ASI 85-08 ' SURVEY OF CURRENT US ARMY POL DOCTRINE, PROCEDURES, PERSONNEL, AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE SUPPLY AND INLAND DISTRIBUTION OF BULK POL 00 0Contract Number: DAAK11-84-D-0004 Task Order Number 6 , .~ FINAL REPORT October 1985 By: D. J. Shearin, Sr. R. D. Kavanaugh 0% G. A. Kupets, Sr. Prepared For: Combat Service Support Directorate US Army Human Engineering Laboratory (.C ,OTE Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland AUG 2 319 88 Prepared By: ARMAMENT SYSTEMS, INC. a- 211 West Bel Air Avenue; P. 0. Box 158 Aberdeen, Maryland 21001 ~~ 8. - a b 88 8 6,,'- ¢ Z-,:Y , . a.- .%- % *. '' x ", "a. ' " .,, - I% '. 'J %V '-.%p- (*:%,, pS-./ "-" ,.:--.,..--' -- *--". -'-"'
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ASI 85-08 '
SURVEY OF CURRENT US ARMY POL DOCTRINE, PROCEDURES,
PERSONNEL, AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE
SUPPLY AND INLAND DISTRIBUTION OF BULK POL
00
0Contract Number: DAAK11-84-D-0004Task Order Number 6
, .~
FINAL REPORTOctober 1985
By:
D. J. Shearin, Sr.R. D. Kavanaugh 0%
G. A. Kupets, Sr.
Prepared For:
Combat Service Support DirectorateUS Army Human Engineering Laboratory (.C ,OTE
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland AUG 2 3 1988
Prepared By:
ARMAMENT SYSTEMS, INC. a-
211 West Bel Air Avenue; P. 0. Box 158Aberdeen, Maryland 21001
UNCLASSIFIEDSECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When D49a gtente_
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEF D C T ORREPORT NMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
ASI 85-08.4. TITLE (end Subdie) S. T% PE OF REPORT A PERIOD COVERED
Survey of Current US Army POL Doctrine, Procedures, Final ReportPersonnel, and Equipment for the Supply and _ _-_ _
Inland Distribution of Bulk POL 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER '-%pASI 85-08 _"
7. AUTHOR(.) a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
D. J. Shearin, Sr. DAAKII-84-D-0004
R. D. Kavanaugh
9. PERFORMING ORG;:ANIZ.ATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK"AREA & WORKC UNIT NUMB3ERS
Armament Systems, Inc.P. 0. Box 158, 211 West Bel Air AvenueAberdeen, MD 21001-0158
II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE
US Army Human Engineering Laboratory October 1985ATTN: SLCHE-CSSD (Mr. J. Stephens) 13. NUMBEROF PAGESAberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5001 34
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME A ADDRESS(It different from ControllingOff1ice) IS. SECURITY CLASS. (of thl report)
UnclassifiedIS. DECL ASSI F CATION/ DOWN ORADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of thi. Report) :Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered In Block 20, If different from Report)
IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES , .. "
P0L Distribution1. AEY WOR S (Continue n reveree aids if noocmee ry end Identify by block number) " "
POL SupplyP0L Requirements -]
*0. ASSUlACT (Co.amt~ e ,.veree eL~ If# nonea, d iden Ify by block number)"" L
-The Army is responsible for inland distribution of bulk POL to all Services. Th.Army's forecasted requirements for POL have increased significantly. Under Air-land Battle and Army 21 concepts, POL requirements will increase further. Eightto ninety percent of POL units assigned responsibility for POL supply are in theReserve and/or National Guard structure. Most of these units are undermanned, -under trained and have critical shortages in POL vehicles and equipment. Thisstudy identified 19 specific problem areas and suggests corrective action toresolve some of the more critical problems,
DO IJAN73 1473 EDITIONoFIovS oLET UNCLASSIFIEDSECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF TmIS PAGE (When Do t E'nteed1* ',.5-
UNCLASSIFIEDSECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(Oan Dat. Uta.e()
?0. (Cont'd)
" he second half of the report focuses on POL supply in the forward area of thebattlefield. It provides a simplified methodology for computing and/or esti-mating fuel requirements based on the percentage of cross-country versussecondary road travel a tank battalion may experience in a particular operation.Potential areas for future US Army Human Engineering Laboratory effort are alsoidentified. !
Accession For
DTIC TABUnannounced E]Justification
By * t
Distributi-on/
Availability CodesAvaiY'- and/or-
Dist Special
S':.'.
,4-1
'o
-.
UNCLASSIFIEDSECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Enteted)
Current Organizations, Missions and Functions ................. 3Current TO&EPrescribedCapabilities ....................... .9Current Capabilities - Actual. ............................ 10Adequacy of Unit Training ......................................... 11Adequacy of Formal School (MOS) Training 11Lack of Systems Approach ................................... 12Fuel Consumption Rate ...................................... 12Warsaw Pact POL Capabilities ...................... 15
MAJOR PROJECTS IN PROCESS TO IMPROVE POL SUPPLY &DISTRIBUTION CAPABILITIES ........................................ 15
POL PROBLEM AREAS ............................................... 17
General .................................................... 18
Specific Problems ............................................ 19
POL RESUPPLY IN FORWARD AREAS ................................... 23
The Forward Area POL Supply System ............................ 24Forward Area POL Resupply .................................. 24Computing Unit Fuel Consumption Rates ......................... 26
POL Unit Force Structure ................................... 29POL Policy, Doctrine and Concepts .......................... 30
POL Quantitative Requirements ............................... 30System Versus "Fix Weakest Link" Approach .................... 31Master Priority List ....................................... 31Personnel and Training ..................................... 31Technical Publications ..................................... 31Other Problems ............................................. 31
POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FUTURE USA HEL EFFORT .......................... 33
Field Data Collection, Study and Analysis .................... 34 0FSSP Operations, Study and Experimental Field Trials ....... 34Requirement for Refueling Under Armor ......................... 34
Page i
,t .J
APPENDICES
A. POL Unit Missions and Capabilities ....................... A-IB. Roster of Military POL Units ........................... B-iC. References ................................. ............ C-1
TABLES
1. TO&E POL Units - Prescribed Capabilities............... 92. POL Units in Current Force Structure .................... i03. POL Consumption Rates - Tracked Vehicles................ 134. POL Consumption Rates - Wheeled Vehicles............... 145. POL Consumption Rates - Army Helicopters ........... 146. Fuel Handling Equipment & Transport Vehicles
Assigned to S&T Battalions. ............................ 257. POL Handling/Transport Equipment Combat Maneuver
6. M1 Tank Battalion (58 Tanks) Fuel Consumption:Fort Knox Conservative Vs. Fort Knox DriverTraining ....... ........... ............. . . ...... 29
V
Pe
KJ
SPage ii ,
INTRODUCTION
The Army is continuing to focus its efforts on themodernization of combat and combat support equipment.Modernization of the logistics system is now receiving much higherpriority and for the first time, logistics research anddevelopment programs are being established. Although the Army 21logistical requirements have not yet been fully defined, based ontoday's projections, the demand for ammunition and POL resupplycan be expected to grow. The fielding of new weapons like the Ml Itank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) and the Multiple LaunchRocket System (MLRS), all with increased rates of fire over theirpredecessors, have significantly increased the requirement forammunition. Similarly, the introduction of large numbers of theseand other new and greater fuel consuming vehicles and equipment,when coupled with greater mobility requirements of the expandedbattlefield, significantly increases the demand for POL.
The US Army Human Engineering Laboratory, in concert with the.0US Army Missile and Munitions Center and School, has been studyingthe ammunition resupply problem for several years. This studyeffort is now beginning to pay dividends with the establishment ofnew ammunition resupply concepts which envision the automatedhandling of ammunition through the use of robots fo: unloading,sorting, repackaging and uploading of ammunition. A similar effort •aimed at increasing the productivity of current POL units is nowrequired.
The combination of existing combat, combat support and combatservice support vehicles use a wide variety of commercial andmilitary engines. There is no stringent fuel economy requirementin the procurement of these engines. The Combat Service SupportMission Area Analysis (CSS-MAA) and other recent POL studiesquestion the capability of the current organization and equipmentfor POL distribution to meet this increased POL demand.
Two methods have been postulated for solving the problems, Sneither of which are fully acceptable to the user. One would beto increase the support structure by adding personnel andequipment. With the high demand for personnel to meet the manynew requirements of the fighting elements of the force structure,it is highly unlikely that additional personnel can be madeavailable to man the additional equipment needed to provide the S
increased quantities of POL. A second alternative would be toreduce the requirement through the application of technology toimprove the efficiency of the engines. Although technology canreduce the rate of growth, it cannot reduce the absolute growthbrought about by the increased numbers of vehicles entering thesystem, and the increased demands on these vehicles in terms of S
increased mobility required by the Army 21 battlefield concepts.
Page 1
51
Within the current research and development program, there is an
apparent absence of emphasis on POL consumption rates as compared
to range, mobility and overall performance.
BACKGROUND
The Army is responsible for the inland distribution of bulkPOL to all services in both a developed and undeveloped theater ofoperations. The Army's forecasted requirements for inlanddistribution of POL have increased significantly. With theintroduction of new, greater fuel consuming vehicles andequipment, and in greater numbers, this trend can be expected tocontinue. Under the Army 21 Airland Battle Concept, POL logisticscan also be expected to increase because of the greater mobilityof forces.
The US Army Army Science Board, Summer 1984 POL Study Group,concluded in its final report that: "If the current trendcontinues, the vehicle fleet is projected to grow from 240,000 to340,000 (42%) and annual fuel consumption from 115 million gallonsto 283 million (146%).
In view of the above, the US Army Human EngineeringLaboratory tasked Armament Systems, Inc. (ASI) to perform a HumanFactors Engineering survey of POL support personnel, organization,doctrine, procedures and equipment in order to provide a current %POL distribution capabilities baseline.
OBJECTIVEThe objective of this initial report is to present the
results of an HFE survey of POL support personnel, organizations,doctrine, procedures and equipment, and to document a currentcapabilities baseline. This report also identifies some of thedoctrinal/procedural and/or equipment shortfalls and problemswhich adversely impact the inland POL supply and distributionfunctions.
(NOTE: The US Army is responsible for the inland distri-bution of all POL. This includes delivery to meet allUS Army and US Air Force (USAF) requirements. Howeverin this study, the focus has been limited to the consump-tion of POL by US Army units. It is currently estimatedthat the USAF consumes 65% of the inland POL, thisfigure will not change significantly in the next 10-15years. Therefore, the reader should keep in mind thatthe problems discussed in the subsequent pages of thisreport address only those problems associated with the
Page 2
0
Army's POL requirements, and represent only about 35% of Wthe total POL inland distribution problem. Addressingthe USAF consumption, both current and projected, isbeyond the scope of this effort.)
METHODOLOGY -
The initial step was to perform a literature search of
Training Manuals (TMs), Field Manuals (FMs), Tables of
Organization and Equipment (TO&Es) and related documents concerned iltwith the distribution of POL. 0
The second step was to extend our knowledge and understandingof the POL inland distribution system through the review ofselected Transportation and Quartermaster Schools' Programs ofInstruction (POI's) and doctrinal and procedural studies anddirectives concerned with the in-theater distribution and handling Sof POL at the retail level, supplemented by discussions with theSchools' instructors and combat developments doctrinal personneland selected personnel assigned to TO&E POL units. The literaturesearch and discussions served as the basis for the documentationof the current POL baseline capabilities and the identification ofproblem areas.
DiSCUSSION
Current Organizations, Missions and Functions
General
Figure 1 is a schematic of the current distributionand supply system for Class III (POL) for a developed theater ofoperations. POL comes in to the theater from ocean tankers. Ifpermanent piers are available, they are used. The more likelyrequirement is to transfer the POL over-the-shore using eitherfloating hoselines or, in a more stable environment, sunken orsubmerged pipelines connected to an onshore POL base terminal.Typically, an existing in-country POL distribution system isnormally operating in support of the peacetime civilian economy .and military forces. POL doctrine indicates that wheneverpossible, active duty US Army personnel should be trained tooperate these existing distribution systems. However, in time ofwar, these existing facilities are often partially or completelydestroyed and it becomes necessary to modify or renovate the oldfacilities, and add new or additional facilities to meet the POLrequirements.
Page 3
- 7~ ~ A ~% %
OCEAN TANKER DISCHARGE I IPELINE/HOSELIN CORPS DIVISION UI
IACFICALi ARn ~ T~IA PfLN AM CIhfC LAS L
84ff It
ClRe er W O*PI L
NOSELihE ORsTA TI A PIPELINESL IOE1"
NORN 1 E AK
=..a
c....
501
xN
Figure 1 .IITE Bulk
rero eu Di t ib t o Sy t m iIee o e
Theaters.
IN ge ItPae
F(Ia ML0 a a. FAE
V A
From the base terminal, the POL is moved forward by barges, I
rail cars, eight inch and six inch tactical pipelines, flexiblehoses, and long-haul highway tank trucks. Resupply in the forwardareas is accomplished using tactical tank trucks and flexiblehoselines. High priority POL requirements are met by aerialdelivery (external and internal stores via helicopter) or "wetwing" using fixed wing transport aircraft.
Figure 2 is a schematic of a bulk petroleum distributionsystem in undeveloped theaters. The primary differences are thelack of permanent type port facilities, permanent pipelines, and anetwork of existing improved highways and railroads. The Army mustconstruct hoselines and pipelines in greater numbers and a large 6number of high volume collapsible storage tanks are required tostore the POL due to the absence of permanent storage facilities.
OCEAN TANKER DISCHPARGIPENE OR HOSEUNE CORPS [ ISN UNIT
MARINE PETROLEUM TERMINALS I OVEMENI SUBSYSTEM WHOLESALE i*HOLESALEI RETAIL
MULTI LEG TACTICAL PETRL P1 PETRI SUP S&S
MOORING SVST U MARINE & 1L OP j 1 ISSP
TERMINALEO
ERMA LARGE VOLUME ~ J~ISvcI XV ,TRIA COLLAPSIBLE TKS
i HOSELINE OR TACTICAL r C MEDIUM X X
'A PIPELINE I RC PL ETLs;<~~l J ,,,'L,,[ RUCK OL) X S'&'"] X
X FSSP X
S&S (OSS&.(,S '
IPEtLINE F5SP S&T
T- PETRI- SU X ,].
RAIL CAI OP X
COMMZ CORPS DIV
Figure 2. Bulk Petroleum Distribution System in UndevelopedTheaters.
Page 5
" . --.. ..... %
., A.
POL Organizations W
Developed Theater
Figure 3 is the Petroleum organization for adeveloped theater of operations.
Theater Petroleum Item Manager
There is a Theater Petroleum Item Manager whocontrols both bulk and packaged petroleum products and isresponsible for all POL operations, including long range petroleumrequirements for the theater. S
Petroleum Group
The Petroleum Group is the principal organizationfor carrying out the bulk fuels distribution mission in theCommunications Zone (COMMZ) and is assigned directly to the sTheater Army. The Petroleum Group and its subordinate unitsoperate the bulk fuel distribution system extending from ports ofentry through the COMMZ and as far into the combat zone aspracticable. The Petroleum Division of the Materiel ManagementCenter (MMC), Theater Army Area Command (TACCOM) is responsiblefor receiving requirements for POL supplies and directingprovision of wholesale supplies through the Petroleum SupplyBattalions to the Supply and Service Companies. The PetroleumDivision of the TAACOM MMC also coordinates with the Theater ArmyMMC for bulk petroleum resupply to the petroleum supply battalionin its area. •
P
.5
Page6 ..
ARMY
CON AGCY PEROEU MT CEN
GRqOUP PETROLEUM'DIRECTORATE
TAACOtl ......... CO P Al."
AREA PETR LEUr I
S U P P R T S U P P L Y
PIPLIN PE RONUIP
EOATp ANTALION
S&S 0
BATTALIONP
COMPAYNY C (OL
I~ ~ ,C JM s.............'............s..,
(OS)
Figure 3. Petroleum Organization in a Developed Theater of
Operations.
Page 7MAREA PTROLA ,
I'.,
..
Appendix A contains the detailed statement of mission andcapabilities for each of the units assigned POL functions within atheater. The POL storage capacities, line haul capabilities andmajor items of equipment are also included for each type unit. Forthose units that support other classes of supplies as well as POL,each class of support is identified together with the major itemsof equipment used for transport.
Undeveloped Theater
Figure 4 is a type corps organization for petroleumoperations in an undeveloped theater.
CORPS
DSCOMIPETROLEUM SUPPOR)T iV-
GROUP GROUP -
PETRI. PL & PETROLEUM SUPPLY &ITML OPf: SUPPLY SERVICE ,
BN BATTALION BATTALION -".
TML OP SUPPLY TRK( CO SERVICE . ICOCOMPANY (PETRL) CO (DS)
Figure 4. Type Corps organization for Petroleum Operations in an
Undeveloped Theater.
Page 8 '
Corps Area POL Operations S
Although the petroleum group in the undevelopedtheater is at the corps level, it has the same functions as thepetroleum group at the theater level, in the developed theater.
Division Area POL Operations
At the division level, the missions and functionsof the Petroleum Pipeline and Terminal Operations Battalions andCompanies, and Petroleum Supply Battalions and Companies are thesame for the undeveloped theater as in the developed theater.
Current TO&E Prescribed Capabilities
Table 1 is a summary of prescribed mission POL storageand handling capabilities for POL units within the force structureup through the Direct Support (DS) units. It does not include the
Division Supply and Transportation Units operating in the forward Sdivision areas. -
TABLE 1.
TO&E POL Units - Prescribed Capabilities 0-
POL Storage Daily Local
Type Unit Capacity Delivery
Petroleum Pipeline and 5.50 Mil Gal 52,000 GalTerminal Operating Co
Petroleum Supply Co l / 1.48 Mil Gal 685,000 Gal
Supply & Svc Co .10 Mil Gal 81,000 Gal(Non-Div, DS)
Trans Med Tk Co (POL) 900,000 Gal? /
!/ With Logistics Unit Productivity Study (LUPS), personnel
and equipment augmentation storage capacity increases to 2.52 milgal and receipts and issues increase to 1.24 mil gal. -,'.
Operating two shifts--local haul. Line haul is 450,000 gal/day.
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Table 2 is a summary of the total POL units by type in thecurrent force structure, stratified by Active Army, Reserve and
National Guard. The Petroleum Pipeline & Terminal OperatingBattalions and Companies, as well as the petroleum supply
battalions, supporting supply companies and medium truck companiesare aligned under the two groups. The mobile laboratories are
generally assigned on a theater or corps basis. The reservepetroleum groups have active duty as well as reserve POLbattalions and companies and medium truck companies are alligned
under the two groups. A detailed listing of these units, including
their current locations, is contained in Appendix B. As can be -,
seen, 81% of the total POL units are either Reserve or National -,
Guard. The Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics (DA,DCSLOG), has stated that the Reserve and NationalGuard Units are being relied upon to provide 80% to 90% of the POL
supply capability for all future conflicts.
TABLE 2.
POL Units in Current Force Structure
Active Reserve NationalType POL Unit Army Units Guard Total
Petroleum Group 0 2 0 2
Petroleum Pipeline and 1 2 0 3Term Oper Bn
Petroleum Pipeline and 3 5 0 8Term Oper Co
Petroleum Supply Battalion 1 6 4 11
Petroleum Supply Company 4 18 0 22
Petroleum Mobile Laboratory 0 3 0 3
Petroleum Medium Truck Company 6 14 9 29
Current Capabilities - Actual
As shown earlier in Table 1, a Petroleum Supply Companyis able to store 1.48 million gallons of bulk POL and to receiveand issue a maximum of 685,000 gallons per day. Theoretically, ifone were to multiply the number of POL supply companies in the
Page 10
force structure by the quantity of receive and issue gallons perday, and do the same thing with the other POL resupply units, atotal POL delivery capability could be estimated. It isrecognized, however, that the actual performance capability can,and often does, vary significantly below the calculated capabilitydepending on the condition of the units' operating equipment, thedegree of training and experience of unit personnel, and theactual operating conditions or environment within a given tacticalarea of operations.
The Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs) are heldperiodically to test the actual performance capabilities of a unitand to identify areas where a unit's performance is deficient. Areview of ARTEP manual 10-227 and related ARTEP manuals for POL %
units, revealed that although applicable missions and relatedtasks are listed, and required times are indicated for theperformance of various administrative tasks, there are nostandards of performance requirements listed for the basic IN0operating mission of receipt and issue of bulk and packaged POL, Areview of studies and reports associated with POL operations,discussions with training personnel, including school instructors,and with TO&E unit officers, revealed that very few ARTEPs or h
training exercises are being held which actually test the basiccapabilities of a POL supply unit to perform under operational ornear operational conditions.
Adequacy of Unit Training
Most of the POL units are in the Army's reserve forcesand participate in weekend drills. However, they participate inmeaningful field exercises on an average of only once in threeyears.
Adequacy of Formal School (MOS) Training
The Transportation School and Quartermaster School were Scalled and asked to provide their latest Programs of Instruction -
(POIs) on all of their POL handling and transport MOS courses.These were reviewed in detail to determine the scope ofinstruction for the handling and transport of POL. The TC school .courses pertain primarily to the operation of POL vehicles (MOS64C30). The POIs were dated October 1983. As such, the trainingdoes not include the newer items such as the 2500 gallon Heavy,Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) POL transporter.Otherwise, the POIs appear to be adequate for training of motortransport operators of POL vehicles and ancillary POL equipment.
POIs from the US Army Quartermaster School for Petroleum SSupply Specialist MOS 76W10 and 76W30 dated 31 December 1984 werealso reviewed. The technical phase of the 76W30 course representeda reduction of 62 hours from the earlier POI which had beensuperseded. A review of the equipment list for this course
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revealed the same shortfall as the TC course, i.e., the latestequipment which is currently in the process of being fielded suchas the 2500 gallon HEMTT POL transporter was not included.
With the exception of training on the latest makes and modelsof POL equipment, the MOS or "how to" aspects such as "How toprocess and distribute POL products", "How to lay out and testpetroleum pipelines/hoselines", "How to gauge and sample PO5storage tanks", etc., are very well covered. As indicated earlierin the report however, little evidence was found of realistic unittraining on operating the basic POL system. No evidence was foundto indicate that the total system interfaces between the various SPOL units, i.e., Petroleum Pipeline and Terminal Operating Units,Petroleum Supply Units, Petroleum Medium Truck Units, etc., haveever been exercised.
Lack of Systems Approach
Although the Army has instituted an "Army Energy £R&DPlan" and specific programs are in effect in the Army MaterielCommand (AMC) aimed at reducing POL usage, there is littleevidence of an integrated systems approach to the solution of POLproblems. The Army continues to focus on weapon system developmentwithout commensurate consideration for the system's logisticsrequirement.
Fuel Consumption Rates
Table 3 provides an example of the increased fuelconsumption rates of recently fielded tracked vehicles incomparison with the earlier models they will replace. As can beseen, the Ml tank requires 53% more fuel than the older M60 foridling, and the M2 and M3 vehicles require 17% more fuel than itspredecessor, the M113 when operating 50% cross country and 50%secondary roads.
** Based on 50% X-Country and 50% Secondary Roads.
Table 4 provides similar information for some of the newer Iewheeled vehicles entering the inventory.
Table 5 provides similar information for Army helicopters. Ascan be seen, the newer helicopters, similar to the newer vehicles,consume more fuel than the older models they are replacing.
AH-lS 123*AH-64 141* Follow-On to AH-1SUH-IH 80*UH-60 169* Follow-On to UH-1H-.0CH-47C 497** Follow-On to CH-47ACH-47D 497** Follow-On to CH-47C
* Typical mission fuel consumption rates based on SB 710-2.
** FM 101-20 0
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*LI AM.
A final report of the 1984 Army Science Board, Subject:"Technology to Improve Logistics and Weapons support for Army 21",dated December 1984 and published by the Assistant Secretary ofthe Army, Research, Development and Acquisition states that"Unconstrained, POL consumption will continue to increase." Thereis not yet a figure of merit developed to define a cap or limit onthe projected total fleet size or on the total POL consumption. Asan example, the above referenced report states that, "For combattactical vehicles, today's fleet is projected to grow from 240,000 .vehicles to 340,000 (+42%) vehicles from 1982 to 2000 and theannual fuel consumption from today's 115 million gallons to 283million gallons (146%) if technology advances are not made, or to158 million gallons (+32%) if R&D efforts to increase engineefficiency are funded and successful." It is further stated that atypical heavy division (DIV 86 POL Profile), in a mid-intensityEuropean combat scenario, would have a daily planned requirementof 549,308 gallons of which the Ml, M2 and M3 combat vehicleswould consume 47%. The report concluded that "Army 21 is notsupportable unless constraints are placed on POL consumption".
(NOTE: The reader should keep in mind that Army POLrequirements represent only about 35% of the totaltheater requirements.)
Warsaw Pact POL Capabilities
As part of the background literature review inpreparation for this POL baseline study, ASI reviewed selectedDefense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and US Army Intelligence Agency(USAIA) documents relative to POL requirements and capabilities ofthe Warsaw Pact countries. These documents include contributionsfrom the Threat Analysis Center, Foreign Science and TechnologyCenter and the Missile Intelligence Agency. They contain, forexample, estimates of percent of available transport capabilityrequired for transport of POL, basic doctrinal concepts whichunderline POL logistics operations, selected unit fuelrequirements and the system of military controlled POL depotstorage requirements and capabilities. Manning levels are alsoprovided. Provision of specific information relative to the aboveis beyond the scope of this study; however, reference to theWarsaw Pact POL requirements and capabilities is made so that thereaders can be made aware of the ready availability of suchinformation in the ASI Aberdeen library should it be required forfuture related study efforts.
MAJOR PROJECTS IN PROCESS TO IMPROVE POL SUPPLY & DISTRIBUTIONCAPABILITIES
Although the lack of a fully integrated and coordinatedsystems approach to the solution of POL problems is evident,
Page 15
considerable effort is underway to solve individual problems suchas improvements to doctrine, establishment of priorities forequipment procurement, correction or redesign of individualcomponents of a system that are not functioning properly, andimprovements in the training activities where. deficiencies havebeen noted. Those actions are being documented in the Master
Petroleum Materiel Requirements Plan (MPMRP) and progress isreported during the Annual Petroleum Materiel RequirementsConference.
A series of Logistics Unit Productivity Studies (LUPS) hasbeen performed and others are in process to improve theproductivity of CSS units. A petroleum supply company substudyperformed by the US Army QM School (report dated 15 December,1983) concluded that the petroleum supply company per capitaproductivity output (POL issues) can be increased (approximately80% increase in total output with a 7% increase in personnel) bychanging the types and quantities of key items of POL handlingequipment. Some of the major changes include the replacement ofRough Terrain Forklifts (RTFLs) with High Mobility MaterielHandling Equipment (HMMHE), increasing the number of 5000 gallonsemitrailers, 5-ton trucks, 22 1/2 ton trailers, and 10,000 and20,000 gallon storage tanks and by adding 50,000 gallon storagetanks. Final actions relative to the implementation of theserecommendations are still pending.
A high priority joint Army/Navy project under the title of"Southwest Asia Petroleum Distribution Operational Project(SWAPDOP)," briefly mentioned earlier in this report, is underway.It consists of two major elements, the Offshore PetroleumDistribution System (OPDS) and the Inland Petroleum DistributionSystem (IPDS). The US Navy has the lead for the OPDS which isplanned as a joint procurement action. The Army has the lead forthe IPDS. These off-shore and inland petroleum distributionsystems will be used to support contingency operations inSouthwest Asia. Primary components of the OPDS are a Single AnchorLeg Mooring System (SALM), a four mile ship-to-shore petroleumdischarge line, and warping tugs for emplacement of the system. Ajoint Army/Navy development effort is also underway to develop aone mile system which uses a Propellant Imbedded Anchor MooringSystem (PEAMS). A recent Army/Navy agreement reached on 9 July1985 provided for assignment to the Navy of total responsibility -0for off-shore POL discharge systems up to the high water mark atwhich point the Army assumes responsibility for all Inland POLdistribution and storage systems. The interface between theoff-shore and inland systems will be a joint effort.
Testing of the OPDS elements is scheduled for the latter partof CY 1985, and testing of the IPDS is scheduled for 1986. Oncethe IPDS is procured and tested, it will be stored at the PuebloArmy Depot pending outbreak of hostilities in SW Asia. Training .,
modules will be procured and used for training of personnel
Pg 1Page 16,.v
U'._*.. ?,
required for installation and operation of the IPDS. Of interestis the fact that the OPDS is a Non-Developmental Item (NDI).Installation, operation and maintenance of the system will beaccomplished by civilian personnel under the direction of the USNavy. Completion of the OPDS project will increase the Navy'scapability for POL operations as follows.
Current Projected
Anchor of POL tankers offshore 25,000 DWT 70,000 DWTShip-to-Shore POL discharge 1 mile 4 milesQuantity of POL product discharged 17,000 BPD 34,000 BPD
Legend: DWT = Dead Weight TonsBPD = Barrels Per Day (20 hours of operation)
Overall management and control of SWAPDOP is being exercisedby an Action Officer Workshop (AOW) chaired by a DCSLOG staffofficer with membership from all participating Army, Navy and MrForce agencies and activities. A General Officer Steering Group(GOSG) provides guidance for conduct of the total effort.
(NOTE: The AOW appears to be an efficient operation.The recent addition of HEL as a member is paying divi-dends in terms of calling attention to shortfalls inthe totil systems program such as the need for im-proved C .)
POL PROBLEM AREAS
Based on an extensive review of literature (see partial listof documents reviewed at Appendix C); discussions with key membersof the AMC POL Project Manager's Staff, the TRADOC Systems Managerand his staff and other organizations charged with theresponsibility for development and procurement of POL distributionequipment; attendance at meetings of the POL Action OfficersWorkshop (AOW); and discussions with officers and NCO's of TO&EPOL units, both active and reserve, a number of problems have beenidentified. Some of these are understandably hypotheses orassertions at this point in time which should be subjected tofurther study and verification to assure that they are, in fact, .-really problems. Others have already been proven to be problemsrequiring some type of corrective action. As a general statement,it is safe to state that, based on a preponderance of informationreviewed, the existing POL structure and operating system does notmeet the requirements of the existing or projected POL consuming U -'fleet of ground and air vehicles and stationary equipment. As thisdemand on POL logistics continues to grow, with greaterrequirements for mobility, agility and survivability, the gapbetween demand and supply capability will continue to widen. Withthese introductory remarks serving as a backdrop, the following
Page 17
'.O
POL problems are presented for consideration and corrective actionas may be indicated. (As noted in the OBJECTIVE of this study, theUS Army only consumes about 35% of the inland POL. The remaining65% is consumed by the USAF.)
General
a. Clarification of Requirements. A clear definitionof the quantities of POL that are required to support both thecurrent and projected military vehicle and equipment fleet islacking. Also, there is a need for users to state, as part oftheir requirement for future vehicles, the refueling rate. Thiswould facilitate the design of not only the on board refuelingport(s) of the vehicle, but also the design of refueling equipmentsuch as the Forward Area Refueling Equipment (FARE), and it wouldaid in the decision as to whether the refueling system should beopen or closed port, etc.
b. A Systems Approach. Reference to lack of a completeintegrated systems approach to the solution of POL problems hasbeen made several times in this report. The importance of thisproblem cannot be over emphasized. The result is that majorefforts are sometimes directed towards the correction of a"bottleneck" at one juncture in a system only to find that it _creates an even greater "bottleneck" at another juncture.Priorities under a "fix each weak link as it is discovered"approach becomes meaningless and the entire process is stretchedout when it is discovered that one correction may not becompatible with another later correction and the initial one mustundergo further design changes resulting in increased costs anddelays in time. Is the most serious problem between the off-shoreto on-shore terminal capability; is it in the intermediatedistribution system from the port forward through the COMMZ; or isit in the forward areas? Is the problem with pipeline layingtechniques; with long-haul tank trucks; with shortfalls in pumpingsubstations; or perhaps lack of communications through the variousechelons of POL supply operators and/or users? High volume pumpsare being procured for movement of POL through the wholesalepipeline system as well as for distribution from tactical POL tanktrucks into combat vehicles with little regard as to whether ornot the wholesale POL storage facilities can handle the increasedflow rates or whether or not the tactical fighting vehicles canaccept the faster fill rates of pumps on tactical POL vehicles. Itis suggested that until these interfaces of the system have beenidentified and the problems associated with each such interfaceplaced in proper perspective, it will not be possible to prepare amaster program in which concurrent and coordinated correctiveactions can be accomplished. Time will not permit the solution ofPOL problems in a sequential manner, nor can the Army afford theincreased costs associated with such an approach.
Page 18
C. A Master Priority List. The importance of a totalsystems approach, coupled with a realistic master priority listthat interrelates each problem and corrective action with thetotal systems requirements can be best illustrated through oneexample. The Director of Logistics, US Mission to NATO has statedthat the Central Europe Pipeline System, although chronologicallyold, is, in a sense, modern and complex in its operation. Itcannot, however, meet daily projected combat requirements, eitheron a storage or throughput basis in its current configuration. aFurther, the NATO POL distribution system in Turkey is at theother end of the spectrum being comprised of very obsolete, wornout, incomplete subsystems or equipment that is also incapable of
meeting the daily requirements either on a storage or throughputbasis. The lack of a systems approach supported by a masterpriority list, makes it difficult if not impossible to answer suchquestions as: "Should these pipeline systems be upgraded to meetcurrent and projected demands, or should the emphasis be placed onproviding a modern vehicle tanker fleet?" If the choice becomes a .0modern tanker fleet, will the in-theater highway systemaccommodate such high volume highway movements, particularly intime of major conflict? What about railroads for transport of POL?Today's higher priority project in terms of personnel, dollars andmanagement attention is with the Southwest Asia PetroleumDistribution System Operational Project (SWAPDOP), not withEurope. Of 19 major initiatives dealing with the correction of POLproblems, seven have no funding through FY87 even though some ofthese unfunded projects are identified as high-priority efforts.It is not the purpose of this study to suggest which problemshould be given the higher priority. It is the purpose, by citingexamples, to stress the importance of a "total systems approach"to include a meaningful master priority list for the correction ofPOL supply problems.
d. Inadequate POL Units, Personnel, and Equipment.Eighty to 90% of the POL units assigned responsibility for POLsupply are in the Reserve and/or National Guard structure. TheseReserve and National Guard units will be called upon during timeof conflict to provide most of the POL resupply capability. Thefew POL units within the active force structure are undermanned,undertrained, and have many critical shortages of POL vehicles andequipment similar to the reserve/NG units. The equipment they dohave is, in many instances, old and in poor operating condition.Many of the units have never been tested to determine theircapability to meet their primary mission requirements.
Specific Problems
a. The Army Research and Development community, toinclude that part of TRADOC associated with specifying systemrequirements, is focused on weapons system performance in terms oflethality, speed, survivability, maneuverability, etc., withoutcommensurate consideration for the POL logistics requirements to
, . Pa e 19
support such modern fighting vehicles. Maintenance is beginning toreceive appropriate attention in the design and development of afighting vehicle, yet little, if any, real attention is beinggiven to reducing the POL consumption requirements of suchvehicles, or to improved, more rapid refueling conditions.
b. Over-the-shore POL logistics capability during earlystages of employment in an undeveloped theater of operations ismarginal.
c. Outmoded pipeline technology imposes labor andtime-intensive requirements for rapid pipeline deployment. S
d. The Current POL highway tanker fleet is slow,vulnerable and plagued with a mix of vehicles and engines. Someare very old and are experiencing high maintenance requirements.
e. Lack of a standardized rapid refueling system has presulted in gross inefficiencies in refueling operations. There.1isa need for a standardized refueling system (SRS) to accommodateinterfaces between wheeled and tracked ground vehicles, aircraft,and the refueling equipment.
f. A tradeoff analysis is needed to determine whether 0the current FARE should be product improved or whether a new-startprogram incorporating present state-of-the-art technology for anew FARE is more desirable. N
g. A front end analysis (FEA) is required for theautomated pipeline equipment system (APES) to insure that it willsatisfy all user requirements. HFE interfaces should be carefullyanalyzed as part of this FEA.
h. There is a need to determine whether the higherpriority should be given to the modernization of a wheeled vehicletanker fleet or to the development and fielding of an armoredcombat vehicle refueller.
i. The Navy has been given the lead for development ofa four mile off-shore to on-shore POL discharge system, to includea single point mooring system with an on-the-bottom POL dischargecapability. The Army has been given responsibility for developing Sa one-mile system. The Army apparently has the lead for the designof the one-mile system and the Navy is responsible for developing Valternatives. The Navy is responsible for the tanker ship or bargeto POL off-shore pipeline interfaces, and the Army is responsiblefor the off-shore pipeline to on-shore PO terminal interfaces.From an operational point of view, the Army is responsible for theconnection to the Navy installed Beach Termination Unit (BTU) andall operations on-shore. Alternatives for installation andoperation of the various off-shore to on-shore POL dischargesystems include civilian installation and operation with Navy
Page 20
control; Army Corps of Engineers installation; and US Navyinstallation and operation. There is a need to clarify the manyinterfaces in terms of compatibility and installation/operationresponsibilities.
j. There is a need to clarify the requirements for
command, control and communications (C ) between off-shore andon-shore operations; between POL terminal facilities and pumpingsubstations along with a POL pipeline; and the intra-POL terminalfacility. There is also a need to clarify the communicationrequirements between the POL operating units up through the DirectSupport (DS) level and the combat and combat support users of POLproducts. Once this command, control and communicationsrequirIments network has been defined, there is a need to procurethe C equipment to provide the required communicationscapability.
k. Collapsible storage tanks, in capacities of 10,000,20,000, and 50,000 gallons have an operational (in use) life an ashelf (in storage) life of only one and five years, respectively.Because of the tremendous reliance on these tanks to provideessential POL support, the shelf and operational life should beextended. These collapsible tanks are often the only storagecapability available to support combat operations until such timeas more permanent facilities can be constructed.
1. Currently there is no capability to quickly -.'Vdetermine the type or usability of fuel which has been captured. -AAirland Battle Concepts envision deep penetrations behind enemylines where traditional petroleum supply support may not always bepossible. As such, there will be a need to identify fuels ofopportunity for combat vehicle use in order to complete themission. By using a small, lightweight, simplified testing kit, it .y"would be possible for combat vehicle crewmen to determine fuelusability in a short period of time.
(NOTE: It is understood that AMC has such a develop-ment project ongoing.)
m. The current family of US Army POL equipmentassemblies does not include a small, lightweight, easily operated
system which armor or mechanized infantry platoon-sized unitscould carry into battle and use to refuel their vehicles fromsources of opportunity under emergency conditions. Without such asystem, units operating behind enemy lines are limited by both the :
amount of fuel they are capable of carrying and by constrained .4,
aerial resupply.
Page 21
mN
n. Of the 25 technical publications on POL that wereavailable for a literature search, 44% (II) were found to be sixyears old or older from the date of publication; one was found tobe 20 years old. Less than a third of these publications have hadrevisions or changes appended.
o. The current inventory of storage tanks, vehicletankers and pipelines is highly vulnerable to the wide range of
enemy fire from small arms, fragmentation, shrapnel, artillery,rockets and aircraft. Preventive measures that may alleviate thisthreat to some degree range from self-sealing materials toblanket-type ballistic protection.
p. This document is essentially a status list ofhardware that is either presently in the inventory or in thedevelopmental phase of its life cycle. It includes taskings tovarious commands as a result of a Petroleum Materiels Requirementconference as well as a general description of how the POLdistribution system functions. The Combat Development Directorateof the Quartermaster School is responsible for its publication anddistribution. Revisions and/or reorganization of the document tomore directly relate requirements to R&D And procurement programswould improve its utility.
q. Packaged POL products have proliferated over theyears to the point that excessive and unnecessary demands havebeen placed on the logiscics :vstem. The entire spectrum ofproducts needs to be analyzed with the thought of modernizingpackaging concepts for this expensive commodity.
r. There is a general consensus that there are 0,1insufficient resources in terms of trained personnel and adequateequipment available in both the active Army and Reserves toproperly staff Petroleum Pipeline and Terminal Operating Units,Petroleum Supply Units and Engineer Pipeline Construction Units.This is particularly acute when these un s have the mission toestablish a POL distribution system in an undeveloped theaterscenario.
s. During tactical operations involving deeppenetrations, crew-personnel required for refueling operations maybe exposed to a wide range of hostile fire from ground and airdelivery systems. Proposals for an armored tracked refuel system,advocated by several Government contractors appear to offer aviable solution to the refueling and rearming problem. However, adetailed Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) andother types of analyses would be necessary to determine if theproposal has positive merit. S
Page 22
POL RESUPPLY IN FORWARD AREAS
Although, as presented in the paragraph entitled "POL ProblemAreas", numerous problems exist throughout the POL supply system,major efforts are either underway or are planned to resolve manyof them. There are two major priority efforts, both of which havebeen mentioned previously.
* First is the Action Officers Workshop (AOW) chaired bya DA, DCSLOG representative with membership from all threeservices whose primary concern is the Southwest Asia PetroleumDistribution Operational Project (SWAPDOP).
Second is the Annual Materiel Requirements Conferencewherein all petroleum problems/projects are documented, completewith schedules of corrective action in the Master PetroleumMateriel Requirements Plan (MPMRP).
It is noted, however, that the greatest majority of problems,by a large margin, which have been identified and for whIchcorrective action is underway, is within the rear echelons orwholesale area. There are problems associated with the offload ofPOL from off-shore tankers to on-shore terminals, and with movingthe bulk product forward from Theater to Army and from Army toCorps, with little emphasis on the forward areas from the end of 0the POL pipeline forward.
The doctrine, policies and procedures for the handling anddistribution of POL products within the rear areas is consideredto be well documented as are the problems associated with thispart of the POL system. Likewise, R&D and procurement projects areeither underway or planned to resolve many major problemsassociated with handling and distribution of POL in these areas.Conversely, efforts to identify a systematic or integratedapproach to the identification and resolution of POL supply and %distribution problems in the forward areas of the battlefield havenot been as fruitful. It is strongly suspected that no overallcoordinated systems approach to the resolution of POL supply anddistribution problems in the forward areas exists at the presenttime.
Based on the above, ASI focused the remainder of the studyresearch effort on POL supply and distribution in the forwardareas (division forward) of the present and projected futurebattlefield as a potential area wherein the Army's Human 46
Engineering Laboratory might make a greater contribution to theresolution of the forward area POL supply system, particularly thesoldier/machine interface problems.
Page 23 ,
The Forward krea POL Supply System
Bulk fuel, like ammunition, is a continuous supplyrequirement that increases or decreases according to the combatsituation, fuel requirements are based on forecasts provided bycombat battalions through supply channels. Brigade logisticspersonnel forecast the fuel consumption rates for their attachedbattalions. The forecasts for the Armor, Infantry, MechanizedInfantry, etc., units are consolidated at the brigade level andforwarded to the Division Materiel Management Center (MMC).
(NOTE: When a brigade is not operating under a division,the brigade requirements are forwarded to the Corps Sup-port Command (COSCOM).
In consolidating and refining POL requirements at thebrigade, the S-4s must consider special circumstances that couldresult in unusually high fuel consumption rates such as vehiclesoperating over hilly terrain which causes higher than normal feelconsumption.
Forward Area POL Resupply
Once fuel requirements are forecast, the brigade S-4sand division G-4 must determine if battalions can carry anddistribute their own fuel. Battalions are generally equipped witheither tank trucks or with fuel pods mounted on cargo-carryingvehicles and/or trailers. In divisional units, the Supply andTransport (S&T) Battalion has tank trucks and semi-trailers aswell as collapsible bulk fuel storage tanks and drums. These areoften positioned in the brigade support area or other locationsrelatively close to using units. QM POL supply companies fromCOSCOM may provide tankers or collapsible tanks and drums tosupply non-divisional battalions.
Table 6 is an extract of the fuel handling equipment andtransport vehicles assigned to the S&T battalions of the varioustype divisions.
The final and perhaps most important node in the POL supplychain is the POL personnel and handling and transport equipmentintegral to the combat maneuver battalions. Table 7 is an extractof POL handling/transport equipment currently assigned to the fourmajor types of combat maneuver battalions.
..
.w
. ' I V, r ,PPaqe 24
IF
TABLE 6.
Fuel Handling Equipment & Transport VehiclesAssigned to S&T Battalions
10,000 Gal 5,000 Gal5,000 Gal Collapsible Collapsible
Type Unit Semi-Tlrs Tanks Drums FARE FSSP
S & T Bn,Air Assault Div 10 36 304 18 6
S & T Bn,Armored Div 34 12 27 5 2
S & T Bn,Inf Div, Mech 29 12 27 5 2
S & T Bn,Inf Div 16 6 27 5
Source: "H" Series TO&Es.
TABLE 7.
POL Handling/Transport EquipmnentCombat Maneuver Battalions
TRK, Tank & Tank 65 GPMTank Pump Unit Pump, Gas N
Fuel Svc, Unit, Liquid, Driven
Type Unit TO&E No. 2500 Gal TRK Mtd TLR Mtd Frame Mtd
FA Bn, SP, qHeavy Div 06356J410 3 2
Ml Tank Bn 17236J210 12 2
Mech Inf BnW/BFVS 07245J210 7 7 2
FA Bn,8 In/MLRS 03395J200 4 3 4
Source: "J" Series TO&Es.
Page 25
It should be noted that all but the mechanized infantrybattalions with the BFVS will be equipped with the new HEMTT 2500gallon fuel trucks. It is understood that the mechanized infantrybattalions have expressed a preference to retain the truck mountedtank and pump units and trailer mounted tank units in lieu of theHEMTT. Based on the fuel consumption rates for the various combatvehicles as shown in Tables 3 and 4, and assuming, for example,that a tank battalion will travel approximately 100 km per day, anMl tank battalion consisting of 58 M1 tanks would requirerefueling once a day (3.33 gal/mi x 100 mi = 333 gal pertank x 58 tanks = 19,314 gal). Twelve 2500 gallon tankers cancarry 30,000 gallons and would therefore have to pick up fuel atan FSSP only once a day. Similar computations for the other typesof units also indicate that the quantity of POL handling andtransport equipment assigned to the combat maneuver battalionsappears to be adequate to perform the POL resupply mission under avariety of scenarios. The reader must remember, however, thatthese computations assume all of the POL vehicles, like the combatvehicles, are operational and will be able to rendezvous at. adesignated point to refuel the combat vehicles. The proponents ofarmored POL resupply vehicles will argue that the unarmored POLresupply vehicle on a future battlefield will have an unacceptablyhigh mortality rate. Also, resupply of POL to combat units engagedin a "deep penetration" scenario behind enemy lines as visualizedby Army 21, would also present a challenge to both an armored andunarmored POL resupply vehicle.
(NOTE: Appendix A contains complete lists of fuel hand-ling, fuel transport, storage capabilities and other POLinformation for each type POL unit responsible for thehandling/transport of POL from the port, forward todivision trains. The question that must be answered is:"Are these units capable of providing the required quan-tities of POL at the right place and at the right timeto the combat forces?")
Computing Unit Fuel Consumption Rates
Just as was found with the study of Class V, there are amyriad of POL consumption planning factors and models forcomputing fuel consumption rates. Prior to 1973, the military hadthe luxury of estimating POL requirements and adding a "fudgefactor" which increased the total quantity necessary to completean assigned mission. Since that time, the shortage of crude oil,the increased numbers and rates of consumption of militaryvehicles, and limitations on the capability to transport anddistribute fuel to highly maneuvering units on a highly mobilebattlefield have all but eliminated the luxury of overestimatingrefined petroleum products to meet a particular mission need.
Methods presently available to calculate fuel consumption/
planning factors include:
FM 101-10-1, July 1976FM 10-17, June 1979STANAG 2115CAA FASTALS Model (short tons per soldier per day)SB 710-2 (gallons per soldier per day)SB 710-2 (gallons per mile/kilometer traveled per day)Gallons per hourPounds per soldier per dayFuel consuming items combat profile
Source: CSS-MAA, Supply Substudy, Part 3,USA QM School, Ft. Lee, Virginia
The Ml tank is one of the largest consumers of fuel on thebattlefield today. Studies performed by the QM school havedetermined that it is impractical to conceptualize fuelconsumption based on a number of miles traveled when dealing witha tank deployed on a battlefield. The amount of maneuvering andjockeying of a tank in a combat situation may cover considerabledistance and consume considerable fuel without any appreciableadvance or withdrawal. The study states that "A tank engine willprobably operate for at least 10 to 12 hours per day on abattlefield environment". During the extremely intense Yom KippurWar, the Israelies reported tank engine operation averaging about20 hours per combat day. In this regard, the Israelies use thesingle figure of approximately 60 liters (15.85 gallons) per houras a consumption planning factor which proved to be extremelyaccurate for their M60 tanks. Although US planners are reluctantto use a general consumption factor such as 100 miles of estimatedtravel for a tank for a typical combat day, such a figure wouldequate to less than 8 hours of tank road movement time when usingthe Israeli planning factor.
Table 3, presented earlier on page 13 of this report, showedthat the fuel consumption rates for selected combat vehicles, V..including the Ml tank, varied significantly depending on whether avehicle was moving across country, on secondary roads, or simplystanding still with the engine idling. Figure 5 represents a modelfor computing the fuel consumption for the Ml tank using the samePOL consumption rates as shown in Table 3 (converted togallons/mile). In this model, the S-4 POL planner can vary thepercentage of time the tank travels cross country with the timetraveled on secondary roads and select from the graph an estimatedfuel consumption rate for an Ml tank battalion operating on thebattlefield for a 24 hour period. For example the graph shows
that .d
if 50% was cross country and 50% was on secondary roads, the Sconsumption would be 14,732 gallons per Ml tank battalion per day.Note that this model assumes a 100 mile distance traveled orequivalent hours of operation,
Page 27
similar to the Israeli approach, the accuracy of which wasvalidated during the Yom Kippur War.
METHOD FOR COMPUTING FUEL CONSUMPTION RATE FOR M I TAW
(1 BN - 58 TANKS. 100 MILES PER 24 HOUR PERIO )
PERCENTCROSS COUNTRY GAL/BN/24 MR
100- 19,314
80- 17.480
60- 15.64814.732
40- 13.815
20 11.983
PERCENT SECONDARY ROADS
0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 5. Ml Tank Battalion (58 Tanks) Fuel Consumption Rates. S
As a matter of comparison, during the Operational Test III 5.'
(OT III) of the Ml tank at Fort Knox, it was reported that fuelconsumption was 3.5 gallons/mile. The same fuel consumption wasreported for the OT III portion of the tests performed at FortHood. When new trainees were trained on the Ml tank at Fort Knoxhowever, and it is understood that the majority of the training".1was performed on cross country type terrain, fuel consumptionjumped to 8.0 gallons/mile. Considering the Fort Knox OT IIItesting as a conservative estimate of fuel consumption for an Mltank battalion (which is similar to the estimate shown inFigure 5), and the fuel consumption based on the preliminarydriver training for tank drivers as representing the "worst case"as shown by the two diagonal lines in Figure 6, one can see thewide divergence in estimating fuel consumption for a one-dayoperation of an Ml Tank Battalion.
Page 28
MPORTANCE OF AN ACCURATE PLANNING FACTOR FOR POL CONSUMPTION
1TO V CROSS COUNTRY eXEA30-
43- -46,400 GAL
40-
25-
20- FT. KNOX CONSERVATIVE
15 S
S23.200 GAL- -1.. . ...00. SECONDARY ROADS,
0 5 10 15 20 25
(GALLONS IN THOUSANDS)
Figure 6. M1 Tank Battalion (58 Tanks) Fuel Consumption: Fort KnoxConservative Vs. Fort Knox Driver Training.
For example, using the worst case presented in Figure 6., S
i.e., 100% cross country at 8 gallons/mile versus the best case of100% secondary road travel at 3.5 gallons/mile, the variance is357% (46,400 - 10,150 = 36,250 . 10,150 = 357%). A more realisticcomparison might be to assume a 50% cross country - 50% secondaryroads for both the 3.5 gallons/mile Ft. Knox DT III test Sexperience and the gal/mi Ft. Knox Driver Training experience(14,732 gallons/24 hours versus 34,800 gallons/24 hours in whichcase the variance would be 136%). Hopefully, this illustrates theimportance of providing a realistic planning factor to tankcommanders for accurately estimating fuel requirements in supportof a Heavy Armored Division operating in an Airland Battle or Army21 battlefield environment.
FINDINGS
POL Unit Force Structure
1. Eighty-one percent of the POL units and approximate-ly 80-90% of POL supply and transport capability rests with theReserve and National Guard.
2. The Army Science Board 1984 Summer Study "Technologyto Improve Logistics and Weapons Support for Army 21" concludedthat: "Army 21 is not supportable unless significant constraints
are placed in POL consumption." This conclusion cannot be fullyverified until Army 21 operational concepts have been fully de-fined and an accurate Day of Supply (DOS) methodology is availa-ble for computing quantitative requirements.
POL Policy, Doctrine and Concepts
3. The policy, doctrine, organizations, methods andprocedures for the movement and distribution of bulk POL from the ,,
port to the using units is well documented and appears to be ade-quate with some exceptions as follows:
a. Currently, there exists eight military approvedand documented sources and nine methods for the computation of aPOL Day of Supply (DOS), none of which are universally accepted asthe best or most accurate method.
b. Current DoD doctrine results in an overlap of
responsibility between Army and Navy for movement of POL fromaan ,.offshore tanker to an onshore facility. The Navy has primary re-sponsibility for this mission in support of the US Marine Corpsand the Army has primary responsibility for support of the Armyand Air Force.
(NOTE: A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed on9 July 1985 tasking a Joint Army/Navy study group toclarify this mission assignment and develop doctrinewhich will assign primary responsibility to the US Navyfor movement of all POL from offshore to onshore (Logis-tics Over-the-shore [LOTS]) up to the high water mark. 0This does not include off-load of POL from tankersmoored to a pier in a developed theater of operationswhich will remain a US Army responsibility.)
c. Operational concepts for conduct of future war-fare are out of phase with logistical concepts. For example,Army 21 tactics and strategy call for a "deep penetration: inwhich sizeable forces are deployed deep into enemy territory. Yet,there are no companion tactics and strategy for the resupply of .
these forces which may not be able to return to friendly areaswithout resupply (see paragraph 2 above).
POL Quantitative Requirements
4. In addition to the need for the clarification ofdoctrine relative to the methodology for computing POL require-ments, there is a need to clarify the requirements in terms of"how rapidly does a user need his fighting vehicles refueled?".Times can vary from a few minutes per vehicle to in excess ofthirty minutes depending on the type vehicle and conditions underwhich refueling is being accomplished.
Page 30
Syst msVersus wFix Weakest Link' Approach
5. Although many actions are either planned or in pro-cess to correct POL supply and distribution shortfall, there islittle evidence of a totally integrated systems approach to theresolution of POL problems. For example, high volume pumps arebeing procured for movement of POL through the wholesale pipelinesystem as well as for distribution from tactical POL tank trucksinto combat vehicles with little regard as to whether or not thewholesale POL storage facilities can handle the increased flowrates or whether or not the tactical fighting vehicles can acceptthe faster fill rates of pumps on tactical POL vehicles.
Master Priority List
6. The Master Priority List is inconsistent with pro-gram execution. For example, of nineteen major initiatives deal-ing with the correction of POL problems, seven have no fundingthrough FY 87 even though some of these unfunded projects ageidentified as high-priority efforts.
Personnel and Training
7. POL unit training is minimal within both the reserveand active units due to the shortages of equipment and environmen-tal restrictions. Reserve units have the opportunity to partici-pate in major field exercises on an average of only once in three Ayears and the benefits of such exercises are significantly de-graded due to equipment shortages and environmental restrictionsin designated training areas which preclude meaningful trainingwith POL products.
Technical Publications
8. A review was made of TMs, FMs and other technicalpublications dealing with POL maintenance and operations. Forty-four percent were found to be six or more years old. With themany changes that are occurring not only in tactics and doctrinerelative to Airland Battle/Army 21, but also in the fielding ofnew equipment, the need for updating POL technical publicationsis apparent.
Other Problems S
A number of problems identified in earlier studies that ?were also noted during the conduct of this study, but for whichlittle evidence of corrective action was either planned or under-way, are listed below. When corrective action was identified,such information is also provided.
Page 31
...... ............. . - . .w ~ ~ w -
9. The Army is focussed on weapons system performancein terms of lethality, speed, survivability, maneuverability, etc.,without commensurate consideration for fuel economy requirements.
Corrective Action: AMC identified 4 initiativesin the Army Energy R&D Plan for 1983 including fleet dieseliza-tion, Ml tank engine improvement, advanced integration propulsionsystem for the next generation tank, and micro-processor control.It remains to be seen whether such programs will fall into a cate-gory like the NBC initiatives, many of which are first to be re-duced or eliminated by a project manager when funding shortagesor program delays occur, or whether they will, in fact, be exe-cuted as part of the basic project effort.
10. Over-the-shore POL logistics capability duringearly stages of employment in an undeveloped theater of operationsis marginal.
Corrective Action: A joint Army/Navy procurement
program is in process to increase distance by which over-the-shbrePOL off-loading can be performed from one to four miles. Also, byuse of the SALM, ofL-'ading can be continued during Sea State 3and higher (previo,s'., limited to Sea State 2).
11. Outmoded pipeline technology imposes labor and timeintensive requirements for rapid pipeline deployment.
Corrective Action: An AMC R&D project is underwayfor an automated pipeline laying system (APES) to increase capa-bility from as little as one mile per day to up to three milesper hour.
12. Current POL highway tanker vehicle fleet is slow,vulnerable and plagued with a mix of vehicles and engines. Someare very old and are experiencing high maintenance requirements.
13. Lack of a standardized refueling system has resul-ted in gross inefficiencies in refueling operations. Some of thenew tactical vehicles recently fielded have multi-refueling portswith no cross leveling capability and utilize the slow "openport" method of refueling.
14. Some of the Forward Area Refueling Equipment (FARE)units are old and in need of repair. When used for multi-vehiclerefueling (4 vehicles at a time), rate of refueling is sometimesless than 25 GPM per vehicle.
15. Command, Control and Communications (C3 ) capa-bilities for both intra-POL terminals and inter-POL pipeline pump-ing stations are considered to be grossly inadequate. This seri-ously degrades POL system operations.
Page 32
Corrective Action: During the AOW 11 Conference,9 June 1985, the Army Signal Center and School representative waltasked to define a communications system capable of meeting Crequirements for the Southwest Asia Petroleum Distribution Opera-tional Program (SWAPDOP) which represents the most critical andmost challenging C requirements.
16. Operational life of the collapsible POL storagetanks, the main and often the sole item used for storage of POL inoperating head terminals, is only one year.
17. There is currently no capability to quickly deter-mine the type or useability of fuel which has been captured.
Corrective Action: An AMC R&D project is underwayto develop a small lightweight kit for rapid analysis of capturedenemy POL products.
18. Current family of US Army POL equipment assemblagqsdoes not include a small, lightweight, easily operated systemwhich armor or mechanized infantry platoon-sized units can carryinto battle and use to refuel their vehicles from sources of op-portunity under emergency conditions.
19. The current inventory of storage tanks, vehicletankers and pipelines are highly vulnerable to a wide range ofenemy fire from small arms, fragments, shrapnel, artillery, rock-ets and aircraft weapons. Little project effort can be found toto improve survivability of this equipment.
20. The Master Petroleum Materiel Requirements Plan isgenerally devoid of timely combat development input from QMSchool, i.e., requirements information. This unnecessarily limitsits usefulness.
21. There is limited crew protection for forward arearefueling operations.
Corrective Action: Proposals for an armored trackedrefueling system have been advocated by Government contractors;however, no known COEA or similar Government sponsored type ofanalysis has been performed to determine the merits of such a pro-posal.
POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FUTURE USA HEL EFFORT
Based on a review of the above findings and on the authors'understanding and background knowledge of the experience andcapabilities of the US Army Human Engineering Laboratory (USAHEL),the following is a list of some of the areas in which it is felt
Page 33 1
0 W-1 L ~ lk -7 'L-,
the USAHEL can make the greatest contributions in terms ofimproving the POL supply and distribution system and primarily itsperformance capabilities.
Field Data Collection, Study and Analysis
Time Trials - Time to refuel selected combatvehicles. (BFVs, Ml, M60, etc.)
Concurrent rearm and refuel of combat vehicles isnot done. "Refuel and rearm procedures and times"is a valid issue.
* POL consumption rates
0 Concurrent versus sequential vehicle refueling/rearming
Queuing of vehicles for rearming/refueling--2500 gallon HEMTT tankers versus FARE unitsversus new technology items.
FSSP Operations, Study and Experimental Field Trials
Where to establish an FSSP
How much POL on ground versus on tankers/trailers
FSSP night operations 6
Replace or PIP the FARE
How to reduce signature of an FSSP ..".
Hot refueling/rapid refueling
Open versus closed port refueling
Requirement for Refueling Under Armor
Robotic refueler
V %
Page 34
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1135 Introduction of Fuels, Lubricants and Oilsin NATO
2924 POL Handling in the Field
2946 Forward Area Refueling Equipment
Page C-4 .p,, p" S ," PhS S U " .' U ',j,.,4d'5 .':: ", " s. "..,2 *..:X,-'..'".*
Program of Instruction (POI)
Petroleum Supply Specialist MOS 76W10, September 1983, US ArmyQM School, Ft. Lee, VA.
Petroleum Supply Specialist Basic Technical Specialty, MOS 76W30, .
31 December 1984, US Army QM School.
Motor Transport Operator Basic Technical Course, MOS 64C30,October 1983, US Army Transportation School, Ft. Eustis, VA.
Special Studies, Reports, Minutes of POL Meetings
Logistics Unit Productivity Study, Petroleum Supply CompanySubstudy, 15 December 1983, US Army Quartermaster School,Ft. Lee, VA.
Fourth Annual Petroleum Materiel Requirements Conference Reportand Master Materiel Requirements Plan, 17 March 1982, DA,US Army Quartermaster School, Ft. Lee, VA.
Seventh Annual Petroleum Materiel Requirements Conference Reportand Master Petroleum Materiel Requirements Plan, 26-30 November1984, US Army Quartermaster School, Ft. Lee, VA. Ne
Minutes of Action Officers Workshop #10 to Improve PetroleumCapabilities, 1-3 April 1985, Sponsored by Office of DeputyChief of Staff for Logistics, DA.
Minutes of Action Officers Workshop #11 to Improve PetroleumCapabilities, 19-23 July 1985, Sponsored by Office of DeputyChief of Staff for Logistics, DA.
Final Report of Army Science Board, 1984 Summer Study, "Technologyto Improve Logistics and Weapons Support for Army 21", December1984, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Research, Development andAcquisition, Washington, D. C.
Analysis of Army Logistics Hardware Requirements, The BDM Corp.,McLean, VA, January 1985.
(U) POL Supply Operations Within A Warsaw Pact Front(S), DIA -