Strategic Sea Mobility for the ADF

The reality of the post Cold War era is theongoing instability in the developing world,manifested at its worst in the War on Terrorin Muslim nations. Closer to home,Australia confronts an ‘arc of instability’which spans South East Asia through to thePacific Island States. Shifting patterns ofwealth, mobility of global capital andlabour, and the disappearance ofcompetitive allegiance buying in the ThirdWorld by the West and former Soviet Blochave all contributed to this situation, whichis unlikely to abate soon. The comingdecades will be characterised by ongoingexpeditionary actions by developed nationsin the developing world, to deal withterrorist movements and the breakdown ofcivil order. This is a reality superimposed upon thewider regional strategic context, in whichthe increasing industrialisation of Asiannations sees increasing investment in

modern air and naval power, and themodern guided weapons technology thatcomes with it. The Asia-Pacific-Indianregion will present, in coming decades, themost complex and sophisticated maritimeand air environment observed since thecollapse of the Soviet Bloc. Australia ispresented with a number of seriouschallenges if it is to maintain its relativestrategic position in this part of the world.This is the context in which Australia findsitself today. The RAN’s legacy force ofamphibious vessels, accreted over severaldecades, is not competitive in thisenvironment. The Manoora and Kanimbla(LPA), the Tobruk (LSH) and six landingcraft (LCH) are ill suited to the developingenvironment, and are limited in remaininglife. The question is thus not one of whetherto replace, but how to replace these assets tobest effect.

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Strategic Sea Mobility

for the ADF by Dr Carlo Kopp

The recentannouncement in thepress that Australiawill invest in new, andpossibly largeamphibious vesselsraises a number ofvery good questionsabout what directionthe RAN will betaking with its futureamphibiouscapabilities. There islittle doubt that asignificant growth inthis type of capabilityis required. The biggerquestion is how tobest implement such acapability, given thediverse needs it has tofulfill and the complexstrategic environmentin which it needs tooperate.

Technology andTrends inAmphibiousOperationsThe role of amphibious vessels is to deployand sustain land forces in expeditionaryoperations. The first large scale use ofspecialised amphibious vessels was inWorld War II in the Pacific, when the USMarine Corps and Army conducted theIsland Hopping campaign to drive out theJapanese, and during the invasion of Europevia Normandy. Since then we have seennotable amphibious operations conductedduring the Korean War (Inchon), theFalklands (Operation Corporate), theinvasions of Grenada and Panama, and ahost of much smaller operations conductedin support of peace enforcement,peacekeeping and counter-terrorismoperations. Australia’s engagement in EastTimor was the largest amphibious operationconducted by Australia. More recently, theUS Navy used its amphibious vesselsduring Operation Enduring Freedom andOperation Iraqi Freedom. An interestingexample during the former campaign wasthe use of a CTOL/CV aircraft carrier as atemporary amphibious base for SpecialForces operating in Afghanistan.Historically, amphibious vessels have beenused mostly to perform amphibiousinvasions of territory held by opposing landforces, both to provide a manoeuvre forceelement in littoral environments or a mainforce delivery. However, the developingtrend is to also use amphibious vessels asstaging and deployment platforms forSpecial Forces raids. In the developingworld basing for Special Forces in closeproximity to hot spots often presentsgenuine problems, both politically and interms of on-site security. An amphibiousvessel provides a highly flexible alternativefor positioning a Special Forces elementand its supporting helicopters close enoughto strike.Recent decades have seen considerableevolution in the style of vessel used foramphibious operations. During the 1940sand 1950s, ‘phibs’ were primarily largetransports equipped often with docks topermit landing craft to deploy personnel,supplies, vehicles and especially armour.

The advent of the helicopter, especially gasturbine powered helicopters, changed thisdramatically, as troops, supplies and lightvehicles could be flown to shore, leavingonly the heaviest equipment, such as tanksand large artillery pieces, to be deployed bylanding craft. The next importantadvancement was in the Air CushionVehicle (ACV) landing craft, capable ofmuch faster transit than conventionaltechnology. A unique development in thisdomain were the large Soviet Wing InGround-effect (WIG) amphibious assaultplatforms, exemplified by the ‘CaspianMonster’. Designed to operate as high-speed amphibious assault platforms, theWIGs presented a formidable capability inthe littoral environments of the Baltic Seaand Black Sea.By the 1990s an important trend emerged inamphibious vessels: a shift away fromspecialised single purpose amphibiousassault helicopter carriers, tank landingships and transports to ‘multirole’amphibious assault ships – combining thecharacteristics of a large transport, ahelicopter carrier and an amphibious dock.Very good examples are the US Navy’sTarawa and Wasp classes, built to deployaround 1,800 Marines with equipment andcarry a mix of 30 to 40 helicopters and fixedwing aircraft. Designed to operate withconsiderable autonomy, such vesselsprovide for troop deployment via ACVs andhelicopters, and some measure of organicclose air support capability via AV-8BHarriers and AH-1 attack helicopters.The US Navy and Marine Corps have by farthe largest and most developed amphibiouscapability globally, and thus present a goodexample for exploring key technology andforce structuring trends in this area. Otherthan the previously noted trend to multirolevessels, which combine the features ofmultiple categories of legacy amphibiousvessel, the other important trend observedin the US amphibious fleet is the drive toincrease the range from which a vessel candeliver its payload to shore. Theuncompromising insistence by the US

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Marines on the CV-22 Osprey V/STOL tiltrotor as a replacement formuch of the CH-46 and CH-53 assault helicopter fleet and the USNavy’s interest in fitting the X-band SPY-3 phased array and RIM-162 ESSM Anti-Ship Missile Defence package on the LHD-8,LPD-12 and LPD-17 amphibious ships both present good examplesof the long term impact of the proliferation of coastal defence Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)systems.Amphibious ships are very high value targets, both due to the sizeof the vessel and its valuable payload. The focus of much of the1944-1945 kamikaze effort was in attacking amphibious vessels,and the effort invested by the Argentines in the Falklands was nodifferent, albeit almost four decades later. If a defender can crippleor sink a larger amphibious vessel, the amphibious operation canfail leaving a force stranded on the beach and unable to hold itsground.In the contemporary world the biggest concern focuses on coastalbatteries of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles, followed closely by air,helicopter, fast patrol boat and submarine delivered weapons. Inthis region these range from EU-built Exocets, US-built Harpoons,Russian-built Yakhonts to Chinese-built Silkworm/Seersucker andSardine ASCMs. As the handful of Exocet hits during the Falklandscampaign demonstrated amply, even a small ASCM deployed by anunsophisticated and underskilled operator can cause enormousdamage. Amphibious ships carry large payloads of fuel andmunitions, which can render damage control effort futile, if theweapon hits the right place.Heavyweight missiles such as the widely deployed subsonicStyx/Silkworm/Seersucker family and the new supersonicYakhont/BrahMos are especially concerning – since they have largewarheads, the mass to penetrate deep into structure and, subject torange, considerable residual fuel onboard. While many advocates oflarger warships like to argue the capacity of such vessels to absorbhits, the survivability of even a 40,000 tonne vessel if hit by aweapon in this class is open to question.While delivery of ASCMs by aircraft, helicopter or fast patrol boatrequires some sophistication by an opponent, using a road mobilecoastal ASCM battery does not. Once the bearing and range to theinbound amphibious fleet are approximately known, the battery can‘shoot and scoot’.

US thinking to date has been to rely on the range/speed of the CV-22 Osprey to deny firing opportunities by assaulting from rangesoutside the reach of most sea skimming ASCMs. Amphibious fleetoperators without the budgets for CV-22 fleets do not have thisoption - the range and cruise speed of assault helicopters wouldimpose hard limits on the distances from which an assault can takeplace.An important recent development in amphibious operations is theintroduction of larger wave piercing catamarans developed byAustralian industry, especially for littoral operations. Catamaransprovide often twice or more the cruise speed of conventional‘phibs’ reflecting in double the productivity of a conventionalvessel with an equal payload. Well suited for operations in shallowlittorals, catamarans have become one of the foci of the UStransformational effort in naval force structure. With a large ratio ofhelicopter deck area to internal volume, and hull geometries easy toapply stealth faceting to, we have yet to see catamarans reach theirfull potential in either capability or size.

Roles and Missions for theAmphibious FleetFor Australia, perhaps the key issue in building a new amphibiousassault fleet will lie in finding the best balance between utility andsurvivability, across the range of scenarios in which such vesselsmight be used.Key roles for the RAN’s replacement amphibious fleet include:- Regional and global Army deployments in support of peaceenforcement and peacekeeping operations.- Regional and global Special Forces deployment and recovery,counter-terrorism raids.- Evacuation of Australian nationals and natural disaster reliefoperations.-.Coalition operations within the region and globally.- Power projection within the region in a nation state conflictscenario.- Combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations.-.Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations as an ASW helicopterplatform.The nature of the globalised world means that ADF ground forcesmay have to fight on the global stage, but also develop and maintainhighly credible capabilities for combat within this region. This hasimportant implications, both in terms of the characteristics of thelittoral environment in which amphibious ships will have tooperate, and in terms of opposing capabilities.Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations typically presentthe low end of the threat spectrum, as opposing forces are unlikelyto have at their disposal credible anti-shipping weapons. The sameis apt to be true of most counter-terrorism operations using SpecialForces, plus operations where civilians need to be extracted fromproblem areas.

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The benign operational environmentdisappears in situations where the vesselsmay be required to perform coalitionoperations against rogue states or largernon-state actors regionally, in situations ofnation state conflict regionally, or in CSARor ASW support operations in support ofany of the previous three environments.In an opposed environment the RAN’samphibious vessels may find themselves insituations where an opponent hasrespectable air and missile capabilities, andhas some competencies in using theseassets. Current thinking is that the new AirWarfare Destroyers will protect theamphibious ships from air and missileattack. Advocates of larger amphibiousvessels have openly argued that these shipsshould carry STOVL Joint Strike Fighteraircraft, the aim being to provide organic airsupport for the land force, and organic airdefence for the amphibious group. Neitherof these arguments seem particularlycredible considering the capabilities of theanti-shipping missiles appearing in theregion, and the level of capability of Sukhoifighters being purchased. What STOVLJSFs do achieve is to increase the value ofthe vessel as a target, while displacingvaluable helicopters from the availablehangar and deck space. In effect utility istraded away in an attempt to improvesurvivability.The recent public and political debate overthe acquisition of either two larger vesselsor four smaller vessels appeared to focusmostly on flexibility. Smaller vessels areindeed more flexible in terms of permittingmore concurrency, and provide someredundancy should a vessel be unavailablefor operations due to overhaul ormechanical problems. The bigger issueshould however be survivability.An investment on this scale cannot be madefor a single role, and optimising the buywith a capability that is ideal for large scalepeacekeeping, peace enforcement and other‘benign environment’ roles is, in effect,building in a genuine risk that theinvestment will be unusable in more hostileenvironments. A Timor-like scenario inwhich the opponent resists using naval andair assets, and coastal missile batteries, is agood example. Operation Corporate in theFalklands should not be forgotten.Another consideration is duplication ofcapabilities already extant in the US Navy.If the aim is to use these vessels in supportof US-led coalitions, then deploying vesselsanalogous in capabilities to US LHDs addsonly incremental mass to an existing taskforce rather than a unique and valuableniche capability.Given that a key role for any ADFamphibious capability is apt to be raidsagainst terrorist enclaves, which if regionalin location will be littoral, smaller and fastervessels will yield a much better return oninvestment than a large LHD. Roles such asSpecial Forces insertion, extraction, CSARand ASW support are all roles where severallarger catamarans would prove moreeffective than one or two very large LHDs. This concept of operations needs to be

explored carefully before committing to ashipbuilding program. A Hi-Lo mix ofconventional LHD capability, and fastcatamaran capability would provide muchmore flexibility, redundancy andsurvivability than a pure LHD solution. An interesting example is the Incat proposalfor the 112-metre Amphibious HelicopterTransporter. It is designed to carry a dozenMRH-90 helicopters, launch or recoverthree, and move 600 tonne class payloads ata 30+ knot cruise speed. This contrasts withthe 15-knot cruise speed 20,000 tonne orgreater Izar and Armaris conventionalLHDs which are the primary focus of thecurrent JP-2048 study phase.If anything is clear from recent evolution inamphibious ship technology and ongoingoperations, flexibility, speed andsurvivability are ongoing issues. There is avery strong case to be made to broaden thescope of the JP-2048 studies and explore awider range of options, and a wider range ofoperational scenarios. In a rapidly evolvingworld doing anything less amounts toplanning for an era long past.

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