SUPREME COURT OF OHIO MARCIA J NIEIUGEL, CLERK JUN …supremecourt.ohio.gov/pdf_viewer/pdf_viewer.aspx?pdf=598178.pdf · Telephone: (419) 578-9246 Facsimile: (419) 531-5675 E-mail:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Jean-Paul Lemerand, Case No. 2007-0686

Appellant, ) On Appeal from the WoodCounty Court of Appeals,

-vs- ) Sixth Appellate District

Michelle L. Mast, ) Court of AppealsCase Nos. WD-06-040

Appellee. ) WD-06-051

EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY

Jeffrey P. Nunnari (0059691) (COUNSEL OF RECORD)3349 Executive ParkwaySuite DToledo, Ohio 43606Telephone: (419) 578-9246Facsimile: (419) 531-5675E-mail: [email protected]

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, JEAN-PAUL LEMERAND

Now comes Appellant, by and through counsel, who hereby movcs the court for an

emergency order to stay the underlying proceedings pending this court's determinafion as to

whether it will accept jurisdiction in this cause. A memorandum of law in support is attached

hereto and is incorporated by reference herein. ^ n n ^ D

JUN 112007

MARCIA J NIEIUGEL, CLERKSUPREME COURT OF OHIO

MEMORANDUM

The underlying proceedings giving rise to this appeal are ongoing. In fact, the

heduled tn oo to_triaLon-Iune26,2007_Appellant previousLysaughta_stayin-tlus

court of the lower court's proceedings, but that request was denied by way of an Entry filed in

this case on May 16, 2007. At the time that Appellant initially sought a stay, the parties'

jurisdictional memoranda had not been filed. The jurisdictional memoranda are now of record

with the court. For the reasons stated in Appellant's original motion seeking a stay, and for the

reasons stated in Appellant's Memorandum in Support ofJurisdiction, the pertinent parts of

which are appended hereto and incorporated by reference herein, Appellant respectfully urges

this court to grant a stay of the trial court proceedings pending this court's determination

whether it will accept jurisdiction in this cause.

YVherefore, Appellant hereby movcs the court for an emergency order to stay the

underlying proceedings pending this court's determination as to whether it will accept

jurisdiction in this cause.

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was duly served upon Patricia J.Kleeberger, Esq., 4052 Holland-Sylvania Road, Toledo, Ohio 43623; Donna Engwert-Loyd,Esq., 608 Madison Avenue, Suite 1400, Toledo, Ohio 43604; and upon Megan E. Newlove,Esq., 131 E. Court Street, Bowling Green, Ohio 43402, by ordinary U.S. Mail on this 8th day ofJune, 2007.

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APPENDIX

EXPLANATION AS TO WHY THIS CASE INVOLVES

A MATTER OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST AND WHY LEAVE TOAPPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED

According to the latest available statistics, there were 54.2 divorces per 100 marriages

in Ohio in 2005. Of these, the number of divorces involving minor children was 19,324, or

fully 47.8% of the total number of divorces granted. The total number of children affected by

divorce in Ohio in 2005 was 33,548. ' According to the latest U.S. Census Bureau statistics, the

number of minor children living with one parent nationally was 18,472,000. Z The Centers for

Disease Control report that the number of children born to unmarried women in 2004 was

approximately 1.5 million, or 36% of all births in that year. 3 In Ohio in 2005, that number was

56,755 or 39% of all births in the state.4 The number of parent-child relationships judicially

established in Ohio exceeded 50,000 for each of the State Fiscal Years from 2001 to 2005.

From these figures, it is easy to recognize that there are a substantial number of children

nationally and in Ohio who do not live within a "traditional family household."

It goes without saying that married parents routinely make decisions affecting the best

interest of their children on a daily basis. These choices include where the child lives, where the

child attends school, what activities the child may participate in, and people with whom the

child may or may not associate, to name a few. The great majority of parental decisions made

' Ohio Dept. of Health, Center for Vital and Health Statistics, Marriage and Divorce Rates and Other SelectedStatistics, by County, Ohio, 2005.2 United States Census Bureau, 2001 Survey of Income and Progam Participafion, Wave 2(Internet Release date:2005).

Centers for Disease Control, National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 55, No. 1(Sep. 29, 2006), Table 18.Ohio Dept. Health, Center for Vital and Health Statistics, Vital Statistics Annual County Birth Summary, 2005.Ohio Dept. of Job and Family Services (http://jfs.ohio.gov/Ocs/OCSPatemity2005.pdt).

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by married parents are made free from governmental interference. Only when the parents'

behaviors place the child at risk of being abused, neglected, or dependent may the state

intervene and take protective measures. The same generally cannot be said of parents who are

divorcing, are divorced, or who never wed. For the vast majority of these parents, judicial

oversight of their parenting plays a role at one point or another. For the unwed parent, judicial

sanction is required for those who establish the parent-child relationship and seek

companionship of their child. For divorcing parents, judicial approval of custody arrangements

and parenting time is required as a part of the divorce process. Unfortunately, this is oftentimes

necessary given that parents under some circumstances do not always act in their children's

best interests due to their inability to put the interests of their children ahead of their own

personal agendas when litigation is pending. Needless to say, therefore, there are circumstances

where judicial intervention is appropriate and necessary in all three contexts: marriage, divorce,

and out-of-wedlock births. But the question becomes, how much intervention is necessary, and

when?

It is beyond question that the resources of the juvenile and domestic relations court

systems in Ohio are stretched to their limits. Moreover, the courts are ill-equipped to make the

best decisions for all children in every case. There will always be situations where parents

whose circumstances bring them within the jurisdiction of the family courts cannot agree as to

the parenting arrangements for their children. In these cases, it is necessary for the court to

make such determinations for them. But what about those parents who are able to reach

agreements concerning their children? Are their agreements subject to modification or rejection

by the court in every case, merely because the judge might have a different idea as to what is in

their child's best interests? Under this state's current jurisprudence, the answer is "yes." But are

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not these agreements worthy of the same respect and deference accorded to agreements of

married parents, so long as they pose no harm to the child? It is an untoward circumstance for

many a parent to have a complete stranger (the judge) dictate to them how their child will be

raised. These judges (and strangers to the family they truly are) are human beings whose

backgrounds, and political, social, and religious beliefs may differ vastly from any one

individual at any given time, and in all probability differ in some important respect or respects

to a vast number of parents who come before him or her on any given day. What is it that

makes the judge's assessment as to how a child should be raised superior to that of the

"average" parent's? This is a legitimate question, as judges, after all, are simply human, and

despite of alI their training, experience, and education, are not always capable of knowing what

is best for all children in all circumstances.

In most situations, it is the child's parents who know the child best. The actively

involved parent has devoted considerable time, love, and energy imparting values to his or her

child and teaching right from wrong. The fit parent is in the best position to irnow what is in his

or her child's best interests. And all parents have the right to raise and nurture their children in

a way that reflects the parents' social, religious, political, and other values in the manner in

which they choose, so long as no harm to the child results. Moreover, the public policy of this

state is for the most part congruent with these principles. Yet there remains dominant in the

legislation and common law by which the family courts operate the notion that they, and they

alone, are vested with the ultimate wisdom and authority to determine what is in a child's best

interests. While judicial oversight of all matters of life is an unfortunate necessity, there are

limits - both practical and legal - which restrict the power of the courts to act in certain

circumstances. Both federal and Ohio constitutional jurisprudence consistently recognize the

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sanctity of the home and the family. But there is a certain tendency in matters pertaining to

parental rights and responsibilities for the courts to intervene in what would otherwise be a

private matter when no intervention is necessary, and to force upon parents judgments - both

moral and legal - as to what a judge believes is in a child's best interests or, as in this case, to

completely ignore agreements reached by fit parents and to assume the role of ultimate arbiter

as to what is in a child's best interests.

This case presents the court with the unique opportunity to re-evaluate the

implementation of Ohio's statutory scheme regulating parental rights and responsibilities in

light of the reality of the demographics of today's society. It presents the court with an

opportunity to balance the family court judge's power as parens patriae against the privacy

rights of parents 5 to raise one's child in a manner they deem appropriate. It also presents the

court with the opporhmity to re-examine the ramifications of its previous holding in Kelm v.

Kelm (2001), 92 Ohio St. 3d 223, in light of the principles enunciated by the United States

Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), and in the context of a situation

where the trial and appellate courts refused to enforce a previously judicially-sanctioned

agreement between the unwed parents of a child - an agreement that both parents and the

child's guardian ad litem deemed to be in the child's best interests.

Accordingly, this court should grant jurisdiction to hear this case so that it may pass

upon the extent to which divorcing, divorced, and unmarried parents have the right to make

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children free from governmental

interference, and to speak to the appropriateness as to when, and to what degree, a court may

intervene when problems arise within the context of such agreements.

6 It is presumed throughout that "the parents" to whom reference is made herein are fit parents capable of makingdecisions in their children's best interests.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Alexandria Lemerand ("Alex") was borm as issue of Appellant Jean-Paul Lemerand

("Jean-Paul") and Appellee Michelle Mast ("Michelle") on December 4, 1992. Jean-Paul and

Michelle never wed. Jean-Paul officially established his parentage of Alex by way of an

administrative order of paternity on March 7, 1994. The Wood County Court of Connnon

Pleas, Juvenile Division, issued a judicial order adopting the administrative determination on

June 22, 1994. Jean-Paul and Michelle later entered into a Consent Judgment Entry for

Visitation and Companionship on July 29, 1994. The entry reserved to the Wood County

Juvenile Court continuing jurisdiction concerning all matters affecting Alex's best interests.

On May 15, 2000 Michelle filed in the juvenile court a Notice ofIntent to Relocate and

Praectpe for Service. Michelle, now married, sought to move with Alex to the Czech Republic,

where her husband had obtained ajob assignment. Jean-Paul sought a preliminary injunction

preventing the child's move and also filed a motion requesting a change of custody. The

juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem on behalf of Alex. Jean-Paul and Michelle

subsequently entered into an in-court settlement agreement on August 1, 2000 resolving all

matters at issue. The agreement, which was read into the record, permitted Michelle to move to

the Czech Republic with Alex for a period of three years, ' in consideration that after the

expiration of Michelle's husband's job assignment, Michelle would return to the Toledo, Ohio

area and establish the child's permanent residence there until the age of majority. 8 The parties

and their counsel all indicated their assent to the agreement, as did the guardian ad litem. 9 The

juvenile court magistrate presiding over the proceedings approved the agreement, finding it to

'Michelle's husband's job assignment was a temporary one." The specific geographic area agreed to was defined by reference to major higbways and thoroughfares, includingareas in the State of Michigan, but essentially involved an area within a 70-mile radius of Jean-Paul's residence.' The guardian ad litem did not actually attend the hearing, but she was aware of the parties' agreement and hadindicated to them her belief that it was in Alex's best interests.

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be in Alex's best interests. A Judgment Entry purportedly memorializing the agreement was

entered on September 12, 2000. The entry once again reserved to the Wood County Juvenile

Court continuing jurisdiction concerning all matters affecting Alex's best interests.

In the late summer of 2005, Michelle mailed Jean-Paul a letter indicating her immediate

intent to move with Alex to the State of Wisconsin. Michelle's husband, weary of his position

in the automotive industry in Detroit, opted to seek other employment, and found a position to

his liking in Racine, Wisconsin. Michelle and her husband decided to relocate the family to

Racine, in spite of Michelle's previous agreement to not move Alex's residence outside of the

previously-agreed upon geographic area. Jean-Paul responded by seeking and obtaining a

preliminary injunction preventing the child's removal, and once again moved for a change of

custody. Soon thereafter, it came to Jean-Paul's attention that the Judgment Entry of September

12, 2000 failed to indicate that Alex's relocation to the Toledo area upon her return from the

Czech Republic would be permanent in nature. A transcript of the in-court proceedings had on

August 1, 2000 was ordered, and it indicates that this was in fact the parties' intent and their

specific agreement. Jean-Paul thereafter moved the court to journalize a nunc pro tunc

judgment entry, which was identical in all respects to the September 12, 2000 Judgment Entry,

save for the insertion of the word "permanent" with respect to the description of the area of

Alex's residence upon her return from the Czech Republic. Michelle opposed the entry, and

Jean-Paul filed a separate action seeking a declaratory judgment that the terms of the parties'

in-court settlement agreement precluded the child's relocation to Wisconsin. In separate orders,

the juvenile court dismissed the declaratory judgment action, and refused to adopt the proposed

nunc pro tunc judgment entry, to indicating that since both vehicles would preclude the court's

'0 Jean-Paut filed a motion for relief from the September 12, 2000 judgment entry after the trial court refused toadopt the proposed nunc pro tunc entry. The trial court denied this motion, as well.

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ability to determine whether the intended move to Wisconsin was in Alex's best interest, they

were counter to public policy. The court thereby eviscerated the intent of the in-court

settlement agreement reached in August, 2000 and placed both parties in the position of having

to litigate a matter that - from Jean-Paul's perspective, at least - had been already settled.

Jean-Paul took appeals from both entries, which were consolidated for purposes of

resolution. The Sixth District Court of Appeals for Wood County affirmed the judgments of the

trial court, stating, "We concur [that the declaratory judgment action would not terminate the

controversy between the parties] ... but go farther, concluding that any contractual

arrangement which would restrain or otherwise inhibit the court's nondelegable duty to

determine that which is in a child's best interest is antithetical to public policy and is resultantly

unenforceable.".Iean-Paul L. v. Michelle M., 2007-Ohio-1042, ¶ 21. Having so found, the

appellate court determined that the issue concerning Jean-Paul's attempt to seek relief from the

September 12, 2000 Judgment Entry was moot.

Jean-Paul now seeks to avail himself of the discretionary authority of this court to

review his case in particular, and to address the far-reaching implications of the appellate

court's holding in this matter of public and great interest in general.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITION OF LAW

Proposition of Law: Divorcing, divorced and unwed parents have the same rightsto enter into agreements concerning the nurturing, care, and raising of theirchildren, free from state interference, as parents who remain married; whenconsidering the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, the court mustgive deference to any agreement reached between parents concerning the care,custody, and control of their children, so long as their children are not put at riskof physical, emotional, or psychological harm as a result of their agreement. (R.C.3109.04, R.C. 3109.051, U.S. Const. Amends. One, Fourteen, construed.)

The right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is an interest of

constitutional dimension arising from the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States

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Constitution. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society ofSisters, 268 U.S.

510 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645

(1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978);

Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The due

process clause of the fourteenth amendment contains a substantive component that protects the

fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of

their children. Washington v. Glucksberg; 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997); Troxel v. Granville, 530

U.S. 57, 66 (2000). "[T]he Due Process clause does not permit a State to infringe on the

fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge

believes a`better' decision could be made." Troxel, 530 U.S., at 72-73. By the same token,

"[t]he constitutional protection against arbitrary state interference with parental rights should

not be extended to prevent the States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of

parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of the child." Id., at

89 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Short of preventing harm to a child, therefore, it is impermissible

for a court to justify its intrusion into a parent's exercise of his or her fundamental rights to

raise a child as he or she sees (or they see) fit solely on the basis that a judge may make a

different decision under a "best interest of the child" standard. In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 20,

969 P.2d 21, 30 (1998).

In the case at bar, Jean-Paul and Michelle reached an agreement concerning Alex's

residential arrangements which they and Alex's guardian ad litem determined to be in her best

interests. The court sanctioned their agreement and also found it to be in Alex's best interests.

But for a clerical error in the transcribing of the agreement into judgment entry form, their

actual agreement would have been entered of record on the journal of the court_ Whether this

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litigation would have ensued in that event is anyone's guess. It is clear, however, that the

omission of the word "permanent" from the judgment entry in question has spawned

considerable litigation between Alex's parents, litigation which has cuhninated in bringing the

issue of the rights of unwed parents to enter into agreements with respect to their children vis-a-

vis a family court's power to decide what is in a child's best interests squarely before this court

for its resolution. The trial and appellate courts both held that parents cannot usurp the family

court's "nondelegable" duty to determine what is in a child's best interests by any form of

agreement. In other words, the lower courts are of the opinion that the family court judge alone,

as a stranger to the family, has the ultimate wisdom and authority to decide what is in a child's

best interests, any agreement by the child's parents which may differ notwithstanding. This is

an impermissible infringement on the constitutional rights of parents to raise their children in

the manner that they choose.

Jean-Paul concedes the fact that the constitutional issues herein raised were not

explicitly before the courts below; however, the appellate court's exercise of its judicial

prerogative to interpret and uphold the public policy of this state implicates the serious

constitutional questions presented by this appeal. Had the appellate court not gone as far as it

did in its holding, this case would not be before this court. But when the court of appeals

decided to "go farther" and hold that any agreement between parents which affects the best

interest of children is antithetical to public policy, a line was crossed. Accordingly, the issues

raised herein are properly before this court for review.

Although arising in a different context, the issues in this case are remarkably similar to

those passed upon by the United States Supreme Court in Troxel. At issue in that case was the

""[A]ny contractual arrangement which would restrain or otherwise inhibit the court's nondelegable duty todetermine that which is in a child's best interest is antithetical to public policy and is resultantly unenforceable."Jean-PaulL. v. Michelle M, 2007-Ohio-1042, ¶ 21.

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constitutionality of the State of Washington's third-party visitation statute. The statute

permitted "any person" to petition a court "at any time" for visitation of a child. The Supreme

Court struck down the statute on constitutional grounds for the reason that it failed to accord

any deference to a parent's decision as to what was in her child's best interests. The Supreme

Court did not find it constitutionally offensive that the court intervened into the private realm of

the family; rather, what the court found offensive was the fact that the Washington trial court

gave no special weight to the child's mother's determination of what was in her daughter's best

interests. Likewise, in this case, the court did not accord any deference to the parties' prior

agreement as to what was in Alex's best interests. But this case is even more egregious, in that

not only did the lower courts fail to accord any special weight to the parties' prior

determination of what was in their child's best interests, they came to the conclusion that

Alex's parents (and all parents) have no right to enter into any such agreements at all!

Essentially, then, the lower courts are of the opinion that trial judges - and only trial judges -

are capable of determining what is in a child's best interests.

It is of course the case that many a judge will approve an agreement reached by parents

concerning the care, custody, and control of their children without any overt amount of

scrutiny. However, it is also the case that a trial judge may, can - and in this case, will - wholly

reject an otherwise reasonable agreement reached by unquestionably fit parents. To be sure, the

laws of this state and the precedent of this court mandate this approach, while at the same time

hinting at the recognition of the principles urged by Jean-Paul herein. For example, R.C.

3109.04(D)(1)(a)(i) states: "If both parents jointly make [a request for shared parenting] in their

pleadings or jointly file a motion and also jointly file the plan, the court shall review the

parents' plan to determine if it is in the best interest of the children. If the court determines that

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the plan is in the best interest of the children, the court shall approve it. .."(Emphasis added.)

Thus, while the foregoing statutory provision allows for the input of parents to suggest what

they believe to be in their child's best interest, the final determination and authority to approve

any such suggestion rests solely with the judge. It is only after the parents' suggestion (which

in reality is their mutual agreement in this scenario) meets with the judge's approval that the

judge is mandated to approve it. So, as the statute at issue in Troxel, R.C. 3109.04 accords no

special weight to parents' determinations as to what is in their child's best interests insofar as

shared parenting is concerned, even when the parents are in agreement. Similarly, when there is

no agreed upon plan for shared parenting, the statute again instructs the court to consider "the

wishes of the child's parents regarding the child's care," (R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a)), but that factor

is but one of many the court is required to consider, and the statute does not (nor does the case

law of this court) require the irial court to accord the parents' wishes any special weight. The

same holds true with respect to post-decree determinations of parenting time and third-party

parenting requests made pursuant to R.C. 3109.051.

It is time for this court to revisit its holding in Kelm v. Kelm (2001), 92 Ohio St. 3d 223

in light of the foregoing concems, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in

Troxel, and in light of the realities presented by the demographics of today's society. In Kelm,

this court held that the issues of child custody and parental visitation are not subject to

arbitration. 12 In reaching this conclusion, this court stated, "It stands to reason that `[i]f parents

cannot bind the court by an agreement affecting the interests of their children, they cannot bind

the court by agreeing to let someone else, an arbitrator, make such a decision for them."' 92

Ohio St. 3d, at 226-227, quoting Kovacs v. Kovacs (1993), 98 Md. App. 289, 300. While Jean-

12 Chief Justice Moyer confined his concurrence in the result to arbitration, but left open the possibility ofaccording deference to agrecments reached through mediation.

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Paul is not championing arbitration, 13 he is advocating the cause of parental autonomy. The

foregoing pronouncement defeats both. Moreover, it presupposes that fit parents are simply

incapable of making decisions respecting their children's best interests based solely on their

marital status. Certainly, married parents do not always readily agree on every matter

concerning their children's best interests. This is common knowledge. Yet, the mere fact that

married parents may not agree on a matter affecting their child's best interests in no way

authorizes the state to intervene and act as the ultimate arbiter. And, in the happy circumstance

where married parents do agree on such matters, they can at least rest assured that there will not

be a stranger to the family measuring their agreements against his or her subjective assessment

of what may be in their children's best interests.

To reiterate, Jean-Paul is not advocating the abolishment of judicial oversight in cases

such as his. But what he is advocating is a voice - his voice, and the voices of others like him -

who but for random circumstance fmd themselves to be a co-parent of a child with someone to

whom he is not married. Such a circumstance should not subject him, nor others like him, to

"second-class citizen" status as concerns the right to make decisions concerning the upbringing

of his child.

Whatever the practical effect of what the lower courts may do in this case as it concerns

the ultimate disposition of Jean-Paul's dispute with Michelle should this court accept

jurisdiction and reverse the judgment below, is a question reasonably asked. However, that is a

question left for another day. Whatever the trial court, and perhaps the appellate court, may

nevertheless determine to be in Alex's best interests insofar as Michelle's proposed move to

Wisconsin is concemed, is not the fulcrum on which this case pivots. The real question is, is

* It is interesting to note, however, that Michigan statutorily authorized child-custody and visitation arbitration ina 2000 legislative enactment (M.C.L. 600.5070, et seq.).

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Jean-Paul's and Michelle's former agreement entitled to recognition? This question then begs

the further questions posed in this appeal. And the practical effect of a determination by this

court on what then happens in the lower courts in Alex's case becomes very real indeed. For if

this court were to determine that Alex's parents' agreement is cognizable at law, then a very

real issue presents itself to the trial court as to how it must proceed. For instance, instead of

analyzing whether moving to Wisconsin is in Alex's best interests, the question most likely

becomes, "Is the enforcement/continuation of the parties' agreement no longer in Alex's best

interests?" This is not a distinction without a difference, as in the latter circumstance it would

be incumbent upon Michelle to demonstrate that the continuation of her agreement with Jean-

Paul - an agreement that she now seeks to unilaterally repudiate due to no fault of Jean-Paul or

Alex - would be detrimental to Alex's well-being. Moreover, it properly focuses the inquiry on

what is indeed in Alex's best interests, not on what is in Michelle's interests as a result of her

decision to violate her agreement with Jean-Paul based on the whims of her husband.

Realistically, Michelle has made Alex's best interests entirely dependent on what is in her own

interests without any showing that what she once decided was in Alex's best interests is no

longer. Such sabotage to Alex's relationship with her father and gamesmanship wherein a child

is a pawn should not be countenanced.

CONCLUSION

Parents may divorce each other, but that does not mean that they divorce their children.

Likewise, simply because parents may never wed does not mean that they do not desire a

relationship with their children, or that their relationships with them are somehow inferior to

that of married parents and their children. The realities of the demographics of today's society

leave no doubt that there are vast numbers of parents who are not married to their co-parents.

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This fact alone is not in any way indicative that their parenting skills are somehow inferior to

the parenting skills of married parents, or that the decisions of heterosexual married partners

should be accorded more deference to the decisions made by any other types of parents. 14

Given this, there really is no compelling state interest to place in the hands of judges the

ultimate authority to determine what is in a child's best interests based solely on the marital

status of her parents, without first mandating that the judge give due deference to the wishes

and concerns of her parents. Ohio's current approach to matters of child custody and visitation

is not only demeaning and patronizing to otherwise fit parents who for whatever reason are

not/no longer married to their co-parents, it is offensive to the fundamental rights of parents to

make decisions regarding the nurturing, care, and upbringing of their children, and it violates

those parents' rights of substantive due process.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Jean-Paul Lemerand respectfully requests this

court to accept jurisdiction in this case so that the important constitutional and statutory

issues herein raised can be reviewed on the merits in this matter of public and great

general interest.

"Consider this court's holding in In re Bonfield (2002), 97 Ohio St. 3d 387.

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