Subjects of Construction

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Statutory Construction Cases

V. Subjects of Construction

Perfecto v. MeerGREGORIO PERFECTO, vs. BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue

Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the members of the SupremeCourt and all judges of inferior courts shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, whichshall not be diminished during their continuance in office. It also provides that until Congress shallprovide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos. When Justice Perfectoassumed office, Congress had not provided otherwise, by fixing a different salary for associate

justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.

The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salaryas member of the judiciary. The latter paid the amount under protest. He contended that the

assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereonwould reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the Judiciary amountto a diminution thereof., and thus violate the Constitution.

Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the judiciary amounts to adiminution thereof. If said imposition would not be considered as a diminution, it would appear that, inthe matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive.Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs. Further, the Constitution provides that

judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services acompensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Thus, next topermanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixedprovision for their support. In the general course of human nature, a power over a mans subsistenceamounts to a power over his will. The independence of the judges as of far greater importance than anyrevenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or privilege. It isessentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is themoney salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the independenceof the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundationwhereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent,

knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune as to make anassured salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the judiciaryrelinquish their position at the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with theirclients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office.So, it is irrefutable that the guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not anexemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which others are liable.The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since thevalid and full consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in the place of the tax.

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

Aglipay v. RuizGREGORIO AGLIPAYvs. JUAN RUIZ

Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order theissuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rdInternational Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons.Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what heconsiders to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denouncethe matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, theDirector of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage forprinting. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remainedunsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religionand is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active powerthat binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds thepurest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people,in the preamble of their Constitution, implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish agovernment that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promotethe general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under aregime of justice, liberty and democracy, they thereby manifested their intense religious nature andplaced unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevatinginfluence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.

Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is thediscretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageousto the Government. Of course, the phrase advantageous to the Government does not authorize theviolation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property for the use,benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stampswas not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. Thestamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derivedfrom the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to takeadvantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and itspeople and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp

contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads SeatXXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

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Manila Prince Hotel v. GSISMANILA PRINCE HOTELvs . GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE

ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL

Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of thePhilippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through publicbidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close biddingheld on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipinocorporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, andRenong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the samenumber of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declarationof Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letterto GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in asubsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive thatGSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may behastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court onprohibition and mandamus.

Issue(s):

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing. Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomesoperative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient ruleby means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a

constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liabilityimposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination andconstruction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to thelegislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enactlegislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operationof such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy forthe protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards aroundthe exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe apenalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provisionineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provisionfor a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended tobe self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarilyexhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution,further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation howeverdoes not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. Asagainst constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a differentprinciple and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon thepeople in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutionalconventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expresslyprovided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is

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that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated asrequiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore andpractically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs nofurther guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision

does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitutionspeaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as theConstitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case,Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictivelyan American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become thevenue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economicrights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choicehas to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen overthe former.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization andthe Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere andthereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessaryclearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Taada v. TuveraApril 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY ANDNATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI]

vs.

HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity asDeputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records

Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing

Facts: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must bepublished in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the OfficialGazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive

orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. They maintain that since the subject of thepetition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they areproper parties for the petition. The respondents alleged, however through the Solicitor-General, thatpetitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They further contend thatpublication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectiveness of laws wherethe laws provide for their own effectivity dates. Thus publication is not indispensable.

Issue: Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of laws

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Held: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does notprovide for its effectivity date for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication but not when the law itself provides forthe date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the factof publication. Article 2 however, considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue does

not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for thedate of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general public adequate noticeof the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice andpublication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. Itwould be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary toapprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the personsaffected thereby. In the present case, Presidential issuances of general application, which have not beenpublished, shall have no force and effect. The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees priorto their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences whichcannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublishedpresidential issuances which are of general application, and that unless so published, they shall have nobinding force and effect.

Taada v. Tuvera (Resolution)December 29, 1986

Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette allunpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shallhave no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move forreconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that themotion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently requiredthe new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).

Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause unless otherwise provided .

Held: The clause unless it is otherwise provided , in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the dateof effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This

clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or onany other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that theusual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) allstatutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executiveorders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validlydelegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules andregulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a validdelegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory

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and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to fill in the details of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or itis no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or assoon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2of the Civil Code.

People v. EchavezParts of a Law; Preamble

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., ascomplainant all private prosecutor

vs.

HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMOOROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO

Facts : Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed separate informations against sixteen people forsquatting which was punishable under PD No. 772. FIve of the informations wereraffled to Judge Vicente Echavez, Jr. The Judge dismissed the five informations beforethe accused could be arraigned. One of the Judge's grounds for the dismissal was thatunder the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of agrazing land. The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered.

Issues : Whether Presidential Decree No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similaracts, applies to agricultural lands.

Ruling/ Held : No . The court ruled that PD No. 772 does not apply to pasture landsbecause its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urbancommunities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made bywell-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture lands in ruralareas.

SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or takingadvantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying orpossessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or anyother purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months toone year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos atthe discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2ndparagraph is omitted.)

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial courtdoes not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is

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The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision.

VI. Interpretation of Specific Types of Statutes

People v. ManantanPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN

Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI)of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the RevisedElection Code . A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probablecause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upondefendants plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as

justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the RevisedElection Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is withinthe purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of thepeace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on variousmotions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon theauthority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.

Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the RevisedElection Code.

Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted froman enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus canoperate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of therule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, butrather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from alegislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term

judge includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity,including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of theLegislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is nonecessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of theRevised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term

judge , including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of thecourts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.

The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case fortrial on the merits.

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Mactan Cebu (MCIAA) v. MarcosMACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITYvs . HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS, in his capacity as the Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cebu City, THE CITY OF CEBU, represented by its Mayor, HON. TOMAS R.OSMEA, and EUSTAQUIO B. CESA

Facts: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act 6958.Since the time of its creation, MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes inaccordance with Section 14 of its Charter. However on 11 October 1994, the Office of the Treasurer of Cebu, demanded for the payment of realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner.Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified. It also asserted that it is aninstrumentality of the government performing a governmental functions, which puts limitations on thetaxing powers of local government units. It nonetheless stands in the same footing as an agency orinstrumentality of the national government by the very nature of its powers and functions. The Cityrefused to cancel and set aside petitioners realty tax account, insisting that the MCIAA is a governmentcontrolled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and234 of the Local Government Code (LGC), and not an instrumentality of the government but merely agovernment owned corporation performing proprietary functions. MCIAA paid its tax account underprotest when City is about to issue a warrant of levy against the MCIAAs properties.

On 29 December 1994, MCIAA filed a Petition of Declaratory Relief with the Cebu Regional Trial Courtcontending that the taxing power of local government units do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees onan instrumentality of the national government. It contends that by the nature of its powers andfunctions, it has the footing of an agency or instrumentality of the national government; which claim theCity rejects. On 22 March 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition, citing that close reading of theLGC provides the express cancellation and withdrawal of tax exemptions of Government Owned andControlled Corporations. MCIAAs motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court in its4 May 1995 order, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the MCIAA is exempted from realty taxes.

Held: Tax statutes are construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.But since taxes are paid for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns againstexemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption from taxpayments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. Elsewisestated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. However, if the grantee of theexemption is a political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction does not applybecause the practical effect of the exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that has to behandled by the government in the course of its operations. Further, since taxation is the rule andexemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing

authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties basedon material consideration of a mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered bythe non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) is a taxable person under its Charter (RA 6958),and was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only inrespect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to alltaxes, except real property tax. Since Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC) expressly

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provides that All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees [sic], executive orders,proclamations and administrative regulations, or part of parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. With that repealing clause inthe LGC, the tax exemption provided for in RA 6958 had been expressly repealed by the provisions of the LGC. Therefore, MCIAA has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties effective after January 1,

1992 until the present.

The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the challenged decision and order of the RTCCebu; without pronouncement as to costs.

Serfino v. CAG.R. No. L-40858 September 15, 1987

SPOUSES FEDERICO SERFINO and LORNA BACHAR vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS and LOPEZ SUGAR CENTRAL MILL CO., INC.

No. L-40751 September 15, 1987

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANKvs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LOPEZ SUGAR CENTRAL MILL COMPANY, INC., SPOUSES FEDERICO SERFINOand LORNA BACHAR

Facts: On 25 August 1937, a parcel of land was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor (OCT1839). On 14 December 1945, he sold said land in favor of Nemesia D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18January 1946). OCT 1839 was lost during the war and upon petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the Court of

First Instance of Negros Occidental ordered the reconstitution thereof. Pursuant thereto, OCT 14-R(1839) was issued on 18 January 1946 in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. On that same day, TCT 57-Nwas issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT 14-R (1839). On 15August 1951, Nemesia Baltazar, sold said property to Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., and the latter did notpresent the documents for registration until 17 December 1964 to the Office of the Registry of Deeds.Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by anothercertificate of title, TCT 38985, in the name of Federico Serfino. On 19 November 1964, the spousesSerfinos mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00; which was inscribed in TCT No. 38985.

The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to recover said land; and the lower court rendered adecision ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 38985; issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintiff; andthe payment of the plaintiff PNB the loan of spouses Serfinos secured by said land. Both partiesappealed from this decision of the trial court. Ruling on the assignment of errors, the appellate courtaffirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification in its decision setting aside the decision of thetrial court declaring plaintiff liable to PNB for payment, however, ordering the plaintiff to reimburse theSerfino spouses of the sum P1,839.49, representing the unpaid taxes and penalties paid by the latterwhen they repurchased the property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfino and PNB to theSupreme Court.

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Issue: Whether the auction sale of the disputed property was null and void.

Held: The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the prescribed procedure in auctionsales of property for tax delinquency being in derogation of property rights should be followedpunctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for theprotection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer andthe public officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and tothe public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of whichvitiates the sale. In the present case, Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely negligent in its payment of land taxes. The record shows that taxes were paid for the years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefor wasobtained in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros Occidental of the land in dispute tothe spouses Serfinos was void since the Province of Negros Occidental was not the real owner of theproperty thus sold. In turn, the spouses Serfinos title which has been derived from that of the Provinceof Negros Occidental is likewise void. However, the fact that the public auction sale of the disputedproperty was not valid cannot in any way be attributed to the mortgagees fault. The inability of theRegister of Deeds to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of the scheduled public auction salewas partly due to the failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare the land in its name for a number of

years and to pay the complete taxes thereon. PNB is therefore entitled to the payment of the mortgageloan as ruled by the trial court and exempted from the payment of costs.

The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision, with modification that PNB mortgage credit must bepaid by Lopez Sugar Central.

Manahan v. ECCMARIA E. MANAHAN

vs.

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GSIS (LAS PIAS MUNICIPAL HIGH SCHOOL)

Facts: Maria E. Manahan, the petitioner, is the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of EntericFever while employed as classroom teacher in Las Pias Municipal High School, Las Pias, Rizal, on 8May, 1975. The deceased was in perfect health when he entered government service on 20 July 1969,and that in the course of his employment in 1974, he was treated for epigastric pain. He succumbed toenteric fever on May 8, 1975. Thus, the petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS) for death benefit under Presidential Decree 626. In a letter dated 19 June 1975, theGSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever, is not anoccupational disease, and that enteric fever or paratyphoid is similar in effect to typhoid fever, in thesense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.

The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the decisionof the GSIS on a finding that the ailment of the deceased, enteric fever, was not induced by oraggravated by the nature of the duties of Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. Thus, the appeal.

Issue: Whether the Workmens Compensation should be resolved in favor of the worker.

Held: The Transitory and Final Provisions of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and claimsaccruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force atthe time of their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of Offenses

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and Claims), workmens compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and during theperiod from 1 November 1974 up to 31 December 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated inaccordance with the laws and rules at the time their causes of action accrued Hence, this Court appliedthe provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, as amended, on passing upon petitioners claim..The illness that claimed the life of the deceased may had its onset before 10 December 1974, thus, his

action accrued before 10 December 1974. Still, In any case, and case of doubt, the same should beresolved in favor of the worker, and that social legislations like the Workmens Compensation Act andthe Labor Code should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief tothe workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury.Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act in thiscase, the presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner theamount of P6,000.00 as death compensation benefit and P600.00 as attorneys fees, to reimburse thepetitioners expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceasedNazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts, and to pay administrative fees.

Ty v. First National SuretyDIOSDADO C. TY vs. FIRST NATIONAL SURETY & ASSURANCE CO., INC.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-16139 April 29, 1961.

DIOSDADO C. T vs. ASSOCIATED INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-16140 April 29, 1961

DIOSDADO C. TY vs. UNITED INSURANCE CO., INC.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-16141 April 29, 1961.

DIOSDADO C. TY vs. PHILIPPINE SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-16142 April 29, 1961.

DIOSDADO C. TY vs. RELIANCE SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-16143 April 29, 1961

DIOSDADO C. TY vs. FAR EASTERN SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC.

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x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-16144 April 29, 1961

DIOSDADO C. TY vs. CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-16145 April 29, 1961

DIOSDADO C. TY vs. CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC.

Facts: At different times within a period of two months prior to 24 December 1953, Diosdado C. Ty,employed as operator mechanic foreman in the Broadway Cotton Factory insured himself in 18 localinsurance companies, among which being the 8 above-named defendants, which issued to him personalaccident policies. Plaintiffs beneficiary was his employer, Broadway Cotton Factory, which paid the

insurance premiums. On 24 December 1953, a fire broke out which totally destroyed the BroadwayCotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, plaintiff was injured on the left hand by a heavyobject. He was brought to the Manila Central University hospital, and after receiving first-aid, he went tothe National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment of his injuries (fractures in index, middle, fourth, and fifthfingers of left hand). From 26 December 1953 to 8 February 1954, he underwent medical treatment inthe hospital. The above-described physical injuries have caused temporary total disability of plaintiffsleft hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the above-named defendants to recover indemnity. Defendants rejected plaintiffs claim for indemnity for thereason that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by him wasnot covered by his policy.

Plaintiff sued the defendants in the Municipality Court of this City, which dismissed his complaints.Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance Manila, presided by Judge Gregorio S.Narvasa, which absolved the defendants from the complaints. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether Diosdado Ty is entitled to indemnity under the insurance policy for the disability of hisleft hand.

Held: The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered asa loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability notcovered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. In the case at bar, due to the clarity of thestipulation, distinction between temporary disability and total disability need not be made in relationto ones occupation means that the condition of the insurance is such that common prudence requireshim to desist from transacting his business or renders him incapable of working. While the Courtsympathizes with the plaintiff or his employer, for whose benefit the policies were issued, it can not gobeyond the clear and express conditions of the insurance policies, all of which define partial disability asloss of either hand by a amputation through the bones of the wrist. There was no such amputation inthe case at bar.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

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Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock InsuranceQUA CHEE GAN

vs.

LAW UNION AND ROCK INSURANCE CO., LTD., represented by its agent, WARNER, BARNES AND CO., LTD.

Facts : Before WWII, Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, owned 4 warehouses in Tabaco, Albay usedfor the storage of stocks of copra and of hemp in which he dealt extensively. They had been, with theircontents, insured with the Insurance Company since 1937, and the lose made payable to the PhilippineNational Bank as mortgage of the hemp and copra, to the extent of its interest. On 21 July 1940, fire of undetermined origin that broke out and lasted almost one week, gutted and completely destroyedBodegas Nos. 1, 3 and 4, with the merchandise stored therein. Plaintiff-appellee informed the insurer bytelegram on the same date. The insurance Company resisted payment, claiming violation of warrantiesand conditions, filing of fraudulent claims, and that the fire had been deliberately caused by the insuredor by other persons in connivance with him. Qua Chee Gan, his brother Qua Chee Pao, and someemployees of his were indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of arson but were acquitted by the trial

court in a final decision on 9 July 1941.

With the civil case, Qua Chee Gan instituted the action in 1940 with the Court of First Instance of Albay,seeking to recover the proceeds of certain fire insurance policies totalling P370,000, issued by the LawUnion & Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., through its agent, Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., upon certain bodegasand merchandise of the insured that were burned on 21 June 1940. The records of the original casewere destroyed during the liberation of the region, and were reconstituted in 1946. After a trial thatlasted several years, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the insurancecompany to pay Qua Chee Gan the sum of P146,394.48 (1st cause of action), P150,000 (2nd), P5,000(3rd), P15,000 (4th) , and P40,000 (5th), each bearing 80% interest per annum in accordance withSection 91 (b) of the Insurance Act from 26 September 1940, until each is paid, with costs against thedefendant. It also dismissed the complaint in intervention of PNB without costs. The Insurance Companyappealed directly to the Supreme Court. It contends that a warranty in a fire insurance policy prohibitedthe storage in the premises of oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and their liquid productshaving a flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit. Gasoline, which has a flash point below 300 degreesFahrenheit was stored therein.

Issue : Whether gasoline may be construed as oil to warrant the forfeiture of claims under theinsurance policy.

Held : The Hemp Warranty provisions relied upon by the insurer speaks of oils (animal and/orvegetable and/or mineral and/or their liquid products having a flash point below 300 Fahrenheit, andis decidedly ambiguous and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, Oils mean lubricants and not

gasoline or kerosene. By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms andphraseology of the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and liberally in favorof the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture. There is no reason why the prohibition of keeping gasolinein the premises could not be expressed clearly and unmistakably, in the language and terms that thegeneral public can readily understand, without resort to obscure esoteric expression. If the companyintended to rely upon a condition of that character, it ought to have been plainly expressed in the policy.Still, it is well settled that the keeping of inflammable oils on the premises, though prohibited by thepolicy, does not void it if such keeping is incidental to the business and according to the weight of

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authority, even though there are printed prohibitions against keeping certain articles on the insuredpremises the policy will not be avoided by a violation of these prohibitions, if the prohibited articles arenecessary or in customary use in carrying on the trade or business conducted on the premises. In thepresent case, no gasoline was stored in the burned bodegas, and that Bodega No. 2 which was notburned and where the gasoline was found, stood isolated from the other insured bodegas.

The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, thus affirming it; withcosts against the appellant.

Co v. RepublicBENJAMIN COvs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the

Nationalist Government of China. He is married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated inthe Catholic church of Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalogdialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and finished his primary studies in the Colegio inBangued, both schools being recognized by the government. He has a child two months old. He hasnever been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to organized government,nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does not believe in, nor practice, polygamy.Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of government and stated that if his petition is granted he would serve the government either in themilitary or civil department. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is partowner of a store in Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of P10,000.00 which heclaims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to civic and charitable organizations likethe Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he hasresided in the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to have earned P1,000.00 inhis tobacco business. With respect to the store of which he claims to be a part owner, he stated that hisfather gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing one-fourth of the sales. Aside from being aco-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00 as a salesman therein. He took a coursein radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He claims that he hasnever been delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file his income taxreturn when he allegedly received an amount of not less than P3,000 from his father which he claims tohave invested in his tobacco business.

Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. After hearing, the court ordered that acertificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision

becomes final and all the requisites provided for in RA 503. The government appealed the decision of the trial court, raising the facts that did not state what principles of the Constitution he knew, althoughwhen asked what laws of the Philippines he believes in, he answered democracy.; that he stated thathis father had already filed his income tax return, when asked why he did not file his income taxreturns; and that he presented his alien certificate of registration, but not the alien certificates of registration of his wife and child.

Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualifyhim to become a Filipino citizen .

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Held: The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the constitution,which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the principles underlying our constitution.Further, Philippine law requires that an alien to conducted himself in a proper and irreproachablemanner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constitutedgovernment as well as with the community in which he is living. In the present case, in so stating that

he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in ourconstitution which are referred to in the law; the belief in democracy or in a democratic form of government is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in theprinciples underlying our constitution. Further, petitioner failed to show that he has complied with hisobligation to register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the AlienRegistration Actl; and further failed to file his income tax return despite his fixed salary of P1,440.00 ayear and his profit of P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and received an amount less than P3,000 fromhis father as one-fourth of the proceeds of the sale of the store, the total of which is more than what isrequired by law for one to file an income tax return.

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, hold that the trial court erred in granting thepetition for naturalization, without pronouncement as to costs.

Guerrero v. CAMANUEL GUERRERO and MARIA GUERRERO

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and APOLINARIO BENITEZ

Facts: On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead theagricultural leasehold system. In 1969, Apolinario Benitez was taken by Manuel and Maria Guerrero totake care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut plantationsituated at the Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Benitez was allowed for that purpose to put up a hutwithin the plantation where he and his family stayed. In addition to attending to the cows, he was madeto clean the already fruitbearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do such other similarchores. Harvest time which usually comes every 3 months. For his work related to the coconuts, heshared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For attending to thecows he was paid P500 a year.

On 10 September 1971, RA 6389 amending RA 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary topublic policy. Sometime in the early part of 1973, Benitez was refrained from gathering nuts from the10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts. He feltaggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of SpecialUnit in the Office of the President in Malacaang, Manila. This led to an execution of an agreement

whereby defendants agreed to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenantthereon and that their relationship will be guided by the provisions of RA 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Actof the Philippines).

In July 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the plantationwith threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom. The Guerreros assigned Rogelio andPaulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra. Defendants

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court denied petitioners motion for having been erroneously addressed to this court instead of to theCFI ignoring petitioners predicament that the CFI had already turned them down and ordered thedismissal of their appeal without notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised to execute its

judgment of conviction against them.

Petitioners spouses then filed on 14 January 1972 their petition for prohibition and mandamus with theCourt of Appeals against the People and City Court. The Solicitor General did not interpose any objectionwhichever viewpoint is adopted by the Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently conflicting orclashing principles of law, i.e.. finality of judicial decision or equity in judicial decision. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition on 17 December 1973, after finding that the city courts

judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the CFI instead of dismissing appeal,could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be endorsed to the Court of Appeals,it held that since petitioners did not implead the CFI as principal party respondent it could not grant anyrelief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve some equities. With theirmotion for reconsideration denied, petitioners filed the petition for review.

Issue: Whether the formal impleading of the Court of First Instance is indispensable and the

procedural infirmity of misdirecting the appeal to Court of First Instance are fatal to the appellees cause

Held: The construction of statutes is always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as todefeat the purpose of the legislator and it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as toavoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity and therefore a literal interpretation is to berejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Thus, in the construction of its own Rules of Court, the Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination andunfairness and to supply the void by holding that Courts of First Instance are equally bound as thehigher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper appellatecourt.

The formal impleading of the CFI which issued the challenged order of dismissal was not indispensableand could be overlooked in the interest of speedy adjudication. The Court of Appeals act of dismissingthe petition and denying the relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court simply because of the non-impleader of the CFI as a nominal party was tantamount to sacrificing substance to form and tosubordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality. The procedural infirmity of petitioners misdirecting their appeal to the CFI rather than to the Court of Appeals, which they hadtimely sought to correct in the CFI itself by asking that court to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court, should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive them of their substantialright of appeal and leave them without any remedy.

The Supreme Court set aside the CA decision dismissing the petition and in lieu thereof, judgment wasrendered granting the petition for prohibition against City court, enjoining it from executing its judgment

of conviction against petitioners-accused and further commanding said city court to elevate petitioners appeal from its judgment to the CA for the latters disposition on the merits; without costs.

Gimenez v. SEC

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GIMENEZ STOCK BROKERAGE AND CO., INC. vs.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MANUEL G. ABELLO, JESUS J. VALDES, ROSARIO N.LOPEZ, JULIO A. SULIT, JR., ACKERMAN & CO., INC. and GONZALO T. SANTOS

The Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission rendered a decision reversing the rulingof its hearing officer. They ordered Gimenez Stock Brokerage & Co., Inc. to pay Ackerman & Co., Inc.,the sum of P124,426 with 12% interest per annum from the date of demand.

A copy of the decision was received by Gimenez Stock brokerage on April 13, 1984. Twenty-seven dayslater , or on May 10, 1984, it filed a motion for reconsideration.

The SEC denied the motion for having been filed out of time, that is because it was filed beyond the fif-teen- day period for appealing the case to this Court. In this certiorari mandamus and prohibition case,Gimenez Stock brokerage contends that the SEC was in error because the appeal to this Court could bemade within thirty days , and, consequently, its motion for reconsideration should be filed within that peri-od (Sec. 1, Rule XVII, New Rules of Procedure in the SEC).

We hold that the SEC erred in holding that the thirty-day period provided for in section 6 of PresidentialDecree No. 902-A was modified by section 39 of the Judiciary Revamp Law, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,which provides for a period of fifteen days for appealing from final orders, resolutions, awards, judg-ments or decisions of any court. The SEC is not a court. It is an administrative agency .

It is of no moment that section 9 (3) of the Judiciary Revamp Law grants to the Intermediate AppellateCourt exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of quasi- judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boardsor commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordancewith the Constitution, the provisions of the Judiciary Revamp Law, and subparagraph (1) of the third

paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Law.

Repeals by implication are not favored. The thirty-day period fixed in Presidential Decree No. 902-A, theorganic law of the SEC, is still in force.

WHEREFORE, the Commissioners' order dated September 3, 1984, denying the motion for reconsidera-tion of Gimenez Stock brokerage for having been filed out of time, is reversed and set aside. It is directedto resolve the motion on the merits. No costs.

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila

Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of FirstInstance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for thepurpose of constructing a public improvement, specifically for the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue.The Chinese Community opposed the said expropriation, contending that there was no necessity of taking, that it already had public character and that it would it would disturb the resting places of thedead.

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The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and absolvedeach and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs.From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed.

Issue: Whether the Chinese cemetery may be validly expropriated by the City of Manila .

Held: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorizedagents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority mustbe strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none isguarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants.When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtlyinterpretation.

The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercisethe right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine thequestion, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of

eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. Inthe present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila:First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, findsthat neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contendedthat the right is being exercised in accordance with law. It is a well known fact that cemeteries may bepublic or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church,while only a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood uses the latter. Where aemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other publicuses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts,which are held in good faith for future use. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in questionmay be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of thedefinition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true,then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has noauthority or right under the law to expropriate public property. But, whether or not the cemetery ispublic or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetimeof those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern,and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatestnecessity exists therefor. In this case there is no necessity of taking since there are other ways by whichRizal Avenue may be expanded to ease the traffic situation.

The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening the street through thecemetery from the record. But that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which answers every purpose of the City. The Supreme Court, thus, affirmed the judgment of

the lower court, with costs against the appellant.

Javellana v. Mirasol

JULIO JAVELLANAvs. LUIS MIRASOL and GERONIMO NUEZ, provincial sheriff of Iloilo

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In the year 1915 Julio Javellana, the plaintiff herein, recovered a judgment for the sum of P5,710.50, with interest, inthe Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo against Maximino Mirasol and Eugenio Kilayco, and in order tosatisfy the same an execution was in due time levied upon certain properties of Maximino Mirasol. On July 6, 1915,said properties were exposed to sale by the sheriff at public auction and were purchased by the judgment creditor,Julio Javellana, the highest bidder, for the sum of P5,920. Before the expiration of the period of one year allowed bylaw for the redemption of property sold under execution, or to be precise, on July 3, 1916, Alejandro Mirasol, a

brother of Maximino Mirasol, appeared before Geronimo Nuez, deputy sheriff of the province aforesaid, and, for the purpose of redeeming the properties in accordance with section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure, placed in thehands of said officer a check, drawn on the Bank of the Philippine Islands and payable to bearer, for the sum of P6,604.74.

In making this redemption it was represented to the deputy sheriff that Luis Mirasol was a redemptioner, or personentitled to redeem, within the meaning of section 464 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and in proof of this fact Ale-

jandro Mirasol exhibited a document bearing date of April 4, 1916, executed by the president of the Bank of thePhilippine Islands, transferring to Luis Mirasol two claims, amounting to several thousand pesos, which had been re-duced to judgment by the bank against Maximino Mirasol. The consideration for the transfer of these judgments isstated in the document of transfer to be P6,150, paid to the bank by Luis Mirasol.

The right of Luis Mirasol to redeem the property was not questioned by the deputy sheriff, and the check presented

by Alejandro Mirasol was accepted. At the same time a receipt was delivered to Alejandro Mirasol, signed byGeronimo Nuez as deputy sheriff, acknowledging the receipt of the sum of P6,604.74, as a deposit for the purposeof redeeming the properties which had been sold as the property of Maximino Mirasol and purchased by the judg-ment creditor Julio Javellana. Of this amount the sum of P5,920 was stated to be the amount of the purchase price,the remainder being accrued interest.

The check which was delivered to Geronimo Nuez by Alejandro Mirasol upon the occasion of making this depositwas not immediately presented for payment to the bank upon which it was drawn but was delivered by that officer tohis superior, the Honorable Amando Avancea, at that time Governor of the Province of Iloilo, and ex officio sheriff.By him the check was retained until the expiration of his term of office, when it was turned over to his successor inoffice, the Honorable Gregorio Yulo. On December 13, 1916, the latter official presented the check to the bank uponwhich it was drawn and received payment.

Pursuant to the redemption thus effected, the deputy sheriff, Geronimo Nuez, at the request of Luis Mirasol, onMarch 9, 1918, executed and delivered to the latter a public document purporting to convey to him all the right, titleand interest in said property which had formerly been vested in Maximino Mirasol.

Julio Javellana, the original judgment creditor of Maximino Mirasol, and purchaser of the properties which had beensold as aforesaid, considering himself aggrieved by the redemption thereof, appeared in the Court of First Instanceof the Province of Iloilo, on April 11, 1918, and filed the original complaint herein, attacking said redemption as ir-regular and unauthorized in point of law and as fraudulent, or simulated, in point of fact, and praying that the docu-ment of March 9, 1918, executed by Geronimo Nuez, and purporting to convey to Luis Mirasol the title to said

property which had formerly been vested in Maximino Mirasol, be declared fraudulent and void, and that said in-strument be cancelled by order of the court. The plaintiff further asked that the sheriff be required to issue to the

plaintiff, as purchaser, a deed of conveyance of said property of a definitive character, as contemplated in section466 of the Code of Civil Procedure..

The defendants having answered, the cause came on to be heard in due course; and his Honor, Judge L. M. South-worth, presiding in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, held that the redemption had been effected in good faith andin accordance with the requirements of law. Judgment was accordingly entered on October 7, 1918, declaring LuisMirasol to be the owner of the properties in question and absolving the defendants from the complaint, with costs.From this judgment the plaintiff, Julio Javellana, appealed.

The most formidable question in the case is one of fact, namely, whether the deposit made on July 3, 1916, by Ale- jandro Mirasol, when he placed a check for P6,604.74 in the hands of Geronimo Nuez, was in fact an absolute and

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unconditional payment in good faith made for the purpose of effecting redemption, or whether it was, on the other hand, a contingent deposit, intended, with the connivance of the deputy sheriff, to be returned in a certain event toLuis Mirasol, without ever coming to the hands of the creditor, Julio Javellana.

It is not be denied that counsel for the plaintiff-appellant have been able to marshal a number of suspicious circum-stances which at first sight seem to sustain their contention that the redemption was merely colorable and that the re-

demptioner did not intend or desire that the redemption money should be unconditionally placed at the disposal of the purchaser, the plaintiff in this case. Nevertheless upon a careful examination of the proof we are convinced thatthe trial judge was correct in holding that the redemption was unconditional and made without reservation. A brief exposition of certain facts bearing on this aspect of the case will, we think, suffice to show the correctness of thisconclusion..

It appears in evidence that the members of the Mirasol family whose names figure in these proceedings have longenjoyed the reputation of being people of considerable substance. But a few years ago Maximino Mirasol becameheavily involved, as a result of the financial operations of one Eugenio Kilayco, in conjunction with whom Maximi-no Mirasol had signed a number of promissory notes. Eugenio Kilayco speedily became insolvent, and the burdenand was reduced to financial ruin. In this crisis Maximino Mirasol became indebted to his brothers, Luis and Alejan-dro; and for the purpose of placing his own estate beyond the reach of his creditors, Maximino Mirasol conveyed tohis brothers certain properties which had come to him by inheritance. It was upon these properties that Julio Javel-

lana, the plaintiff herein, cause the execution to be levied in 1915 to satisfy the judgment which he had recoveredagainst Maximino Mirasol and Eugenio Kilayco, as stated in the first paragraph of this opinion. When said executionwas levied Luis and Alejandro Mirasol at once notified the sheriff that they were the owners of said properties, bas-ing their claim upon the conveyances executed in their favor by Maximino Mirasol. However, an indemnifying bondwas executed by Julio Javellana to protect the sheriff, and the latter ignored the claim. The sale accordingly took

place on July 6, 1915, as already stated; and on September 6, thereafter, Luis Mirasol and Alejandro Mirasol simul-taneously began action against Julio Javellana and others in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to quiet their allegedtitles to the properties in question and to annul the sheriff's sale. The defense interposed in those cases was that theconveyances upon which the plaintiffs relied to prove title in themselves were fraudulent and void as against thecreditors of Maximino Mirasol. On February 16, 1916, the Court of First Instance sustained this defense, and ab-solved the defendants from the complaint. This plaintiffs thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court, where the judg-ment of the Court of Fist Instance was affirmed on February 13 [16], 1918. 1

From this statement it will be seen that the cases instituted by Luis Mirasol and Alejandro Mirasol to recover the properties in question were still pending upon appeal at the time when the period for the redemption of those proper-ties was about to expire in July, 1916. Luis Mirasol and Alejandro Mirasol, the plaintiffs in those actions, weretherefore in a quandary upon the problem of saving something out of the wreck of their brother's fortune; for it wasobvious that if the sixth day of July, 1916, should pass without redemption and the decision of the lower court in theappealed cases should be finally affirmed, the properties in question would be irretrievably lost. In this dilemmaLuis Mirasol decided to purchase the credits of the Bank of the Philippine Islands against Maximino Mirasol, whichhad already been reduced to judgment, and to proceed in the character of judgment creditor to redeem the propertiesfrom Julio Javellana. Accordingly on April 4, 1916, the purchase of the judgments of the Bank of the Philippine Is-lands was accomplished in the city of Manila by Luis Mirasol; and a few days later he transmitted to his brother Alejandro, in the city of Iloilo, the sum of P7,000, with instructions to redeem the properties. The steps taken byAlejandro pursuant to these instructions have already been narrated.

It naturally would have occurred to persons circumstanced like the Mirasols that, in case of the reversal of the judg-ment in the appealed cases, the money which was thus used to effect redemption might be lost, since it must have been considered exceedingly doubtful whether in that event the creditor could be compelled to return it. Partingfrom this suggestion, the case of the plaintiff-appellant supposes that Alejandro Mirasol, with a view to the eventualrecovery of the check in case of the reversal of the pending cases, entered into a collusive agreement with Geronimo

Nuez, whereby the latter agreed to conceal the fact of redemption until the outcome of the appealed cases should beknown and in case of reversal to return the check unused. In this connection it is shown that Geronimo Nuez is re-lated in some way to the Mirasols, and the inference is suggested that he would be disposed to act in the matter in away friendly to their interests. As might be expected the existence of this agreement is denied by both the principals,

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Alejandro Mirasol and Geronimo Nuez, and the conclusion that there was collusion of any sort rests entirely uponcircumstantial evidence.

It will be noted that the appellant's theory of the case upon this point has as its principal basis a concealment of theredemption, but his view of the case is refuted by the proven fact that there was no concealment of the redemption.The delay of the sheriff in converting the check into money and his failure to offer the proceeds to Julio Javellana, or

his attorney, possibly require some explanations; and this is in our opinion found in the attitude of procrastinationwhich was deliberately adopted by Julio Javellana himself under the advice of his attorney after the fact of the re-demption of the property had been brought to their attention.

Ruperto Montinola, one of the attorneys for Julio Javellana throughout all this litigation, says that on July 4,1916, heleft Iloilo for other parts and was absent from the city for three days. He says that soon after returning he was in-formed by some one in the corridor of the courthouse that Alejandro Mirasol had deposited a sum of money in thehands of the sheriff, whereupon he at once wrote a letter, asking information of the sheriff, and on the same day[July 10] received a notification from Geronimo Nuez, informing him that on July 3, 1016, Alejandro Mirasol, "asa creditor of Maximino Mirasol," had deposited in the sheriff's office the sum of P6,604.70, for the redemption of the properties in question. Geronimo Nuez says that on July 3, 1916, or the very day when the deposit was made,he called up the office of Montinola to inform him of the fact the redemption of the property had been effected butwas told that Montinola was not in. The effort of the witness to reach Montinola was again repeated on the two suc-

ceeding days but without success, owing to the absence of Montinola from the city. Finally, on or about July 10,Montinola himself asked this witness to send him a formal notification of the redemption. In the light of this testi-mony there can be no question that Montinola knew of the redemption very soon after July 3, 1916; and we havefrom his own lips the further statement that when he next saw his client, Julio Javellana, he, as attorney, advised himthat they should wait since it was the duty of the redemptioner to tender payment directly to the creditor.

We attach no importance to the circumstance that the official notification says that the redemption was effected byAlejandro Mirasol "as creditor" instead of Alejandro Mirasol "as attorney in fact for Luis Mirasol." This error in our opinion is merely an example of those inaccuracies which naturally creep into recitals hastily written by persons notintent upon the exactitude of their statements.

The advice which Montinola gave his client, namely, to wait, furnishes, we think, a natural and reasonable explana-tion of all the delay that thereafter occurred in connection with the cashing of the check; and we cannot believe that

this delay was the result of a plot to withhold the proceeds of the check from Julio Javellana, its rightful owner. Con-cealment there was none. The contention of the appellant on this question is in our opinion untenable.

The contention is made in the appellant's brief that the position of Luis Mirasol as a litigant in the prior appeal is in-consistent with his position as litigant in this case; and he is supposed to be estopped from now claiming in the char-acter of redemptioner the property which he then claimed in the character of owner. We are unable to see any forcein the suggestions; as the positions occupied by this litigant are based upon alternative rather than upon opposed pre -tension. No one can question the right of a litigant to claim property as owner and to seek in the same proceeding al-ternative relief founded upon some secondary right. The right of redemption, for instance, is always considered com-

patible with ownership, and one who fails to obtain relief in the sense of absolute owner may successfully assert theother right. That which a litigant may do in any one case can of course be done in two different proceedings.

The proposition is advanced with apparent confidence in the appellant's brief that if judgment had been reversed bythe Supreme Court in the cases brought by the Mirasol brothers against Julio Javellana, the latter could have retainedthe redemption money, supposing that he had seen fit to reduce it to possession. As to this it is perhaps unnecessaryhere to express a definite opinion. Nevertheless in view of the emphasis placed on the point in the appellant's brief,we deem it desirable to express a doubt as the correctness of the proposition thus stated. The act of Luis Mirasol inredeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an officious act in any sense. It was on thecontrary necessary to the reasonable protection of his right as a subsequent judgment-creditor of Maximino Mirasol

a right in no wise involved in the issues of the appealed cases. Consequently, if those cases had been reversed,the title by virtue of which Julio Javellana had obtained the redemption money would have been destroyed, and in

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redemptioner were stated with much force by Justice Fisher in Enage vs. Viuda e Hijos de F. Escao , 38 Phil., 657;and we have no hesitancy in adhering to the doctrine there announced.

A still more fundamental point than those above touched upon has also been suggested, which is this: Can an ordi-nary creditor whose judgment is subsequent to that under which the property was sold exercise the right of redemp-tion in any case?

The difficulty arises upon the interpretation of subsection 2 of section 464 of said Code and has its origin in the useof the word "lien" in the original English text of that provision. The expression "a creditor having a lien by attach-ment, judgment, or mortgage" apparently imputes to attachments and judgments an attribute which they do not pos-sess in this jurisdiction; for it is well established with us that an ordinary judgment for a sum of money does not cre -ate a lien upon the property. (Peterson vs. Newberry, 6 Phil. Rep., 260.) It is, however, equally well-settled that the

judgment creditor has a preferential right by virtue of paragraph (B) of subsection 3 of article 1924 of the Civil Code(Peterson vs. Newberry, supra ; Molina Salvador vs. Somes, 31 Phil. Rep., 76); and upon examining the officialSpanish version of section 464 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it will be noted that the translator, being evidently

perplexed by the used of the word "lien" in the English text, adopted the expression " derecho preferente " as its near-est Spanish equipment. In so doing, we think he displayed proper discernment, and though he may not have pro-duced a literal version, he expressed the spirit of the original with approximate fidelity.

It is well to add, furthermore, that even to the mind of the American lawyer, the word "lien" as used in this context,does not necessarily imply the existence of a specific real obligation fixed upon the property of the judgment debtor.In proof of this it is sufficient to quote the opening words on the topic "Lien of Judgments" in the treatise on "Judg-ments" contained in the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, where it is said: "The lien of a judgment does not consti-tute or create an estate, interest, or right or property in the lands which may be bound for its satisfaction; it onlygives a right to levy on such lands to the exclusion of adverse interests subsequent to the judgment." (23 Cyc.,1350.)

The view that the "preferential right" of the civil law may be here taken as the approximate equivalent of "lien," asused in the English version, is corroborated by the decision of this Court in Tec Bi and Co. vs. Chartered Bank of In-dia, Australia and China (16 Off. Gaz., 911), where it was held that the world "lien," as used in section 59 of the In-solvency Law, includes the preferences created by articles 1922 and 1924 of the Civil Code.

The foregoing suggestions furnish the clue to the proper interpretation of the provision now under consideration; andthe result is that any ordinary creditor, or assignee of such, having a judgment subsequent to that under which the

property was sold may exercise the right of redemption. This interpretation, instead of being strained or artificial, asmight superficially appear, is really forced upon us to save the provision from total obliteration. No rule of interpre-tation is better accredited than that which is expressed in the Latin Maxim Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

The circumstance has not escaped our attention that upon this question, as upon the other point of the necessity for the production of the appropriate documents in proof of right of redemption, we are announcing a rule different fromthat adopted by the Supreme Court of California in interpreting a very similar provision contained in the Code of Civil Procedure of that State. It is there held that no judgment creditor can redeem until he has in fact acquired a lienon the property of the debtor by virtue of his judgment. (Bagley vs. Ward and Mebius, 27 Cal., 369; Perkins vs. Cen-ter, 35 Cal., 713.) But it will be noted that under the law of California a judgment may be made a lien on the debtor's

property; and provision is made as to the time and manner in which the lien becomes, or is made, effective. The in-terpretation may naturally be quite different in a jurisdiction where, as here, the judgment, instead of creating a lien,merely gives a preferential right, which attaches when the judgment attains finality. In this connection it should not

be forgotten that, though our Code of Civil Procedure is derived from American sources and the English version iscontrolling, the official Spanish translation may be used as a legitimate aid to interpretation; and where it is foundthat the original idea as expressed in English is wholly unadapted to our system of jurisprudence, the Spanish trans-lation may be taken as indicating the meaning which should be attached to the expression in this jurisdiction. It is to

be assumed that our lawmakers, whether Americans or Filipinos by nationality, have legislated with knowledge of conditions here existing; and even those laws which have been bodily taken from coloring from the change of envi-ronment.

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Our conclusion upon the whole case is that the redemption of the properties in question by Luis Mirasol was lawful-ly accomplished. The judgment of the trail court dismissing the complaint must therefore be affirmed. It is so or-dered, with costs against the appellant.

Villanueva v. Comelec (Resolution)CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES, QUEZON, VIVENCIO G. LIRIO

Facts: On 4 January 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, one Narciso Mendoza, Jr.filed his sworn certificate of candidacy as independent for the office of vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon inthe 30 January 1980 local elections. Later that day, however, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his ownhandwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy for personal reasons. His unsworn withdrawalhad been accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection. Later on 25 January 1980,

petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendozas withdrawal, filed his ownsworn Certificate of Candidacy in substitution of Mendozas for the said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket. The results showed petitioner to be the clear winner over respondent with amargin of 452 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers, however, disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officers opinion that petitioners namedoes not appear in the certified list of candidates. The canvassers accordingly proclaimed respondentVivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of Dolores.

On 21 February 1980, Comelec denied the petition of Villanueva, stating that Mendozas withdrawal wasnot under oath as required by Section 27 of the 1978 Election Code, and that his withdrawal was notmade after the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy, as contemplated by Section 28, but on thesame day.

Issue: Whether the informal withdrawal of Mendoza invalidates the election of Villanueva as vicemayor.

Held: Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of death,withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendozas withdrawal wasfiled on the last hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies, which he had filed earlier that sameday. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been madesubstantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by theComelec. Further, the will of the electorate should be respected, it should not be defeated through theinvocation of formal or technical defects. The will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality

that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory andnon-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before theelectorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeatedby the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy. The legal requirement that awithdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendozas failure to observe therequirement should be considered a harmless irregularity. The bona fides of petitioner Villanueva as asubstitute candidate cannot be successfully assailed. The votes cast in his favor must be counted.

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