A STUDY OF Vl'2 OPEKATIONS 1 • . jared by: Koai 2m Johnson Cap fca in, Infantry i 4i/w~ l°i 4i/w~ l°i yo yo Table Table of Contents of Contents Sectionl t Papers accompanying the study. Sectionl t Papers accompanying the study. Page Page 1. 1. Section ll r The study (Title) Section ll r The study (Title) Page Page U - . Section III: General consideration Section III: General consideration Page Page 1. 1. 8, 8, Section IV: Night marches Section IV: Night marches Page Page Section V: Night Attacks Section V: Night Attacks Page Page 15. 15. Section VI: Night attacks by mechanized weapons Page 23. Section VII: V II: Raids Page 25. 25. Pare Section VIII: Night Defense Page 27. - Section IX: Historical Samples Page 28. Section Xr Conclusion Page 30. Bibliography Page 3<U MS.IORAITDUL!: For the Director, 2nd year claso, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leave nworth, Kansas. SUBJECT: A study as to what extent night operations will become necessary, considering improvements in modern arms and the governing principles of nd^Jit operations. 1. Papers Accompanying.— Bibliography for this study. 2. The Study Presented.-- -Considering improvements in modern arms, the Air Corps, etc., to what extent will night operations become necessary and what wi-11 be the governing- principles of night attacks, night marches, etc. — 3. General considerations. Fieli Service Regulations, United States Army, 1923 states, "Resort must frequently be had to the cover of dark- ness in order to effect surprise and to inininiize losses." This single statenent covers entirely the reasons , for military operations £fc- night, namely to effect surprise and to minimize losses.- study of military history will reveal that ni^ht operations are as old as war itself and historical examples nay be found in the Bible but a stu:' 1-'" 1-'" of these examples will show that, the commanders always initiated 1
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A STUDY OF Vl'2 OPEKATIONS1
• . jared by: Koai 2m Johnson Cap fcain, Infantry
ii4i/w~ l°i4i/w~ l°iyoyoTableTable of Contentsof Contents
Sectionl t Papers accompanying the study.Sectionl t Papers accompanying the study. PagePage 1.1.
Section llr The study (Title)Section llr The study (Title) PagePage UU-- ..
Section III: General considerationSection III: General consideration PagePage 1.1.
8,8,Section IV: Night marchesSection IV: Night marches PagePage
Section V: Night AttacksSection V: Night Attacks PagePage 15.15.
Section VI: Night attacks by mechanized weapons Page 23.
Section VII:VII: Raids Page 25.25.Pare
Section VIII: Night Defense Page 27.
-Section IX: Historical Samples Page 28.
Section Xr Conclusion Page 30.
Bibliography Page 3<U
MS.IORAITDUL!: For the Director, 2nd year claso, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leave nworth, Kansas.
SUBJECT: A study as to what extent night operations will become necessary, considering improvements in modern arms and the governing principles of nd^Jit operations.
1. Papers Accompanying.— Bibliography for this study.
2. The Study Presented.-- -Considering improvements in modern arms, the
Air Corps, etc., to what extent willnight operations become necessary and
what wi-11 be the governing- principles of night attacks, night marches,
etc. — 3. General considerations. Fieli Service Regulations, United States
Army, 1923 states, "Resort must frequently be had to the cover of dark
ness in order to effect surprise and to inininiize losses." This single
statenent covers entirely the reasons ,for military operations £fc- night,
namely to effect surprise and to minimize losses.
study of military history willreveal that ni^ht operations are
as old as war itself and historical examples nay be found in the Bible
but a stu:' 1-'"1-'" of these examples will show that, the commanders always initiated 1
these operations 'with * v*<iw to securing the same effects •
In the pa«t nnd prior to th« .Torlu V.'^i;, due to the comparative
short range of the .-niscle throwing vteapons carried in tho field and the
inferior means of obsor^ttx; nr.d reconnaissance, night operation soon
made necessary only in c]jr,e proximity to, or on the battle field, how
ever the principles laid dovfo hy *:ho commander of the past ar9 of eqml
value today if properly applied to oon&Jtiohs existing in modern warfare.
The modern- battle area is. of considerable" extent wheil a study is
made of the moans available to bhe presont day array for preventing
surprise and inflicting casualties.
The area of irrncdiate contact between two opposing forces is covered
with a mass of SHiall-armc> aut.oitftlie weapons and artilleiy, capable of
placing such distinctive fires along the front that the passage of assault
troops through these fires can only be fcoconplished at an enormcus ex
penditure of men and munitions.
Modern artillery with its excellent means of observation and its
ability to accurately deliver its fire at long ranges greatly deepens
the zone in which, it is reasonable to expect, severe casualties.
Interdiction and fires on troop movements and concentrations in reer
areas are normal missions of part of the heavier batteries and ranges
extending to sixteen thousand yards are now possible. (9-1 to 32, 140 to
143, 173 to 179)
Aviation more than any other weapon" will force troops to make use
of the cover of darkness in order to, carry out operations in which it is
desired bo'effect surprise and reduce casualties. Itfs distant radius
of action,- its ability to observe and deliver destructive fire will cause
many operations, which in the past have been carried out in safety in day
light, to be at night. The ability of aviation to observe and attack at
night in single planes or small groups willnecessitate the taking of both
positive and negative measures for protection against aircraft, even during
night operations. (10-Chap. IV, VII, VIII).(10-Chap..
The modern armored or mechanized force consisting of tanks, armored
cars, self propelled artillery and other weapons, while having great
2
mobility anl an extended radius of action 5s so difficult to control and
lrVtied in visibility when prepared for combat that its employment at
ni£l«t willnot constitute a serious menace to operations taking place in
rear areas. It has however possibilities for use in at gainst enemy
positions end will be discussed later in this paper.
From the above brief statements it appears that night operations will
play a tiore important part in future wars and in order to effect surprise,
the concentration and preparation for battle will, for the most part,
be made under cover of darkness. In addition night combat v/ill have to
be resorted to not only to secure surprise and minimize losses but to
thoroughly defeat an enemy in the shortest possible time and before re
serves can be rushed into fcha battle and by the modern, rapid means of
transportation. For the same reasons the defense must be as stubborn at
night as during the hours of daylight.
Night operations, in general, may be classed under the two following
headings;
xa) Movements made under protection of other covering troops, i.e.,
night marches, concentration and reliefs of front line units.
b) Movements and operations carried out without the protection of
otter covering troops, i.e. attacks, approach marches, marches
in the presence of the enemy and withdrawal. (1-114) (2-199)
In general, certain characteristics are common to all night operations
and exercise the greatest influence on the success or failure of operations
and exercise the greatest influence on the success or failure of the move
ment undertaken.
Darkness decreases the effect of infantry rifle as automatic rifle
fire and therefore increases the importance of the weapons of close com
bat and weapons fired from fixed mounts which can be laid in definite lines
of fire during hours of daylight.
The difficulty of movement and in maintaining control, contact and
communication beween units necessitates the use of close formations with
decreased intervals and distances.
Direction is hard to maintain and therefore itwillbe necessary to
follow roads, trails or other well-defined direction lines and advance
to limited and easily recognized objectives.
3
1 ~: ruin3The morale of fcroopfl at zr. ;hl ia highly n anaana panic nay
he r;ost trivial Incident*rapidly spread thr it a coranand from the moa
This increases • \u25a0 tith o ve ons to
secure s ;rpriso and for troops on the >f tsive • mararc to inaure
fche service eurit;-. (1-114 ) (•
In view of theoe characteristics, requirements
necessary, for aT ssf.tl night op*: it :.s and are °s follows
a) 3ecrecy.-Ind orJer tc secure Sv tnd reduce casualties every
effort must be made to keep secrot t': operations at night including all
preparations*
b) Careful preparation* -ftie ;r.o»*t careful preparation are necessary,
icluding the t el; nd correct issuance of orders ?,n& all necessary and
possible reconnaissances in order that the operation may proceed smoothly
and with little or no confusion.
c) Security. -Adequate security tneasures are necessary ir order to
avoid confusion or pinis in event of an -inexpeoted happening o** c. counter
v/ilh the enemy.
d) High morale and training.-Due to th^ sensitive moral* of troops
at ni-^ht, only those having a high morale and are well trained can be
expected to successfully conclude a night operation, (1-114) (2-199, 200,
202) (3-2) (4-3, 4)
4. Night Marches.— Kight marches are made in order to effect secret
concentrations either before or during battle, to make approach marches
and deployments for attacks to be launched at day light, to v/ithdraw from
combat or any inarch which is desired to be concealed from the enemy and is
made within the radius of his observation and reconnaissance agencies. In
the tropics and during hot weather night marches may sometimes be resorted
to in order to escape the effects of heat durint the daylight hours*
(1-114) (2-201) (5-144,145)
They have the advantages of maintaining the secrecy of the movement,
increasing the surprise effect and reducing losses. The disadvantageso
are: the difficulty of following unknown roads or routes across country,
the difficulty of control, the uncertainty of the time required for their
execution, the increased fatigue of movement at night and the lowered morale
4
duo to the loss of sleep and the inability of the troops to observe their
surroundings during dnrkness. (3-2,3) (4-4)
Under the most favorable conditions the };lans and preparations for
a night inarch must be carefully considered end carried out to the last
detail possible depending on the time available and the existing situation.
The situation -permitting, a complete reconnaissance should he made
tc 3elect the best routes. Routes should be selected that willavoid
the cross injr of column's" or the interference or collision of columns in
the" dark. Full use should be made of good roads as poor roads, trails
and cross-country marches will increase the difficulties of the rvarch*
Ifnecessary to move across -country, compass directions should be
determined during daylight or the route clearly marked so that it can
be followed in darkness. Guides should be made familiar with the route
during daylight. Preparations should be made to place men at road inter
sections and in towns in order to direct movement without delay.
Iftroops are to move into bivouac areas at the completion of the
march, these areas should be reconnoitered and marked, ifpossible.
Bivouac areas should be selected so as to allow the ronr elements of the
column to be in them before daylight* Areas such as woods and villages
should be selected, if concealment for troops and trains is desired.
Assembly areas for troops advancing to a line of departure should have
good lines if approach into the area and from it to the line of departure.
The area should provide concealment and cover from hostile fire and should
be of sufficient distance from the advance enemy elements so as they may
not discover the movement into or out of the area.
Every effort must be made to keep the inarch and the preparations
for it, secret. It may be necessary to give out false infomation as to
routes, destination and mission in order to mislead enemy agents. The
maintaining of secrecy in the preparations will be most difficult and
only those officers whom it necessary to inform beforehand should have
correct information of the movement. lawns and villages should be avoided
if possible but if passed through strict control of both troops and in
habitants should be inforced. Smoking and lights must be prohibited. If
near the enemy noises must be reduced to a minimum, equipment must be
Z. British Field Service Regulations, Voluni' 11, Operations, 1924. EiS Majesty 131 3 Stationary Office, London,
3. Tactical Principles and Decisions, Chapter XXI, Wight Operations. The General Sorvieo Schools, Fort Leaven//orb;t, Kansas , 1925.
4. Tii^ht Operations, (Pamphlet) The Infantry School, Dopartment o
Military Art# 2923-1924.
5. Lectures on Land Warfare. A ?ield Officer, William ?^bv?ers and Sons^ Ltd., London, 1922.
6. Military Operations. France and Belgium, 1914. August-October 1914. Brigadier-Cieneral J. E. Edmunds. HacMillan and Co., Ltd.,- London, 1922.
7. Hostory of the War in South Africa, 1399-1902. Vol. I. Hajor-General Sir Frederick Maurice, Hunt and Blackett, Ltd., London, 1906,
8. Official History, the Russo-Japanese War. Vol. 11. Historical Section of the c ndtteeittee of Imperialof Imperial Defense. Endland,Endland, 1912,Defense, 1312.
q \u0084
• and Technique of Field Artillery. The General Service Schools Presw, 7oi Leavenworth, Kansas, 1927.
10. Tactics .id Technique of Air Corps. Chapters IV, VIIand VIII. The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1929.
11. Tactical Principles and Decisions. Chapter XX. Raids. The General Service Schools, Fort LeaVenv/orth, Kansas, 1925.