Supreme Court Petition versus RA 9495

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSUPREME COURT

City of Manila

FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR andHOBART DEVEZA DATOR, JR.,

Petitioners,

SC G.R SP. No. ________

-versus- FOR: CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, AND INJUNCTION, WITH APPLICATION FOR TEMPO- RARY RESTRAINING ORDER

SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,in his capacity as the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF THEDEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, and theCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Respondents.x-------------------------------------------------------x

PETITION

PETITIONERS, by counsel, most respectfully state, THAT:

I

THE PARTIES

Petitioner FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, is of legal age, married,

with residence and postal address at Sitio Paang Bundok, Brgy. 5,

Calauag, Quezon; whereas petitioner HOBART DEVEZA DATOR,

JR., is of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at

Lucban, Quezon. Petitioners can be served with orders,

resolutions, pleadings, writs and other processes through the

undersigned counsel.

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On the other hand, respondents: a) HONORABLE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, is being sued

in his capacity as Executive Secretary and as implementor of

Republic Act No. 9495. He may be served with writs, summons,

pleadings, orders, decision and other court processes at his office

at Room 234, Mabini Hall, Malacañang Palace, Manila; b)

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND

MANAGEMENT, is of legal age, married, with principal office

address at Department of Budget and Management, Malacañang

Palace, Manila; c) COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS holds office at

Intramuros, Manila, where all of them, in their indicated

respective principal offices, may be served with summons, writs

and other processes of this Honorable Court.

II

NATURE OF THE PETITION

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to declare

the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9495, and COMELEC

Resolutions Nos. 8533, 8534, 8535, 8537, 8538 and 8539, all

dated November 12, 2008;

This is also a special civil action for Prohibition to enjoin,

forbid, and prohibit the above-named respondents from

implementing, enforcing, and effecting Republic Act No. 9495 and

the questioned COMELEC Resolutions, particularly:

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i. the respondent Executive Secretary from

processing the appointment of the interim

governor, vice governor and members of the

Sanguniang Panglalawigan of the de facto

Quezon del Sur; and

ii. the Secretary of Budget from disbursing public

monies necessary for:

a. the conduct of the plebiscite;

b. disbursing the salaries, allowances and other

emoluments of the interim local government officials

of the de facto Quezon del Sur; and the

iii Commission on Elections from initiating and

conducting the plebiscite pursuant to Section 49 of

R.A. 9495.

Lastly, the provisional remedy of PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

and/or TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER is respectfully

applied for under the same tenor of the prayer for Writ of

Prohibition.

III

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On 6 February 1901, the Philippine Commission enacted Act

No. 83, otherwise known as the Provincial Government Act. It

sought to present a template of provincial administration and

granted these entities with corporate powers1. Thereafter, on 12 1 Act No. 83, Section 2 – Every provincial government established under this Act shall be a body corporate, with power to sue and be sued, to have and use a corporate seal, to hold

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March 1901, by virtue of Act No. 103, the provision of Act No. 83

was extended to the Province of Tayabas.

On 1 July 1916, the Philippine Commission enacted the

Administrative Code, which expressly repealed Act Nos. 83 and

103, among other laws. The Revised Administrative Code of 1917

(Act No. 2711) recognized Tayabas as one of then 42 provinces of

the Philippine Islands (under Section 37).

On 7 September 1946, the Province of Tayabas was renamed

as Quezon Province through Republic Act No. 14. Later, the sub-

province of Aurora was created through Republic Act No. 648

(1951) until it was separated from the province by the enactment

of Batas Pambansa No. 7 (1979).

In the meantime, Republic Act No. 1205 was enacted in

1955, converting all specially organized provinces into regularly

organized provinces.

On 1 January 1992, the Local Government Code of 1991 took

effect, among the pertinent effects thereof was an implied repeal

of “[a]ll general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,

executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations,

or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the

provisions of this Code…2”

Relevant to the instant case is the passage of Republic Act

No. 9495, “An Act Creating the Province of Quezon del

property real or personal, to make contracts for labor and material needed in the construction of duly authorized public works and to incur any such other obligations as are expressly authorized by law.2 Section 534 (f), R.A. No. 7160.

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Sur,” which lapsed into law on 7 September 2007. It was

published in the Official Gazette in Volume 104, No. 16, on April

21, 2008.

Republic Act No. 9495 originated from House Bill 2862 (later

H.B. 5970) and was authored principally by Representatives

Lorenzo Tañada III and Danilo Suarez of the 3rd and 4th

Congressional Districts of Quezon Province. It was referred to the

Committee on Local Government, which met on 15 February 2006

and approved the passage of the bill for second reading of the

plenary session. On 7 December 2006, H.B. 5970, through an

omnibus motion to approve all other local bills, passed the second

reading without debate3. On 20 December 2006, H.B. 5970 was

approved by the House for third reading4. It passed the Senate on

7 June 2007.

Implementing RA 9495, respondent COMELEC issued the

following Resolutions (please go to

http://comelec.wordpress.com/category/plebiscite/):

Resolution No. 8533 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF THE PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR, PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED SEPTEMBER 07, 2007, WHICH SHALL BE COMPOSED OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF: AGDANGAN, BUENAVISTA, CATANAUAN, GENERAL LUNA, MACALELON, MULANAY, PADRE BURGOS, PITOGO, SAN ANDRES, SAN FRANCISCO, SAN NARCISO, UNISAN, ALABAT, ATIMONAN, CALAUAG, GUINYANGAN, GUMACA, LOPEZ, PEREZ, PLARIDEL, QUEZON AND TAGKAWAYAN; AND THE REMAINING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE OF QUEZON TO KNOWN AS QUEZON DEL NORTE, WHICH SHALL BE COMPOSED OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF BURDEOS, GENERAL NAKAR, INFANTA, JOMALIG, LUCBAN,

3 Uncatalogued transcript of the Journal of the House of Representatives, 12/07/06, page 240. 4 Uncatalogued transcript of the Journal of the House of Representatives, 12/20/06, page 109.

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MAUBAN, PAGBILAO, PANUKULAN, PATNANUNGAN, POLILIO, REAL, SAMPALOC, CANDELARIA, DOLORES, SAN ANTONIO, SARIAYA, TIAONG AND THE CITIES OF LUCENA AND TAYABAS, TO BE CONDUCTED ON DECEMBER 13, 2008.”

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

Resolution No. 8534 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “CALENDAR OF ACTIVITIES AND PERIODS OF PROHIBITED ACTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECEMBER 13, 2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED SEPTEMBER 07, 2007.”

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

Resolution No. 8535 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “IN THE MATTER OF DEPUTIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE CONDUCT OF THE DECEMBER 13, 2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED SEPTEMBER 7, 2007.”

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

Resolution No. 8537 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “RULES AND REGULATIONS ON : (A) BEARING, CARRYING OR TRANSPORTING FIREARMS OR OTHER DEADLY WEAPONS; (B) SECURITY PERSONNEL OR BODYGUARDS; (C) BEARING ARMS BY ANY MEMBER OF SECURITY OR POLICE ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATION (D) ORGANIZATION OR MAINTENANCE OF REACTION FORCES DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIOD IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECEMBER 13, 2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED SEPTEMBER 7, 2007.”

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

Resolution No. 8538 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “RULES ON THE LIQUOR BAN IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECEMBER 13, 2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED SEPTEMBER 7, 2007.”

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

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Resolution No. 8539 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO APPOINT, FILL-UP POSITIONS AND TRANSFER OR REASSIGN ITS PERSONNEL IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECEMBER 13, 2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495.”

IV

GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION

R.A. 9495 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM BECAUSE NO SUFFICIENT STANDARD WAS LAID DOWN FOR THE POWERS THAT THE INTERIM APPOINTEES MAY EXERCISE.

R.A. 9495 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF R.A. 7160.

R.A. 9495 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT THAT NO MORE THAN ONE (1) SUBJECT SHALL EMBRACE A STATUTE:

A. THE LAW CREATES ANOTHER LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OTHER THAN QUEZON DEL SUR;

B. THE LAW RENAMES QUEZON PROVINCE AS QUEZON DEL NORTE;

C. R.A. 9495 DEVISES AN EXCEPTION TO THE REQUIREMENT OF SITUS IN THE ASSESSMENT, EXACTION, AND COLLECTION OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES AND THEREFORE NOT GERMANE TO THE INTENDMENT OF THE STATUTE;

THE PLEBISCITE CAN NO LONGER BE CONDUCTED ON DECEMBER 13, 2008 AS THE PERIOD FIXED BY THE SAID LAW HAS LAPSED;

RESPONDENT COMELEC’S QUESTIONED RSOLUTIONS ISSUED ON NOVEMBER 12, 2008 CAN NOT BE ENFORCED FOR LACK OF PUBLICATION THRU THE UP LAW CENTER.

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V

DISCUSSION

Requisites of Judicial Inquiry Are Present In the Case at Bar.--------------------------------------------------

In Dumlao v. Commission on Elections5, the Honorable

Supreme Court ruled that no constitutional question will be heard

unless there is compliance with what are known as requisites of a

judicial inquiry. These requisites are the following:

a. There must be an actual case or controversy;

b. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the

proper party;

c. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest

possible opportunity; and

d. The decision on the constitutional question must be

necessary to the determination of the case itself.

It is submitted that the above requisites are applicable in the

case at bar.

There must be an Actual Case or Controversy.--------------------------------------------------

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal

right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It

is “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties

5 95 SCRA 392, 401-404 [1980]. Also in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, [Supreme Court] G.R. Nos. 171396, 171400, 171409, 171424, 171483, 171485, and 171489, 5/3/06, <www.supremecourt.gov.ph> page 21

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having adverse legal interest6;” a real and substantial controversy

admitting of specific relief.

In the case at bar, the petitioners are seeking to restrain:

a. the illegal disbursement of funds that would

result in the appointment of interim officers;

b. the illegal disbursement of funds to execute a

defective law; and

c. the illegal disbursement of funds to conduct

a plebiscite on December 13, 2008 in view of

the lapse of time provided by law for its

execution.

The Question of Constitutionality must be raised by the Proper Party.

--------------------------------------------------

“Locus standi” is defined as “a right of appearance in a

court of justice on a given question7.” In private suits, standing is

governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in

Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as

amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or

defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Accordingly,

the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be

benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party

6 Cruz, Isagani A., “Philippine Political Law” 1993 ed., p. 238. Cited in David, v. Macapagal-Arroyo, page 22.7 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 1991, p.94, cited in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra, page 24.

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entitled to the avails of the suit8.” Succinctly put, the petitioner’s

standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

In the instant case, the petitioners are real-parties-in-interest

as they are residents of Quezon Province and are registered

voters thereof, where they own real properties and pay the

corresponding real property taxes. Petitioner Pulgar is a

registered voter of Calauag, Quezon and exercises his right to

vote therein, copy of a Certification from the Calauag, Quezon

Commission on Elections is hereto attached as ANNEX “A” and

made part hereof. Petitioner Dator, Jr. is likewise a real property

owner in Lucban, Quezon, copy of the Certification from the

Lucban, Quezon Assessor’s Office is hereto attached as ANNEX

“B” and his Voter Certification as ANNEX “C” made parts

hereof. In fine, petitioners are suing as taxpayers of and as

registered voters in the Province of Quezon.

The Constitutional Question must be raised at the Earliest Possible Opportunity.

--------------------------------------------------

It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines

whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest

opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional

issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that

can resolve the same, such that, “if it is not raised in the

8 Salonga v. Warner Barnes Co., 88 Phil 125, also cited in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra, page 25.

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pleadings, it cannot be considered at trial, and, if not considered

at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal9.”

The petitioner is constrained to raise the issue of the

constitutionality of RA 9495 before this Honorable Court because

there is no plain, adequate nor speedy remedy available to them

other than the filing of this case.

R.A. 9495 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM BECAUSE NO SUFFICIENT STANDARD WAS LAID DOWN FOR THE POWERS THAT THE INTERIM APPOINTEES MAY EXERCISE.--------------------------------------------------

As previously stated, R.A. 9495 lapsed into law on 7

September 2007. In accordance with Section 58 thereof, the law

is to become effective upon its actual publication in a newspapers

of general circulation. This was not done. As provided in its

Section 49, a plebiscite was scheduled within 60 days from the

effectivity of the law.

Thereafter, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 52

(a), the President shall appoint interim officials to their positions

as interim governor, vice governor and interim members of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Here lies the crux of the

controversy.

What powers can the interim appointees exercise?

Section 52 (a), R.A. 9495 provides:

9 Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49, 65, citing People v. Vera 65 Phil 56.

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“xxx The President of the Philippines shall appoint in the province herein created an interim governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguiniang panlalawigan who shall serve only until a new set of provincial officials have been elected and qualified.”

The law does not say anything about the powers that the

interim appointees can exercise. Neither would the application of

the provisions of R.A. 7160 prove adequate to supply such

powers, as would be discussed below.

The Local Government Code provides for political and

corporate powers of a local government unit (LGU) (Section 15,

R.A. 7160). This “dual personality” means that as political units of

government, the LGUs have governmental powers as agents of

the national government. As corporate units, they have powers

which are proprietary, not necessarily governmental, but which

they may perform for the benefit of their constitutencies10.

It is submitted that the respondents could not exercise any

of these aforecited powers. The interim appointees cannot

exercise the province’s political power because R.A. 9495 did

not expressly give them such powers. Neither could these

appointees appoint any person to work with them and could

therefore “not act on anything or transact any business.” This is

so since the organization of the provincial government of Quezon

del Sur can only be filled “within sixty (60) days after the

commencement of the corporate existence of the province…”

10 Pimentel, Jr., A.Q., “The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key to National Development,” 1993 ed., p. 45.

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(Section 53). This could possibly occur sometime between 10 May

2010 but not later than 30 August 2010.

With respect to its corporate powers (Section 4, R.A. 9495/

Section 22, R.A. 7160) the interim appointees cannot exercise the

same because the period when the Province of Quezon del Sur

can commence its corporate existence was set “upon the election

and qualification of the governor, vice governor and the majority

of the members of the sangguniang panlalawigan.” (Section 52,

R.A. 9495/Section 14, R.A. 7160). This could occur sometime

between 10 May 2010 until 30 June 2010, and at such time, the

term of interim appointees ends.

In Mejia, et al., v. Balolong, et al11., the Supreme Court ruled,

thus:

“…But as a city is a public corporation or a juridical entity, and as such can not operate or transact business by itself but through its agents or officers, it was necessary that the government of the city be organized, that is, that the officials thereof be appointed or elected in order that it may act or transact business as such public corporation or entity.”

Any doubt as to the nature of the powers that the

interim appointees may exercise is negated by the

express powers that the law grants to the Ad-hoc

Committee composed of incumbent officials and

representatives of the Province of Quezon (Section 50, R.A.

9495). As matter cannot exist in the same space and time,

neither could the exercise of delegated powers exist in the Ad-hoc

11 81 Phil 468.

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Committee and the interim appointees. In essence, the appointed

interim officials are a bureaucratic surplusage.

With the aforecited defects, R.A. 9495 could not stand the

tests of delegation of powers as enunciated in the seminal case of

Pelaez v. Auditor General12

R.A. 9495 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF R.A. 7160.--------------------------------------------------

Section 6 of R.A. 7160 provides that;

“Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantiall altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, ..... subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.”

The limitations and requirements are found in the

Implementing Rules and Regulations (hereinafter, IRR).

Section 533 of the same law directed the formulation of the

IRR. Article 9 (b) of the IRR provides, to wit:

“Article 9. Provinces.

(a) xxx

(b) Procedure for creation. –

(1) Petition – Interested municipalities or component cities shall submit the petition in the form of a resolution, of their respective sanggunians requesting the creation of a new province to the Congress, and furnish copies thereof to the sangguniang panlalawigan of the original province or provinces.

12 15 SCRA 569.

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(2) Comments on petition – The sangguiang panlalawigan of the original province or provinces shall submit to the Congress its comments and recommendations on the petition for the creation of the proposed province.” (Emphasis supplied)

A perusal of the Committee on Local Government public

hearing conducted on 15 February 2006 would show serious

defects in the compliance of its proponents with the mandatory

requirements of the law. Attached as ANNEX “D” is a copy of the

transcript of the public hearing conducted by the Committee on

Local Government.

Mention was made by the sponsor of the bill, Rep. Lorenzo

Tañada III of their compliance with the statutory requisites for the

creation of a LGU13. However, the Committee displayed a cavalier

attitude towards the compliance of the proponents with the

mandatory requirement of the IRR on the resolutions of interested

municipalities and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quezon, to

wit:

“REP. EDUARDO V. ROQUERO, M.D. Mr. Chairman.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Honorable Roquero

REP. ROQUERO. Thank you. Maari din po ba nating malaman kung ano po ang pleasure o

stand ng provincial board, the governor?

REP. TAÑADA. Yeah, Mr. Chairman, the resolution signed by the Board Members are comprised by Board Member Roderick Magbuhos, Board Member Gerald Ortiz, Board Member Icias Ubana and Board Member Rommel Edaño. This has not yet been voted upon by the

13 a. 2000 Census – 746,883 for “Quezon del Sur” and 736,072 for “Quezon del Norte.” Minimum is 250,000.

b. Department of Finance 2002-2003 reported earnings of “Quezon del Sur” as 198.3 Million and “Quezon del Norte” – 276.1 Million. Minimum is 20 Million per 1991 constant price.

c. Land Area - “Quezon del Sur” 4,033 sq.km. and 4,892 sq. km. for “Quezon del Norte.” Minimum is 2,000 sq.km. Source: Transcript of the public hearing of the Committee on Local Government, 2/25/06, p. 4

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Provincial Board, so it is hard for me to speculate on how the Provincial Board will vote on the matter but there is a resolution that was filed.

REP. VIRADOR. Just a follow-up on that, Mr. Chairman. THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Honorable Virador.

REP. VIRADOR. I noticed that the Governor is not mentioned in this resolution. What is really his stand on this proposal Mr. Chairman?

REP. TAÑADA. Again, Mr. Chairman, this would be mere speculation on my part, but when this bill has been filed (sic) as early as the 11th Congress, this was sponsored then by my father, the former Senator Bobby Tañada,and Congressman Raffy Nantes. It passed the House in the 11th Congress but due to the impeachment case of then President Erap Estrada in 2001, it was not tackled in the Senate.

The position of Governor Enverga the (sic) time was to let the people decide. So I am not sure if the Governor would still maintain the same position today. In the 12th Congress, this bill creating the Province of Quezon del Sur was, again, filed by Congressman Nantes and former Congresswoman Aleta Suarez, but this was not passed in the Committee nor in the Plenary of the House. So this will be the third attempt. Hopefully, we will see the light of day and get it pass through the Senate.

xxx xxx xxx

REP. VIRADOR. Mr. Chairman, while I recognize that the approval of the governor or other members of the sangguiniang panlalawigan is not necessary for the creation of a new province, I just want to manifest that, maybe, I can interpret this that this is also the sentiment of other governors that they don’t want that their allocation, their IRA will be divided. I hope that is not the reason. But at any rate, Mr. Chairman, I do support this bill for the betterment of the lives of the people from Quezon.

REP. TAÑADA. Mr. Chairman.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Okay. The Honorable Tañada.

REP. TAÑADA. Yeah, just to clarify what Congressman Virador mentioned. It is not stated in Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code that the approval of the governor or the sangguniang panlalawigan is a condition precedent for this Committee to tackle House Bill 2861….” (Emphasis supplied)

As can be culled from this discussion, the proponent of the

bill did not possess any resolution from the sangguniang bayan

and sangguniang panlalawigan of the affected LGUs; the

Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Quezon was not given a chance

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to officially file its comments and recommendation on the

petition; and the prevailing view of the committee was that it was

not necessary to obtain these matters as a condition precedent

for the passage of the bill into law. Please refer to the

Certification dated April 11, 2008 executed by the Secretary of

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quezon attesting the absence

of any affirmative resolution endorsing for approval the proposed

bill on the division of Quezon as ANNEX “E” hereof.

The constitutional question is: can Congress ignore the

provision of the IRR in the creation of a LGU?

R.A. 9495 EMBRACES MULTIPLE SUBJECTS.--------------------------------------------------

The subject law is violative of the general principle that

every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject

which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

1.15. Title of statute.

The Constitution provides that “every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” This provision is mandatory, and a law enacted in violation thereof is unconstitutional. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon the legislature. First, the legislature is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statue, of heterogeneous subjects. Second, the title of the Bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

1.16. Purposes of Requirement.

The principal purpose of the constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its title is to apprise the legislators of the object,

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nature and scope of the provisions of the bill, and to prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators. It is to prohibit duplicity in legislation, the title of which completely fails to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its provisions. In other words, the aims of the constitutional requirement are: “First, to prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by means of provisions in bills of which the title gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of the legislation that are being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.

A fourth purpose may be added. The title of a statue is used as a guide in ascertaining legislative intent when the language of the act does not clearly express its purpose. The title may clarify doubt or ambiguity in the meaning and scope of a statue, and limiting a statue to only one subject and expressing it in its title will strengthen its function as an intrinsic aid to statutory construction.14

In the subject law, another province is being created,

Quezon Del Norte, which is an entirely new province, carved out

from the Province of Quezon.

The creation of Province of Quezon as shown elsewhere is

embodied in Republic Act No. 14 which was approved on

September 7, 1946.

What Republic Act 9495 seeks to accomplish, among its

many subjects, is to rename Quezon Province as Quezon del

Norte which is totally not germane to the purpose of the law.

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

1.23. Purview of statute.

The purview or body of a statue is that part which tells what the law is all about. The body of a statue should embrace only one subject matter. The constitutional requirement that a bill should have only one subject matter which should be expressed in its title is complied with where

14 Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Fifth Edition, pp. 11-12 (Emphasis ours)

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the provisions thereof, no matter how diverse that may be, are allied and germane to the subject and purpose of the bill or, negatively stated, where the provisions are not inconsistent with, but in furtherance of, the single subject matter.

The legislative practice in writing a statue is to divide an act into sections, each of which is numbered and contains a single proposition. A complex and comprehensive piece of legislation usually contains, in this sequence, a short title, a policy section, definition section, administrative section, sections prescribing standards of conduct, section imposing sanctions for violation of its provisions, transitory provision, separability clause, repealing clause, and effectivity clause.15

This case is on all fours with the case of Baralidasan vs.

Commission on Elections16, where this Honorable Court struck

down Republic Act 4790 entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality

of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional.

This Honorable Court ruled as follows:

The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province — Cotabato — to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.

On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:

Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.

15 Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Fifth Edition, pp. 15-16 (emphasis ours).16 GR No. L-28089, October 25, 1967

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Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.

Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which are:

For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.

Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios — in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato — are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."

This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.

1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall

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embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."2

It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application, originated.5

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6

In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:

The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

xxx xxx xxx

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7

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With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 — projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in the title of the law." This posture — we must say — but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.

Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" — which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set

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forth in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.

As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the following described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:

It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a sufficient title, and that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.

. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.

A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.

The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleading."9

Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10

We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the

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mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.

We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:

. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them,

In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate, . . . .

Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.

Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was apparently

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these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:

The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.

This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.

When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios — not nine barrios — was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine — of the original twenty-one — barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.

Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.14

3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal

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interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the real party in interest.

Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.

The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.15

Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are fanned into the new town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.

For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.17 (emphasis ours)

In the case at bar, the people of Quezon Province are kept in the

dark by the title of the defective law. Technically, two provinces

are created by RA 9495. Quezon del Sur can exist independently

with Quezon Province, being the mother province thereof. Yet, the

law went out of bounds by creating another entirely new

province, Quezon del Norte, with new technical boundaries yet

17 G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967

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retaining the old capital of Lucena City. Quezon del Norte

whichever one looks at it is not Quezon Province.

RA 9495 AMENDS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

Another glaring defect of Republic Act 9495 is Section 55

thereof, which states:

Equitable Division. - Upon the effectivity of this Act, the obligations, funds, assets and other properties of the present Province of Quezon, renamed Quezon del Norte, shall, as much as possible, be divided equitably between Quezon del Sur and Quezon del Norte. The President of the Philippines shall order such division upon the recommendation of the ad hoc committee which may avail of assistance from the Commission on Audit and other departments concerned.

The tax revenues from business enterprises principally located in one of the two provinces created herein but whose facilities or structures extend to the other such as, but not limited to, power generating plants shall be proportionally divided between the two provinces: Provided, That such enterprises shall not be subjected to a second tax in addition to what is already imposed by the province where they are principally located. (emphasis ours)

The said section is in effect a mandate that the tax revenues

from the business enterprises principally located in Quezon del

Norte particularly the power generating plants shall be

proportionally divided between the two provinces.

This Honorable Court can take judicial notice that there are

two gigantic power generators located in two municipalities in

Quezon particularly in the municipalities of Mauban and Pagbilao.

Under the law, these municipalities are included in the newly

proposed Quezon del Norte. Quezon Power Plant is located in

Mauban, Quezon while Team Energy formerly Hopewell Power

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Plant is located in Pagbilao, Quezon, copies of the Certifications of

the Provincial Assessor’s Office are hereto attached as ANNEXES

“F” and “F-1” and made parts hereof. Mauban and Pagbilao are

proposed to be within the new Quezon del Norte, a second

province sought to be created under RA 9495.

Realty Tax has been defined as follows:

REALTY TAX Local Tax. The difference is that a realty tax has always been imposed by the lawmaking body and later by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his lawmaking powers, and is enforced throughout the Philippines and not merely in a particular municipality or city, but the proceeds of the tax accrue to the province, city, municipality and barrio where the realty taxed is situated.

In contrast, a local tax is imposed by the municipal or city council.18.

Under Section 201 of the Local Government Code it

provides:

SEC. 201. Appraisal of Real Property. - All real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at the current and fair market value prevailing in the locality where the property is situated. The Department of Finance shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the classification, appraisal, and assessment of real property pursuant to the provisions of this Code. (emphasis ours)

In other words, Republic Act 9495 is sui generis limited to

Quezon del Norte and Quezon del Sur, seeking to amend the

effects of Section 201 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as

the Local Government Code. While in BARALIDASAN the

insertion of twelve barrios from the Province of Cotabato in the

proposed Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del

Sur, changed the boundaries of the two provinces, Section 55 is

18 Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation vs. Central Board of Assessment Appeals. L-46245, May 31, 1982; 114 SCRA 267 (emphasis ours)

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surreptitiously added as palliative to the soon to be decimated

Quezon del Sur. It runs counter to the disposition of the real

property tax and all its incidents pursuant to Art SEC. 271 of the

Local Government Code:

Distribution of Proceeds. - The proceeds of the basic real property tax, including interest thereon, and proceeds from the use, lease or disposition, sale or redemption of property acquired at a public auction in accordance with the provisions of this Title by the province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area shall be distributed as follows:

 (a) In the case of provinces:

 (1) province - Thirty-five percent (35%) shall accrue to the general fund;

 (2) municipality - Forty percent (40%) to the general fund of the municipality where the property is located; and

 (3) barangay - Twenty-five percent (25%) shall accrue to the barangay where the property is located.

 (b) In the case of cities:

(1) city - Seventy percent (70%) shall accrue to the general fund of the city; and

 (2) Thirty percent (30%) shall be distributed among the component barangays of the cities where the property is located in the following manner:

 (i) Fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the barangay where the property is located;

 (ii) Fifty percent (50%) shall accrue equally to all component barangays of the city; and

 (c) In the case of a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area:

 (1) Metropolitan Manila Authority - Thirty-five percent (35%) shall accrue to the general fund of the authority;

 (2) municipality - Thirty-five percent (35%) shall accrue to the general fund of the municipality where the property is located;

 (3) barangays - Thirty percent (30%) shall be distributed among the component barangays of the municipality where the property is located in the following manner:

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 (i) Fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the barangay where the property is located;

 (ii) Fifty percent (50%) shall accrue equally to all component barangays of the municipality.

 (d) The share of each barangay shall be released, without need of any further action, directly to the barangay treasurer on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each quarter and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback for whatever purpose. (emphasis ours)

Real Property Tax is a tax imposed, assessed and collected

where the realty is situated (and of course enjoyed by the

collecting LGU to the exclusion of other LGUs). In other words,

R.A. 9495 seeks to make an exception that a newly created

province such as Quezon del Sur shall have a participatory benefit

from the real property taxes collected from another distinct and

independent province which is Quezon del Norte. This state of

affairs is clearly absurd, illogical and therefore unconstitutional.

All realty taxes in Quezon del Norte perforce accrue only to the

LGU as envisioned by R.A. 7160 and the jurisprudence that goes

with it. There is no such thing as participatory or joint

beneficiaries in land or real property taxes except the cities,

municipalities, or barangays within the same local government

unit. The clear purpose of Section 55 is to inveigle prospective

oppositors that the author thereof is bent on the preservation of

the status quo relative to the collection of real property tax

windfalls from the power behemoths located in Mauban and

Pagbilao. Regrettably, this is nowhere near the desired objective.

The legal ploy is constitutionally infirmed. The law provides no

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workable standard on how the gross real property taxes

collectible by the proposed Quezon del Norte from the power

generators located within its territory shall be proportionately

divided with its new neighbor, Quezon del Sur. Nothing was

further mentioned or specified on what administrative or

executive agency shall implement these peculiar, if not magical,

arrangements.

Non-publication for Unreasonable Period of Time

Remember that R.A. 9495 lapsed into law on September 7, 2007.

But RA 9495 has a fixed timetable. The bill lapsed into law on

September 7, 2007 without the signature of the President. The

law was already published in Volume 104, No. 16, April 21, 2008

issue of the Official Gazette, copy of the Certification issued by

the Bureau of Printing is hereto attached as ANNEX “G” hereof.

In its section 49 however, the law provides for the conduct of a

plebiscite “within sixty (60) days from the date of (its)

affectivity…or on the immediately succeeding national

elections whichever comes first.” Per Tañada v. Tuvera19, the

plebiscite should have been set on June 21, 2008, or sixty (60)

days from OG publication which of course came first because

there is no “succeeding national elections” between September 7,

2007 or April 21, 2008 and June 21, 2008. Even if RA 9495 does

not mention its publication in the Official Gazette, the Tañada

doctrine is deemed read in the statute. Eight months from

19 G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986

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becoming a law and no publication is done yet as the final step is

by all indications already unreasonable given the importance we

must accord on the final bilateral act of Congress and the

Executive. This Honorable Court is justified in striking the law as

unconstitutional on the strength of the doctrinal instructions of

TAÑADA.

RESOLUTIONS NOS. 8533, 8534, 8535, 8537, 8538 and 8539(ANNEXES “H”, “I”, “J”, “K”, “L”, and “M” hereof), ALL DATED NOVEMBER 12, 2008 WERE NOT PUBLISHED UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UP LAW CENTER

Under Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3 of the Administrative Code of

1987:

Filing. --- (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copes of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain or disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.

Resolution No 8537 declares and penalizes the following acts:

SECTION 2. Prohibitions. - During the plebiscite period commencing November 19, 2008 up to December 16, 2008.

(a)No person, including those possessing a permit to carry firearms outside of residence or place of business, shall bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places including all public buildings, streets, parks and private vehicle or public conveyances.For this purpose, “firearm” includes airgun, while “deadly weapons” includes hand grenade or other explosives, except pyrotechnics; while “deadly weapon” includes bladed instruments;The issuance of firearms licenses shall be suspended during the election period;

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(b)No member or officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), or any other law enforcement agency of the government, shall bear firearms outside of their respective barracks, garrisons, camps, offices or such other military or police installations;

(c) No candidate for public office, including incumbent officials seeking election to any public office or who are not seeking election, to employ, avail himself/herself/themselves of or engage the services of security personnel or bodyguards, whether or not such bodyguards is/are members or officers of the PNP, the AFP or any other law enforcement agency of the government, unless duly authorized by his/their commanders and granted exemption of the commission;

(d)No person shall act as security personnel or bodyguard of any candidate or to authorize or order such assignment;

(e)No member of security or police organization of government agencies, commissions, councils, bureaus, offices or government-owned or controlled corporations or privately-owned or operated security, investigate, protective or intelligence agencies, to bear firearms outside the immediate vicinity of his place of work; and

(f) No person to organize or maintain reaction forces strikes forces or any other similar forces.

Admittedly, these questioned Resolutions of the respondent

COMELEC were not yet filed with the UP Law Center much less

published in the National Administrative Register. In the case

of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs.

HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor

& Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the

PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION20, this

Honorable Supreme Court ruled:

Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

20 G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992 (emphasis ours)

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Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)

Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).

Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:

. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.)

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.)

For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.

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ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Petitioners replead, by reference, the foregoing allegations.

In Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals21, the Honorable

Supreme Court enumerated the requisites for an application for

the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the writ of

preliminary injunction, to wit:

“To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardship tips directly in its favor. The higher standard reflects judicial deference toward “legislation or regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes.” Moreover, an injunction will alter, rather than maintain, status quo, or will provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits. Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable relief and authority, in assessing whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all the equities of the situation, including the public interest. In litigations between governmental and private parties, courts go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of public interests than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved. Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardship.”

As clearly shown from the foregoing, the petitioners have an

actual and substantial interest over the resolution of this issue

21 429 SCRA 81, 102-103 (Emphasis supplied)

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because public monies are poised to be spent on clearly unlawful

purposes.

Moreover, the continuance of the Republic Act No. 9495 as a

law necessarily affect and will continue to affect the right of the

petitioners over public funds and cause irremediable injury and

injustice to the petitioners, unless its implementation is enjoined

by the Honorable Court (Section 3 (a) and (b), Rule 58, Revised

Rules of Court). There is an urgent necessity for the issuance of a

writ of preliminary injunction to prevent serious damage that is

caused and will be caused by Republic Act No. 9495. Unless

enjoined, the respondents will continue to enforce and implement

Republic Act No. 9495 - the constitutionality of which is in serious

question, conduct a costly plebiscite and render the outcome of

this case moot as any judgment that will be rendered herein will

be ineffectual (Section 3 (c), Rule 58).

As one Blogger aptly observed:

IMPLICATION OF DIVISION

Now that the bill cutting Quezon has finally become a law (GMA failed to sign it within the reglamentary period), we are now faced with the last hurdle of its implementation: the plebiscite. Once the people blindly vote for the division, we perpetually lose the physical, cultural, and psychological connect with the rest of Quezon. We lose the crown jewels including the head that adorns them.

Truth to tell, the proponents of this law failed to exert the minimum effort of notifying the sizeable sectors of the province. What was heard for the most part was the upside for the division. Nothing was heard for the downside. The proponent, while the bill was being railroaded in the Committee, was busy imagining the short haul political benefit for him and his family. What was heard was the litany of motherhood exhortations that the South must stand by its own feet, rely and develop its own resources, and enjoy the magnanimity of the Central government by way of

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the Internal Revenue Allotment. How about the local sources of revenue?

What can we boast in the South as its crown jewels?

Gumaca, with its century old water problem, is a transient town. It is the site of commercial banks and government agencies in the area. Despite the reign of an old political family there, nothing was done in the development of Gumaca, touted to be the Capital of Quezon del Sur. Its water system is the worst in the province. There was even an ordinance that proscribes taking care of pigeons. The reason is obvious. Doves with their droppings dirty the roofs that collect rain water! While Hondagua in Lopez is host to the Puyat Philippine Flour Mills, it has for the last twenty years operating in reduced capacity. PFM pays minuscule property tax to Lopez and provides employment to about 200 natives of the town. Catanauan in the Bondoc remains sleepy thanks to its sleepy and corrupt leadership.

Moreover, the proponent failed to see that the half of the IRA is for salaries and wages of a new bureaucracy for the new province. Assuming that one half of the P900M IRA goes to the South, or P450M, P225M of it goes to employees’ pay. Its 20% development fund is pegged at P90M or P45M for each district. We lose our availments from the RPT from the crown jewels, estimated at P1.25B annually, not to mention priority in landing a job where employment opportunities loom in the North. Why should we rely on the palliative Countrywide Development Fund of the Congressmen when we know that 50% of it goes where it shouldn’t go? Someone is looking at the multimillion peso budget for the construction of the new South Capitol Complex housing the new center for the newly minted province.

Most of us found ourselves holding a fait accompli for a law.

The act of division shall do injustice to South Quezon. There was no clinical or scientific neither an academic study made prior to floating the proposal. South Quezon needs North Quezon for unity of purpose. The North nourishes the South. South Quezon loses its physical and psychological connection with the North. By legislating territorial division it spells the economic petrifaction of its half.22

Republic Act No. 9495, and the accompanying Resolutions of

the respondent COMELEC, should be stricken down as

unconstitutional, capricious, and whimsical, and issued with grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

22 katataspulong ng Quezon Province, http://www.sonnypulgar.com/no-to-quezon-division/

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There is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, adequate remedy

in the ordinary course of law.

Petitioners are entitled to the relief prayed for and part of

such relief consists in enjoining and restraining the respondents

from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 9495 and from

conducting any further proceedings on the execution of the said

law.

Petitioners are entitled to the relief prayed for and part of

such relief consists in ordering the respondents, their attorneys,

representatives, agents and any other person assisting them or

acting for and on their behalf;

a. to refrain or desist from enforcing or implementing the

Republic Act No. 9495 and Resolution Nos. 8533, 8534, 8535,

8537, 8538 and 8539; and

b. to refrain from conducting any further proceedings with

respect to the allotment, disbursement, and disposition of funds

relative to the conduct of an alleged plebiscite soon after the

statutes’ effectivity, pending the resolution of this case.

These manifestly capricious and whimsical acts, unless

enjoined during the pendency of the instant petition, will certainly

work injustice to petitioners, and will render any decision herein

moot and ineffective.

Petitioners shall suffer grave and irreparable injury unless

this Honorable Court enjoins, through a restraining order, and

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thereafter, through a writ of preliminary injunction, the

respondents, their attorneys, representatives, agents and any

other person assisting them or acting for and on their behalf, from

proceeding with the implementation of Republic Act No. 9495 that

would cause injustice to them.

Petitioners are ready, willing and able to post a bond in favor

of the respondents in such amount as the Honorable Court may

fix to answer for any and all damages which the respondents may

suffer or sustain by reason of the issuance of a temporary

restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, should the

Honorable Court remotely finally decide that petitioners are not

entitled thereto.

MOTION TO SET CASE FOR EN BANC

Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

“(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.”

Section 4 of the Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.

2-89, as amended, provides, viz:

“4. At any time after a Division takes cognizance of a case and before a judgment or resolution therein rendered becomes final and executory, the Division may refer the case en consulta to the Court en banc which, after consideration of the reasons of the Division for such referral, may return the

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case to the Division or accept the case for decision or resolution.”

The instant case involves the constitutionality of Republic

Act No. 9495 and the issues involved are novel and pure

questions of law. Petitioners moves for the elevation of this case

to the Court en banc.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed

that the instant petition be given due course, and pending

consideration thereof, for reasons of extreme urgency, this

Honorable Court immediately issue a temporary restraining order,

on such bond as this Honorable Court may require, ordering the

respondents, their attorneys, representatives, agents and any

other person assisting them or acting for and on their behalf to

ENJOIN, FORBID, AND RESTRAIN the respondents from

conducting the plebiscite in Quezon Province for the ratification of

the creation of the Province of Quezon del Sur on December 13,

2008, and to:

a. refrain or desist from enforcing or implementing

Republic Act No. 9495 and the following Resolutions illegally

issued by the respondent COMELEC, to wit:

Resolution No. 8533 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF THE PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR, PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED SEPTEMBER 07, 2007, WHICH SHALL BE COMPOSED OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF: AGDANGAN, BUENAVISTA, CATANAUAN, GENERAL LUNA, MACALELON, MULANAY, PADRE BURGOS, PITOGO, SAN ANDRES, SAN FRANCISCO, SAN NARCISO, UNISAN, ALABAT, ATIMONAN, CALAUAG, GUINYANGAN, GUMACA, LOPEZ, PEREZ, PLARIDEL,

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QUEZON AND TAGKAWAYAN; AND THE REMAINING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE OF QUEZON TO KNOWN AS QUEZON DEL NORTE, WHICH SHALL BE COMPOSED OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF BURDEOS, GENERAL NAKAR, INFANTA, JOMALIG, LUCBAN, MAUBAN, PAGBILAO, PANUKULAN, PATNANUNGAN, POLILIO, REAL, SAMPALOC, CANDELARIA, DOLORES, SAN ANTONIO, SARIAYA, TIAONG AND THE CITIES OF LUCENA AND TAYABAS, TO BE CONDUCTED ON DECEMBER 13, 2008.”

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

Resolution No. 8534 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “CALENDAR OF ACTIVITIES AND PERIODS OF PROHIBITED ACTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECEMBER 13, 2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED SEPTEMBER 07, 2007.”

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

Resolution No. 8535 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “IN THE MATTER OF DEPUTIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE CONDUCT OF THE DECEMBER 13, 2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED SEPTEMBER 7, 2007.”

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

Resolution No. 8537 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “RULES AND REGULATIONS ON : (A) BEARING, CARRYING OR TRANSPORTING FIREARMS OR OTHER DEADLY WEAPONS; (B) SECURITY PERSONNEL OR BODYGUARDS; (C) BEARING ARMS BY ANY MEMBER OF SECURITY OR POLICE ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATION (D) ORGANIZATION OR MAINTENANCE OF REACTION FORCES DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIOD IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECEMBER 13, 2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED SEPTEMBER 7, 2007.”

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

Resolution No. 8538 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “RULES ON THE LIQUOR BAN IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECEMBER 13, 2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495 DATED SEPTEMBER 7, 2007.”

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xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

Resolution No. 8539 dated November 12, 2008 entitled “AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO APPOINT, FILL-UP POSITIONS AND TRANSFER OR REASSIGN ITS PERSONNEL IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECEMBER 13, 2008 PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF QUEZON DEL SUR AND THE RENAMING OF THE MOTHER PROVINCE INTO QUEZON DEL NORTE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9495.”; and

b. refrain from conducting any further proceedings with

respect to the actual and substantial interest over the resolution

of this issue because public monies are poised to be spent on

clearly unlawful purposes pending the resolution of this case.

After due consideration of petitioners’ application for a writ

of preliminary injunction, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of

preliminary injunction be issued on such bond as this Honorable

Court may require, ordering the respondents, their attorneys,

representatives, agents and any other person assisting them or

acting for and on their behalf: to refrain or desist from enforcing

or implementing Republic Act No. 9495; and to refrain from

conducting any further proceedings with respect to proceedings

with respect to the actual and substantial interest over the

resolution of this issue because public monies are poised to be

spent on clearly unlawful purposes pending the resolution of this

case pending the resolution of this case. After due consideration

of the instant petition, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of

certiorari be issued setting aside as unconstitutional, null and void

Republic Act No. 9495, and making final the writ of preliminary

injunction perpetually restraining the respondents, their

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attorneys, representatives, agents and any other person assisting

them or acting for and on their behalf, to refrain or desist from

enforcing or implementing Republic Act No. 9495; and to refrain

from conducting any further proceedings with respect to

disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners likewise pray that after deliberation, the Division

taking cognizance of this case, refer the same en consulta to the

Court en banc.

Other reliefs, just and equitable are likewise prayed for.

Makati City for Manila City. November 14, 2008.

ESCOBIDO AND PULGAR LAW OFFICES2nd Floor, Africa Bldg.,

#2041 Edison cor. Aragon Sts., Brgy. San Isidro,

Makati City, Metro ManilaTelefax Nos.: 887-3120/887-3121

Website : katataspulong.blogspot.comE-mail : [email protected]

By :

CELSO O. ESCOBIDORoll of Attorneys No. 23974

IBP No.: 738978/01-17-2008/Quezon CityPTR No.: 9878790/01-17-2008/Quezon City

V E R I F I C A T I O N / C E R T I F I C A T I O N

WE, FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, of legal age, Filipino, with postal address at Sitio Paang Bundok, Brgy. 5, Calauag, Quezon and HOBART DEVEZA DATOR, JR., of legal age, Filipino, postal address at Lucban, Quezon, subscribing under oath, hereby depose and state, THAT:

1. We are the Petitioners in the above-entitled case;

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2. We have caused the preparation of the foregoing Petition, read the contents thereof, and the allegations whereof are true and correct of our knowledge and belief;

3. We have not commenced any other petition or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof or any other tribunal or agency;

4. To the best of my knowledge, no similar Petition is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal agency;

5. If we should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before said courts or tribunal, we hereby undertake to promptly inform this Honorable Court of that fact within five (5) days therefrom.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have affixed our signature this ___ day of ___________, 2008 in ___________________.

FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR HOBART DEVEZA DATOR, JR. Affiant Affiant Comm. Tax Cert. No. _________________ Comm. Tax Cert. No. _________________ Issued on _________________ Issued on _________________ Issued at _________________ Issued at _________________

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ___ day of May, 2008 at the City of Makati, Metro Manila, affiant:

is personally known to the notary public;

identified by notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by

Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, thru the ff:

Driver’s License No.

____________SSS ID No. _________________

GSIS ID No. _________________

TIN ID No. _________________

Passport No. _______________

Company I.D.

________________

Com. Tax Cert. No.

__________ issued on ___________ issued at _______________.

Doc. No. _______;Page No. _______;Book No._______;Series of 2008.

cc:OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL134 Amorsolo St. Legaspi Village, Makati City

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THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARYHon. Eduardo R. ErmitaRoom 234, Mabini Hall, Malacañang Palace, Manila.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)Intramuros, Manila

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENTMalacañang PalaceJP Laurel Street, San Miguel, Manila NCR 1005

Republic of the Philippines )C i t y o f M a k a t i ) s.s.x ---------------------------------------------------- x

A F F I D A V I T O F S E R V I C E

I, JOMEL A. VALLES, as Liaison Officer of Escobido and Pulgar Law Offices with office address at 2/F, Africa Building, #2041 Edison corner Aragon Streets, San Isidro, Makati City, Metro Manila, subscribing under oath hereby depose and state, THAT:

That on _____________________, I served a copy of the following pleading/paper.

Nature of Pleading

PETITION

in SC G.R SP. No. ____________ entitled FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR and HOBART DATOR, JR. -versus- SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, pursuant to section 3, 4, 5 and 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

By Personal Service Mail to: By Registered Mail ServiceSUPREME COURT under Registry Receipt No. ____________City of Manila On ______________ at ____________ To :

By Registered Mail Service By Registered Mail Serviceunder Registry Receipt No. ____________ under Registry Receipt No. ____________On ______________ at ____________ To : On ______________ at ____________ To :THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERALHon. Eduardo R. Ermita 134 Amorsolo St. Legaspi Village, Makati CityRoom 234, Mabini Hall, Malacañang Palace, Manila.

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By Registered Mail Service By Registered Mail Serviceunder Registry Receipt No. ____________ under Registry Receipt No. ____________On ______________ at ____________ To : On ______________ at ____________ To :COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND Intramuros, Manila MANAGEMENT

Malacañang PalaceJP Laurel Street, San Miguel, Manila NCR

1005

____________________. Makati City, Philippines.

JOMEL A. VALLES Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ___th day of ___________, 2008 at the City of Makati, Metro Manila, affiant:

is personally known to the notary public;

was identified by notary public through Competent Evidence of Identity as

defined by Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, thru the presentation/production of the ff:

Driver’s License No.

_____________SSS ID No. 33-4522830-8

GSIS ID No. _________________

TIN ID No. _________________

Passport No. _______________

Company I.D.

________________

Com. Tax Cert. No.

13774922 issued on January 4, 2008 issued at Del Gallego, Camarines Sur.

Doc. No. _______;Page No. _______;Book No._______;Series of 2008.

FRUMENCIO E. PULGARNotary Public

Until December 31, 2008PTR No. 0997846

issued on January 10, 2008at Makati City Metro Manila

TIN No. 106201485