Succession for 21 March.docx
XII. 13th week (acceptance and repudiation of the inheritance;
executors and administrators)Study: Civil Code, articles
1041-1069Read:1. Ignacio v. Martinez- YAPFacts: Crispulo Martinez,
the deceased husband of Dolores Arce Ignacio and father of the
minor Arsenio Martinez, was a brother of Felisa Martinez and uncle
of Juan Martinez, the defendants. The plaintiff's ward and the
defendants were the owners in equal parts of the undivided real
estate described in the complaint.Dolores Arce Ignacio, as the
guardian of her minor son, instituted this action for the purpose
of having the property divided and the one-third part belonging to
the minor turned over to her. The defendant, Felisa Martinez,
alleged that she and her deceased husband bought Crispulo Martinez'
interest in the property in question in 1908. Defendants paid for
the educational fees of Crispulo and in return the latter renounce
and assigned to the former his undivided interest in the subject
property left by their parents.The contract was signed and
notarized when Crispulo was living with his sister, Felisa,
separate from his wife and son on account of bad feeling then
existing between them, and that on the very day that that date, he
requested his wife, in the presence of Felisa to send for a person
to make his will, as he wished to annul the contract, and that
Felisa then stated to him that it was not necessary for him to make
his will for that purpose as she had already destroyed the
document. Felisa has administered the property since the execution
of the contract.Issue WON there was a valid repudiationRuling:
No.Under the Civil Code, repudiation of the inheritance is an act
entirely voluntary and free, made without consideration. An heir
cannot renounce his inheritance in favor of a designated heir or
heirs, or any other persons. Neither can an heir renounce or
repudiate his inheritance so as to relieve himself of all liability
after he had accepted the inheritance, without the benefit of an
inventory, and had received the products therefrom as such heir.
Acts of mere conservation or professional administration do not
constitute an acceptance of the inheritance.In the instant case,
Crispulo Martinez had, by taking possession of the property,
exercising act of dominion over it, and receiving products
therefrom for a period of more than eight years, accepted the
inheritance without the benefit of an inventory. He "renounced" his
interest in favor of designed persons, one of whom was not an heir
of his deceased parents, and for a valuable consideration. The
word" renounce," used in paragraph 4 of the document does not,
under the terms of the document, constitute must be considered
together. Words, phrases or clauses cannot be segregated and given
a meaning which is contrary to the terms of the entire document.
"The whole contract must be interpreted or read together in order
to arrive at its true meaning.2. Guy v. CA - AQUINOFacts:1. The
special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of
Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and
Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged illegitimate
children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Makati
City.2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with
his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition
alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be
settled without the issuance of letters administration. The other
heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the
certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by
Remedios and not by counsel.
3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and
waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in
exchange for financial and educational assistance from the
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate
of the decedent from any and all liabilities.4. The lower court
denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental
motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian
of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver.
It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of
non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the
lower court. Hence, this petition.Issue: Whether or not a guardian
can validly repudiate the inheritance the wardsRULING: No,
repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and
guardians must necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of
inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the
best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court,
the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the
private-respondents could not have waived their supposed right as
they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the
decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a
right which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.As
to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirsThe court is
not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the
claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of
letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the
determination of heirship included. As held in previous decision,
two causes of action may be brought together in one complaint, one
a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance. (Briz
v. Briz)3. Sison v. Azarraga - BISNAR Isidro Azarraga executed a
will, wherein he instituted his son, Leodegario as his executor. In
his will, he also left some of his properties to Leodegario and
instituted his grandchildren, Maria Felisa and Jesus, as universal
heirs. Maria Felis and Jesus were children of his daughter,
Filomena. Tomas Sison, guardian of the minor grandchildren, filed a
motion to remove Leodegario as executor for having collected large
sums of money belonging to the estate in his care and in paying
them out without authorization of the court. He further argued that
the grandchildren were in danger of losing their interests and
claims in the estate. Leodegario however argued that the amounts he
collected belonged to him, as they were proceeds of his machinery
that were sold by Isidro. Issue: Whether Leodegario, as executor,
can make payments of his claims from the estate? Ruling: No. It is
improper for the executor to make payments to himself and to take
possession of the property of the deceased that he might claim from
the estate. The executor who alleges that he has claims against the
estate in his care in under the obligation, to give notice thereof,
in writing to the court, so that a special administrator may be
appointed to adjust his claim; this the appellant has not done.
4. Mercado v. Vda. De Jaen- CLETOFacts: Monsignor Juan Bautista
Perfecto Gorordo, retired Bishop of Cebu, died in Cebu on December
20, 1934. He left a will instituting his sister, Maria Gorordo
Viuda de Jaen, as the universal heir to his estate, and in case of
her death, his nieces Telesfora Jaen and Cesarea Gorordo Revilles.
He bequeathed part of his estate to the various persons and
entities mentioned in his will, and named Father Emiliano Mercado,
parish priest of San Nicolas, Cebu, as executor, and in the absence
of the latter Father Alejandro Espina, parish priest of the Cebu
Cathedral. The will of the deceased bishop was probated without
opposition and consequently the Court of First Instance of Cebu
confirmed the appointment of Father Emiliano Mercado as executor
after the latter filed a bond of P5,000. The heirs Maria Gorordo
Viuda de Jaen, Telesfora Jaen and Cesarea Gorordo de Revilles
instituted in the will, however, excepted to the order of February
15, 1935, appointing Father Emiliano Mercado as the executor. The
lower court denied their motion, hence the present appeal. The
appellants' opposition to the appointment of Father Mercado was
based on his alleged unfitness and incapacity to discharge the
duties of executor for the following reasons:o (1) That
notwithstanding the appellants' opposition, he contracted the
services of Attorneys Hipolito Alo and Gabino R. Veloso to
represent him in these proceedings for the sole purpose of repaying
the obligations he owed said Attorney Alo;o (2) that he cannot be
impartial as executor because the church of San Nicolas of which he
is parish priest is one of the legatees named in the will. It being
natural that as such parish priest he would favor the interests of
his parish to those of the heir and the other legatees, and above
all, he is related to some of the legatees;o (3) that as the estate
has no debts and the heirs instituted in the will are all of age
and are willing, according to them, to secure payment of all the
legacies, there is no necessity of making the estate incur such
unnecessary expenses as the executor's fees and expenses and his
attorneys' fees;o (4) that the appellants are better able to
protect the interests of the estate; ando (5) that Attorney
Margarito E. Revilles, married to the heir Cesarea Gorordo, is
willing to render professional services to the estate free of
charge. In support of these allegations, the appellants pointed out
that the named executor hired Attorney Alo, to whom he is under
obligation, in order to be able to repay him in some way not with
his own money but with the money of the estate, thereby insinuating
that he lacks the interest which a good executor must have for the
protection of the rights and interest of the estate entrusted to
him. Issue:W/N Fr. Espina is unfit or unworthy of the trust of
being named executor of the estate. NO. Held: When the retired
bishop Monsignor Juan Bautista Perfecto Gorordo chose Father
Emiliano Mercado as executor and administrator of his estate after
his death, he must have had good and sufficient reasons therefore,
and his will must be respected. The evidence shows that when the
deceased bishop made his will naming said priest in preference to
anybody else, he was in the full enjoyment of his intellectual
faculties. Under the circumstances, it is not only just but also
right to fully comply with his last will In order for the court to
exercise its power to not appoint the named executor, the
unworthiness, incapacity, ineptitude and unfitness of such person
must be manifest and real and not merely imaginary. The evidence
shows that Attorneys Alo and Veloso were engaged by Father Emiliano
Mercado not as attorneys for the estate but as his own, in his
capacity as petitioner for the probate of the will of Bishop
Monsignor Juan Bautista Perfecto Gorordo. It shows further that the
special agreement he had with said attorneys was to the effect that
their fees would only be that determined and fixed by the court.
The appellants' allegation that Father Mercado cannot be impartial
as executor because the church of which he is the parish priest is
to receive a legacy of P10,000 under the will, is untenable. His
parish is not a legatee as all that the will provides with respect
to said sum of P10,000 is as follows:To the poor of Cebu, Opon, and
San Nicolas, I bequeath ten thousand pesos (P10,000) under the
administration and at the discretion of whomsoever may be the Most
Reverend Bishop of the Diocese. The foregoing provision does not
give Father Mercado as executor, even the right to intervene in the
distribution and disposition of the funds in question. The
appellants' proposition not to name any executor to save the estate
unnecessary expenses, as the testator left no debts and the heirs
on the other hand, are willing to secure payment of the legacies,
is untenable. The will contains so many provisions, there are so
many legacies to deliver and pay, and it is premature to assert
that the estate has no obligation or debt to pay. Thus, it is
necessary to have an executor to take charge of the estate so as to
protect the interests thereof and later enforce compliance with the
will of the testator. The appellants' last proposition that they
and Attorney Margarito E. Revilles could look after the interests
of the estate better than Father Mercado and attorneys Alo and
Veloso, is likewise untenable. The estate in their hands would be
no more immune from irregularities, and the interests of the
legatees amounting to more than those of the heirs would not be
better taken care of because of what may be inferred from the
incident which took place during the preparation of the inventory
of the estate left by the testator.
5. Liwanag v. CA - FERNANDEZ Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is
the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D. Liwanag
Respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her as such special
administratrix, Civil Case No. 50897 of the same court, for the
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage constituted in his favor by
said Pio D. Liwanag during his lifetime petitioner moved to dismiss
Agregado's complaint, upon the ground that as special
administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor of the deceased.
WON petitioner, as special administrator, can be sued? Yes Section
7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor
holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or
other collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (1)
abandon his security and prosecute his claim and share in the
general distribution of the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his
mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court, making
the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a
deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may prove
the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely
exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the
ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon
the mortgage, he shall not...share in the distribution of the
assets.Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second
remedy, having filed his action for foreclosure against the
administratrix of the property.The Rules of Court do not expressly
prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit
against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse
effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases
where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So
that if We are not to deny the present action on this technical
ground alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator will
be delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted
will be defeated.
6. Pacific Commercial Co. v. Sotto - FORTES Pacific Commercial
v. Mauricia Sotto (1916)By Roselle Fortes-Leung Doctrine: if a
final judgment is obtained by a creditor against the estate of a
deceased person represented by a special administrator, such
judgment must be satisfied by the regular administrator or executor
out of the funds of the estate. Facts: Mauricia Sotto is the
administratrix of the estate of Claro Ong Pacific Commercial was a
supplier of La Fortuna Bakery It delivered merchandise amounting to
P3,303.75 P1,200 was paid Balance was P2,103.75 Claro Ong was the
owner of La Fortuna Bakery Ong sold the bakery to Mamerto Laudico
who later on sold it to Matias Ubaldo. Both Laudico and Ubaldo
assumed all liabilities Pacific knew about the sale to Laudico but
not of the sale to Ubaldo The 3rd owner, Ubaldo made several
payments to Pacific but P399 remains unpaid When the original owner
died, Pacific Commercial presented its claim to commissioners of
Ongs estate Commissioners denied claim of Pacific But trial court
allowed the claim and found Ongs estate liable Defense of the
estate of Claro Ong: Mauricia Sotto is merely a special
administratrix Hence not liable to an action by creditor to pay any
debts of the deceased
WON: 1. The estate of Ong is liable? YES2. A special
administratrix is allowed to pay the estates debt? - No HELD:
Record fails to disclose any attempt whatever on the part of Claro
Ong to be released from his obligation to pay the plaintiff the
amount in question. There was no novation as Pacific did not
consent to the substitution of Ubaldo as new debtor The fact that
Mauricia Sotto is only the special administratrix cannot prejudice
in any way the interests of the estate which she represents. The
correctness of the plaintiffs claim has been fully considered by
the court below after hearing and the presentation of all the
testimony by both parties. The claim of debtor, Pacific Commercial
shall be paid by the regular administrator of the estate of Claro
Ong.
7. Anderson v. Perkins - ITARALDEDOCTRINES: 1) special
administrators function is to preserve not only the property of the
decedents estate but also its value. 2) The sale of alleged
personal estate of the deceased husband cannot be authorized where
his widow claims some items as conjugal or are her own property -
the conjugal partnership must first be liquidated and the issue of
ownership adjudicated.FACTS : Dora Perkins Anderson filed a
petition for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of
the late Eugene Arthur Perkins and the appointment of Alfonso Ponce
Enrile as special administrator of the estate. Court approved
appointment of special administrator upon his posting of a bond.
Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an
opposition to the probate of the will presented by petitioner Dora
Perkins Anderson.The special administrator submitted an inventory
of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to
the deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death. 2
years later, he submitted to the court a petition seeking authority
to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution
or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased,
such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which
were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order
to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value
might be obtained in their dispositionIdonah Slade opposition
Perkins filed an to the proposed sale reasoning that (1) most of
the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of
herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized removal
of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been
made.Lower court approved the proposed sale, authorizing the
Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same. Idonah Slade Perkins moved
to reconsider this order on the grounds, among others, that said
order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels
sought to be sold were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2,
Rules of Court; and that the personalty sought to be sold
represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor;
ISSUES: 1) WON the personal properties sought to be sold not being
perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority to
sell them? 2.) WON the opposition of the surviving spouse of the
deceased that she is entitled to a large portion of the personal
properties in question should be entertained ?HELD: 1. Section 2,
Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that the
special administrator "may sell such perishable and other property
as the court orders sold", which shows that the special
administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable"
property only. It is true that the function of a special
administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased until a regular administrator is appointed. But it is not
alone the specific property of the estate which is to be preserved,
but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale
by a special administrator of perishable property. It is in line
with this general power of the special administrator to preserve
not only the property of the estate but also its value, that
section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell "other
property as the court ordered sold" .2.Indeed the records show that
up to the time the propose sale was asked for and judicially
approved, no proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to
segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant
from the mass of the estate supposedly left by the deceased or to
liquidate the conjugal partnership property of the
oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of
the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and
decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an
agreement be reached with a appellant as to which properties of the
conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve
their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all, most
of the items sought to be sold pieces of furniture, kitchen and
dinner ware, electrical appliances, various gadget and books can
easily be protected and preserved with proper care and storage
measures in either or both of two residential houses (in Manila and
in Baguio City) left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme
urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong
opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be
adjudged owner of a substantial portion of the personal estate in
question.3.It does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable
opportunity to point out which items in the inventory she did not
want sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and later
her motion for reconsideration to the order approving the same were
overruled by the court without so much as stating reasons why the
grounds for her opposition were not well-founded; the records do
not even show that an inquiry was made as to the validity of the
grounds of her opposition.8. Torres v. Javier - KUNGIt appears that
two women are claiming to be the legal wife of Tan Po Pic,
deceased, Marta Torres and a Chinese woman named Yu Teng New. Marta
Torres objected to the appointment of any one except herself, while
Juan Cailles Tan Poo, on behalf of the Chinese woman, opposed the
appointment of Marta Torres. The probate court being unable to
determine who, if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased,
appointed a disinterested third person to act as
administrator.ISSUES/RULINGS1. The first error assigned is that the
court erred in allowing Tan Y. Soc to appear in the proceeding.It
appears that Tan Y. Soc was appointed administrator of the said Tan
Po Pic, deceased, the Court of First Instance of Manila under the
misapprehension that Tan Po Pic was a resident of the city of
Manila at the time of his death. After it had been ascertained that
the deceased was a resident of the Province of Rizal, the Court of
First Instance of Manila transferred the case to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. In that court, as we have already seen, the
appointment by the Court of First Instance of Manila was
disregarded the proceedings were begun for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court of First Instance of Rizal.2. The second
error assigned is that the court erred in taking into consideration
the claim that Tan Po Pic, deceased, had a Chinese wife in China.It
must be remembered that the probate court did not find as a fact
that there was a wife in China; nor does his appointment of a third
person determine the fact of the existence of another wife in
China. The court considered the facts and circumstances as they
were presented in the proceedings and upon the whole believed it
for the best interest of all concerned to appoint as administrator
a disinterested third person, particularly in view of the fact that
there was likely to be litigation between Marta Torres and the
Chinese wife as to which is in fact his legal wife and entitled to
an interest in the estate of the deceased Tan Po Pic. We do not
find the errors assigned sufficient to warrant any action on the
part of this court.3. The third error assigned is to the effect
that the trial court erred in not finding that Marta Torres was the
lawful wife of the deceased Tan Po Pic.We do not believe the court
erred in this respect. The court had a right in view of the
controversy between the women to name a disinterested third person
as administrator and leave the controversy between them to be
settled in the administration proceedings at the proper time.We are
of the opinion that the decision of the probate court is so far
correct that it must be affirmed. Section 642 of the Code of Civil
Procedure requires that letters of administration should be
granted, first, to the surviving husband or wife; second, to other
relatives in the order named; third, in case the surviving wife or
next of kin or person selected by them be unsuitable, the
administration may be granted to some other person, such as one of
the principal creditors; and fourth, if there is no such creditor
competent and willing to serve, the administration may go to such
person as the court may appoint.
9. Esler v. Tad-Y -YAPFacts:Vicente Tad-Y died leaving a will
survived by his wife and son. The will cannot be admitted to
probate because in its execution the solemnities required by the
law were not complied with. Hence, an intestate proceeding was
instituted.The Court appointed Locsin as special administrator, he
being one of the persons named by the testator Vicente Tad-y as
executors in his will.Esler alleged that the trial court erred in
appointing Manuel Locsin as administrator in this proceeding
without the consent of Rosario Esler Vda. de Tad-Y and the minor
Jose E. Tad-Y.Issue: WON Court erred in appointing Locsin as
administratorRuling: No.After considering the reason given in the
briefs of both parties, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
the appeal is groundless. If the administrator Manuel Locsin was
appointed by the court as special administrator, section 660 of the
Code of Civil Procedure does not permit any appeal from the
appointment of said administrator. If Manuel Locsin was appointed
by the trial court as administrator of the intestate estate in
accordance with section 642 of Act No. 190, the trial court had
discretion to issue the letters of administrator to any of the
persons mentioned in said section, and unless there has been an
abuse of discretion, which does not appear to have been committed
in the present case, the appointment shall not be revoked on
appeal.10. Johannesburg v. Harvey - AQUINO CARMEN THEODORA JOHANNES
died intestate in Singapore. His heirs are: B.E Johannes, husband,
Frederick Charles, Alfred, and Ida DAlmeida, her siblings. All the
heirs lives in Singapore except for brother Alfred. B.E Johannes
was appointed as administrator of the properties of the deceased
situated in Singapore by the SC Straits Settlements in Singapore.
Alfred, on the other hand, was appointed administrator of Manila
estate deposits in Manila banks previously under guardianship by
Phil. Trust Company amounting to P109,732.55. The other heirs filed
a petition to annul the appointment of Alfred and to issue an order
directing Judge George Harvey to give it to B.E Johannes as lawful
administrator. They claim that Judge Harvey gravely abused its
discretion. Issue: Whether the Judge correctly appointed Alfred as
administrator of Manila estate of Carmen.HELD: Yes. It is often
necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a
person dies intestate owning property in the country of his
domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in
both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of
decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration,
while any other administration is termed the ancillary
administration. The reason for the ancillary adminstration is
because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have
any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted.
The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies,
leaving in a country other than that of his las domicile, property
to be administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable
for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs. The
principal administration in this instance is that at the domicile
of the late Carmen Theodora Johannes in Singapore, Straits
Settlements. What is sought in the Philippine Islands is an
ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary
administration, conformable to the provisions of sections 601, 602,
and 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The proper course of
procedure would be for the ancillary administrator to pay the
claims of creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and
remit the surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction, for distribution
among the next of kin. It is almost a universal rule to give the
surviving spouse a preference when an administrator is to be
appointed, unless for strong reasons it is deemed advisable to name
someone else. While naming the surviving husband or wife, as the
case may be, as one to whom administration can be granted, leaves
this to the discretion of the court to determine, for it may be
found that the surviving spouse is unsuitable for the
responsibility. Moreover, nonresidence is a factor to be considered
in determining the propriety of the appointment, and in this
connection, it is to be noted that the husband of the deceased, the
administrator of the principal administration, resides in
Singapore. Ancillary letters should ordinarily be granted to the
domicilliary representative, if he applies therefor, or to his
nominee, or attorney; but in the absence of express statutory
requirement the court may in its discretion appoint some other
person. Pursuant to section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an
order of a Court of First Instance appointing an administration of
the estate of a deceased person constitutes a final determination
of the rights of the parties thereunder, within the meaning of the
statute, and is appealable.
11. Moran Sison v. Teodoro - BISNARFacts: Carlos Moran Sison was
appointed judicial administrator, without compensation, of the
estate of Margarita David, and was required to file a bond before
assuming his duties. Sison filed a bond in the amount of P5,000 and
assumed his duties. 1955: Sison filed an accounting of his
administration, wherein, he included of the expenses of
administration the amount he had paid Visayan Surety &
Insurance Corporation for the renewal of his bond. Narcisa F.
Teodoro, one of the heirs, objected, claiming that the sums paid
for renewal of Sisons bond was not a necessary expenses of
administration and should not be charged to the estate. Issue:
Whether a judicial administrator serving without compensation, is
entitled to charge as an expense of administration the premiums
paid on his bond? Ruling: No. Position of an executor or
administrator is one of trust. It is proper for the law to
safeguard the estates of deceased persons by requiring the
administrator to give a suitable bond, and that the ability to give
this bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office. The
ability to give this bond is in the nature of a qualification for
the office. The execution and approval of the bond constitute a
condition precedent to acceptance of the responsibilities of the
trust. If an individual does not desire to assume the position of
executor or administrator, he may refuse to do so. It is
far-fetched to conclude that the giving of a bond by an
administrator is an necessary expense in the care, management and
settlement of the estate within the meaning of the law, because
these expenses are incurred "after the executor or administrator
has met the requirement of the law and has entered upon the
performance of his duties.12. Joson v. Joson - CLETOFacts: Tomas
Joson died on July 5, 1945 in Quezon, Nueva Ecija leaving behind
heirs and properties. He married three times and was survived by
nine (9) heirs: two (2) children and grandchildren by his first
wife Eufemia de la Cruz; two (2) daughters by his second wife
Pomposa Miguel and his third wife and surviving widow Dominga M.
Joson. Upon his death, his will was presented to the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija by his son Felicisimo Joson for probate. In
August, 1945, said will having been duly probated, Felicisimo Joson
was appointed administrator of the estate and, accordingly, he
filed an inventory of the properties left by the deceased. The
administrator prepared accounts that were never approved by the
court. Eduardo Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition to all
the accounts filed by the administrator where he alleged that the
administrator diminished the shares of the heirs in the yearly
produce of the properties and had padded his expenses of
administration. In the meantime, the heirs were able to compromise
their differences and entered into an extrajudicial settlement and
partition of the entire estate. This settlement was contained in
two documents wherein they manifested that they are entering into
it because of their desire to put an end to the judicial proceeding
and administration. But, as the court was never informed of this
extrajudicial settlement either by the administrator or by the
heirs, it issued an order requiring the administrator to file an
accounting of his administration from 1949 to 1954, which
accordingly the administrator complied with. However, on November
25, 1954, without said accounts having been heard or approved, the
administrator filed a motion to declare the proceedings closed and
terminated and to relieve him of his duties as such. Heir Eduardo
Joson filed an opposition to said motion but, after hearing, the
court issued an order declaring the proceedings terminated and
relieving the administrator not only of his duties as such but also
of his accounts notwithstanding the heirs' opposition to said
accounts. According to the trial court, the report of the
administrator is a mere incident in the proceeding to wind up the
estate of the deceased, and If the parties concerned have already
entered into an extra-judicial settlement of the estate, the same
should put an end to this proceeding. Once this proceeding is
terminated, the incidents thereto must yield, since the only
purpose of submitting a report of the accounts by the administrator
is to facilitate the liquidation. The trial court also said that
the administration of an estate cannot be an end but only a means
of settlement of the estate, and therefore, calling on the
administrator to account for his administration becomes unnecessary
from the moment that the heirs have already entered into an
extra-judicial settlement.Issue:(1) Is the duty of an administrator
to make an accounting of his administration a mere incident, which
can be avoided once the estate has been settled? No.(2) Are the
proceedings deemed terminated by the mere execution of an
extrajudicial partition of the estate without the necessity of
having the accounts of the administrator heard and approved by the
court? No.(3) Is the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty
of proving his account from the moment said partition has been
executed? No. Held:There is merit in the petition. Section 1 of
Rule 86 categorically charges an administrator "with the whole of
the estate of the deceased which has come into his possession at
the value of appraisement contained in the inventory; with all the
interest, profit, and income of such an estate; and with the
proceeds of so much of the estate as is hold by him, at the price
at which sold." Section 8 of the same rule imposes upon him the
duty to render an account of his administration within one year
from his appointment, unless the court otherwise directs, as well
as to render such further accounts as the court may require until
the estate is fully settled. Section 10 provides that before an
account of the administrator is allowed notice shall be given to
all persons interested of the time and place of examining and
allowing the same. Section 9 expressly directs that the court shall
examine the administrator upon oath with respect to every matter
relating to his account except when no objection is made to the
allowance of the account and its correctness is satisfactorily
established by competent testimony. The duty of an administrator to
render an account is not a mere incident of an administration
proceeding which ran be waived or disregarded when the same is
terminated; rather, it is a duty that has to be performed and duly
acted upon by the court before the administration is finally
ordered closed and terminated. When the administrator moved the
court to close the proceedings and relieve him of his
administration and of his accounts, the heirs who objected thereto
objected likewise to the closing of the proceedings invoking their
right to be heard but the court ignored their opposition and
granted the motion setting forth as reasons therefor what we quoted
in the early part of this decision. The fact that all the heirs of
the estate have entered into an extrajudicial settlement and
partition in order to put an end to their differences cannot be
interpreted as a waiver of the objections of the heirs to the
accounts submitted by the administrator, especially when there is
nothing provided in said partition that the aforesaid accounts
shall be deemed waived or condoned. This is more so when, according
to the oppositors, the administrator has committed in his accounts
a shortage in the amount of P132,600.00 which certainly cannot just
be brushed aside by a mere technicality. The case should be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
13. Chua v. Absolute Management Corp - FERNANDEZDoctrine: In
compliance with this duty, the court also has the inherent power to
determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased the
administrator should include or exclude in the inventoryFacts:
Betty T. Chua was appointed as administratrix of the intestate
estate of the deceased Jose L. Chua. Thereafter, she submitted to
the trial court an inventory of all the real and personal
properties of the deceased.1awphi1.ntOne of the creditors of the
deceased, [herein respondent] Absolute Management Corporation,
filed a claim on [sic] the estateAbsolute Management Corporation
noticed that the deceaseds shares of stocks with Ayala Sales
Corporation and Ayala Construction Supply, Inc. were not included
in the inventory of assets.Absolute Management Corporation,
suspecting that the documents attached to Betty T. Chuas reply were
spurious and simulated, filed a motion for the examination of the
supposed transferees. xxx It premised its motion on Section 6, Rule
87CA ruling:the Court of Appeals pointed out that the presentation
of the deeds of assignment executed by the decedent in petitioners
favor does not automatically negate the existence of concealment.
The appellate court stated that it is a common occurrence in estate
proceedings for heirs to execute simulated deeds of transfer which
conceal and place properties of the decedent beyond the reach of
creditors.The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals reads:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated
February 7, 2000 of respondent Judge Manuel P. Dumatol is hereby
SET ASIDE. He is hereby ORDERED to give due course to petitioners
"Motion for the Examination of the Administratrix and Others" and
thereafter, to dispose of the claim accordingly.Issue: The issue in
this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the
trial court to give due course to the Motion for Examination?
YesHeld: Section 6 of Rule 87 seeks to secure evidence from persons
suspected of having possession or knowledge of the properties left
by a deceased person, or of having concealed, embezzled or conveyed
any of the properties of the deceased.16The court which acquires
jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the
filing of the corresponding proceedings has supervision and control
over these properties. The trial court has the inherent duty to see
to it that the inventory of the administrator lists all the
properties, rights and credits which the law requires the
administrator to include in his inventory. In compliance with this
duty, the court also has the inherent power to determine what
properties, rights and credits of the deceased the administrator
should include or exclude in the inventory. An heir or person
interested in the properties of a deceased may call the courts
attention that certain properties, rights or credits are left out
from the inventory. In such a case, it is likewise the courts duty
to hear the observations of such party. The court has the power to
determine if such observations deserve attention and if such
properties belong prima facie to the estate.However, in such
proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whether the
properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or to the
persons examined. If after such examination there is good reason to
believe that the person examined is keeping properties belonging to
the estate, then the administrator should file an ordinary action
in court to recover the same. Inclusion of certain shares of stock
by the administrator in the inventory does not automatically
deprive the assignees of their shares. They have a right to be
heard on the question of ownership, when that property is properly
presented to the court.In the present case, some of the transferees
of the shares of stock do not appear to be heirs of the decedent.
Neither do they appear to be parties to the intestate proceedings.
Third persons to whom the decedents assets had been conveyed may be
cited to appear in court and examined under oath as to how they
came into possession of the decedents assets. In case of fraudulent
conveyances, a separate action is necessary to recover these
assets.Taken in this light, there is no reason why the trial court
should disallow the examination of the alleged transferees of the
shares of stocks. This is only for purposes of eliciting
information or securing evidence from persons suspected of
concealing or conveying some of the decedents properties to the
prejudice of creditors. Petitioners admission that these persons
are the decedents assignees does not automatically negate
concealment of the decedents assets on their part. The assignment
might be simulated so as to place the shares beyond the reach of
creditors. In case the shares are eventually included in the
estate, this inventory is merely provisional and is not
determinative of the issue of ownership. A separate action is
necessary for determination of ownership and recovery of
possession
14. Salonga Hernandez v. Pascual - FORTESSalonga Hernandez v.
Pascual (2006)by Roselle Fortes-LeungDoctrine: Administrator or
executor primarily liable for attorneys fees subject to
reimbursement from the estate. When direct recovery of the
attorneys fees is made on the estate rather than on the
administrator or executor, proper notice must be given to all heirs
of the decedent In short, lack of notice to other heirs is fatal to
the claim of the law firm Facts: Dona Adela Pascual was married to
Don Andres Pascual They have no children and executrix, Dra. Olivia
Pascual is the illegitimate niece of Don Andres Pascual Don Andres
died intestate and predeceased Dona Adela Dona Adela died testate
years later, appointing Dra. Olivia Pascual as executrix of her
will Petitioner Salonga Hernandez is a professional law partnership
Their services were engaged by the Executrix Dra. Olivia Pascual in
the settlement of the estate of Dona Adela Pascual In their 1987
retainer agreement, which Dra. Pascual signed, the final
professional fee shall be 3% of the total gross estate as well as
the fruits thereof based on the court approved inventory of the
estate Salonga Hernandez Law Firm obtained a favorable judgment,
the will presented by Dra. Pascual was allowed The firm then filed
a Notice of Attorneys Lien on the properties of the Estate of Dona
Adela The firm applied as well for a Notice of Writ of Execution
WON: A lawyer who renders legal services to the executor or
administrator of an estate can claim attorneys fees against the
estate instead of the executor or administrator? Held: Attorneys
fees chargeable to the estate, not only to the share of Dra.
Pascual. However, the court remanded the case to RTC Malabon to
hear the Petition for Payment of Professional Fees General Rule: it
is the executor or administrator who is primarily liable for
attorneys fees due to the lawyer who rendered legal services for
the executor or administrator in relation to the settlement of the
estate. The executor or administrator may seek reimbursement from
the estate for the sums paid in attorneys fees if it can be shown
that the services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the
estate 2 Recourses of Lawyers should executors refuse to pay
professional fees:1. file an action against the executor or
administrator, but in his/her personal capacity and not as
administrator or executor2. file a petition in the testate or
intestate proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of
attorneys fees as an expense of administration Resort to option 2
means all the heir must be notified of the claim The court held
that the firm incompletely resorted to the second option BUT it did
not serve notice to all the heirs of Dona Adela Pascual Requisite
notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees is anchored on the
constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law Payment of such attorneys fees
necessarily diminishes the estate of the decedent, and may
effectively diminish the value of the testamentary dispositions
made by the decedent
XIV. 14th week (collation)Study: Civil Code, articles
1061-1077Read:1. Guingguing v. Abuton - ITARALDEDOCTRINE: Disputes
between heirs with reference to the obligation to collate may be
determined in the administration proceedings over the estate of the
ancestor without the necessity of the institution of a separate
action. FACTS: Estates in question is that of Ignacio Abuton. He
died leaving 2 sets of children by 2 differenct wives. With first,
Dionisia Olarte, who predeceased Ignacio,he got 12 children. With
second, Teodora Guinguing, he got 4 children.Gabriel Binaoro was
appointed administrator. In due course of proceeding Binaoro
submitted to the court an inventory of the properties belonging to
the deceased at the time of his death. In this inventory he
included only the lands which the testator had devised to the
children of the second marriage, omitting other lands possessed by
him at the time of his death and which were claimed by the children
of the first marriage as having been derived from their
mother.Teodoro Guinguing, in representation of herself and her four
minor children, protested asking that the administrator be required
to amend his inventory and to include therein all property
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of Ignacio Abuton and
Dionisia Olarte, including property actually in the hands of his
children by her which had been delivered to said children as an
advancement. The purpose of the motion was to force the first set
of children to bring into collation the properties that had been
received by them, in conformity with article 1035 of the Civil
Code; and the motion was based partly on the supposition that
Ignacio Abuton had never in fact effected a liquidation of the
conjugal property pertaining to himself and Dionisia Olarte. This
motion was formally opposed by two of the children of the first
marriage, namely, Agapito and Calixto Abuton y Olarte.Lower court
ordered that the administrator should include in the inventory of
the estate all of the property of which the testator was possessed
at the time of his death, considering that no property was acquired
by the testator during his second marriage, thus the administration
was concerned only with the property that had been acquired before
the death of first wife. Since testator already divided the
properties with the first wife to the children of first marriage,
the only property subject matter of the present administration
proceedings are the property retained by the testator in his own
hands. Both parties appealed this order. This order was appealed
with the contention, among others, that the for it to be valid, a
formal notice must be given to all persons in interests in the same
manner as if a new action had begun.ISSUE: WON formal notice must
be given to all persons in interest for the order of the Lower
court regarding the inclusions or changes in the inventory of the
estate of the deceased be valid?HELD: NO. The making of the
inventory is necessarily of a preliminary and provisional nature,
and the improper inclusion of property therein or the improper
omission of property therefrom is not absolutely decisive of the
rights of persons in interest. Since all the heirs are already
virtually represented in the administration and are bound by all
proper orders made therein, the order has legal effect. This is not
inconsistent with the proposition that contested claims of
ownership between the administrator and third persons should be
tried in separate proceedings, which is entirely true. The question
here is merely between some of the heirs and the administrator, as
representative of all persons in interest. Besides, it should be
pointed out, the inclusion of a property in the inventory does not
deprive the occupant of possession; and if it is finally determined
that the property has been properly included in the estate, the
occupant heir is liable for the fruits and interest only from the
date when the succession was opened (art. 1049, Civ. Code). The
provisions of the Civil Code with reference to collation clearly
contemplate that disputes between heirs with respect to the
obligation to collate may be determined in the course of the
administration proceedings.
2. Tordilla v. Tordilla - KUNGFrancisco Tordilla, who died
intestate in Naga, Camarines Sur, on December 18, 1925, leaving as
his only heirs his widow, a legitimate son, the defendant and
appellant, and a recognized natural daughter, petitioner and
appellee. ISSUE / RULING1. One of the issues, The contention of
appellant is that, where a certain value is stated in a deed of
donation, that value cannot be questioned when the properties are
brought into collation.This is incorrect, as article 1045 of the
Civil Code provides for the assessment of the property at its
actual valuation at the time of donation. The recital in the deed
cannot therefore be controlling. The actual value at the time of
the donation is a question of fact which must be established by
proof the same as any other fact. The trial court, with much
experience, and after study of the evidence produced, held that the
actual value of one of the properties was greater than that recited
in the deed of donation, and also fixed the fruits and income from
the donated properties at a higher figure than appellant thought
just. The fruits and interest produced by property subject to
collation must be ascertained under article 1049 of the Civil Code.
There is some doubt in our mind as to the real value of the parcel
in question and the amount of the income from the donated
properties.2. The seventh, eighth, and ninth assignments of error
refer to the validity of Exhibit H, a contract entered into between
the appellee and the appellant in another case and signed shortly
before the death of their father. The contract is in the nature of
a compromise and covered two items, namely, first, the support of
the natural daughter which the brother agreed to assume for one
year and, second, a proposed division of their future inheritance
upon the death of their father. It is assumed that appellant has
complied with his terms of the contract, and the father died before
the obligation of the brother terminated. The second portion of the
contract Exhibit H clearly relates to the anticipated future
inheritance and, therefore, is null and void under the provisions
of article 1271 of the Civil Code which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not out of
the commerce of man, may be the subject-matter of contracts.
"Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to
future inheritances, except those the object of which is to make a
division intervivos of the estate, in accordance with article
1056.
"Any services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be
the subject-matter of a contract."cralaw virtua1aw library
The action of the trial court in holding Exhibit H to be
uncontroverted and predicating its final action on the terms of
that document was erroneous and contrary to law. 3. The tenth
assignment of error reads: "In adjudicating to the natural daughter
the same share or amount of properties as that adjudicated to the
legitimate son." This assignment of error is based on article 840
of the Civil Code which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 840. When the testator leaves legitimate children or
descendants, and also natural children, legally acknowledged, each
of the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the portion
pertaining to each of the legitimate children who have not received
any betterment, provided that a sufficient amount remains of the
disposable portion, from which it must be taken, after the burial
and funeral expenses have been paid.
"The legitimate children may pay the portion pertaining to the
natural ones in cash, or in other property of the estate, at a fair
valuation."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellee contends that article 840 of the Civil Code has been
repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure, based on the statement of
this court in Concepcion v. Jose (46 Phil., 809). It is true that
in the majority decision in that case it speaks of article 840
being repealed. While, with the question there considered, namely,
from where the funeral expenses should be taken, the Code of Civil
Procedure changed the rule as to those items from what had formerly
been in the Civil Code, by reading the whole decision we have no
hesitancy in saying that what the court then had in mind was not a
repeal of the article but in fact merely a modification thereof. In
the case of In re Intestate Estate of Tad-Y, found in the same
volume (46 Phil., 557), this court, speaking through the Chief
Justice, applied article 840 of the Civil Code in the following
language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To determine the share that pertains to the natural child which
is but one-half of the portion that in quality and quantity belongs
to the legitimate child not bettered, the latters portion must
first be ascertained. If a widow shares in the inheritance,
together with only one legitimate child, as in the instant case,
the child gets, according to the law, the third constituting the
legitimate in full ownership, and the third available for
betterment in naked ownership, the usufruct of which goes to the
widow. Then the natural child must get one-half of the free third
in full ownership and the other half of this third in naked
ownership, from which third his portion must be taken, so far as
possible, after deducting the funeral and burial expenses. . . .
."cralaw virtua1aw libraryOur attention has not been called to any
case in which this court has treated article 840 as entirely and
completely repealed.We are therefore of the opinion that this case
must be disposed of according to the above quotation from the case
of Tad-Y.The decision and orders of the trial court must therefore
be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consonant
with this opinion. Costs against appellee. So ordered.
3. Adan v. Casili - YAPFacts: Felix Adan commenced an action
against his sister and the latter's husband Casili, to secure the
judicial partition of the estate left by their deceased mother
Simplicia, which consist of six parcels of land. Parcels 1 and 3,
however, were subsequently discarded, the first having been sold by
the, and the second being admittedly the property of their half
sister. The remaining four parcels, are valued at P2,783.55.The
defendants interposed the following defense: That the four lots in
question were ceded by the deceased to her daughter as her share of
the inheritance; and that the plaintiff has received more than his
share consisting of money, livestock, palay, and real property
which amounted to P3600, namely:It found, that the plaintiff
received from his mother during her lifetime various sums
aggregating P3,000 for his expenses while studying surveying in
Manila, one-half of which, or P1,500, should be brought into
collation; that he also received or took from his mother twelve
carabaos worth P360, and 300 cavans of palay worth P1,260, all of
which amounted to P3,120 more than the value of the four parcels of
land now in the possession of the defendants. Hence it absolved the
defendants from the complaint without any finding as to
costs.Issue: WON Felix Adan received more than his share.Ruling:
Yes.We find the record that the plaintiff and appellant did not
prove his contentions. On the other hand, the defendant spouses
both testified in their own behalf, and in addition to their
testimony they called the caretaker to corroborate their
declaration regarding the appropriation by the plaintiff of twelve
carabaos.It was also established during the trial that the
plaintiff studied surveying in Manila and that during his studies
his mother and sister sent him money for his support and
expenses.Under the article 1041 of the Civil Code, allowances for
support, education, attendance in illnesses, even though unusually
expensive, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary
presents are not subject to collation. But article 1042 of the same
Code provides that expenses which may have been incurred by the
parents in giving their children a professional or artistic career
shall not be brought to collation unless the parent so orders or
they encroach upon the legitimate. It also provides that in cases
in which it is proper to collate them, the money which the child
would have spent if it had lived in the house and company of its
parents shall be deducted therefrom.Since the career of surveyor is
a professional one, and since the expenses incurred by plaintiff's
mother in giving him that career encroached upon the legitimate, it
is proper to collate one-half of the amount spent by her for him
during the two years he studied surveying, the other half being
considered as the amount which the plaintiff would have spent if he
had lived in the house and company of his mother.Summarizing the
evidence, we find that the plaintiff has received from the estate
of his mother a total of P2,630.00. The defendant Victoria Adan, on
the other hand, received from her deceased mother the four parcels
of land in question, the agreed value of which is P2,783.55 less
P300 (funeral expenses), P2,483.55 as her net share, which is less
than that received by the plaintiff.4. Lesaca v. Lesaca -
AQUINOFACTS: Baldomero Lesaca died and survived by the following
heirs: second wife, 2 minor children by the latter, 3 children by
his first marriage, and three acknowledged natural children.
Petition for the probate of the will and for the administration of
the estate was instituted in the CFI of Manila. CFI, at the
instance of the widow granted each of the two minor children a
monthly allowance of P100 for living expense plus an extra P300 for
matriculation and uniforms. The other children opposed and the CFI
issued an order, holding the amounts to be considered allowances
for support, to be deducted from their hereditary protion onlu is
so far as they exceed what they are entitled to as fruits or
income. Minor children contends that these allowances are not
subject to collation by virtue of Article 1430 (1067) which
provides that, allowances for support xxx are not subject to
collation. ISSUE: WON the allowances for support granted by the
court to the minor children pending liquidation of the estate are
subject to collation and deductible from their share of the
inheritance. HELD: Yes. The answer should be the affirmative in
view of Article 1430 of the CC The surviving spouse and his/her
children shall be given an allowance for their support out of the
general estate, pending the liquidation of the inventoried estate,
and until their share has been delivered to them, but it shall be
deducted from their portion in so far as it exceeds what they may
have been entitled to as fruits or income. The contention of the
minor children is without merit. Article 1041 us found under the
section Collation, which refers only to property or rights received
by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the
decedent.
5. Vda. De Rodriguez v. CA (read separate opinion) -
BISNARFacts: The Spouses Jose Valero and Beatriz Bautista did not
beget a child during their marriage. Beatriz adopted Carmen
(Carmencita) Bautista and although, Jose also wanted to adopt her,
he was unable to do so having been disqualified for having 2
children from his 1st marriage. Jose had 2 daughters from his 1st
marriage: 1) Flora Valero Vda. De Rodriguez; and 2) Rosie Valero
Gutierrez. Jose donated his pro indiviso share in 2 conjugal lots
with improvements to Carmen. Jose executed his last will and
testament, wherein he devised to his wife properties sufficient to
constitute her legitime and left the remainder to his Flora and
Rosie. He failed to mention the donation to Carmen. The spouses
then sold to Carmen the 2 properties that were earlier donated to
her. It was sold for P120,000. When the spouses Jose and Beatriz
died, proceedings for the settlement of their estate began. In the
proceedings for Joses estate, his share in the 2 properties were
included. Carmen, claiming ownership, moved that the 2 properties
be excluded from Joses estate. The executor opposed on the ground
that the lots were donated to Carmen and the donation would
allegedly involve collation. The properties were excluded from the
inventory of Joses estate. Hence the appeal. Flora argues that
although the properties were sold to Carmen, the consideration was
too low, only of the true value, that it was really a donation.
Issue: Whether the 2 properties are subject to collation? Ruling:
The issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that early stage
of the proceedings. It was not necessary to mention in the order of
exclusion the controversial matter of collation. Proceedings have
not yet reached the stage when the question of collation or
advancement to an heir may be raised and decided. The numerous
debts of the decedents are still being paid. The net remainder
(remanente liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet been
determined. In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the
question of collation and to decide whether Carmens titles to the
disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below have not
reached the stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes
of the compulsory heirs have to be determined.Separate Opinion:
Teehankee 2 properties are not subject to collation. The question
of collation of said lots is immaterial insofar as respondent and
the deceased Jose M. Valeros estate since Carmen is not even an
heir of his estate (which he had willed to his two legitimate
children, herein petitioners, his second wife Beatriz Bautista
having predeceased him in September, 1972). Under Article 1061 of
the Civil Code, only a compulsory heir succeeding with other
compulsory heirs is required to collate whatever property he/she
may have received from the decedent during the decedent's lifetime
by way of donation or any other gratuitous title in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition." There can therefore be no
collation here because from the documents of record, respondent
Carmen is not a compulsory heir who received property by donation
or gratuitous title from the deceased that would be subject to
collation. It also has to be mentioned that the properties were
sold to Carmen, not donated.
6. Lucerne vda de Tupas v. RTC - CLETOFacts: Epifanio R. Tupas
died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving his
widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He
also left a will dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to probate
by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Among the
assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the
Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital. However, at the
time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he
having donated them the year before to the Tupas Foundation, Inc.,
which had thereafter obtained title to said lots. Claiming that
said donation had left her practically destitute of any
inheritance, Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation,
Inc. to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it
prejudiced her legitime. The Trial Court did not see things her
way, holding that the properties which were disposed of by way of
donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer
part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death on August
20, 1978, that the donation properties were Epifanio's capital or
separate estate, and that Tupas Foundation, Inc., being a stranger
and not a compulsory heir, the donation inter vivos made in its
favor was not subject to collation.Issue: W/N a donation inter
vivos by a donor now deceased may be declared inofficious and be
reduced at the instance of the donor's widow? Yes. W/N the donation
was subject to collation? Yes. Held: The Trial Court is in error on
all counts and must be reversed. A person's prerogative to make
donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that
he cannot give by donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752,
Civil Code). If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what
he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is
reducible to the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to
its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's
appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil
Code). Such a donation is, moreover, collationable - that is, its
value is imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the
tune of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of
the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of
the estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of
gifts to compulsory heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of
the Civil Code would seem to limit collation to the latter class of
donations. The fact that the donated property no longer actually
formed part of the estate of the donor at the time of his death
cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. It is
obvious that collation contemplates and particularly applies to
gifts inter vivos. The further fact that the lots donated were
admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no
moment, because a claim of inofficiousness does not assert that the
donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what was
within his power to give. In order to find out whether it is
inofficious or not, recourse must be had to the rules established
by the Civil Code for the determination of the legitime and, by
extension, of the disposable portion. These rules are set forth in
Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the Code, on the basis of which the
following step-by-step procedure has been correctly outlined:1.
Determination of the value of the property which remains at the
time of the testator's death2. Determination of the obligations,
debts, and charges which have to be paid out or deducted from the
value of the property thus left;3. Determination of the difference
between the assets and the liabilities, giving rise to the
hereditary estate;4. Addition to the net value thus found, of the
value, at the time they were made, of donations subject to
collation; and5. Determination of the amount of the legitimes by
getting from the total thus found the portion that the law provides
as the legitime of each respective compulsory heir. Deducting the
legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the
freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here
must be measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was
made does not exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to
stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess
and must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if
any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the
petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased
Epifanio R. Tupas. Case remanded.
7. De Roma v. CA - FERNANDEZDoctrine: Anything less than such
express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of
Article 1062.Facts: Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted
daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate
on April 30, 1971Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time
filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on
the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to
Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been includedThe properties
in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what
the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to
collation. The private respondent rigorously argues that it is,
conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part,
citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate
because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was
not officious Issue: WON there was express stipulation to collate
in the deed of sale? noLaw: Article 1062. Collation shall not take
place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly
provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless
the donation should be reduced as inofficious.Held: We agree with
the respondent court that there is nothing in the deed of donation
expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As
the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation
as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express
prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is
irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from
the collation required under Article 1061.We surmise from the use
of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of
donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume
he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It
is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the
document, that he would have included therein an express
prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's
intention.Anything less than such express prohibition will not
suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.1awphil TThe
intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and
unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in
Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we
apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical
enough.8. Pagkatipunan v. IAC - FORTESCanuta Pagkatipunan v. IAC
(1991)by Roselle Fortes-Leung
Doctrine: The avowed specific provisions of the Civil Code
respecting collation, which are controlling even in intestate
succession, must be followed in adjudicating the remaining portion
of the conjugal estate. Adjudication must not be purely speculative
and conjectural. Facts: Jose Velasquez, Sr. was married to
Victorina Real, they had 5 children When Victorina died, Jose
contracted marriage with Canuta Pagkatipunan Canuta bore him 13
children The conjugal partnership with Victorina was not liquidated
and Jose enjoyed full possession of the conjugal properties When
Jose Velasquez died, the 2nd conjugal partnership with Canuta was
also not liquidated and Canuta possessed the properties This
situation gave rise to the controversies in the instant case
spawned by the parties' conflicting claims from both sides of the
two marriages. Commissioners determined 27 lots belonged to
conjugal partnership of first marriage Trial Court held that West
Ave house should be divided into 2, one half to 2nd wife and her
children, the other half to the husband and his heirs TC also
cancelled all donations inter vivos executed by Jose Velasquez to
his children with Canuta Decreed as simulated sale and resale of
Canuta to siblings of the property in the name of Sps. Jose and
Victorina Velasquez WON: The trial and appellate courts properly
adjudicated the shares of Jose Velasquezs heirs?HELD: Case was
remanded to RTC Laguna and directed it to follow procedure
prescribed in the SC ruling and outlined in the NCC Lower court's
ruling adjudicating the remaining portion of the conjugal estate to
the private respondents is purely speculative and conjectural.
Failed to consider among others, the following provisions of the
Civil Code: Art. 908 determining legitime, value of property left
by testator, deduction of debts and charges Add value of donations
subject to collation in the net value of the estate Art. 1061
compulsory heirs to include donations received from decedent for
the computation of legitime Trial court must determine gross value
of the conjugal properties of the 1st marriage Art. 909. Charge
donations received by compulsory heirs to their legitimes, those
received by strangers to the free portion Court however affirmed
findings that Canuta Pagkatipunan employed fraudulent acts to
acquire title over some properties Sale then resale back to her by
her siblings Deeds of assignments in favor of her children Affirmed
that properties listed in the inventory belong to 1st marriage
9. Zaragoza v. CA - ITARALDEDOCTRINE: Collation cannot be done
where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only
impleaded one of the compulsory heirs - the petition must therefore
be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new
proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present. FACTS:
Flavio Zaragosa died intestate survived by 4 children. Alberta
Zaragosa- Morgan, one of the children who eventually became an
American citizen filed a complaint in CFI iloilo against spouses
Florentino (here brother) and Erlinda Zaragosa for the delivery of
her inheritance shares consisting of the Lots 943 and 871. She
claimed that Flavio during his lifetime, by way of donation or any
other gratuitous title, partitioned the his properties among his 4
children. For her 3 brothers and sisters, deeds of sale without
valid consideration were executed to deliver their shares . For her
part, since she is no longer Filipino citizen, she was precluded
from acquiring properties in the Philippines, except by hereditary
succession. Hence, no deed of conveyance was executed in her favor.
Florentino denied these allegations and filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint failed to implead indispensable
parties. But the lower court ruled in favor of Alberta, finding
that Flavio partitioned his properties during his lifetime among
his three children by deeds of sales and he intended Lot 871 to be
the share of private respondent. CA modified the ruling declaring
lot 871 and 943 as inheritance of Alberta as the sale of lot 943
was fictitious and void. ISSUE: WON the partition intervivos by
Flavio of his properties which inlucde Lots 871 and 943 is valid?
HELD: It is the basic rule in the law of succsession that a
partition inter vicos may be done for as long as legitimes are not
prejudiced. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after
collation, as provided for in Article 1061. Unfortunately,
collation can not be done in this case where the original petition
for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other
compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without
prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the
indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of
their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by
the partitioning inter vivos. SC dismissed the case without
prejudice to the institution of the proper proceedings. 10. Valero
vda. De Rodriguez - KUNG (SAME WITH THE ABOVE CASE)Spouses Jose
Valero and Beatriz Bautista did not beget a child during their
marriage. Carmen (Carmencita) Bautista and although, Jose also
wanted to adopt her, he was unable to do so having been
disqualified for having 2 children from his 1st marriage. Jose had
2 daughters from his 1st marriage, Flora Valero Vda. De Rodriguez;
and Rosie Valero Gutierrez. Jose donated his pro indiviso share in
2 conjugal lots with improvements to Carmen but this was never
registered. Later on, Jose executed his last will and testament,
where he devised to his wife properties sufficient to constitute
her legitime and left the remainder to his Flora and Rosie. In the
will, Jose never mentioned the donation previously made to Carmen
(adopted). The said property was then sold to Carmen for a
consideration of P120,000.00 Upon the death of Jose and Beatriz,
the said properties were included in the inventory of the decedents
estate. Carmen filed a petition for exclusion of the said
properties contending that she was the owner, and it was sold to
her.The executor opposed on the ground that the lots were donated
to Carmen and the donation would allegedly involve collation. Flora
argues that although the properties were sold to Carmen, the
consideration was too low, only of the true value, that it was
really a donation. Issue: Whether the 2 properties are subject to
collation? Ruling: No, According to the SC, the issue of collation
was not yet justiciable at that early stage of the proceedings. It
was not necessary to mention in the order of exclusion the
controversial matter of collation. Proceedings have not yet reached
the stage when the question of collation or advancement to an heir
may be raised and decided. The numerous debts of the decedents are
still being paid. The net remainder (remanente liquido) of their
conjugal estate has not yet been determined. In this appeal, it is
not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide
whether Carmens titles to the disputed lots are questionable. The
proceedings below have not reached the stage of partition and
distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be
determined.11. Lauro Vizconde v. CA - YAPFacts: Petitioner Lauro
Vizconde and his wife Estrellita had two children, Carmela and
Jennifer. Estrellita, is the daughter of spouses Rafael and Salud.
The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio, Ramon,
Teresita, and Ricardo, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his
parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four
children.Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land in
Valenzuela for P135,000. After 11 yrs., Estrellita sold the
Valenzuela property to Lim and Chiu for P3.4M. Estrellita bought
from a parcel of land with at BF Homes, Paraaque using a portion of
the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property. The remaining
amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance
was deposited in a bank.Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela
and Jennifer, were killed, an incident popularly known as the
"Vizconde Massacre". Petitioner was left as the sole heir of his
daughters. Petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement
with Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car
and the Paraaque property. The total value of the deposits
deducting the funeral expenses is P3M. The settlement gave: Rafael
and Salud (50% bank deposits), Petitioner (50% bank deposits, car
and Paranaque Property)Rafael died, Teresita instituted an
intestate estate proceeding and prayed to be appointed Special
Administratrix of Rafael's estate. Ramon filed another opposition
alleging, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by
Rafael which she sold for not less than P6M.RTC appointed Teresita,
in turn as the Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. Ramon,
moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding and
asked that the Paraaque property, as well as the car and the
balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be
collated.Since there is no sufficient evidence to show that the
acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable
consideration, the trial court ordered the properties to be
collated.Issue: WON the properties should be collated.Ruling:
No.Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with
other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by
donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the
decedent.The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of
petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding.First: Petitioner, a
son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs. With
respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even
shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a
stranger. Petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate
proceeding.Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and
determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not
be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is
provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a
separate action to resolve title. The probate court went beyond the
scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the
validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and
Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property
between the concerned parties was gratuitous.Third: The order of
the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is
premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings
is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to
indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been
impaired to warrant collation.Fourth: What was transferred to
Estrellita, by way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The
Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds
of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become
collationable simply by reason thereof.Fifth: Estrellita died ahead
of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an
amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even
assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated, collation
may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long
been returned to the estate of Rafael.12. Eloy Imperial v. CA -
AQUINOFACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel
of land. On July 1951 Leoncio allegedly sold the said lot to his
acknowledged natural son (petitioner) who then proceeded to
subdivide in into several lots. Parties admit that despite the
contracts designation as one of Absolute Sale the transaction was
in fact a donation. Barely two years after, Leoncio filed a
complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale on the
ground that he was deceived by petitioner into signing the
document. The parties entered into a compromise agreement under the
terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the
rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed
to sell a part of the land and deposit the proceeds in a bank for
Leoncio. In 1962 Leocnio died leaving as his heir petitioner and
his adopted child, Victor. Victor substituted Leoncio in the
above-mentioned case. Victor died in 1977 and survived his natural
father. In 1981 the father died leaving two sons (brothers of
Victor). These brothers are the respondents in this case.
Respondents in 1986 filed a complaint for annulment of the donation
with the RTC. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata, prescription and laches, and that Leoncio had conveyed
sufficient property to cover the legitime of Victor. The RTC held
the donation to be inofficious and impaired the legitime of Victor.
On appeal with the CA, the appellate court affirmed the decision of
the lower court, hence, the present appeal. ISSUE: (1) WON it is
proper to reduce the inofficious property donated? (2) And IF YES,
is the action not barred by prescription (lower courts held that
the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years, both courts deemed
that the action is a real action over an immovable property)? HELD:
(1) Yes. As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8,
1962, it was only Victor who was entitled to question the donation.
However, instead of filing an action to contest the donation,
Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177
and even moved for execution of the compromise judgment therein.
Victor did not renounced his legitime merely because he substituted
his adopted father in the civil case (regarding the compromise
agreement). Victor merely participated in the execution of the
compromise judgment. When Victor substituted Leoncio upon the
latters death, his act of moving for execution of the compromise
judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his
legitime. He was not precluded or estopped from subsequently
seeking the reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are
Victors heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their
right to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also
in Article 1053: If the heir should die without having accepted or
repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his
heirs. (2) No. A claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of
title. In Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals, the SC declared that what
is brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the
value of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for
this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys
ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or
donee. What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for
reduction of an inofficious donation? The CC specifies the
following instances of reduction or revocation of donations:(1) 4
years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or
adoption of a child;(2) 4 years, for non-compliance with conditions
of the donation;and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the
donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure of the
donor to reserve property for his or their support. Donations as in
the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation
of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular
prescriptive period, for which reason we must resort to the
ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144, actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within 10 years from the
time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive
period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? Mateo vs. Lagua,
which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation
propter nuptias, the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues
upon the death of the donor-decedent. Since it is only then that
the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes
may be determined. It took private respondents 24 years since the
death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action, therefore, has
long prescribed.