Strike Cases

Republic of the Philippines

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 88210 January 23, 1991

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,petitioner,vs.SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA),respondents.Ricardo V. Puno, Jr., Caesar R. Dulay, Solon, R. Garcia, Rene B. Gorospe & Bienvenido T. Jamoralinz, Jr. for petitioner.

E.N.A. Cruz, Entero & Associates for PALEA.

In issue in this case is the authority of the Secretary of Labor to order the petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. to reinstate officers and members of the union who participated in an illegal strike and to desist from taking any disciplinary or retaliatory action against them.

The 1986-1989 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Philippine Airlines (PAL) and the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) provided for pay increases for various categories of employees in Section 1, Article V entitled "PAY SCALE." Besides the pay increases, the CBA also provided for the formation of a PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel

(f) . . . to undertake the study, review, correction, updating, complete overhaul, re-classification or re-grouping of positions as may be required of the payscale and position classification to evolve updated payscales as soon as possible. (p. 76,Rollo.)

and that

(iii) . . . the Payscale Panel shall exert all reasonable efforts to complete its studies so as to evolve new updated payscale and position classification by January 01, 1988, (p. 76,Rollo.)

As agreed by the parties, the PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel was formed in due time and went to work. By July, 1988, the Job Evaluation Committee of the panel had finished the reconciliation and initial evaluation of positions in all departments within PAL.

In November, 1988, the PALEA members of the panel proposed the amount of PHP 3,349 as the minimum salary entry level for the lowest job classification (Job Grade 1), while the PAL panel members proposed PHP 2,310 and a PHP 200 across-the-board increase for employees who could not avail of the payscale adjustments. The panel conferences continued but there was no meeting of minds. PALEA would not accept less than the amount it proposed, while the PAL panel members alleged that they had no authority to offer more.

PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in bad faith.

On December 29, 1988, PALEA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike on account of: (1) bargaining deadlock; and (2) unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith.

On January 3, 1989, PAL filed with the NCMB a motion to dismiss PALEA's notice of strike for being premature as the issues raised were not strikeable since there still existed a PAL-PALEA CBA which would not yet expire until September 30, 1989 or with nine (9) more months to run.

During the conciliation meeting, the following evolved as the real issues:

1. determination of the minimum entry rate

2. wage adjustment due to payscale study

3. retroactive pay as a consequence of the upgraded payscale or goodwill bonus. (p. 38,Rollo.)

On January 6, 1989, Attorney Jesus C. Sebastian, NCMB-NCR Executive Conciliator/Mediator, advised PALEA president, George Pulido, that the issues raised in the notice of strike were "appropriate only forpreventive mediation,"hence, not valid grounds for a lawful strike. However, when subsequently a representative of NCMB supervised the conduct of PALEA'S strike vote, PAL's counsel was baffled for it was inconsistent with the NCMB order treating the strike notice aspreventive mediation case No.PM-01-007-89. PAL's counsel sought clarification from NCMB'S Sebastian. He assured PAL that the NCMB representatives could not certify the strike vote.

On January 12, 1989, PALEA submitted the strike vote results to the NCMB. The next day, January 13, 1989, PAL petitioned Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon to immediately assume jurisdiction over the dispute in order to avert the impending strike. The reasons for PAL's petition were, as stated by the Secretary himself:

The Philippine Airlines, Inc. is a corporation where the government has substantial equity holding. It is engaged in an industry imbued with national interest. It is the flag carrier of the Republic of the Philippines. Being the sole airline that services domestic routes, a prolonged work stoppage will push back the national economic recovery program of the government and consequently result to enormous damage to the economy of the country. Hundreds of thousands of people directly and indirectly dependent on the continued operations of the firm including the huge work force of the company will likewise be prejudiced. The viability of the firm will also be endangered. These considerations have in the past guided this Office in consistently exercising its powers under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, in handling labor disputes in the Company. The current situation is no exception to this rule. This Office is of the view that the present work stoppage at Philippine Airlines, Inc. will adversely affect the national interest. Thus, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the instant dispute. (pp. 38-39,Rollo.)

Inexplicably, the Secretary failed to act promptly on PAL's petition for his assumption of jurisdiction.

Seven (7) days passed with no reaction from Secretary Drilon. On January 20, 1989, PALEA declared a strike paralyzing PAL's entire operations the next day, January 21, 1989, and resulting in serious inconvenience to thousands of passengers who were stranded in 43 airports throughout the country, and the loss of millions of pesos in unearned revenue for PAL. Late in the day, at 7:50 P.M., Secretary Drilon issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute which had already exploded into a full-blown strike, ordering the strikers to lift their pickets and return to work, directing management to accept all returning employees, and resolving the issues subject of the strike, by awarding the following monetary benefits to the strikers, while prohibiting the company from taking retaliatory action against them:

. . . to resolve the impasse between the herein parties, this Office finds the following award just and reasonable:

1. As far as the issue of minimum entry level is concerned, the company is directed to adjust the same to P2,500.00 from its present level effective January 1, 1989.

2. The company is ordered to grant the amount of P3.3 million per month to cover across-the-board increases of covered regular employees subject to the distribution of the union as embodied in their proposed scheme but in no instance should the lowest adjustment be less than P300.00. In line with this, the scheme proposed by the union and submitted to NCMB on January 20,1989 is herein adopted.

It is understood, however, that in items 1 and 2 above, the amount which is higher should be granted.

3. A goodwill bonus in the amount of P3,000.00 to be paid in four equal pay period installments beginning February 15 and up to March 31, 1989 is hereby awarded. (p. 39,Rollo.)

Declaring the strike valid, the Secretary stated:

Except for the fact that the Union's notice of strike was treated as a preventive mediation case (at the instance of NCMB), it should be noted thatthe Union complied with all the requirements for a valid strike. It observed the cooling-off periods required and submitted the necessary strike vote. If ever there is any ground to discipline the Union officers for non-compliance with the law, it would be based on the "non-filing" of the strike notice, which "non-filing" was a consequence of the NCMB'S efforts to create the appropriate atmosphere to resolve the dispute by treating the notice of strike as a preventive mediation case. Otherwise put,the strike would have been legal in all respects had not the NCMB, in its good faith effort to settle the dispute, treated the notice of strike as a case for preventive mediation. Under these circumstances, and in the interest of industrial peace and the promotion of the concept of preventive mediation,the parties are directed to desist from committing any retaliatory act as a result of the work stoppage.The UNION, however, is hereby warned that in the future this office will not tolerate such conduct and will apply the full force of the law. (pp. 3-4,Rollo.)

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The Secretary denied it in a minute resolution on May 8, 1989 or three months later.

In this petition for review, PAL avers that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction:

1. in ruling on the legality of the strike;

2. in directing PAL to desist from taking retaliatory action against the officers and members of the Union responsible for the illegal strike; and

3. in failing to seasonably exercise his authority to avert the illegal strike and protect the rights and interests of PAL whose business is affected with public interest.

Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary's authority to resolve a labor dispute within 30 days from the date of assumption of jurisdiction, encompasses only the issues in the dispute,notthe legality or illegality of any strike that may have been resorted to in the meantine (Binamira vs. Ogan-Occena, 148 SCRA 677, 685 [1987]). Indeed, as found by the Labor Secretary in his Order of January 21, 1989, the only issues involved in the dispute were:

1. determination of the minimum entry rate

2. wage adjustment due to payscale study

3. retroactive pay as a consequence of the upgraded payscale or goodwill bonus.

The legality or illegality of the strike was not submitted to the Secretary of Labor for resolution.

The jurisdiction to decide the legality of strikes and lock-outs is vested in Labor Arbiters, not in the Secretary of Labor. Art. 217, par. a, subpar. 5 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.

(a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decidewithin thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non- agricultural.

xxx xxx xxx

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this code, includingquestions involving the legality of strikes and lock-outs. (Emphasis supplied.)

In ruling on the legality of the PALEA strike, the Secretary of Labor acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction.

There is merit in PAL's contention that the Labor Secretary erred in declaring the strike valid and in prohibiting PAL from taking retaliatory or disciplinary action against the strikers for the damages suffered by the Airline as a result of the illegal work stoppage.

PALEA's strike on January 20, 1989 was illegal for three (3) reasons:

1. It was premature for there was an existing CBA which still had nine (9) months to run,i.e., up to September 30, 1989. The law expressly provides that neither party to a collective bargaining agreement shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. While either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date (known as the "freedom period") it shall nevertheless be the duty of both parties to keep thestatus quoand to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the freedom period and/or until a new agreement is reached by them (Art. 253, Labor Code).

2. It violated the no-strike provision of the CBA, to wit:

The Association agrees thatthere shall be no strikes,walk outs, stoppage, or slowdown of work, or any other form of interference with any of the operations of the Company during the periodbetween the signing of the Agreement up to September 30, 1989. (Emphasis supplied, p-118,Rollo.)

3. The NCMB had declared the notice of strike as "appropriate for preventive mediation." The effect of that declaration (which PALEA did not ask to be reconsidered or set aside) was to drop the case from the docket of notice of strikes, as provided in Rule 41 of the NCMB Rules, as if there was no notice of strike. During the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings no strike could be legally declared. The Secretary must have thought so too, that is why he failed to act, for a period of seven (7) days, on PAL's petition for him to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. The strike which the union mounted, while preventive mediation proceedings were ongoing, was aptly described by the petitioner as "an ambush" (p. 2,Rollo).

Since the strike was illegal, the company has a right to take disciplinary action against the union officers who participated in it, and against any union members who committed illegal acts during the strike, Art. 264 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities.. . .

xxx xxx xxx

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages.Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status:Provided,That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary action against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike, but not the company's right to take action against union officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts. The prohibition which the Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful deprivation of property and denial of due process for it prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge property losses that it suffered as a result of the union's illegal mass action.

The Secretary may have realized that he was partly to blame for PAL's damages because of his failure to act promptly and use his authority to avert the illegal strike under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.

Nevertheless, the Secretary's delay does not excuse the reckless and irresponsible action of the union in declaring the illegal strike. The liability of the union for that is primary and exclusive.

WHEREFORE, the petition forcertiorariis granted. The orders dated January 21, 1989 and May 8, 1989 of the Secretary of Labor in NCMB NCR Case No. PM-01-007-89 are set aside and nullified insofar as the said orders declare valid the PALEA strike of January 20-21, 1989 and restrain the petitioner from taking appropriate legal action against PALEA's officers who led the illegal strike, and any union members who may have committed illegal acts during said strike. The monetary benefits awarded to the union in the said orders are, however, affirmed. Costs against respondent PALEA.

G.R. No. L-49983 April 20, 1992

FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, GERARDO ROSANA, FE DIVINA, PATRICIO MIRANDA, ARTURO GUEVARRA, PURIFICACION CABRERA, ANGELINA GAVIOLA, TITO MARQUEZ, ELPIDIO ORINION, DELIA ABUEG, TERESITA GARCIA, ELENA PADILLA, DOLORES DAILEG, CRESCELIA YBAES, ELENA ORTILLA, MARIETA SALONGA, RODOLFO LABARINTO, AURELIA SAN JUAN AND LOURDES LUNA,petitioners,vs.HON. AMADO G. INCIONG AND ARIS (PHILIPPINES), INC.,respondents.

This petition forcertiorariwith prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeks to annul and set aside two decisions issued by the respondent Amado G. Inciong, Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment in Re: Illegal Strike Staged by Federation of Free Workers at Aris Philippines and docketed as AJML-009-78, entitled "Aris (Philippines) Inc., v.Federation of Free Workers, Gerardo Rosana, et al." The decision dated April 11, 1978 declared the illegality of the strike; ordered all striking employees except the union officers to return to work within twenty four (24) hours from the receipt of the order; revoked the previous order dated April 2, 1978; granted the application for clearance to place all union officers under preventive suspension and placed the administration of the union and the collective bargaining agreement directly under the Federation of Free Workers. The second assailed decision dated January 29, 1979 granted the application for clearance to terminate the services of eighteen (18) union officers and members of the FFW local union.

Petitioner Federation of Free Workers (FFW) is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor while petitioners Gerardo Rosana, Fe Divina, Patricio Miranda, Arturo Guevarra, Purificacion Cabrera, Angelina Gaviola, Tito Marquez, Elpidio Orinion, Delia Abueg, Teresita Garcia, Elena Padilla, Dolores Daileg, Crescelia Ybaes, Elena Ortilla, Marietta Salonga, Rodolfo Labarinto and Aurelio San Juan are union officers of the FFW local union and Lourdes Luna is a member of the union at private respondent Aris (Philippines), Incorporated. Private respondent Aris (Philippines), Incorporated (company) is a duly Organized domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of leather gloves exclusively for export.

On September 17, 1977, a certification election was held in private respondent company under the supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Petitioner FFW garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently declared the authorized bargaining representative.

Consequently, private respondent company and petitioner FFW executed a memorandum of agreement on February 3, 1978 wherein (a) the company recognized FFW as the bargaining representative of the rank and file employees in the bargaining unit as of February 1, 1978; (b) the company and FFW shall negotiate for a new collective bargaining agreement, but in the meantime FFW will continue to administer the then existing CBA which expired on December 31, 1977 until a new CBA is executed; and (c) FFW will be entitled to all union dues starting February 1, 1978. The same hold-over CBA contained a "no strike no lockout clause."

Pursuant to the aforementioned memorandum of agreement, the company and FFW met on February 7, 13, 15, 22 and 25, 1978 to negotiate for a new CBA that would govern the terms and conditions of employment of the rank and file employees in the company. However, the parties failed to reach any agreement and a deadlock ensued.

On February 28, 1978, the FFW through its president, petitioner Gerardo Rosana filed with the MOLE (now DOLE) a notice of strike.

The company and FFW met on March 7, 13, 27 and 29, 1978 at the Bureau of Labor Relations for conciliation upon summons by Director Carmelo Noriel. However, the parties still failed to reach any accord, so on March 29, 1978, FFW requested respondent Amado G. Inciong (then Acting Secretary) to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and undertake to terminate the case within two weeks (seeRollo, p. 19).

On April 1, 1978, after the required thirty (30) days notice, the FFW staged a strike on all the three (3) plants of the company (seeRollo, pp. 19-20).

The private respondent company having been classified as a vital industry pursuant to Letter of Instruction No. 368 and thus protected by Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended, against any strike, the respondent Deputy Minister assumed jurisdiction over the dispute.

A marathon conference was held on April 2, 1978 between the company and FFW in Camp Crame with the active mediation of respondent Inciong and Brig. Gen. Prospero Olivas.

During the conference, an order dated April 2, 1978 was issued by respondent Inciong directing the company to give a wage increase of P3.00 for three years and to give one day additional vacation and one day additional sick leave each and ordered the strikers to immediately return to work (seeRollo, pp. 32-33).

Notwithstanding the FFW's commitment to abide by the aforesaid order of April 2, 1978, the strikers not only failed to lift the picket lines and return to work but intensified further the barricades.

On April 4, 1978, the company filed with the Secretary of Labor an urgent motion to declare the strike illegal and to revoke the order of April 2. 1978 at the same time it applied for clearance to terminate the employment of the illegal strikers with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment for violation of Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended and General Order No. 5.

In the meantime, the illegal strikers were placed under preventive suspension,

The respondent Deputy Minister rendered a decision on April 11, 1978, to wit:

Based on the foregoing and by virtue of the powers of the Secretary of Labor under PD 823 as amended, and in order to serve as a warning to all other who violate or disregard the law and the authorities duly empowered to enforce it, the following are hereby ordered;

1. The strike and the strike activities undertaken by the union are hereby declared illegal;

2. All striking employees except the union officers are hereby ordered to return to work within 24 hours from the receipt of this order by the parties. The company may hire new employees to replace those employees who fail to report for work without any valid reason within the prescribed period.

3. The Order of 2 April 1978 is hereby revoke(d). Instead, the last position of management under pressure from the government and the strikers in the amount of P2.25 is hereby adopted, but alloted (sic) as follows:

(a) P1.00 for the first eighteen (18) months; and

(b) P1.25 for the second eighteen (18) months.

The P1.00 increase is retroactive to January 1, 1978, but the new 3-year collective bargaining agreement shall be effective upon signing. In addition, the company shall give one additional vacation and sick leave each. All other provisions of the collective agreement which expired in December 1977 are deemed retained for incorporation into the new CBA.

4. Clearance is hereby granted to the company to place all union officers under preventive suspension. However, the individual accountability of the union officers and members for the illegal strike and other illegal activities of the union shall be the subject of further hearing by the Secretary of Labor. Atty. Virgilio Sy of the Bureau of Labor Relations is hereby designated as hearing officer and he shall submit this report and recommendation to the Secretary of Labor within 20 working days from start of hearing.

5. Pending determination of the accountability of the union officers, the administration of the union and the collective bargaining agreement is hereby placed directly under the Federation of Free Workers (FFW).

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 23-25)

On the same date, the company and FFW, through the mediation of respondent Inciong entered into a memorandum of agreement to end their dispute and the strike.

Pursuant to the aforementioned memorandum of agreement, the company and FFW executed a CBA on April 12, 1978 before respondent Inciong.

Anent the application for clearance to terminate the employment of the illegal strikers, the respondent Deputy Minister rendered a decision on January 29, 1979 granting or approving the application for clearance to terminate, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the application for clearance to terminate the services of Gerardo Rosana, Fe Divina, Patricio Miranda, Arturo Guevarra, Purificacion Cabrera, Angelina Gaviola, Tito Marquez, Elpidio Orinion, Delia Abueg, Teresita Garcia, Elena Padilla, Dolores Daileg, Crescelia Ybaes, Elena Ortilla, Marietta Salonga, Rodolfo Labarinto, Aurelio San Juan and Lourdes Luna is hereby granted and/or approved.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 30-31)

Hence, this present petition.This Court in a resolution dated March 30, 1979 issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing or executing the order dated April 11, 1978 and the decision dated January 29, 1979 (seeRollo, pp. 44-45).

Petitioners stress that the respondent's order dated April 2, 1978 had become final and executory and therefore his subsequent decision dated April 11, 1978 could not legally revoke the said final order.

The law invoked by the petitioners is section 10 of Presidential Decree No 823 as amended, to wit:

Sec. 10. Where a labor dispute has not been resolved by the Regional Offices, the Bureau of Labor Relations, the National Labor Relation, Commission and the voluntary arbitrators within the reglementary period, the Secretary of Labor is hereby authorized to assume jurisdiction over and summarily decide such dispute which poses an emergency or is critical to the national interest as determined by him on advise and recommendation of the Undersecretary of Labor, the Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Where the Labor Dispute Involves A Notice Of Strike Or Lockout, the secretary of Labor May, At Any Time, Assume Jurisdiction And Summarily Decide It.The decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final and executory unless stayed by the President of the Philippines. (Rollo, pp. 13-14)

In sum, petitioners insist that respondent Deputy Minister gravely abused his discretion and acted in total lack or in excess of his jurisdiction when he issued his decisions dated April 11, 1978 and January 29, 1979.

On the contrary, private respondent company emphasizes that the fact that the order dated April 2, 1978 declared on its face that the awards given therein are the "final and complete resolution of the issues" in the case does not mean that the said order may no longer be revoked or modified by the Minister (now Secretary) of Labor. It notes that the aforequoted phrase simply means that all the issues raised by the collective bargaining deadlock between the parties are already resolved and completely settled but did not make the order final and executory as of the date of issuance. Hence, the respondent Deputy Minister has the authority to modify and/or revoke his former order.

Furthermore, private respondent maintains that petitioners' failure to seasonably move for reconsideration or appeal the decision dated April 11, 1978 made it final and therefore may no longer be reviewed by the Supreme Court. It also underscores the fact that the petitioners are already estopped from questioning the assailed decisions because the parties already executed a memorandum of agreement on April 11, 1978 and subsequently, a collective bargaining agreement on April 12, 1958.

In conformity with the private respondent's stand, the respondent Deputy Minister through the Solicitor General argues that since the order dated April 2, 1978 was not appealed to the Office of the President, it is still well within the power of. the respondent Deputy Minister to reconsider and revoke the same (seeRollo, p. 128).

Furthermore, the Solicitor General stresses that the remedy of appeal was not pursued by the petitioners but instead they allowed the decision dated April 11, 1978 to lapse into finality, hence, they cannot now contest the correctness of the said decision through a petition forcertiorarieleven (11) months after its promulgation (seeRollo, p. 127).

The pivotal issue therefore, is whether or not the respondent Deputy Minister gravely abused his discretion when he revoked his former order dated April 2, 1978.

After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds the petition devoid of merit and holds that the respondent Deputy Minister did not gravely abuse his discretion when he revoked his previous order dated April 2, 1978 and subsequently issued his decisions dated April 11, 1978 and January 29, 1979.

The order dated April 2, 1978 of the Minister of Labor never assumed finality by the very own acts of petitioner union who broke its commitment to lift the strike when it resumed its blockades on the plant gates, erected tents, posted new placards and circulated new leaflets, The narration of the incidents of the controversy by the Deputy Minister of Labor in his decision dated April 11, 1978 shows that he even made a commitment to recommend affirmation by the Office of the President of his April 2 order and to ask management not to raise the illegality of the strike before the Department of Labor if only petitioner union would accept the same upon the opening of working hours on the following Monday, April 4. He renewed this commitment on April 4, 1978 when the union officials promised before General Prospero Olivas at Camp Crame and Mayor Joseph Estrada to dismantle their pickets and return to work immediately. However, petitioner union again backed out and continued their massive picketing. This Court is perplexed why petitioner union would now have the temerity to claim that said order of April 2, 1978 had attained finality.

Besides, it is very clear that the remedy of petitioners against the decision dated April 11, 1978 revoking his previous order dated April 2. 1978 is appeal to the Office of the President.

While the special civil action ofcertiorarimay be availed of in the alternative situation where an appeal would not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, this is on the theoretical assumption that the right to appeal is still available in the case. If, however, the remedy by appeal had already been lost and the loss was occasioned by petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies,certioraricannot lie is a substitute or a tool to shield the petitioner from the adverse consequences of such neglect or error. The two remedies are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive (Manila Electric Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88396, July 4, 1990, 187 SCRA 200, 205).

Applying this fundamental principle to the case at bar, it is readily evident that the petitioners had ample opportunity to appeal the decision of the respondent Deputy Minister revoking his previous order dated April 2, 1978. The remedy of appeal to the Office of the President was not pursued by the petitioners. They nevertheless deliberately allowed the period for appeal to pass without interposing one. Worse, despite the then availability of the remaining period for appeal, the petitioners allowed the decision to lapse into finality. Hence, they cannot now contest the legality of the decision through the present petition forcertiorari.

It is noteworthy that the present petition hardly assailed the correctness of the decision dated January 29, 1979 despite petitioners supplemental petition seeking the reinstatement of the individual petitioners with full backwages and without loss of seniority.

The respondent Deputy Minister already declared the strike staged by the union illegal in his decision dated April 11, 1978, the pertinent portion of which provides:

It should be noted that the strike and the strike activities undertaken by the union were patently illegal. First, the employer is engaged in a vital industry and, therefore, protected by PD 823 as amended from strikes and lockouts. Second, the Secretary of Labor had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and therefore, the parties are enjoined against strikes and lockouts. Third, the parties themselves have voluntarily agreed to maintain the status quo while waiting for the summary decision of the Secretary of Labor. Moreover, even if the strike were not illegal per se, the strike activities staged by the union, especially the establishment of massive human barricades at all entrances to the company and the use of coercive methods to keep company officials aid other personnel out, were definitely illegal. (Rollo, p. 20)

We already ruled in the case ofUnion of Filipro Employees v.Nestle Philippines, Inc. (G.R. Nos. 88710-13, December 19, 1990, 192 SCRA 396, 411) that "[a] strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code its amended (Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. 82088, October 13, 1969; 178 SCRA 482). The Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act."

Unrebutted evidence shows that the individual petitioners actively participated in the illegal strike staged by the union (seeRollo, pp. 27-26, 30). Hence, the termination of the services of the individual petitioners is justified.

All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the assailed decisions of the respondent Deputy Minister are not tainted with arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction and therefore, We find no reason to disturb the same.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decisions of the Deputy Minister of Labor dated April 11, 1978 and January 29, 1979 are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 30, 1979 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-82088 October 13, 1989

ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, INC.,petitioner,vs.THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, DIONISIO ESTIOCA and THE STRIKERS,respondents.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako and Ramon C. Fernandez for petitioner.

Jose C. Espinas for private respondents.

GRINO-AQUINO,J.:This is the seventh petition to come before this Court involving the parties herein, and the fifth by the herein employer, Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (the "Company" for short).

Dionisio Estioca was first hired by the petitioner in May 1977 as a clerk in its personnel department. In 1980, he rose to become a personnel aide. On July 1, 1981, he became the Personnel Supervisor, a supervisory and/or managerial position, next in rank to the Personnel Manager.

On March 5, 1982, the National Federation of Labor (NFL) of which Estioca was president, filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the monthly-salaried employees (90 more or less) of the Company "composed of administrative and supervisory personnel which is an appropriate bargaining" unit (See petition in G.R. No. 67343).

Over the Company's opposition, the Med Arbiter on August 23, 1982, directly certified the NFL as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the monthly-salaried employees of the Company. The Company appealed but it was dismissed by the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). It filed a petition forcertiorariin the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 67343). The petition was dismissed for lack of merit on July 16, 1984.

On or about April 2, 1982, Estioca posted an announcement on the bulletin board of the employees' coffee shop criticizing the Company for having earmarked the sum of P250,000 for the inter-department athletic tournament (which he called "a farce and baloony") to be held that year, instead of using the money to pay the employees' claims for living allowance. He urged the employees to boycott the sports event. The announcement authored by him, reads:

TO ALL ZMEU MEMBERS:

GEORGE HAS VERBALLY APPROVED THE RELEASE OF P250,000.00 FOR THE INTER-DEPARTMENT ATHLETICS FOR THIS YEAR ALONE. THE MOST SUDDEN DECISION FOR THAT AMOUNT IS VERY, VERY MUCH SURPRISING ON THE PART OF MANAGEMENT EVER SINCE.

THIS IS ENTIRELY A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO DIVERT THE MINDS AND THE ATTENTIONS OF THE EMPLOYEES WHO ARE CLAIMING FOR THEIR RIGHTS. REMEMBER, OUR CLAIMS FOR DIFFERENTIAL OF OUR LIVING ALLOWANCE HAS BEEN DENIED BY MANAGEMENT. THEN, WHY SPEND THE P250,000.00 FOR ATHLETICS? GIVE US OUR LIVING ALLOWANCE FIRST BEFORE ANY ADDITIONAL BENEFITS, THIS IS OUR MONEY.

I AM APPEALING TO ALL OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF ZMEU TO WITHDRAW YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE ATHLETICS BEING ORGANIZED BY MANAGEMENT. THIS IS A FARCE AND BALOONY I WANT YOU TO SEE ME IF YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

PRESIDENT

4/19/82 (p. 6, Rollo)

It turned out that Estioca's figures were incorrect for the athletic meet budget was P54,000 only.

On April 17, 1982, the employees filed a claim for their living allowance before the Labor Arbiter (NLRC Case No. 0178-82).

On April 26,1982, Attorney Alberto De la Rosa, resident manager of the Company (whose main office is in Makati, Metro Manila), wrote a letter to Estioca asking him to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for:

a) Spreading false rumors regarding the so called P250,000.00 budget for athletics during this interdepartment games;

b) For agitating employees to fight against management's plan and programs of athletic activities which are good for the employees and company; and

c) For using company materials and equipment for personal and private use/purpose without authority. (p. 7, Rollo.)

Estioca received the letter on April 26, 1982. He answered it on April 27, 1982. On April 30, 1982, he was notified that the Company was terminating his service as personnel supervisor for loss of trust and confidence in him. The termination was duly reported by the Company to the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).

On May 3,1982, the respondent NFL, on behalf of the monthly-paid employees, filed with the Regional Director of the MOLE in Zamboanga City, a notice of strike against the Company for the following grounds:

a. Illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, President of Zambowood Employees Local, National Federation of Labor on April 30, 1982, on account of union activities;

b. Unfair labor practice, particularly union busting;

c. Non-payment of living allowances;

d. Employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit, contrary to law. (p. 8, Rollo.)

The Company opposed the notice of strike because the grounds stated in the notice were not valid grounds for a strike, the procedural rules for declaring a strike were not followed and the NFL, had no personality to file the notice because its petition for certification as the collective bargaining agent of the monthly-salaried employees was still pending resolution. (The Company's petition for review [G.R. No. 67343] of the BLR's decision certifying the NFL as bargaining agent of the employees was dismissed by the Supreme Court on July 16, 1984).

On May 23, 1982, the respondents struck.

On May 25, 1982, the Company issued a written order to the striking employees to return to work immediately or be dismissed, but they paid no heed.

On May 27,1982, the Company asked the Minister of Labor to certify the controversy for arbitration.

On May 28, 1982, Estioca filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC's Arbitration Branch. It was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IX-0216-2.

As the strike continued, the company sent letters of termination on June 17, 1982 to the strikers, dismissing them for serious misconduct, willful disobedience, and abandonment. The Company sent a termination report to the MOLE Regional Director in Zamboanga City, and asked that the employees' notice of strike be dismissed for having become moot and academic.

On July 9, 1982, the Company filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City a complaint against the striking employees for damages arising from the unlawful obstruction of its premises and asked the court to issue an injunction against them. The strikers filed a petition forcertiorariin the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 61236) alleging lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the dispute. On January 31, 1984, We granted the writ ofcertiorariand permanently enjoined the Court of First Instance from taking further action in the case. The Company refiled its action for damages in the Regional Office of the MOLE in Zamboanga City on May 2,1984.

On August 18,1982, the Minister of Labor certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration (Certified Case No. 0309). The pertinent portion of the certification reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the labor dispute at Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., is hereby certified to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Art. 264(6) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. In line with this certification, all striking workers including those terminated by the company, must return to work immediately and Management shall accept all returning workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing previous to the work stoppage. The assistance of the military and police authorities is requested for the effective and orderly implementation of this order. The NLRC is given thirty (30) days from receipt hereof to terminate proceedings. (p. 12, Rollo.)

In obedience to the Secretary's order, the strikers tried to return to work on August 19, 1982, but were rebuffed by the Company.

Backtracking from its earlier request for compulsory arbitration, the Company filed a motion for reconsideration of the Minister's order on the pretext that there was nothing more to arbitrate because the strikers had been dismissed. When its motion for reconsideration was denied, the Company brought the matter up to this Court on a petition forcertiorari(G.R. No. 62893). The petition was dismissed on June 6, 1988.

On the other hand, the strikers filed a petition formandamusin this Court (G.R. No. 64183) to compel the Company to take them back. On September 15, 1988, this Court granted their petition. The dispositive portion of its decision provided:

WHEREFORE, the petition formandamusis granted. Public respondents are hereby ordered to implement their return-to-work order, and private respondent must respect the right of the eighty-one petitioners to resume their respective positions as of the time the strike was called. The question as to the backwages and their seniority rights will be determined in the compulsory arbitration proceeding. This decision is immediately executory. (p. 13, Rollo.)

Pursuant thereto the NLRC on September 27, 1988, ordered the Company to readmit the striking employees including those who had been dismissed. The Company alleged that the positions of the dismissed strikers had been filled up. On November 18, 1988, fifteen (15) "replacements" filed a petition for injunction in the NLRC, in Certified Case No. 0306, to enjoin the ertswhile strikers from returning to their jobs.

Adopting the report of Commissioner Gabriel Gatchalian who was commissioned to hear the case and its incidents, the NLRC promulgated a decision on June 5,1984, denying the temporary employees' petition for injunction, upholding the legality of the strike, ordering the reinstatement of the workers and Estioca, finding the company guilty of contempt, and ordering it to pay a fine of P10,000. The dispositive portion of the decision provided:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered as follows:

1. The respondent is declared guilty of unfair labor practice and is ordered to reinstate all the striking workers including Dionisio Estioca to their former positions without loss of seniority and with full backwages from the date they first presented themselves to return to work on 19 August 1982 until their actual reinstatement; respondent is likewise ordered to cease and desist from further committing the unfair labor practice acts on plaintiffs;

2. The petition for injunction filed by the fifteen (15) replacements hired after 19 August 1982 is denied and they are instead ordered to vacate their positions in favor of the returning strikers entitled thereto; and

3. The respondent is declared guilty of contempt and is ordered to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) to this Commission payable within ten (10) days from receipt of the Decision." (p.59, Rollo.)

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Company filed a petition forcertiorariandmandamusin the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 68028) protesting that the decision of the NLRC was rendered without due notice and hearing, hence, in violation of its right to due process.

In the meantime, Estioca's complaint for illegal dismissal (RAB- IX-0216-2) had also reached the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 68429) as the Executive Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ordered his reinstatement as personnel supervisor with backwages from April 30, 1982, up to his reinstatement (Annex A, pp. 36-37, Rollo).

The Supreme Court consolidated G.R. No. 68028 and G.R. No. 68429, and on October 29,1985, it required the NLRC to hold a formal hearing in Certified Case No. 0309 and NLRC Case No. RAB-IX-0216-2 to determine the legality of the strike and the dismissal of Estioca and other incidental questions.

Complying with that directive, the NLRC held hearings where evidence were presented by both sides. On November 6, 1987, the NLRC reiterated its earlier decision dated June 5, 1985 Annex A, pp. 35-40, Rollo).

For the fifth time, the Company is before Us seeking relief from the NLRC's decisions. Its petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 82088) alleges that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that the dismissal of Estioca was illegal; that the company committed unfair labor practice; that the strike on May 23, 1982 was lawful, and that hence, the Company should reinstate the strikers including Estioca.

Complying with Our resolution ordering the respondents to comment on the petition, the private respondents filed a comment. The Solicitor General filed no comment for the public respondent failed to comply with Our order to send the records of the case to him.

After carefully considering the pleadings of both parties, We are not persuaded to grant the petition.

The petitioner's allegation that Estioca's position as personnel supervisor was managerial in nature was not denied by Estioca. As next-in-rank to the personnel manager, he performed, in the latter's absence, the duties and functions of that position. He was authorized to sign and approve sick leaves and vacation leaves of the employees, to hire employees (Exhs. 12 and 14), discipline them, give them assignments, and prepare their work schedules, special trips, and operations. He had no less than 17 employees under his direct supervision (Exh. 22).

In view of Estioca's managerial position, the Company contends that its loss of trust and confidence in him was a lawful cause for his dismissal. It argues that Estioca's act of posting a scathing and hostile announcement in the Company's cafeteria, falsely denouncing the Company for its supposed extravagance and fomenting discontent and resentment among the employees on account of the Company's supposed indifference to their claim for increased living allowance, were acts of disloyalty to the management. Although Estioca later apologized for his "intemperate language" and "impetuous action," which he admitted exceeded "the bounds of tolerable dissent which management has the right to reprove or correct," and expressed regret for "the difficult situation that I have created for the management" (Exh. 23, p. 19, Rollo), the company was not appeased.

Was his dismissal justified?

Art. 245 of the Labor Code provides that "managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization." Estioca is, therefore, disqualified to head a union of the rank and file employees.

However, RA 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989 (15 days after its publication in the "Philippines Daily Inquirer") provides that although "supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank and file employees," they may, however, "join, assist or form separate labor organization of their own."In the NFL's petition for direct certification as the bargaining representative of the monthly-salaried employees of the Company, it was expressly alleged that said organization is "composed of administrative and supervisory personnel." Consequently, Estioca's leadership of that union was not unlawful as it was not inconsistent with his position as personnel supervisor of the Company. However, his act of posting a bellicose announcement critical of the Company and based on false or erroneous information, was undoubtedly prejudicial to the Company. The Company's reaction was understandable but too harsh in view of Estioca's subsequent apology for his action. We, therefore, agree with the public respondent that Estioca's dismissal from the service was illegal.

The other issue that addresses itself to this Court is whether the strike was illegal. The NLRC held that the strike was not illegal:

Verily, the test of strike legality are its purpose, the means of execution and compliance with legal requirements. From the evidence it appears that a notice of strike was filed by petitioner on May 3, 1 982 and that a strike vote was taken whereby 79 voted yes while 3 voted no and forthwith reported the same to the Department seven days before the strike commenced on May 23, 1982. Hence, Art. 264 of the Labor Code was complied with. The ground of the strike is stated in the strike notice which charges unfair labor practice on the part of respondent by way of union busting in addition to Estioca's dismissal for union activities. The chronology of events disclose that on March 5, 1982, the union of monthly paid employees filed a petition for certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations. After the filing of the same, as testified to by Estioca, which was not rebutted by respondent Celso Abastillas and Lilio Navarro, Comptroller and Production Manager, respectively called the employees on separate occasions sometime in April 1982 and asked them to withdraw their membership from the union. Respondent also dismissed Dionisio Estioca, union president, on April 30, 1982, (pp. 37-38, Rollo.)

The petitioner alleges that the strike was illegal because long before the union filed the notice of strike the employees' claim for living allowance had already been filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV as NLRC Case No. RAB-IX-01 78-82 (p. 21, Rollo). Said claim could no longer be invoked as a ground for the declaration of a strike in view of Art. 265 of the Labor Code as amended, which provides:

ART. 265. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.- x x x.

It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the grounds for the strike or lockout.

The rationale of this prohibition, is that once jurisdiction over the dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike.

We hold, however, that the illegal dismissal of Estioca and the Company's union-busting efforts were legal grounds for the strike.

In fact, the Company did not deny the charge of union busting levelled by the respondents. The NLRC found that

..., as testified to by Estioca, which was not rebutted by respondent, Celso Abastillas and Lilio Navarro, Comptroller and Production Manager, respectively, called the employees on separate occasions sometime in April 1982 and asked them to withdraw their membership from the union. (p. 38, Rollo.)

Union busting, or interference with the formation of a union, constitutes an unfair labor practice (Art 248, subpar. 4, Labor Code), hence a valid ground for the declaration of a strike.

The Company's refusal to accept the striking workers when they returned to work as directed in the Labor Secretary's return-to-work order dated August 18, 1982, was unjustified. For that reason, the Company is liable to pay the workers backwages. However, in view of the admission in the private respondents' comment that in August 1984 the 81 striking workers were readmitted by the Company (p. 65, Rollo), they are entitled to backwages for the period when they presented themselves for work until they were accepted by the Company in August 1984.

WHEREFORE, the petition forcertiorariis dismissed. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in Certified Case No. 0309 is affirmed with modification by ordering the petitioner Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. to reinstate the strikers, including Dionisio Estioca, to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with backwages from August 19,1982 when they offered to report for work, up to August 1984 when they were readmitted by the Company. With respect to Estioca, his backwages shall not exceed a period of three (3) years from April 30, 1982. The fine of P10,000 imposed on the petitioner for its delay in complying with the Secretary's return-to-work order, is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD,petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,respondents.

L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.

Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR,J.:The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties parties

3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;

4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.

5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;

6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;

7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang demonstration will be held the following morning; and

8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)

In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)

Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )

In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invokingBien vs. Castillo,1which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).

In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondenten bancdismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for beingpro formaas it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).

At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sittingen banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).

On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).

Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).

IThere is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.

(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."2(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles."3In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and toestablish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."4Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise."5(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen.6And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.7(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.

(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.8Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity."9Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;10and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."11The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights.12On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando inGonzales vs. Comelecand reiterated by the writer of the opinion inImbong vs. Ferrer.13It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo inGonzales vs. Comelec,supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg inN.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan,14believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed,"15even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test.16Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand,viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger.17II

The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselvesvis-a-visthe local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained.18Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.19The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike.20The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate thesine qua nonof an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression.21If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.III

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."

We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech."22Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban employees.23We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case,supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests.24As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.

Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.

On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.

IV

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining andfor the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission itsraison d'etre as ordained and directed by the Constitution.

V

It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination;25or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law,26even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years.27Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts28as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services.28-aVI

The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation.29The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.

Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of App