Super Boethium De Trinitate
Super Boethium De Trinitate
byThomas Aquinas
Questions 1-4, translated by Rose E. Brennan, S.H.N. (Herder,
1946) Questions 5-6, translated by Armand Mauer (Toronto, 1953)
CONTENTS
ST. THOMAS' INTRODUCTION BOETHIUS' PREFACE
St. Thomas' CommentaryQUESTION I: Concerning the knowledge of
divine things
1. Whether the Human Mind in Order to Attain to a Knowledge of
Truth Requires a New Illumination of Divine Light
2. Whether the Human Mind Can Arrive at an Idea of God
3. Whether God Is the First Object Known by the Mind
4. Whether the Human Mind Is Capable of Arriving at a Knowledge
of the Divine Trinity Through Natural ReasonQUESTION II: Concerning
the manifestation of knowledge of divine truth
1. Whether Divine Truths Ought to Be Treated of by the Method of
Inquiry
2. Whether There Can Be Any Science of Divine Truths Which Are
Matters of Faith
3. Whether in the Science of Faith, Which Is Concerning God, it
Is Permissible to Use the Rational Arguments of the Natural
Philosophers
4. Whether Divine Truths Ought to Be Concealed by New and
Obscure WordsLECTIO 1
1. Boethius' Text
2. St. Thomas' CommentaryQUESTION III: Concerning Those Things
That Pertain to the Knowledge Possessed by Faith
1. Whether Faith Is Necessary for Mankind
2. Whether Faith Should Be Distinguished from Religion
3. Whether the Christian Religion Is Aptly Called Catholic or
Universal
4. Whether it Is a True Article of Faith, That the Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit Are One GodQUESTION IV: Concerning Those Things
That Pertain to the Cause of Plurality
1. Whether Otherness Is the Cause of Plurality
2. Whether Variety of Accidents Produces Diversity According to
Number
3. Whether Two Bodies Can Be, or Can Be Conceived of as Being
Simultaneously in the Same Place
4. Whether Variety of Location Has Any Influence in Effecting
Numerical DifferenceLECTIO 2
1. Boethius' Text
2. St. Thomas' CommentaryQUESTION FIVE: The division of
speculative science
1. Is Speculative Science Appropriately Divided into these Three
Parts: Natural, Mathematical, and Divine?
2. Does Natural Philosophy Treat of What Exists in Motion and
Matter? 3. Does Mathematics Treat, Without Motion and Matter, of
What Exists in Matter?
4. Does Divine Science Treat of What Exists Without Matter and
Motion?QUESTION SIX: The methods of speculative science
1. Must we Proceed according to the Mode of Reason in Natural
Science, according to the Mode of Learning in Mathematics, and
according to the Mode of Intellect in Divine Science?
2. Should We Entirely Abandon the Imagination in Divine
Science?
3. Can Our Intellect Behold the Divine Form Itself?
4. Can Our Intellect Behold the Divine Form by Means of Some
Speculative Science?
Prooemium ST. THOMAS INTRODUCTION
Ab initio nativitatis investigabo et ponam in lucem scientiam
illius, Sap. 6. I will seek her out from the beginning of her
birth, and bring the knowledge of her to light (Wis. 6:24)
Naturalis mentis humanae intuitus pondere corruptibilis corporis
aggravatus in primae veritatis luce, ex qua omnia sunt facile
cognoscibilia, defigi non potest. Unde oportet ut secundum
naturalis cognitionis progressum ratio a posterioribus in priora
deveniat et a creaturis in Deum, Rom. 1: invisibilia ipsius a
creatura mundi etc.; Sap. 13: a magnitudine speciei creaturae et
cetera. Et hoc est quod dicitur Iob 36: omnes homines vident eum,
scilicet Deum, unusquisque intuetur procul. The natural intuition
of the human mind, burdened by the weight of a corruptible body,
cannot fix its gaze in the prime light of First Truth, in which all
things are easily knowable; whence it must be that, according to
the progress of its natural manner of cognition, the reason
advances from the things that are posterior to those that are
prior, and from creatures to God. For the invisible things of Him,
from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made (Rom. 1:20) and For by the greatness of
the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so
as to be known thereby (Wis. 13:5); and this is what is said in Job
36:25: All men see Him, gazing from afar.
Creaturae enim, per quas naturaliter cognoscitur Deus, in
infinitum ab ipso distant. Sed quia in his, quae procul videntur,
facile visus decipitur, idcirco ex creaturis in Deum cognoscendum
tendentes in errores multiplices inciderunt. Unde dicitur Sap. 14
quod creaturae Dei sunt muscipulae pedibus insipientium et in
Psalmo: defecerunt scrutantes scrutinio. Et ideo Deus humano generi
aliam tutam viam cognitionis providit, suam notitiam mentibus
hominum per fidem infundens. Unde dicitur 1 Cor. 2: quae sunt Dei,
nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei, nobis autem revelavit Deus per
spiritum suum. Et hic est spiritus, quo efficimur credentes, 2 Cor.
4: habentes eundem spiritum fidei credimus, propter quod et
loquimur. For creatures, through whom God can be known by the
natural light of reason, are at an infinite distance from Him. But
since, in those who look at a thing from a great distance, vision
may readily be deceived, therefore those striving to attain to a
knowledge of God from creatures fell into many errors: wherefore it
is said: The creatures of God are... a snare to the feet of the
unwise (Wis. 14: 11), and: They have failed in their search (Ps.
63:7); and therefore God has provided for the human race another
safe road of cognition, bestowing upon the minds of men, by faith,
a knowledge of Himself. Therefore, it is said: The things also that
are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God: but to us God has
revealed them by His Spirit (1 Cor. 2: 11): and this is the Spirit
by whom we are enabled to be believers: Having the same spirit of
faith, as it is written: I believed, for which cause I have spoken
(Ps. 115: 10); we also believe, for which cause we speak also (2
Cor. 4:13)
Sicut ergo naturalis cognitionis principium est creaturae
notitia a sensu accepta, ita cognitionis desuper datae principium
est primae veritatis notitia per fidem infusa. Et hinc est quod
diverso ordine hinc inde proceditur. Philosophi enim, qui naturalis
cognitionis ordinem sequuntur, praeordinant scientiam de creaturis
scientiae divinae, scilicet naturalem metaphysicae. Sed apud
theologos proceditur e converso, ut creatoris consideratio
considerationem praeveniat creaturae. Therefore, as the principle
of our cognition is naturally the knowledge of created things,
obtained by means of the senses, so the principle of supernatural
cognition is that knowledge of First Truth conferred upon us,
infused by faith; and hence it follows that in advancing one
proceeds according to a diverse order. For philosophers, who follow
along the way of natural cognition, place knowledge about created
things before knowledge about divine things: natural science before
metaphysics: but among theologians the procedure is in reverse
order, so that study of the Creator comes before that of
creatures.
Hunc ergo ordinem secutus Boethius ea quae sunt fidei tractare
intendens in ipsa summa rerum origine principium suae
considerationis instituit, scilicet Trinitate unius simplicis Dei.
Unde ei competunt verba praemissa: ab initio nativitatis et cetera.
This order, therefore, Boethius followed: intending to treat of
those things which are of faith, he took as the starting point of
his study that highest origin of things, namely, the Trinity of the
one, simple God. Whence it is that the above-quoted words are
applicable to him: I will seek her out from the beginning of her
birth, and bring the knowledge of her to light.
In quibus circa praesens opusculum, quod ad Symmachum patricium
urbis composuit, tria possunt notari, scilicet materia, modus et
finis. In these words, as regards the present opusculum, which he
addressed to Symmachus, a patrician of Rome, three things can be
noted: namely, the matter, the mode, and the purpose.
Materia siquidem huius operis est in una divina essentia
Trinitas personarum, quae consurgit ex prima nativitate, qua divina
sapientia a patre aeternaliter generatur, Prov. 8: nondum erant
abyssi, et ego iam concepta eram; in Psalmo: ego hodie genui te.
The matter of this work is the Trinity of Persons in the one,
divine Essence, that Trinity which has its source in the primal
nativity in which divine wisdom is eternally generated by the
Father. The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived
(Prov. 8:24), and: This day have I begotten you (Ps. 2:7)
Quae quidem nativitas initium est cuiuslibet nativitatis
alterius, cum ipsa sola sit perfecte naturam capiens generantis;
aliae vero omnes imperfectae sunt, secundum quas genitum aut partem
substantiae generantis accipit aut substantiae similitudinem. Unde
oportet quod a praedicta nativitate omnis alia nativitas per
quandam imitationem derivetur, Eph. 3: ex quo omnis paternitas in
caelo et in terra nominatur. Et propter hoc filius dicitur
primogenitus omnis creaturae, Col. 1, ut nativitatis origo et
imitatio designetur, non eadem generationis ratio. Unde
convenienter dicit: ab initio nativitatis; Prov. 8: dominus
possedit me in initio viarum suarum. Nec solum creaturarum est
initium praedicta nativitas, sed etiam spiritus sancti, qui a
generante genitoque procedit. This nativity is the beginning of
every other nativity, as it is the only one involving perfect
participation in the nature of the generator: but all others are
imperfect according as the one generated receives either a part of
the substance of the generator, or only a similitude: from this it
follows that from the aforesaid nativity, every other is derived by
a kind of imitation; and thus: Of whom all paternity in heaven and
in earth is named (Eph. 3: 15); and on this account the Son ,is
called the first-born of every creature (Col. 1:15) so that the
origin of nativity and its imitation might be designated, but not
according to the same meaning of generation; and therefore it is
aptly said: I will seek her out from the beginning of her birth.
The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways (Prov. 8:22);
for not only of creatures is the aforesaid nativity the beginning,
but even of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Generator and
the Generated.
Per hoc autem quod non dicit: initium nativitatis investigabo,
sed ab initio designatur quod in hoc nativitatis initio eius
perscrutatio non finitur, sed ab hoc incipiens ad alia procedit.
But in saying this, he does not say: I will seek out the beginning
of nativity, but from the beginning signifies that his search is
not limited by initiation of this kind of nativity, but that,
beginning from this, he proceeds to others.
Eius namque doctrina in tres partes dividitur. Prima namque est
de Trinitate personarum, ex quarum processione omnis alia nativitas
vel processio derivatur, in hoc quidem libro, qui prae manibus
habetur, quantum ad id quod de Trinitate et unitate sciendum est,
in alio vero libro, quem ad Iohannem diaconum Ecclesiae Romanae
scribit, de modo praedicandi, quo utimur in personarum Trinitate,
qui sic incipit: quaero, an pater. For his doctrine is divided into
three parts. The first part, concerning the Trinity of Persons,
from the procession of whom every other nativity and procession are
derived, is contained in that book which we possess at hand, so far
as anything can be known about the Trinity and Unity. But in
another book which he wrote to John, a deacon of the Roman Church,
we find what he says about the mode of predication which we employ
in the distinction of Persons and unity of essence; and this book
begins: I inquire whether the Father.
Secunda vero pars est de processione bonarum creaturarum a Deo
bono in libro, qui ad eundem Iohannem conscribitur de hebdomadibus,
qui sic incipit: postulas a me. The second part, which is about the
procession of good creatures from a good God, is in a book that is
written to the same John (De hebdomadibus), and this begins: You
ask of me.
Tertia vero pars est de reparatione creaturarum per Christum.
Quae quidem in duo dividitur. Primo namque proponitur fides, quam
Christus docuit qua iustificamur, in libro qui intitulatur de fide
Christiana, qui sic incipit: Christianam fidem. Secundo explanatur,
quid de Christo sentiendum sit, quomodo scilicet duae naturae in
una persona conveniant, et hoc in libro de duabus naturis in una
persona Christi ad Iohannem praedictum conscripto, qui sic incipit:
anxie te quidem. The third part is about the separation of
creatures through Christ. This is divided into two parts: For
first, there is set forth the faith which Christ taught by which we
are justified, in that book entitled De fide Christiana, which
begins: The Christian faith. In the second part, an explanation is
given of what must be held about Christ: namely, how two natures
are united in one person. This discussion of the two natures and
the one person in Christ is also in a book written to the same
John, which begins: You, indeed, solicitously.
Modus autem de Trinitate tractandi duplex est, ut dicit
Augustinus in I de Trinitate, scilicet per auctoritates et per
rationes, quem utrumque modum Augustinus complexus est, ut ipsemet
dicit. Now the mode employed in treating of the Trinity is twofold,
as St. Augustine says in I De Trinitate, namely, through truths
known on the basis of authority, and through those known by reason,
both of which modes Augustine combined, as he himself says.
Quidam vero sanctorum patrum, ut Ambrosius et Hilarius, alterum
tantum modum prosecuti sunt, scilicet per auctoritates. Boethius
vero elegit prosequi per alium modum, scilicet per rationes,
praesupponens hoc quod ab aliis per auctoritates fuerat prosecutum.
Et ideo modus huius operis designatur in hoc quod dicit:
investigabo, in quo rationis inquisitio designatur, Eccli. 39:
sapientiam, scilicet Trinitatis notitiam, antiquorum, scilicet quam
antiqui sola auctoritate asseruerunt, exquiret sapiens, id est
ratione investigabit. Some of the holy Fathers, as Ambrose and
Hilary, employed but one mode of explanation: namely, by setting
forth those truths founded upon authority. But Boethius chose to
proceed according to the other mode; namely, according to reasoned
arguments, presupposing what had been concluded by others on the
grounds of authority. Hence also the method of his work is
indicated in what he says: I shall investigate, in which an inquiry
of reason is signified. In Sirach 39:1 we read: Wisdom, namely,
knowledge of the Trinity; of all the ancients, that is, which the
ancients affirmed solely on the grounds of authority; the wise man
will seek out, that is, he will investigate by reason.
Unde in prooemio praemittit: investigatam diutissime
quaestionem. Wherefore, in the preface he speaks of An
investigation carried on for a very long time.
Finis vero huius operis est, ut occulta fidei manifestentur,
quantum in via possibile est, Eccli. 24: qui elucidant me, vitam
aeternam habebunt. Et ideo dicit: ponam in lucem scientiam illius,
Iob 28: profunda fluviorum scrutatus est, et abscondita produxit in
lucem. The purpose of this work is: that hidden things may be made
manifest, so far as that is possible in this life. They that
explain me shall have life everlasting (Sirach 24:31); and
therefore, he says: I will bring the knowledge of her to light
(Wis. 6:24). The depths also of rivers he searched, and hidden
things he brought forth to light (Job 2 8: 11).
Pars 2
LECTIO 1Prooemium: Boethius Text
Christianae religionis reverentiam plures usurpant, 1.1.1.1
There are many who claim as theirs the dignity of the Christian
religion;
sed ea fides pollet maxime ac solitarie quae cum propter
universalium praecepta regularum, quibus eiusdem religionis
intellegatur auctoritas, tum propterea, quod eius cultus per omnes
paene mundi terminos emanarit, catholica vel universalis vocatur.
1.1.1.2 but that form of faith has supreme authority, and has it
exclusively, which, both on account of the universal character of
the rules and doctrines affirming its authority, and because the
worship in which they are expressed has spread throughout the
world, is called catholic or universal.
Cuius haec de trinitatis unitate sententia est: "Pater,"
inquiunt, "deus filius deus spiritus sanctus deus". 1.1.2 The
belief of this religion concerning the Trinity is as follows: The
Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God.
Igitur pater filius spiritus sanctus unus non tres dii. 1.2.1
Therefore, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, not three
Gods.
Cuius coniunctionis ratio est indifferentia. 1.2.2.1 The nature
of Their Unity is such that there is no difference.
Eos enim differentia comitatur qui vel augent vel minuunt, ut
Arriani qui gradibus meritorum trinitatem variantes distrahunt
atque in pluralitatem diducunt. 1.2.2.2 Difference cannot be
avoided by those who add to or take from the Unity, as for instance
the Arians, who by graduating the Trinity according to merit, break
it up and convert it to Plurality.
Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est; 1.2.3.1.1 For the
essence of plurality is otherness;
praeter alteritatem enim nec pluralitas quid sit intellegi
potest. 1.2.2.1.2 apart from otherness plurality is
unintelligible.
Trium namque rerum vel quotlibet tum genere tum specie tum
numero diversitas constat; 1.2.3.2 In fact, the difference between
things is to be found in genus or species or number.
quotiens enim idem dicitur, totiens diversum etiam praedicatur.
2.1 In as many ways as things are the same, in the same number of
ways they are said to be diverse.
Idem vero dicitur tribus modis: aut genere ut idem homo quod
equus, quia his idem genus ut animal; vel specie ut idem Cato quod
Cicero, quia eadem species ut homo; vel numero ut Tullius et
Cicero, quia unus est numero. Quare diversum etiam vel genere vel
specie vel numero dicitur. 2.2 Sameness is predicated in three
ways: by genus; e.g., a man and a horse, because of their common
genus, animal. By species; e.g., Cato and Cicero, because of their
common species, man. By number; e.g., Tullius and Cicero, because
they are numerically one. Similarly difference is expressed by
genus, species, and number.
Sed numero differentiam accidentium varietas facit. Nam tres
homines neque genere neque specie sed suis accidentibus distant;
nam vel si animo cuncta ab his accidentia separemus, tamen locus
cunctis diversus est quem unum fingere nullo modo possumus; duo
enim corpora unum locum non obtinebunt, qui est accidens. Atque
ideo sunt numero plures, quoniam accidentibus plures fiunt. 2.3 But
a variety of accidents brings about numerical difference; three men
differ neither by genus nor species, but by their accidents, for if
we mentally remove from them all other accidents, still each one
occupies a different place which cannot possibly be regarded as the
same for each, since two bodies cannot occupy the same place, and
place is an accident. Wherefore it is because men are plural by
their accidents that they are plural in number.
St. Thomas Commentary
Post prooemium hic Boethius tractatum suum incipit de Trinitate
personarum et unitate divinae essentiae. Et dividitur liber iste in
duas partes. In prima prosequitur ea quae pertinent ad unitatem
essentiae contra Arianos. In secunda prosequitur ea quae pertinent
ad Trinitatem personarum contra Sabellium, ibi: sed hoc interim ad
eam. Hereupon, after the Prooemium, Boethius begins his treatise De
Trinitate Personarum, et Unitate divinae essentiae: and this book
is divided into two parts. First, he discusses those things which
pertain to the unity of the divine essence, making opposition the
Arians. Secondly, he treats of those things which pertain to the
Trinity of persons, in opposition to Sabellius, beginning: In as
many ways as things are the same, in the same number of ways they
are said to be diverse.
Prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima proponit Catholicae fidei
sententiam de unitate divinae essentiae. In secunda investigat
propositae sententiae veritatem, ibi: age igitur, ingrediamur.
Prima dividitur in duas. In prima describit fidei condicionem,
cuius sententiam prosequi intendit. In secunda proponit descriptae
fidei sententiam de proposito, ibi: cuius haec de Trinitatis. The
first part is also divided into two sections. In the first, he
proposes the doctrine of the Catholic faith in regard to the unity
of the divine essence. Secondly, he investigates the truth of the
doctrine proposed when he says: Therefore... In the first section
he treats of two things. First, he represents the condition of that
faith whose doctrine he intends to explain. Secondly, he sets forth
the doctrine of the faith he has described concerning this
proposition, saying: The belief of this religion concerning the
Trinity.
Describit autem eam dupliciter, scilicet ex comparatione
haeresum, quibus praepollet, et ex proprio nomine, quia Catholica
vel universalis vocatur. Dicit ergo: plures, id est diversarum
haeresum sectae, usurpant, id est indebite sibi attribuunt,
reverentiam Christianae religionis, id est quae Christianae
religioni debetur, ut scilicet ei omnes subdantur, secundum illud 1
Ioh. 3: haec est victoria quae vincit mundum, fides nostra. Vel
reverentiam quam Christiana religio Deo exhibet credendo his quae
divinitus sunt praedicata. 1.1.1.1 He describes this religion in a
twofold manner, namely, by comparison with heretical cutis, which
it excels, and also in its own name since it is called catholic or
universal. He says, therefore, that there are many, that is, many
sects of diverse heresies, who make unlawful claims, since they
unduly attribute to themselves the honor of the Christian religion,
that is, the honor which ought to be paid to it: namely, that all
others should be subject to it. 1 John 5:4: This is the victory
that overcomes the world, our faith. Or, again, they claim the
dignity which belongs to the Christian religion in that it
manifests the glory of God by believing those truths which have
been divinely revealed.
Sed ea fides pollet maxime ac solitarie. Haec duo adiungit, ut
discretionem faciat eius quod est secundum veritatem et eius quod
est secundum opinionem. Secundum enim rei veritatem haeretici
Christiani non sunt, cum a doctrina Christi recedant, et quantum ad
hoc Catholica fides solitarie pollet; sed secundum apparentiam et
hominum opinionem haeretici Christiani dicuntur, quia saltem vel
voce nomen Christi confitentur, et quantum ad hoc fides Catholica
non sola, sed maxime pollet. 1.1.1.2 But that form of faith has
supreme authority, and has it exclusively. Here he adds the two
things that make it distinct both according to truth and according
to reputation. Now according to the truth of the matter, heretics
are not Christians, since they cut themselves off from the
teachings of Christ, and in this respect the Catholic faith alone
is valid. But according to appearances and in the opinion of men,
heretics are called Christians because they do indeed still, at
least in word, confess the name of Christ; and according to this
aspect, the Catholic faith is not the only one, but holds the place
of greater authority.
Ipsa enim communius et diffusius est recepta, unde subdit: quae
vocatur Catholica in Graeco vel universalis in Latino, quod idem
est; Catholicum enim Graece Latine universale dicitur. Cuius
nominis assignat duas rationes, dicens: tum propter praecepta
universalium regularum. Praecepta enim, quae fides Catholica
proponit, non uni tantum genti observanda, sed omnibus proponit, in
quo praecipue differt a lege Moysi, quae uni tantum populo
praecepta proponebat. Similiter etiam singulae haereses suis tantum
sectatoribus praecepta accomoda tradunt, sed fides Catholica de
omnibus curam gerens omnibus praecepta accomoda tribuit, non solum
continentibus, ut Manichaei, sed etiam coniugatis; non solum
innocentibus, ut Novatiani, sed etiam paenitentibus quibus illi
salutem denegant. Unde subdit: quibus, scilicet universalibus
regulis, intelligitur auctoritas eiusdem religionis, qua omnes ei
subditi esse debent. That this religion is the more common and the
more widely diffused is understood when he says, is called catholic
or universal. Now this is the same thing; for catholic in the
Greek, means the same as the Latin universal. For the use of this
name, he assigns two reasons, saying: On account of the precepts of
its universal rules, for the precepts which the Catholic religion
sets forth are not to be observed by one race alone, but by all:
and in this respect it differs especially from the Law of Moses
which gave precepts to one people alone. Likewise even individual
heresies propose rules that are accommodated to their own members
only; while the Catholic faith, having the care of all, gives its
precepts to all: not to the unmarried alone, as do the Manichaeans,
but also to the married; not to the innocent alone, as do the
Novatians, but to sinners as well, for whom that sect would make
salvation impossible. Wherefore he adds: the authority of this
religion is evident because of its universal rules, on account of
which all ought to be subject to it.
Vel dicuntur universales regulae, quia eis nihil falsitatis,
nihil iniquitatis admiscetur in quocumque articulo sive in
quocumque casu. Deinde subiungit aliam causam dicens: tum propterea
quod eius cultus et cetera. Planum est secundum illud Psalmi: in
omnem terram exivit et cetera. Or they may be called universal
rules since there is in them no falsity or any admixture of evil,
neither in any essential article or accidentally. Then he adds
another reason, saying: Because the worship in which they are
expressed has spread throughout the world, a thing which is
evidently in accord with that saying of Ps. 18:5: Their sound has
gone forth into all the earth: and their words unto the ends of the
world.
Cuius haec de Trinitatis et cetera. Hic ponitur praenotatae
fidei sententia de proposita quaestione. Et circa hoc tria facit.
Primo ponit Catholicae fidei sententiam de unitate Trinitatis.
Secundo eiusdem sententiae rationem, ibi: cuius coniunctionis et
cetera. Tertio ostendit praedictae rationis convenientiam, ibi:
principium enim pluralitatis. 1.1.2 Hereupon he next sets forth the
doctrine of the Catholic faith concerning the question proposed:
The belief of this religion concerning the Trinity. Concerning
this, he does three things: First, he presents the teaching of the
Catholic faith on the unity of the Trinity. Secondly, the reason
for this opinion: The principle of this unity. Thirdly, he shows
the fitness of the reason, saying: Now the essence of
plurality.
Proponit autem fidei Catholicae sententiam per modum argumenti,
eo quod fides argumentum non apparentium dicitur Hebr. 11. In quo
quidem argumento ex hoc, quod deitas singulis personis uniformiter
attribuitur, concluditur quod de omnibus non pluraliter, sed
singulariter hoc nomen Deus praedicatur. 1.1.2.1 Moreover, he
proposes the opinion of Catholic faith in a certain argumentative
form, because faith is called the evidence of things that appear
not (Heb. 11:1). In the same argument, indeed, from the fact that
divinity is attributed equally to each of the Persons, he concludes
that of all three the name God is predicated not plurally, as taken
together, but individually.
Deinde huius sententiae rationem assignat. Et primo ponit
rationem, secundo per contrarium exponit, ibi: eos enim et cetera.
1.1.2.2 Next he assigns the reason for this belief. First, he
states the reason, and secondly, he explains it by its contrary
where he says: Difference cannot be avoided by those who add to or
take from the Unity.
Dicit ergo: cuius quidem coniunctionis, id est coniunctae
argumentationis, ratio est indifferentia, scilicet deitatis in
tribus personis, quam fides Catholica confitetur. Ex hoc enim est
quod ex praemissis praedicta conclusio sequitur, quia indifferens
deitas tribus personis non differenter attribuitur. Quam quidem
rationem per contrarium exponit, dicens: eos enim comitatur
differentia, deitatis scilicet, qui vel augent vel minuunt, id est
qui ponunt unam personam maiorem vel minorem alia, ut Ariani
dicentes patrem esse maiorem filio. Unde subdit: qui, scilicet
Ariani, variantes Trinitatem gradibus meritorum, id est dignitatum,
dum filium patri subiciunt et spiritum sanctum utrique, distrahunt,
id est in diversa trahunt deitatem in eis dividendo, atque in
pluralitatem deducunt. Ex divisione enim sequitur pluralitas. E
contrario vero Catholici aequalitatem personarum confitentes
indifferentiam profitentur et per consequens unitatem. 1.1.2.2.1
Therefore he says: The nature of Their Unity is such that there is
no difference, namely, the Unity of Deity in the three Persons, as
confessed by the Catholic faith. From this the conclusion following
upon the foregoing words is that Deity without difference is
attributed to each of the three Persons; (1.1.2.2.2) and this
reasoning he explains by its contrary saying: Difference cannot be
avoided by those who add to or take from the Unity (of the Deity):
that is, who hold that one Person is greater or less than the
others, as the Arians, who make the Father greater than the Son.
Wherefore he continues: As for instance the Arians, who by
graduating the Trinity, break it up; that is, by graduating the
Trinity according to dignity, since they make the Son subject to
the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both Father and Son, and so
convert it to Plurality; that is, produce diversity by dividing the
Deity among the Persons. For from division there follows plurality.
Conversely, Catholics who confess an equality of the Persons, an
equality without difference, make profession of consequent
Unity.
Deinde cum dicit: principium enim etc., ostendit rationem
praemissam esse convenientem. Et dividitur in duas partes. In prima
demonstrat praeassignatae rationis necessitatem. In secunda
quiddam, quod in sua demonstratione supposuit, probat, ibi: omnium
namque et cetera. Circa primum proponit duo. Primo quod alteritas
est principium pluralitatis, alteritatem intelligens differentiam
qua aliqua inter se altera constituuntur. Et maluit dicere
alteritatem quam alietatem, quia non solum substantiales
differentiae pluralitatem constituunt, quarum est facere aliud, sed
etiam accidentales, quarum est facere alterum; ad alietatem vero
sequitur alteritas, sed non e converso. Ex hoc autem habetur ratio
Arianicae deductionis. Si enim alteritas est principium
pluralitatis et posita causa ponitur effectus, ergo ponentibus
alteritatem per augmentum et diminutionem sequitur pluralitas
deitatis. 1.2.3.1.1 Next, he shows that the foregoing reasoning is
valid, saying: For the essence of plurality is otherness, and first
he points out the necessity possessed by this reasoning. Secondly,
what in the demonstration itself had been supposed is made clear:
In fact, the difference between three or more things lies in genus
or species or number. Regarding the first point he does two things.
First he shows that otherness is the principle of plurality,
understanding by otherness any difference by which things can be
constituted among themselves as other. And he prefers to say
otherness rather than separateness because not only substantial
differences constitute plurality, since they make another thing,
but accidental differences also constitute plurality, since they
make for otherness: they make a thing other. Now otherness follows
upon separateness; but the converse is not true. And the reason for
the deduction of the Arians follows from this supposition. For if
otherness is the principle of plurality, and positing a cause
posits its effect, then supposing in them that otherness is by
augmentation and diminution, plurality of divinity would
follow.
Secundo proponit alteritatem esse proprium principium
pluralitatis, quia praeter eam pluralitas intelligi non potest. Ex
quo habetur ratio Catholicae coniunctionis. Remota enim propria
causa tollitur effectus. Si ergo in tribus personis non est
alteritas aliqua deitatis, non erit pluralitas, sed unitas.
1.2.3.1.2 Secondly, he proposes that otherness is properly the
principle of plurality, because, except for it, understanding of
plurality is impossible; and according to this principle is the
Catholic explanation of divine unity: for if a proper cause is
taken away, so also is the effect. If, therefore, in the three
Persons there is no otherness of Deity, there will be no plurality,
but unity.
Deinde cum dicit: omnium namque rerum etc., probat quod
supposuerat, scilicet alteritatem esse proprium principium
pluralitatis. Et est ratio sua talis. Omnium rerum genere vel
specie vel numero differentium est aliqua alteritas sive
differentia causa diversitatis. Sed omnes res plures, sive sint
tres sive quotlibet, sunt diversae vel genere vel specie vel
numero. Ergo omnium plurium principium est aliqua alteritas.
1.2.3.2 Next, he proves what was supposed, namely, that otherness
is the proper principle of plurality, when he says, In fact, the
difference between three or more things. And the reason is that in
all things that differ in genus or species or number, there is some
otherness or difference which is the cause of plurality or,
diversity. But all plural things, whether three or more, are
diverse either generically, specifically, or numerically; therefore
some kind of otherness is the principle of all plurality.
Circa hanc rationem tria facit. Primo ponit minorem, secundo
ibi: quotiens enim etc. probationem minoris, quae talis est.
Quotiens dicitur idem, totiens dicitur diversum. Sed idem dicitur
tribus modis: genere, specie et numero. Ergo et diversum. Primam
supponit ex hoc quod dicitur in I topicorum quod quotiens dicitur
unum oppositorum, totiens dicitur et reliquum, et ex hoc quod
dicitur X metaphysicae quod idem et diversum sunt opposita. 2.1 In
explaining this, he does three things. First, he states the minor;
secondly its proof, beginning, In as many ways as things are the
same, in the same number of ways they are said to be diverse. This
is [the demonstration of] the proof: In as many ways as things are
said to be the same, in the same number of ways they are said to be
diverse. But things are said to be the same in three ways, namely,
in genus, species, and number. Therefore things are said to be
diverse in the same number of ways. The first is supposed from what
is stated in I Topic., that as much is said of one of two opposites
as is said of the other: and from the saying of X Metaph., that the
same and different are opposites.
Secundam manifestat per exempla et supponit eam ex I topicorum.
2.2 The second is made clear by examples and supposes what is said
in I Topic.
Tertio vero probat maiorem quantum ad id quod poterat esse
dubium, ibi: sed numero differentiam et cetera. Quod enim
diversitatis illorum, quae sunt diversa genere vel specie,
principium sit aliqua alteritas, manifestum est ex ipso nomine. Ex
hoc enim aliqua sunt diversa genere, quod est eis genus alterum, et
diversa specie, quod sub altera specie continentur. Sed in his,
quae dicuntur diversa esse numero, non est manifestum ex ipso
nomine quod aliqua alteritas sit principium diversitatis et
pluralitatis, immo magis videtur e converso secundum nomen quod
pluralitas quae in numero designatur sit principium diversitatis,
cum ita dicantur aliqua esse diversa numero secundum nomen, sicut
genere vel specie. Et ideo ad verificandum maiorem sui syllogismi
ostendit quod hanc etiam differentiam, qua aliqua dicuntur differre
numero, facit aliqua alteritas sive varietas. Quod probat per hoc
quod in tribus hominibus, qui conveniunt genere et specie,
inveniuntur altera accidentia, sicut in homine et bove altera
species et in homine et lapide genus alterum. Unde sicut homo et
bos distant specie, ita duo homines distant accidentibus. 2.3
Thirdly, he proves the major in regard to that point which might be
held in doubt, saying: But a variety of accidents brings about
numerical difference. That the diversity of those things which are
diverse according to genus or species must have as principle some
otherness, is evident from the name itself. For from the fact that
things are of different genera it is evident that a different, or
other, genus belongs to each; and if they differ in species, it is
because they are contained under other species. But in the case of
things which are said to be diverse numerically, it is not evident
from the name itself that otherness is the principle of plurality.
Furthermore, it might rather appear to be the converse according to
the name and that plurality, which is designated by number, might
be the principle of diversity, since things numerically different
are different according to the same name employed when difference
is by genus or species: Therefore, to prove the major of his
syllogism, he shows that this difference by which things are said
to differ numerically is produced by a certain kind of otherness or
variety. He proves this by the fact that in three men who agree in
genus and species, but who differ numerically, there is found
accidental otherness, just as between man and ox there is specific
otherness and between man and stone generic otherness. Wherefore,
as man and ox differ specifically, so two men differ
accidentally.
Et quia posset aliquis dicere quod varietas accidentium non est
causa pluralitatis secundum numerum, quia remotis accidentibus vel
secundum rem, scilicet separabilibus, vel animo sive cogitatione,
sicut inseparabilibus, adhuc remanent subiecta, cum accidens sit
quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem, ideo huic
responsioni obviat dicens quod quamvis omnia accidentia possint
saltem animo separari, tamen alicuius accidentis diversitas nullo
modo potest nec etiam animo a diversis individuis separari,
scilicet diversitas loci. Duo enim corpora non patiuntur eundem
locum nec secundum rem nec secundum animi fictionem, quia hoc non
intelligi nec imaginari potest. Unde concludit quod ex hoc sunt
aliqui homines plures numero, quod sunt accidentibus plures, id est
diversi, et in hoc terminatur sententia huius partis. And because
some one might be able to say that accidental variety is not the
cause of numerical plurality since, if accidents are done away
with-either removed actually, as when separable, or by the mind and
in thought, as when inseparablesubstance still remains, since
accident is that which can be present or absent without corruption
of the substance: therefore he forestalls this objection, saying
that, although all accidents might indeed be separated from a
substance by the mind, nevertheless the diversity of one accident
could in no way, even by the mind, be separated from diverse
individuals, namely, diversity of place. For two individuals cannot
be in the same place either according to fact or according to any
fiction of the mind, since this cannot be understood or imagined.
Wherefore he concludes that from the fact that men are plural in
number they are plural by reason of accidents; that is, they are
for this reason diversified; and with this is terminated the
teaching of this part of the treatise.
Quaestio 3 QUESTION IIIConcerning Those Things That Pertain to
the Knowledge Possessed by Faith
Hic duplex est quaestio. Prima de his quae pertinent ad fidei
commendationem. Secunda de his quae pertinent ad causam
pluralitatis. This question is twofold. First, there is
consideration of those things that pertain to the communion of
faith: secondly, of those that pertain to the cause of
plurality.
Circa primum quaeruntur quattuor.
1. Primo. Utrum humano generi sit fides necessaria.
2. Secundo. Quomodo se habet fides ad religionem.
3. Tertio. Utrum convenienter vera fides Catholica vel
universalis nominetur.
4. Quarto. Utrum haec sit verae fidei confessio quod pater et
filius et spiritus sanctus singulus est Deus, et tres sunt unus
Deus absque omni inaequalitatis distantia. In regard to the first,
four questions are asked:
1. Whether faith is necessary for mankind.
2. How faith is related to religion.
3. Whether the true faith is aptly called Catholic or
universal.
4. Whether this is the, confession of the true faith: that
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each is God, and that the Three are
one God without any difference owing to inequality.
Article 1Whether Faith Is Necessary for Mankind
Articulus 1 Objections
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium
humano generi fidem habere. Ut enim dicitur Eccl. 7, quid necesse
est homini maiora se quaerere? Quasi dicat: nihil. Sed ea quae per
fidem traduntur sunt homine maiora, utpote rationem eius
excedentia; alias ad ea cognoscenda sufficeret ratio causans
scientiam nec requireretur fides. Ergo non fuit necessarium homini,
ut ea quae sunt fidei extra doceretur. 1. It seems that faith
should not be considered necessary for mankind. As is said in
Eccles. 7:1, Why does a man need to seek things that are above him?
This is to say, there is no need. But those things that are
believed by faith are above man, as exceeding his reason; otherwise
~his reason, which is the cause of science, would suffice.
Therefore it was not necessary for man that, over and above the
truths of reason, he should be taught those of faith.
Praeterea, Deus naturam humanam in sua conditione perfecte
instituit, unde dicitur Deut. 32: Dei perfecta sunt opera. Sed ex
his, quae menti humanae in sua conditione sunt indita, non potest
homo pertingere ad cognoscendum ea quae sunt fidei; alias possent
per scientiam haberi, quae causatur ex hoc quod conclusiones
resolvuntur in principia naturaliter nota. Cum igitur perfectum
dicatur aliquid, cui nihil deest eorum quae debet habere, ut
dicitur in V metaphysicae, videtur quod homo fide non indigeat. 2.
God established human nature as something perfect when He created
it. Deut. 32:4, The works of God are perfect. But from the ability
bestowed upon the human mind according to its original condition,
man cannot attain to those things which must be known by faith;
otherwise he would be able to possess scientific knowledge of them,
a knowledge which is caused by the fact that conclusions are
resolved into naturally known principles. Since, therefore, a thing
is called perfect if it lacks nothing that it ought to possess, as
is said in V Metaph., it seems that man does not require faith.
Praeterea, unusquisque sapiens ad perveniendum ad finem viam
eligit levissimam et ab impedimentis remotissimam. Sed
difficillimum videtur credere ea quae supra rationem sunt et valde
hominibus periculosum, cum multi a salutis statu decidant propter
hoc quod non credunt. Ergo videtur quod Deus qui est sapientissimus
non debuerit viam fidei praeparare hominibus ad salutem. 3. Every
wise man makes choice of the shorter way to reach a goal: but it
would appear exceedingly difficult for a creature to believe truths
which are above reason and, in the case of men, extremely
dangerous, since many fall away from the state of salvation because
they do not believe; therefore, it seems that God, who is all-wise,
ought not to have established faith as the way of salvation for
men.
Praeterea, ubicumque est acceptio aliquorum cognitorum sine
iudicio, est via facilis ad errorem. Sed non habemus aliquid in
nobis, per quod possimus iudicare de his quae per fidem accipimus,
cum iudicatorium naturale se ad huiusmodi non extendat, utpote
supra rationem exsistentia. Ergo patet via facilis ad errorem. Et
ita videtur esse homini potius noxium quam utile, ut dirigatur in
Deum per fidem. 4. Whenever there is acceptance of knowledge
without judgment, the road to error is easy; but we have in
ourselves no ability by which we are able to judge of the things
which we accept by faith, since our natural judgment does not
extend to truths of this kind, as they exceed reason; therefore
evidently the road to error is an easy one for us, and so it would
appear rather harmful than useful for man that he should be
directed to God by the way of faith.
Praeterea, ut dicit Dionysius, malum hominis est praeter
rationem esse. Sed homo fidei inhaerens a ratione discedit, et in
hoc etiam assuescit rationem contemnere. Ergo videtur quod via ista
sit hominibus noxia. 5. As Dionysius says, it is an evil for man to
exist apart from reason; but man in adhering to faith departs from
reason, and in this he is even accustomed to despise reason;
therefore it seems that such a way is evil for men.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicitur Hebr. 11: sine fide impossibile est
placere Deo. Sed hoc est homini maxime opportunum, ut Deo placeat,
sine quo nihil boni facere aut habere potest. Ergo fides est homini
maxime necessaria. But on the contrary, it is said in Heb. 11:6,
Without faith it is impossible to please God; but it is supremely
necessary for man that he be pleasing to God, since otherwise he
can neither do nor possess any good; therefore faith is most
necessary for man.
Praeterea, homini maxime necessarium est veritatem cognoscere,
cum gaudium de veritate cognita sit beatitudo, ut Augustinus dicit.
Sed, sicut dicit Dionysius 7 c. de divinis nominibus, fides
collocat credentes in veritate et in eis veritatem. Ergo fides est
homini maxime necessaria. Again, it is most necessary for man to
know the truth, since beatitude is joy in knowing the truth, as
Augustine says; but faith establishes believers in truth and
establishes truth in them, as Dionysius says (De div. nom., chap.
7); therefore faith is most necessary for man.
Praeterea, illud, sine quo non potest conservari humana
societas, est humano generi maxime necessarium, cum homo sit
naturaliter animal politicum, ut dicitur in VIII Ethicorum. Sed
sine fide humana societas non potest conservari, quia oportet quod
unus homo alii credat in promissis et in testimoniis et in aliis
huiusmodi quae sunt necessaria hominibus ad commanendum. Ergo fides
humano generi est maxime necessaria. Again, that without which
human society cannot be conserved is especially necessary for man,
since man is a political animal, as is said in VIII Ethic.; but
without faith human society cannot be preserved, since it is
requisite that one man believe in the promises of another and in
his testimony and the like, for this is necessary if they are to
live together; therefore faith is most necessary for mankind.
Responsio. Dicendum quod fides habet aliquid commune cum
opinione et aliquid cum scientia et intellectu, ratione cuius
ponitur media inter scientiam et opinionem ab Hugone de sancto
Victore. Cum scientia siquidem et intellectu commune habet certum
et fixum assensum, in quo ab opinione differt, quae accipit alterum
contrariorum cum formidine alterius, et a dubitatione quae fluctuat
inter duo contraria. Sed cum opinione commune habet quod est de
rebus quae non sunt intellectui pervia, in quo differt a scientia
et intellectu. Response. I answer that it must be said that faith
has something in common with opinion, and something in common with
knowledge and understanding, by reason of which it holds a position
midway between opinion and understanding or science, according to
Hugh of St. Victor. In common with understanding and knowledge, it
possesses certain and fixed assent; and in this it differs from
opinion, which accepts one of two opposites, though with fear that
the other may be true, and on account of this doubt it fluctuates
between two contraries. But, in common with opinion, faith is
concerned with things that are not naturally possible to our
understanding, and in this respect it differs from science and
intellection.
Quod autem aliquid non sit patens humanae cognitioni, potest ex
duobus contingere, ut dicitur in II metaphysicae, scilicet ex
defectu ipsarum rerum cognoscibilium et ex defectu intellectus
nostri. That a thing should not be apparent to human understanding
can arise for two reasons, as is said in II Metaph.: namely,
because of lack of knowability in things themselves, and because of
lack of intellectual ability on our part.
Ex defectu quidem rerum, sicut in rebus singularibus et
contingentibus quae a nostris sensibus sunt remotae, sicut sunt
facta hominum et dicta et cogitata, quae quidem talia sunt, ut uni
homini possint esse nota et alii incognita. Et quia in convictu
hominum oportet quod unus utatur altero sicut se ipso in his, in
quibus sibi non sufficit, ideo oportet ut stet illis quae alius
scit et sunt sibi ignota, sicut his quae ipse cognoscit. Et exinde
est quod in conversatione hominum est fides necessaria, qua unus
homo dictis alterius credat, et hoc est iustitiae fundamentum, ut
Tullius dicit in libro de officiis. Et inde est quod mendacium
nullum sine peccato est, cum per omne mendacium huic fidei tam
necessariae derogetur. 1. It may be due to lack on the part of
things, as in the case of singular and contingent things which are
remote from our senses, like the deeds and words and thoughts of
men; for these are of such a nature that they may be known to one
man, but unknown to others. And since among men dwelling together
one man should deal with another as with himself in what he is not
self-sufficient, therefore it is needful that he be able to stand
with as much certainty on what another knows, but of which he
himself is ignorant, as upon the truths which he himself knows.
Hence it is that in human society faith is necessary in order that
one man give credence to the words of another, and this is the
foundation of justice, as Tullius says in his book, De officiis.
Hence also it is that no lie is without sin, since every lie
derogates from that faith which is so necessary.
Ex defectu vero nostro sunt non apparentia res divinae et
necessariae, quae sunt secundum naturam maxime notae. Unde ad harum
inspectionem non sumus statim a principio idonei, cum oporteat nos
ex minus notis et posterioribus secundum naturam in magis nota et
priora naturaliter pervenire. Sed quia ex vi illorum, quae ultimo
cognoscimus, sunt nota illa quae primo cognoscimus, oportet etiam a
principio aliquam nos habere notitiam de illis quae sunt per se
magis nota; quod fieri non potest nisi credendo. Et etiam hoc patet
in ordine scientiarum, quia scientia quae est de causis altissimis,
scilicet metaphysica, ultimo occurrit homini ad cognoscendum, et
tamen in scientiis praeambulis oportet quod supponantur quaedam
quae in illa plenius innotescunt; unde quaelibet scientia habet
suppositiones, quibus oportet addiscentem credere. 2. The truth of
things may also not be evident because of defect on our part, as in
the case of divine and necessary things which, according to their
own nature, are most knowable. Wherefore, to understand them, we
are not capable of immediate intellection, from the very beginning,
since it is in accordance with our nature to attain from things
less knowable and posterior in themselves, to knowledge of those
that are themselves more knowable and prior. But since from none of
those things that we know last do we have any knowledge of those
that we know first, it is needful for us even at first to have some
notion of those things that are most knowable in themselves; but
this cannot be except by believing. And this is evident even in the
order of the sciences; since that science which is concerned with
highest causes, namely, metaphysics, comes last in human knowledge;
yet in sciences that are preambles to it there must be supposed
certain truths which only in it are more fully revealed; therefore
every science has some suppositions that must be believed in order
to carry on the process of learning.
Cum ergo finis humanae vitae sit beatitudo, quae consistit in
plena cognitione divinorum, necessarium est ad humanam vitam in
beatitudinem dirigendam statim a principio habere fidem divinorum,
quae plene cognoscenda exspectantur in ultima perfectione humana.
Since, therefore, the end of human life is beatitude, which
consists in the full cognition of divine truths, it is necessary
that human life be directed to this beatitude by an initial
possession of divine truths by faith, truths which man can hope to
know fully in the ultimate state of human perfection.
Ad quorum quaedam plene cognoscenda possibile est homini
pervenire per viam rationis etiam in statu huius vitae. Et horum
quamvis possit haberi scientia et a quibusdam habeatur, tamen
necessarium est habere fidem propter quinque rationes, quas Rabbi
Moyses ponit. Certain of these truths that must be known can be
attained by reason even in this life: however, although knowledge
of them is possible and even possessed by certain men, nevertheless
faith is necessary for five reasons, which Rabbi Moses
enumerates:
Prima scilicet propter profunditatem et subtilitatem materiae,
per quam occultantur divina ab hominum intellectu. Unde ne sit homo
sine eorum qualicumque cognitione, provisum est ei ut saltem per
fidem divina cognoscat, Eccl. 7: alta profunditas, quis cognoscet
illam? 1. First, on account of the depth and subtlety of the
matter, by which divine truths are hidden from human understanding.
Therefore, lest any man be without some knowledge of them,
provision is made that through faith, at least, he know divine
truths. Therefore, in Eccles. 7:25 it is said: It is a great depth,
who shall find it out?
Secunda propter imbecillitatem intellectus humani a principio.
Non enim provenit ei sua perfectio nisi in fine; et ideo ut nullum
tempus sit ei vacuum a divina cognitione, indiget fide, per quam ab
ipso principio divina accipiat. 2. Secondly, on account of the
weakness of the human intellect from the beginning. For perfection
of knowledge does not belong to the human intellect except at the
end; therefore, that it should at no time lack a knowledge of God,
it requires faith by which it may accept divine truths from the
very beginning.
Tertio propter multa praeambula, quae exiguntur ad habendam
cognitionem de Deo secundum viam rationis. Requiritur enim ad hoc
fere omnium scientiarum cognitio, cum omnium finis sit cognitio
divinorum; quae quidem praeambula paucissimi consequuntur. Unde ne
multitudo hominum a divina cognitione vacua remaneret, provisa est
ei divinitus via fidei. 3. Thirdly, because of the many preambles
that are required for a knowledge of God according to reason. For
this there is needed knowledge of almost all the sciences, since
cognition of divine things is the end of them all. But few indeed
would comprehend these preambulatory truths or investigate them
completely. Therefore, lest large numbers of men should be left
without knowledge of divine things, the way of faith has been
provided by God Himself.
Quarto, quia multi hominum ex naturali complexione sunt
indispositi ad perfectionem intellectus consequendam per viam
rationis; unde ut hi etiam divina cognitione non careant, provisa
est fidei via. 4. In the fourth place, many men on account of their
natural constitution are unfitted for perfect intellectual
investigation according to reason; therefore, that these might not
lack knowledge of divine truths, the way of faith has been
provided.
Quinto propter occupationes plurimas, quibus oportet homines
occupari; unde impossibile est quod omnes consequantur per viam
rationis illud quod est de Deo necessarium ad cognoscendum, et
propter hoc est via fidei procurata, et hoc quantum ad illa quae
sunt ab aliquibus scita et aliis proponuntur ut credenda. 5. In the
fifth place, because of numerous occupations with which men are
busied, it would be impossible for all of them to discover, by way
of reason, necessary truth in regard to God, and on this account
the way of faith has been established, both as regards things that
might in some way be known and as regards those that required
revelation in order that they be believed.
Quaedam vero divinorum sunt, ad quae plene cognoscenda
nullatenus ratio humana sufficit, sed eorum plena cognitio
exspectatur in futura vita, ubi erit plena beatitudo, sicut unitas
et Trinitas unius Dei. Et ad hanc cognitionem homo perducetur non
ex debito suae naturae, sed ex sola divina gratia. Unde oportet
quod huius etiam perfectae scientiae quaedam suppositiones primo ei
credendae proponantur, ex quibus dirigatur in plenam cognitionem
eorum quae a principio credit, sicut et in aliis scientiis accidit,
ut dictum est; et ideo dicitur Is. 7 secundum aliam litteram: nisi
credideritis, non intelligetis. Et huiusmodi suppositiones sunt
illa quae sunt credita quantum ad omnes et a nullo in hac vita
scita vel intellecta. But in the case of certain divine truths, for
a complete understanding of them the human mind in no way suffices,
but full knowledge of them is to be awaited in that future life
when there will be complete beatitude: such is the truth of the
Trinity and the unity of one God; and man is led to knowledge of
this, not in accordance with anything due his nature, but by divine
grace alone. Therefore it is necessary that, for a perfection of
knowledge of this kind, certain suppositions be proposed which must
be believed at first, and from these one is directed into full
cognition of those truths which at the outset he held on faith,
even as in other sciences also, as has been said. Hence in Is. 7:9
it is said, according to one translation: Unless you believed, you
would not understand. And suppositions of this sort are those that
must be believed by all, since in this life they are neither known
nor understood by, any one.
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet ea quae sunt fidei sint
maiora homine naturae viribus consideratis, non sunt tamen maiora
homine divino lumine elevato. Et ideo non est necesse homini, ut
huiusmodi propria virtute quaerat, sed est ei necesse, ut divina
revelatione ea cognoscat. 1. It may be said: Although matters of
faith considered according to mans natural powers are above him,
they are not above man when he is illuminated by divine light;
hence it is not necessary for man that he seek out such truths by
his own power, but it is necessary for him to know them by divine
revelation.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus in prima rerum conditione hominem
perfectum instituit perfectione naturae, quae quidem in hoc
consistit, ut homo habeat omnia quae sunt naturae debita. Sed supra
debitum naturae adduntur postmodum humano generi aliquae
perfectiones ex sola divina gratia, inter quas est fides quae est
Dei donum, ut patet Eph. 2. 2. It may be said: God, in the first
creation of things, established man as perfect in accordance with
the perfection of his nature, and this consisted in the fact that
man had all things due to his nature. But over and above that due
to nature there were added afterward to the human race certain
other perfections owing their source to divine grace alone, and
among these was faith, as is evident from Eph. 2:8, where it is
said of faith that it is the gift of God.
Ad tertium dicendum quod cuilibet in beatitudinem tendenti
necessarium est cognoscere in quibus beatitudinem quaerere debeat,
et qualiter. Quod quidem facilius fieri non poterat quam per fidem,
cum rationis inquisitio ad talia pervenire non possit nisi multis
praecognitis quae non est facile scire. Nec etiam potuit cum minori
periculo, cum humana inquisitio propter imbecillitatem intellectus
nostri sit facilis ad errorem, et hoc aperte ostenditur ex ipsis
philosophis, qui per viam rationis finem humanae vitae quaerentes
et modum perveniendi in ipsum in errores multiplices et turpissimos
inciderunt, adeo sibi invicem dissentientes, ut vix duorum aut
trium esset de his per omnia una concors sententia, cum tamen per
fidem videamus in unam sententiam etiam plurimos populos convenire.
3. It may be said: For anyone striving to attain beatitude it is
necessary to know in what he ought to seek this beatitude, and in
what way. But this, indeed, can be done in no easier way than
through faith, since investigation by reason cannot attain to such
knowledge except after a previous knowledge of many other things,
things not easy to know. Nor can one attain to such knowledge
without danger, since human investigation, because of the weakness
of our intellect, is prone to error; and this is clearly shown by
reference to those philosophers who, in attempting to find out the
purpose of human life by way of reason, did not find in themselves
the true method, and so fell into many and shameful errors; and so
greatly did they differ among themselves that scarcely two or three
among them all were in agreement on any one question; yet, on the
other hand, we see that by faith many peoples are brought to the
acceptance of one common belief.
Ad quartum dicendum quod quandocumque acceptis aliquo modo
assentitur, oportet esse aliquid quod inclinet ad assensum, sicut
lumen naturaliter inditum in hoc quod assentitur primis principiis
per se notis et ipsorum principiorum veritas in hoc quod assentitur
conclusionibus scitis et aliquae verisimilitudines in hoc quod
assentimus his quae opinamur; quae si fuerint aliquantulum
fortiores, inclinant ad credendum, prout fides dicitur opinio
iuvata rationibus. Sed illud, quod inclinat ad assentiendum
principiis intellectis aut conclusionibus scitis, est sufficiens
inductivum et ideo etiam cogit ad assensum et est sufficiens ad
iudicandum de illis quibus assentitur. Quod vero inclinat ad
opinandum qualitercumque vel etiam fortiter, non est sufficiens
inductivum, unde nec cogit, nec per hoc potest perfectum haberi
iudicium de his quibus assentitur. Unde et in fide qua in Deum
credimus non solum est acceptio rerum quibus assentimus, sed
aliquid quod inclinat ad assensum; et hoc est lumen quoddam, quod
est habitus fidei, divinitus menti humanae infusum. Quod quidem
sufficientius est ad inducendum quam aliqua demonstratio, per quam
etsi numquam falsum concludatur, frequenter tamen in hoc homo
fallitur, quod putat esse demonstrationem quae non est. Est
sufficientius etiam quam ipsum lumen naturale quo assentimus
principiis, cum lumen illud frequenter impediatur ex corporis
infirmitate, ut patet in mente captis. Lumen autem fidei, quod est
quasi quaedam sigillatio primae veritatis in mente, non potest
fallere, sicut nec Deus potest decipi vel mentiri, unde hoc lumen
sufficit ad iudicandum. 4. It may be said: Whenever there is
acceptance of a truth, by whatever mode of assent, there must be
something which moves the mind to assent: just as the naturally
possessed light of the intellect causes assent to first principles,
and the truth of those first principles causes assent to
conclusions made from them; while in other ways we assent to things
of which we have an opinion, though, if motives were a little
stronger, they would incline us to belief, in so far as faith is
said to be opinion. But that which inclines the mind to assent to
the first principles of understanding or to conclusions known from
these principles is a sufficient induction which forces assent, and
is sufficient to judge of those things to which the mind gives its
assent. On the other hand, whatever inclines one to form an
opinion, even though with a good amount of conviction, is not that
sufficient form of induction whereby assent is forced, nor by
reason of it can there be perfect judgment of the things to which
assent is given. Therefore also in faith by which we believe in
God, not only is there acceptance of the truths to which we give
assent, but also something which inclines us to that assent; and
this is the special light which is the habit of faith, divinely
infused into the human mind. This, moreover, is more sufficient for
inducing belief than any demonstration, for, though from the latter
no false conclusions are reached, still man frequently errs in
this: that he thinks something is a demonstration which is not. The
light of faith is also more sufficient than the natural light of
reason by which we assent to first principles, since this natural
light is often impeded by bodily infirmity, as is evident in the
case of the. insane. But the light of faith, which is, as it were,
a kind of impression of the First Truth in our minds, cannot fail,
any more than God can deceive us or lie; therefore this light
suffices for making judgment.
Hic tamen habitus non movet per viam intellectus, sed magis per
viam voluntatis; unde non facit videre illa quae creduntur nec
cogit assensum, sed facit voluntarie assentire. Et sic patet quod
fides ex duabus partibus est a Deo, scilicet et ex parte interioris
luminis quod inducit ad assensum et ex parte rerum quae exterius
proponuntur, quae ex divina revelatione initium sumpserunt. Et haec
se habent ad cognitionem fidei sicut accepta per sensum ad
cognitionem principiorum, quia utrisque fit aliqua cognitionis
determinatio. Unde sicut cognitio principiorum accipitur a sensu et
tamen lumen quo principia cognoscuntur est innatum, ita fides est
ex auditu, et tamen habitus fidei est infusus. This habit of faith,
nevertheless, does not move us by way of intellectual
understanding, but more by way of the will; therefore it does not
make us comprehend those truths which we believe, nor does it force
assent, but it causes us to assent to them voluntarily. And thus it
is evident that faith comes in two ways: namely, from God by reason
of the interior light which induces assent, and also by reason of
those truths which are proposed exteriorly and take their source
from divine revelation. These latter are related to the knowledge
which is of faith as things known by the senses are to knowledge of
first principles, because in both cases there is a certain
determination given to cognition. Therefore, as cognition of first
principles is received by way of sense experience, and yet the
light by which those principles are known is innate, so faith comes
by way of hearing, and yet the habit of faith is infused.
Ad quintum dicendum quod vivere secundum rationem est bonum
hominis in quantum est homo, vivere autem praeter rationem potest
uno modo sonare in defectum, sicut est in illis qui vivunt secundum
sensum, et hoc est hominis malum. Alio modo potest sonare in
excessum, ut cum homo divina gratia adducitur in id quod est supra
rationem; et sic praeter rationem vivere non est hominis malum, sed
bonum supra hominem. Et talis est cognitio eorum quae sunt fidei,
quamvis et ipsa fides non omnibus modis sit praeter rationem; hoc
enim naturalis ratio habet, quod assentiendum est his quae a Deo
dicuntur. 5. It may be said: To live in accordance with reason is
the good of man inasmuch as he is man. Now, to live apart from
reason, according to one meaning, can be understood as a defect, as
it is in those who live according to sense; and this is an evil in
man. But in another way, it may mean to live above reason as when,
by divine grace, a man is led to that which exceeds reason: and in
this case, to live apart from reason is not an evil in man, but a
good above that which is human. And such is the cognition of truths
of faith, although faith itself is not in every way outside reason;
for, it is the natural reason which holds that assent ought to be
given to truths declared by God.
Article 2Whether Faith Should Be Distinguished from Religion
Articulus 2 Objections
Ad secundum sic proceditur, videtur quod fides a religione
distinguenda non sit, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in Enchiridion,
fide, spe et caritate colendus est Deus. Sed cultus Dei est actus
religionis, ut patet per diffinitionem Tullii qui dicit quod
religio est quae cuidam superiori naturae, quam divinam vocant,
cultum caerimoniamque affert. Ergo fides ad religionem pertinet. 1.
It seems that faith ought not to be distinguished from religion,
because, as Augustine says in Ench., God is to be worshiped by
faith, hope, and charity; but worship of God is an act of religion,
as is evident from the definition of Tullius, which says: Religion
is that which offers to a superior nature, which men call divine,
worship and ceremony; therefore faith pertains to religion.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro de vera religione quod vera
religio est qua unus Deus colitur et purgatissima pietate
cognoscitur. Sed cognoscere Deum est fidei. Ergo fides sub
religione continetur. 2. Augustine says in De vera religione: The
true religion is that by which the one God is honored and known
with a most unsullied piety or purity. But to know God is a thing
which belongs to faith; therefore, faith is contained under
religion.
Praeterea, offerre Deo sacrificium est actus religionis. Sed hoc
pertinet ad fidem, quia, ut dicit Augustinus in V de civitate Dei,
verum sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur, ut sancta societate
inhaereamus Deo. Prima autem inhaesio hominis ad Deum est per
fidem. Ergo fides ad religionem praecipue pertinet. 3. To offer
sacrifice to God is a function or act of religion, but this
pertains to faith, as Augustine says in IV De civ. Dei: True
sacrifice is any work done in order that we may adhere to God in
holy association; but the first adherence of man to God is by
faith; therefore faith pertains principally to religion.
Praeterea, ut dicitur Ioh. 4, spiritus est Deus, et eos, qui
adorant eum, in spiritu et veritate adorare oportet. Magis ergo
proprie adoratur Deus, cum ei prosternitur intellectus, quam cum ei
prosternitur corpus. Sed per fidem ei prosternitur intellectus, dum
se intellectus totaliter subicit ad assentiendum his quae a Deo
dicuntur. Ergo fides ad religionem maxime pertinet. 4. In John 4:24
it is said: God is a Spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore
Him in spirit and in truth. Now, God is adored more when one
submits his intellect to Him than when a bodily prostration is
made; but through faith the intellect is submitted to God, since it
subjects itself entirely in assenting to the truths revealed by
God; therefore faith pertains especially to religion.
Praeterea, omnis virtus, quae habet Deum pro obiecto, est virtus
theologica. Sed religio habet Deum pro obiecto; non enim nisi Deo
cultum debitum affert. Ergo est virtus theologica. Sed magis
videtur pertinere ad fidem quam ad aliquam aliarum, cum non
dicantur esse extra religionem Christianam nisi qui sunt extra
fidem. Ergo religio videtur idem esse quod fides. 5. Every virtue
having God as its object is a theological virtue: but religion has
God as its object, since it is nothing else than the offering of
due reverence to God; therefore it is a theological virtue. But it
appears to belong more to faith than to any of the others, since
only those are said to be outside the Christian religion who are
outside [i.e., without] faith; therefore religion seems to be the
same as faith.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod Tullius in II veteris rhetoricae ponit
religionem partem iustitiae, quae est virtus cardinalis. Ergo cum
fides sit virtus theologica, religio erit alterius generis quam
fides. On the contrary is what Tullius says in II Veteris
Rhetoricae, where he makes religion a part of justice, which is a
moral virtue. Therefore, since faith is a theological virtue,
religion is of a genus other than that of faith.
Praeterea, religio consistit etiam in actu qui est ad proximum,
ut patet Iac. 2: religio munda et immaculata et cetera. Sed fides
non habet actum nisi qui est ad Deum. Ergo religio est omnino a
fide distincta. Again, religion consists also in activity regarding
the neighbor, as is evident in Jas. 1:27: Religion clean and
undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit the
fatherless and widows in their tribulation; faith has no act except
that which is referred to God; therefore religion is altogether
distinct from faith.
Praeterea, religiosi dicuntur communiter, qui quibusdam
specialibus votis astringuntur. Non solum autem ipsi dicuntur
fideles. Ergo non est idem fidelis et religiosus. Ergo nec idem
fides et religio. Again, those are commonly called religious who
are bound by special vows, but they are not the only ones called 1.
the faithful. Since, therefore, one of the faith and a religious
are not the same thing, faith and religion are not the same.
Responsio. Dicendum quod, sicut patet per Augustinum X de
civitate Dei, theosebia quae cultus Dei dicitur, religio, pietas et
latria ad idem pertinere intelliguntur, scilicet ad Deum colendum.
Cultus autem cuilibet rei impensus nihil aliud esse videtur quam
debita operatio circa illud adhibita. Et ex hoc dicuntur aliqui
diversimode colere agros, parentes, patriam et alia huiusmodi, quia
diversis diversae operationes coaptantur. Deus autem non hoc modo
colitur, quod ei nostra operatio aliquid prosit aut subveniat,
sicut est in praedictis, sed solum in quantum nos ei subdimus et
subditos demonstramus. Hic ergo cultus divinus absolute nomine
theosebiae designatur. Sed religio importat quandam ligationem,
secundum quod homo quodammodo se astringit ad cultum istum; unde,
ut dicit Augustinus in libro de vera religione, religio a religando
dicta creditur, vel etiam a reeligendo, ut dicit in X de civitate
Dei. Ex propria enim electione aliquis ligatur ad aliquid
faciendum. Oportet autem nos eum reeligere quem amiseramus
neglegentes, ut ibidem dicit. Et inde est quod illi, qui vitam suam
totam et se ipsos ad divinum obsequium votis quibusdam obligant,
religiosi dicuntur. Sed pietas animum colentis respicit, qui non
ficte nec mercennario affectu obsequitur. Response. I answer that
it must be said that, as is evident from Augustine (X De civ. Dei),
theosebia, which the worship of God is called, includes as
pertaining to it in the same way, religion, piety and latria, since
all have as their purpose the worship of God. Reverence paid to
anything, however, seems to be nothing else than a due operation
performed with regard to it; and consequently men are said to
cherish in various ways their fields, their parents, their country,
and other like things because different works are fitting to each.
But God is not cherished in this same way: that any operation of
ours would be of benefit or assistance to Him, as in the case of
the above-mentioned instances; but it implies only that we submit
ourselves to Him and show ourselves to be His subjects. Therefore
this reverence which is absolutely divine is designated by the name
of theosebia. But religion implies a certain binding, back
according to which man obliges himself in some manner to this
worship of God; wherefore Augustine says in his book, De vera
religione: The word religion is thought to be derived from the
religare (to bind back), or from recte eligere (to choose rightly),
as is said in IV De civ. Dei. For it is by proper choice that a
person binds himself to do something that must be done. We must
also reelect those things which by negligence we have lost, as he
also says. Therefore it is that those who consecrate their whole
lives and themselves to the service of God by certain vows are
called religious; but piety regards the mind of the worshiper, that
it be not insincere or moved by desire of gain.
Et quia his, quae supra nos sunt, quasi quaedam divina veneratio
debetur, beneficia etiam quae miseris exhibentur sunt quasi quaedam
Dei sacrificia, secundum illud Hebr. ultimo: communionis et
beneficentiae nolite oblivisci, talibus enim hostiis promeretur
Deus, hinc est quod nomen pietatis et religionis ad opera
misericordiae transfertur et maxime ad beneficia quae in parentes
et patriam exhibentur. Sed latria importat debitum colendi sive
rationem cultus, ex hoc scilicet quod eius sumus servi quem
colimus, non hoc modo, quo homo servus hominis dicitur propter
quodcumque accidentale debitum, sed quia totum, quod sumus, ei
debemus tamquam creatori. Unde et latria servitus dicitur non
quaelibet, sed illa tantum, qua homo Dei servus est. Sic ergo
religio consistit in operatione, qua homo Deum colit se ei
subdendo. Quae quidem operatio debet esse conveniens et ei, qui
colitur, et colenti. Since also a certain divine veneration, as it
were, is due to those above us, even the acts of kindness which are
done for the unfortunate are in a way sacrifices to God, according
to the last part of the Epistle to the Hebrews (13: 16): And do not
forget to do good and to impart: for by such sacrifices Gods favor
is obtained. Hence it is that the name of piety and of religion are
transferred to works of mercy, and especially to benefits done to
parents and country. But latria implies a reverence that is of
obligation, or worship in its essence; and this is so because we
are, indeed, the subjects of Him whom we honor, not after the
manner in which one man is said to be the servant of another,
because of some accidental debt to him, but because all that we are
we owe to Him as our Creator. Therefore latria is not any kind of
service, but that by which man acknowledges his subjection to God.
Thus, therefore, religion consists in an operation by which man
honors God by submitting to Him; and this operation ought to be in
harmony with Him who is honored, and with the one offering
homage.
Ipse autem qui colitur, cum sit spiritus, non potest corpore,
sed sola mente contingi. Et sic cultus ipsius principaliter in
mentis actibus consistit, quibus mens ordinatur in Deum. Et hi sunt
praecipue actus theologicarum virtutum, et secundum hoc dicit
Augustinus quod Deus colitur fide, spe et caritate; et his
adiunguntur actus donorum tendentium in Deum, ut sapientiae et
timoris. Now since He who is reverenced is a spirit, He cannot be
approached by the body, but only by the mind; and so worship of Him
consists chiefly in acts of the mind by which the mind itself is
ordained to God. These acts are principally those of the
theological virtues; and in accordance with this, Augustine says
that God is worshiped by faith, hope, and charity, to which are
added also the acts of the gifts ordained toward God, such as those
of wisdom and of fear.
Sed quia nos, qui Deum colimus, corporei sumus et per corporeos
sensus cognitionem accipimus, inde est quod ex parte nostra
requiruntur ad cultum praedictum etiam aliquae corporales actiones,
tum ut ex toto quod sumus Deo serviamus, tum ut per huiusmodi
corporalia nos ipsos et alios excitemus ad actus mentis ordinatos
in Deum. Unde dicit Augustinus in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda:
orantes de membris sui corporis faciunt quod supplicantibus
congruit, cum genua figunt, cum extendunt manus vel prosternuntur
solo et si quid aliud visibiliter faciunt, quamvis eorum
invisibilis voluntas et cordis intentio Deo nota sit nec ille
indigeat his indiciis, ut animus pandatur humanus; sed hinc magis
se ipsum excitat homo ad orandum gemendumque humilius atque
ferventius. But because we who honor God are also possessed of
bodies and receive our knowledge through bodily senses, there is
the necessity that certain physical actions accompany the worship
of God, not only that we may render service to God with our whole
being, but also that by these bodily actions we may arouse in
ourselves and in others acts of the mind ordained to God. Wherefore
Augustine says in his book, De cura pro mortuis habenda: Those who
pray make the members of their bodies conform to their acts of
supplication when they genuflect, extend their hands, or prostrate
themselves upon the ground, or perform any other visible action;
and although it is their invisible will and the intention of the
heart that is known to God, it is not unseemly that the human soul
should so express itself, but rather by so doing man stirs himself
to pray and to lament his sins the more humbly and fervently.
Sic ergo omnes actus, quibus homo se Deo subdit, sive sint
mentis sive corporis, ad religionem pertinent. Sed quia ea, quae
proximis propter Deum impenduntur, ipsi Deo impenduntur, constat
quod pertinent ad eandem subiectionem, in qua cultus religionis
consistit. Et sic diligenter consideranti apparet omnem actum
huiusmodi ad religionem pertinere. Unde Augustinus dicit quod verum
sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur, ut sancta societate
inhaereamus Deo. Tamen quodam ordine. Primo namque et principaliter
ad cultum praedictum pertinent actus mentis ordinati in Deum.
Secundo actus corporis qui ad hos excitandos et designandos fiunt,
ut prostrationes, sacrificia et huiusmodi. Tertio ad eundem cultum
pertinent omnes alii actus in proximum ordinati propter Deum.
Hence, all acts by which man subjects himself to God, whether they
are acts of mind or of body, pertain to religion. But because those
things that are rendered to the neighbor on account of God are
rendered to God Himself, it is evident that they also pertain to
this same subjection in which religious worship consists; and so to
one diligently considering the matter it is apparent that every
good act pertains to religion. Hence Augustine says (loc. cit.):
True sacrifice is every work done that we may adhere to God in holy
companionship; however, in a certain order. First and foremost,
those acts of the mind ordained to God pertain to the worship which
we are speaking of. Secondly, there are acts of the body intended
to arouse reverence of mind or to give expression to it, such as
prostrations, sacrifices, and the like. Thirdly, there also pertain
to divine worship all other acts ordained to the neighbor for the
sake of God.
Et tamen sicut magnanimitas est specialis virtus, quamvis omnium
virtutum actibus utatur secundum specialem rationem obiecti, utpote
coniectans magnum in actibus omnium virtutum, ita et religio est
specialis virtus, in actibus omnium virtutum specialem rationem
obiecti considerans, scilicet Deo debitum; sic enim est iustitiae
pars. Illi tamen actus specialiter religioni assignantur, qui
nullius alterius virtutis sunt, sicut prostrationes et huiusmodi,
in quibus secundario Dei cultus consistit. Nevertheless, as
magnanimity is a certain special virtue, although it uses the acts
of all virtues, since it bestows a grandeur in the exercise of them
all and so regards its object under a certain special aspect; so
also religion is a special virtue in the acts of all the virtues,
considering a special aspect of its object, namely, that which is
due to God; and thus it forms a part of justice. There are,
moreover, special acts assigned to religion, which pertain to no
other virtue, such as prostrations and the like, in which the
worship of God consists secondarily.
Ex quo patet quod actus fidei pertinet quidem materialiter ad
religionem, sicut et actus aliarum virtutum, et magis, in quantum
actus fidei est primus motus mentis in Deum. Sed formaliter a
religione distinguitur, utpote aliam rationem obiecti considerans.
Convenit etiam fides cum religione praeter hoc, in quantum fides
est religionis causa et principium. Non enim aliquis eligeret
cultum Deo exhibere, nisi fide teneret Deum esse creatorem,
gubernatorem et remuneratorem humanorum actuum. From this it is
evident that acts of faith pertain, indeed, materially to religion,
as do the acts of other virtues, and the more so inasmuch as acts
of faith are the first motions of the mind toward God; but formally
faith is distinguished from religion, as regarding another aspect
of its object. Faith agrees with religion also because faith is the
cause and principle, of religion. For no one would elect to
manifest reverence to God unless by faith he held that God was the
Creator, Ruler, and Rewarder of human actions.
Ipsa tamen religio non est virtus theologica. Habet enim pro
materia quasi ipsos actus vel fidei vel alterius virtutis, quos Deo
tamquam debitos offert. Sed Deum habet pro fine. Colere enim Deum
est huiusmodi actus ut debitos Deo offerre. Nevertheless religion
is not a theological virtue: for it has as its matter all acts, as
those of faith or of any other virtue inasmuch as these are offered
as due to God; but it has God as its end. For to worship God is to
offer acts of this kind as due to God.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia obiecta. From what has been
said, the response to all the objections is evident.
Article 3Whether the Christian Religion Is Aptly Called Catholic
or Universal
Articulus 3 Objections
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides Christiana
Catholica nominari non debeat, quia cognitio debet esse
cognoscibili proportionata. Non enim quidlibet modo cognoscitur.
Sed fides est cognitio Dei, qui neque est universalis neque
particularis, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Trinitate. Ergo nec
fides debet universalis dici. 1. It seems that the Christian
religion ought not be called Catholic, because knowledge must be
proportionate to the knowability of a thing. Now an indefinite
thing is not known in any way at all: but faith is a knowledge of
God who is neither universal nor particular, as Augustine says in
his book, De Trinitate; therefore this religion cannot be called
universal.
Praeterea. De singularibus non potest esse nisi singularis
cognitio. Sed fide quaedam singularia facta tenemus, ut passionem
Christi, resurrectionem et huiusmodi. Ergo fides non debet dici
universalis. 2. One can have only singular knowledge about singular
things; but by faith we hold the truth of certain singular facts,
as the Passion and Resurrection of Christ, and the like; therefore
the Christian faith cannot be called universal.
Praeterea, ab eo quod est commune multis non debet proprium
nomen alicui eorum imponi, cum nomen causa innotescendae rei
imponatur. Sed quaelibet traditio vel secta proponit ea quae tradit
ut universaliter ab omnibus credenda vel observanda et ut
universaliter vera. Ergo non debet fides Christiana specialiter
Catholica dici. 3. From what is common to many, it is not
permissible to impose a name as proper to any one of them, since a
name is given in order that a thing may be known as distinct: but
every school or sect proposes certain things that must be
universally held by all its followers, or certain doctrines that
must be universally affirmed as true; therefore the Christian
religion has no special right to be called Catholic.
Praeterea, idolatria ad omnes mundi angulos pervenit. Sed
Christiana fides nondum invenitur ad omnes mundi fines pervenisse,
cum aliqui barbari sint, qui fidem Christi non cognoscant. Ergo
idolatriae secta magis debet dici Catholica quam Christiana fides.
4. Idolatry extends to every corner of the earth; but the Christian
religion has not yet been brought to all the regions of the world,
since there are yet some barbarians who do not know the faith of
Christ; therefore these idolatrous sects, rather than the Christian
religion, deserve the name of Catholic.
Praeterea, quod non convenit omnibus, non potest dici
universale. Sed fides Christiana a multis non recipitur. Ergo
inconvenienter Catholica vel universalis dicitur. 5. What does not
include all should not be called universal; but the Christian
religion is not accepted by many; therefore it is inaptly called
universal or Catholic.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus in libro de vera religione:
tenenda est nobis Christiana religio et eius Ecclesiae
communicatio, quae Catholica est et Catholica nominatur non solum a
suis, verum etiam ab omnibus inimicis. On the contrary is that
which Augustine says in De vera religione: The Christian religion
must be held by us, and the communication of that Church which is
catholic and which is called Catholic, not only by its own members,
but even by its enemies.
Praeterea, universale et commune idem esse videtur. Sed fides
Christiana ab apostolo communis fides dicitur, ut patet Tit. 1:
Tito dilecto filio secundum communem fidem et cetera. Ergo
convenienter potest dici universalis vel Catholica. Again,
universal and common appear to be the same; but the Christian faith
is called the common faith by the Apostle (Titus 1:4): To Titus, my
beloved son according to the common faith; therefore it is rightly
called Catholic.
Praeterea, illud, quod universaliter omnibus proponitur, maxime
debet dici universale. Sed fides Christiana omnibus proponitur, ut
patet Matth. ultimo: docete omnes gentes et cetera. Ergo ipsa
merito debet dici Catholica vel universalis. Again what is
universally proposed to all should in a special way be called
universal; but the Christian faith is universally proposed to all,
as is evident in the last chapter of Matthew (28:19), Teach all
nations, etc.; therefore it is deservedly called Catholic or
universal.
Responsio. Dicendum quod fides sicut et quaelibet alia cognitio
duplicem habet materiam, scilicet in qua, id est ipsos credentes,
et de qua, id est res creditas, et ex parte utriusque materiae
fides Christiana Catholica dici potest. Response. I answer that it
must be said that faith, just as any other cognition, has a twofold
matter: namely, that in which it exists (the believers themselves)
and that about which it is concerned (the truths believed); and as
regards both types of matter, the Christian religion can be called
Catholic.
Ex parte quidem credentium, quia illam fidem veram asserit
apostolus Rom. 3, quae est testificata a lege et prophetis. Cum
autem prophetarum tempore diversae gentes diversorum deorum
cultibus insisterent, solus autem populus Israel Deo vero cultum
debitum exhiberet, et sic non esset una universalis religio,
praedixit per eos spiritus sanctus cultum veri Dei ab omnibus esse
assumendum. Unde dicitur Is. 45: mihi curva