: Nandurin Karang Awak: Cultivate the Land Within (2011)

1Chairil Anwar, Aku Ini Binatang Jalang. (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2007) hal. 3[2] Paul Celan, Candu dan Ingatan. (Jakarta: Horison, 2005) hal. 47[3] Lihat Goldmann via Raman Selden, Panduan Pembaca Teori Sastra Masa Kini. (Yogyakarta: UGM Press, 1991), hal. 37

[4] A. Teeuw, Tergantung Pada Kata. (Bandung: Pustaka Jaya, 1983) hal. 95[5] Antologi Berjalan Ke Utara: Mengenang Moh. Wan Anwar (Bandung: ASAS UPI) hal. 16

Hasan Ali enggan ulas fatwa demo Qaradhawi Presiden Jalur Tiga (JATI) Datuk Hasan Ali berkata beliau tidak dapat mengulas pandangan ulama disegani Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi yang menyebut bahawa perbuatan menyertai demonstrasi sebagai satu perkara harus bagi orang Islam.

Namun, beliau berkata pandangan Qaradhawi itu tidak hanya






terhenti setakat mengharuskannya sahaja.

"Saya tidak fikir dia kata boleh (berdemonstrasi), habis di situ. Saya tidak fikir begitu. Tapi boleh (berdemonstrasi) kalau tujuannya murni, kalau anggota yang melaksana mempunyai akhlak, syariat yang jelas," katanya.

Hasan bagaimanapun berkata beliau tidak dapat mengulas lanjut fatwa yang dikeluarkan Qaradhawi kerana beliau hanya seorang ahli politik dan bukannya seorang mufti atau seorang ahli fikah.

"Saya bukan mufti saya tak berani nak kata harus tak harus. Setiap kes harus dilihat mengikut sudut tertentu," katanya.

Beliau ditanya demikian kerana fatwa oleh Qaradhawi dibuat atas perjalanan demonstrasi di Dataran Tahrir di Mesir untuk menuntut demokrasi yang turut melibatkan keganasan dan pergeseran dengan pasukan keselamatan.

Fatwa oleh Qaradhawi itu ditimbulkan ketua penerangan PKR Dr Muhammad Nur Manuty dalam satu kenyataan semalam.

Ia antara lainnya menyatakan bahawa demonstrasi harus kerana merupakan "salah satu kaedah untuk membebaskan rakyat dari cengkaman pemerintahan yang zalim, tidak adil serta tidak memberikan kebebasan rakyat bersuara dan bergerak dalam suasana yang aman."

Namun, Hassan tetap mempertahankan keputusan Ahad lalu oleh Jawatankuasa Fatwa Kebangsaan yang mengharamkan menyertai demonstrasi yang bertujuan tidak baik, melanggar undang-undang serta mencetuskan huru-hara dan kekacauan.

"Tak perlu ragu, kita lantik mereka mesti sebab mereka berilmu... Ada di antara mereka yang hafal hadis dan hafal al-Quran.

"Fatwa ini bukan senang-senang, saya tahu bukan mudah. Entah berapa kitab yang mereka rujuk," katanya.

Beliau juga percaya keputusan jawatankuasa itu hanya merujuk kepada perhimpunan seperti BERSIH 3.0 yang berlangsung pada 28 April lalu.

Jelasnya, beliau tiada masalah dengan tujuan asal perhimpunan tersebut untuk menuntut pilihan raya bersih dan adil.

"Tapi bila sampai ke lapangan, hendak merdekakan Dataran Merdeka, jadi mini revolusi pula yang hendak diketengahkan," katanya.

Perkara sama dinyatakan Perdana Menteri Datuk Seri Najib Razak pada Jumaat lalu – bahawa perhimpunan BERSIH 3.0

diadakan untuk mengguling kerajaan yang dipilih secara demokrasi.

Kumpulan berkenaan juga berhasrat untuk menawan Dataran Merdeka seperti di Dataran Tahrir, Mesir bagi menunjukkan gambaran bahawa kerajaan tidak boleh mengawal keadaan, kata Najib.

It's easy to talk about values, about what's right and wrong when one is standing around the water cooler at the office, or in surroundings where everyone agrees with us. It's easy to say, for example, that we are not a racist. But what if a friend says something like, "I don't want my daughter dating a (fill in the blank)", or "I think that new guy is gay, he probably has Aids." Do we stand up for what's right? Do we let the remark pass?

Dr. King's quote is saying a person's actions are how we judge them (measure them). Do we live what our value or just talk about it? Do we make a stand against bigotry or remain silent when confronted with it? Are we willing to act on something that's currently an unpopular view, even if we may suffer some consequences?

Sitting here typing on ABC, in the comfort of my own home, I can safely say whatever I want to. But when the chips are down, lives or safety are on the line, will I stand up for civil rights even if I may sacrifice friends, a job, or my life? Salute Dr.Farouk Musa.

Gerakan Wahhabiyyah dan Ulama Melayu TradisionalIni hanyalah secebis rumusan yang saya perolehi daripada beberapa blog rakan serta kajian saya sendiri untuk kita merenungi kembali sejarah dahulu bagi memahami apa yang berlaku, khususnya tempoh antara masa sesudah kematian Syeikh Muhammad bin 'Abdul Wahhab sehingga kebangkitan kembali ulama-ulama Wahhabiyyah selepas tahun 1343H. Sejarah adalah penting sebagai panduan untuk kita merancang dan mengurus masa depan.

1. Syeikh Muhammad bin 'Abdul Wahhab telah meninggal dunia pada tahun 1206H. Maka gerakan dakwahnya diteruskan oleh pengikut-pengikut beliau sesudah itu. Bagaimanapun, gerakan ini tidak terus kuat kerana ia tetap mengalami pasang surutnya.

2. Syeikh Ahmad al-Fatani (m. 1325H) menyebut di dalam kitabnya 'Hadiqatul Azhar': “Dan masuk mereka akan Makkah pada tahun 1220H. Dan telah menghasarkan

http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=835148738

[mengepung] mereka itu akan Makkah hingga lapar ahlinya dan makan setengah mereka itu akan anjing. Kemudian masuk mereka itu akan dia dan merentah mereka itu padanya 7 tahun. Dan adalah pada masa itu Daulah ‘Aliyyah 'Uthmaniyyah di dalam huru-hara yang amat sangat.” Kata beliau lagi: “Kemudian keluar titah daripada Sultan (Khalifah) kepada Muhammad Ali Pasha, Raja Masir dengan suruh memerangkan mereka itu. Maka diperangkan mereka itu hingga dibinasakan dan dihilangkan daulah mereka itu dan ditawankan raja mereka itu yang bernama 'Abdullah ibnu Sa'ud dan beberapa perdana menterinya dan dibawakan mereka itu ke Masir, kemudian ke Istanbul. Maka diarakkan mereka itu kemudian dibunuhkan mereka itu”. (Rujukan blog al-Ashairah )

3. Peristiwa tersebut mungkin berlaku pada tahun 1233H, di mana gerakan mereka telah ditewaskan oleh kerajaan 'Uthmaniyyah, sepertimana yang disebut oleh Ibn 'Abidin (m. 1252H) di dalam kitabnya 'Raddul Muhtar'. Setelah itu, Mekah dan Madinah dikuasai semula oleh aliran tradisional sehinggalah tahun 1343H.

4. Syeikh 'Uthman Jalaluddin (m. 1371H) menyatakan di dalam kitabnya 'Matali' al-Anwar' (h. 170) bahawa dari tahun 1311H sehingga tahun 1342H ulama-ulama Mekah masih mengikut pengajian tradisi berdasarkan mazhab-mazhab fiqh dan akidah Asy'ariyyah-Maturidiyyah. Namun pada tahun 1343H, Mekah dan Madinah telah mula dikuasai oleh gerakan Wahhabiyyah dengan naiknya Raja 'Abdul 'Aziz Al Su'ud ke tampuk pemerintahan. Maka bermula dari itu ulama-ulama Wahhabiyyah menyebarkan secara besar-besaran pengaruh mereka sehingga pengajian-pengajian tradisi kemudiannya mula disingkir dan menjadi terpencil. Apabila Syeikh 'Uthman pulang kembali ke Tanah Melayu pada tahun 1351H, beliau mendapati fahaman tersebut telahpun menular di kalangan masyarakat Melayu. (Rujukan blog al-Fanshuri)

5. Tidak sedikit juga yang cuba menerapkan fahaman ini di kalangan masyarakat Melayu. Antara tokoh-tokohnya ialah seperti Syeikh Abu Bakar al-Asy'ari dan Syeikh Muhammad Tahir Jalaluddin. Maka, ramai ulama tradisional dengan bersikap defensif bangkit mengkritik fahaman baru ini. Antara tokoh-tokohnya ialah Syeikh 'Abdullah Fahim, mufti Pulau Pinang, Syeikh Yusuf Syihabuddin (m. 1973), mufti Selangor, Syed 'Alwi bin Syed Tahir al-Haddad (m. 1962), mufti Johor, Syeikh Muhammad Fadhlullah Suhaimi dan lain-lain.

http://al-fanshuri.blogspot.com/2009/11/kata-ulama-kita.html

http://al-ashairah.blogspot.com/2008/09/shaikh-ahmad-al-fathani-wahabi-itu.html

6. Antara satu contoh konflik yang berlaku di antara dua aliran ini ialah sebuah polemik yang hangat pernah berlaku di antara Syeikh Abu Bakar Haji Hasan (m. 1938), bekas kadi Muar dan Syeikh Muhammad Tahir Jalaluddin al-Minkabawi mengenai solat sunat qabliyyah Jumaat. Syeikh Muhammad Tahir telah menyusun sebuah risalah yang menyatakan bahawa solat sunat qabliyyah Jumaat sebenarnya tidak sunnah. Risalah ini diberi judul: ‘Tazkirah Muttabi‘i al-Sunnah fi ma Yaf‘al Qabl wa Ba‘d al-Jumu‘ah’. Lalu kenyataan tersebut dibantah oleh Syeikh Abu Bakar di dalam bukunya ‘Taman Persuraian’ mempertahankan bahawa ianya adalah sunnah. Syeikh Muhammad Tahir kemudian mempertahankan pendapatnya itu di dalam buku lain berjudul ‘Huraian yang Membakar Taman Persuraian Haji Abu Bakar’ dan ‘Ta’yid Tazkirah Muttabi‘i al-Sunnah fi al-Rad ‘ala al-Qa’il bi Sunniyyah Rak‘atayn Qabl al-Jumu‘ah’. Syeikh Abu Bakar kemudian sekali lagi menolak pandangan beliau dengan buku lain berjudul ‘Taufan yang Memalui Atas Huraian Haji Tahir al-Minkabawi’ ( 1932).7. Kita tidak mendapati tokoh-tokoh Wahhabiyyah yang menonjol secara popular dalam tempoh antara sesudah kematian Syeikh Muhammad bin 'Abdul Wahhab sehingga munculnya tokoh-tokoh mutaakhirin Wahhabiyyah, iaitu seperti Syeikh 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Baz, Syeikh al-Albani, Syeikh al-'Uthaymin, Syeikh al-Fawzan, Syeikh Bakar Abu Zayd dan lain-lain. Barangkali ini disebabkan oleh kesibukan mereka dalam tempoh tersebut dengan berperang atau kemerosotan pengaruh mereka di kalangan umat Islam. Dengan itu dapatlah kita fahami, kenapa kebanyakan pendapat-pendapat dan fatwa-fatwa mutaakhirin ini yang ditaklid dan dipegang oleh pengikut-pengikut Wahhabiyyah pada masa sekarang, selain tokoh pengasas gerakan itu sendiri. Kelompongan ini membuktikan bahawa aliran tradisional yang merupakan jumhur ulama pada ketika itu masih berpengaruh secara kuat di Hijjaz.8. Namun pemikiran Wahhabiyyah ini tetap wujud walaupun dalam kedudukan yang lemah. Ada di antara ulama tradisional yang menangani mereka secara berdebat, seperti yang dilakukan oleh Syeikh Ahmad bin Idris (m. 1253H) yang berdebat dengan sebahagian pengikut Wahhabiyah yang antaranya bernama al-Kubaybi. Syeikh Ahmad akhirnya berjaya mematahkan hujah mereka. ( سيدنا مناظرة

علماء مع عنه الله رضي إدريس بن أحمد الشريف(Rujukan) (الوهابية9. Dalam era kemerosotan Wahhabiyyah ini, kebanyakan

http://cb.rayaheen.net/showthread.php?tid=16563&page=1&next

http://soufia.org/book_monazart.html



aktiviti mereka hanya terbatas di daerah Najd sahaja. Sehinggakan Syeikh Muhammad Rasyid Ridha melihat tidak ada wakil ulama Mazhab Hanbali di Mekah, lalu beliau menyuruh salah seorang ulama yang bermazhab Hanbali agar menjadi mufti Mazhab Hanbali di sana.10. Fahaman Wahhabiyyah pada awal kebangkitannya selepas tahun 1343H banyak dipengaruh oleh pemikiran-pemikiran Muhammad 'Abduh dan Muhammad Rasyid Ridha yang mungkin sedikit berbeza dengan tokoh-tokoh mutaakhirin mereka kemudiannya yang lebih jelas dan sepakat dalam banyak pandangan. Antara tokoh-tokoh awalnya pada masa sesudah kebangkitan itu ialah Syeikh 'Abdul Rahman al-Sa'di, Syeikh Amin al-Syanqiti, Syeikh 'Abdul Zahir Abu al-Samah (m. 1370H), Syeikh Muhammad 'Abdul Razzaq Hamzah (m. 1392H), dan lain-lain. Kebangkitan ini menimbulkan banyak polemik kemudiannya di antara fahaman Wahhabiyyah dan golongan jumhur ulama Islam yang berterusan sehinggalah sekarang ini...

Islamic Reform - Bibliography

religious movements muhammad texts all recent news on Hizmet Movement and Fethullah Gulen

Contemporary Islamic reform movements often trace their roots to the founding era of Islam. Several verses of the Koran encourage reform (islah), and a statement of the prophet Muhammad predicts that a renewer (mujaddid) will arise in each century to reform the community of Muslims. Among the scholars cited by various reform movements as fulfilling this prediction are Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (Iran-Baghdad, 1058–1111), Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (Anatolia-Damascus, 1263–1328), Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi (India, 1703–1762), Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (Arabia, 1703–1792), and 'Uthman dan Fodio

(West Africa, 1754–1817). These and other prominent reformers shared a scripturalist desire to return Islam to the tenets of the sacred texts, as well as a corresponding distaste for popular practices and contemporary religious hierarchies that they viewed as deviating from these tenets. These recurrent movements for reform had varying impacts on Islamic thought. Some reformers, such as al-Ghazali, were incorporated into the orthodoxy of Islamic scholarship; others, such as Ibn Taymiyya, were largely ignored for centuries.

During the nineteenth century, a new wave of reform movements emerged as part of the resistance to European imperial expansion, on the proposition that this domination was due to Muslims' religious laxity. Prominent movements and individuals included Hajji Shariat Allah and the Fara idi movement in Bengal, Ahmad Brelwi in India, Imam Shamil in the Caucasus, 'Abd al-Qadir in Algeria, and Muhammad Ahmad in the Sudan.

The nineteenth century also witnessed the rise of a new strain of Islamic reform, one that appealed to European models. Like earlier reformers, these modernists called Muslims to return to the sacred texts of Islam; unlike other reformers, however, they identified a happy coincidence between the spirit of these texts and contemporary European values and institutions. This coincidence accounted for Europeans' power, and the adoption of these ways would restore the glory of Islam. For example, Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Iran, c. 1838–1897), one of the most influential figures in this movement, famously wrote, "I cannot keep from hoping that Muhammadan

society will succeed someday in breaking its bonds and marching resolutely in the path of civilization after the manner of Western society" (Kurzman, 2002, p. 108).

One aspect of contemporary Western civilization that modernist Islamic reformers particularly appreciated was the Protestant Reformation, which they interpreted as a move toward the ideals of Islam. Muhammad 'Abduh (Egypt, 1849–1905), Afghani's student and another major figure in the movement, described Protestantism as "calling for reform and a return to the simplicities of the faith—a reformation which included elements by no means unlike Islam" (Browers and Kurzman, p. 3). Similarly, the most prominent South Asian Islamic modernist, Muhammad Iqbal (India, c. 1877–1938), suggested that Protestantism emancipated Europe from religious and political absolutism and embraced human goodness as opposed to original sin—"the basic propositions of Islam, as of modern European civilization" (Browers and Kurzman, p. 3).

In the middle of the twentieth century, the analogy was reversed: instead of measuring the Reformation by the yardstick of Islamic ideals, Muslim reformers measured Islam by the yardstick of the Reformation. Iqbal came to feel that Muslims "are today passing through a period similar to that of the Protestant revolution in Europe" (Browers and Kurzman, p. 5) Abduh's influential disciple, Muhammad Rashid Rida (Syria-Egypt, 1865–1935), phrased the analogy in exhortatory terms, citing the need for Muslims to combine "religious renewal and earthly renewal, the same way Europe has done with religious reformation

and modernization" (Kurzman, 2002, p. 80).

Also in the mid-twentieth century, Islamic reformism split into two strands: one that upheld the equation of certain Western and early Islamic ideals, and one that rejected Western precedents. The liberal Islamic movement defended Western values such as democracy, human rights, and gender equality, using Islamic justifications—either specific injunctions from sacred texts on behalf of these positions, or silences in the texts that leave these matters to human invention, or the necessity and desirability of reinterpreting the texts within changing social contexts. A leading representative of this final approach, 'Abd al-Karim Sorush (Iran, b. 1945), has argued that religious interpretation must take account of intellectual developments outside of the sacred sources: "No reform can take place without re-shuffling the traditional suppositions, and no re-shuffling can emerge unless one is masterfully acquainted with both traditions and the newly developed ideas outside the sphere of revelation" (Kurzman, 1998, p. 250).

The second strand adopted certain modern values and practices but denounced their European provenance. For example, Hasan al-Banna (Egypt, 1906–1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, the first and largest revivalist organization of the twentieth century, called for modern-style "social reform" including mass education, a war on poverty, and public health measures, yet his definition of reform associated all ills in Muslim societies with the rise of Western influence (al-Bana, pp. 14–17 and 126–129). More recently, Usama bin Ladin's Advice and Reform Committee, the Saudi Arabian opposition group that he

founded while in exile in the Sudan in the mid-1990s, railed against political oppression and espoused the doctrines of human equality, rule of law, freedom of the press, human rights, and economic development, using the latest technologies to spread its message—while rejecting the notion that anything positive could be learned from the West.

Both strands of contemporary Islamic reform emerged largely from modern state school systems—Soroush was trained in pharmacology and philosophy, al-Banna in modern education, bin Ladin in engineering. With the expansion of secular education, the traditional seminary (madrasa) scholarship has lost the near-monopoly over religious interpretation that it attempted to enforce in earlier eras.

Among the beneficiaries of educational expansion have been women, who were almost entirely excluded in earlier eras from advanced training in religious matters. As more Muslim women have gained secular education, small Islamic feminist movements have emerged in numerous countries. These movements criticize patriarchal cultural practices that they consider to be foreign to the original message of Islam, as well as patriarchal interpretations of the message that they consider to be a product of ongoing efforts by men to monopolize religious scholarship.

One of the common themes of Islamic reform movements, in the early twenty-first century as in past centuries, remains the denunciation of the seminaries' obscurantism and subservience to state authorities. This subservience has only been enhanced by the seminary reform projects of numerous colonial and postcolonial

states.

At the same time, the proliferation of Islamic authorities beyond the seminary has generated such a large variety of liberal and radical Islamic movements, all of them espousing "reform," that the word has been rendered almost meaningless. The term is so elastic, and so positively charged, that it is difficult in the early 2000s to find Muslim statements that reject reform in principle—even as criticisms of any particular reform are legion.

Islamic Reform - Bibliography - Religious, Movements, Muhammad, and Texts - JRank Articles http://science.jrank.org/pages/8030/Islamic-Reform.html#ixzz1vd3TS5Lh

Seorang pemuda yang percaya kepada perjuangan menegakkan keadilan mengikut neraca yang digariskan dalam tradisi keilmuan Islam. Merupakan aktivis sosial, pemikir dasar alternatif, penulis amatur dan juga penceramah bebas. Sedang cuba memahami realiti zaman moden dengan menelaah karya-karya intelektual Barat untuk disaringkan (islamisasi) agar dapat dimanfaatkan dalam perjuangan Islam di Malaysia. Merupakan pendokong kepada gagasan idea Prof Syed Naquib Al-Attas. Sedang menelaah kitab 'Islam and Secularism' dan juga 'Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam' hasil karangan Prof Syed Naquib Al-Attas. Sekarang menjawat jawatan Felo dalam Himpunan

Keilmuan Muslim (HAKIM).

Merenung nasib khazanah ilmiah MelayuMemandangkan hari ini cuti umum sempena pertabalan Yang di-Pertuan Agung yang baru, saya sempat menziarahi Prof. Abdullah Zakaria Ghazali yang merangkap pakcik saya di rumahnya tadi. Beliau merupakan Profesor di Jabatan Sejarah Universiti Malaya. Seperti biasa, pertemuan tersebut sarat dengan perbincangan yang berat-berat juga mencerahkan.

Kebetulan saya baru pulang daripada Khazanah Fataniyah semalam dan sedang menekun beberapa lembaran turāth karangan ʿālim dan āmir terkenal Riau kurun ke-19 Masihi, Raja ʿAlī Hāji yang bertajuk “Thamaratu al-Muhimmah Ḍiyāfatu li al-ʾUmarāʾ wa al-Kibriyāʾi li ʾĀhli al-Maḥkamah” ( Buah-buahan yang Dicita-citakan Hal Keadaan Jadi Jamuan bagi Raja-Raja dan bagi Orang Besar-Besar yang

http://rausyanfikir.com/2012/04/merenung-nasib-khazanah-ilmiah-melayu.html

http://rausyanfikir.com/2012/04/merenung-nasib-khazanah-ilmiah-melayu.html

http://science.jrank.org/pages/8030/Islamic-Reform.html#ixzz1vd3TS5Lh





Mempunyai Pekerjaan di dalam Tempat Berhukum/ Fruits of Mission in Entertaining the Leaders and Majesty that occupy the Court of Power).

Sempat menunjuk kitab itu kepada beliau dan terus tercetus pelbagai perbahasan ilmiah berkaitan sejarah dan khazanah ilmu Alam Melayu.

Profesor Dr Yusuf Al-Qardhawi didalam fatwanya

mengenai mogok lapar ada menyatakan bahawa

mereka(tahanan-tahanan) adalah pejuang keadilan...."

The Quran ( ; ,, literally meaning "the recitation"), also

transliterated Qur'an, Koran, Al-Coran,Coran, Kuran, and Al-

Qur'an, is the central religious text of Islam, which Muslims consider

the verbatim word of God (, Allah). It is regarded widely as the finest

piece of literature in the Arabic language.

Golongan Islam Liberal ini tidak menzahirkan diri mereka sebagai orang yang menolak agama, tetapi berselindung di sebalik gagasan mengkaji semula agama, mentafsir semula al-Quran, menilai

semula syariat dan hukum-hukum fekah. Segala tafsiran yang dianggap lama dan kolot mengenai agama termasuk hal yang telah menjadi ijmak ulamak, termasuk tafsiran daripada Rasulullah s.a.w. dan sahabat serta ulamak mujtahid ditolak oleh mereka.Pengaruh liberalisme yang telah terjadi dalam agama Yahudi dan Kristian mulai diikuti oleh sekumpulan sarjana dan pemikir muslim termasuklah dengan menubuhkan forum diskusi dan institusi seperti Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) di Indonesia dan Sister in Islam (SIS) di Malaysia.

Gerakan Islam Liberal ini sebenarnya adalah lanjutan daripada gerakan modernisme Islam yang muncul pada awal abad ke-19 di dunia Islam sebagai suatu konsekuensi interaksi dunia Islam dengan tamadun barat. Modernisme Islam tersebut dipengaruhi oleh cara berfikir barat yang berasaskan kepada rasionalisme, humanisme, sekularisme dan liberalisme.

Rancangan musuh-musuh Allah dan muslim, iaitu Zionis dan Amerika adalah untuk memecahbelahkan umat Islam dengan memberi sokongan kepada golongan Islam yang radikal dan pada belahan dunia Islam yang lain mereka menaja kelompok Islam liberal, disamping

menghidupkan semula tarekat-tarekat sufi yang menyimpang, MAKA gambaran majoriti umat Islam sebenar yang mengikuti manhaj ahli sunnah wal jamaah dan menjadi umat pertengahan tidak

dapat dilihat dengan jelas.Menurut penganut dan aktivis kumpulan Islam liberal ini, agama hendaklah disesuaikan kepada realiti semasa, sekalipun terpaksa menafikan hukum-hakam dan peraturan agama yang telah sabit dengan nas-nas syarak

secara qat’ie. Jika terdapat hukum yang tidak menepati zaman, kemodenan, hak-hak manusia, dan tamadun global, maka hukum itu hendaklah ditakwilkan atau sebolehnya digugurkan.Sebenarnya, program Islam liberal ini dilancarkan oleh barat untuk memperkuatkan liberalisme politik di negara-negara umat Islam

setelah gagalnya sekularisme di Timur Tengah (dunia Islam). Bagi mereka, tanpa liberalisme Islam yang kuat, maka liberalisme politik di Timur Tengah dan negara umat Islam yang lain tidak akan berhasil. Kerana itu, mereka menaja kumpulan-kumpulan dan individu-individu tertentu di negara-negara umat Islam untuk mempromosikan fahaman Islam liberal ini.Secara ringkasnya, ada tiga bidang dalam ajaran Islam yang menjadi sasaran liberalisasi iaitu; [1] liberalisasibidang

aqidah dengan penyebaran fahaman pluralisme agama, [2] liberalisasi bidang syariah dengan melakukan perubahan metodologi ijtihad, dan [3] liberalisasi konsep wahyu dengan melakukan dekonstruksi terhadap al-Quran.Semoga Allah selamatkan kita daripada sebarang bentuk kesesatan.Wallahua’lam Eikhwan Ali Lawati blog beliau di http://engineermemali.blogspot.com Penulis ialah Naib Presiden GAMIS, merangkap Pengerusi INSPIRASI ANAK MUDA

Transformasi sosial yang menyeluruh dan kenaikan 23.4 % penyertaan wanita dalam proses membuat keputusan di sektor awam antara contoh pencapaian Kementerian Pembangunan Wanita, Keluarga dan Masyarakat [ KPWKM ] dalam tempoh tiga tahun sepanjang 2009 – 2012. Kejayaan ini telah membuktikan potensi wanita dioptimumkan sebagai asas kepada tiang negara dan salah satu unsur pembangunan negara.Dalam usaha melestari dan melonjakkan pencapaian diatas dengan lebih efektif, harus diakui bahawa Malaysia hari ini berhadapan beberapa cabaran umumnya dalam kalangan tiga komposisi wanita di Malaysia iaitu :Ketandusan Kepemimpinan WanitaKenaikan peratusan penyertaan wanita dalam bidang pentadbiran negara menunjukkan ruang untuk wanita mengoptimumkan peranannya di peringkat nasional telah diberi perhatian serius. Namun, prestasi kepemimpinan wanita hari ini masih lagi tidak melengkapi dua paksi utama kepimpinan – kompetensi [Qawiyy] mahupun integriti [Al –

http://engineermemali.blogspot.com/

Amin]. Pelbagai krisis, pertikaian dan konflik yang berlaku nyata merencatkan perjalanan agenda kemajuan buat manfaat seisi masyarakat.Kejahilan Hak – Hak WanitaAntara kelemahan yang ketara dalam kalangan wanita hari ini adalah tidak memahami dengan mendalam hak – hak mereka. Kebanyakan daripada mereka cenderung memilih untuk tidak mengambil tindakan atau berdiam diri apabila terperangkap dalam kezaliman, diekspoitasi, mahupun dimanipulasi. Namun, wanita juga perlu berilmu dalam menuntut hak supaya tidak melampaui batas – batas yang telah digariskan oleh syara’ dan perundangan.Keruntuhan Akhlak Gadis SemasaSaban hari kita dipaparkan dengan pelbagai berita yang menunjukkan kerosakan moral dan akhlak remaja mahupun gadis semasa. Keldai dadah, lari dari rumah, pengkid, isu ketransjantinaan dan pelbagai masalah – masalah sosial kian meruncing.Justeru, cabaran – cabaran yang disebutkan di atas menuntut kita selaku mahasiswi khususnya untuk bersama – sama

mempersiapkan diri dengan segala keupayaan serta memanfaatkan

peluang berada di taman ilmu institusi pengajian tinggi antaranya :1. Mengoptimumkan peluang majlis – majlis ilmu bagi menguasai asas – asas

kefahaman Islam walau apa jua bidang pengajian yang sedang ditekuni

2. Melatih diri untuk terus mengamalkan cara hidup Islam yang sebenar dalam kehidupan seharian

3. Mengkaji akar umbi punca dan realiti permasalahan masyarakat

4. Melengkapkan diri dengan segala ilmu dan kemahiran asas seni memimpin di mana – mana peringkat

Persiapan ini penting kerana mahasiswi merupakan aset terbesar

negara dan unsur terpenting yang merintis proses perubahan

menyeluruh demi masa depan Malaysia yang lebih gemilang. Kunci masyarakat idaman bermula dari perubahan sikap kita! Wallahua’alam. ADIELA KAMARIZZAMAN, Timbalan Presiden II

PAS telah menjelaskan bersedia mengadakan perbincangan dengan badan bukan kerajaan (NGO) berhubung salah faham mengenai Islam, bukan muzakarah dengan Umno. Menurut Presiden PAS Tidak timbul isu muzakarah dengan Umno! [TITIK!]16 Mei 1948 adalah merupakan tarikh yang tidak akan dapat dilupakan oleh masyarkat Islam dunia, khususnya masyarakat Islam di bumi para Anbiya’,Palestin. Inilah tarikh yang menyaksikan kepada penubuhan negara haram Israel, suatu peristiwa yang sangat menyedihkan umat Islam sehinnga digelar An-nakba yang bererti bencana. Bermula daei peristiwa inilah, umat islam

terus bersatu bagi membebaskan bumi Palestin .Minggu ini sekali lagi kita menyaksikan rabitah dan kesatuan umat Islam di Malaysia khususnya selepas satu deklarasi yang telah dibuat oleh Pertubuhan Kebudayaan Palestin Malaysia (PCOM) bersama-sama 12 NGO lain melalui kempen Hunger 4 Freedom bagi menyokong tahanan Palestin yang melancarkan mogok lapar yang disifatkan sebagai paling lama dalam sejarah. Tujuan mogok ini dilancarkan ialah untuk menuntut hak-hak tahanan yang ditahan oleh rejim zalim Israel iaitu menghentikan dasar gangguan harian,serangan ganas,kehilangan hak lawatan, pemeriksaan tahanan secara berbogel, pengabaian perubatan dan pengurungan berasingan.

Sempena Hari Ibu 13 Mei 2012, Kumpulan Mahasiswi sekitar Lembah Klang bersepakat untuk menjayakan Minggu Aspresiasi Wanita [ MAWAR ’12 ] bagi menghargai jasa dan pengorbanan kaum ibu di Malaysia.Beberapa siri aktiviti telah dirangka bermula dari 20 Mei 2012 – 27 Mei 2012 melibatkan hampir enam kumpulan gerakan mahasiswi kampus sekitar Lembah Klang sebagai penggerak utama yang dikoordinasi oleh Sinergi Muslimat Muda [ SIGMA ], iaitu salah satu lapangan tumpuan di bawah Gabungan Mahasiswa Islam Se – Malaysia [ GAMIS ].Ziarah Mahabbah Rumah Titian Kaseh [ RTK ]

Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Universiti Teknologi Malaysia [ PMI UTM ] dengan kerjasama Ma’ruf Club Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Malaysia [ MC UIAM ] telah diamanahkan untuk mendekati salah satu kumpulan wanita di Malaysia iaitu golongan ibu tunggal.Tugasan ini menemukan kami dengan warga Rumah Titian Kaseh [ RTK ] yang terletak di Tasik Titiwangsa, Kuala Lumpur. Berkonsepkan rumah perlindungan sementara, kediaman ini dihuni oleh 85 orang yang terdiri daripada warga emas, ibu tunggal, orang kelainan upaya serta anak – anak yatim.Kepelbagaian latar belakang penghuni RTK ini memberikan gambaran realiti kehidupan sebenar masyarakat Malaysia hari ini. Keruntuhan institusi keluarga hasil dari penceraian, sumbang mahram, dan penderaan antara sebab utama mereka mencari perlindungan di RTK ini. Keprihatinan sukarelawan melunaskan tanggungjawab sosial turut berkumpul di RTK ini bagi bersama – sama mendidik serta membangunkan keupayaan dan kemahiran warga rumah perlindungan ini.Kaum ibu tunggal diajar kemahiran seperti katering, menjahit, membuat tasbih dan sebagainya dan seterusnya diberi pendedahan untuk mempromosikan hasil produk mereka dalam usaha meneruskan kelangsungan hidup mereka. Hasil pendapatan mereka ini akan digunakan untuk membiayai kos – kos perbelanjaan warga RTK seperti yuran sekolah anak – anak yatim, keperluan OKU dan warga emas.

Menurut beliau lagi "Isu muzakarah sudah lama dan acapkali dibentangkan kepada Umno dan Umno jadikan isu politik."

Tegasnya "Kalau nak bincang dengan Umno lebih baik bincang mengenai pilihan raya yang bersih." fELLOW : Terdiri dari pakar-pakar yang banyak berjasa dalam dakwah Islamiah. Mengukuhkan YAUM dengan nasihat, buah fikiran dan penerapan nilai Islam.

PENGERUSI : Menentukan hala tuju YAUM dalam

mencapai visi dan misi yang ditetapkan.

LEMBAGA PEMEGANG AMANAH: Merupakan badan

pentadbir YAUM yang terdiri dari individu –individu

pelbagai latar belakang dan bidang kepakaran.

PENGURUSAN: Operasi YAUM diterajui oleh Pengarah

Urusan dan dibantu oleh pasukan pengurusan yang

terdiri dari pegawai dan staf yang berpengalaman dan

komited terhadap perjuangan dakwah YAUM.

Yayasan Usuluddin Malaysia (YAUM) ditubuhkan secara rasmi

pada 17 Februari, 2012, dibawah Akta Pertubuhan, Jabatan

Perdana Menteri.

YAUM lahir sebagai satu sokongan dalam usaha penyampaian

dakwah demi memantapkan aqidah umat Islam sekarang.

diselenggara oleh : Farid Mat Zain, Ismail BakarTitle Muhammad 'Abduh dan masyarakat melayu / diselengga

raoleh : Farid Mat Zain , Ismail Bakar Imprint Bangi : Jabatan Pengajian Arab dan Tamadun Islam, Universiti

Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2007Description

viii, 235 p. ; 23 cm.

معار 2 موقوف 0متاح 2 مطلوب 0

الحجز فى 0 اخرى 0

الوحدات مجموع 4

منتهية الغير الطلبات 0 الطلبات مجموع 04 / 4 - 1 وحدات

1المحتوى الى التسجيلة الضافة اختار

طلبLocation ISLAM-P. TUN SERI LANANG

http://gemilang.ukm.my/cgi-bin/chameleon?sessionid=2009112509462518170&skin=default&lng=ar&inst=consortium&host=202.185.40.3%2B1888%2BDEFAULT&patronhost=202.185.40.3%201888%20DEFAULT&search=SCAN&function=INITREQ&sourcescreen=COPVOLSCR&pos=1&rootsearch=3&elementcount=1&u1=2009&t1=Jabatan%20Pengajian%20Arab%20dan%20Tamadun%20Islam,%20Universiti%20Kebangsaan%20Malaysia,&beginsrch=1

http://gemilang.ukm.my/cgi-bin/chameleon?sessionid=2009112509462518170&skin=default&lng=ar&inst=consortium&host=202.185.40.3%2B1888%2BDEFAULT&patronhost=202.185.40.3%201888%20DEFAULT&search=SCAN&function=INITREQ&sourcescreen=COPVOLSCR&pos=1&rootsearch=3&elementcount=1&u1=2009&t1=Jabatan%20Pengajian%20Arab%20dan%20Tamadun%20Islam,%20Universiti%20Kebangsaan%20Malaysia,&beginsrch=1

http://gemilang.ukm.my/cgi-bin/chameleon?sessionid=2009112509462518170&skin=default&lng=ar&inst=consortium&host=202.185.40.3%2B1888%2BDEFAULT&patronhost=202.185.40.3%201888%20DEFAULT&search=SCAN&function=INITREQ&sourcescreen=COPVOLSCR&pos=1&rootsearch=3&elementcount=1&u1=4&t1=Muhammad%20'Abduh%20dan%20masyarakat%20melayu%20%2F%20diselenggara%20oleh%20%3A%20Farid%20Mat%20Zain,%20Ismail%20Bakar&beginsrch=1

http://gemilang.ukm.my/cgi-bin/chameleon?sessionid=2009112509462518170&skin=default&lng=ar&inst=consortium&host=202.185.40.3%2B1888%2BDEFAULT&patronhost=202.185.40.3%201888%20DEFAULT&search=SCAN&function=INITREQ&sourcescreen=COPVOLSCR&pos=1&rootsearch=3&elementcount=1&u1=4&t1=Muhammad%20'Abduh%20dan%20masyarakat%20melayu%20%2F%20diselenggara%20oleh%20%3A%20Farid%20Mat%20Zain,%20Ismail%20Bakar&beginsrch=1

Call Number BP80.M8M84 kiUnits n.1Copy 0Barcode 00001454672Status 23:59 2012-6-26: االستحقاق تاريخ

Muhammad Abduh's Religio-Political Ideas of Reformation

DR. AHMAD BAZLI SHAFIE (CV) Name : AHMAD BAZLI SHAFIEDepartment : FACULTY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTPost : SENIOR LECTURERGender : MALERace : MALAYNationality : MALAYSIAAddress : FAKULTI PEMBANGUNAN SOSIALEmail : [email protected]

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATION(Institute),(Qualification),(Discipline),(Year)International Institute Of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC-IIUM), Ph.D, Islamic Thought, 2005International Institute Of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), M.A, Islamic Thought,1998International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), B.A Hons (IRKHS), Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Heritage, 1993PUBLICATIONSArticles in JournalsAhmad Bazli Shafie, (1999), “Conceptual and Curricular Dimensions Of Abduh’s Educational Reform, AL-SHAJARAH “(Journal Of The International Institute Of Islamic Thought and Civilization), Vol 4(2)BooksAhmad Bazli Shafie, (2004), “The Educational Philosophy of Shaykh Muhammad Abduh”, 1st Edition, ISTAC-IIUM, Kuala LumpurChapter in BooksAhmad Bazli Shafie (2006), “Pendekatan Neo-Modernis Dalam Memahami al- Qur’an: Kaedah Hermeneutik Fazlur Rahman in iri Wacana Pemikiran Islam kontemporari”. Edition 1st Page : 29-46Ahmad Bazli Shafie (2006), “Interaksi Antara Pelbagai Tamadun in Modul Tamadun Islam dan Tamadun Asia Edition 1st Page : 19-31″Articles in ProceedingsAhmad Bazli Shafie (2006),”Ajaran Sesat: Punca dan Kaedah Penyelesaian, Seminar

http://fps.umt.edu.my/files/2012/03/Dr-Ahmad-Bazli.jpg

http://gemilang.ukm.my/cgi-bin/chameleon?sessionid=2009112509462518170&skin=default&lng=ar&inst=consortium&host=202.185.40.3%2B1888%2BDEFAULT&patronhost=202.185.40.3%201888%20DEFAULT&search=AUTHID&searchid=146&function=ITEM&sourcescreen=COPVOLSCR&pos=1&totalitems=4&itempos=1&rootsearch=SCAN

Liberalisme Agama Peringkat Kebangsaan”, 01/04/2006, 02/04/2006, Dewan Redang, Hotel Grand Continental, Kuala Terengganu.Ahmad Bazli Shafie (2007), ‘Muhammad Abduh dan Pembaharuan Pendidikan, Simposium Sejarah Pemikiran Politik Islam II: Muhammad Abduh dan Masyarakat Melayu”, 24/03/2007, 24/03/2007,Dewan Senat, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia PerihalBerdakwah dan mencari penyelesaian kepada persoalan berkaitan aqidah dan arus pemikiran yang melanda umat Islam di Malaysia.MisiMenjadi satu badan dakwah yang menerapkan nilai akidah Ahli Sunnah Wal-JamaahKeteranganYayasan Usuluddin Malaysia (YaUM) telah sah secara rasmi pada tarikh 17 Februari 2012. Ditubuhkan dibawah Akta Pertubuhan, Jabatan Perdana Menteri.

Ia lahir untuk menjadi penyokong dalam usaha penyampaian dakwah demi memantapkan aqidah umat Islam.Mohammed Abduh was born in 1849 group in mahallat nasr Egypt. his father named Abduh Hasan Khoirullah coming from Turkey. According to his mother's history comes from the arab tribes to her lineage is Umar Bin has been.

Mohammed Abduh in education began to learn to write and read at home after he hapal Holy Book qur'an in 1863 he was sent by his parents to the bacaanya and thamta to set the record straight on tajwid masjid al-ahmadi. However, because the method is not appropriate given the lesson her teacher like getting used the term nahwu or recite the fiqh finally Mohammed abduh back to mahallat nasr with determination will not be back for more study.

In 1866 at the age of 20 years old she married financier intentions want to till the fields farm as it is with his father. No longer married, his father forced him to return to the keep on the way he thamta not to thamta but kedesa Kani Sahurin residence of Sheikh Darwish Khadr who studied a wide range of religious sciences in Egypt. Sheikh Mohammed Abduh Darwish led to always read, thanks to the encouragement of Sheikh Darwish, Mohammed Abduh back growing enthusiasm for learning and reading a book.

After experiencing the change of attitudes toward learning, then he returned to the thamtha mosque Ahmadi to learn. In 1866 he went to Cairo to study at Al-Azhar University. Teaching methods in Al-Azhar University is still the same with Al-Ahmadi mosque in the mengahapal method. Al-Azhar condition when it is contrary to the habits is something disbelief. Read the book of geography, science and philosophy are haram kalam, while wearing shoes is bid'ah and contrary to the teachings of Islam.

The situation and condition of the community frozen stiff Abduh, Muhamad closed door meetings, neglecting the role of ijtihad in Islamic understanding of sense while in Europe in particular people's lives very deify sense. These conditions, in the next decade will affect the adan Egypt.

But such influence was felt at the time he Mohammed Abduh entered the Al-Azhar University as an institution fostering formal and scholars are divided into two groups. First, a group that has a pattern of taqlid is a group that the majority and the second, a group that has a pattern of tajdid and is a minority. Mohammed Abduh was in the minority when it's in pelopori include: Al-Sheikh Mohammed Basyuni (literary experts) and Shaykh Hasan Thawil (expert in philosophy and logic)

factors influencing thought Muhammad Abduh is

Social factors, namely the attitude to life is shaped by family and especially his teacher Sheikh Darwisy and Sayyid al-Afghani, Jamaludin beside it in the school environment and Egypt where he Thanta found ineffective educational system, as well as with religious static and mind-mind the fatalistic

Cultural factors, namely the science acquired while studying the formal disekolah-sekolah of Jamaludin al-

Afghani, as well as the experience of the ditimbanya from the West.

Political factors were sourced from the political situation of his time, since dilingkungan his family in Mukallaf Nasr. When these factors are based on the birth of melatar thought Muhammad Abduh in various fields, theology, Shariah, education, social politics and so on. Islam and the West: Proceedings of the Harvard Summer School Conference on the Middle East, July 25-27, 1955by Richard N. FryePages: 220Contributors: Richard N. FryePublisher: Mouton & CoPlace of Publication: The HaguePublication Year: 1957

Revolt Against Modernity:

Muslim Zealots and the West

Michael YoussefBrill Archive, 1985 - 189 pages

THE MODERNIST MOVEMENT IN EGYPTBY OSMAN AMIN

In speaking of the Modernist Movement in Egypt, I have not hesitated to give importance to the ideas of Muhammad ˓Abduh, the greatest Egyptian religious reformer and one of the most remarkable figures of modern Islamic history. On his death in July 1905, ˓Abduh left numerous disciples and many works of real interest and inestimable value. He was, and is still, commonly given the rare title al-ustādh al-imām, "the Master and Guide"; and this title alone shows the influence which this thinker had upon his contemporaries. A young Egyptian writer, Kāmil al-Shinnāwī, has recently described ˓Abduh's life as a "mélange of the life of a prophet and that of a hero."

Certainly I do not pretend, in these few pages, to present every detail of his life and work. But this paper will realize my modest aim if it succeeds in throwing some light on the figure and the doctrine of a master who remains for us, his adepts, forever alive and present before our eyes.

1. HIS PERSONALITY

The most salient feature that distinguished Muhammad ˓Abdūh in the shaykhly class in the Muslim world was his abundant spiritual energy. As a result, the majority of the shaykhs

-165-

http://www.google.com.my/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22Michael+Youssef%22

THE MODERNIST MOVEMENT IN EGYPTBY

KENNETH CRAGG

"Surgeons must be very carefulWhen they bear the knife:Underneath their deep incisionsLies the culprit -- life."

Emily Dickinson

Analysts and students who try to investigate living entities, as we now do, must learn the same respect and awe for what they handle. It is well to have this frame of mind when we venture to penetrate into so vast a thing as the contemporary Muslim mind. We have, however, one comforting aspect -- one that does not always apply to surgeons - namely, that however ineffectively we probe the subject will survive.

But so exacting is it that it is right to look for some clue to guide us in the treatment of the theme. May we, perhaps, seek one in the Muslim concept of the "niyyah", or "intention", without which no performance of Muslim dīn, or religious practice, is valid. Only when recited with "intention" is the shahāda, or confession of faith, authentic. Only when "intended" does the fast of Ramaddān avail, or the pilgrim journey to Mecca constitute a hajj. It is by intention that all things Muslim are to be assessed and evaluated.

Following on the biographical study of Muhammad 'Abduh, it may be the best plan to attempt to pursue this clue of intention into the story of the sequel of his influence. For Muhammad 'Abduh died precisely half a century ago. No one will dispute that the story of Egyptian "modernism" is the story of 'Abduh and his legacy. What should be said analytically of the sub-

-149-

lelaki dan masyarakat patriak ketika itu. Qasim Amin dilihat berjaya memberi kacukan pendekatan liberalisme Syaikh Rifa’at Tahtawi dan rasionalisme Imam Muhammad Abduh. Hal ini tertuang menerusi Tahrir al-Mar'ah yang melihat emansipasi wanita melalui dua cara pandang yang besar: Reformasi pendidikan dan sosial, serta reformasi pemikiran keagamaan.Atas dasar itulah, Muhammad Imarah, yang mengumpulkan karya-karya Abduh dan Qasim Amin, menganggap Tahrir al Mar'ah merupakan penegasan terhadap kemuncak pemikiran Imam Muhammad Abduh terhadap keberadaan perempuan. Daripada sinilah terbitnya kontroversi, Qasim Amin membela tradisi Hijab tetapi pada masa yang sama sepakat bahawa wujud kemunduran wanita Mesir khususnya pandangan sesetengah perempuan berhijab.

Peranan Wanita dalam Da ‘wah

Demikian inilah mengapa al-Ghazali juga melihat peranan penting yang dapat dimainkan wanita dalam da‘wah. Da‘wah di sini harus merangkul makna yang lebih luas daripada misi, dan kurang daripada pertukaran agama. Bagi al-Ghazali, ia akhirnya satu bentuk aktivisme Muslim, di mana wanita dapat memainkan peranan yang aktif dalam keseluruhan pembangunan masyarakat Mesir dan penentangannya terhadap imperialisme dan budaya kolonial: Ia mungkin memerlukan beberapa generasi Islam untuk merampas tampuk pemerintah. Kita tidak terburu mengejar dan melangkaui waktu. Pada hari Islam memerintah, wanita Islam akan menemui diri mereka di dalam kerajaan mereka yang azali, iaitu mendidik lelaki.

Transformasi Turki: Daripada Erbakan hingga Erdogan - II

Marwan Bukhari

Dr Radwan Masmodi, pengasas dan Pengarah Center for The Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID) semasa awal kemenangan AKP – tahun 2002 – pernah menyebut dalam sebuah artikelnya yang bertajuk Turkey Leads The Way menulis: In Turkey today, we at last have a group of Muslim conservatives who are trying to develop a version of secularism that is acceptable to Muslims. Theirs is not the anti-religious sort of secularism that has been practiced in many quarters of the Muslim world, but an Islamically acceptable secularism, which says that the government belongs to the people and that religious practices and views should not be forced by the state.

anti-secular. Peristiwa tersebut popular di kalangan pengkaji politik antarabangsa sebagai post-modern coup. Berkenaan hal tersebut, penulis buku The Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of the State, Vali Nasr telah mengulas dalam satu jurnal bertajuk The Rise of Muslim Democracy dengan sebagaimana berikut: The Turkish military, long the fierce keeper of Kemalism’s secularnationalist flame, was not reconciled to an Islamist ascendancy. Beginning in early 1997, the generals launched what Cengiz Çandar has dubbed a “postmodern coup”, manipulating the courts and the parliamentary process to upend Erbakan’s government.

al-Muhalla, Ibn Hazm secara tegasnya menulis: Seorang mujtahid yang pandangannya atau hasil ijtihadnya mengelirukan sesungguhnya jauh lebih baik daripada para pentaqlid yang mana pendapat mereka itu adalah benar.

Ibn Hazm terhadap golongan fuqaha’ merupakan satu contoh, di mana mereka menurutnya: Repeating the letter of texts mechanically without understanding their meaning and not bothering themselves to understand it;

Marx (1818-1883) mengkritik peranan agama dengan menyatakan:

“Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real

happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo.”

[Agama adalah keluhan mereka yang tertindas, nurani kepada dunia yang tiada bertiada bertimbang-rasa, dan jiwa kepada suasana yang nihil kejiwaannya. Ia adalah candu masyarakat. Penghapusan agama sebagai khayalan kebahagiaan masyarakat adalah desakan kepada kebahagiaan sebenarnya. Menyeru mereka agar melupakan segala khayalan tentang kehidupan mereka sebenarnya seruan yang mengajak meninggalkan keadaan yang memerlukan khayalan. Kritik ke atas agama adalah sebenarnya, dalam bentuk embrio, kritikan ke atas aliran air mata yang mana agama merupakan puncanya.]

Haji Agus Salim dan HOS Tjokroaminoto, tokoh utama Sarekat Dagang Islam boleh dikira sebagai pelopor Islam Progresif.

Kedua-dua tokoh ini menyumbang ke arah gerakan Islam yang menjadikan demokrasi, kemerdekaan dan keadilan sebagai tujuan masing-masing. Agus Salim

misalnya

Menangani Fir'aunisme

Marwan Bukhari

Fir’aunisme dan agama

Malik Bennabi di dalam bukunya The Question of Culture menyebutkan: The organization of society, its life and movement, indeed, its deterioration and stagnation, all have a functional relation with the system of ideas found in that society. If that system were to change in one way or another, all other social characteristics would follow suit and adapt in the same direction.Dalam organisasi sesebuah masyarakat, kehidupan dan pergerakannya, sesungguhnya, kemunduran dan kejumudan, kesemuanya mempunyai kaitan dengan sistem ide yang terdapat dalam masyarakat tersebut. Sekiranya sistem itu berubah dalam satu arah atau sebaliknya, segala ciri sosial akan menurutinya dan beradaptasi mengikut arah yang sama).

Katanya lagi: Ideas, as a whole, form an important part of the means of development in a given society. The various stages of development in such a society are indeed different forms of its intellectual developments. If one of those stages corresponds to what is called “Renaissance”, it will mean that society at that stage is enjoying a wonderful system of ideas; a system that can provide a suitable solution to each of the vital problems in that particular society.

(Ide, secara keseluruhannya, membentuk satu juzuk daripada kaedah pembangunan sesuatu masyarakat itu. Pembangunan yang berperingkat dalam sesebuah masyarakat adalah merupakan pembangunan intelektual yang berbagai rupa. Sekiranya salah satu daripada peringkat perubahan itu bersesuaian dengan apa yang dinamakan “Renaissance” – kebangkitan - maka masyarakat pada ketika

itu sedang menikmati sistem ide yang sungguh menakjubkan; sistem yang dapat memberi penyelesaian yang jitu bagi setiap masalah utama di dalam masyarakat tersebut).

Contemporary Islamic reform movements often trace their roots to the founding era of Islam. Several verses of the Koran encourage reform (islah), and a statement of the prophet Muhammad predicts that a renewer (mujaddid) will arise in each century to reform the community of Muslims. Among the scholars cited by various reform movements as fulfilling this prediction are Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (Iran-Baghdad, 1058–1111), Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (Anatolia-Damascus, 1263–1328), Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi (India, 1703–1762), Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (Arabia, 1703–1792), and 'Uthman dan Fodio (West Africa, 1754–1817). These and other prominent reformers shared a scripturalist desire to return Islam to the tenets of the sacred texts, as well as a corresponding distaste for popular practices and contemporary religious hierarchies that they viewed as deviating from these tenets. These recurrent movements for reform had varying impacts on Islamic thought. Some reformers, such as al-Ghazali, were incorporated into the orthodoxy of Islamic scholarship; others, such as Ibn Taymiyya, were largely ignored for centuries.

During the nineteenth century, a new wave of reform movements emerged as part of the resistance to European imperial expansion, on the proposition that this domination was due to Muslims' religious laxity. Prominent movements and individuals included Hajji Shariat Allah and the Fara idi movement in Bengal, Ahmad Brelwi in India, Imam Shamil in the Caucasus, 'Abd al-Qadir in Algeria, and Muhammad Ahmad in the Sudan.

The nineteenth century also witnessed the rise of a new strain of Islamic reform, one that appealed to European models. Like earlier reformers, these modernists called Muslims to return to the sacred texts of Islam; unlike other reformers, however, they identified a happy coincidence between the spirit of these texts and contemporary European values and institutions. This coincidence accounted for Europeans' power, and the adoption of these ways would restore the glory of Islam. For example, Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Iran, c. 1838–1897), one of the most influential figures in this movement, famously wrote, "I cannot keep from hoping that Muhammadan society will succeed someday in breaking its bonds

and marching resolutely in the path of civilization after the manner of Western society" (Kurzman, 2002, p. 108).

One aspect of contemporary Western civilization that modernist Islamic reformers particularly appreciated was the Protestant Reformation, which they interpreted as a move toward the ideals of Islam. Muhammad 'Abduh (Egypt, 1849–1905), Afghani's student and another major figure in the movement, described Protestantism as "calling for reform and a return to the simplicities of the faith—a reformation which included elements by no means unlike Islam" (Browers and Kurzman, p. 3). Similarly, the most prominent South Asian Islamic modernist, Muhammad Iqbal (India, c. 1877–1938), suggested that Protestantism emancipated Europe from religious and political absolutism and embraced human goodness as opposed to original sin—"the basic propositions of Islam, as of modern European civilization" (Browers and Kurzman, p. 3).

In the middle of the twentieth century, the analogy was reversed: instead of measuring the Reformation by the yardstick of Islamic ideals, Muslim reformers measured Islam by the yardstick of the Reformation. Iqbal came to feel that Muslims "are today passing through a period similar to that of the Protestant revolution in Europe" (Browers and Kurzman, p. 5) Abduh's influential disciple, Muhammad Rashid Rida (Syria-Egypt, 1865–1935), phrased the analogy in exhortatory terms, citing the need for Muslims to combine "religious renewal and earthly renewal, the same way Europe has done with religious reformation and modernization" (Kurzman, 2002, p. 80).

Also in the mid-twentieth century, Islamic reformism split into two strands: one that upheld the equation of certain Western and early Islamic ideals, and one that rejected Western precedents. The liberal Islamic movement defended Western values such as democracy, human rights, and gender equality, using Islamic justifications—either specific injunctions from sacred texts on behalf of these positions, or silences in the texts that leave these matters to human invention, or the necessity and desirability of reinterpreting the texts within changing social contexts. A leading representative of this final approach, 'Abd al-Karim Sorush (Iran, b. 1945), has argued that religious interpretation must take account of intellectual developments outside of the sacred sources: "No

reform can take place without re-shuffling the traditional suppositions, and no re-shuffling can emerge unless one is masterfully acquainted with both traditions and the newly developed ideas outside the sphere of revelation" (Kurzman, 1998, p. 250).

Ads by GoogleKuala Lumpur Hotels Save up to 75% Instant confirmation Read hotel reviews. Agoda.com/Kuala_Lumpur_Hotels

Neuroscience Speakers ISNR International Conference Orlando Florida Sept. 19-23, 2012 www.ISNR.org

The Basics of Prayer Prayer has some ground rules. See how the Bible explains Prayer. everystudent.com

Pen Pembaca Al-Quran Lesen tunggal Kdn dan Hologram, Pengimport & Pembekal di MALAYSIA www.quranreadpen.net

The second strand adopted certain modern values and practices but denounced their European provenance. For example, Hasan al-Banna (Egypt, 1906–1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, the first and largest revivalist organization of the twentieth century, called for modern-style "social reform" including mass education, a

http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/aclk?sa=L&ai=BJ8buTOq7T-WHC6jGigew1KykDN2i4eQDxfLmhVLAjbcBwIsREAQYBCDTl_YBKAQ4AFDayMHA______8BYMubgoXAF7IBEXNjaWVuY2UuanJhbmsub3JnugEJNzI4eDkwX2pzyAEB2gE3aHR0cDovL3NjaWVuY2UuanJhbmsub3JnL3BhZ2VzLzgwMzAvSXNsYW1pYy1SZWZvcm0uaHRtbKkCM2UDO0CDlT7IAv3ViTKoAwHoA-QG6AOxA-gDO_UDAAAAxPUDAAAAEA&num=4&sig=AOD64_28IbiTLbrds6r1O69HsZ_uQNgztg&client=ca-pub-4803409109489353&adurl=http://www.quranreadpen.net

http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/aclk?sa=L&ai=BJ8buTOq7T-WHC6jGigew1KykDN2i4eQDxfLmhVLAjbcBwIsREAQYBCDTl_YBKAQ4AFDayMHA______8BYMubgoXAF7IBEXNjaWVuY2UuanJhbmsub3JnugEJNzI4eDkwX2pzyAEB2gE3aHR0cDovL3NjaWVuY2UuanJhbmsub3JnL3BhZ2VzLzgwMzAvSXNsYW1pYy1SZWZvcm0uaHRtbKkCM2UDO0CDlT7IAv3ViTKoAwHoA-QG6AOxA-gDO_UDAAAAxPUDAAAAEA&num=4&sig=AOD64_28IbiTLbrds6r1O69HsZ_uQNgztg&client=ca-pub-4803409109489353&adurl=http://www.quranreadpen.net

http://www.googleadservices.com/pagead/aclk?sa=L&ai=BGstnTOq7T-WHC6jGigew1KykDPyGjeYDxJPlhVLAjbcBkL8FEAMYAyDTl_YBKAQ4AFCesMiGBWDLm4KFwBegAezfzNcDsgERc2NpZW5jZS5qcmFuay5vcme6AQk3Mjh4OTBfanPIAQHaATdodHRwOi8vc2NpZW5jZS5qcmFuay5vcmcvcGFnZXMvODAzMC9Jc2xhbWljLVJlZm9ybS5odG1sgAIBqAMB6APkBugDsQPoAzv1AwAAAMT1AwAAABCIBgE&num=3&cid=5Gh8tFx67-W0p61DWYxmUKea&sig=AOD64_1tZfiUAZ5xQjNcSPiNEwQaO1WkJA&client=ca-pub-4803409109489353&adurl=http://everystudent.com/wires/prayers.html

http://www.googleadservices.com/pagead/aclk?sa=L&ai=BGstnTOq7T-WHC6jGigew1KykDPyGjeYDxJPlhVLAjbcBkL8FEAMYAyDTl_YBKAQ4AFCesMiGBWDLm4KFwBegAezfzNcDsgERc2NpZW5jZS5qcmFuay5vcme6AQk3Mjh4OTBfanPIAQHaATdodHRwOi8vc2NpZW5jZS5qcmFuay5vcmcvcGFnZXMvODAzMC9Jc2xhbWljLVJlZm9ybS5odG1sgAIBqAMB6APkBugDsQPoAzv1AwAAAMT1AwAAABCIBgE&num=3&cid=5Gh8tFx67-W0p61DWYxmUKea&sig=AOD64_1tZfiUAZ5xQjNcSPiNEwQaO1WkJA&client=ca-pub-4803409109489353&adurl=http://everystudent.com/wires/prayers.html

http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/aclk?sa=L&ai=BQSr9TOq7T-WHC6jGigew1KykDI_z35UCx6rN3CjAjbcBkKEPEAIYAiDTl_YBKAQ4AFC4tue7A2DLm4KFwBeyARFzY2llbmNlLmpyYW5rLm9yZ7oBCTcyOHg5MF9qc8gBAdoBN2h0dHA6Ly9zY2llbmNlLmpyYW5rLm9yZy9wYWdlcy84MDMwL0lzbGFtaWMtUmVmb3JtLmh0bWyAAgGoAwHoA-QG6AOxA-gDO_UDAAAAxPUDAAAAEA&num=2&sig=AOD64_22pHEIUvZuR6Y9WOOcmZZUaLc_Rg&client=ca-pub-4803409109489353&adurl=http://www.isnr.org/

http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/aclk?sa=L&ai=BQSr9TOq7T-WHC6jGigew1KykDI_z35UCx6rN3CjAjbcBkKEPEAIYAiDTl_YBKAQ4AFC4tue7A2DLm4KFwBeyARFzY2llbmNlLmpyYW5rLm9yZ7oBCTcyOHg5MF9qc8gBAdoBN2h0dHA6Ly9zY2llbmNlLmpyYW5rLm9yZy9wYWdlcy84MDMwL0lzbGFtaWMtUmVmb3JtLmh0bWyAAgGoAwHoA-QG6AOxA-gDO_UDAAAAxPUDAAAAEA&num=2&sig=AOD64_22pHEIUvZuR6Y9WOOcmZZUaLc_Rg&client=ca-pub-4803409109489353&adurl=http://www.isnr.org/

http://www.googleadservices.com/pagead/aclk?sa=L&ai=BxI4VTOq7T-WHC6jGigew1KykDMbTzKwD1teZrEWujeKxRaDvDxABGAEg05f2ASgEOABQ9rP-3AFgy5uChcAXoAGy5ObVA7IBEXNjaWVuY2UuanJhbmsub3JnugEJNzI4eDkwX2pzyAEB2gE3aHR0cDovL3NjaWVuY2UuanJhbmsub3JnL3BhZ2VzLzgwMzAvSXNsYW1pYy1SZWZvcm0uaHRtbIACAcACBcgCttzbGagDAegD5AboA7ED6AM79QMAAADE9QMAAAAQiAYB&num=1&cid=5Gh8tFx67-W0p61DWYxmUKea&sig=AOD64_3FbZMZN9CJs8hDAZ83CL757JIiRg&client=ca-pub-4803409109489353&adurl=http://www.agoda.com/partners/tracking.aspx%3Ftype%3D1%26site_id%3D1418969%26url%3Dhttp://www.agoda.com/asia/malaysia/kuala_lumpur.html%26tag%3D7af0e98e-5192-4c55-9afb-dc5f6dbc86e5

http://www.googleadservices.com/pagead/aclk?sa=L&ai=BxI4VTOq7T-WHC6jGigew1KykDMbTzKwD1teZrEWujeKxRaDvDxABGAEg05f2ASgEOABQ9rP-3AFgy5uChcAXoAGy5ObVA7IBEXNjaWVuY2UuanJhbmsub3JnugEJNzI4eDkwX2pzyAEB2gE3aHR0cDovL3NjaWVuY2UuanJhbmsub3JnL3BhZ2VzLzgwMzAvSXNsYW1pYy1SZWZvcm0uaHRtbIACAcACBcgCttzbGagDAegD5AboA7ED6AM79QMAAADE9QMAAAAQiAYB&num=1&cid=5Gh8tFx67-W0p61DWYxmUKea&sig=AOD64_3FbZMZN9CJs8hDAZ83CL757JIiRg&client=ca-pub-4803409109489353&adurl=http://www.agoda.com/partners/tracking.aspx%3Ftype%3D1%26site_id%3D1418969%26url%3Dhttp://www.agoda.com/asia/malaysia/kuala_lumpur.html%26tag%3D7af0e98e-5192-4c55-9afb-dc5f6dbc86e5

http://www.google.com/url?ct=abg&q=https://www.google.com/adsense/support/bin/request.py%3Fcontact%3Dabg_afc%26url%3Dhttp://science.jrank.org/pages/8030/Islamic-Reform.html%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dca-pub-4803409109489353%26adU%3DAgoda.com/Kuala_Lumpur_Hotels%26adT%3DKuala%2BLumpur%2BHotels%26adU%3Dwww.ISNR.org%26adT%3DNeuroscience%2BSpeakers%26adU%3Deverystudent.com%26adT%3DThe%2BBasics%2Bof%2BPrayer%26adU%3Dwww.quranreadpen.net%26adT%3DPen%2BPembaca%2BAl-Quran%26gl%3DMY&usg=AFQjCNFN4fYzfStWwRDNVRCZokXv9jvdGA

war on poverty, and public health measures, yet his definition of reform associated all ills in Muslim societies with the rise of Western influence (al-Bana, pp. 14–17 and 126–129). More recently, Usama bin Ladin's Advice and Reform Committee, the Saudi Arabian opposition group that he founded while in exile in the Sudan in the mid-1990s, railed against political oppression and espoused the doctrines of human equality, rule of law, freedom of the press, human rights, and economic development, using the latest technologies to spread its message—while rejecting the notion that anything positive could be learned from the West.

Both strands of contemporary Islamic reform emerged largely from modern state school systems—Soroush was trained in pharmacology and philosophy, al-Banna in modern education, bin Ladin in engineering. With the expansion of secular education, the traditional seminary (madrasa) scholarship has lost the near-monopoly over religious interpretation that it attempted to enforce in earlier eras.

Among the beneficiaries of educational expansion have been women, who were almost entirely excluded in earlier eras from advanced training in religious matters. As more Muslim women have gained secular education, small Islamic feminist movements have emerged in numerous countries. These movements criticize patriarchal cultural practices that they consider to be foreign to the original message of Islam, as well as patriarchal interpretations of the message that they consider to be a product of ongoing efforts by men to monopolize religious scholarship.

One of the common themes of Islamic reform movements, in the early twenty-first century as in past centuries, remains the denunciation of the seminaries' obscurantism and subservience to state authorities. This subservience has only been enhanced by the seminary reform projects of numerous colonial and postcolonial states.

At the same time, the proliferation of Islamic authorities beyond the seminary has generated such a large variety of liberal and radical Islamic movements, all of them espousing "reform," that the word has been rendered almost meaningless. The term is so elastic, and so positively charged, that it is difficult in the early 2000s to find

Muslim statements that reject reform in principle—even as criticisms of any particular reform are legion.

Dear Friends,The summer is now upon us, and most of you will be diving into summer courses, attending conferences, leaving on research trips, enjoying much-needed vacations, or attempting to manage all of the above. For those of you who are still trying to finalize book lists for fall courses, I have included a selection of our NEW, FORTHCOMING, and BACKLIST books below.As always, if you would like to receive exam copies of any of the books included in this message, please don’t hesitate to contact me. I am also your main contact if you wish to combine or customize any UTP materials for your fall courses; I would be happy to answer any of your questions about our print or digital custom publishing options.Best wishes for a healthy, happy, and productive summer.

NEW FOR COURSES

A History of Science in Society: From Philosophy to Utility, Second Edition By Andrew Ede and Lesley B. Cormack

This bestselling book traces the history of science through its continually changing place in society and explores the links between the pursuit of knowledge and the desire to make that knowledge useful.

Paper $49.95ISBN: 9781442604469

Medieval Military Technology, Second Edition By Kelly DeVries and Robert Douglas Smith

This thorough update of a classic book includes fully revised content, new sections on the use of horses, handguns, incendiary weapons, and siege engines, and new illustrations.

Paper $34.95ISBN: 9781442604971

Remembering 1759: The Conquest of Canada in Historical Memory Edited by Phillip Buckner and John G. Reid

Combined with Revisiting 1759, this collection provides readers with the most comprehensive, wide-ranging assessment to date of the lasting effects of the Conquest of Canada.

Paper $29.95ISBN: 9781442612518

Revisiting 1759: The Conquest of Canada in Historical Perspective Edited by Phillip Buckner and John G. Reid

Revisiting 1759 provides a fresh historical reappraisal of the Conquest and its aftermath using new approaches drawn from military, imperial, social, and Aboriginal history.

Paper $27.95ISBN: 9781442612426

NEED AN EXAM OR DESK COPY?If you would like to request UTP books to consider for course use, please email me and be sure to include your course name, the semester in which the course is being offered, and the estimated enrollment.Or, visit any of our book webpages to request electronic exam copies. UTP’s electronic exam copy system now runs on the industry-standard Adobe Digital Editions platform, allowing you to view your exam copies on more than one device. To place a personal order, please contact customer service or order through our website.

FORTHCOMING

An Uncertain Future: Voices of a French Jewish Community, 1940-2012 By Robert I. Weiner and Richard E. Sharpless

Paper ISBN: 9781442605596Available September 28, 2012

Edible Histories, Cultural Politics: Towards a Canadian Food History Edited by Franca Iacovetta, Valerie J. Korinek, and Marlene Epp

Paper ISBN: 9781442612839Available September 15, 2012

FROM OUR BACKLIST

The Shock of War: Civilian Experiences, 1937-1945 By Sean Kennedy

Paper ISBN: 9781442603707

A History of Science in Society: A Reader Edited by Andrew Ede and Lesley B. Cormack

Paper ISBN: 9781551117706

A World Beyond Borders: An Introduction to the History of International Organizations By David MacKenzie

Paper ISBN: 9781442601826

Canada's Jews: A People's Journey By Gerald Tulchinsky

Paper ISBN: 9780802093868

North America: An Introduction By Michael M. Brescia and John C. Super

Paper ISBN: 9780802096753

The Civilization of the Italian Renaissance: A Sourcebook, Second EditionEdited by Kenneth R. Bartlett

Paper ISBN: 9781442604858

The Defining Decade: Identity, Politics, and the Canadian Jewish Community in the 1960s By Harold Troper

Paper ISBN: 9781442610460

The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy, Second Edition By Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcock

Paper ISBN: 9780802095367

The Middle Ages in Texts and Texture: Reflections on Medieval Sources Edited by Jason Glenn

Paper ISBN: 9781442604902

The Shaping of Western Civilization: From Antiquity to the Enlightenment By Michael Burger

Paper ISBN: 9781551114323

2012 CONGRESS OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES The University of Toronto Press will be attending this year’s Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences, May 26-June 2 in Waterloo, Ontario. We will have both scholarly and higher education books on hand, so that you can browse the latest research and teaching tools

available in your field. We’re also keen to hear about your project ideas, so please stop by for a visit! We will be located in the Athletic Complex on the Wilfrid Laurier University campus in booths 53-56.We look forward to seeing you there!

his contention that religion will be called upon mankind the crisis of contemporary society

Needed and to

Is quite different a distinctive space of human practice anthropological” and constructed the

meaning that scope for f religion to embrace larger phenomenon involving politics, modern

science, n as a collection of cultural defined as by is

Religion is a collection of cultural systems, belief systems, and worldviews that relate humanity

to spirituality and, sometimes, to moral values.[1] Many religions havenarratives, symbols, traditions and sacred

histories that are intended to give meaning to life or to explain the origin of life or the universe. They tend to

derive morality, ethics,religious laws or a preferred lifestyle from their ideas about the cosmos and human

nature.

1. While religion is difficult to define, one standard model of religion, used in religious

studies courses, was proposed byClifford Geertz, who simply called it a "cultural system" (Clifford

Geertz, Religion as a Cultural System, 1973). A critique of Geertz's model by Talal

Asad categorized religion as "ananthropological category." (Talal Asad, The Construction of

Religion as an Anthropological Category, 1982.)

The word religion is sometimes used interchangeably with faith or belief system, but religion differs from private

belief in that it has a public aspect[citation needed]. Many religions have organized behaviors, clergy, a definition of

what constitutes adherence or membership, congregations of laity, regular meetings or services for the

purposes of veneration of a deity or for prayer, holy places (either natural or architectural), and/orscriptures.

The practice of a religion may also include sermons, commemoration of the activities of

a god or gods, sacrifices, festivals, feasts, trance, initiations, funerary services, matrimonial

services, meditation, music, art, dance, public service, or other aspects of human culture. However, there are

examples of religions for which some or many of these aspects of structure, belief, or practices are absent.

Al-Manar Edisi Januari 1998AL-MANAR

MENDUDUKUNG CITA-CITA TAJDID

ISSN 1394-8490 9 771394849001

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_service

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dance

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Art

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Music

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meditation

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrimony

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrimony

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Funeral

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initiation

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trance

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banquet

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Festival

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sacrifice

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gods

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sermon

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scripture

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prayer

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deity

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laity

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_church

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clergy

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_behaviour

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belief_system_(disambiguation)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faith

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropology

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talal_Asad

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talal_Asad

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clifford_Geertz

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_studies

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_studies

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_nature

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_nature

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmos

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lifestyle_(sociology)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_law

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_code

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universe

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_of_life

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meaning_of_life

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tradition

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mythology

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion#cite_note-0

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spirituality

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Worldviews

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belief_systems

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_systems

Diterbitkan Bersama Oleh Akademi Pengajian Islam Universiti Malaya dan Yayasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Islam

Malaysia

Tumpuan:

Konsep Media Islam Dalam Menyampaikan Kebenaran

Serangan Pemikiran dan Pengurusan Yahudi Ke Atas Media Khutbah: Media Yang Hilang Roh Dan Wibawa

Bertepuk Tangan Sebagai Media Sokongan

Kaedah Penentuan Hukum Dalam Drama Dakwah

Al-Kawakibi: Ulamak Yang Menentang Kediktatoran Dengan Pena

Rakaman pada 12 Mei 2012 di Daurah Fiqiah II 2012 anjuran Tahun 3 Mahasiswa Fiqh & Fatwa University Sains Islam Malaysia. Perbentangan Kertas Kerja Kedua oleh YBhg Ustaz Mohd Murshidi Mohd Noor dari Universiti Malaya bertajuk MADRASAH HADITH - Pengaruh Al-Bukhari Dalam Perbahasan Ilmu Fiqh.

In The Shock of War: Civilian Experiences, 1937-1945, Sean Kennedy shifts the reader's focus from the battlefields of World War II to the civilian experience. This short yet comprehensive text complements existing studies of World War II that document diplomatic and military operations. While many of these studies acknowledge the significance of the conflict for civilians, The Shock of War places civilians at the centre of events, drawing attention to the many different regions of the world affected by the conflict, and comparing various facets of the civilian experience. Kennedy's refreshing approach emphasizes the diverse and complex impact of the war which in some instances brought people together and which in others was profoundly destructive.

"Ya Allah, perbaikilah urusan agamaku yang menjadi pegangan bagi setiap urusanku. Perbaikilah duniaku yang di situlah urusan kehidupanku. Perbaikilah akhiratku yang ke sanalah aku akan kembali. Jadikanlah hidupku ini sebagai tambahan kesempatan untuk memperbanyak amal kebajikan, dan jadikanlah kematianku sebagai tempat peristirahatan dari setiap kejahatan."

Perumpamaan orang-orang Muslim , bagaimana kasih sayang yang tolong menolong terjalin antara mereka, adalah laksana satu tubuh. Jika satu bahagian merintih merasakan sakit, maka seluruh bahagian tubuh akan bereaksi membantunya dengan berjaga ( tidak tidur ) dan bereaksi meningkatkan panas badan ( demam ) " ( HR Muslim )" Hai orang-orang yang beriman, jadilah kamu orang-orang yang benar sebagai penegak keadilan , dan janganlah sekali-kali kebencianmu terhadap suatu kaum, mendorong kamu untuk ( berbuat ) tidak adil. Berlaku adillah, karena adil itu lebih dekat dendan taqwa. Dan bertaqwalah kepada Allah, sesungguhnya Allah maha mengetahui apa yang kamu kerjakan" ( QS Al Maidah : 8 )

“kemudian jika kamu berbantah2 dalam sesuatu perkara,maka hendaklah kamu mengembalikannya kepada KITAB ALLAH (QURAN) dan SUNNAH Rasul,jika kamu benar beriman kepada ALLAH dan hari akhirat,Yang demikian adalah lebih baik bagi kamu dan lebih elok pula kesudahannya.[maksud surah an-nisa 59].

قبل من أنزل الذى والكتاب رسوله نزلعىل الذى والكتاب ورسوله باهللا آمنوا آمنوا الذين ,Wahai orang-orang yang beriman“ ياtetaplah beriman kepada Allah dan Rasul-Nya dan kepada Kitab yang Allah turunkan kepada Rasul-Nya serta kitab yang diturunkan sebelumnya” (Q.S. An-Nisa’ : 136).

: “Engkau telah mengerjakan Sunnah(ku)”. Dan kepada yang mengulang, beliau bersabda : “Engkau mendapatkan pahala dua kali lipat”. (H.R. Abu Dawud dan An-Nasa’i) (Al-Khatib, 1998 : 3-4).

�ان ...( حب ابن و مسلم و البخاري رواه �و�ى م�ان ام¢ر¡ىء� ¥ل£ ¡ك ل §م�ا ¡ن إ و� §ات¡ £ي ¡الن ب �ع¢م�ال¥ ¢أل ا §م�ا ¡ن Sesungguhnya keberadaan amal-amal itu“ )إtergantung niatnya. Dan seseorang hanyalah akan mendapatkan sesuatu sesuai niatnya …” (H.R. Bukhari, Muslim, dan Ibnu Hibban). . ¡ �و¢م ي �ى ¡ل إ ¡ه�ا ب ع�م¡ل� م�ن¢ ر¥ و¡ز¢ و� ه�ا ر¥ و¡ز¢ ¢ه¡ �ي ف�ع�ل �ة° £ئ ي س� §ة° ن س¥ س�ن§ م�ن¢ و� �ام�ة¡ ¢ق¡ي ال ¡ �و¢م ي �ى ¡ل إ ¡ه�ا ب ع�م¡ل� م�ن¢ �ج¢ر¥ أ و� ه�ا �ج¢ر¥ أ �ه¥ ف�ل �ة° ن ح�س� §ة° ن س¥ س�ن§ م�ن¢( مسلم. ( و البخارى رواه �ام�ة¡ ¢ق¡ي Barangsiapa mengadakan sesuatu sunnah (jalan) yang baik, maka baginya pahala“ الsunnah dan pahala orang lain yang mengerjakannya hingga akhir kiamat. Dan barangsiapa mengerjakan sesuatu sunnah

yang buruk, maka atasnya dosa membuat sunnah buruk itu dan dosa orang yang mengerjakannya hingga akhir kiamat.” (H.R. Bukhari dan Muslim

أسفا الحديث بهذا يؤمنوا لم إن آثارهم عىل نفسك باخع Maka (Apakah) barangkali kamu akan membunuh dirimu“ فلعلكkarena bersedih hati sesudah mereka berpaling, sekiranya mereka tidak beriman kepada keterangan ini (al-hadits)”. (Q.S. Al-Kahfi : 6). Maksud kata Hadits dalam ayat tersebut adalah Al-Qur’an. Demikian pula firman Allah SWT :

فحدث ربك بنعمة فأما“Dan terhadap nikmat Tuhanmu, maka hendaklah kamu menyebut-nyebutnya(dengan bersyukur)”. (Q.S. Adh-Dhuha : 11)

Each chapter of this highly readable text concludes with a "For Further Reading" section.

The Shock of War is an invaluable survey of a critically important subject. Kennedy adeptly synthesizes the wide sweep of history without losing sight of the personal stories—a very impressive achievement that will be appreciated by specialist and general reader alike.

Jonathan F. Vance, The University of Western Ontario

Sean Kennedy does a great service in this short book. He has included much new work on the experience of civilians in the Second World War, both in Asia and Europe, and crafted a series of judicious essays on popular mobilization, life under foreign occupation, the scale and scope of the war's genocidal atrocities, and the social impact of the war's destruction. The book will serve as an essential starting place for students of the human experience of the Second World War.

William I. Hitchcock, University of Virginia

THE SHOCK OF WAR: CIVILIAN EXPERIENCES, 1937-1945By Sean Kennedy

International Themes and Issues

University of Toronto Press, Higher Education Division © 2011

World Rights

160 Pages

Acknowledgements

Introduction

1. The Strains of Mobilization2. Living under Occupation3. The Impact of Violence4. A World Unsettled

Index

Sean Kennedy is Associate Professor in the History Department at the University of New Brunswick and the author of Reconciling France against Democracy: The Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Français 1927-1945 (2007).

THE HIDDEN CAUSE OF THE GREAT RECESSION: EXTRACT FROM ‘REALECONOMIK’ BY GRIGORY YAVLINSKY

Posted by Yale University Press London

Grigory Yavlinsky on BBC’s HARDtalk

In his recent book Realeconomikthe internationally respected economist Grigory

Yavlinsky makes a powerful case that without a commitment to established social principles

in business and politics, a stable global economy will be impossible to achieve. In this

exclusive extract Yavlinksy, veteran leader of one of Russia’s liberal opposition parties and

recent guest on BBC’s Start the Week and HARDtalk, provides a fascinating introduction to

his controversial book.

Extract from Realeconomik: The Hidden Cause of the Great Recession (and How to Avert the Next

One)

It would have been pointless to write a book like this just three years ago—one simply couldn’t hope

for a positive response. But the situation is different now, largely because of two changes. The first is

the financial crisis of 2007–2009, which made at least some of the educated public more interested in

understanding the underlying fundamental problems of the current world economy.

Second, and this could be more significant, the current debate on economic policy of U.S. President

Barack Obama’s administration provides more room and opportunities for serious discussion than

before. Before these changes occurred, any debate on such issues would in principle have been

consigned to oblivion, so there was only one option—to wait for the opportune moment.

The title and subtitle, Realeconomik: The Hidden Cause of the Great Recession (and How to Avert the

Next One), reflect the central idea of my book: the cause of the crisis is that at the core, modern

capitalism is concerned with money and power, not ideals, morals, or principles. I use the word

Realeconomik as an analogue to Realpolitik, a pejorative term for politics that masquerades as

practicality while in fact comprising the cynicism, coercion, and amorality of Machiavellian

principles.

Contemporary economists might not accept some of the ideas proposed in Realeconomik. I could not

have published these ideas even in the first half of 2008 without being considered at best retrograde

or at worst an ignoramus. Even now I have little hope that the opinions of contemporary trendsetters

in economics and business have changed. However, it is possible that what is variously described as

the “Great Recession of the early twenty-first century” or the “longest U.S. slump since the 1930s”

will make at least some of these people consider seriously the argument of this book.

Unfortunately, the reasoning you will fi nd here has become unfashionable. In the 1950s, when the

world was still extricating itself from the ruins of World War II, the ideas I wish to discuss were more

a part of public discussion. Today, many will find them politically incorrect, if not seditious. An entire

generation of Western politicians, businessmen, and economists has come of age without ever

thinking seriously about the relationship between morality and economics or ethics and politics.

If we turn to eastern Europe, in particular early in the post-Soviet age, such discussions were out of

the question. It was generally accepted that business should be measured only by profits. Politicians

who succeeded communist-era leaders (and who largely had been a part of the communist ruling

http://yalebooks.co.uk/display.asp?K=9780300159103




http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9722750.stm

http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01hw6g1


http://yalebooks.wordpress.com/author/yaleuplondon/

class) proclaimed the transition from totalitarianism to market democracy yet actually adopted the

most unprincipled and cynical view of the nature of politics, driven by the all-encompassing

conviction (learned in their communist past) that in a market capitalist society only profits mattered—

the central idea of Realeconomik.

In Realeconomik I do not seek to make any moral judgments: I aim instead to be descriptive and

analytical. My goal is not to moralize, but rather to indicate those areas that are usually not discussed

in public—to write what many people think but may prefer to keep to themselves. I have tried to

be more or less impartial, though one may perceive judgment behind many of my words. I have no

intention of condemning anybody as mean or immoral: in no way do I consider myself a man who has

the right to judge my fellow human beings. Anyway, that’s not my task.

Grigory Yavlinsky

I aim to formulate a number of thoughts about what I perceive to be the underlying causes of the

global economic, moral, and political crisis at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Testing some

of the ideas contained in Realeconomik will surely require several years of solid academic

work. Nevertheless, I accepted the kind offer of Yale University Press to publish it now, because time

moves so swiftly in our modern world that I feel the urgency to state clearly the things that I believe

to be crucial to understanding the events unfolding before our eyes.

The underlying premise of Realeconomik is that the nature of the Great Recession is not only

economic—or perhaps not even attributable mainly to economic factors. Neither is it the product of

mere complacency and negligence of duty on the part of authorities and top-level managers in

the private sector, as some experts insist. Rather, the underlying fundamentals and causes go deeper

—to such things as general rules of society and the logic to which they are subject, encompassing the

issues of individual and social values, moral guidance, and public control, as well as their

evolution over the past several decades. These issues are much more serious and have a greater

impact on economic performance than is customarily believed.

Academic researchers and governmental decision makers should not lose sight of the fact that even

comparatively sophisticated ways of responding to this crisis, as proposed by many, such as writing

new, stringent rules, exercising more public control over their enforcement, imposing taxes on some

kinds of financial operations, and the like will not resolve fundamental problems, which are not

simply economic. Far less will be achieved by simply “pouring money on the crisis,” even if it is

accompanied by exposing the banking secrets of thousands of officials and businessmen.

There are no ready-made solutions to these problems. However, I hope tRealeconomik will provide a

fresh perspective for anyone concerned about another bursting bubble, persistently high

unemployment, the “new normal” (economic stagnation in a low-growth, low-inflation environment),

financial volatility, sharply rising poverty rates (even in industrialized nations such as the United

States), and social unrest, or the possibility of something more catastrophic.

Realeconomik is not a clarion call to change everything instantly. At the same time, the ideas

discussed here could and should become the cornerstone of modern policies in developed countries

that could help overcome certain disturbing political, economic, and social developments of the

past twenty-fi ve years.

I have structured Realeconomik to include a number of ideas and observations that reveal the key

traits of the modern Western economic and political system from the perspective of various changes


of the past two or three decades, both in the essence and character of business activities and in their

political and ideological underpinnings. Those changes can tell us much about the global economic

decline.

I am ready to accept criticism, as some shortcomings of Realeconomik are obvious to me, too.

However, the urgency of the problem persuaded me not to let perfection be the enemy of the good.

Comprehension of the key provisions should not require extensive scholarly references or an array

of empirical evidence.

It is difficult to talk about the economy from the perspective of morality, as the very concept of

morality seems to be devoid of established content, is subject to broad interpretation, and is often

rather elusive. But those difficulties seem insufficient reason to exclude morality from

economic analysis and research. It is essential to treat the issue of morality seriously and extensively

to provide a meaningful perspective for economic processes and their consequences, especially in the

framework of longterm analysis.

I realize that treating moral sense as an economic phenomenon is a complex enterprise sure to be

widely challenged, and I address this subject extensively elsewhere in Realeconomik. Nevertheless, I

must begin with the premise that there exists a code of simple and well-known, almost

universal, informal rules of behavior. These rules are essential to the efficient functioning of market

mechanisms and need to be constantly maintained, if not enforced, by public institutions.

Consequently, public neglect of these rules in business, as well as in regulating activities, may lead—

and to a large extent has already led—to serious deficiencies in economic mechanisms, first and

foremost in the financial sector.

I believe this premise is of utmost importance, and that may excuse my desire to share with the

readers my personal impressions and findings. The latter originate not only from my research but

also from daily experience of mixing with people who consider the relation of politics and business to

morality an issue unworthy of serious consideration. The viewpoint of these people reflects the

cynical attitudes common in the West, and it also represents a psychological vestige of the

hypocritical totalitarian past in the Eastern Bloc countries. This worst-of-both-worlds combination

often produces the atmosphere I call Realeconomik: undisguised cynicism that can lead to

lawlessness, corruption, and even violence as a means to resolve political and economic

disagreements.

Realeconomik by Grigory Yavlinsky

Certainly I understand the difference and draw a clear line between personal codes of behavior and

the much more complex ethics in public policy. Nevertheless, that line is neither absolute nor

insurmountable: a politician who maintains ethical principles in his private life is likelier

to implement them in politics, though the degree to which he can do so may be limited by the results

achievable. If sticking to principles dooms a policy to failure, that policy is flawed; achieving positive

results without compromising principle is the true art of politics, an art sadly neglected.

In Realeconomik I hope to demonstrate the need to rearrange our economic mindset to allow more

room for values and guidelines to govern the behavior of economic agents. If I succeed in drawing

public attention to this need, I will consider my mission fulfilled.

…


Grigory Yavlinsky is a Russian economist and founder and member of the Russian United Democratic

Party (YABLOKO). As deputy prime minister of Russia in 1990, he wrote the first Russian economic

programme for transition to a free-market economy, 500 Days. He lives in Moscow.

Realeconomik: The Hidden Cause of the Great Recession (and How to Avert the Next One) is

available now from Yale University Press.

Ernest RenanFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (November 2007)

Ernest Renan by Antoine Samuel Adam-Salomon, circa 1870s

Joseph Ernest Renan (28 February 1823 – 2 October 1892[1]) was a French expert of Middle East ancient

languages and civilizations,[2] philosopher and writer, devoted to his native province of Brittany. He is best

known for his influential historical works on early Christianity and his political theories, especially concerning

nationalism and national identity.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_theory

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brittany

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosopher

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#cite_note-1


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antoine_Samuel_Adam-Salomon

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability#Burden_of_evidence

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Citation_needed

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Identifying_reliable_sources

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ernest_Renan&action=edit

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ernest_Renan&action=edit

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citing_sources#Inline_citations


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ernest_Renan_1876-84.jpg

Contents

[hide]

1 Life

o 1.1 Birth and family

o 1.2 Education

o 1.3 Study at Issy-les Moulineaux

o 1.4 Study at college of St Sulpice

o 1.5 Scholarly career

1.5.1 Life of Jesus

o 1.6 Continuation of scholarly career: social views

1.6.1 Definition of nationhood

o 1.7 Late scholarly career

2 Reputation and controversies

o 2.1 Statue

o 2.2 Views on race

3 Works

4 Honours

5 Archives and memorabilia

6 References

7 Further reading

8 External links

[edit]Life

[edit]Birth and family

He was born at Tréguier in Brittany to a family of fishermen. His grandfather, having made a small fortune with

his fishing-shack, bought a house at Tréguier and settled there, and his father, captain of a small cutter and an

ardent republican, married the daughter of a Royalist tradesman from the neighbouring town of Lannion. All his

life, Renan felt a conflict between his father's and his mother's political beliefs.[citation needed] He was five years old

when his father died, and his sister, Henriette, twelve years his senior, became the moral head of the

household. Having in vain attempted to keep a school for girls at Tréguier, she departed and went to Paris as

teacher in a young ladies' boarding-school.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris,_France


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lannion

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republicanism

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tr%C3%A9guier

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ernest_Renan&action=edit&section=2


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#External_links

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Further_reading

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#References

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Archives_and_memorabilia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Honours

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Works

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Views_on_race

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Statue

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Reputation_and_controversies

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Late_scholarly_career

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Definition_of_nationhood

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Continuation_of_scholarly_career:_social_views

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Life_of_Jesus

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Scholarly_career

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Study_at_college_of_St_Sulpice

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Study_at_Issy-les_Moulineaux

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Education

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Birth_and_family

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#Life

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan

[edit]Education

Ernest, meanwhile, was educated in the ecclesiastical seminary of his native town. His school reports describe

him as "docile, patient, diligent, painstaking, thorough". While the priests taught him mathematics and Latin, his

mother completed his education. Renan's mother was half Breton. Her paternal ancestors came

from Bordeaux, and Renan used to say that in his own nature the Gascon and the Breton were constantly at

odds.[3]

During the summer of 1838, Renan won all the prizes at the college of Tréguier. His sister told the doctor of the

school in Paris where she taught about her brother, and he informedFAP Dupanloup, who was involved in

organizing the ecclesiastical college of St Nicholas du Chardonnet, a school in which the young Catholic

nobility and the most talented pupils of the Catholic seminaries were to be educated together, with the idea of

creating friendships between the aristocracy and the priesthood. Dupanloup sent for Renan, who was only

fifteen years old and had never been outside Brittany. "I learned with stupor that knowledge was not a privilege

of the church ... I awoke to the meaning of the words talent, fame, celebrity." Religion seemed to him wholly

different in Tréguier and in Paris. The superficial, brilliant, pseudo-scientific Catholicism[citation needed] of the capital

did not satisfy Renan, who had accepted the austere faith of his Breton masters.

[edit]Study at Issy-les Moulineaux

Ernest Renan

During 1840, Renan left St Nicholas to study philosophy at the seminary of Issy-les-Moulineaux. He entered

with a passion for Catholicscholasticism. The rhetoric of St Nicholas had wearied him, and his serious

intelligence hoped to satisfy itself with the vast and solid material of Catholic theology. Thomas

Reid and Nicolas Malebranche first attracted him among the philosophers, and, after these, he turned to GWF

Hegel,Immanuel Kant and JG Herder. Renan began to see an essential contradiction between

the metaphysics which he studied and the faith he professed, but an appetite for truths that can be verified

restrained his scepticism. "Philosophy excites and only half satisfies the appetite for truth; I am eager for

mathematics", he wrote to Henriette. Henriette had accepted in the family of Count Zamoyski an engagement

more lucrative than her former job. She exercised the strongest influence over her brother.

[edit]Study at college of St Sulpice

It was not mathematics but philology which was to settle Renan's gathering doubts. His course completed at

Issy, he entered the college of St Sulpice in order to take his degree in philology prior to entering the church,

and, here, he began the study of Hebrew. He realized that the second part of Isaiah differs from the first not

only in style but in date, that the grammar and the history of the Pentateuch are later than the time of Moses,

and that the Book of Daniel is clearly written centuries after the time in which it is set. Secretly, Renan felt

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Book_of_Daniel

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moses

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentateuch

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Book_of_Isaiah

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hebrew_language

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philology


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zamoyski

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johann_Gottfried_von_Herder

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolas_Malebranche

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Reid

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Reid

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theology

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scholasticism

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Issy-les-Moulineaux



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brittany

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Nicholas_du_Chardonnet&action=edit&redlink=1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%A9lix_Dupanloup


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gascony

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bordeaux

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breton_people

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin_language

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematics


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Renan.jpg

himself denied the communion of saints, yet desired to live the life of a Catholic priest. The struggle between

vocation and conviction was won by conviction. During October 1845, Renan left St Sulpice for Stanislas, a lay

college of the Oratorians. Still feeling too much under the domination of the church, he reluctantly ended the

last of his associations with religious life and entered M. Crouzet's school for boys as a teacher.

[edit]Scholarly career

Ernest Renan by René de Saint-Marceaux

Renan, educated by priests, was to accept the scientific ideal with an extraordinary expansion of all his

faculties. He became ravished by the splendour of the cosmos. At the end of his life, he wrote of Amiel, "The

man who has time to keep a private diary has never understood the immensity of the universe." The certitudes

of physical and natural science were revealed to Renan during 1846 by the chemist Marcellin Berthelot, then a

boy of eighteen, his pupil at M. Crouzet's school. To the day of Renan's death, their friendship continued.

Renan was occupied as usher only during evenings. During the daytime, he continued his researches

in Semitic philology. During 1847, he obtained theVolney prize, one of the principal distinctions awarded by

the Academy of Inscriptions, for the manuscript of his "General History of Semitic Languages." During 1847, he

took his degree as Agrégé de Philosophie – that is to say, fellow of the university – and was offered a job as

master in the lycée Vendôme.

In 1856, Ernest Renan married in Paris Cornélie Scheffer, daughter of Henry Scheffer and niece of Ary

Scheffer, both French painters of Dutch descent. They had two children, Ary Renan, b. in 1858, who became a

painter, and Noémi, b. in 1862, who eventually married Yannis Psycharis.

[edit]Life of Jesus

Within his lifetime, Renan was best known as the author of the enormously popular Life of Jesus (Vie de

Jésus).[4] This book was first translated into English during 1863 by Charles E. Wilbour and has remained in

print for the past 145 years.[5] Renan's Life of Jesus was lavished with ironic praise and criticism by Albert

Schweitzer in his book Quest of the Historical Jesus.

The book's controversial assertions that the life of Jesus should be written like the life of any historic person,

and that the Bible could and should be subject to the same critical scrutiny as other historical documents

caused some controversy, and enraged many Christians.[6][7][8][9]

[edit]Continuation of scholarly career: social views

Renan was not only a scholar. In his book on St. Paul, as in the Apostles, he shows his concern with the larger

social life, his sense of fraternity, and a revival of the democratic sentiment which had inspired L'Avenir de la

science. During 1869, he presented himself as the candidate of the liberal opposition at the parliamentary

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apostles

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_of_Tarsus






http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life_of_Jesus

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quest_of_the_Historical_Jesus

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Schweitzer

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Schweitzer


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_E._Wilbour



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yannis_Psycharis

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ary_Renan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ary_Scheffer

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ary_Scheffer

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Henry_Scheffer&action=edit&redlink=1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vend%C3%B4me

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Academy_of_Inscriptions

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volney_prize

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semitic_languages

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marcellin_Berthelot

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri-Fr%C3%A9d%C3%A9ric_Amiel

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_de_Saint-Marceaux


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oratorians

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communion_of_saints

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ernest_Renan_by_Ren%C3%A9_de_Saint-Marceaux.jpg

election for Meaux. While his temper had become less aristocratic, his liberalism had grown more tolerant. On

the eve of its dissolution, Renan was half prepared to accept the Empire, and, had he been elected to the

Chamber of Deputies, he would have joined the group of l'Empire liberal, but he was not elected. A year later,

war was declared with Germany; the Empire was abolished, andNapoleon III became an exile. The Franco-

Prussian War was a turning-point in Renan's history. Germany had always been to him the asylum of thought

and disinterested science. Now, he saw the land of his ideal destroy and ruin the land of his birth; he beheld the

German no longer as a priest, but as an invader.

Ernest Renan in his study by Anders Zorn

In La Réforme intellectuelle et morale (1871), Renan tried to safeguard France's future. Yet, he was still

influenced by Germany. The ideal and the discipline which he proposed to his defeated country were those of

her conqueror—a feudal society, a monarchical government, an élite which the rest of the nation exists merely

to support and nourish; an ideal of honour and duty imposed by a chosen few on the recalcitrant and subject

multitude. The errors of the Commune confirmed Renan in this reaction. At the same time, the irony always

perceptible in his work grows more bitter. His Dialogues philosophiques, written in 1871,

his Ecclesiastes (1882) and his Antichrist (1876) (the fourth volume of the Origins of Christianity, dealing with

the reign of Nero) are incomparable in their literary genius, but they are examples of a disenchanted and

sceptical temper. He had vainly tried to make his country obey his precepts. The progress of events showed

him, on the contrary, a France which, every day, left a little stronger, and he roused himself from his

disbelieving, disillusioned mood and observed with interest the struggle for justice and liberty of a democratic

society. The fifth and sixth volumes of the Origins of Christianity (the Christian Church and Marcus Aurelius)

show him reconciled with democracy, confident in the gradual ascent of man, aware that the greatest

catastrophes do not really interrupt the sure if imperceptible progress of the world and reconciled, also, if not

with the truths, at least with the moral beauties of Catholicism and with the remembrance of his pious youth.

[edit]Definition of nationhood

Renan's definition of a nation has been extremely influential. This was given in his 1882 discourse Qu'est-ce

qu'une nation? ("What is a Nation?"). Whereas German writers likeFichte had defined the nation

by objective criteria such as a race or an ethnic group "sharing common characteristics" (language, etc.),

Renan defined it by the desire of a people to live together, which he summarized by a famous phrase, "avoir

fait de grandes choses ensemble, vouloir en faire encore" (having done great things together and wishing to do

more). Writing in the midst of the dispute concerning the Alsace-Lorraine region, he declared that the existence

of a nation was based on a "daily plebiscite."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alsace-Lorraine

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_group

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Race_(classification_of_human_beings)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivity_(philosophy)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichte

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_is_a_Nation%3F

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_is_a_Nation%3F

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nation-state


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marcus_Aurelius

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nero

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecclesiastes

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anders_Zorn

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Prussian_War

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Prussian_War

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon_III_of_France

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meaux

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ErnestRenan.jpg

Karl Deutsch (in "Nationalism and its alternatives") suggested that a nation is "a group of people united by a

mistaken view about the past and a hatred of their neighbours." This phrase is frequently, but mistakenly,

attributed to Renan himself. He did indeed write that if "the essential element of a nation is that all its

individuals must have many things in common", they "must also have forgotten many things. Every French

citizen must have forgotten the night of St. Bartholomew and the massacres in the 13th century in the South."

Renan's work has especially influenced famed 20th century historian of nationalism, Benedict Anderson.

[edit]Late scholarly career

Ernest Renan birthplace museum inTréguier.

During old age, the philosopher contemplated his childhood. He was nearly sixty when, in 1883, he published

the autobiographicalSouvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse, the work by which he is now best known in France.

They showed the blasé modern reader that a world no less poetic, no less primitive than that of the Origins of

Christianity exists or still existed within living memory on the northwestern coast of France. They have

the Celtic magic of ancient romance and the simplicity, the naturalness, and the veracity which the 19th century

prized so highly. But his Ecclesiastes, published a few months earlier, his Drames philosophiques, collected in

1888, give a more adequate image of his fastidious critical, disenchanted, yet optimistic spirit. They show the

attitude towards uncultured Socialism of a philosopher liberal by conviction, by temperament an aristocrat. We

learn in them howCaliban (democracy), the mindless brute, educated to his own responsibility, makes after all

an adequate ruler; how Prospero (the aristocratic principle, or, if we will, the mind) accepts his dethronement

for the sake of greater liberty in the intellectual world, since Caliban proves an effective policeman and leaves

his superiors a free hand in the laboratory; how Ariel (the religious principle) acquires a firmer hold on life and

no longer gives up the ghost at the faintest hint of change. Indeed, Ariel flourishes in the service of Prospero

under the external government of the many-headed brute. Religion and knowledge are as imperishable as the

world they dignify. Thus, out of the depths rises unvanquished the essential idealism of Renan.

Renan was a great worker. At sixty years of age, having finished the Origins of Christianity, he began

his History of Israel, based on a lifelong study of the Old Testament and on the Corpus Inscriptionum

Semiticarum, published by the Académie des Inscriptions under Renan's direction from the year 1881 till the

end of his life. The first volume of the History of Israel appeared in 1887; the third, in 1891; the last two

posthumously. As a history of facts and theories, the book has many faults; as an essay on the evolution of the

religious idea, it is (despite some passages of frivolity, irony, or incoherence) of extraordinary importance; as a

reflection of the mind of Renan, it is the most lifelike of images. In a volume of collected essays, Feuilles

détachées, published also in 1891, we find the same mental attitude, an affirmation of the necessity

of piety independent of dogma. During his last years, he received many honours, and was made an

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dogma

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piety

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acad%C3%A9mie_des_Inscriptions

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Old_Testament

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariel_(Shakespeare)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prospero

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caliban_(character)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Celt

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tr%C3%A9guier


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benedict_Anderson

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albigensian_Crusade

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._Bartholomew's_Day_massacre

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Deutsch

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Maison_Mus%C3%A9e_Ernest_Renan_Tr%C3%A9guier.jpg

administrator of the Collège de Franceand grand officer of the Legion of Honour. Two volumes of the History of

Israel, his correspondence with his sister Henriette, his Letters to M. Berthelot, and the History of the Religious

Policy of Philippe-le-Bel, which he wrote in the years immediately before his marriage, all appeared during the

last eight years of the 19th century.

Renan died after a few days' illness in 1892, and was buried in the Cimetière de Montmartre in the Montmartre

Quarter of Paris.

[edit]Reputation and controversies

Hugely influential in his lifetime, Renan was eulogised after his death as the embodiment of the progressive

spirit in western culture. Anatole France wrote that Renan was the incarnation of modernity. One of his greatest

admirers was Manuel González Prada in Peru who took the Life of Jesus as a basis for his anticlericalism.

[edit]Statue

Statue of Ernest Renan in Tréguier town square

In 1903 a major controversy accompanied the installation of a monument in Tréguier designed by Jean

Boucher. Placed in the local cathedral square, it was interpreted as a challenge to Catholicism, and led to

widespread protests, especially because the site was normally used for the temporary pulpit erected at the

traditional Catholic festival of the Pardon of St Yves. It also included the Greek goddess Athena raising her arm

to crown Renan gesturing in apparent challenge towards to cathedral.[10][11] The local clergy organised a

protest Calvary sculpturedesigned by Yves Hernot as "a symbol of the triumphant ultramontaine church."[12]

[edit]Views on race

Renan has been criticised by some for antisemitism because of his comments on the alleged limitations of the

Semitic mentality. Renan claimed that the Semitic mind was limited by dogmatism and lacked a cosmopolitan

conception of civilisation.[13] For Renan, Semites were "an incomplete race."[14] However, in his 1883 essay "Le

Judaïsme comme race et religion" he disputed the concept that Jewish people constitute a unified racial entity

in a biological sense, which made his views unpalatable within racialized antisemitism. Renan was also known

for being a strong critic of German ethnic nationalism, with its antisemitic undertones. His notions of race and

ethnicity were completely at odds with the European antisemitism of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Other comments on race, however, have also proven controversial, especially his belief that political policy

should take into account supposed racial differences:

Nature has made a race of workers, the Chinese race, who have wonderful manual dexterity and almost no

sense of honor...A race of tillers of the soil, the Negro; treat him with kindness and humanity, and all will be as it



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antisemitism



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yves_Hernot

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calvary_(sculpture)



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Athena

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pardon_(ceremony)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Boucher_(artist)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Boucher_(artist)


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peru

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuel_Gonz%C3%A1lez_Prada

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatole_France


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montmartre_Quarter

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montmartre_Quarter

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cimeti%C3%A8re_de_Montmartre

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_IV_of_France

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legion_of_Honour

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coll%C3%A8ge_de_France

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Renan12.jpg

should; a race of masters and soldiers, the European race. Reduce this noble race to working in

the ergastulum like Negros and Chinese, and they rebel... But the life at which our workers rebel would make a

Chinese or a fellah happy, as they are not military creatures in the least. Let each one do what he is made for,

and all will be well.[15]

This passage, among others, was cited by Aimé Césaire in his Discourse on Colonialism, as evidence of the

alleged hypocrisy of Western humanism and its "sordidly racist" conception of the rights of man.[16]

[edit]Works

Averroès et l'averroïsme (1852)

Histoire générale et système comparé des langues sémitiques (1855)

Études d'histoire religieuse (1857)

De l'origine du langage (1858)

Essais de morale et de critique (1859)

Le Cantique des cantiques – translation – (1860)

An essay on the age and antiquity of the Book of Nabathaean agriculture. To which is added an inaugural

lecture on the position of the Shemitic nations in the history of civilization (1862)

Vie de Jésus (1863) (Translation: Life of Jesus)

Prière sur l'Acropole – Prayer on the Acropolis (1865)

Mission de Phénicie (1865-1874)

L'Antéchrist (1873)

Caliban (1878)

Histoire des origines du Christianisme – 8 volumes – (1866–1881) v. 2 v. 3 v. 4 v. 5 v. 7

Histoire du peuple d'Israël – 5 volumes – (1887–1893) History Of The People Of Israel Till The Time Of

King David

Eau de Jouvence (1880)

Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse (1884)

Lectures On The Influence Of The Institutions, Thought And Culture Of Rome On Christianity And The

Development Of The Catholic Church (1885)

Le Prêtre de Némi (1885)

Examen de conscience philosophique (1889)

La Réforme intellectuelle et morale (1871)

Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? (Lecture delivered on 11 March 1882 at the Sorbonne)

L'avenir de la science (1890)

http://www.archive.org/details/a605826300renauoft

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Paris

http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikisource:Qu'est-ce_qu'une_nation%3F

http://www.archive.org/details/lecturesontheinf00renauoft

http://www.archive.org/details/lecturesontheinf00renauoft


http://www.archive.org/details/historyofthepeop002809mbp

http://www.archive.org/details/historyofthepeop002809mbp

http://www.archive.org/details/thehistoryoftheo07renauoft

http://www.archive.org/details/thehistoryoforig00renauoft

http://www.archive.org/details/hischrisorg00renauoft

http://www.archive.org/details/thehistoryoftheo03renauoft

http://www.openlibrary.org/details/historyoftheorig02renauoft

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Tempest#Literature

http://www.archive.org/details/renansantichrist00renaiala

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mission_de_Ph%C3%A9nicie_(1865-1874)

http://www.lexilogos.com/document/renan_acropolis.htm

http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Life_of_Jesus

http://www.lexilogos.com/document/renan/vie_jesus.htm

http://www.archive.org/details/essayonageantiqu00renauoft

http://www.archive.org/details/essayonageantiqu00renauoft

http://www.archive.org/details/songofsongstrans00renarich

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cantique_des_cantiques


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Averroism

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Averroes



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aim%C3%A9_C%C3%A9saire


http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ergastulum&action=edit&redlink=1

Cohelet or the preacher (circa 1890)

Renan's letters from the Holy Land; the correspondence of Ernest Renan with M. Berthelot while gathering

material in Italy and the Orient for "The life of Jesus"; tr. by Lorenzo o'Rourke (1904)

[edit]Honours

The armoured cruiser Ernest Renan was named in his honour.

The community of Renan, Virginia was named after him.

[edit]Archives and memorabilia

Musée de la Vie romantique, Hôtel Scheffer-Renan, Paris

[edit]References

French Wikisource has

original text related to this

article:

Ernest Renan

Biography portal

1. ^ " Obituary Notes" Popular Science Monthly Volume 42 Wikisource December 1892 ISSN 0161-7370

2. ^ That science was called at the time philology

3. ^ René Galand, L'âme celtique de Renan (1959)

4. ^ English translation of Vie de Jésus at LEXILOGOS.COM

5. ^ As of this writing, WorldCat reports 115 different editions of the book in 1426 different libraries.

6. ^ Jules Théodose Loyson Une prétendue Vie de Jésus, ou M. Ernest Renan, historien, philosophe et

poëte (Paris, Douniol, 1863)

7. ^ Augustin Cochin Quelques mots sur la Vie de Jésus de M. Ernest Renan (Paris, Douniol, 1863)

8. ^ Instruction pastorale de Monseigneur l'évêque de Nîmes au clergé de son diocèse contre un ouvrage

intitulé "Vie de Jésus" par Ernest Renan (1863)

9. ^ Several of the books of Henri-Joseph Crelier have polemical titles naming Renan.

10. ^ Ernest Renan à Tréguier

11. ^ Catalogue, Ernest Renan (1823–1892) un Celte en Orient, Musée d’Art et d’histoire, Musée de Bretagne,

1992, Ville de Saint-Brieuc, Ville de Rennes.

12. ^ Le calvaire de réparation à Tréguier ( Côtes-d'Armor )

13. ^ "The Racial Motif in Renan's Attitude to Jews and Judaism", in: S. Almog (ed.), Antisemitism Through the

Ages, Oxford 1988, pp. 255–278

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Renan#cite_ref-12

http://www.ac-rennes.fr/pedagogie/hist_geo/histarts/calvaire_texte.htm



http://www.jeanboucher.net/?d=monuments&p=ernest_renan


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri-Joseph_Crelier


http://books.google.com/books?id=44lCAAAAIAAJ

http://books.google.com/books?id=44lCAAAAIAAJ


http://books.google.com/books?id=16YMAAAAIAAJ


http://books.google.com/books?id=oKYMAAAAIAAJ

http://books.google.com/books?id=oKYMAAAAIAAJ


http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/24540192&referer=brief_results

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/24540192/editions?editionsView=true&start_edition=1&se=yr&sd=asc&qt=sort_yr_asc


http://www.lexilogos.com/document/renan/life_jesus.htm


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Galand



http://www.worldcat.org/issn/0161-7370

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Serial_Number

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikisource

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly

http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_42/December_1892/Obituary_Notes


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Biography

http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/fr:Ernest_Renan



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scheffer

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mus%C3%A9e_de_la_Vie_romantique


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renan,_Virginia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_cruiser_Ernest_Renan


http://www.archive.org/details/renanslettersfro00renauoft

http://www.archive.org/details/renanslettersfro00renauoft

http://www.archive.org/details/coheletorpreache00renarich

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wikisource-logo.svg

14. ^ Anti-Semitism, by Gotthard Deutsch, Jewish Encyclopedia

15. ^ From Ernest Renan, "La Reforme intellectuelle et morale" Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1929

16. ^ Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, Joan Pinkham, trans. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000,

pp. 37–8.

This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed.

(1911). Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.

[edit]Further reading

DiVanna, Isabel. Writing History in the Third Republic (2010) excerpt and text search

[edit]External links

Wikimedia Commons has

media related to: Ernest

Renan

Wikiquote has a collection

of quotations related

to: Ernest Renan

Wikisource has original

works written by or about:

Ernest Renan

Sources

Works by & about Ernest Renan at Internet Archive (scanned books original editions color illustrated)

Works by Ernest Renan at Project Gutenberg

What is a Nation? – Renan's most famous lecture in English translation

The history of the origins of Christianity Cornell University Library Historical Monographs Collection.

{Reprinted by} Cornell University Library Digital Collections

Nation-building Interventions and National Security:An Australian Perspective

By Michael G. Smith and Rebecca Shrimpton

ABSTRACT

The international security implications of failed and failing states are profound. To achieve stability requires a commitment from the international community to rebuild the host state and avert future conflict. Thus, successful stability operations require a long-term civil-military commitment, as evidenced by lessons from events following World War II and the Korean War. Smith and Shrimpton highlight key lessons from historical and recent nationbuilding interventions in nonpermissive environments, and urge Australia to give higher priority to

http://www.ndu.edu/press/nation-building-australian-perspective.html#Author

http://www.amazon.com/dp/1429740108/

http://dlxs2.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=cdl;idno=cdl064

http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/core/hss3/e_renan.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Gutenberg

http://www.gutenberg.org/author/Ernest_Renan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Archive

http://www.archive.org/search.php?query=mediatype%3A(texts)%20-contributor%3Agutenberg%20-collection%3A(opensource)%20AND%20(subject%3A%22Renan%2C%20Ernest%2C%201823-1892%22%20OR%20creator%3A%22Renan%2C%20Ernest%20%2C%201823-1892%22%20OR%20creator%3AErnest%20Renan)

http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Author:Ernest_Renan


http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Special:Search/Ernest_Renan

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Ernest_Renan

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Ernest_Renan


http://www.amazon.com/Writing-History-Republic-Isabel-Noronha-Divanna/dp/1443819344/


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica_Eleventh_Edition

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_domain


http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Calmann-Levy&action=edit&redlink=1


http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/view.jsp?artid=1603&letter=A#4621


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PD-icon.svg

preemptive strategies that help prevent conflict, and to holistic approaches that build sustainable stability. The authors argue that Australia's primary efforts should remain focused on its nearer geographic region, capitalizing on the interests, relationships, and benefits that proximity offers. This strategic approach to nationbuilding would enhance international security and reduce the prospects of international conflict in the Pacific region while strengthening Australia's contribution to regional stability.

In their compelling book Fixing Failed States,1 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart offer a sobering prognosis for global stability and human security. They assert that "[f]orty to sixty states, home to nearly two billion people, are either sliding backward and teetering on the brink of implosion, or have already collapsed."2 This reality has profound implications for the future of foreign interventions for the purpose of nation-building. What might this entail for Australia? And what is involved in nation-building in failed or failing states? According to Ghani and Lockhart, the situation "is at the heart of a worldwide systemic crisis that constitutes the most serious challenge to global stability in the new millennium."3

Such questions imply that nation-building interventions have a past, and arguably a present, in international politics. But as the current debate on international objectives in Afghanistan shows, nation-building is a contestable notion, meaning different things to different actors. History suggests that states undertake foreign interventions primarily in pursuit of national security interests rather than through a desire to build capacity for independent and competent governance in other countries per se. That said, nation-building does occur as a result of international interventions, even if this outcome is not always the intervention's primary objective, and successful nation-building demands a long-term commitment of considerable resources by donor states, as well as from organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank.

If interventions are to occur in the future—a given if we accept the picture of global stability and security painted by Ghani and Lockhart—to what extent could they be driven by proactive and preconflict nation-building strategies, rather than ad hoc formulations as a response to conflict or war? And to what extent might nation-building be incorporated into the formal national security policies of Australia in the years ahead? Could the "3D Approach" for stabilization interventions—diplomacy, development, and defense—be applied in a coordinated pre-conflict manner to enhance security, governance, and sustainable development, rather than waiting for stabilization in a postconflict environment?

This article contends that Australia should consider nation-building as an important pillar in conflict prevention and as an integral component of its national security strategy, and addresses four related questions:

What are nation-building interventions? What is meant by nation-building, and can it be measured? What is the relationship between nation-building and international military interventions? What is the future for nation-building interventions in which Australia might be involved?

Nation-building and National Security

Conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy have been consistent themes in Australia's foreign and defense policies for many years. More recently, conflict prevention was emphasized in Australia's first National Security Statement in December 2008, when then–Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced that Australia's approach to regional engagement should be one "that develops a culture of security policy cooperation rather than defaults to any assumption that conflict is somehow inevitable." Rudd also saw utility in "creative middle power diplomacy . . . capable of identifying opportunities to promote [Australia's] security and to otherwise prevent, reduce or delay the emergence of national security challenges."4

Australia's policy roadmap for conflict prevention, however, is yet to be articulated clearly. There are sound arguments that the next National Security Statement (and arguably a first National Security Policy document) should incorporate Australia's contribution to coherent and coordinated nation-building strategies for fragile states, particularly those in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Such an approach would go beyond intervention to

effect regime change, to achieve a military victory, to kickstart stabilization and reconstruction following conflict, or even to achieve the important Millennium Development Goals— goals currently lagging in the Pacific region.5

Positive nation-building policies would enhance Australia's long-term security by helping to strengthen the resilience of the Asia-Pacific region to conflict, natural and man-made disasters, and political and economic setbacks. To be effective, however, this nation-building approach would require Australia to continue to strengthen its commitment to whole-of-government (and whole-of-nation) civil-military6 analysis, planning, and project coordination. This would demand the development of efficient mechanisms, and a cadre of trained personnel, to work collegially with host governments and international and regional organizations. Importantly, government departments and agencies would need to contribute to nation-building strategies in a collaborative way to achieve objectives agreed to by Australia and the governments of host nations. In practical terms, from Australia's perspective, this would require enhanced synergy between the programs of leading agencies—principally the Australian Agency for International Development, Defence, the Australian Federal Police, and the Attorney-General's Department—to develop country strategies that assigned responsibilities and priorities in concert with those of the host nation.

Focused nation-building policies of this kind offer an opportunity to provide the assistance necessary to arrest a fragile state's slide toward collapse before it reaches the critical tipping point—to strengthen a state's capacity to govern and provide security for its citizens. Such policies look to address the root causes of the systemic crisis described by Ghani and Lockhart to help turn the tide of a state's deterioration. Security policies can often link regional instability with national insecurity in a negative manner. More useful is a focus on building regional stability to enhance national security under a positive nation-building approach.

The implications of moving the locus of effort from perceived threats to existential opportunities are significant. Implementing an opportunity-based approach is more cost-effective over the long term than having to respond to conflicts when they occur. As well, such an approach accentuates a focus on the following:

identification of positive influences and forces that can be harnessed (as opposed to negative forces which must be defeated or countered)

empowerment of local actors (as opposed to replacement with international actors), and support for local solutions (rather than importation of foreign solutions)

a clear paradigm of local ownership with the host nation central to the process a long-term commitment based on mutual trust and interests.

By contrast, international postconflict stabilization responses risk weakening the host nation's authority and central responsibility (or even temporarily replacing it), potentially resulting in dependency and a delay in the restoration of state functions by local authorities.

A coordinated nation-building approach, beyond the efforts of individual departments and agencies, would not replace Australia's current threat-based approach to national security, but provide a complementary preventive mechanism to enhance regional security. Such nation-building policies would offer a suite of options for international engagement that address root causes of violence and conflict, not just the violence itself. Positive nation-building policies have the potential to neutralize threats before they arise.

Within the Asia-Pacific region, future competition between China and the United States for power and influence is a distinct yet parallel possibility to the problem of failed and failing states. Australia's dilemma will be to structure and balance its national capabilities for possible great power (and their proxy) conflicts with the ability to respond to instability within a region comprising fragile states. History and geography confirm that instability in its immediate region become conflicts of necessity rather than choice for Australia, demonstrated not only by World War II but more recently by Australia's commitments to Bougainville (an autonomous region of Papua New Guinea), Timor-Leste, and the Solomon Islands. A preemptive, coordinated, and long-term nation-building approach by Australia to regional fragile states would not only help reduce the prospects of serious conflict and great power rivalry, but also contribute to sustainable development by helping empower people to avert the human indignity of poverty and the impact of natural disasters. This is a bold strategy, and one that would contribute purposefully to the Australia-U.S.

alliance in a meaningful way beyond providing assets to more distant conflict and postconflict situations, as important as such contributions will continue to be. Australia's commitment to greater responsibility in its immediate region would be in line with the longstanding quest of the United States for "burden-sharing," now even more important given the impact of the global financial crisis and soaring national debt of the United States.7

Over the longer term, such a nation-building approach by Australia would be more cost-effective than accepting the inevitability of having to respond to regional instability through expensive military operations (in human, platform, and dollar terms as well as opportunity costs). In shifting the policy emphasis from a conflict response–based model to a conflict prevention–based one, the capability requirement becomes more civilianized, more purposeful, less expensive, less overt, and less disruptive. Or, as the former Chief of the Australian Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, noted recently, it provides "more security through less defence."8

Interventions

The importance of strengthening state resilience has become a central feature of approaches to international peace and security over the past two decades. "Nation-building" (or its associated but more narrowly focused sibling, "state-building") is generally recognized as an essential tool in addressing the causes of conflict, as well as in bridging the divide between the traditional state-centric concept of power politics and the contested concept of human security as advocated predominantly by non-state actors.

Not all international security analysts may agree with Ghani and Lockhart's assessment of state failure, but there is general consensus concerning the difficulties in implementing effective intervention strategies that lead to state resilience—strategies that in recent years have proved contestable or, at best, only partially successful. Paul Collier points out that one-sixth of the world's population is currently caught in a poverty trap from which escape is problematic. He notes that the ultimate negative impact of such poverty will have far-reaching effects on global security, as well as having immediate and protracted local humanitarian consequences.9 In December 2008, U.S. strategist Patrick Cronin highlighted the growing significance of "fragile and ungoverned spaces," listing this as one of eight global security challenges facing the then new Obama administration. Cronin commented: "There is no surefire way to build effective states. And there are too many weak states to address them at once or to consider investing everything in a solitary problem. . . . While weak states are not automatically threats, fragile states may aid and abet a host of other problems, from piracy to trafficking to incubating terrorism and pandemics."10

The Fund for Peace, in its Failed State Index for 2010, highlights significant concern at the poor state of global governance.11 This situation seems unlikely to improve markedly, given the slow recovery from the global financial crisis, coupled with the potential for increased intensity in the number of mega-disasters resulting from climate change. The findings of the Failed State Index also indicate that Australia's immediate geopolitical region requires closer policy attention and that more "heavy lifting" will be required of Australia in the years ahead. 12 There is a strategic choice to be made in Canberra about the nature of such heavy lifting, with a balance needing to be struck, weighted toward either responsive/ reactive or preventive/proactive policies.

The United Nations and World Bank have also highlighted the importance of nation-building in contributing to global stability. The UN blueprint for reform—the Brahimi Report of 2000—links peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding strategies to better enable states emerging from conflict to avert a return to fighting through the development of effective governance structures based on open communication with their citizens.13 The World Bank has increasingly related its development responsibilities to security sector reform and the rule of law, to the extent that the working title of its forthcoming World Development Report 2011 (WDR11) is "Conflict, Security and Development." Although not stated as such, WDR11 is quintessential nation-building, tying the responsibilities of the state to the needs of its local communities, while at the same time recognizing the need for coordinated international support.14

Individually and collectively, states and coalitions engaged in expeditionary interventions since the end of the Cold War have sought to achieve a more coherent, comprehensive, and whole-of-government approach to their

endeavors, employing the 3D Approach. But in these undertakings, nation-building has been a product rather than a reason for intervention, and the product has demanded significantly more focus than anticipated to reach the standard required for stability.

Definition and Measurement

Nation-building should not be confused with humanitarian intervention, which focuses on the immediate provision of life-support services. The ultimate goal of successful nation-building is a resilient, viable, and politically stable society supported by a responsive and accountable state apparatus. The concept of nation-building can be applied to strategies for both postconflict reconstruction and conflict prevention. Since the 1990s, however, Australian nation-building efforts have principally been responses to conflict situations, concentrating on stabilization and reconstruction. Far less attention has been given to important civil-military opportunities for conflict prevention, security sector reform, political reconciliation, and strengthening government accountability to local communities as part of holistic nation-building and poverty reduction programs.

The terms nation-building and state-building are often used interchangeably, although there can be important differences between the two. Nation-building represents the broad process of constructing a national identity and linking it to the authority of the state. It involves unifying the majority of the population within the state—despite ethnic, social, cultural, and/ or religious diversity—and fostering a national identity that is reflected in the character and authority of the state. State-building is narrower in its focus, referring to the functioning of a state from the consolidation of its territory to the development of effective institutions, processes, specialized personnel, and a monopoly over violence. State-building involves improving the architecture and effectiveness of government instrumentalities in a nontotalitarian manner that is representative of the people it serves. Nation-building requires the establishment of ongoing dialogue and mechanisms for effective and safe interaction between the people and the state as opposed to building institutional frameworks and mechanisms. A focus on state-building alone can lead to the establishment of inappropriate governments for longer term stability. Without an accurate and appropriate understanding of what unifies (or conversely divides) a population, the potential exists to measure success based on short-term inputs and costs rather than longer term outcomes and processes. The reality is that international interventions are unlikely to be successful in the long term unless they are committed to nation-building.

Measuring the effectiveness of nation-building is a complex undertaking. The task requires looking beyond the easily quantifiable and tangible metrics of dollars spent, training provided, militants demobilized, police and civil servants recruited, and growth in the private sector. It involves complementing quantitative data with qualitative analysis to provide an accurate appraisal of the accessibility, responsiveness, credibility, and legitimacy of the government, community perceptions of security and justice, and the effective and efficient delivery of basic services to the population. Strong and decisive political leadership is critical, and the process should result in a conflict-sensitive, locally owned, bottom-up popular investment in a host government and its national institutions. A range of political checks and balances on government action cannot be limited to a single milestone of free and fair elections. A strong sense of national identity can and should shape the development of government institutions to be responsive, appropriate, legitimate, and credible to the host population. Optimal nation-building, therefore, is a dynamic interaction between a state and its people, supported and facilitated by international intervention providing resources, advice, and expertise. Such an ideal does not incorporate regime change through intervention, although regime change may sometimes occur as an important step in the nation-building process.

Isolating the elements for successful nation-building further adds to the complexity of measuring its effectiveness. Each situation is unique, and solutions defy simple templating or transplanting. Building on the Brahimi Report of 2000, and reviewing peace interventions in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan, an important Kings College study in 2003 identified five key areas for effective peacebuilding in postconflict environments: planning and process; public administration and governance; rule of law and postconflict justice; the security sector; and the humanitarian-peacekeeping-development interface.15 If each is developed in a manner that appropriately accounts for the unique history and culture of a host nation, these areas could represent the pillars of a nation-building strategy. But the relevance of these pillars can be applied equally to the viability of conflict prevention strategies as international assistance to nation-building is likely to be more effective in a preconflict environment.

Various organs of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Development Programme, Peacebuilding Commission, and UN Secretariat's Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs, have expended considerable effort in improving capacity in postconflict reconstruction, usually with limited resources and in situations of fragile peace. In such circumstances the Security Council has increasingly mandated missions with tasks that are akin to nation-building.

Ghani and Lockhart's "Ten Functions of a State" (see table) provide a useful guide in helping to measure effectiveness in nation-building. These functions, however, are not a prescription for success and must be contextualized within an individual nation's history and culture. What seems clear, however, is that countries that appear most at risk on the Failed State Index tend to display poor progress in these functions.

Two significant historical examples of nation-building are the post–World War II economic and political reconstructions of Western Europe and Japan. These triumphs of nation-building, nonetheless, were fundamentally based on U.S. and Western national security interests that arose in response to intense ideological, political, and military competition with the Soviet Union. As such, nation-building was a strategy for containing communism, rather than a commitment to build strong and stable societies per se, supporting the earlier claim that nation-building policies complement more realist and conventional defense policies. The rebuilding of Western Europe and Japan, and later South Korea following the Korean War stalemate, were interventions for the long haul, and focused on a deliberate civil-military approach that remained subordinate to civilian authority. Subsequent interventions have failed to replicate the size and success of these three nation-building enterprises. Aspirational aspects of this model, however, can perhaps be seen in the UN's modern integrated peacekeeping approach, although with a less clear political overlay and generally without the commitment of sufficient resources by member states.

in Australia's immediate region there are also examples of nation-building efforts that have had varying degrees of success, such as in Bougainville, Timor-Leste, and the Solomon Islands. Despite substantial differences in the political and security genesis of each of these interventions, each has required civil-military and multidimensional responses (even those that were originally more narrowly conceived as primarily military operations). These three different examples continue to be works in progress, despite the success achieved to date; the withdrawal or downsizing of foreign military and police forces does not necessarily correspond with or equate to a robust peace or signify sustainable nation-building. This becomes apparent when such forces are required to return to reclaim peace and stability as another start-point for nation-building, as was the case in Timor-Leste in 2006. 16 Much remains to be done in each of these countries for nation-building to prove successful, and emphasis needs to be given to conflict prevention strategies.

The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq evolved differently from those that led to the rebuilding of Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea, which occurred over an extended period as part of a deliberate Cold War strategy. The former have been based on short-term planning horizons, respectively aimed at disrupting terrorist safe havens (Afghanistan) and neutralizing weapons of mass destruction (Iraq). These interventions commenced while lacking coordinated and coherent civil-military planning, and they have morphed repeatedly, without clear long-term visions and without promises of long-term commitments. Nation-building has neither been promised nor applied in earnest, yet the 3D Approach has the trappings of nation-building.

Operationally, the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions have been only partially successful in gaining the overall support of the local population, and in providing for their protection. In this modern and complex 3D environment, strategic priorities have oscillated between enhancing global security through countering terrorism and assisting host states in their nation-building efforts. A confluence of these two (sometimes contradictory) priorities has not been uniformly achieved between interveners and host states alike, particularly when regime change has been perceived as the prime motive for intervention. Nation-building in postwar Europe, Japan, and South Korea had a central focus on building democracies. The more recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have been more focused on military objectives, with the political imperative of fostering democracy a secondary concern. In these interventions the first principle of war, the selection and maintenance of the aim, has proved difficult and rubbery, and long-term commitments to nation-building have been avoided by, and uncoordinated among, contributing coalition partners. The Christian Science Monitor recently noted that "helping faltering regimes defend themselves

because they supposedly face a terrorism problem, which may somehow morph into a threat to the United States [and by implication other countries], will often just mean assisting repressive governments defend themselves against their own people."17 Such action clearly does not constitute effective nation-building. Rather than being used as examples for future nation-building strategies, or as reasons for not undertaking nation-building, Afghanistan and Iraq should be consigned to the category of "exception" rather than of "rule."

Relationships

The nation-building agendas of the international community and host states are fundamentally political in nature, but the political underpinnings of crises and national political dynamics are not always well understood by international actors. Based on practical experience gained in a host of operational crises from Angola to Afghanistan, James Kunder has emphasized that there is a consistent lack of understanding of "the deep-rootedness of the underlying political conflict" that spawns a complex crisis.18

Not all interventions respond to conflict or are military in nature. Interventions based primarily on long-term economic aid and development occur by mutual agreement between sovereign states, even if in some instances the receiving country may be dependent on foreign aid and have limited practical room for political autonomy and maneuver. The relationship between Australia and countries such as Papua New Guinea and Nauru are sometimes cast in this light. Such aid and development interventions may be necessary for the economic survival of the receiving nation, but they do not always have a positive impact on nation-building. A challenge for donors such as Australia is how to channel aid and development into meaningful nation-building strategies, including at the community grassroots level, rather than creating situations of budgetary dependence. If fragile states are to prosper and escape the traps of poverty and insecurity, they and their donors will require strategies beyond the meeting of the expenditure targets of the Millennium Development Goals.

Foreign interventions that include the use of force for nation-building, on the other hand, must accord with international law, which rests on the principle of state sovereignty and the norm of nonintervention. Other than acting in self-defense or under specific mandate of the United Nations, no state can interfere in the domestic affairs of another (article 2[4] of the UN Charter). A recent exception to this principle, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), was unanimously agreed upon by world leaders in 2005 as a new norm. R2P encompasses the notion that sovereignty is a responsibility and not a privilege, and that when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens the international community has a responsibility to intervene when sanctioned by the Security Council. R2P, however, is yet to be invoked in practice.

The rise of militant nonstate actors has challenged the efficacy of international law between states. While irregular forces have been accommodated under international humanitarian law through the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, international law has not always proved useful in managing asymmetric conflict between state and nonstate actors. To allow for nation-building in contested environments, old principles of irregular and counterinsurgency warfare have been dusted off and relearned. Principally, this requires the subordination of military forces to civilian authority in theater. But this has proved difficult to achieve in practice, particularly when host governments have been ineffective or corrupt, and when those intervening lack the necessary pool of well-trained civilian diplomats, mentors, change agents, administrators, development specialists, police, and technocrats.

Last-minute calls in such interventions for a "civilian surge," capable of understanding the cultural requirements of different fragile states, cannot be accommodated quickly as such elements require years of preparation. In this light, Australia's recent initiative to establish an Australian Civilian Corps (ACC) is sensible. Rather than short-term responses to conflicts and disasters, however, the ACC's long-term utility may ultimately rest on its assistance to unstable and fragile states as part of conflict prevention through an understanding of the culture, history, politics, and language of the people in locations where they may need to be deployed frequently.

The lessons from nation-building interventions in nonpermissive environments such as Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and the Solomon Islands are yet to be codified, while old lessons are relearned and misapplied. Nevertheless, some preconditions for success in such environments warrant repetition. These include:

no intervention without strategy a political commitment for the long haul coordinated civil-military analysis, planning, and execution—the 3D Approach to security, governance, and

development a supportive and receptive host government, relatively corruption-free and leading the change sufficient resources to ensure public security and to isolate insurgents and spoilers primacy of political objectives—civilian leadership and military subordination to a capable civil authority population respect for, and confidence in, the security forces of intervening states a genuine local and international commitment to governance and the rule of law effective mechanisms for population protection early and effective communications and information strategies a coordinated national development plan.

It is likely that the international community's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan will curb the appetite of many countries for nation-building interventions in the near future. Ambition may have run well ahead of capability in these interventions, and mistakes made are likely to result in justifiable caution in future expeditionary endeavors. While it is not impossible to achieve success in such situations, the costs are significant and may be disproportionate to the benefits without a clear understanding of the context, the task, and a capacity to apply the right tools to the right problems. Nation-building in hostile environments is a highly complex and political undertaking that is both resource- and time-intensive. The relearning of this long-known but ultimately forgotten lesson by the international community in Iraq and Afghanistan has been an unforgiving process. Yet much wisdom has emerged from recent experience and care should be taken to catalogue and institutionalize these civil-military lessons.

Future Interventions for Australia

The prognosis for effective nation-building interventions by Australia in the future is not clear. For major conflicts such as Afghanistan, the time horizons seem ridiculously short for nation-building to be effective, and contributions by Australia (while important in Oruzgan Province) will have minimal impact on Afghanistan's overall nation-building outcome. In tough economic times, and acknowledging that the conflict has become increasingly unpopular among the populations of some coalition countries, the strategic focus has shifted to limiting public expectations of success and contemplating withdrawal timelines. Current NATO strategy does not represent a consolidated plan for building the nation-state of Afghanistan. Australia must honor its commitment in Afghanistan, but equally it needs to consider and plan its future approach to nation-building beyond Afghanistan, and the priority of nation-building as a component in national security strategy.

Post-Afghanistan, the priority for Australia's nation-building efforts should concentrate on the archipelagic and maritime environment of its immediate region, incorporating strategically important countries in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Rather than focusing on responses to conflicts and natural disasters, priority should be given to strategies for conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction. Comprehensive civil-military nation-building strategies will be required over the long term, with an emphasis on identifying opportunities to strengthen physical security, economic development, governance, and the rule of law. This is a mammoth task, but, compared with many other continents and regions, it should be possible to reduce the current level of fragility and to contribute to a more secure, prosperous, and peaceful region. Such an approach will require Australia to work closely with host governments and multilateral agencies, and to harmonize expectations and programs into less stovepiped and more coherent nation-building strategies. Through these efforts, and by working to achieve a careful and effective balance in emphasis between proactive nation-building strategies and the enduring traditional defense policies for conventional threats, Australia will enhance its own security and be respected as a regional middle power "punching to its weight."

Such a strategy, if implemented effectively, would make an important contribution to strengthening the Australia-U.S. alliance, and would be consistent with the U.S. goal of burden-sharing its global responsibilities, particularly as the balance of power between the United States and China continues to evolve. Optimizing peace and security in the important maritime environment of the Indian and Pacific Oceans proximate to Australia is an important contribution to global security.

Australia is a small but respected middle power in the global context. Contributions to global peace, security, and development will be optimized through purposeful engagement with the United Nations and the Bretton Woods economic institutions. Increased multiagency engagement by Australia will contribute positively to the UN's capacity and reform program, and enable Australia to learn important global lessons for potential application in regional nation-building strategies. For example, Australia has much to learn from Africa, the global epicenter of security and development case studies that dominate the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding agenda.

Conclusion

Australia's national security can be enhanced through proactive and long-term civil-military nation-building strategies based on conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction, principally focusing on Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. More work is required by policymakers if Australia's immediate region is to be peaceful, prosperous, and secure. These efforts should be complemented by support to multinational agencies in the global arena—principally the United Nations and the World Bank Group. By contrast, nation-building efforts focused on stabilization and postconflict reconstruction, particularly in more distant locations, are likely to be more costly and less successful. Such interventions should be considered by exception. Australia's experience in regional nation-building interventions has shown greater success than ventures farther afield.

A national security strategy with increased emphasis on regional conflict prevention through coherent nation-building strategies will help strengthen Australia's contribution to the Australia-U.S. alliance. This alliance is likely to remain the cornerstone of Australia's security policy even as the balance of power continues to evolve in the Asia-Pacific region. PRISM

Selling Foreign Intervention (in Syria & Lebanon)Posted by Qifa Nabki The debate over Syria in the Arab media and social networks has essentially

become a debate about foreign intervention, and the most commonly encountered argument on the

pro-regime side goes something like this:

“The Syrian opposition is a foreign-funded, foreign-armed conspiracy to topple the Assad regime and

strike a blow against the Resistance Axis. The grievances of many Syrians are legitimate, but

accepting any support from the West or its Arab allies is tantamount to treason, and thereby empties

the opposition of any legitimacy.”

There are many reasons to oppose intervention in Syria, but the argument above strikes me as very

odd. I find myself wondering whether the many (intelligent, otherwise reasonable) people who make

it are being willfully disingenuous or are simply oblivious to to the political history of this region. The

fact that these same people often proudly tout Syria’s ability to punch above its regional weight by

manipulating events in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine tends to make me feel less charitable…

To take an obvious counter-example, Hizbullah makes no secret of its allegiance to and dependence

upon foreign powers in pushing its agenda. The group’s weapons are not manufactured in Lebanon;

they get them from Syria and Iran. A significant portion of its budget comes directly from foreign

sources. And its political leaders openly state that Hizbullah’s maneuvers take into account the

interests of a regional alliance stretching from Tehran to Beirut via Damascus.

Critics will hasten to point out that Hizbullah’s agenda is not directed against Arab governments but

rather against Israel, but this ignores the fact that the party spent eighteen months in 2007-08 trying

to bring down the Saniora government. It attempted to do this peacefully, just as the early phase of

the Syrian uprising was a pageant of political protest and not an armed insurrection. But the fact that

Hizbullah’s demonstration did not immediately devolve into an insurrection had less to do with the

party’s benevolence toward Saniora and everything to do with the balance of military power in the

country. If Hizbullah were to stage such a demonstration in Damascus today (assuming that this party

would be legal in Syria, which it wouldn’t be), it would be crushed by Syrian Army tanks within a day

or two.

The lesson to be drawn from this comparison is perhaps that the Syrian opposition’s greatest sin is

not that it has allowed itself to be tainted by rumors of foreign tutelage, but rather that it has not

embraced and rationalized such tutelage as fluently as Hizbullah has. Supporters of the party don’t

mind its brand of foreign-funded, foreign-armed influence, but find it treasonous in the case of the

Syrian opposition. And this is despite the fact that the extent of foreign influence on the situation in

Syria is far from clear.

But even assuming that the constellation of groups collectively referred to as the “Free Syrian Army”

is entirely funded and armed by a couple governments (say, Saudi Arabia and Qatar), then the

following question poses itself:

What justifies, in the mind of an Assad regime supporter, a clear Iranian-Syrian agenda in

Lebanon, but de-legitimizes a Saudi-Qatari agenda in Syria?

In other words, if the fact of the “foreignness” of intervention is not what makes it treasonous, then

what does? I have not heard a convincing answer to this question yet, but I’m sure the many

intelligent and pro-regime readers of this blog would be happy to try setting me straight.

Between Politics and Principles: Hamas’ Perilous Maneuversby Ramzy Baroud

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Doha, Qatar, where they signed an

agreement to form a unity government (Reuters) Despite all of Hamas’ assurances to the contrary, a defining struggle is taking place within the Palestinian Islamic movement. The outcome of this struggle—which is still confined to polite political disagreements and occasional intellectual tussle—is likely to change Hamas’ outlook, if not fundamentally alter its position within a quickly changing Arab political landscape.

The current Hamas is already different from the one initially set up by a local Gaza leadership in December 1987 in response to the first Palestinian uprising. One of the very first statements circulated by their newly established ‘military wing’ (masked men armed with wooden clubs and cans of spray paint) expressed the nature of that political era:

“What has happened to you, O rulers of Egypt? Were you asleep in the period of the treaty of shame and surrender, the Camp David treaty? Has your national zealousness died and your pride ran out while the Zionists daily perpetrate grave and base crimes against the people and the children?”

Although the power discrepancy between Israel and the Palestinians has remained largely unchanged, Hamas has morphed from a local Palestinian branch of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood into a tour de force within Palestinian society. It has also become an important regional player, long designated by the US and Israel as a member of the radical camp in the Middle East (the other members being Iran, Syria and Hezbollah). While Iran and Syria were demonized for aiding and enabling Palestinian and Lebanese resistance to Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah successfully resisted Israel’s military adventures in Gaza and Lebanon.

Arab revolutions, however, forced a remarkable transformation in terms of power relations in the region. Longtime symbols of Western influence in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen were violently and decisively forced out of power, although their cronies are still battling for position and sway. The ‘moderate camp’ was shocked to its core by the removal of Honsi Mubarak, who, for three decades, diligently guarded a pro-American fort in exchange for a fixed sum of money. The dramatic events that swept the Arab world required urgent action, a spectacular jockeying for influence—to either coerce where change was deemed unacceptable, or exploit genuine, homegrown uprisings where change presented an opportunity to settle scores.

Syria was a prime example of the latter. It is widely understood that to balance the power play of gains and losses, the removal of Mubarak could only be offset with the ousting of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad. Only then would the game return to a state of normalcy—especially when we consider the diminishing American influence in the region following its withdrawal from Iraq. Unfortunately for Syria, the conflict was quickly redrawn around regional politics. The horrifying violence in Syria is being contextualized within dangerous paradigms concerning NATO intervention and some Arab countries’ insistence on transforming the civil war into a zero-sum game.

Hamas, which had successfully survived factional rivalry, Israeli wars and international isolation, was faced with its most pressing dilemma since the legislative elections of January 2006. On one hand, the so-called Arab Spring has ushered the unmistakable (and predicted) rise of Islamic political forces—of which Hamas is part and parcel. On the other, it has confusingly renovated the political equilibrium of the entire region.

It is no secret that without Iran’s financial support, Hamas would have found it very difficult to operate in the Gaza Strip following the Israeli blockade in 2007. Damascus had provided Hamas with a political platform, allowing the Islamic movement a level of freedom to propagate its ideas and take some of the heat off its besieged leadership in Gaza and the West Bank. Disowning its allies due to a growingly polarizing political (and sectarian) discourse in the region is not an easy decision by any means. Here lies Hamas’ predicament.

Political realism is unavoidably opportunistic. Hamas’ reputation among its supporters was maintained through a careful balance between political savvy and religiously motivated ideological principles. Revolutionary times can upset any balance, however skillfully cultivated. A series of agreements between Hamas and Fatah—including the landmark Doha accord on February 6—were attributed to the reformatting of regional alliances: Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah suffered a serious blow with the ousting of Mubarak, and Hamas’ future in Syria looked increasingly dim in light of the escalating violence.

Although Palestinians have been demanding reconciliation between the rivals, to no avail, the successive unity episodes were incriminating to both parties as national accord and resisting Israel proved less urgent than regional politics. Hamas’ drift to a new camp continued at astonishing speed. Hamas’s leaders in Damascus, and also Gaza went out on regional tours, hoping to forge new alliances to the once shunned resistance movement. And in another twist, exiled Hamas leaders have suddenly emerged as agents of political moderation. The swiftness of the new terminology is explained by Brian Murphy and Karin Laub: “The movement’s top leader in exile, Khaled Mashaal, wants Hamas to be part of the broader Islamist political rise…. For this, Hamas needs new friends like the wealthy Gulf states that are at odds with Iran” (AP, Feb 9).

Writing in the Lebanese Daily Star, Michael Broning, Israel-based director of the German Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung foundation, agrees. “Meshaal has come to represent a force of change,” he states, while Gaza Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh “represents the conservative wing of Gaza’s Hamas leadership.” Thus a long-coveted opening is presenting itself as “disagreements within Hamas have been escalating, pitting the movement’s diaspora leadership against the Hamas-led Gaza administration.” Tellingly, the title of Broning’s article is: “Engage Hamas’ moderates and test their newfound flexibility” (Feb 24).

Some commentators, Broning included, are widely speculating on the future of the movement. News outlets are rife with reports regarding Hamas’ maneuvering—whether compelled by political necessity or propelled by the ideological triumph of Islamist forces in the region.

Hamas might be reinventing itself, or it may simply be trying to weather the storm. Either way, the political context of Hamas’ maneuvers is quickly leaving its traditional home (the Israeli occupation), and moving into a whole new dimension regarding the region as a whole. While Hamas might convincingly argue that survival necessitates measured shifts in politics, it is more difficult to explain how quickly and readily regional politicking is trumping national priorities.

Indeed, the line separating principles and politics can at times be a very fine one.

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/03/02/between-politics-and-principles-hamas-perilous-maneuvers/



Foreign military intervention and women’s rightsJournal of Peace Research July 2011 48:455-468,

Foreign military intervention and women’s rights

1. Dursun Peksen ⇓ 1. Department of Political Science, East Carolina University

1. [email protected]

Abstract

A large body of scholarly work has been devoted to the possible consequences of foreign military intervention for the target state. This literature, however, tends to be state-centric and mostly neglects the insight from gender-specific theoretical and empirical perspectives. The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which military intervention affects women’s rights. It is argued that unilateral interventions are prone to diminishing women’s status by encouraging the persistence or creation of repressive regimes and contributing to political disorder in the target state. If the use of armed forces ever helps or causes no damage to women’s well-being, it will likely be during interventions led by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). This is because IGO interventions are unlikely to protect or support an authoritarian, patriarchal political system. Furthermore, such multilateral missions will increase international awareness of women’s status along with other human rights issues in the target society, thereby creating more pressure on the government to enforce women’s rights. To empirically substantiate these arguments, three different indicators that tap socio-economic and political aspects of women’s status are used, including the indices of women’s economic, political, and social rights from the Cingranelli-Richards database. The results indicate that while women’s political and economic status suffer most during unilateral US interventions, IGO interventions are likely to have a positive influence on women’s political rights. Non-US unilateral interventions, on the other hand, are unlikely to cause any major change in women’s status. Finally, military interventions in general have no major statistically significant impact on women’s social rights.

Political, Economic, and Social Consequences of Foreign Military Intervention

1. Jeffrey Pickering 1. Kansas State University

1. Emizet F. Kisangani 1. Kansas State University

Abstract

Foreign military intervention is one of the most common types of interstate military force used over recent decades. As war’s costliness increases and the efficacy of economic sanctions and other foreign policy tools is increasingly questioned, it may become even more prevalent. Unfortunately, the field of international relations has little systematic understanding of the types of impacts such military ventures can have on target states in the developing world. In PCSE AR1 regressions of 106 developing countries from 1960 to 2002, we find that large scale foreign military interventions, which have over 1000 intervening troops, do not leave a significant imprint on governing institutions, economic growth rates, or physical quality of life in developing democracies. The same cannot be said for non-democratic states in the developing world. Hostile interventions can help to democratize non-democratic targets, while rival interventions lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.

http://prq.sagepub.com/search?author1=Emizet+F.+Kisangani&sortspec=date&submit=Submit

http://prq.sagepub.com/search?author1=Jeffrey+Pickering&sortspec=date&submit=Submit

mailto:[email protected]

http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/48/4/455.abstract#corresp-1

http://jpr.sagepub.com/search?author1=Dursun+Peksen&sortspec=date&submit=Submit

Political, Economic, and Social Consequences of Foreign Military InterventionPolitical Research Quarterly September 200659: 363-376,

POST-COLD WAR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFRICAMashudu Godfrey Ramuhala

Abstract

Military intervention remains controversial both when it happens and when it fails to happen. Since the end of the Cold War, military intervention has attracted much scholarly interest, and it was demonstrated that several instances of the use of force or the threat to use force without Security Council endorsement were acceptable and necessary. Matters of national sovereignty remain the fundamental principle on which the international order was founded since the Treaty of Westphalia. Territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their domestic affair, continue to be the foundation of international law, codified by the United Nations Charter, and one of the international community‟s decisive factors in choosing between intervention and non-intervention. Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, matters of sovereignty and non-interference have been challenged by the emergent human rights discourse amidst genocide and war crimes. The aim of this article is to explain the extent to which military intervention in Africa has evolved since the end of the Cold War in terms of theory, practice and the way military intervention unfolded upon the African continent. This will be achieved by focusing on both successful and unsuccessful cases of military intervention in Africa. The unsuccessful cases include Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994 and Darfur in 2003 on the one hand, and the successful cases being Sierra Leone in 2000 and the Comoros in 2008 on the other. While the unsuccessful cases attracted much scholarly attention and controversy, given their prolonged nature and difficulty in terms of conclusion, successful cases were short in terms of time and attracted little scholarly attention and controversy.

Home > Vol 39, No 1 (2011) > http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/101/134 The Deadlock in Syria

Seemingly, the Arab spring before it blossoms in Syria has been hardly hit due to harsh social and political weather there. When the uprising started 14 months ago, it got the global attention. Everybody around the world was feeling sympathy with demonstrators. Moreover, the time was ripe and much exposed to change, because the wave of the so-called spring was tough enough to challenge the pillars of all regional authoritarian regimes.The success of demonstrators in Tunisia, Egypt and their superiority in Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya all were good source of psychological fuel to set the Syrian demonstrators on the roller-coaster of opposition to Bashar-al-Assad regime.Thanks to NATO-led "a kind of military intervention" in Libya which sparked criticisms of human rights activists but remained generally unheard because the outcome of the intervention supported the status of anti-Moammar Gaddafi regime's oppositions.While in the two other countries—Yemen and Bahrain—the movements took a different path due to regional differences. Initially, in Bahrain protestors marched to streets to ask for socio-economic and political reforms, with no visible bias to particular sect. but unfortunately, the regional arrangement of power that also on the basis of clear sectarian line turned the movement upside down. Demands got stinky and one sect just retreated and the other put step ahead.A similar story was repeated with minor differences in the case of Yemen; tribal bondage was far stronger than religious ties and the demonstrators failed to form an uprising with national characteristic.As a result, civil uprising receded with no visible achievements. So, the failure of civil unrest in the three above mentioned countries indeed caused Mr. President Bashar al-Assad to a see a glimpse of

http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/101/134

http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/issue/view/19

http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/index

light at the end of long tunnel of the time. From the very start, the regime responded with clenched fist and branded them as terrorists. The regime showed no flexibility against demonstrators and used all its force to suppress them. The situation became gruesomely dangerous when the international community failed to take a joint front against Damascus.Drafts prepared mostly by European countries for tougher action and were vetoed twice in the United Nations Security Council by China and Russia which feared the consequences. In other words, after both countries—China and Russia—grudgingly accepted to avoid exercising their veto right in the UNSC in the case of Libya. The resolution paved the way for foreign military intervention. The mission from protecting civilians was changed into outstation of Moammar Gaddafi.So, in order not to undergo similar situation, Chinese and Russian officials dealt with Syrian regime with much more caution. They refused to approve drafts which indirectly paved the way for military intervention. Moreover, the Libyan mission was not carried completely with visible victory. It continued for months and imposed cost on the already economic-slowdown and a stroke on military budget. So, it is clear that comparing Libya with Syria is a blunt mistake because the regime of President Assad is far powerful and also interconnected with countries like Iran and groups like Hezbollah.Thus, considering the challenges, it is far likely for anti-Assad countries to start a war against Damascus. In another word, the United States is engaged in a corrosive war against Taliban-led militants in Afghanistan and just pulled out of Iraq; clearly, it does not have the will to start another war in such crisis ridden region. Without the US, it is far likely that its European allies embark to such financially and humanitarianly costly war.The regional rivalry among countries is also something that cannot be neglected assessing the ongoing situation in Syria. Tehran has been supporting Presiden Assad since the very start of civil uprising. The supreme leader who is the ultimate decision maker in the country, Mr. Ayatollah Ali Khamenae often openly voiced out support for Damascus regime while condemning other regimes; reacted similarly in the case of uprising breakout. While insisting that Arab countries are affected by more than 30-years old Islamic revolution in Iran, he links civil unrest in Syria to foreign intervention.Therefore, the so-called proxy war and the dominant presence of Allawites, a minority that can hardly be branded as part of Shiite group, have further complicated the situation. See for instance, theThursday's suicide bombings that shook the Damascus; the two suicide bombings which left more than 55 dead and more than three hundred injured were claimed by a group named al-Nusra. Al-Nusra is a hardliner Sunni group which is believed to have close links with Al-Qaeda. If the allegation is true, we would observe further violence and bloodsheds.According the United Nations reports, around 9000 people are killed since the start of uprising more than a year ago, and around 800 people killed in period after ceasefire accord mediated by joint Arab-UN representative, Mr. Kofi Annan. The ceasefire has not helped least to peace and instability. With the presence of Arab monitoring mission, available reports denote on severe clashes between minor armed opposition and security forces."Rebels fought the army in northern Syria on Saturday, activists said, and Syrian dissidents abroad gathered to try to unify and project themselves as a credible alternative to President Bashar al-Assad". "The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported fighting in Idlib province, on Syria's northern border with Turkey and a hotspot of the 14-month-old revolt against Assad's rule."Violent clashes are raging between Syrian regime forces and armed military defectors ... The sounds of strong explosions were heard followed by security forces using heavy and medium machinegun fire," the British-based Observatory said".

Seemingly, all stakeholders are tittering up and down to find a solution to the deadlock but there is nothing to count on much. But this is Syrian people who ultimately shoulder all the burdens of continuous instability and unrest.Masood Korosh is the staff writer of Daily Outlook Afghanistan. He can be reached at [email protected]

Syria's Bloody StalemateInterviewee: Peter Harling, Director, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, International Crisis GroupInterviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org

May 15, 2012

Much of Syria is "in a state of chaos," says Peter Harling, who has been based

in Damascus for the International Crisis Group, and has gone back and forth for

months. The regime of President Bashar al-Assad is "both well-entrenched and

losing control." As for the opposition, the Syrian National Council, based abroad,

he says the group "has championed an increasingly radicalized street, over-

invested in an elusive international intervention, and eschewed more

constructive politics." As for the jihadists, he says that what is surprising "is that

foreign fighters and jihadis, for now, have not taken on a bigger role." On the

international side, he says Kofi Annan's cease-fire plan "grew out of the

international community's inability to agree on anything else," and as long as

the "stalemate endures, it will continue to enjoy support, even from states that

do not put much faith in it but have no workable alternative to offer."

You have been back and forth to Syria for quite some time. Could we

start with your assessment of the situation on the ground? Is the Assad

government in control; what is the role of the opposition?

The regime is both well-entrenched and losing control. Much of the country is in

a state of chaos. Despite plethoric security and military assets, the single most

important road, running north to south from Aleppo to Damascus, is unsafe.

Criminal activity is rampant even in the vicinity of the capital. For months,

opposition armed groups have made it difficult for regime troops to maintain a

sustainable presence in many parts of Syria. More often than not, loyalist forces

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about/staff/field/mena/peter-harling.aspx

http://www.cfr.org/experts/israel-iran-iraq/bernard-gwertzman/b3348

are reduced to hit-and-run operations that cause tremendous damage, solve

nothing, and rather make things worse.

At the same time, the regime's core structures remain solid. A steady trickle of

defections has continued, but the floodgates have not opened. This resilience

has several causes. Some regime officials fear the future for the country, their

community, or themselves, and believe this is a struggle for survival. Others

have actually profited from the crisis, gaining in status or wealth in the booming

economy of violence. Yet others are deeply disillusioned, tempted to defect, but

disinclined to do so as long as the regime appears here to stay. All in all, the

power structure is eroding slowly in a country that is crumbling fast all around it.

What is life like in Syria these days with sanctions making it harder to

bring in imports? Does life go on anywhere near normal?

The governorates of Idlib, Hama, Homs, Dayr Zor, Damascus-Countryside, and

Deraa have borne the brunt of the violence. First, demonstrations were

repressed at great cost to human life. Soon, retaliations against the security

services' widespread abuse led the regime to take even tougher measures. The

emergence of an insurgency fueled by this cycle is now met with forms of

collective punishment. Towns and villages are shelled with no discernible

military objective, or raided, looted thoroughly, and set ablaze. Ensuing refugees

are not only left to their own devices, but often chased around as if they were

expected to disappear [into] thin air.

The prevailing narrative in regime circles, to put it simply, is this: Syria is

under attack and fighting back.

Areas of relative calm remain. Towns along the Mediterranean coast, which are

home to a strong Alawite population, have been largely spared in recent

months. From day one the regime showed considerable restraint in dealing with

dissent in the Kurdish northeast and in the Druze town of Sweida, in the south,

eschewing the escalation and radicalization that has been witnessed elsewhere.

Aleppo, the country's largest city and economic hub, has experienced only a

belated and limited deterioration. In the capital, the most central neighborhoods

recently enjoyed a revival of sorts. As Damascus absorbed constituencies from

elsewhere--the wealthy owners of villas and farms in its surroundings, the

middle-class of towns hit by the conflict, and poorer refugees fleeing

repression--its economic activity was rekindled, on the face of it.

But this convergence on Damascus has also created new problems for the

regime. It revealed the glaring gap between this bubble of artificial calm and

consumerism, and the devastation of so many other parts of the country.

Refugees were dumbfounded by what they saw of Damascenes, while the latter

were shocked by what they heard of the former, [which were] first-hand

witnesses and victims of what amounts to a scorched-earth policy. Moreover,

opposition armed groups, initially rooted in their communities and holding their

ground, have gone on the offensive as loyalist troops chased them in the areas

they controlled. By putting them on the run, the regime has brought danger

closer to home.

Describe the Assad regime's thinking. It recently held parliamentary

elections, which were scoffed at by the outside world as propaganda.

But is there more to it than that?

The prevailing narrative in regime circles, to put it simply, is this: Syria is under

attack and fighting back. In this view, its strategic posture is both the primary

cause of the conflict and the reason why its current leadership will ultimately

pull through. A manageable domestic crisis was exacerbated by foreign

interference, motivated by the regime's support of resistance against Israel.

Officials point to biased Western and Arab media coverage, the influx of money

and technology (such as satellite phones), and the double standards best

illustrated by Bahrain, as exhibits one, two, and three, exposing the conspiracy.

Without such meddling, the regime argues, unrest would have long toned down.

In particular, the regime's reform program, which on paper goes far beyond

anything a country like Saudi Arabia would be willing to even envisage, would

have fully satisfied popular demands.

Of course, missing from this narrative is the extraordinarily arrogant, brutal, and

sectarian behavior of the security services in dealing both with peaceful protests

and armed resistance, at the cost of damaging beyond repair the relationship

between the regime and large swaths of society. Those who would like to

weaken or topple Syria's current leadership are doing little more than seizing

the unexpected opportunity they were given.

All in all, the [Syrian National] Council has championed an increasingly

radicalized street, over-invested in an elusive international intervention, and

eschewed more constructive politics.

For the regime, however, this narrative serves two seemingly paradoxical

purposes. On one hand, it justifies all its shortcomings--from excessive use of

force to lack of political initiative through to its mishandling of the economy. All

can be blamed on hostile propaganda and subversive activities, or warranted by

the requirements of national salvation. In that sense, the crisis calls not for a

homegrown but an international solution. On the other, the belief runs deep

within Syria that the United States is not willing to go all the way to topple this

regime, for fear of a regional conflagration, because the status quo serves Israel

best, or due to domestic considerations, among various other conjectures. Thus

the conspiracy, conveniently, is both omnipotent and impotent: it can control

the world's media, prompt demonstrations across Syria, support an armed

insurgency and wreck the country's economy, but what it cannot do is end the

regime.

What's your opinion of the Syrian National Council, which seems in

exile not to be very important, but does draw support from Western

countries?

It is hard to see in what way the Syrian National Council has made the situation

better, not worse. Although it was conceptualized as a formation designed to

represent society as a whole, it has played a very polarizing role. By

mishandling personality issues, it has alienated more prominent opposition

figures than necessary. It has failed to successfully reach out to minorities,

notably the Kurds. More problematic, it has yet to take any serious initiative

toward the Alawites, who form the bulk of the security services. Many Syrians

who cherish the state's relative secularism have been deeply disturbed by the

Council's choice of allies, which they read as selling out to an imperialist United

States and reactionary Gulf monarchies.

All in all, the Council has championed an increasingly radicalized street, over-

invested in an elusive international intervention, and eschewed more

constructive politics. This has helped the regime harden the fault lines it plays

upon. The situation is not static, however. The opposition is aware of its own

shortcomings and may still make progress in overcoming them.

What about groups like al-Qaeda in Iraq? Do you think, as some

analysts do, that they are bringing their form of terrorism to Syria in

the hope of weakening the Alawite regime?

Foreign fighters and jihadis have been part of the picture for some time. How

could it be otherwise? Syrian society has been subjected for months to

unthinkable forms of violence, and the country is increasingly in a state of

chaos. The sectarian makeup of the security forces has exacerbated the

confessional component of the conflict. Fighting an "Alawite regime" obviously is

a pull factor for volunteers from around the region. And on the ground, the

absence of any clear ideology and the limited room for maneuver of traditional,

religious opinion leaders have opened space for more radical narratives. Finally,

disenchantment with the international community has coincided with money

pouring in from the Gulf.

Currently, both sides to the conflict are breaching the cease-fire they

committed to, tangibly and repeatedly, with no noticeable consequences.

What is surprising, however, is that foreign fighters and jihadis, for now, have

not taken on a bigger role. Fifteen months into the occupation of Iraq,

decapitations on tape, bomb attacks specifically targeting Shiite civilians, and

sectarian killings were occurring on a massive scale. In Syria, society is still

showing overwhelming restraint and sense of purpose. Radicalization is a fact,

but it is limited by an understanding that it serves the regime. Even jihadi

networks appear to have learned some lessons from Iraq, where the crimes they

engaged in ultimately spelled their demise.

What is your sense of the peace plan of Kofi Annan? Is it still viable, or

has the recent violence made it no longer relevant?

As we can see from recent developments, the viability of the [Kofi] Annan plan

[for a cease-fire] is not solely a function of what happens on the ground.

Currently, both sides to the conflict are breaching the cease-fire they committed

to, tangibly and repeatedly, with no noticeable consequences. Bomb attacks are

difficult to attribute, but some things are clearer. For instance, opposition armed

groups have engaged as of late in a systematic targeted-killing spree, picking

out military personnel, security officers, civilian proxies (popularly known as

shabbiha), and informants. Guerrilla-style attacks are also staged against

regime assets, relentlessly, even in central Damascus. For its part, the regime is

pursuing military operations and has dramatically expanded its security

crackdown to include moderate opposition figures and civil society networks.

Treatment of detainees has reportedly worsened considerably.

Arguably, the violence has worsened in many ways, but has taken on more

dispersed and diversified forms, which are more difficult to detect and deter for

a relatively small monitoring mission, compared to the shelling of a large city

like Homs, as was the case several weeks ago. However, the Annan plan grew

out of the international community's inability to agree on anything else. For this

reason, and as long as this stalemate endures, it will continue to enjoy support,

even from states that do not put much faith in it but have no workable

alternative to offer. Meanwhile, such skeptics will presumably increase their

covert support to the opposition, hoping to tilt the balance on the ground.

Having taken these steps, there is a chance that if and when the Annan plan

falters, they will be sucked into more direct intervention in the ensuing vacuum.

Intervention and Nonintervention - The policy doctrines

Throughout modern history, the principle of non-intervention, tempered by

the right of self-defense, has been cherished, especially by small and weak

nations that lacked the strength to resist intrusions by stronger rivals. The

United States, which started its political life as a small and weak nation,

was no exception. Its vocal support of the principles of nonintervention—the

nonintervention doctrine—has served three major purposes throughout the

years, aside from its use as a guideline for policy. First, it was meant to

deter European interventions directed against the United States and its

neighbors. President George Washington, in his Farewell Address to the

nation, repeated a mantra common to the Founders. The United States

would not intervene in Europe's affairs in return for reciprocity by European

powers. Accordingly, it would object to interventions by other powers

because it considered nonintervention as the normal rule to be applied by

the world community.

Second, the doctrine was intended to inform the American people that

pressures on their government for a policy of intervention were likely to be

rejected on principle, even when Americans were eager to help European

colonies in Latin America to become independent states. Expectations were

that repeated proclamations of the nonintervention policy would deter

interventions that the country could ill afford to undertake.

Third, once the principle had become venerable and established as right

and moral conduct, it became useful as a psychological tool of politics.

Many undesirable international activities could be readily condemned by

labeling them as "intervention." Desired interventions could be excused by

denying that they constituted interventions. Alternatively, the United States

could claim that a particular intervention was within the scope of

interventions permitted under the hallowed nonintervention doctrine.

Putting policies within a framework of "moral" and "immoral" actions is

particularly important for a democratic country where political leaders

depend on the support of elected government officials and public opinion. It

is easier to secure support when policies can be defended as moral

principles, rather than as complex bargaining schemes or maneuvers in

political power games.

All three purposes appeared to be particularly well served during the early

years of the nation. It is therefore not surprising that American presidents,

starting with George Washington, almost routinely advocated

nonintervention. During the decades when the country was most vulnerable

to foreign intervention and ill-equipped to intervene individually or

collectively in faraway Europe, the doctrine was credited with keeping

European powers from intervening in the affairs of the United States as a

reward for American nonintervention in Europe's liberation struggles. The

doctrine permitted American leaders to refuse most requests for political as

well as humanitarian interventions. The successes claimed for the doctrine

strengthened faith in its value.

At first, the doctrine was generally expressed in absolute terms to give it

the strongest possible impact. This formulation was never viewed as a

renunciation of the presumably inalienable right of every country to use

intervention to protect its vital interests. Rather, the doctrine was avowed

for its practical usefulness for American policy needs. That the

nonintervention doctrine involved legal considerations under international

law was not stressed until 1842, when Secretary of State Daniel Webster

alluded to its grounding in the legal doctrine of sovereign rights.

Because the absolute formulation of the doctrine was literally interpreted by

many people, it grew embarrassing when the United States engaged in

numerous interventions in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, American

statesmen reformulated the doctrine so that it would specify the exceptional

conditions under which intervention would be permitted. The ebb and flow

of efforts to spell out the limits of nonintervention, without abandoning the

nonintervention doctrine as a general principle, constitute the major

aspects of doctrinal developments over the ensuing decades.

President James Buchanan's inaugural address in 1857 is an early example

of reformulation. He declared it to be the nation's policy never to interfere

in the domestic concerns of other nations "unless this shall be imperatively

required by the great law of self-preservation." He did not specify the

occasions when the law of self-preservation might apply and the ways in

which such occasions could be identified. Buchanan also contended that the

nonintervention doctrine did not preclude the duty of preventive

intervention. When, as happened in Mexico in 1859, a Western Hemisphere

country was afflicted by internal unrest that spilled over its borders, it was

the duty of the United States to intervene to stop the unrest and thereby

prevent intervention by other powers. Congress did not accept this

argument at that time. But when the argument was revived and amplified

during the closing decades of the nineteenth century, it became an accepted

clarification of the scope of the nonintervention doctrine.

Officially, a number of major clarifications were labeled corollaries to the

Monroe Doctrine, which had become an icon for the nonintervention

principle. Linking interventionist policies to this icon served to maintain the

aura that the non-intervention doctrine remained absolute. For example, the

Olney Corollary of 1895 asserted the right of the United States to intervene

in any conflict between an American and non-American power that

endangered the security of the United States. Under the Roosevelt

Corollary of 1904, the United States claimed an even broader right and duty

to act as policeman of the Western Hemisphere. If any nation in the

hemisphere permitted conditions on its territory that might invite

intervention by another country, then it was incumbent on the United States

to intervene to remedy these conditions and forestall intervention by others.

The United States must assume this obligation because the Monroe

Doctrine prevented other powers from exercising their right of intervention

in troubled Western Hemisphere countries.

Many American political leaders were dissatisfied with the doctrinal and

practical consequences of the Roosevelt Corollary. In an attempt to adhere

more closely to the spirit of nonintervention, President William Howard Taft

sought to control internal political affairs in other nations through

economic, rather than military, pressures. Since the nonintervention

doctrine did not prohibit intervention for the protection of nationals, his

administration encouraged American business interests to settle in

potentially unstable neighboring countries. Presumably, they would help the

country to stabilize its economy and prevent political turmoil. If the

presence of American businesses failed to prevent unrest, the United States

could then send protective missions as part of its right to protect its citizens

abroad. In this manner it could control the politics of unstable countries

without violating restraints commanded by the nonintervention doctrine.

During the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, the nonintervention doctrine

received yet another interpretation. Wilson's claim that the United States

must discourage dictatorships or unconstitutional governments in Latin

America by refusing to recognize them was accompanied by strong

professions that such interventions accorded with the principles embodied

in the established doctrine of nonintervention. Destruction of unpopular

governments, Wilson argued, freed foreign nations from undue restraints on

their sovereign right to opt for democratic rulers. Rather than serving as a

tool for coercing these nations into unwanted action, intervention thus

became a tool to enable their people to exercise their will. While Wilson

expanded the scope of the right of intervention on one hand, he also laid the

groundwork for subsequent contractions of the right. His stress on the

sovereign rights of states to determine their own fates, regardless of size,

led to a series of international agreements that proclaimed the

nonintervention principle as a prescription of international law except for

individual or collective self-defense. Such agreements became part of the

Covenant of the League of Nations (1918) and later the United Nations

Charter (1945).

Nations of the Western Hemisphere went even further than the rest of the

international community. Through a series of agreements and declarations

springing from successive inter-American conferences in the 1930s,

Western Hemisphere countries, including the United States, adopted a

principle of absolute nonintervention by individual countries within the

Western Hemisphere. Individual countries retained the right to protect the

personal security of their citizens. Beyond that, only collective intervention

by the combined forces of Western Hemisphere countries would remain

lawful.

The United States was willing to bind itself to such absolute declarations of

nonintervention because it believed that the collective intervention

arrangements made in the Western Hemisphere and on the broader

international scene provided a viable alternative to intervention by

individual countries. At the same time, a series of presidential declarations

emphasized more strongly than had been done in the early years that

nonintervention pledges did not mean an abandonment of the right of self-

defense when there was no effective collective action. Whenever possible,

the United States also tried to conclude mutual defense and economic

assistance treaties to provide a legal basis for coming to the aid of selected

countries when counterintervention was needed to resist a communist

takeover.

In addition, the United States explicitly asserted a right of

counterintervention against illegal interventions by other powers.

Protection from intervention was a privilege earned by deserving countries;

it was not an absolute right. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, during the

administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, declared that the

nonintervention principle applied only to nations that respected the rights

of others. The United States, as a powerful member of the community of

nations, had a right and duty to intervene in order to prevent or stop illegal

interventions directed against countries that lacked the power or will to

resist such interventions.

The dangers that would give rise to interventions were identified explicitly

but broadly in the 1930s and 1940s. During that period, American political

leaders believed that the efforts of the Axis powers to expand their control

over Europe and Asia endangered peace and warranted intervention.

American leaders sought—sometimes successfully and sometimes

unsuccessfully—to have these concerns incorporated into multinational

declarations to indicate that nonintervention pledges did not apply to power

plays by the Axis powers. The idea that mutual nonintervention pledges by

the United States and the Axis powers might be a better way to protect the

United States was rejected by the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Following the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II, communism was

viewed as the main danger to the national integrity and security of the

United States and the world. In the Truman Doctrine, proclaimed in 1947,

the United States declared broadly that either unilateral or collective

intervention was justified to protect any country in the world from falling

under communist rule. The peace and security of the United States and the

world were at stake. The Eisenhower Doctrine, proclaimed in 1957,

pinpointed some of the areas where intervention might be expected.

Specifically, the political integrity of Middle Eastern nations was declared to

be vital to world peace and American interests. If nations in the Middle East

were threatened by overt armed aggression by communist forces, the

United States would come to their aid if they requested help.

The 1970s saw a retrenchment in overt interventions against communist

expansion. Accordingly, it seemed appropriate once more to redefine the

scope of the nonintervention doctrine to conform to the prevailing official

interpretation of the limits set by the policy. The Nixon Doctrine of 1970

expressed the principle that the United States did not consider it an

obligation to protect other countries against communist intervention unless

it had determined, in specific cases, that American security interests were

involved. Even then, intervention was not the sole duty of the United States

but was an obligation shared by all countries opposed to the overthrow of

noncommunist governments by communist contenders. President Jimmy

Carter deemed the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 a major

threat to the West's oil lifeline. He responded in 1980 with the Carter

Doctrine, declaring with unusual specificity that attempts by any foreign

power to gain control over the Persian Gulf region would be considered a

threat to the vital interests of the United States. It would be repelled, using

military force if necessary. Five years later, in 1985, President Ronald

Reagan once more pledged support for a policy of unilateral armed

intervention in Third World countries if this became necessary to overthrow

Marxist-Leninist regimes. The policy was to be applied selectively anywhere

in the world where people were fighting against communism. In practice, it

was implemented mostly in Central America.

The Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan doctrines did not pinpoint the

conditions that might trigger a specific intervention. However, high-level

military leaders often laid out the policy in somewhat more detail. For

instance, General Colin Powell, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff during the administration of George H. W. Bush (1989–1993), declared

that military interventions should be undertaken only when a number of

conditions were met. Most importantly, the political objectives of the

intervention had to be clearly defined and the gains and risks and likely

outcomes had to be adequately assessed. Based on these assessments, it

should be clear that the objectives of the intervention could be reached

through military means at a defensible cost. Finally, nonviolent alternative

policies, if suitable, had been tried first and failed.

Many observers argued that the various and sundry doctrines and

statements by military leaders should not be viewed as blueprints for action.

Rather, like the previously proclaimed nonintervention principles, they were

tailored primarily for psychological impact. They were intended to

discourage intervention-minded leaders and to give moral support to

nations fearing communist attacks. It was hoped that policy

pronouncements would obviate the need for remedial action. If action

became necessary, the pronouncements could be characterized as prior

warnings that legitimized subsequent actions.

Thus, the nonintervention doctrine has ebbed and flowed in its more than

200-year history. It has gone from an absolute expression, tempered by the

implicit exception that interventions for vital purposes were permissible, to

an emphasis on a broad range of exceptions to the doctrine, which left it

little more than an empty shell. Then it was reformulated in absolute terms,

tempered by statements of exceptions stressing that collective or unilateral

intervention would still be used by the United States to protect vital

security interests. But the absolutism abated again in the wake of major

international threats posed by upheavals in Europe and Asia and evidence

that collective interventions were difficult to orchestrate.

By the early twenty-first century, the policy implications of the doctrine

were that the United States, like all sovereign states, claimed the right to

protect its security by all means within its power—including intervention—

whenever its leaders believed that this security was seriously endangered.

Despite American capacity to intervene freely in the politics of most small

nations, however, intervention would be used sparingly, primarily when

conditions existed that potentially threatened the security of the United

States and its allies and when all other means to resolve the problems

failed. The pledges of nonintervention made in the twentieth century

indicated the areas where intervention was most likely to occur and the

conditions most likely to provoke it. They served as a rough guide to the

government in its choice of policy options.

: The policy doctrines - Intervention and Nonintervention http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Intervention-and-Nonintervention-The-policy-doctrines.html#b#ixzz1vm9w3TgY

Survival.docx

Documents

farid mat zain

jabatan perdana menteri

anak usrah kita

vie de jsus

la rforme intellectuelle

universiti kebangsaan malaysia

uthman dan fodio

increasingly radicalized street