Submission by Network for Animals FINAL (1) · Submission by Network for Animals to the Committee of Inquiry ... Korea and Taiwan has demonstrated unequivocally that diplomatic efforts

SIMPLY TOO RISKY!

Why the South African government should not move to legalise the trade in rhino horn

Submission by Network for Animals to the Committee of Inquiry established by the Department of Environmental Affairs to investigate

the feasibility of a trade in rhino horn

12 March 2015

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Compiled by Claire Attwood & David Barritt

Network for Animals

Network for Animals (NFA) is a not-for-profit organisation that uses investigations, public education, financial assistance and government outreach to improve the welfare of animals worldwide.

NFA has a presence in the Americas, Europe, Africa and the Far East. In the Philippines, NFA works with law enforcement authorities to help stamp out the illegal dog meat trade; in the UK it was instrumental in changing legislation pertaining to hunting with hounds and is currently active in the debate about badger culling; in Africa it works on rhino and elephant issues; and in Canada it is well known for its opposition to the annual seal hunt. In Greece NFA supports the country’s largest animal shelter.

From time to time NFA is active in disaster relief, rescuing and caring for animals in distress.

Network for Animals believes that where animal welfare is concerned, moral and ethical considerations should be an integral part of government policies and legislation.

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Executive Summary

Network for Animals is opposed to the establishment of a legal trade in rhino horn for three reasons:

• a legal trade would not stem the slaughter of South Africa’s rhinos − it

would make it worse • a legal trade is unethical and out of step with South Africa’s

environmental policy • a legal trade is impractical because South Africa does not have the

resources to adequately monitor and control such a trade.

Each of these reasons is thoroughly explained in this submission.

To illustrate the serious flaws in pro-trade arguments, we point to the tragedy that occurred with African elephants when legal sales of ivory stockpiles were allowed by CITES in 1999 and 2008. Studies have shown that – contrary to expectations – the two sales stimulated the market, inflated prices and contributed to an increase in the illegal ivory trade and the killing of elephants.

Network for Animals advocates the following actions:

i.) Viet Nam is the world’s largest destination and consumer of rhino horn. The South African government should urgently scale up its diplomatic efforts to bring about a situation where the two governments work hand in hand to combat the illegal trade in rhino horn. The experience of Japan, Korea and Taiwan has demonstrated unequivocally that diplomatic efforts can, and do, work.

ii.) The South African government should work in partnership with Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to urgently scale up demand reduction campaigns.

iii.) The South Africa government should show strong political will and make rhino crime a high profile, national priority.

iv.) The South African government should support and encourage NGOs to harness international goodwill and appreciation of African wildlife so as to raise funds to improve the capacity and resources of conservation authorities at national and provincial level and specifically at sites such as the Kruger National Park.

v.) The South African government should burn its rhino horn stockpile, thereby sending a message to the world that the trade in rhino horn is wrong.

Advancing a proposal to lift the CITES ban on the trade in rhino horn would be nothing short of an experiment in resource management. To adopt such a reckless approach when time is running out for rhinos could spell the end for rhinos in the wild.

Finally, the South African government should make it clear that South Africa’s natural heritage – and its national treasures, like rhinos – are not for sale.

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1. Introduction  

South Africa is home to more than 90% of the world’s remaining 20 000 white or square-lipped rhinoceros Ceratotherium simum and (together with its neighbour, Namibia) more than 80% of the black or hooked-lip rhinoceros Diceros bicornis. However, rhino poaching has exploded in South Africa: in only four years (between 2010 and 2014), at least 3 668 rhinos were killed for their horns in national parks, provincial conservation areas and private game ranches. The number of rhino killings has increased every year, in spite of efforts by both the public and private sector to protect the animals.

The irony is that South Africa has the world’s most successful conservation record for rhinos: it was South Africa that brought the southern subspecies of white rhinoceros back from the brink of extinction, growing a remnant population of between 20 and 50 animals to more than 20 000 animals in little more than 100 years. Alarmingly, the current poaching crisis threatens to undo more than a century of successful rhino conservation and management.

Faced with a crisis of this proportion, it is understandable that South Africa’s Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) is searching for solutions and exploring avenues to stem the slaughter of rhinos and avert the march of the species towards extinction. To this end, the Department has appointed a Committee of Inquiry to explore the feasibility of proposing to CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) that the ban on the international trade in rhino horn (adopted by CITES in 1977) should be lifted.

Advocates of a legal trade in rhino horn argue that the trade ban has failed. They recognise that there is strong demand for rhino horn and say that:

• a legal trade would allow more effective regulation and control of the trade in rhino horn;

• legal sales would take pressure off wild populations by satisfying the demand for rhino horn currently met by poachers; and

• funds generated from the sale of stockpiled and harvested horn could be used to support the conservation of the species.

However, as Network for Animals will demonstrate in this submission, these arguments do not withstand scrutiny. We will show that tabling a proposal to CITES to lift the ban on the trade in rhino horn would be reckless, out of step with the prescripts of the National Environmental Management Act and could very possibly hasten the decline of rhinos towards low numbers, limited range and ultimately extinction. This is because under present circumstances it would be impossible to effectively regulate a legal rhino horn trade.

This submission will outline the problems surrounding the efficacy, ethics and practicality of lifting the CITES trade ban; show that there are tested alternatives for solving the rhino crisis; and demonstrate that the unintended consequences of opening a trade in rhino horn could be disastrous for rhinos.

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2. South Africa’s rhino crisis

In 2012, a report by TRAFFIC * , an international wildlife trade-monitoring network, asserted that the rapid escalation of rhino poaching amounts to an “unprecedented conservation crisis” for South Africa. The situation has become far worse since then. Early this year the DEA reported that at least 1 215 rhinos were killed in 2014, a 21% increase over 2013 when 1 004 rhinos were slaughtered for their horns†. The graph below shows the extraordinary spike in rhino poaching that has occurred in South Africa over the past seven years. At the current rate of poaching, rhino deaths could outstrip births in as little as two years‡. If this happens, rhinos could become extinct in less than 20 years.

Rhino poaching has exploded because of increased demand: the price of rhino horn has skyrocketed: from around USD4 700 per kilogram in 1993 (R55 000/kg at today’s exchange rate) to about USD65 000 per kilogram (R756 000/kg). This means that today, rhino horn is worth more than gold, diamonds or cocaine (Biggs et al., 2013). It is mainly demand from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam that is driving the illegal trade in rhino horn. Viet Nam’s economy is one of the fastest growing in the world and the current demand for the product is fuelled by a booming economy and a rapid rise in purchasing power – more people than ever before can afford to buy rhino horn.

                                                                                                               * Milliken, T & Shaw, J. 2012. The South Africa-Viet Nam rhino horn trade nexus. A deadly combination of institutional lapses, corrupt wildlife industry professionals and Asian crime syndicates. Johannesburg, South Africa. Traffic. 180 pp. Available at: www.traffic.org † As reported by Save the Rhino. ‡ Save the Rhino: www.savetherhino.org

10   13   24   13  83   122  

333  448  

668  

1004  

1215  

0  

200  

400  

600  

800  

1000  

1200  

1400  

NO.  OF  RHINO  KILLED  

NO.  OF  RHINO  KILLED  

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In Viet Nam rhino horn is used as a traditional medicine, mainly for reducing temperature and purging the body and blood of toxins. Lately, however, Vietnamese dealers promote rhino horn as a treatment for life threatening diseases such as cancer, of course this is a cynical marketing ploy that increases the value of horn and the profitability of the rhino horn trade. (Rhino horn is made from keratin, the same type of protein that is in hair and fingernails. Doctors and scientists have tested the efficacy of rhino horn as a medicine and concluded that users of rhino horn would get the same benefits if they ate their fingernails instead.)

There are at least three other important groups of rhino horn users in Viet Nam: an affluent group of habitual users who routinely mix rhino horn powder with water or alcohol as a general health and hangover-curing tonic (many users in this category use rhino horn as a means to flaunt their wealth and status among friends and associates); young mothers who keep rhino horn on hand to “treat” high fever in their children; and a group of users that gives rhino horn as a gift for the purpose of gaining social or political influence. (Milliken & Shaw, 2012.)

Key to the debate around re-opening the trade in rhino horn is CITES − the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. CITES is an international agreement between governments. Its aim is to ensure that international trade in species of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival. CITES imposed a ban on the trade in rhino horn in 1977 in response to long-term, high levels of rhino poaching that were threatening to push all rhino species to extinction. Even after the CITES ban, South Africa allowed a legal trade of rhino horn within its borders. However, in 2000 it became apparent that Asian nationals were exploiting the domestic permitting system to purchase rhino horn from private owners and then illegally trafficking the horn out of South Africa. In an effort to stop this trade, the South African government placed a national moratorium on the domestic trade in rhino horn (Government Gazette No. 31899, Notice No. 148, 13 February 2009). In 2014, the DEA published a report (Taylor, et al. 2014) that concluded the moratorium on the domestic trade in rhino horn should remain in place at the present time and that the DEA should immediately develop a secure national electronic permitting system to bring non-compliance issues under control. (The moratorium does not apply to horn obtained during a trophy hunt, which is still legal.)

If South Africa decides to adopt a pro-trade policy, it would have to submit a proposal to CITES and gain a two-thirds majority vote in its favour. This means the South African proposal would need to convince at least 120 of the 180 Parties to CITES that legalising the trade in rhino horn will be good for rhinos. The next opportunity for South Africa to submit such a proposal is at the Conference of Parties (CoP 17) scheduled to take place in Cape Town in 2016.

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3. The argument for a legal trade in rhino horn

A number of rhino owners (both private and State) are actively campaigning for a legalisation of the trade in rhino horn, arguing that a legal supply of horn could be part of the solution to the current poaching crisis. The South African government has received a number of proposals for legalising the trade, including one from the provincial conservation authority, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife. The essential elements of the pro-trade argument are captured by Biggs et al. (2013) who propose:

• rhino horn re-grows after it is cut and the annual horn production of one animal averages 0.9kg per year. Therefore, the current demand for rhino horn could be met by the 5 000 white rhinos on private conservation land in South Africa alone. (Sedating a rhino and removing its horn can be done for about USD20, or R250);

• the natural mortality of rhinos would provide hundreds or horns per year;

• the income generated for conservation by a legal trade in rhino horn is substantial;

• a legal trade could simultaneously supply horns, fund rhino protection and provide an incentive for their sustainable use and long-term survival.

Proponents of these arguments do not expect poaching to stop completely, but they hope that legal supplies would meet some of the demand that would otherwise be fulfilled by killing rhinos.

Pro-trade arguments are attractive because the protection of rhinos is costing the South African government and the private sector hundreds of millions of rand every year. According to the DEA, private rhino owners are spending an average of R85 per hectare, per year to protect their rhinos, which amounts to approximately R310 500 per year, per property. In comparison, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife spends about R250 per hectare, per year (Taylor et al., 2014). Furthermore, the South African stockpile of rhino horns now totals 21 tonnes, according to Edna Molewa, South Africa’s Minister of Environmental Affairs§. This stockpile does not include horns in private hands. At a price of USD65 000 per kilogram (R756 000/kg), the government stockpile alone could be worth as much as USD1.36 billion (R16 billion).

While the sale of South Africa’s stockpile could be used for rhino conservation there is no guarantee that the proceeds of a sale would, in fact, be directed to conservation coffers. There are such serious weaknesses in the pro-trade argument that, were it to propose a lifting of the trade ban to CITES, South Africa could be perceived as peddling the future of one of its national treasures to the highest bidder.

                                                                                                               § Decision over sale of stockpile rhino horn set for 2015. Mail & Guardian, 10 February 2015.    

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Network for Animals’ main arguments against the legalisation of the rhino horn trade ban are detailed below under the headings efficacy, ethics and practicality.

4. The argument against a legal trade in rhino horn

4.1. Efficacy

Would the lifting of the CITES ban on the trade of rhino horn resolve the poaching crisis or would it make it worse?

It is Network for Animals’ view that lifting the ban on rhino horn trade would be disastrous for rhinos because: (i) it would legitimise and encourage rhino horn use, thus leading to increased demand and even more poaching; (ii) the models proposed by the pro-trade lobby are naïve and untested; and (iii) a legal trade would undermine diplomatic efforts and awareness and education campaigns that are gaining traction in user nations.

To illustrate the serious flaws in pro-trade arguments, we point to the tragedy that occurred with African elephants when legal sales of ivory stockpiles were allowed by CITES in 1999 and 2008.

i.) A legal trade in rhino horn would legitimise and encourage rhino horn use and increase demand

Between the late 1970s and mid-1990s, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Yemen were major consumers of rhino horn, but today these countries no longer feature in the rhino horn trade in a significant way. At present, Mainland China also falls into this category because the use of rhino horn in manufactured traditional medicines is no longer occurring.

There are legitimate and alarming concerns that a legal trade could re-awaken the market for rhino horn in these countries and that demand could spiral out of control. If this were to happen in Mainland China, where the middle class is growing at a staggering rate and where there is a growing trend towards conspicuous consumption, it would undoubtedly herald the end for rhinos. (In the year 2000, only 4% of urban Chinese households earned a middle class income of between USD9 000 and USD34 000 per year, but that figure grew to 68% by 2012. In the decade ahead, the trend is expected to continue, with urban household income predicted to at least double by 2012.)**

Hand-in-hand with the concern that a legal trade might stimulate markets in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China, is the very real fear that the

                                                                                                               ** Barton, D.; Chen, Y. & Jin, A. 2013. Mapping China's middle class. McKinsey & Company. Available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/consumer_and_retail/mapping_chinas_middle_class

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establishment of a legal trade might have the effect of legitimising rhino horn usage and encouraging demand. Again, the size of the existing market, coupled with the size of the potential market for rhino horn means it is virtually certain that that demand would not be met by legal sources of horn.

This argument is bolstered by uncertainty around the capacity of intensive breeding programmes for rhinos to significantly meet the demand for rhino horn. There is no evidence that farmed rhinos would breed at the same rate as wild rhinos. Furthermore, breeding programmes would need to consider the genetic weakness of the white rhino stock: all white rhinos originate from the same genetic stock – the tiny reservoir of between 20 and 50 rhinos that survived the onslaught of hunters in the 19th century. It is also estimated that it would take up to five years for an adult rhino population to produce a generation that was sufficiently mature for their horns to be harvested.

ii.) The models proposed by the pro-trade lobby are naïve and untested

Precisely how would the legal sale of rhino horn help to save rhinos? The pro-trade lobby puts forward a number of proposals, all predicated on the notion that an increased supply of rhino horn would flood the market, bring down prices and ultimately reduce poaching. However, a recent paper by two highly regarded Mexican economists casts doubt on the validity of this economic model, saying it is simplistic and based on highly questionable assumptions.

The paper “Leonardo’s sailors. A review of the economic analysis of wildlife trade” is authored by Alejandro Nadal and Francisco Aguayo and published by the highly regarded Leverhulme Centre for the Study of Value in the United Kingdom. The authors acknowledge that the illegal trade in wildlife products is an important driver of biodiversity loss and they use economic theory to interrogate pro-trade arguments, namely the notion that the use of legal markets is the best policy option for conservation. Their findings identify two major flaws in pro-trade argument: that they are logically inconsistent and theoretically discredited (in fact, say Nadal and Aguayo, “the economic analysis of wildlife trade… appears to have been trapped in the backwaters of textbook economics”); and based on serious information gaps, mainly because the illegal trade in wildlife is clandestine in nature.

The authors note that the pro-trade argument is often applied as a “one size fits all” option for elephants, rhino, tigers, bears, alligators and many other species and is usually based on a range of unrealistic assumptions. One of these is that a legal trade will substitute for an illegal trade. Another is that profits from legal sales will be invested in conservation. Yet another is to simplify the behaviour of wildlife traders by assuming they are a homogenous group of agents trading an identical product with no power to negotiate prices:

“In these models … value chains are described as if market supply was vertically integrated, reducing to one link the intermediation between poachers and final consumers. Key agents in the supply chain are presented in many

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cases as crime syndicates, but no serious analysis is undertaken to unravel their economic logic. Products are treated as being homogeneous and this is why it is assumed that legal trade flows are able to fully substitute illegal ones. In the pro-market account, there is no room for strategic behaviour on the part of the illegal suppliers. Finally, there is complete independence between supply and demand, and thus the legalisation of trade has no expansionary effects whatsoever on demand”. (Nadal and Aguayo, 2014, p.8)

The authors interrogate each of these false assumptions and conclude that advancing policy recommendations on the basis of inadequate economic theory and analysis is imprudent:

“In the field of policies for environmental and social sustainability the need to work with the greatest possible responsibility implies awareness of theoretical results and limitations of analytical tools. When dealing with matters of life and death, and wildlife trafficking is indeed a matter of life and death, paying due consideration to the law of unintended consequences is vital.” (Nadal and Aguayo, 2014, p.2).

The message for South Africa is clear: pro-trade arguments are based on simplistic and unrealistic economic theory and there is so much uncertainty about the real consequences of lifting the CITES trade ban, that the risk to rhinos and to South Africa is simply too great to consider allowing any form of trade. When one considers the importance of the tourism industry to South Africa’s economy, the recklessness of the pro-trade stance becomes even clearer.

The tourism industry

South Africa is a popular tourist destination and in 2013 welcomed 9.616 million tourists – up from 9.188 million in 2012. According to Statistics South Africa, the direct contribution of tourism to GDP grew from R84.3 billion in 2011 to R93.3 billion – or 3% of GDP – in 2012. Similarly, tourism contributed approximately 617 287 direct jobs in 2012, amounting to about 4.6% of direct employment in the country, up from over 591 785 direct jobs in 2011.

South Africa has highlighted tourism as a key growth sector: the government aims to increase the contribution of tourism (both direct and indirect) to the economy to R499-billion by 2020. The country’s rich natural resource base holds immense recreational value and, at present, South Africa competes very effectively for a share of the nature-based tourism market, one of the fastest growing sectors of the global tourism industry††. With respect to “Big Five” tourism, South Africa has a competitive advantage over many other areas of Africa where rhinoceros populations have been decimated or completely

                                                                                                               ††  OECD. 2009. Wildlife and nature-based tourism for pro-poor growth. In Natural resources and pro-poor growth: the economics and politics. OECD publishing. Available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org

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eliminated. However, if South Africa were to lose its rhino populations as a result of risky and ill-advised policy decisions, it would no longer be able to offer nature-based tourists an opportunity to see or photograph the Big Five. If this was to occur, there would be serious consequences for the tourism industry – and more significantly, the livelihoods of people living in rural areas.

If the economic value of the tourism industry is taken into account when considering the risks and benefits of a legal trade in rhino horn, it is obvious that the risk is simply to great to take.

iii.) A legal trade would undermine diplomatic efforts and awareness and education campaigns that are gaining traction in Viet Nam

Experience has shown that intensive diplomatic pressure; education and awareness campaigns can lead to dramatic changes in market dynamics, a consequent reduction in poaching and real gains for rhinos. The experience of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Yemen, as documented by Save the Rhino‡‡, clearly demonstrates this:

• Japan: throughout the 1970s, Japan was the number one consumer of rhino horn in Asia. Manufactured, branded medicines containing rhino horn were available for sale in shops and pharmacies. In 1980, Japan ratified CITES and shortly afterwards the country’s Ministry of Health required all manufacturers of rhino horn medicines to find substitutes for their products. In this way, demand reduction strategies completely eliminated demand for rhino horn in Japan.

• South Korea: trade in rhino horn shifted from Japan to South Korea which became a major consumer of rhino horn in the 1980s. Most sales were over the counter, with practitioners both prescribing and supplying rhino horn. In 1983 South Korea ratified CITES and in the same year an import ban on rhino horn was introduced. A key strategy in this success story was the threat of sanctions that was made under the United States’ Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protection Act of 1967, legislation that provides for bilateral sanctions to be imposed against a country that is seen to be undermining international conservation policy. Korea is no longer a major consumer of rhino horn.

• Taiwan: from the mid 1980s to early 1990s, Taiwan was Asia’s biggest rhino horn consumer; at the time that the Taiwanese market peaked, Zimbabwe lost most of its rhinos. As with South Korea, rhino horn was principally traded over-the-counter as a pharmaceutical. The US

‡‡ Ellis, K. Tackling the demand for rhino horn. Available at http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/thorny_issues/tackling_the_demand_for_rhino_horn

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government also persuaded Taiwan to respond to the implications of Pelly Amendment sanctioning. An import ban was implemented in 1985 and the government prohibited sales in 1992. The Taiwanese Ministry of Health conducted trials on rhino horn and proclaimed it was not worth using. Since these measures were implemented, Taiwan has not been a user of rhino horn.

• China: China was a minor consumer in the 1970s and 1980s but it became more active in the 1990s. Imports were banned in 1981 and exports in 1988. Domestic trade was prohibited and all stockpiles of rhino horn were registered and sealed in 1993. China continues to be of concern because rhino horn is occasionally trafficked to Viet Nam through Chinese ports and because the country has a bad reputation for failing to stem the illegal trade in as ivory and tiger and bear parts.

• Yemen: in Yemen, rhino horn was used for the carving of traditional dagger handles known as “jambiya” and the country was a signficant user during the 1970s and 1980s. However the government brought in legislation to implement the CITES ban and expanded and upgraded its Environment Protection Agency. This, combined with a public awareness campaign, virtually eradicated Yemeni demand for rhino horn.

These examples demonstrate that intensive pressure and an international outcry over rhino poaching led to fewer rhinos being killed for their horns. By the mid 1990s, virtually all major consuming countries had rhino horn trade bans in place and demand reduction strategies began to take effect. For 16 years (between 1990 and 2005) rhino poaching losses in South Africa averaged 14 animals per year. However, since 2005 the killings have multiplied and Viet Nam has emerged as the largest market for rhino horn.

There are strong arguments to support and dramatically ramp up the nascent diplomatic processes that are currently underway and targeted at Viet Nam – simply because they worked in other parts of Asia. For instance, as recently as February 2015, Minister Edna Molewa met with high-level political representatives from the Czech Republic, Mozambique and Viet Nam in Geneva, Switzerland. The aim of the meeting was to strengthen cooperation and enhance the collective efforts of range, transit and destination states to combat the illegal trade in rhino horn. And, a number of targeted campaigns are underway in Viet Nam to challenge deeply held beliefs about the benefits of rhino horn use and ultimately change consumer behaviour. A good example is the joint social marketing campaign launched by WWF and TRAFFIC; it is targeted at urban Vietnamese men between the age of 35 and 50 and aims to counter the belief that rhino horn use promotes success, masculinity and luck.

The establishment of a legal trade would undermine the work that is being done at a diplomatic level to curb the illegal trade in rhino horn. And it would compromise the efforts of a number of conservation NGOs whose education and awareness campaigns are showing signs of gaining traction in Viet Nam.

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Lessons from history: exposing the myth of a regulated market

Experience with the trade in ivory from African elephants suggests that if the trade in rhino horn is legalised, poaching will increase, not decrease.

In January 1990, after years of heated debates, CITES banned the international trade in ivory. It is widely accepted that the ivory ban worked. The poaching epidemic that had affected so many African elephant range states was alleviated. Ivory prices plummeted and ivory markets in Europe and the USA closed. It was not solely the ban that worked – it is believed that widespread publicity surrounding the CITES debates created a perception that the trade in ivory was harmful and – following the announcement of the ban – illegal.

But the good times didn’t last long for Africa’s elephants. In 1999, CITES extended permission to South Africa to trade its ivory stockpiles with Japan and in 2008, it allowed South Africa, Botswana and Namibia to sell another 60 tonnes of ivory. These countries claimed to have well managed elephant populations and they wanted to use the revenue from the sale of ivory to fund conservation activities (the sales of the stockpiles were predicated on the belief that over 100 tonnes of legal ivory would flood the market and bring down prices, thereby undercutting the illegal market and so reducing poaching). In fact – devastatingly for Africa’s elephants – the very opposite happened.

Studies by the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)§§ demonstrated that the two sales of ivory stockpiles stimulated the market, inflated prices and contributed to an increase in the illegal ivory trade.

The EIA report “Blood ivory. Exposing the myth of a regulated market” documents how China emerged as an important market for ivory in the 1990s. In July 2008 it was granted “Approved Buyer” status by CITES, in the face of growing evidence that the country’s control systems were not fit for purpose. A host of studies conducted between 2004 and 2008 demonstrated that China’s ivory trade control system is flawed and patchy. For instance, the key findings of a survey conducted in 2011 were that there has been a massive increase in both demand for ivory and in retail prices. Over the past five years there has been a concomitant tripling of elephant poaching levels and the quantities of illegal ivory seized en route to Asia. An estimated 25 000 elephants were killed illegally in 2012.*** Uganda, alone, is said to have lost at least 60 percent of its elephants in the past decade.

                                                                                                               §§ Environmental Investigation Agency. 2012. Blood ivory. Exposing the myth of a regulated market. London, UK. Environmental Investigation Agency. Available at http://eia-international.org/reports/blood-ivory-exposing-the-myth-of-a-regulated-market *** UNEP, CITES, IUCN & TRAFFIC. 2013. Elephants in the dust – the African elephant crisis. A rapid response assessment. Available at http://www.cites.org/common/resources/pub/Elephants_in_the_dust.pdf - page=4&zoom=auto,0,658  

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It is Network for Animals’ view that the EIA report “Blood ivory. Exposing the myth of a regulated market” should be compulsory reading for the Committee of Inquiry tasked with investigating the feasibility of a trade in rhino horn. The experience of the ivory trade makes it glaringly obvious that the ban on the trade in rhino horn must remain in place.

4.2. Ethics

According to the economists Nadal and Aguayo, the pro-trade lobby may be seen as part of a broader perspective in which all natural resources are considered to be commodities that may be used by humans to fulfill their needs and contribute to their wellbeing. This view encompasses a simplistic perspective in which private property rights are seen to lead to greater efficiency in resource management. The concept of “sustainable use” is often used to lend support to the idea that greater efficiency results from the appropriation of resources by anyone who has the power to exploit them.

In Network for Animals’ view, this approach is manifestly flawed and the South African government should be wary of being swayed by pro-trade arguments that are based on the idea that property rights take precedence over the public interest. An analysis of the South African wildlife industry, and the way it has been corrupted by the current rhino crisis, lends credence to this idea.

The wildlife industry

In South Africa, commercial game ranching or wildlife management on private property has demonstrated phenomenal growth in the past five decades. Today, private game ranches cover an area of about 20,5 million hectares, nearly three times the area protected by national or provincial conservation authorities. Wildlife is harvested as a source of meat, hunted for trophies, traded as live specimens and viewed by tourists. The wildlife industry not only makes an important contribution to the economy of South Africa, it is also considered to have enhanced the conservation of biodiversity. However, almost all game ranches are businesses engaged in profit making first, and conservation second.

Rhino owners are usually, but not always, engaged in the hunting industry which, over the years has produced incentives for land-owners to allocate or convert large areas of land for the specific purpose of stocking rhinos. This is because, until 1989, live rhinos were sold for relatively low prices by provincial conservation agencies (most notably the then Natal Parks Board), and re-sold to trophy hunters at a substantial profit. Although this anomaly was corrected in 1989, the number of rhinos sold and hunted in South Africa grew steadily until in 2005 when a dramatic spike in rhino hunts was recorded. This coincides with the period in which hunters from Viet Nam and other Asian countries became the dominant force in the hunting of rhinos, driving up the price of rhino trophies. Hunting by Asian nationals has been called “pseudo

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hunting” because the purpose is not to demonstrate the skills of the hunter, nor to produce a trophy for display, but rather to acquire rhino horn for commercial trade. One of the saddest aspects of the pseudo-hunting phenomenon is that it has ensnared professional hunters, game ranchers, wildlife veterinarians and game capture operators, as well as members of provincial and national conservation agencies. Permits for hunting rhinos, or for exporting rhino horn, have been issued improperly, allowing the organised criminal gangs to slaughter rhinos under the guise of hunting, usually with no consequences (Milliken, T & Shaw, J. 2012, p.11).

One of the dangers of the South African government adopting a pro-trade policy is that it would reward the unscrupulous wildlife professionals who have become involved in pseudo hunting – allowing them to continue to profit from the killing of rhinos. Another danger is that the pro-trade perspective − in which private property rights are seen to lead to greater efficiency in resource management − is completely out of step with South Africa’s environmental policy which is underpinned by the idea that the environment is a common heritage of all South Africans.

The National Environment Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) provides South Africa with national legislation to govern nature conservation activities. The Act establishes the principle of sustainable development and requires that the use of renewable resources does not exceed the level beyond which their integrity is jeopardised. It also stipulates that the environment be held in public trust for the people, that the use of environmental resources must serve the public interest and that the environment must be protected as the people’s common heritage. These requirements are all in line with the Constitution of South Africa.

The pro-trade approach to rhino conservation is out of step with NEMA because it reduces a national treasure to an asset or commodity and promotes the interests of rhino owners (both private and State) above the public interest. The lifting of the CITES ban on the trade in rhino horn cannot serve the interests of the people of South Africa because it is simply too risky: it threatens the right of ordinary South Africans (and the rights of future generations) to an environment in which rhinos may live freely in the wild and be appreciated as part of the country’s natural heritage.

Network for Animals proposes that, instead of promoting the lifting of the CITES ban, South Africa should demonstrate to the world that rhinos are a national treasure worth fighting for. The country should declare a state of emergency on behalf of rhinos and their right to remain wild. South Africa’s rhinos are far too valuable to the nation to peddle their very survival to the highest bidder.

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4.3. Practicality

Why a legal trade in rhino horn cannot work

One of South Africa’s foremost experts in elephants, Professor Rudi van Aarde, captures Network for Animals’ deep concerns about the practicality of lifting the trade ban on rhino horn when he says: “we (South Africa) do not have the capacity or inclination to manage trade in animal products. Poaching is a problem, but is nothing new. What is new is the participation of criminal syndicates whose activities flourish under poor or improper governance. ” †††

A brief analysis of the dynamics of the illegal rhino horn trade demonstrates how well founded Professor van Aarde’s opinion is. And, his assertions are supported by the experience of South Africa with the rampant poaching of abalone Haliotis midae, a sea snail with a high economic value in China and other Asian states.

Rhino poaching in South Africa

In South Africa, the killing of rhinos for their horns is a complex matter. Contrary to the belief that poaching is largely conducted by poor Mozambicans who infiltrate the Kruger National Park through porous borders, an estimated 60% of poachers are South African (Milliken & Shaw, 2012, p.79). And, whereas some rhinos are killed by guns (usually AK47 assault rifles), a growing number of rhinos have been killed by a single shot from a high caliber weapon – some have even been darted with immobilization drugs. The latter “style” of poaching implicates corrupt professional hunters, game ranch owners, game capture specialists, pilots and wildlife veterinarians, all of whom have become active participants in South Africa’s rhino poaching crisis. Also implicated in rhino poaching are South African National Parks (SANParks) and provincial conservation agency officials.

According to Milliken and Shaw, in a few short years, South Africa’s rhino horn trade has rapidly evolved into a “sophisticated, efficient and highly adaptive phenomenon that loosely links various combinations of rogue wildlife industry players, government rangers or officials who can be coerced, compromised or corrupted into illegal activity, and Asian criminal operators.” (Milliken & Shaw, 2012, p.11.) The result is an intricate criminal network that operates at local, national, regional and international levels.

                                                                                                               ††† Prof Rudi van Aarde is the director of the Conservation Ecology Research Unit, a research group in the Department of Zoology and Entomology at the University of Pretoria. He is quoted in an article by Marion Whitehead that was published in the Saturday Star on 4 October 2014. The article is available at http://conservationaction.co.In oza/recent-articles/poaching-a-political-problem/

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The complexity of the rhino horn trade is precisely what makes South Africa unsuitable as a centre for the proposed legal trade. Of paramount concern is the potential for illegal horns from poached rhinos to be laundered into the legal market.

Network for Animals has studied the arguments of the pro-trade lobby and remains sceptical that practical steps will be taken to establish, monitor and control a legal trade in rhino horn. Network for Animals’ specific concerns are:

i.) Without stringent monitoring a legal trade could serve as a cover for the illegal trade in rhino horns. If the high levels of corruption detailed above cannot be managed, how will South Africa monitor and control a legal trade? The complete failure by South Africa to combat the illegal trade in abalone should provide stark warning that the country is not capable of, or ready to, adequately control a legal trade in rhino horn (see below).

ii.) Even if South Africa was able to adequately monitor and control a trade in rhino horn, there is little evidence that its trading partners would be able to do the same. Viet Nam is the world’s most important market for rhino horn and it seems logical that Viet Nam would be nominated as an approved buyer if a legal trade were established. But Viet Nam has an exceedingly poor track record when it comes to monitoring and controlling the import of rhino horn. According to CITES export data, 657 rhino trophies were legally exported from South Africa to Viet Nam between 2003 and 2010, but Vietnamese import data show that only 170 rhino horns were declared to the Vietnamese authorities. Viet Nam’s failure to account for 74% of CITES-approved rhino trophies must raise serious questions about the country’s suitability as a trading partner.

iii.) A Central Selling Organisation (CSO) has been proposed as a mechanism for structuring and managing a legal trade in rhino horn. It has been suggested that the CSO should be the only authority that would negotiate and manage the selling of horns, that buyers’ stockpiles should be subject to regular audits and that the market chain should be closely monitored so as to limit incentives for price speculation and hoarding. It is Network for Animals’ view that the proposed CSO is based several false assumptions, among them that all rhino owners would want to work through such an organisation (in reality rhino horn owners are a disparate mix of private and public owners with different objectives and priorities) and that it would be able to prevent the laundering of illegal horns. Moreover, in the view of Network for Animals, the details of how the CSO would function and regulate trade has not been sufficiently well elucidated by the pro-trade lobby for this model to be convincing.

iv.) The advancement of arguments that suggest that DNA fingerprinting would prevent the laundering of illegal horns cannot be accepted at face value because the details of such a scheme are not adequately defined. For instance, who precisely would conduct and pay for the genetic analysis and tracking of horns?

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Lessons from history: South Africa’s illicit abalone trade

Until the mid-1990s, South African abalone Haliotis midae supported a thriving legal trade. Annual commercial catches were in the region of 600 tonnes and recreational fishers caught several hundred more tonnes. But rampant poaching of abalone resulted in the closure of the recreational fishery in 2004, and a gradual lowering of the commercial catch to the current take of 75 tonnes per year.

Efforts to combat the illegal trade, including listing the species in the CITES

Appendix III in 2007, conducting government-led enforcement operations,

establishing designated environmental courts to deal with abalone offences and developing more inclusive fisheries policies have all proved unsuccessful. This is as a result of inadequate resources for monitoring, control and

surveillance of inshore fisheries, and long standing socio-political grievances

between small-scale fishers and the post-apartheid government. According to

Greef & Raemaekers (2014) criminal syndicates exploited the grievances of coastal fishers, using them to extract abalone from the nearshore environment. Evidence suggests that local poachers are sometimes paid for their services with illegal drugs, demonstrating that the syndicates are multi-product firms with interests in a range of illegal activities.

There are real comparisons to be drawn between the illegal abalone trade and the current rhino poaching crisis. Although it is a food rather than a pharmaceutical, abalone is also a luxury product that fetches high prices on Asian markets. Like rhino horn, it is associated with the culture of conspicuous consumption, a potent new force in Asian economies that leads consumers to believe they need to flaunt their wealth or influence. Abalone is prepared with great care and served at special occasions: to mark the conclusion of a business deal or to celebrate weddings and other important social events.

One of the most important lessons to be taken from the abalone example is that a substantial growth in the volume of legal abalone (the aquaculture industry grew rapidly between 1990 and the present and now produces approximately 2 000 tons of abalone per year) completely failed to stem demand for illegal abalone and had no impact whatsoever on poaching. Moreover, the involvement of organised crime syndicates – as is the case with the trade in rhino horn – was a game changer. South Africa’s conservation and law enforcement authorities were completely incapable of defending the abalone resource against the multi-national syndicates that engage in a wide range of illicit activities, from drug smuggling to human trafficking.

There are many examples of wildlife products for which legal and illegal trades coexist and where the illegal trade has undermined the legal trade. South

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Africa’s abalone fishery is one of them. The country should not make the same mistakes with rhinos.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

If the government were to table a proposal to the CITES Conference of Parties in 2016, it would be a devastating mistake, not only for rhinos but for South Africa’s international reputation as a sanctuary for African wildlife. A large number of countries and people would view South Africa’s attempt to legalise the rhino horn trade as self-serving and this would undermine the image of our country as a good partner.

In this submission, Network for Animals has utilised a number of peer reviewed papers and reports to demonstrate that there are major weaknesses in the arguments put forward by the pro-trade lobby, and serious questions around the efficacy, ethics and practicality of lifting the CITES trade ban. Network for Animals has also shown that there are tested alternatives for solving the current rhino crisis, namely strategic diplomacy with user nations and targeted education and awareness campaigns.

Network for Animals is of the opinion that tabling a proposal to CITES would be reckless and damaging to rhinos. Such an action would impact negatively on the country’s national heritage. South Africa and its rhinos deserve better.

Network for Animals advocates the following actions:

i.) A growing body of evidence shows that Viet Nam is the world’s largest destination and consumer of rhino horn; there is also evidence that intensive diplomatic pressure can lead to a significant change in market dynamics and a reduction in poaching. Therefore, the South African government should urgently scale up its diplomatic efforts to bring about a situation where the two governments work hand in hand to combat the illegal trade. Specifically, the South African government should develop and ratify a bi-lateral treaty with Viet Nam that:

• makes rhino horn crime a national priority of both countries

• ensures that there is adequate legislation in place in both countries to secure convictions and harsh penalties for rhino crimes

The experience of Japan, Korea and Taiwan has demonstrated unequivocally that diplomatic efforts can and do work.

ii.) The South African government should work in partnership with Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to urgently scale up demand reduction campaigns. These campaigns should be targeted at Vietnamese consumers in the short-term, but a need might arise for similar campaigns targeted at Chinese and Thai consumers in future.

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iii.) The South Africa government should show strong political will and make rhino crime a higher national priority. Specifically, the government should:

• ensure that those convicted of rhino crimes receive adequate penalties that serve as an effective deterrent;

• develop better regulation of the wildlife industry;

• ensure effective monitoring of the sport hunting of rhinos.

iv.) The South African government should work closely with and support and encourage conservation NGOs. This will harness international goodwill, assist in fundraising and improve the capacity and resources of conservation authorities at national and provincial level, and specifically at certain sites such as the Kruger National Park.

v.) The South African government should burn its rhino horn stockpile, thereby sending a message to the world that the trade in rhino horn is wrong.

Finally, the South African government should make it clear that South Africa’s natural heritage – and its national treasures, like rhinos – are not for sale.

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References

Network for Animals wishes to acknowledge the wide scope and high quality of the information that is presented by Tom Milliken and Jo Shaw in the TRAFFIC report “The South Africa – Viet Nam rhino horn trade nexus: a deadly combination of institutional lapses, corrupt wildlife industry professionals and Asian crime syndicates. Other documents consulted in the compilation of this submission are:

Bennett, E.L. 2014. Legal ivory trade in a corrupt world and its implications on African elephant populations. Conservation Biology, 29 (1): 54–60. DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12377

Biggs, D.; Courchamp, F.; Martin, R. & Possingham, H. 2013. Legal trade of Africa’s rhino horns. Science, 339: 1038–1039. Available at http://www.sciencemag.org

De Greef, K. & Raemaekers, S. 2014. South Africa’s illicit abalone trade. An updated overview and knowledge gap analysis. Cambridge, UK. TRAFFIC International. 36 pp.

Economists at Large. 2013. Horn of contention. A review of literature on the economics of trade in rhino horn. Prepared for IFAW South Africa. Melbourne, Australia. Economists at Large. Available at http://www.ifaw.org/united-states/resource-centre/horn-contention-review-literature-economics-trade-rhino-horn

Environmental Investigation Agency. 2012. Blood ivory. Exposing the myth of a regulated market. London, UK. Environmental Investigation Agency. Available at http://eia-international.org/reports/blood-ivory-exposing-the-myth-of-a-regulated-market

Mail & Guardian. 2015. Decision over sale of stockpile rhino horn set for 2015. Mail & Guardian, 10 February 2015. Available at http://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-10-stockpiled-rhino-horns-sale-decision-will-be-made-in-2016/

Martin, E. & Vigne, L. 2011.The ivory dynasty. A report on the soaring demand for elephant and mammoth ivory in southern China. London, UK. Elephant family, the Aspinall Foundation and Columbus Zoo and Aquarium. Available at http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/pdf_files/131/1315037780.pdf

Milliken, T. & Shaw, J. 2012. The South Africa – Viet Nam rhino horn trade nexus: a deadly combination of institutional lapses, corrupt wildlife industry professionals and Asian crime syndicates. Johannesburg, South Africa. Traffic. Available at http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/index.php?s=1&act=refs&CODE=s_refs&boolean=or&author=Milliken,+T.

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Nadal, A. & Aguayo, F. 2014. Leonardo’s sailors. A review of the economic analysis of wildlife trade. Manchester, United Kingdom. The Leverhulme Centre for the Study of Value. Available at http://thestudyofvalue.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/WP5-Nadal-and-Aguayo-Leonardos-Sailors-2014.pdf

Pinnock, D. 2014. Egg dancing on a bloodied horn. Daily Maverick. Available at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-06-17-op-ed-egg-dancing-on-a-bloodied-horn/ - .VORbMXbc_SM

Taylor, A.; Brebner, K.; Coetzee, R.; Davies-Mostert, H.; Lindsey, P.; Shaw, J. & t'Sas Rolfes, M. 2014. The viability of legalising trade in rhino horn in South Africa. Pretoria, South Africa. Department of Environmental Affairs. 108 pp. Available at https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/rhinohorntrade_southafrica_legalisingreport.pdf

Whitehead, M. 2014. Poaching a political problem. Saturday Star. Available at http://conservationaction.co.za/recent-articles/poaching-a-political-problem/

WWF. 2014. Tackling rhino poaching from the source. Panda Bulletin, December 2014.

Websites

Conservation Action Trust: http://conservationaction.co.za

Environmental Investigation Agency: http://eia-international.org/

Outraged South African Citizens Against Rhino Poaching (OSCAP) – http://www.oscap.co.za

Rhino Resource Centre – http://www.rhinoresourcecentre.com

Save the Rhino – http://www.savetherhino.org