Strategic analysis in chaotic times

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c r a f t i n g i n n o v a t i o n t o g e t h e r

Navneet Bhushan

([email protected])

Crafitti Consulting (www.crafitti.com) at ISSA, DRDO, Delhi

August 06, 2013

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May 30, 2014 2 © Crafitti Consulting Private Ltd.

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Black Swan – The impact of the highly improbable

• “I cannot accept a pretense of science. I much prefer a sophisticated craft, focused on tricks, to a failed science looking for certainties” Nassim Nicholas Taleb

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China is pursuing Deng’s reforms of 1978. • The Deng reforms very clearly articulate the

“superpower” phase that China has entered since the start of this century. A new type of Superpower is the design.

• To fulfill the Superpower by 2050 dream, China will require secure, fast and wide access to Africa because of the natural resources – untapped.

• Also, China will need access to markets in other part of world. Karakoram highway is already open to China. China will need to build fast goods trains from Karachi, Gwadar and Pasni to Karakoram. It will also require the land transport to be safe and secure. By 2022 China has to achieve that.

• China’s Superpower design is at stake.

DENG XIOPING’s CHINA

-DESIGN FOR A NEW TYPE OF SUPER

POWER

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WHITE PAPER ON CHINA’s ARMED FORCES!!! APRIL 2013

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The PLA Army (PLAA) is composed of mobile operational units, border and coastal defense

units, guard and garrison units, and is primarily responsible for military operations on land. The

PLAA mobile operational units include 18 combined corps, plus additional independent

combined operational divisions (brigades), and have a total strength of 850,000. The combined

corps, composed of divisions and brigades, are respectively under the seven military area

commands (MACs): Shenyang (16th, 39th and 40th Combined Corps), Beijing (27th, 38th and

65th Combined Corps), Lanzhou (21st and 47th Combined Corps), Jinan (20th, 26th and 54th

Combined Corps), Nanjing (1st, 12th and 31st Combined Corps), Guangzhou (41st and 42nd

Combined Corps) and Chengdu (13th and 14th Combined Corps).

Currently, the PLAN has a total strength of 235,000 officers and men, and commands three fleets,

namely, the Beihai Fleet, the Donghai Fleet and the Nanhai Fleet. Each fleet has fleet aviation

headquarters, support bases, flotillas and maritime garrison commands, as well as aviation

divisions and marine brigades. In September 2012, China's first aircraft carrier Liaoning was

commissioned into the PLAN. China's development of an aircraft carrier has a profound impact

on building a strong PLAN and safeguarding maritime security.

The PLAAF now has a total strength of 398,000 officers and men, and an air command in each of

the seven Military Area Commands (MACs) of Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing,

Guangzhou and Chengdu. In addition, it commands one airborne corps. Under each air command

are bases, aviation divisions (brigades), ground-to-air missile divisions (brigades), radar brigades

and other units.

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Carrying out Scenario-based Exercises and Drills

The PLA takes scenario-based exercises and drills as the basic means to

accelerate the transition in military training and raise combat

capabilities. It widely practices in training such operational concepts in

conditions of informationization as information dominance,

confrontation between different systems, precision strike, fusion,

integration and jointness.

It organizes training based on real combat needs, formations and

procedures. It pays special attention to confrontational command

training, live independent force-on-force training and training in complex

battlefield environments. Thus, the warfighting capabilities based on

information systems have been thoroughly improved.


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Reactive Approach – the traditional Indian Strategic approach

– is a recipe for disaster

Comprehensive Integrated Strategic Response – is needed

STEEPV scanning for creating multiple futuristic

Scenarios is needed

In the multiple Scenarios created – alternative doctrinal

concepts and Strategies need to be played out

These integrated global analytical models, simulations and

gaming should become the basis of creating new responses,

capabilities and doctrine

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© CRAFITTI CONSULTING

A Weakening of Hierarchies

• Information abundance permits INDIVIDUALS to by-pass hierarchies that have – deliberately or inadvertently – controlled or limited information

• Alternative human organization forms – based mainly on the Network have proved more effective and efficient for transacting information than hierarchies.

• In Information intensive enterprises, hierarchical organizations may not be competitive with networks.

IN ATHENA’s CAMP – Preparing for conflict in the Information Age, (Ed)

Arquilla J. and Ronfeldt D, RAND, 1997

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© CRAFI

TTI CONSULTIN

G

INFORMATION

WE HAVE

JUST

STARTED TO

LEARN

WHAT IS

INFORMATI

ON

Information was initially viewed as being about a

message and/or a medium. A new idea emerged where

some information is being regarded as material – as

lying at the core of all existence, where it may be as

fundamental as matter and energy. These concepts

are under a slightly clichéd title of Information

Physics.

However, they are powerful concepts. If matter and

energy are convertible physical entities, Information

can create both matter and energy in a broader sense

of the words. Thus an Informed actor is likely to

create something tangible (matter or energy).

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© CRAFI

TTI CONSULTIN

G

WE HAVE

JUST

STARTED TO

LEARN

WHAT IS

INFORMATI

ON

The universal tendency of organizations

is towards breakdown and

randomization, i.e., Entropy. All living

systems must counter this Entropy,

through processing of matter and energy.

These processes require information.

The view has developed that everything

is information. LIFE IS

COMPUTATION! (In a broader sense)

INFORMATION

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Law of Increasing Intelligence of Technical Systems

Technical Systems are evolving into Higher and Higher intelligence

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Combat

Fight/Duel/Conflict/Battle/War/World

War/Armageddon

Modelling

Representing a system and its internal and/or external

dynamics in such a form (may be mathematical) that

information about its behaviour can be extracted or

studied

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Parameters and Processes of Combat

• Two Sides

• Search

• Detection

• Identification

• Acquisition

• Tracking

• Weapon Target Assignment

• Weapon Aiming and Firing

• Attrition

• Command and

Control

• Damage

Assessment

• Strategic and

Tactical

Movement

• Influence of

Technology

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Nature of Combat and Combat Models

Past : Numerical Strength is Combat Power/ Attrition

Based

Modelling: Lanchester Equations Based and Fire Power

Scores in QJMA

Present: Technology Based Platform-Centric Revolution

in Military Affairs

Modelling: Weapon Power Scores in Extended Adaptive

Dynamic Model

Future: Integrated Comprehensive Warfare

Modelling: Exploring New Models – Intelligent Weapon

Power Scores

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Approaches to Combat Modelling

Analytical Methods

• Lanchester Equations

• Adaptive Dynamic

Model

Firepower Scores

• QJMA

• WEI

• Weapon Power Scores

Simulation

• Combat

Simulations

• Wargames

New Approaches

• Cellular Automata

• Petri Nets

• Artificial Life

• Particle Swarm

Optimization

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Rand Report MG 268 (http://www.rand.org)


More than 12000 Sorties flown in mid 1990s to compare JTIDS datalink 16 system with conventional voice only communications

250% IMPROVEMENT

IN Kill Ratio

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The Past

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Combat

• Duels

• LOS Fire

• Attrition Based Warfare

• Numerical Strength

Important (the 3:1 Rule)

To make a Brigade of 4000 troops ineffective, one

needs to destroy atleast 33% to 50% of its troops

using a Division of about 15000 troops

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Combat Models: Past

• Coupled Differential Equations

incorporating the rate at which both sides

destroy each other’s numerical strengths

• Quantified Judgement Method of Analysis

based on Empirical Formulae developed

using Historical Combat Data of Past

Wars (T.N. Dupuy)

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The Present

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Influence of Technology on War/Combat

Information Technology

C4ISR IW/EW/SEW

PGMs ILSS

Knowledge Processing

Intelligence Analysis

Tactical and Strategic

Planning

Automated/Rapid Military

Decision Making

Telecom & Networking

Communications

NetWar/CyberWar

Mobile Comm

Lethality

Mass Destruction to

Selective/Precise &

Effective Destruction

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COLLECT &

PROCESS

BATTLEFIELD

INFORMATION WITH

SPEED AND

ACCURACY

CAPABILITY TO

PICK OUT

TARGETS IN A

DYNAMIC BATTLE

SCENARIO

ABILITY TO DESTROY

TARGETS WITH

PRECISION FROM

GREATER RANGES

HEART OF REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

(RMA)

INTERACTION

ABILITY TO SEE / CHOOSE TARGETS BETTER

INCREASES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS

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The Future

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Network Centric Warfare

Network is the Computer

Fundamental Shift from Platform Centric

warfare to Network Centric Warfare

Characterized by:

Very High Level of Shared Battlespace

Awareness

Shared Knowledge of Commanders Intent

Self-Sync, Speed of Command, and rapid lock-

out

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Network Centric Warfare:

Sources of Increased Combat Power

Shared Battlespace Awareness

Increased Battlespace Awareness

Battlespace Expansion: Employment of

Weapons at Max Range

Increased Survivability

Self-Synchronization of Forces

Reduced Collateral Damage

Virtual Collaboration: Moving Information not

people

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Modelling and Analysis of

Advanced Technologies and

Combat Support Systems in

Combat between RMA Forces

The Present

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Evaluation of Weapon

Power Scores of Army,

Navy and Air Force

Weapons

Combat

Support System

(CSS)

Capability Assessment

Combat

Outcomes

CSS Weights

based on AHP

Force Multiplier

related to CSS Estimation of

Quantity of

Weapons

Force Strength

Evaluation

Generation of

Combat Scenarios

Modified

Adaptive

Dynamic

Model

Estimation of

Model

Parameters

OLD M E T H O D O L O G Y

1998-2000

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Weapon Power Score

Self

Protection

Index

Integration

Index Lethality

Operability

Index

On-Board

Weapons

Capability

On- Board Self

Defence

Capability

Night / All

Weather

Capability

Ability to get

connected to

C3I System

Each Combat Node in the Network

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= Operational Lethality Index (OLI) x (1+ Self-Protection Index (SPI)) x

(1 + Operability Index (OI)) x (1 + Integration Index (II))

Weapon Power Score (WPS)

Force Strength (FS)

= Summation of product of WPS and Quantity of weapons in a force

Force Potential (FP)

= Force Strength x (1 + Combat Support System Effectiveness Factor)

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Factors considered for OLI Computations

Weapons Factors

Infantry Small Arms

and Non Mobile

Weapons

Rate of Fire, Range, Accuracy, Reliability,

and Potential Targets per Strike, Dispersion

Factor

Arty Towed/AD Guns All of the above and certain Artillery

related factors

Arty Self-Propelled All of the above and Mobility factors.

Armour, Ships,

Submarines

OLI of on-board Guns and Missiles,

Mobility factor Punishment factor,

Ammunition factor, Amphibious

capability factor etc.,

Attack Helicopter,

Aircraft OLI of on-board Guns, Missiles, Ceiling

factor Mobility factor,

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Factors Affecting SPI, OI and II of Army Platforms

Weapon System Factors Affecting

SPI II OI

Infantry Survivability Night Vision,

Transportability

Communication Links

with Brigade. HQ. and

RPV/UAV

Armor

Built-in-Armor,

Reactive Armor, Top

Attack Protection NBC

Protection, Fire &

Explosion Suppression,

Silhouette, Agility

Night Vision, All

Weather Operations,

fording,

Amphibious

Capability, Air

droppable

Communication Links

with RPV/UAV and other

Armor Vehicles.

Artillery Guns Shoot & Scoot

Capability, Stand Off

Range, Armored

Protection

All weather

Operability, NBC

Operability.

Integration with AOP

AD Arty/ SAM Shoot & Scoot

Capability, Stand Off

Range

Radar Control, NBC

Environment

Integration with C2

system

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c r a f t i n g i n n o v a t i o n t o g e t h e r Factors Affecting SPI, OI and II of Air force Weapons


SPI OI II

Close Air

Support /

Attack Helo

Deep Strike

Air Defense

Chaff, ECM,

ESM, Multi Mode

Radar, Precision

Guided Munitions

All of the above

and Inertial

Navigation

System

All of the above

and Look

Down/Look Up

Radar

Night Flight,

Night Time

Delivery, All

Weather

Operation

Inter Aircraft

& Ground

Station

Communicati

on

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c r a f t i n g i n n o v a t i o n t o g e t h e r Factors Affecting SPI, OI and II of Naval Platforms


SPI II OI

Battle Ships Intensity of

Threats faced,

Ability to detect

threatening

Platform,

Protection to

Evade hit,

Protection to

Evade Kill given

hit, Ability to

Jam/Confuse

Enemy Platform

Shallow

Water/ High

Seas

Operability

Communication

Links with Shore,

with Maritime

Aircraft, with Sub

Marine force, with

other Ships.

Submarine

Communication Links

with Shore, Maritime

Aircraft, Own

Submarine force.

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Combat Support Systems (CSS)

Intelligence Surveillance

& Reconnaissance(ISR) C4 Information

Warfare

Logistics

Support

System

• Space based

• Airborne

• Sea Based

• Ground Based

• Command and

Control

• Communications

• Computers

• System

Integration

• EW

• Opsec

• Psyops

• Deception

• Lethal IW

• Non lethal IW

• Encryption

• SW Engg

• Networking

• Computer Security

• Info Security

Infrastructure

Resources

Material

Management

National

Resources

Inter-service

Integration

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IW

ILSS

Space

Air

Sea

Gnd

Cmd & Control

Communications

Computers

System Integration

ISR C4

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I1 I2 I3 I4 C1 C2 C3 C4 W L

Space based ISR (I1) 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1

Airborne ISR (I2) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1

ISR Sea based ISR (I3) 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1

Gnd based ISR (I4) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1

Cmd and Control (C1) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0

C4 Communications (C2) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Computers (C3) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

System Integration (C4) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

IW (W) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

ILSS (L) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1

I1 I2 I3 I4 C1 C2 C3 C4 W L

Space based ISR (I1) 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0

Air ISR (I2) 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0

ISR Sea based ISR (I3) 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0

Gnd based ISR (I4) 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0

Cmd and Control (C1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

C4 Communications (C2) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0

Computers (C3) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0

System Integration (C4) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1

IW (W) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0

ILSS (L) 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1

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Combat

Support

Systems

Combat

Support

System

Dependency

Indices (Di)

Combat

Synergy

Indices

(Si)

Sub System

Activity Index

Ai =(Di) X (Si)

CSS Normalised

Weights

(Wi)

Order of

Ranking

Space based ISR 0.064 0.083 0.00531 0.0598 VIII

Air based ISR 0.096 0.070 0.672 0.0757 IV

Sea based ISR 0.115 0.047 0.00541 0.0609 VI Gnd based ISR 0.096 0.070 0.00672 0.0757 IV

Cmd and Control 0.165 0.033 0.00545 0.0614 V

Communications 0.054 0.165 0.00891 0.1004 III Computers 0.054 0.165 0.00891 0.1004 III

System

Integration 0.076 0.165 0.01254 0.1413 II

IW 0.142 0.165 0.2343 0.2639 I

ILSS 0.138 0.039 0.00538 0.0606 VII

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ISR C4

Space Based

Air Based

Sea Based

Ground Based

Command and Control

Communications

Computers

System Integration

IW ILSS

Country A Country B Country C

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CSS Factors

ISR

Space based ISR Communications Satellites, Navigation Satellites,

Meterological Satellites, Imaging Reconnaissance Satellites,

Relay Satellites

Air baser ISR AWACS/AEW, Air based Ground Tactical Reconnaissance,

Maritime Reconnaissance, Airborne Ground Strategic

Reconnaissance, Airborne Battlefield Surveillance Capability

(UAV/RPV capability)

Sea based ISR Surface Tactical Recce, Sub-surface Tactical Recce, Strategic

Recce, Coast based Strategic Recce

Ground based

ISR

Tactical Recce, Air Space Recce, Strategic Recce

C4

Command and

Control

Strategic C2, Tactical C2, Politics Military C2, Inter Services

Integration

Communications Utilization of EM Spectrum, Communication System,

Communication Security, Merger with National Telecom

System

Computers Computing Power, Software capability, Knowledge

processing and Automated Decision Making Capability

System

Integration

Data Fusion, National Level Interoperability, Inter Services

Operability, Integration of ISR, C2, ILSS with Lethal

System, Fault Tolerant Communication / Computing,

Interoperability Standards

Information Warfare (IW) Operations Security, Psychological Operations, EW,

Deception Lethal IW, Non Lethal IW, Cryptology, Computer

Security, Info Security, Intelligence

ILSS Armed Forces Resources, Logistics Infrastructure, Material

Management, National Resources, Inter Service Integration

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Modified Adaptive Dynamic Model (MADM)

• Off shoot of Lanchester Models

• J.M. Epstein

• Use of Exchange Ratio and

Prosecution Rate

• Parameters reflecting ability to

concentrate fire in engagements

• Uses Force strength instead of

Numerical Strength

• Withdrawal and reinforcements

• Close Air Support to Ground Forces

Extensions

• Air to Air Combat

• Naval Combat

including sub surface

• use of Weapon Power

Scores instead of

WEI for Force

Strength

• Estimation of

parameters based on

realistic data

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• Initial Force Strengths

of the Forces

• Force Strength

Reinforcement on each

day

• Force Strength Attrition

Rate

• Exchange Ratio

• Threshold Attrition

Rates

• Number of Close Air

Support (CAS) Aircraft

• CAS daily Sortie rate

per Aircraft

• CAS aircraft Attrition

rate per sortie

• Battle termination

Conditions

Force

Strength loss

and Aircraft

Attrition per

day

OUTPUT

INPUT

Modified

Adaptive

Dynamic

Model

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SIDE A SIDE B

Ground Forces Ground Forces

CAS Forces CAS Forces

AD Fighters AD Fighters

AD Escorts AD Escorts

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Test Scenario – Country A Strike

Corps attacking Country B holding forces

Force with Country A

Force with Country B

1 Armoured

Division

2 Infantry Division

1 Independent

Armoured Brigade

3 Independent

Armoured Brigades

3 Infantry Divisions

1 Armoured Regiment

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Total FS available (x1000)

Country A

1 Armoured Division + 3 Infantry Division + 1Independent Armed Bde = 910.6 + 3 x 184.5 + 359.9 = 1824

Country B

2 Infantry Division + 3 Independent Armed Bde + 2Armoured Regiments = 2 x 152.3 + 3 x 266.2 + 88.7 = 1191.9

Force Strength Ratio (FSR (A/B)) = 1.53

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Mobilizations Schedule

Ith

Day Country A (Attacker) Country B (Defender)Force FS

(x1000)Force FS

(x1000)1 2 Infantry Division

= 2 x 184.5369 2 Infantry Bde + 1

Integral ArmedRegt = 2 x 1/3 x152.3 + 1/3 x266.2

190.3

2 2 Armed Bdes =2 x 359.9

719.8 2 Armed Bde + 1Inf. Bde = 2 x266.2 + 1/3 x152.3 = 532.4 +50.8

583.2

3 Armoureddivision -Armoured Bde =910.6 - 359.9

550.7 1 Armed Bde =266.2

266.2

4 Infantry Division 184.4 1 Infantry Division 152.3

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Results of Test Scenario

o=2.0 a = d = 0.035

Day FSattacker

(remaining)

FSdefen

der(remaining)

Threshold

attacker

Threshold

defender

FSR

1 369.00 193.10 184.50 127.50 1.93902 1041.16 583.56 520.58 390.99 1.78423 1527.58 675.61 763.79 452.66 2.26104 1613.37 656.90 806.69 440.12 2.45615 1501.68 496.89 806.69 440.12 3.02216 1395.64 354.74 806.69 440.12 3.9343

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Performance IndexATK (A) DEF (B)

TFS (a) 1823.9 1192RFS (b) 1395.64 354.74FSL(a-b) 428.26 837.26

FSL/TFS (X) 0.235 0.70PI = X(B)/X(A) 0.70/0.235 = 2.99

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The NEED and Proposed

Approaches

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Intelligent Weapon Power

Score

Self

Protection

Index

Integration

Index Lethality

Operability

Index

On-Board

Weapons

Capability

On- Board Self

Defence

Capability

Night / All

Weather

Capability

Ability to get

connected to

C3I System

Information

processing

Foresight and

Learning

Decision

Making

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Network Centric Operations

NCO is a theory which proposes that the application of information age concepts to speed communications and increase situational awareness through networking improves both the efficiency and effectiveness of military operations.


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Taxonomy of Network Centric Warfare

Architectures

© Crafitt

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Architecture Characteristics

A. Centralized One central high value Hub – other low value nodes networked

and controlled by Hub

B. Hub-Request “Type E” Request based plus one or more central high value hubs

C. Hub-Swarm “Type G” Swarming plus one of more central high value hubs

D. Joint Mixture of other six types (Type A, Type B, Type C, Type E, Type F

and Type G)

E. Request-Based Nodes of same value, but with different specialized capabilities.

Request for service between nodes of different kinds

F. Mixed Mixture of “Request-Based” and “Swarming”

F1: Limited Types Small number of node types (includes the case of separate sensor,

engagement, and C2 grids”

F2: Commonality Nodes are different, but have significant commonality

G. Swarming Nodes identical or nearly so

G1: Emergent Swarming Nodes follow simple rules, like insects

G2: Situationally Aware

Swarming

Nodes share information to build up Situational Awareness

picture

G2(a): Orchestrated One node is a temporary “leader”

G2(b): Hierarchical Nodes are arranged in a Hierarchy

G2(c): Distributed No Leader or Hierarchy

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The Fifth C in C5ISR

Comprehensive Integrated Warfare –

A Revolution in Search of Doctrine

Weapons + C4ISR ≠ C5ISR May 30, 2014 60 © Crafitti Consulting Private Ltd.

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Comprehensive Integrated Military Doctrine

Military Doctrine is defined as a comprehensive system of views and procedures for conduct of future wars including various military operations, established by military experts, technologists and armed forces, in the likely threat environment, and within the purview of present force structures.

The doctrine is subject to periodic reviews and analysis and is evolved taking into account the dynamic geo-political, economic and technological trends in the world scenarios. Also such a doctrine should be freely available as a comprehensive document, so as to give a common basis for decision making at all level of military and defense hierarchy of the nation.


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National Security Doctrines


Doctrines

Domain Aim(s)

1. POLITICAL DOCTRINE

International Relations

Foreign Policy

Diplomacy

Politics

How to Avoid war

If imposed, how to support war

2. MILITARY DOCTRINE

Army

Navy

Air Force

Space Force

Joint Operations

How to wage war

3. ECONOMIC DOCTRINE

Economic Policy

Industrial Policy

How to support and sustain war

4. INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE

Intelligence Agencies

Analysis Agencies

How to collect, process and disseminate information for timely decision making

5. WMD DOCTRINE NBC Policy

Peaceful Nuclear Uses

How to deal with enemy’s WMDs and deploy own WMD

6. SPACE DOCTRINE

Space Plans

Communication, Reconnaissance & Spy Satellites

Launch Vehicles

How to support (1) - (5) by providing near real time information to analysts

7. CYBERPACE/ INFORMATION

WARFARE DOCTRINE

Cyber Space

Audio Visual & print Media

Propaganda

Propaganda in cyberspace

Counter enemy propaganda

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Anti ISR Attack

Anti C4 Attack

Anti EW Attack

Anti ILS Attack

Strategic Attack

Attack against enemy

Mobile Unit

Attack Levels

Border

FWD Deployed

Highly Mobile

smaller Units

(screen force)

Airborne Surveillance

Systems

Automated

PG Long Range

Missile

Mobile C4 ISR

Centre

Enemy

Fig. 3. Future Doctrine (Highly Non-Linear)

Mobile Armoured Units

The Changing Battlefield – to Non-Linear Battlefield ….

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Comprehensive Integrated Warfare Doctrine has to be based on Swarming and Spiral

Swarming

Swarming is achieved when the dispersed nodes of a network of small (and also perhaps some large) forces can converge on an enemy from multiple directions, through either fire or maneuver. The overall aim should be sustained pulsing - Swarm networks must be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, then disserve and re-disperse, immediately ready to recombine for a new pulse.


To defeat an already networked force – which acts through swarming – we need to develop very complex Spiral Swarms – Swarming the Swarms Doctrine

Doctrine of Spiral Swarms

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WORLD – WHAT IS YOUR

MODEL? Scenario Writing: Description of future possible situations

and sequences of events, primarily with the intention of

stimulating reflections on possible problems and secondly

to anticipate future developments.

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STEEPV

• SOCIAL factors affecting the area

• TECHNOLOGICAL factors affecting the area

• ECONOMIC factors affecting the area

• ECOLOGICAL factors affecting the area

• POLITICAL/GEO-POLITICAL factors affecting the area

• HUMAN VALUES affecting the areas © Crafitti Consulting Private Limited 66

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China Takes Pakistan – A Scenario by 2017-2022

Scenario: Pakistan supported, penetrated and engulfed by China - 2017-2022 timeframe

The process of Chinese support to Pakistan is an ongoing process. Since 2010, China has 11000 soldiers in POK. This is close to 2+ Infantry brigades equivalent strength. Chinese are involved in building the Gwadar port – a very strategic conduit to middle-east and of course to Africa as well. Besides, China has been providing arms and ammunition to Pakistan Military forces for many decades now. Chinese are in. They are considered the thick friends by Pakistani Military.

• USA is a declining superpower.

• China is pursuing Deng’s reforms of 1978. The Deng reforms very clearly articulate the “superpower” phase that China has entered since the start of this century.

• Pakistan is failing if not already a failed state. Living under drones 24x7 has made many Pak-Afghan areas border residents anti-US. The people also may be shifting towards Chinese, thinking of China to be their long-term savior.


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Comprehensive Integrated Evolution of Scenarios

• SEMINAR GAMING

• PLAYING THE SEMINAR GAME

• ANALYZING THE GAMES

• CREATING STRATEGIC INSIGHTS

• DEVELOPING THESE INSIGHTS INTO CAPABILITIES


HAVE WE PLAYED ANY OF THE WARGAME THAT WE DEVELOPED? ARE THERE ANY INSIGHTS, IF WE HAVE PLAYED

THESE GAMES?

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• Germans created Blitzkrieg in WW II. A combination of Panzer armored divisions with air power. The world saw the implementation of synergy of two different dimensions of warfare.

• The Air-Land battle doctrine was the conceptual construct on which US created Operation Desert Storm in 1991 against Iraq. It was an unprecedented success with almost 2 months of continuous air-operations before starting the armor action. After the initial elimination of Iraqi ability to see and observe through various technological capabilities, the B52s continuously dropped iron bombs that led to very swift ground action and complete subjugation of larger Iraqi forces.

• Although it was not exactly the evolution of Blitzkrieg that Germans did with their Panzers in WW II, nevertheless, the world saw the power of synergy of multiple warfare dimensions. What are the key lessons that a country like India can take from these?


Needed: Air-Mountain Warfare Doctrine for India

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India faces two very hostile foes in Pakistan and China. The military problem is that the borders with both these countries are very different. For example, against Pakistan the armour based operations are possible although the line of sight in plains of Punjab may be less than 800m, yet tanks have fairly open space to make deep inroads. Desert with more than 1000 m line of sight and large open space is definitely a tank warfare arena.

It is really against China, India faces a very different terrain. The tank operations in mountains are extremely difficult and in fact likely to be useless as tanks may become sitting ducks when their mobility is either not possible or at best reduced considerably. The infantry becomes the key force for the army.

The next dimension of warfare – that is the air is available to create a possible synergy to create military capability and operations that are more potent and efficient. The nature of war against Pak and against China will be different - hence what will be an armor based war with Pak, will have to be infantry/mountain + air war against China. Do we have a doctrine for Air-Mountain Battle doctrine?

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The Air-land battle doctrine employed in Iraq by US was developed in 1980s - the conceptual constructs of that doctrine.

Where are conceptual constructs of India's Air-Mountain battle doctrine? It is time to debate and create the conceptual constructs of such a uniquely Indian doctrine?

The current acquisition of C130s and C17s indicates some thoughts on Air mobility and theater switching of brigade size forces. However, it is very late in the game.

Following Sun Tzu - why we should fight the Chinese war, instead we should create the scenarios and reactions where we should be taking initiatives against China and Pakistan, not reacting to their strategic surprises.

In summary, we need to create an integrated Air-Mountain Warfare doctrine. This then should also integrate Space dimension, Cyber dimension and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) dimensions against China.

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Crafitti Consulting

Crafting innovation together . . .

www.crafitti.com

Navneet Bhushan ([email protected])

+91 9902766961

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http://www.crafitti.com/

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